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On synchronic dogmatism

Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693 (2015)

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  1. The Dogmatism Puzzle Undone.James Simpson - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    According to the dogmatism puzzle, for any S and any p, if S knows that p, then she’s entitled to be dogmatic about p, and so disregard any evidence against p, for she knows that (or is in a position to know that) that evidence is misleading. But this seems clearly problematically dogmatic. The standard solution to the dogmatism puzzle involves appealing to the view that acquiring new evidence (even misleading evidence) can undermine one’s knowledge that p. That’s why one (...)
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  • Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.
    In this paper, I’ll survey a number of closure principles of epistemic justification and find them all wanting. However, it’ll be my contention that there’s a novel closure principle of epistemic justification that has the virtues of its close cousin closure principles, without their vices. This closure principle of epistemic justification can be happily thought of as a multi-premise closure principle and it cannot be used in Cartesian skeptical arguments that employ a closure principle of epistemic justification. In this way, (...)
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  • The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.
    According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source: Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that (...)
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  • Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary.Rodrigo Borges - 2019 - In Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. Springer Verlag.
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  • The diachronic threshold problem.Rodrigo Borges - 2021 - Philosophical Studies.
    The paper introduces a new problem for fallibilist and infallibilist epistemologies – the diachronic threshold problem. As the name suggests, this is a problem similar to the well–known threshold problem for fallibilism. The new problem affects both fallibilism and infallibilism, however. The paper argues that anyone who worries about the well known problem for fallibilism should also worry about this new, diachronic version of the problem.
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  • Book Symposium: Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard, Michael Veber, Nicola Claudio Salvatore & Rodrigo Borges - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):115-165.
    ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.
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  • Saul Kripke e o paradoxo do dogmatismo.João Rizzio Vicent Fett - 2017 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):227-243.
    O slogan "Conhecimento gera dogmatismo" causa-nos imediata perplexidade. O dogmatismo é trivialmente tomado como uma postura irracional de manutenção de crenças. Saul Kripke, contra esta intuitiva perspectiva, ofereceu um argumento que supostamente prova que se você sabe que uma proposição P é verdadeira, então você está autorizado a ser dogmático quanto a se P. Neste ensaio, temos os seguintes objetivos. Em primeiro lugar, vamos criticar uma recente objeção ao argumento pró-dogmatismo de Kripke feita por Rodrigo Borges, segundo a qual, uma (...)
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  • Entitlement and misleading evidence.Jeremy Fantl - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):743-761.
    The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p. Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in-fact irrelevant to that question – (...)
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  • Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.
    Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...)
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