(<https://philpapers.org/rec/KOSFMS?ref=mail>), I had the impression of reading something about my EDWs approach! Therefore I read Koslicki’s book (2008).

(2008) Katherin Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects*, Oxford University Press

[There are quite important ideas in this book that are very similar to my ideas published in 2002, 2005 (the article from *Synthese* journal), 2006 and posted on Internet immediately after being published. In the next years after publishing at so famous journal Synthese, I was wondering why so few people quoted my name. Years later, I have understood the reason why…

**(2018) Gabriel Vacariu: Very similar ideas between Katherin Koslicki’s ideas (2008) *The Structure of Objects*, Oxford University Press) and my ideas (2002-2005-2006)**

When I read this paragraph about her book:

In Form, Matter, Substance, Kathrin Koslicki develops a contemporary defence of the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism. According to this approach, objects are compounds of matter (hule) and form (morphe or eidos) and a living organism is not exhausted by the body, cells, organs, tissue, and the like that compose it. Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of

criteria of success. However, a plausible application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of concrete particular objects hinges on how hylomorphists conceive of the matter composing a concrete particular object, its form, and the hylomorphic relations which hold between a matter-form compound, its matter and its form. Koslicki offers detailed answers to the questions surrounding this approach to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects. As a result, matter-form compounds emerge as occupying the privileged ontological status traditionally associated with substances, despite their metaphysical complexity, due to their high degree of unity.

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In the following paragraphs, I introduce some paragraphs with ideas that are quite similar to my ideas…]

Chap. VII, ‘Objects as Structured Wholes’, section 2.3 ‘An Ontology of Kinds’

[the ideas of kinds are very similar to my EDWs. And later…]

This middle ground, I propose, can be derived from a commitment to an ontology

of *kinds*, which will be justified in more detail in the next chapter. According to

this conception, a plurality of objects composes a whole of a particular kind, when

the objects (material components) in question satisfy the selection requirements

set by the formal components associated with wholes of that particular kind, e.g.,

requirements concerning, for example, the variety, configuration and sometimes

even the number of parts out of which wholes of that particular kind may be composed. (p. 170)

Content or matter, as we argued at the end of Chapter V, is best viewed as

consisting of a domain of objects that are themselves already structured: this

conception breaks down only when applied to a ‘‘first’’ level of composition

(if there is such a thing), made up of entities that are not further composed

of anything; however, since these ground-level entities are presumably not also

mereologically complex, a theory which concerns the relation between wholes

and their parts does not apply to them and is hence not violated by their

non-dichotomous nature.

Structure or form has been tied to an ontology of kinds: each kind of object

is taken to have associated with it a set of selection requirements which act as a

recipe of sorts in specifying the range and configuration of material components

eligible to compose a whole of that particular kind. We have, however, up to this point left open the *ontological category* to which the formal components of

objects are to be assigned, i.e., whether these entities belong to the category

of objects, to that of properties and relations, or to some other category still.

These issues will be investigated further and in more detail in Chapter IX. (p. 175)

Standard mereology itself, however, cannot be thought of as providing such

independent evidence for the existence of mereologically complex objects which,

like sets, are free from the sorts of constraints that could be reasonably attributed

to the presence of formal components within these objects: for mereological

sums, according to the standard conception, need not satisfy any of the selection

requirements concerning the variety, number or configuration of their parts;

rather, their composition, as we pointed out earlier, is completely unconstrained

and happens whenever there is *any* plurality of objects, regardless of what

characteristics these objects bear and how these objects are related to one another. (p. 175)

As a consequence of the assumptions already endorsed up to this point,

it now *follows* that the world does not contain numerically distinct, spatiotemporally

coincident wholes which share exactly the same parts: for NAT, in

conjunction with the assumption that objects of distinct kinds have distinct formal

components, yields the result that there could not be two or more numerically

distinct, spatio-temporally coincident objects which belong to *distinct kinds* and

which share all of their parts: rather, it is predicted that such objects will always differ with respect to some of their proper parts, viz., their formal components.23 (pp. 182-3)

If tables are hybrid objects, consisting of formal and material components,

then so are molecules, since the same considerations apply in both cases. For the

relation between a molecule and the particles which constitute it is exactly the

same as that which holds between a table’s material components and the table

itself: the molecule and the particles that constitute it occupy the same region

of space-time, but they do not share all of their properties (e.g., the particles

might exist before or after the molecule exists; they need not constitute the

molecule in question; etc.); moreover, it is integral to the existence and identity

of the molecule that the particles which constitute it are of a particular variety and exhibit a particular configuration associated with objects of this particular kind. (pp. 186-7)

As long as we confine ourselves to the case of mereologically complex objects,

however, the considerations which motivated us to adopt NAT are general: they

apply to such microscopic objects as molecules just as much as they apply to such

macroscopic objects as tables. (187)

**§VII.2.11 Composition as Non-Identity**

In the previous sections, we have already aligned ourselves explicitly with the

Platonic and Aristotelian models of parthood and composition with respect to

feature (iii), the *restricted* notion of composition, as well as feature (iv), the

*dichotomous* conception of wholes as composed of *structure* or *form*, on the one

hand, and *content* or *matter*, on the other. Next, we similarly follow these ancient

mereologies with respect to feature (ii), the *ontologically committing* conception

of wholes. (192)

Finally, I want to comment on feature (i) of the Platonic and Aristotelian model

of parthood and composition, viz., the genuinely *unified* nature of wholes. (192)

Depending on the ontological category to which an object

belongs, the principles of unity at work in holding the parts of these objects

together correspondingly differ widely: for example, the principle of unity

holding together the parts of a heap may be anything that enforces physical

contact, i.e., the sharing of boundaries, among its parts (e.g., a band holding

together some wooden sticks); the parts of a universal (e.g., animal or living

thing) are held together by the qualitative similarity under which these objects

may be grouped; (193)

appropriately directed to some discipline outside of philosophy,

such as cosmology.3⁹ Assuming, on the other hand, that, for whatever reason,

there *are* objects of the particular kind in question, then it should come as no

surprise that one of them has come into existence, when a particular plurality

of objects satisfies the requirements for how to ‘‘build’’ an object of this kind.

To illustrate, specimens of the kind *H2O molecule* come into existence when

two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom enter into a particular configuration

of chemical bonding: objects of this kind are *unified* in the sense that they are

*one* specimen of the kind in question, i.e., *one* relative to the measure ‘‘H2O

molecule’’; their material components hang together to the degree that hydrogen

and oxygen atoms, which enter into the relation of chemical bonding, can be

expected to do so. That an object which counts as *one* or *unified* relative to the measure ‘‘H2O molecule’’ has parts at all, poses no threat to its status as a

particular specimen of the kind in question: rather, given what we know about

the chemical composition of H2O molecules, nothing could be one specimen of

this kind or unified relative to this particular measure without having as parts

at least two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Given that this is just what

it means to be an H2O molecule, there is nothing further that the mereologist

proper or the ontologist at large can add to what the scientist has already told

us about the chemical composition of objects of this kind. The mereologist *can*,

however, be held responsible for the task of devising a theory of parthood and

composition which is responsive to the fact that there can be no H2O molecule,

unless a particular plurality of objects satisfies the formal requirements as to

number, variety and configuration associated with this kind of whole.⁴⁰ (197-8)

Chap. VII In Defense of Kinds [‘kinds’ are very similar to my EDWs]

An important piece of the theory of parthood and composition, which was

presented in outline in the preceding chapter, is the restricted composition

principle (RCP), which carried with it an as of yet unjustified commitment to

an ontology of kinds: a plurality of objects was said to compose a whole of

a particular kind, when the objects (material components) in question satisfy

the selection requirements set by the formal components associated with wholes

of that particular kind, i.e., requirements concerning, among other things, the

variety, configuration and sometimes the number of parts out of which wholes

of that particular kind may be composed. Such a restriction on composition, of

course, only has plausibility if there are independent reasons for thinking that

objects really do belong to kinds and that kinds really do pose constraints on the

mereological composition of their members.

