


Rethinking Kant
Volume I

Edited by

Pablo Muchnik



Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Rethinking Kant: Volume I, Edited by Pablo Muchnik

This book first published 2008

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2008 by Pablo Muchnik and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-84718-821-4, ISBN (13): 9781847188212

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Introduction Pablo Muchnik.....	1
Part I: Issues in Kantian Freedom	
Chapter One.....	22
Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will Benjamin Vilhauer	
Chapter Two	48
The Last Beatitude of Self: Spontaneity's 'Place' in the Objectivity of the World Jason R. Fisette	
Chapter Three	68
The Merits and Deficiencies of Kant's Incorporation Thesis Diane Williamson	
Part II: Dealing with Human Nature	
Chapter Four.....	88
Anthropology from a Kantian Point of View: Toward a Cosmopolitan Conception of Human Nature Robert Louden	
Chapter Five	109
Understanding Kant's Claim that 'Morality cannot be without Anthropology' Oliver Thorndike	

CHAPTER ONE

INCOMPATIBILISM AND ONTOLOGICAL
PRIORITY IN KANT'S THEORY OF FREE WILL

BEN VILHAUER

Kant is an incompatibilist about free will and determinism. Like all incompatibilists, Kant thinks that there is a fundamental conflict between determinism and free will. But like no other incompatibilist, Kant holds both that determinism is true, and that we have free will. Kant thinks that the truth of determinism is demonstrated by the conclusion of the Second Analogy, that is, by the conclusion that the necessitation of all alterations according to causal laws is a condition for the possibility of the experience of objective succession. But he also thinks we have an immediate awareness that we are morally responsible, in a sense that implies that we have free will. This awareness is based on what he describes in the second Critique as a "fact of pure reason."

With a position like this, it is natural to wonder whether Kant would be better characterized as a compatibilist. Compatibilists think there is no fundamental conflict between determinism and free will, so it is common for them to hold that both obtain. But Kant's commitment to incompatibilism is quite clear in his texts. 5:95 in the second *Critique* provides an example:

If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could have been left undone; how then, can appraisal in accordance with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been omitted because the law says that it ought to have been omitted?¹

Acknowledgements: This research was supported by funds from a Summer Stipend from the Research Center for the Humanities and Social Sciences at William Paterson University. Thanks to the participants in the ENAKS conference for a helpful discussion of the ideas presented here, especially Pablo Muchnik,

Kant's point here is that a thief can only be blameworthy for a theft if he could have done otherwise than commit the theft, and that he could not have done otherwise if the theft was the inevitable outcome of deterministic causation. This is a claim no compatibilist can make.

Clearly, there is some tension to be dealt with if Kant is to maintain commitments to both determinism and incompatibilistic free will. There is broad scholarly agreement that Kant thinks he can resolve the tension by means of his transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena, and qua noumena. Kant holds that the determinism entailed by the Second Analogy constrains agents as they appear in time (i.e. agents qua phenomena), but not as they are in themselves (i.e. agents qua noumena), because they do not appear in time as they are in themselves. But there is less agreement about the nature of this distinction, and exactly how it is supposed to resolve the tension.²

The purpose of this paper is to argue that Kant's incompatibilism can only be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction, i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena. The ontological interpretation allows Kant

Karl Ameriks, Michael Rohlf, and David Cummiskey. Thanks also to Eric Watkins, Robert Pippin, Michael Forster, and Graham Bird.

¹ References to Kant's texts will be made as follows: material from the first *Critique* (KrV) will be cited by page in A and B editions. Second *Critique* material will be cited as 'KpV', third *Critique* as 'KU', *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* as 'G', *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* by 'MAN', all followed by Akademie pagination, i.e., as paginated in *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-). Texts used are as follows: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, hrsg. von Jens Timmerman (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998); *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, hrsg. von Karl Vörländer, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990); *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001). Translations are my own, in consultation with the following translations: *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1929), and Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996); *Critique of Practical Reason*, Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1985), and Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Critique of Judgment*, Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), and J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951); *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959); *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, James Ellington [in *Philosophy of Material Nature* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985)].

² I also discuss this distinction in my 2004 and forthcoming papers. In some parts of the present paper I have adapted remarks from those other papers.

to be an incompatibilist because the ontological priority of agents qua noumena "ontologically undermines" the significance of phenomenal determinism for agents' free will. That is, since agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena, the fact that agents qua noumena are not subject to determinism is more fundamental than the fact that agents qua phenomena are subject to determinism, and it is the more fundamental fact that we should be concerned with in addressing metaphysical issues such as free will. It will also be argued that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. According to the two-aspect interpretation, the transcendental distinction between agents qua noumena and qua phenomena is a semantic and epistemological distinction. Since it rejects the ontological priority of noumena, it has no way to assert that the non-determinism of agents qua noumena is more fundamental than the determinism of agents qua phenomena. For the two-aspect interpretation, the truth of determinism must remain just as fundamental as the truth of any other characterization of agents. This means that, on the two-aspect interpretation, there is no better reason to call Kant an incompatibilist than there is to call him a compatibilist.

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, the ontological interpretation will be described, and an explanation will be given of how it makes room for Kant's incompatibilism. Recent (independent) work by the present author, Eric Watkins, and Robert Hanna will be drawn on to demonstrate that the ontological interpretation can mount a better defense against some traditional objections than has often been thought.³ In the second part, the two-aspect interpretation of Kant's theory of free will shall be described, and it will be argued that it cannot make room for Kant's incompatibilism.

I- The Ontological Interpretation

There are four sections in the first part of this paper. The first briefly describes the ontological interpretation, and explains how it makes room for both determinism and incompatibilistic free will. The second section

³ Hanna and Moore, "Reason, Freedom and Kant: An Exchange"; Vilhauer, "The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will," and "Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist about Determinism and Moral Responsibility?"; Watkins, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*. Hanna and Watkins do not advance their accounts in defense of the ontological interpretation, though in my view their accounts lend themselves naturally to such a defense.

describes a line of objection that has often been thought decisive against the ontological interpretation, and then explains how some recent developments in Kant scholarship can be used to defend the ontological interpretation against this line of objection. The third section explains how transcendental idealism can block a potentially counterintuitive consequence of the ontological interpretation. The fourth section distinguishes the ontological interpretation from the "two worlds" interpretation. The overall goal of this section is not to provide a detailed defense of the ontological interpretation, but only to show that, despite its long history, the way in which it reconciles determinism and incompatibilistic free will should be of renewed interest.

I-1. Overview

According to the ontological interpretation, the ontological priority of atemporal agents qua noumena gives Kant a way to "ontologically undermine" the significance of phenomenal determinism. Though Kant's noumenal ignorance principle means that we cannot have theoretical knowledge of the existence of agents qua noumena, it is practically necessary for us to be committed to their existence if we are to accept the implications of the "fact of pure reason." The guiding idea of the ontological interpretation is that determinism is *merely* a condition for the possibility of the appearances of agents in time—it is not a condition for the possibility of the existence in themselves of the agents which are the ontological substrates of their appearances.

Agents qua noumena stand "outside" space and time, so to speak, and are therefore independent of the deterministic empirical causal series. Agents qua noumena freely shape the deterministic phenomenal causal series, in such a way as to make room for incompatibilistic alternative possibilities of action (and hence incompatibilistic free will) despite the truth of determinism. The idea is that those stretches of the empirical causal series which constitute the actions of some agent qua phenomenon would have been different if that agent qua noumenon had chosen differently, since agents qua noumena are the ontological substrates of agents qua phenomena.

Earlier proponents of the ontological interpretation include Norman Kemp Smith and Herbert Paton.⁴ But many contemporary commentators have thought that the implications of this interpretation are too counterintuitive for it to be worthy of further detailed scholarly study. As

⁴ See e.g. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* and Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*.

will be argued below, however, recent work suggests that the consequences of the ontological interpretation may not be so counterintuitive after all.

I-2. An Objection to the Ontological Interpretation, and a Response

It has long been wondered how some agent qua noumenon could freely shape the part of the deterministic causal series which constitutes her actions qua phenomenon without also shaping much of the causal series prior to her own birth qua phenomenon. The problem, pointed out by Ralph Walker,⁵ can be explained as follows. If determinism is true, then there is, at each instant in time prior to some agent's birth, a sufficient cause of all that agent's actions. In other words, at every instant in time prior to that agent's birth, there is a set of events which, when coupled with the laws of nature, suffices to cause all the actions that agent will take throughout her life. But it seems that an agent qua noumenon could not determine the part of the causal series constituting her actions qua phenomenon without also determining any part of the causal series that contains a sufficient cause of her actions qua phenomenon. So it seems that, if determinism is true, an agent can only determine the part of the causal series constituting her actions qua phenomenon by determining events at every instant in the past prior to her birth.

On its own, Walker's point already seems to some philosophers to constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of Kant's theory of free will.⁶ This response may be too strong. The claim that one determines events prior to one's own birth may indeed be quite counterintuitive, but it might be argued that it is not a great deal more counterintuitive than the idea that agents qua noumena are not in time. So one might think that if this strategy can in fact accommodate incompatibilistic free will, then Kant can accept the consequence that one determines events prior to one's own birth without making his theory significantly more perplexing than it already was.

Walker's basic argument against Kant can be extended further, however. The sufficient cause of any human agent's actions at some point in the past prior to his birth must inevitably include the actions of other agents. This claim is not true for all possible agents (e.g. agents which

⁵ Walker, *Kant*, pp.148-9. Walker's point is anticipated in some ways by Kemp-Smith (*Ibid.*, pp. 517-18).

⁶ See e.g. Bennett, "Kant's Theory of Freedom."

exist necessarily or agents which come into being entirely by chance) but it is true for agents like humans whose existence is contingent upon the actions of other agents. This means that a human agent qua noumenon could only determine his own actions qua phenomenon by determining some actions of some other agents qua phenomena. If Kant's theory of free will truly entails this outcome, then we have what seems to be a clear *reductio*. Integral to Kant's incompatibilism is the view that one must noumenally determine one's phenomenal actions to be morally responsible for them. If noumenally determining one's own phenomenal actions requires one to noumenally determine the actions of some other agents, then one can only be morally responsible for one's own phenomenal actions by making it the case that other agents are not morally responsible for (at least some of) their own phenomenal actions. One agent's moral responsibility could only come at the expense of the moral responsibility of other agents.

However, recent (independent) publications by Eric Watkins, Robert Hanna, and myself demonstrate that Kant's theory of free will does not imply this outcome. The supposed *reductio* just considered makes an unwarranted assumption. It assumes a particular model of the agent qua noumenon's determination of the agent qua phenomenon. On this model, the agent qua noumenon has control over the events that constitute the actions of the agent qua phenomenon, but does not have control over the deterministic laws that render antecedent and subsequent events causally necessary. If we accept this model, then there is no way for the agent qua noumenon to determine the actions of the agent qua phenomenon without determining a swathe of events that cuts through the entire history of the world. But this model is not the only one possible. Watkins, Hanna, and I advocate a model on which the agent qua noumenon determines the actions of the agent qua phenomenon by controlling the laws of nature which necessitate the actions of the agent qua phenomenon.

Of course, if the laws of nature are structured in such a way that the laws necessitating one's own actions also necessitate indefinitely many other events that are *not* one's own actions, then this model is in little better shape than the previous one, because controlling one's own actions by means of controlling the laws necessitating them would entail controlling indefinitely many other events which were not one's own actions, potentially including the actions of other agents. Laws of nature are often assumed to have two features either of which would imply that the laws necessitating one's own actions also necessitate indefinitely many events that are not one's own actions. The first is *universal repeated instantiation* of causal laws, and the second is *complete unity* of causal

laws. Universal repeated instantiation is the idea that there can only be a natural law if it is repeatedly instantiated, i.e. instantiated by more than one actual event. Complete unity is the idea that there is, at bottom, just one perfectly general law of nature from which all other laws are in principle derivable (typically this is presumed to be a law of physics). But according to Kant's account of causation, we need not assume that either of these structural features obtain.

First consider universal repeated instantiation. I argue that Kant would have to accept universal repeated instantiation if he accepted Hume's view, since according to Hume, the very concept of causal law is abstracted from observations of repeated successions of event-types. But of course Kant rejects this view: according to the Second Analogy, our knowledge that all events are causally necessitated is a condition for the possibility of the experience of objective succession, so if we had to abstract the concept of causal law from the observation of events, we could never arrive at the concept of causal law in the first place. Even a strong interpretation of the Second Analogy can allow for laws which are instantiated only once in the actual causal series. The Second Analogy entails that all events are necessitated according to causal laws, but it entails nothing about how often particular causal laws are instantiated. As will be discussed in more detail in part 2, this point is crucial for making sense of Kant's account of empirical psychology. This is because Kant holds that we can know there are laws of empirical psychology even though the absence of an enduring substrate in inner sense means that we cannot repeat experiments on it (MAN 471). If we cannot repeat experiments on it, we cannot know whether its laws are repeatedly instantiated.

Now consider complete unity. Hanna and I both point out remarks in the third *Critique* which demonstrate that Kant does not accept complete unity. In section 4 of the First Introduction Kant argues there that the unity of natural laws is a regulative idea, not a constitutive principle. We cannot develop natural science without assuming that there is a significant amount of unity of laws in nature, but unity with other laws is not a condition for the possibility of something's being a law. Hanna and I make use of this point in different ways. Hanna looks to the third *Critique's* account of the explanation of organisms to argue that single-instance causal laws are emergent features of the organisms that embody human agents. I argue that since natural laws must be backed by forces for Kant, the supposition that irreducibly different single-instance laws are instantiated by the matter of each human body would require our theories of matter to expand indefinitely to include a vast array of fundamental forces of matter. This would conflict with Kant's view that it is inherent in the methodology of

the material sciences to reduce fundamental forces of matter to the smallest possible number (as expressed in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*). I argue that single-instance laws must be laws of empirical psychology, that is, that they must be instantiated in the phenomenal soul. It follows from Kant's empirical dualism (see e.g. KrV A379) that laws governing the phenomenal soul and its interactions with the body are not laws of matter, and this makes it possible to avoid the problem of proliferating fundamental physical forces. We must still posit forces to explain such interactions, but we can suppose that they are non-physical forces. This is just what Kant appears to do at KU 475:

one of the forces we attribute to the soul is a *vis locomotiva*, because bodily movements do actually arise whose cause lies in the soul's representations of them, but we do this without trying to ascribe to the soul the only manner in which we know motive forces (namely, through attraction, pressure, impact, and hence motion, which always presuppose an extended being).

Though the new interpretations just discussed differ in significant ways, they share a common strategy that can be used to rebut the supposed *reductio* considered above. That is, they all make use of idea that agents qua noumena in some sense control causal laws, and this idea can be used to argue that the ontological interpretation does not have counterintuitive implications for the scope of our moral responsibility.

I-3. Transcendental Idealism and Control Over Laws of Nature

It would be natural to object that human agents cannot be supposed to control laws of nature. After all, this is a power which traditionally rests with God. If we accept the ontological interpretation of the transcendental distinction, however, it is quite natural to suppose that human agents are responsible for causal laws.

Here is an explanation of how this works. Kant is clearly committed to what scholars sometimes call the "noumenal ignorance principle," i.e. the view that that we cannot have theoretical knowledge of noumena. The noumenal ignorance principle is often taken to imply a broader proscription on knowledge about noumena than is warranted by Kant's texts, however. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge of determinations, and knowledge of determinations is synthetic knowledge that particular predicates apply to things. We can only have such knowledge about objects in space and time. But if the existence of noumena is implied by features of transcendental idealism of which we have a priori knowledge,

then we can know that noumena exist without knowing any of their determinations.

According to Kant, the synthetic apriority of our knowledge of space and time implies that space and time are transcendently ideal, i.e. that they are imposed on the empirical world by our minds. But what we thereby impose is only a formal feature of reality, that is, an empty manifold of spatiotemporal extension. The empirical objects that make up the specific content of empirical reality cannot be entirely constituted by the human mind. Their empirical content must be contributed by something that is independent of our minds: if there were nothing mind-independent to stand as the ground of the specific content of empirical reality, it would be impossible for empirical reality to amount to anything more than an empty manifold. We cannot suppose that this mind-independent ground of empirical content is the spatiotemporal object we experience. Since the spatiotemporality of those objects is the product of the human mind, this would be to suppose that mind-dependent entities were mind-independent. Instead, we must use philosophical reflection to "isolate" a non-spatiotemporal ontological substrate which is the ground of the specific content that appears in spatiotemporally extended empirical objects. This is the noumenal. As Paton puts it, noumena provide empirical content by contributing the "particularity" of the properties of empirical objects.⁷ That is, noumena make it such that empirical objects instantiate the particular properties they instantiate rather than other particular properties.

It may be objected that causal laws explain why empirical objects instantiate the properties they instantiate.⁸ But that explanation is only partial, because it cannot explain why *these* particular causal laws obtain, rather than some others. Noumena explain the particularity of causal laws in the same way that they explain the particularity of the properties of empirical objects. The understanding and the forms of intuition together construct the objective temporal order by imposing the form of deterministic causal necessitation on all empirical events. But this imposition only explains the formal, general fact that *there are deterministic causal laws*. It does not explain the fact that the particular causal laws that obtain are *these* laws, rather than some other laws. Instead, noumena are responsible for the fact that the particular causal laws that obtain are the laws they are.

The idea that noumena are responsible for causal laws allows us to make sense of the assumption (made practically necessary by the fact of

⁷ See e.g. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. 1, p. 139.

⁸ Thanks to Robert Pippin for this objection.

pure reason) that agents qua noumena freely shape the structure of the deterministic phenomenal causal series. Since human agents are noumena as well as phenomena, human agents are responsible for some of the laws of nature. We can suppose that each agent qua noumenon is responsible for the particular causal laws that govern the actions of that same agent qua phenomenon.⁹

It is important to stress that, according to the version of the ontological interpretation advocated in here, agents qua noumena only have an indirect sort of responsibility for causal laws. What we freely choose qua noumena are our maxims, that is, the principles we act upon, not causal laws. (Choosing one's maxims does not imply having theoretical knowledge of determinations of oneself qua noumenon.)¹⁰ Our choices of maxims appear in inner sense as phenomena of empirical psychology, necessitated by the laws of empirical psychology. The practical types in terms of which we choose our maxims and the correlated theoretical a posteriori types and laws in terms of which these choices appear to us are entirely different. Because of the noumenal ignorance principle, we cannot know *why* they correlate as they do. We cannot learn anything like a function from noumenal determinations to phenomenal determinations that might be thought to undergird this correlation. But the "fact of pure reason" requires us to believe that they correlate in such a way that if our choices of maxims had been different, then the empirical-psychological events that

⁹ This supposition does not amount to theoretical knowledge, but it is nonetheless practically necessary if reason is to maintain a belief in incompatibilistic free will along with a belief in determinism. It might be objected that the noumenal ignorance principle is enough to resolve the tension between these beliefs. That is, it might be thought that if we can know nothing about noumena, then we can suppose straightaway that, despite phenomenal determinism, our nature as noumena gives us incompatibilistic free will. It might be thought that we could end our speculations about noumenal agency there and save ourselves the additional metaphysical entanglements. There is a grain of truth in this. That is, the noumenal ignorance principle on its own suffices to make it consistent to hold beliefs in incompatibilism and determinism together. Kant clearly holds, however, that when confronted with the claim that determinism can be squared with incompatibilistic free will, reason demands more than mere consistency. Reason demands an explanation of how it can be true, and this is why Kant presents a metaphysics of free will in addition to his account of noumenal ignorance.

¹⁰ Our maxims would seem to be properties of ourselves qua noumena in some sense, but the epistemic relation we have to our own maxims does not violate Kant's noumenal ignorance principle. Theoretical knowledge requires the spontaneous determination of something passively received, and Kant understands our relation to our maxims as entirely spontaneous.

are their appearances would have been necessitated according to different causal laws.¹¹

I-4. Ontological Priority Without Two Worlds

It is not rare for contemporary Kant scholars to assume that any interpretation that makes noumena ontologically prior to phenomena must be a "two worlds" interpretation, i.e. an interpretation according to which noumena and phenomena are two sets of ontologically independent entities. Though the ontological interpretation can be explained as a two worlds interpretation, it need not be. Considerations of ontological parsimony favor rejecting two worlds versions of the ontological interpretation. According to the version advocated in the present paper, there is only one set of ontologically subsistent entities, i.e. noumena. This does not imply that phenomena are not real. It only implies that phenomena are ontologically dependent upon noumena. Phenomena can be understood as relational properties of noumena. More specifically, phenomena are (so to speak) second-order relations between noumena and human intuition. That is, they are *relations of the relations* between noumena and human intuition.

Our minds are passive with respect to first-order relations between noumena and intuition. In other words, the first-order relations are the relations through which our intuition is passively affected by noumena. They make up the purely sensible content that is transcendently prior to the determination of intuition according to the schematized categories. Purely sensible content "fills in" various spatiotemporal locations in the empty manifold of pure intuition. It is indeterminate, however: it is what Kant calls "intuitions without concepts," and describes as "blind." We have no experience of it. Experience is only possible for the human mind through the combination of passive receptivity at the level of first-order relations, and spontaneity at the level of the second-order relations constructed through the schematization of the categories. Empirical objects and laws are spontaneously constructed second-order relations between first-order relations. In other words, empirical objects and laws are relations between the locations in space and time that are "filled in" with purely sensible content by the first-order relations. Second-order

¹¹ This account of how transcendental idealism explains responsibility for causal laws closely follows my 2004 and forthcoming papers. Watkins also discusses this issue in some similar ways in *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*.

relations are spontaneously constructed through the successive synthesis of the manifold, through which the schematized categories are applied to purely sensible content. The idea is that there is one spontaneous activity of the transcendental constitution of empirical reality, and the construction of the second-order relations, the construction of empirical objects and laws, and the application of the schematized categories to purely sensible content, are all different ways of talking about that one activity.

This approach explains the ontological foundations of the particular causal laws governing the free choices of agents qua phenomena as follows. As mentioned above, our choices of maxims appear in inner sense as temporally extended phenomena of empirical psychology, governed by particular laws of empirical psychology. These laws are second-order relations between agents qua noumena and the inner sense of those same agents qua phenomena. The particularity of these laws, i.e. the fact that the laws which obtain are *these* laws rather than some others, is the result of first-order relations between agents qua noumena and the inner sense of those same agents qua phenomena which "fill" the various points in time in inner sense with purely sensible content. The laws have the form of deterministic necessitation because it is imposed upon them as they are constructed according to the schematized category of causality.

This part of the paper has not been intended to provide anything like a complete defense of the ontological interpretation. Its purpose has been only to explain how the ontological interpretation resolves the tension between determinism and incompatibilism, and to demonstrate that recent work shows it can mount a better defense against traditional objections than has often been thought. In the second part of the paper, it will be argued that the two-aspect interpretation's rejection of the ontological priority of noumena implies that it cannot resolve the tension between determinism and incompatibilism. Since the key difference between the ontological interpretation and the two-aspect interpretation is precisely that the former accepts the ontological priority of noumena and the latter rejects it, the second part of the paper will provide an indirect argument for the ontological interpretation.

II- The Two-Aspect Interpretation

The purpose of this part of the paper is to argue that the two-aspect interpretation's rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena prevents it from accommodating Kant's incompatibilism. Since Henry Allison has presented the most detailed account of the two-aspect interpretation of the agential transcendental distinction, much of this part

will proceed by way of a critique of his views.

II-1. Overview

Throughout the history of Kant scholarship, some commentators have recoiled from the idea of noumena which stand "outside" space and time. Such commentators have seen this idea as a metaphysical monstrosity, and they have thought either that Kant did not really endorse it, or that it was his greatest mistake. They have often advanced deflationary accounts of transcendental idealism that attempt to avoid a commitment to the existence of non-spatiotemporal noumena while preserving what they take to be Kant's insights. In the contemporary literature, commentators of this deflationary sensibility typically accept what is referred to as the "two-aspect" interpretation of transcendental idealism. Its central claims are that noumena and phenomena are two aspects of the same things, and that neither aspect is more ontologically fundamental than the other.

Proponents of the two-aspect interpretation face a difficult task when it comes to explaining Kant's theory of free will. As mentioned earlier, there is broad scholarly agreement that the key move in Kant's theory of free will is the idea that determinism is true for agents qua phenomena, but not for agents qua noumena. This is supposed to allow us to accept incompatibilism along with determinism and moral responsibility. On the ontological interpretation, this move works because agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena. The fact that agents qua noumena are not deterministic is more fundamental than the fact that agents qua phenomena are deterministic. But it is hard to see what good this move can do if one accepts the two-aspect interpretation. The two-aspect interpretation explains the transcendental distinction as merely a distinction between two different epistemic or semantic relationships we can stand in to things. Without some further claim to the effect that the way we represent things when we consider them as noumena is how they more fundamentally *are*, the non-determinism of agents qua noumena can do nothing to undermine the significance of phenomenal determinism. But any such further claim is ruled out by the two-aspect interpretation's rejection of the ontological priority of noumena. So proponents of the two-aspect interpretation must suppose that Kant thinks that we have free will even though determinism is just as fundamental a truth about our actions as non-determinism. But this a view of free will which one cannot in good conscience call incompatibilistic. This is a view of free will which there is just as much reason to call compatibilistic as there is to call incompatibilistic.

Henry Allison is arguably the most influential contemporary advocate of the two-aspect interpretation. He rejects "the 'noumenalistic' view that grants ontological priority to things as they are in themselves."¹² On his view, what this means is that transcendental idealism is not committed to the existence of any non-spatiotemporal things. Allison's view is that "Kant's transcendental distinction is primarily between two ways in which things (empirical objects) can be 'considered' at the metalevel of philosophical reflection."¹³ In other words, the only things we can consider are empirical objects. We can consider them in abstraction from their spatiotemporality, but considering them in abstraction from their spatiotemporality does not make them any less spatiotemporal. To quote Allison again, to "consider things as they are in themselves is to reflect on them in a way which ignores or abstracts from the subjective conditions of human sensibility."¹⁴

Supposing that transcendental idealism is not committed to the existence of non-temporal things makes it hard to make sense of Kant's incompatibilistic theory of free will. Allison's own commitment to an incompatibilistic interpretation of Kant seems clear. He claims that

[A]t the heart of Kant's account of freedom in all three *Critiques* and in his major writings on moral philosophy is the problematic conception of transcendental freedom, which is an explicitly...incompatibilist conception (requiring an independence of determination by all antecedent causes in the phenomenal world).¹⁵

If we follow Allison in rejecting the ontological priority of things in themselves, however, we cannot suppose that atemporal agents qua noumena serve as the ontological substrates of agents qua phenomena, and shape the empirical causal structure of agents qua phenomena to make room for free choices. We are left without any way to undermine phenomenal determinism. So it is not clear how we could preserve incompatibilistic free will on Allison's interpretation. If we accept Allison's account, we find ourselves with a tension between Kant's commitments to incompatibilistic free will on the one hand, and determinism on the other.¹⁶ It looks like one of them has to be given up.

¹² Allison, *Idealism and Freedom*, p. 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, p. 1.

¹⁶ Karl Ameriks makes a related point about Allison's interpretation in "Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations."

But Allison claims to preserve both.¹⁷

Allison's interpretation gives us two ways in which the tension might be resolved. First, Allison holds that his account of transcendental idealism *does* in fact make agents qua noumena independent enough from the deterministic empirical causal series to make room for incompatibilistic free will. Second, Allison argues that if we properly interpret the Second Analogy, we will see that the sort of determinism it entails is very weak, and this will show us that Kantian determinism does not pose as much of a threat to free will as some commentators have thought.¹⁸ Allison provides additional support for his interpretation of the Second Analogy with an argument to the effect that Kant holds there are no laws of empirical psychology. In the remainder of the paper, it will be argued that these potential resolutions are unsuccessful.

II-2. Allison's Two-Aspect Interpretation of Incompatibilistic Free Will

The purpose of this section is to consider Allison's claim that the two-aspect interpretation can accommodate incompatibilist free will. Allison claims that

by treating space, time, and the categories as epistemic rather than ontological conditions, transcendental idealism also opens up a "conceptual space" for the nonempirical thought (although not knowledge) of objects, including rational agents, as they may be apart from these conditions, that is, as they may be "in themselves"...For the most part, of course, this conceptual space remains vacant and the thought of things as they are in themselves therefore reduces to the empty thought of a merely transcendental object, a "something in general = x." In the consciousness of our rational agency, however, we are directly aware of a capacity (to act on the basis of an ought) that...we cannot regard as empirically

¹⁷ While Allison strives to preserve Kant's incompatibilism, some commentators (e.g. Ralf Meerbote and Hud Hudson) give up incompatibilist free will, and interpret Kant as a compatibilist. (See Hudson, *Kant's Compatibilism*, and Meerbote, "Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions.")

¹⁸ Allison discusses the weak interpretation of the Second Analogy as what he calls a "first step" in responding to the criticism that the deterministic necessitation of empirical objects prevents us from supposing that agents qua noumena are exempt from such necessitation (Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 326) and then discusses his strategy for accommodating incompatibilism within his account of transcendental idealism as a second step. In this paper, for expository purposes, it has been necessary to discuss it second.

conditioned...[I]nsofar as we attribute it to ourselves, we must also attribute an intelligible character, which is thought in terms of the transcendental idea of freedom. Consequently, in attributing the latter to ourselves and our agency, we do not merely prescind or abstract from the causal conditions of our actions, considered as occurrences in the phenomenal world; rather we regard these conditions as nonsufficient, that is, as "not so determining" as to exclude a "causality of our will" since we think of ourselves as initiating causal series through actions conceived as first beginnings.¹⁹

Allison's key claim here is that he can say more on behalf of agents qua noumena than he can on behalf of noumena in general. With respect to noumena in general, we can only consider them in a negative way, as a "something in general = x." With respect to agents qua noumena, however, we can add to this negative conception the positive idea of ourselves as initiators of causal series. We think of ourselves not just in abstraction from the causal conditions that necessitate our actions—we also think of these causal conditions as nonsufficient.

Allison's remarks here may make his interpretation sound similar to the ontological interpretation discussed above. Like the ontological interpretation, Allison's interpretation includes the idea that agents, considered as things in themselves, are independent of the deterministic causal series. But as emphasized earlier, the crucial difference is that Allison rejects "the 'noumenalistic' view that grants ontological priority to things as they are in themselves." Allison holds that Kant's transcendental distinction is between two ways in which we can think of empirical objects, and it is constitutive of anything's being an empirical object that all of its alterations have sufficient causal conditions. We can certainly "regard these conditions as nonsufficient," as Allison puts it above. But, if Allison is to maintain his account of the transcendental distinction, this inevitably involves a kind of make-believe, because we are merely regarding objects with sufficient causal conditions as if they did not have sufficient causal conditions. On Allison's account, when thinking about agents, we sometimes consider them in abstraction from their sufficient causal conditions, but this does not show that there are any agents without sufficient causal conditions.

This line of argument will surely meet the objection that this is not *mere* make-believe, on Allison's interpretation, because it is a requirement of practical reason to represent causally necessitated agents as if they did not have sufficient causal conditions. But even if this point is accepted, the problem about incompatibilism remains. Allison's basic view seems to be

¹⁹ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, pp. 44-5.

that our actions are deterministically necessitated, but we can ascribe free will to ourselves because transcendental idealism allows us to represent ourselves as if our actions were not deterministically necessitated. But this makes it no more accurate to call Kant an incompatibilist than it is to call him a compatibilist. According to Allison, phenomenal determinism is an ultimate reality. Allison cannot undermine this determinism by positing agents qua noumena as the ontological substrates of agents qua phenomena, as the ontological interpretation does, because Allison rejects the ontological priority of noumena. So, instead of undermining determinism, Allison makes free will compatible with determinism by holding that we are free because we can represent ourselves as if we were not deterministically necessitated.

In other words, according to the ontological interpretation, the idea that noumena are not deterministically necessitated is a discovery with profound implications for phenomenal determinism. It implies that phenomenal determinism is not an ultimate reality. The ontological foundations of agents are not deterministic. Agents only appear to be deterministic. On Allison's interpretation, on the other hand, the idea that noumena are not deterministically necessitated implies nothing at all about phenomenal determinism, except that reason sometimes requires us to ignore it. So, if what we have seen so far represents Allison's account of free will in its entirety, it seems fair to say that the ontological interpretation can accommodate a robust sort of incompatibilism which Allison's account cannot accommodate.

But what we have seen so far does not represent Allison's account in its entirety. Allison thinks past commentators have mistakenly interpreted Kant's phenomenal determinism as a very strong sort of determinism, when in actuality it is much weaker. Allison advances several arguments to weaken phenomenal determinism. This is important for the question of incompatibilism. Even if Allison cannot make room for incompatibilistic free will by undermining phenomenal determinism, he may be able to make room for it if he can weaken phenomenal determinism sufficiently.

The most striking manifestation of Allison's weakened interpretation of phenomenal determinism is his rejection of Kant's claim that human actions are, in principle, predictable. One example of Kant's predictability claim is at KrV A550/B578:

[All] the actions of a human being in appearance are determined... according to the order of nature, and if we could investigate all the appearances of men's wills to their grounds, there would not be a single human action we could not predict with certainty and recognize as necessary from its antecedent conditions.

Allison claims "Kant has neither the need nor the right to assert...that, given sufficient knowledge, we could infallibly predict human actions."²⁰ Allison thinks this for two reasons. First, Allison holds that the Second Analogy does not imply any sort of determinism that would justify this predictability claim. Second, Allison holds that Kant is committed to an account of empirical psychology according to which there can be no psychological laws. In the next two sections, arguments will be made against both of these claims.

II-3. Allison's Interpretation of the Second Analogy

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that if we are to represent objective successions of appearances, they must take place in accordance with "the law of the connection of cause and effect"(KrV B233). The core of Kant's argument for this claim is as follows:

time cannot in itself be perceived, and what precedes and what follows cannot, therefore, by relation to it, be empirically determined in the object. I am conscious only that my imagination places the one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object. In other words, the objective relation of appearances following one another is not to be determined through perception alone. Now in order that this relation be known as determinate, the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it determines as necessary which must be placed before, and which after, and that they cannot be placed in the reverse relation. But a concept which carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity can only be a pure concept that resides in understanding, not in perception. In this case it is the concept of the *relation of cause and effect*...Therefore experience itself— i.e. empirical cognition of appearances— is possible only insofar as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all change, to the law of causality[.] (KrV B233-234)

If we consider Kant's remarks in the Second Analogy on their own, it is less than transparent what he means in claiming that we must subject the succession of appearances to the "law of causality." This is clarified in a passage at KrVA91/B94, however, when he explains that the concept of cause "makes strict demand that something, A, should be such that something else, B, follows from it *necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule*." When we add this clarification to the Second Analogy, Kant's position appears to be the following: all events are bound

²⁰ Allison *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 326.

to other events according to rules of causal necessitation, or, as we might instead say, according to particular causal laws.²¹

Allison rejects this account, and instead advocates a weak interpretation according to which the Second Analogy does entail that succession in the empirical causal series is necessary, but does *not* entail the existence of particular causal laws.²² According to Allison's version of the weak interpretation,

judgements about objective temporal succession do not presuppose that the elements of the succession are connected by empirical laws. All that is presupposed is that there is some antecedent condition (presumably roughly contemporaneous with *x*'s being in state A at *t*₁) which, being given, state B necessarily ensues for *this particular x* at *t*₂. There are no additional assumptions regarding the *repeatability of the sequence* and its relevance to *other objects of x's type* that are either required or licensed by this presupposition.²³

What Allison means by there being no assumption of relevance to "other objects of *x*'s type" is that, despite there being a given case of an *x* in state A necessitated by some antecedent condition to enter state B, we cannot infer from this that in any other case, an *x* in state A with an antecedent condition of the same kind will be necessitated to enter state B. So necessity does not obtain in terms of general laws formulated at the level of types, but in terms of relations between particular states of particular objects.

A crucial part of Allison's claim that necessitation is at the level of

²¹ It is important to emphasize that we should not interpret Kant as arguing that, if we do not know the particular causal law necessitating an alteration, we cannot experience the alteration as objective. This would be a problem, because the only way to gain knowledge of some particular causal law is by induction from repeated observations of objective alterations caused *according to* that causal law. Thus, if we had to have knowledge of the particular causal law necessitating an alteration in order to experience it as objective, we could never learn the law by induction. Learning by induction requires that we begin by not knowing the law, then make observations, and then induce the law. But if knowledge of the law is required for objective experience, then the observations required to induce the law would not be possible without already knowing the law, and that is just to say that we could not learn the law by induction. The point Kant is making in the Second Analogy is more general—we cannot experience or otherwise represent a succession of appearances as objective unless we think of it as necessitated by a causal law.

²² Other supporters of the weak interpretation are Beck (e.g. *Essays on Kant and Hume*) and Buchdahl (e.g. *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science*).

