One approach to conceptualizing virtue is to compare and contrast virtues with skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The knowledge of someone with a virtue is purported to be analogous to the knowledge of the expert in a skill. Since the study of expertise is concerned with understanding the development of skill acquisition from the stages of novice to expert, it has the potential to shed light on the acquisition of virtue. This thesis has gained traction in contemporary virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Determining whether this thesis is plausible requires answering three central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? Third, is there evidence that virtue development tracks skill acquisition? This chapter explores these questions and poses some answers to them.

~~D~~development, epistemology, ethics, expertise, ~~intuition, morality, psychology,~~ skill, virtue~~, wisdom~~

Chapter 3

Virtue as a Skill

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Introduction

One approach to conceptualizing virtue has been to compare and contrast virtues with practical skills, since both involve knowing how to act well in particular situations. The "virtue as skill" thesis can be found in many ancient Greek discussions of virtue. It is an example of Aristotle's suggestion that "we should use as evidence what is apparent for the sake of what is obscure."[1] One central aspect of this thesis is that the moral knowledge of the virtuous person is analogous to the practical knowledge of the expert in a skill.[2] Learning a skill is a process of acquiring practical knowledge, that is, the knowledge of how to do something, like building a house or driving a car. With virtue, the practical knowledge is the knowledge of how to act well, like acting honestly.

The study of expertise is focused on the highest levels of performance in a skill domain. Experts are thus a good analogue for the virtuous person, given that the virtuous person consistently brings about the highest level of moral behavior. In addition, the study of expertise is also concerned with understanding the development of expertise, from the stages of novice to expert. The process for acquiring skills has the potential then to shed light on the acquisition of virtue, as both are acquired in stages. As Julia Annas notes,

> this is an important analogy, because ethical development displays something that we can see more clearly in these more limited contexts:

> there is a progress from the mechanical rule- or model-following of the learner to the greater understanding of the expert, whose responses are sensitive to the particularities of situations as well as expressing learning and general reflection.[3]

This view finds support in the work on moral development by psychologists Daniel Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez, who claim that "the expertise literature can provide rich insights into the psychological development of moral character and conduct."[4] Part of the payoff of the "virtue as skill" approach, which Paul Bloomfield points out, is that the skill analogy can yield "a viable epistemology in which moral knowledge is shown to be a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect."[5] These and other potential benefits of the "virtue as skill" approach should be of interest to anyone working in virtue theory.

This ancient Greek thesis has gained some traction in contemporary accounts of virtue, both in virtue ethics (moral virtues) and virtue epistemology (intellectual virtues).[6] In both literatures, however, it is important to note that this thesis takes different forms. We can broadly classify the forms as weak, moderate, and strong. On the weak form, virtues have some connection to skills, but the virtues themselves are not to be understood along the lines of a skill. Linda Zagzebski, for example, says that while virtues are not themselves skills, they are associated with skills that provide the knowledge of how best to accomplish the goals of virtue.[7] The moderate form, endorsed by Aristotle, claims that there are structural similarities between virtue and skill, such that we can gain insight into how virtues are developed by looking at how skills are acquired. However, this is not an admission that virtues are skills—just that there are important

parallels. Finally, on the strong form, the claim is that virtues should be conceptualized as a type of skill. This still leaves room for noting some differences between skills and virtues. Julia Annas, for example, argues that virtues are the kind of skills that involve the ability to explain one's reasons for action, without claiming that all skills are like this.[8] The framework for this chapter is to see how far we can run with the strong form of the "virtue as skill" thesis.[9]

If the thesis that a virtue is a type of practical skill is correct, then it will have a significant impact on our conceptions of virtue and moral knowledge. Determining whether this thesis is plausible requires answering three central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? Third, do we have evidence that moral development tracks skill acquisition? So, as we canvas the various positions people have staked out in regard~~s~~ to virtue as skill, we need to question the assumptions being made about skills and expertise.

Furthermore, in defending the strong form of the thesis, we need to keep in mind how arguments need to be structured in order to deny the identification of virtues as skills. It will not be sufficient to point to just any feature of our conception of virtue that is not also found in skills, or vice versa. For example, take James Wallace's argument that virtues are not skills because all virtues are valuable, but not all skills are valuable.[10] As Zagzebski rightly points out in response~~,~~:

> This argument does not support the conclusion that virtues are not skills, however, but only that the class of virtues is not coextensive with the class

of skills. -On Wallace's reasoning it might be the case that every virtue is a skill, although not every skill is a virtue.[11]

The "virtue as skill" approach cannot be undermined merely by pointing to a unique feature of virtue, as there had better be some unique feature of virtue in order to distinguish it from everything ~~which~~ that is not a virtue. Similarly, any skill domain is going to have unique features to it that distinguish it from other skill domains. Not every skill involves music, but it doesn't follow that musical performances are not a matter of skill. On the other hand, there is a caveat to this type of defense of the "virtue as skill" thesis, which is that whatever is unique to moral virtue needs to be there because of its connection to morality.[12] Otherwise, there is the danger of making merely ad hoc moves to save the "virtue as skill" thesis. So, consistent with Zagzebski's response to Wallace, one could claim that not every skill is a virtue because not every skill deals with matters of morality. In short, it is to be expected that there are some features that are found in virtue but not in other skills, due to virtues being specifically moral skills. But if the difference between virtues and skills is not due to morality—~~,~~ for example, if virtues are traits you are born with or that you acquire by luck—~~,~~ then that kind of difference would undermine the idea that virtues are skills.

In the following sections, important analogies between virtues and skills will be highlighted. After briefly discussing in the next section some work in virtue epistemology that sheds light on the general structure of skills and virtues, I will then focus on the moral virtues ~~first~~ and return later to the intellectual virtues. Some putative disanalogies will be discussed in these sections as well, though the most significant disanalogies will

appear towards the end. Finally, I conclude with thoughts about where more research is needed to fully explore the "virtue as skill" approach.

Virtue as a Term of Success, and as an Acquired Competency

One key draw of the "virtue as skill" thesis, which is prominent in discussions of virtue epistemology but which can be generalized to include moral virtues, is specifically the idea that virtue is a term that implies success. According to Zagzebski, a virtue is "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end."[13] The element of reliable success is what leads Zagzebski to claim that virtues are associated with skills, because skills supply the knowledge of how to achieve success with the goals of virtue. Ernest Sosa also centrally draws on a skill analogy in his analysis of the concept of knowledge. Sosa says that there are three questions we can raise about any practice with a characteristic aim:

> Performances with an aim, in any case, admit assessment in respect of our three attainments: accuracy: reaching the aim; adroitness: manifesting skill or competence; and aptness: reaching the aim *through* the adroitness manifest.[14]

In explaining this, Sosa uses the example of an archer trying to hit a bull's-eye. We can ask if the target was hit, and whether the shot manifested the archer's skill. The two can come apart, because a novice can get lucky, and an expert might get unlucky (say from a gust of wind). The goal is not just to hit the target and manifest one's skill, but also that the target is hit *because* of one's skill, which makes it an apt performance. As this example also highlights, virtue is not only a success term, but success due to an acquired

competency. The success an archer has in hitting a target through skill represents an achievement for which the archer deserves credit, which wouldn't be the case if she hit the target merely by luck.

Sosa argues that this "AAA" structure can be applied to any performance with an aim, such as skilled behavior and moral behavior. Furthermore, he argues that you can extend this to epistemology, where the fundamental value (or aim) to be realized is truth. The goal is not merely to attain true belief (i.e., hitting the target), but also for true belief to be attained *because* of the exercise of cognitive skills (i.e., epistemic or intellectual virtues). One of the implications of this that Sosa notes is that "epistemic virtues enter constitutively in the attainment of fundamental value, not just instrumentally. Virtues are thus constitutive because the aptness of belief is constituted by its being accurate because competent."[15] If the goal was merely truth, then virtues would be viewed as just instrumental to attaining truth. But the goal is really aptness, which shows the virtues to be of constitutive value, and likewise for moral virtues.[16] Drawing on another skill analogy to explain this, Sosa says of a ballerina that what we really value is not just her performance, but that it was also the "product" of the ballerina's skill. If the performance was "produced" in some other way, say by her performing those moves by accident, then we wouldn't value it as much. Sosa refers to this in terms of a "performance-immanent value," [17] which is to be contrasted with the value a separable product might have independent of how it was produced (such as in the value of a good cup of coffee). In this respect, Sosa undermines one argument Aristotle presented against the "virtue as skill" thesis: that skills only concern "making" things with a value that is independent of its production, while virtues are concerned with "doing," as in activities where the value is

in the activity itself.[18] The "virtue as skill" thesis is thus best understood in terms of acquired performance, rather than productive, skills.

Some acquired competencies, however, may not prove analogous to virtues. For example, tying one's shoelaces is an acquired competence, but one seemingly too simplistic to be analogous to virtue. To handle this difference, Plato distinguished between skills and knacks, where knacks can be acquired without any specialized training. It's something you can learn how to do merely by trying to do it yourself, or by watching someone else do it. Annas, following Plato, claims that there is an intellectual component in skills that is not found in knacks, such that there's no theory to teach when it comes to knacks.[19] This way of marking the distinction implies that if putative experts in a field can't really articulate any theoretical principles supporting their practice, then that field represents a knack rather than a skill.

The articulation requirement, though, is controversial, but this is not the only way of cashing out the distinction.[20] In Ryle's well-known discussions of "knowing how,"[21] he marks a difference between "single-track" and "multi-track" dispositions.[22] Single-track dispositions are simplistic operations, ~~such that~~ "the actualisations of which are nearly uniform."[23] Multi-track dispositions, by contrast, are defined as "dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely-heterogeneous."[24] He goes on to argue that~~:~~

> ~~K~~[k]nowing *how*, then, is a disposition, but not a single-track disposition like a reflex or a habit. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications of criteria, but they are not tandem operations of theoretically avowing maxims and then putting them into practice.[25]

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So instead of the knack—skill difference being based on the possibility of offering articulate justifications, the distinction could be based on the difference between activities whose expressions are simple and uniform, versus those which are "indefinitely-heterogenous."[26] In this sense, virtues would clearly be classified as multi-track dispositions.

Skills and Virtues: Deliberate Practice

When it comes to how virtuous competencies are acquired, the skill analogy plays a significant role. In his well-known discussion of moral virtues, Aristotle claims that:

> we acquire them as a result of prior activities; and this is like the case of the arts, for that which we are to perform by art after learning, we first learn by performing, e.g., we become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre. Similarly, we become just by doing what is just, temperate by doing what is temperate, and brave by doing brave deeds.[27]

Since ancient times, one of the defining roles of the skill analogy is to illuminate the acquisition of virtue by showing how it is acquired in ways similar to that of practical skills. Annas highlights the importance of this when she claims that "W[w]e cannot understand what virtue is without coming to understand how we acquire it."[28]

Probably one of the most commonly understood aspects of skill acquisition is that acquiring a skill takes "practice, practice, practice." Estimates place the amount of experience necessary to achieve expertise in any field at ten10 years or 10,000 hours.[29] However, mere experience isn't sufficient for achieving expertise. People reach a certain level of acceptable performance, after which further experience does not necessarily lead to any improvement in performance. Research indicates that a particular kind of practice

is necessary for expertise, as improving your level of skill requires continually striving to do things that you currently cannot do. This kind of experience is referred to as "deliberate practice," and ~~it's~~ roughly 10,000 hours of deliberate practice ~~that's~~ are needed for expertise. As you engage in deliberate practice, you seek out feedback about your performance, in the hopes of identifying and correcting errors. There need to be specific aspects of your performance that you go about planning how to improve, which then structures the kind of deliberate practice you engage in.[30]

Someone might object here that all the deliberate practice and self-regulating behavior that goes into acquiring expertise is a point of departure from morality, for it might be that one does not need to do such extensive practice to be moral. Narvaez addresses this point in an instructive way, stating,~~:~~

> As a result of my studies with groups differing in expertise, I believe that moral judgment is a domain that is similar to that of music. Most people have some knowledge of music. For example they can sing songs, having learned from general experience how to carry a tune. Yet general experience does not lead to expertise in music. . . . Likewise, although one can learn a great deal about moral reasoning in everyday life, in order to reach the highest levels one must undergo deliberative, focused study.[31]

This leads us to an interesting implication of expertise for ethics. It is fairly difficult to attain expertise in a field, since the process is challenging and requires dedicated practice for at least ten~~10~~ years on average. If we can only expect a select few to achieve expertise, then we would expect the same of becoming a fully virtuous person. Of course it would still be the case that we could expect a lot of people to have partially acquired

some virtues, even though that falls short of full virtue. If virtues represent an expert-level skill, that implies that full virtue possession is rare, though without implying that it is rare because it is an unattainable ideal.

While it might appear to be a drawback that an expertise model of moral development makes the possession of virtue out to be rare, rather than commonplace, it can be seen as an important advantage of the model. Much has been made recently of the "situationist" challenge to the widespread possession of virtues as cross-situationally consistent character traits. Christian Miller argues that the best response to the situationist critique will have to accept that the possession of virtue is rare. "Thus, virtue ethicists can readily agree that experiments in psychology justify the belief that there currently is not widespread possession of the virtues—there was never any expectation otherwise."[32] Furthermore, this isn't merely an ad hoc move to save the "virtue as skill" thesis, precisely because expertise is rare.

A further implication of this is that once you start recognizing different levels of performance, you then have to start asking questions about what levels of performance are going to be expected of people. It might help to think here of a skill example, say driving a car. Most people can attain a competent (or mid-way) level of proficiency in driving, such that they can obtain a driver's license and be (for the most part) safe drivers. Only a relatively few people, though, become expert drivers. Obviously our traffic laws expect people to be able to drive at a competent level, rather than at the level of expertise. But then, what kind of expectations should we have about moral behavior, on an expertise model? We might legitimately expect all adults to be competent with respect to morality, but expertise may be expecting too much.

In any case, we can leave this discussion for now, because it remains an open question on an account of ethical expertise what standards we hold people accountable to in their moral behavior. Thus, if someone were to object to the model of ethical expertise being presented here that "expertise is just too much to expect of a person, thus the model fails," then the response is that it's just a reason not to hold people to expert-level standards, rather than a reason to reject the model itself. After all, just because we hold people to a particular standard, it doesn't follow that we can't recognize going above and beyond that standard.

Skills and Virtues: Self-Regulating Behavior

Engaging in deliberate practice requires a great deal of self-regulating behavior, and this has formed another parallel with virtue. Self-regulating behavior is important in acquiring expertise because feedback cannot come merely from others, as crucial as that is in the early stages of skill acquisition.[33] Often there won't be a coach around when you are exercising your skill, and so you need to learn how to provide feedback on your own performance. Therefore, it is important for deliberate practice that you are able to monitor your own behavior during such sessions. Experts also must monitor the environment that they are working in for changes.[34] This is especially relevant when experts face situations that contain features with which they have little prior experience ~~with~~. Because expertise develops out of concrete experience, experts will be at their best when facing relatively familiar situations. Thus, experts also need to be aware of when they are facing situations that include unique features, so as to adjust their performance. While they may not perform as well in truly unique situations, they will usually fare better than novices, for situations are unlikely to be unfamiliar in all respects.

Roberts argues that these kinds of self-regulating behaviors and strategies are fundamental to at least some of the virtues, specifically what he refers to as the virtues of will-power.[35] He claims that these virtues are skills, and his main argument for this is that he thinks such virtues are inherently "strategic," in the sense that they involve figuring out various techniques for managing one's impulses and emotions. Support for this can be found in Ryle, who argues that "performances in which strength of will is exerted may be performances of almost any sort, intellectual or manual, imaginative or administrative. It is not a single-track disposition."[36]

Roberts thinks that the virtues of will-power have a different target from other virtues. That is, the goal of the virtues of will-power is self-control, rather than specifically the pursuit of morally good ends. Furthermore, Roberts claims that "~~P~~[p]eople can be more or less skilled in the management of their own inclinations, and these skills are an important part of the virtues of will power."[37] Roberts's suggestion here is that some virtues seem to be centrally about managing our own inclinations, so that we don't act in ways contrary to the more substantive virtues. In this respect, the moral value of the virtues of will-power is derived from the values those virtues support. That is, courage is valuable insofar as it helps us to act honestly or justly when doing so is dangerous, but courage could be similarly displayed in carrying out immoral actions.[38]

In laying out his view, Roberts rebuts a number of arguments presented by Wallace that virtues cannot be skills. One argument by Wallace, which is later repeated by Zagzebski,[39] is that virtues involve resisting inclinations to do the wrong thing, but that resisting these inclinations does not require practice in solving technical difficulties, as in skills.[40] However, as Roberts points out, while virtues involve overcoming contrary

inclinations, it doesn't follow that doing so doesn't involve techniques. Information of a technical sort may be needed in overcoming inclinations:

> if somebody already has a moral motive, and then finds that bad habits and adverse emotions are getting in the way of acting lovingly, the psychologist has a potential role, and though we would not normally call this role "technical," what the psychologist may supply here is precisely information and training of a "how to" sort.[41]

Thus, virtues and skills cannot be contrasted merely on the grounds that the difficulties involved in each are entirely distinct. Furthermore, it does not make sense to think of acting virtuously as not involving difficulties other than ones of inclination. That would imply that knowing what honesty requires is always simple, but always knowing the requirements of honesty is especially difficult.[42]

Skills and Virtues: Automaticity and Flow

Other aspects of skill acquisition have been drawn on to explain qualities associated with virtue—such as virtuous behavior being understood as habitual, or how virtuous behavior need not be accompanied by self-conscious thoughts about virtue.[43] A defining feature of expert performance is the ability of experts to act in a way that seems (and usually is) almost effortless. Experts do not need to devote much conscious attention to what they are doing, and this lack of conscious attention does not lead to any reduction in their performance. This phenomenon is referred to as automaticity in the psychological literature.[44] While automaticity is a defining feature of expert performance, it starts to appear at earlier stages of skill development. With practice, tasks can be accomplished more effectively and more efficiently. This allows a person to devote less attention to the

tasks at hand without any reduction in performance, and to shift that attention to other matters. Being able to improve one's performance requires ~~having~~ that the initial tasks ~~becoming~~ become effortless, so one can devote attention and energy to more difficult tasks.

Of special interest for virtue is what is referred to as goal-dependent automaticity. The idea is that our goals have mental representations, and while we often think consciously about our goals (which can then lead to behavior to accomplish those goals), these goals (and their corresponding goal-directed behavior) can be triggered nonconsciously. Stimuli in one's environment can activate the mental representation of our goals and corresponding behavior without our awareness. If this happens repeatedly, the goal is said to be "chronically accessible," as in easily activated.[45] Importantly, as Nancy Snow notes, "Automaticity researchers are clear that nonconsciously activated goal-directed behaviors are not reflex reactions to stimuli, but are intelligent, flexible responses to unfolding situational cues."[46] Finally, as a result of repetition, an association is made between these situational cues and goal-directed behavior. So this is how behavior can become automatic, without it being unthinking or simple rote behavior. When it comes to virtue, Snow claims that we should understand habitual virtuous action on this model, where the goal is specifically related to virtue.[47]