The aim of the current chapter is to defend this commitment to an ontology

of kinds at least for the particular case of *natural kinds*. (p. 200)

Kinds are categories or taxonomic classifications into which particular objects

may be grouped on the basis of shared characteristics of some sort. Judging from

the name, one might expect *natural* kinds (if indeed there are any) to reflect

those categories which are, in some sense, present in *nature*; (201)

The aim of the current chapter has been to defend a commitment to an ontology

of kinds for the special case of natural kinds; such a commitment plays an

important role in motivating and underwriting the structure-based and restricted

conception of parthood and composition outlined in the previous chapter. The

special case of natural kinds was intended as an illustration of how a commitment

to a certain class of kinds in general, or to specific kinds among them, may

be generated on the basis of *extra-mereological* considerations: the belief in the

existence of natural kinds, for example, may be supported by an appeal to

their role in prediction and explanation; particularly noteworthy in this respect

is the weight borne by *scientific* natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical and

biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments, (ii) the laws of nature and (iii) causal

explanations. Once such *independent* reasons for believing in the existence of a

certain kind of object have been given, we find in general that objects must satisfy

more or less stringent mereological constraints in order to count as instances of

the kind; as noted in the previous chapter, the types of constraints that are relevant

in this context typically concern the *variety*, *configuration* and sometimes even the

*number* of material components which must be present in an object in order for it to count as a whole of that particular kind. (233-4)

The evidence reviewed above suggests that structures are at least in some contexts

treated as objects, rather than as properties or relations. At the same time, even

when structures are so treated, they are always also closely linked with certain

properties and relations which elements in the domain come to exhibit as a result

of occupying the positions made available by the structure in question; but these

properties and relations are nevertheless in these contexts not identified with the

structures with which they are associated. (p. 252)

Finally, the following fourth response to the scenario raised above is also available.

Once we have found reasons to deny Unrestricted Composition (and I have of

course provided such reasons in Chapter II), we are no longer committed to

endorsing the claim that every plurality of objects itself composes something; in

particular, we are no longer committed to endorsing the claim that the material

components out of which the big statue is constructed themselves compose

a single object, a heap, which constitutes the big statue and has persistence

conditions different from those associated with the big statue. My analysis

predicts that we only have reason to believe in the existence of an object,

when that object falls under a kind whose existence can be justified by appeal

to independent considerations from outside the mereology. And what pressing

non-mereological reasons are there to be committed to the existence of the kind

*heap*? (258)

And since we have denied Unrestricted Composition,

there is no *single* intermediary object which constitutes the big statue and which

can survive being scattered while the big statue cannot. It thus seems as though,

at the very least, various options are available by means of which a hylomorphic

approach may respond to the Grounding Problem and the sort of scenario raised

above; I will leave the question of how to decide between these options, and

perhaps between others that I have not canvassed in the foregoing remarks, open

for future discussion. (p. 259)

Each of these areas conceives of *a* structure as the sort of entity which (i) makes

available *positions* or *places* for other objects to occupy; and which (ii) places

two distinctive sorts of constraints on these positions. The first sort of constraint

concerns the *type* of constituent which may occupy the position in question.

The second sort of constraint concerns the particular geometrical or topological

*configuration* or *arrangement* which must be exhibited by these constituents, as a

result of occupying the positions made available by the structure.

In some cases, these two sorts of constraints a structure places on its occupants

also conspire to generate restrictions as to the exact *number* of constituents a

particular kind of compound must have: for example, the structure associated

withH2Omolecules makes available exactly three positions that may be occupied

by hydrogen and oxygen atoms respectively, while that associated with the logical

connective ‘‘and’’ makes available exactly two positions that may be occupied

by any grammatically well-formed truth-evaluable sentence of the language in

question. Other structures, however, are more lenient when it comes to the precise

number of positions allowed in a particular formation: the musical structure

associated with a twelve-bar blues, for example, does not legislate exactly how

many notes must occur in a particular manifestation of this structure; moreover,

‘‘John is likely to leave’’ and ‘‘John is likely to leave in a hurry’’ both exemplify

the basic pattern of a raising construction, even though the second sentence

contains more words than the first. (259)

The numerical identity of the items occupying the positions made available by a structure is

generally unimportant to the question of whether the structure in question has

been successfully implemented; the individual occupants of these positions are

thus *variable* from the point of view of the structure. What matters concerning

these items, and what is hence taken as *invariable*, from the point of view of the

structure, is only their type and their configuration.

When we say that structural concerns are prominent in a specific discipline,

what we mean is that the theories, axioms or laws formulated by the discipline

in question focus in particular on capturing the behavior of those elements that

are designated as *invariable* within a given context. (259-60)