²³ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 231, my italics.

particulars is that it makes sense for us to think of sequences as causally necessitated even if they are not repeatable. If we had to understand causal necessitation in terms of repeatable sequences, we could not understand causal necessitation in terms of particulars, because particulars are not repeatable. Only the types particulars instantiate are repeatable. If Allison held that necessitated sequences had to be understood as repeatable, he would have to represent them in terms of types. But if Allison explained causal necessitation in terms of types, then he would have to accept that a sequence could only be causally necessitated if there was a causal law that covered it. The reason is as follows. Suppose that we explain something's being causally necessitated to change from A to B by saying that the thing is of a certain type, and that there was an antecedent condition of a certain type. And suppose that this is the whole explanation. If this explanation is to be genuinely explanatory, then it must be true in all cases that if a thing is of that type, with antecedent conditions of that type, the thing will change from A to B. There must, in other words, be a causal law.²⁴ So if Allison were forced to explain causal necessitation at the level of types, he would not be able to maintain his weak interpretation of the Second Analogy.

It is therefore crucial for Allison to maintain his position that causal sequences can be necessitated without being repeatable. But it is hard to see how he can maintain it, in view of Kant's KrV A91/B124 claim that the concept of cause involves the idea of following according to a rule. Allison attempts to incorporate this idea. He holds that Kant's explanation of causation in terms of rules expresses "merely the thought that a particular effect must be conceived to follow in every case or without exception from its cause."²⁵ But there is no sense in talking of a particular effect following "in every case," or "without exception," since particulars are not repeatable. If we explain what it means for a sequence to be causally necessitated in terms of the idea that the sequence is an instance of a rule, then the feature of the sequence in virtue of which it is causally necessitated has to be repeatable, because it is essential to something's being a rule that it can be repeatedly instantiated. Therefore, if we are to

²⁴ We can block this inference to a law if we say that it is only because these types are instantiated in this particular thing that it is necessitated to change in this way—that is, if we index our references to the types to their particular instantiations in this particular thing (i.e. to what analytic metaphysicians call 'tropes'). But then the structure we have individuated in this explanation is itself merely a more complicated particular, and is unrepeatable for the same reasons that other particulars are unrepeatable.

²⁵ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 223.

explain causal necessitation in terms of rules, it has to be binding at the level of types, not at the level of particulars.

Said differently, to think of a rule, it must be possible to think of what it would mean for it to be broken, in order to know what is ruled out by the rule, so to speak. But a rule that cannot be repeatedly instantiated would be a rule with only one possible instance. How can we understand what it would mean for a rule with only one possible instance to be broken? It could only be broken, it seems, in a case where the only possible instance of the rule did not accord with the rule. But if we are supposing that the rule's only possible instance does not accord with the rule, then what is it that we are supposing the instance does not accord with? We can give no example that would explain the rule, because an example would imply another possible instance of the rule. This would seem to demonstrate that we can form no concept of a rule with only one possible instance. For these reasons, it seems difficult to accept the idea that the Second Analogy only entails causal necessitation at the level of particulars. Since, as argued above, causal necessitation at the level of types implies the existence of causal laws, it is equally difficult to accept Allison's claim that the Second Analogy does not imply the existence of causal laws.

Allison has a second strategy he also uses to deny that the Second Analogy entails the existence of causal laws. Allison thinks that the Second Analogy can only entail the existence of particular causal laws if it entails that the schema of causality is a condition for ordering distinct events, in addition to being a condition for ordering the successions of states that constitute events. In the following passage, he argues that it is *not* a condition for ordering distinct events:

Kant's argument [only] attempts to prove that the concept or schema of causality is a necessary condition of the experience of the succession of the states in an object, that is, of *an event*, not that it is a condition for the ordering of distinct events. One might think this too obvious to mention, were it not for the fact that the opposite is so frequently assumed to be the case. Some Kant interpreters make this assumption because they realize that the appeal to causal laws can be used to fix the temporal location of given events or types of events vis-à-vis one another. Thus, given a causal law linking events of type A (as cause) with events of type B (as effect), we can fix the temporal location of events of these types with respect to one another. And, since time cannot be perceived, it is only by appeal to such laws that we can determine the temporal order of distinct events. By extension of this principle we arrive at the idea that the determinability of the location of all events in a time presupposes their connectibility according to causal laws. There may very well be something to this line of argument, and it is certainly Kantian in spirit. The problem is that it is not

the argument which Kant advances in the Second Analogy. The notion of the complete or thoroughgoing determinability of the temporal position of events is, for Kant, a regulative Idea; as such, it expresses a requirement of reason, not a transcendental condition of the possibility of experience.²⁶

The distinction that this criticism depends upon, between successions that constitute events on the one hand, and successions of distinct events, on the other, is not relevant to the claim made in the Second Analogy. In this passage, Allison speaks of an event as a "succession of the states in an object." But Kant makes remarks in the Second Analogy which conclusively demonstrate that events so understood are always composed of smaller such events — since every succession of states can be broken down indefinitely into shorter successions of states— so that objective successions of determinations *constituting* an event always involve objective successions *of* events. The remarks are as follows:

Between two instants there is always a time, and between two states at those two instants there is always a difference which has a magnitude. For all parts of appearances are always themselves magnitudes in turn. Therefore all transition from one state to another occurs in a time that is contained between two instants, the first determining the state the thing leaves, and the second determining the state the thing enters. Therefore both instants are limits of the time of a change, and so of the intermediate state between the two states...Now every alteration has a cause which evinces its causality in the entire time in which the alteration takes place. This cause, therefore, does not engender the alteration suddenly, i.e. at once or in an instant, but in a time; so that, as the time increases from its initial instant a to its completion in b, the magnitude of the reality (b-a) is also generated through all the smaller degrees contained between the first and the last. Therefore all alteration is possible only through a continuous action of the causality...This is the law of the continuity of all alteration. Its basis is this: that neither time nor appearance in time consists of parts which are the smallest, and that, nonetheless, the state of a thing passes, as it alters, through all these parts...to its second state...Therefore the reality's new state arises from the first state, in which it was not, through all the infinite degrees of this reality, and the differences of the degrees from one another are all smaller than that between 0 and a. (KrV A208-9/B253-4)

Given Kant's "law of the continuity of all alteration," any alteration can be subdivided into multiple alterations extending across shorter temporal intervals. In other words, any succession of states is always a

²⁶ Ibid., p. 229.

succession of successions of states. Therefore, it is impossible for the Second Analogy to provide for objective succession of states *constituting* events and not for objective succession *of* events, because the objective successions constituting events are always also objective successions of events. For this reason, we cannot accept Allison's claim that Kant considered the objective orderability of events merely a regulative idea.

