Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-26.
    Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood. -/- Certaines réponses aux analogies entre l'avortement et l'infanticide font (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Defending the substance view against its critics.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2021 - The New Bioethics 28 (1):54-67.
    Recently, the substance view of persons has been heavily criticized for the counterintuitive conclusions it seems to imply in scenarios such as embryo rescue cases and embryo loss. These criticisms...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Defending the Distinction Between Pregnancy and Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (3):189-191.
    In this paper, I respond to criticisms toward my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Pregnancy and parenthood.Andrzej Waleszczyński - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Singh asserts that the parent–child relationship engenders a moral responsibility for the newborn. Simultaneously, he contends, drawing on the argument from potentiality, that the fetal stage of human development does not establish the parent–child relationship. Consequently, within Singh’s proposed relational framework, moral responsibility for the developing fetus does not manifest. Thus, Singh advocates for abortion, citing the absence of moral responsibilities arising for the pregnant woman for the fetus. In this article, I critique Singh’s argument from potentiality, identifying flaws and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Orphans and the relational significance of birth: a response to Singh.Christopher A. Bobier - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (6):439-440.
    Prabhpal Singh has defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. Newborns stand in the parent-child relation while fetuses do not, and standing in the parent-child relationship brings with it higher moral status for newborns. Orphans pose a problem for this account because they do not stand in a parent-child relationship. I argue that Singh has not satisfactorily responded to the problem.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation