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  1. Non-literal lies are not exculpatory.Hüseyin Güngör - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    One can lie by asserting non-literal content. If I tell you “You are the cream in my coffee” while hating you, I can be rightfully accused of lying if my true emotions are unearthed. This is not easy to accommodate under many definitions of lying while also preserving the lying-misleading distinction. The essential feature of non-literal utterances is their falsity when literally construed. This interferes with accounts of lying and misleading, because such accounts often combine a literal construal of what (...)
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  • Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking.Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (6):1467-1510.
    The morphological marking that distinguishes conditionals that are called “counterfactual” from those that are not, can also be found in other modal constructions, such as in the expression of wishes and oughts. We propose to call it “X-marking”. In this article, we lay out desiderata for a successful theory of X-marking and make some initial informal observations. Much remains to be done.
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  • Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.
    We introduce an expected-value theory of linguistic modality that makes reference to expected utility and a likelihood-based confirmation measure for deontics and epistemics, respectively. The account is a probabilistic semantics for deontics and epistemics, yet it proposes that deontics and epistemics share a common core modal semantics, as in traditional possible-worlds analysis of modality. We argue that this account is not only theoretically advantageous, but also has far-reaching empirical consequences. In particular, we predict modal versions of reasoning fallacies from the (...)
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  • Underspecifying Desires.Richard Jefferson Booth - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy (5):1-30.
    According to a simple theory of the relationship between 'want' ascriptions and the desires they ascribe, when I learn that ⌜A wants p⌝ is true, I learn that the truth of p is necessary and sufficient for satisfying one of A’s desires. I argue that this simple theory is false: ⌜A wants p⌝ can be true and underspecific: p may be necessary but not sufficient for the satisfaction of one of A’s desires. I show that existing semantics for 'want' cannot (...)
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  • Wanting what’s not best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.
    In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sentences of the form 'S wants p'. Our theory is partly motivated by Phillips-Brown's (2021) observation that subjects can desire things even if those things aren't best by the subject's lights. That is, being best isn't necessary for being desired. We compare our proposal to existing theories, and show that it provides a neat account of the central phenomenon.
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