II-4. Allison's Interpretation of Empirical Psychology

Now let us consider Allison's interpretation of empirical psychology, which he thinks lends support to his claim that the Second Analogy does not entail the existence of causal laws. According to Allison, Kant denies that there are laws of empirical psychology. This lends support to Allison's reading of the Second Analogy because, if there is some province of the empirical world where objective succession does not require causal laws, then Kant cannot consistently argue in Second Analogy that all objective succession requires causal laws. Therefore charity in interpretation would demand that we not interpret Kant as making such a claim in the Second Analogy.

Allison claims that "If reason and its causality...exhibit an empirical character, then the study of that character must pertain to the province of empirical psychology" and on this point he is correct.²⁷ He is also correct when he explains that "Kant denies that empirical psychology is a science, insisting that the most it can provide is a 'natural description...but not a science of the soul' (MAN 4: 471;8)."²⁸ Allison errs, however, when he goes on to claim that this involves a "denial of nomological status to the empirical generalizations of psychology." (Allison 1990: 33) In the text Allison cites (MAN 4: 471), Kant directly refers to the "laws" (*Gesetze*) of "inner sense," which are part of the content of "the empirical doctrine of the soul," i.e. empirical psychology:

the empirical doctrine of the soul must always remain still further removed than chemistry from the rank of what may be properly called natural science, since mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their laws [*Gesetze*], unless one might want to take into consideration the law of continuity in the flow of this sense's inner changes, but the extension of cognition so obtained would bear much the same relation to the doctrine of body, as the doctrine of the properties of the straight line bears to the whole of geometry. [This inapplicability is due to the fact that]

²⁷ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, pp. 31-2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

the pure inner intuition in which the soul's phenomena are to be constructed is time, which has only one dimension.

Kant's point in this passage is not about whether or not there are psychological laws, though he clearly implies here that there are.²⁹ His point is rather about how much can be known a priori about these laws. He claims that not enough can be known a priori for empirical psychology to count as a science. The context for this passage is a discussion about how, if a "body of doctrine" is to count as science, or a "pure doctrine of nature," it must be possible to have a priori knowledge of some features of the particular empirical laws it contains. Whether such a priori knowledge is possible or not depends on how much of the "body of doctrine" can be represented mathematically. All of the objects of physics appear in space and time, and mathematics is applicable to both space and time. Kant thinks this means that we can have a significant amount of a priori knowledge about the features of the particular empirical laws of physics. The objects of inner sense, by contrast, only appear in time, and given temporality alone, there is much less scope for the application of mathematics. Kant concludes that we can have little or no a priori knowledge about the features of the particular laws governing the objects of inner sense. Thus physics counts as a science, and empirical psychology does not. Kant nowhere in this passage suggests that a lack of a priori knowledge about the features of the particular laws of empirical psychology implies a lack of a priori knowledge that there *are* laws of empirical psychology.

For these reasons, Allison is wrong to read Kant as holding that there are no laws of empirical psychology. Since his interpretation of empirical psychology is the last potential source of support for his view that the Second Analogy does not entail that laws exist, his view of the Second Analogy must be rejected. This means that Allison cannot weaken phenomenal determinism in any way that might make it more hospitable to incompatibilist free will. The best Allison's interpretation can offer us is an account of why we would be justified in ignoring phenomenal determinism when we think of ourselves as agents. But a theory based on this strategy would appear to be a form of compatibilism. At the very least, it must be acknowledged that it has no better claim to be called incompatibilistic than it has to be called compatibilistic.

²⁹ Kant also makes remarks in other places in his texts that indicate equally clearly the presence of empirical psychological laws. See e.g. KU 5: 278, where Kant says that "empirical laws about mental changes...show only how we do judge; they do not give us a command about how we ought to judge."

This implies that Allison's account of Kant's theory of free will cannot satisfactorily accommodate Kant's incompatibilism. Since Allison's account fails to accommodate Kant's incompatibilism because of fundamental features of the two-aspect interpretation, it seems reasonable to suppose that the fate of the two-aspect interpretation more generally must be the same as the fate of Allison's interpretation.

Conclusion

My goal has been to argue that Kant's incompatibilism can only be accommodated by accepting the ontological priority of noumena. In the first section I argued that the ontological interpretation can accommodate Kant's incompatibilism because it accepts the ontological priority of noumena, and that recent research shows that the ontological interpretation can mount a better defense against traditional objections than has often been thought. In the second section, I argued that the two-aspect interpretation cannot accommodate Kant's incompatibilism because it rejects the ontological priority of noumena. This provides an indirect argument for the ontological interpretation. The metaphysics required by the ontological interpretation is no doubt more complicated than the metaphysics required by the two-aspect interpretation. But it has long been recognized that incompatibilistic free will comes at a high metaphysical price. So it should not be too surprising to find that an interpretation that can accommodate incompatibilistic free will is more metaphysically complicated than an interpretation that cannot. The additional metaphysical complexity of the ontological interpretation can only be taken to be an important objection to it if one thinks that incompatibilistic free will is not worth the price. Kant seems to have thought it that it was worth the price.

Works Cited

- Allison, H. *Idealism and Freedom* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- . *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- . *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
- Ameriks, K. "Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations," *Inquiry* 35 (1992): pp. 219-232.
- Beck, L.W. *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven: Yale University

- Press, 1978).
- Bennett, J. "Kant's Theory of Freedom," in *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy*, ed. A.W. Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
- Buchdahl, G. *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- Friedman, M. "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- Hanna, R. and Moore, A. "Reason, Freedom and Kant: An Exchange," *Kantian Review* 12, no. 1 (2007): pp. 113-133.
- Hudson, H. *Kant's Compatibilism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
- Smith, N.K. *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1992).
- Langton, R. *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things In Themselves* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Meerbote, R. "Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions," in *Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity*, ed. William Harper and Ralf Meerbote (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1984).
- Paton, H.J. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936).
- Pereboom, D. "Kant on Transcendental Freedom," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73, no. 3 (2006): pp. 537-567.
- Vilhauer, B. "The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will," forthcoming in the *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*.
- . "Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist about Determinism and Moral Responsibility?" *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12, no. 4 (2004): pp. 719-730.
- Watkins, E. *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Walker, R. *Kant* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
- Wood, A.W. "Kant's Compatibilism," in *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Allen Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).