Another relevant aspect of automaticity can be found in Csikszentimihalyi's work on "flow," which helps us to understand the state of mind of the ethical expert in action.[48] When one is in a state of flow, one is immersed in the experience of the activity itself, and is not thinking self-consciously about one's performance of it. Being in this state means that you do not need to exert self-control to keep yourself from being distracted.

Furthermore, as Annas points out, "the point that 'flow' experience is not self-conscious answers well to the point that the mature virtuous person, unlike the learner, responds to the situation in a way unmediated by thoughts that represent oneself as somebody trying to do the virtuous thing, or trying to be like the virtuous person."[49] Expert performance at the time of action need not be self-conscious, and we shouldn't require that genuinely virtuous behavior is always accompanied by self-conscious thoughts about one's own virtue.[50]

Building on this, automaticity enables effortless expert performance that~~which~~ allows the expert to operate well on the basis of intuitive (rather than deliberative) judgments, as intuitions are experienced as immediate and not as the result of any conscious deliberation.[51] This intuitiveness is central to expert performance because it allows the expert to react quickly to situations. One important thing to keep in mind about the talk of intuition in expertise is that the ability of the expert to reliably act well on an intuitive level is due to having an immense amount of experience and practice.[52] Expertise, however, is not the only source of intuitive judgment. Intuitions can also arise from the use of mental heuristics, which are basically short-cuts in reasoning, where you simplify a complex problem in order to come to a decision more easily. Since there are multiple sources of intuitive judgments, and they vary with respect to reliability, it's important to note what Daniel Kahneman (who pointed out the unreliability of many forms of heuristics) has to say on the different sources:

> the accurate intuitions of experts are better explained by the effects of prolonged practice than by heuristics. -We can now draw a richer and

> more balanced picture, in which skill and heuristics are alternative sources of intuitive judgments and choices.[53]

So we should expect the fully virtuous person to generally act on moral judgments that are arrived at in an intuitive manner.[54]

The talk of intuitions, however, is often met with a fair amount of skepticism. It may remind one of ethical intuitionism, where moral knowledge is arrived at independent of experience (a priori), but there is a relevant difference in the concept of intuition in expertise. The intuitive response of an expert is possible only because of the depth of experience the expert has accumulated (a posteriori).[55]

The importance of intuitive judgment leads to some debate between those advancing the "virtue as skill" thesis. Because the expertise literature reveals that expert performance relies on numerous nonconscious processes, there is evidence that experts frequently cannot articulate how they knew to act in a particular situation. A chess master, for example, might say something no more illuminating than "I saw it was the right move to make."[56] While experts might be able to articulate some of their mental processes, they cannot necessarily explain why they saw situations in a particular light, or why a particular course of action occurred to them.[57] Even when experts are able to articulate an explanation, the explanations are often inconsistent with their observed behavior. It's important to note that this occurs with experts who are clearly not working in fields anyone would label as a mere "knack."

However, for some working with the "virtue as skill" approach, being an expert means being able to give an account of one's actions. Giving an account, according to Annas, means "that the person with a skill be able explicitly to explain and justify her

particular decisions and judgements, and to do so in terms of some general grasp of the principles which define that skill."[58] So the question becomes whether or not to view articulation as something necessary for expertise and virtue.[59] One aspect that complicates this is that there is ambiguity about what counts as a sufficient explanation or justification. Presumably, what the chess master says in the preceding~~above~~ is not sufficient. But does a sufficient explanation need to involve discussing all the other possible moves and why they would be ruled out? In addition, if expertise does not go hand-in-hand with the ability to sufficiently give an account of one's actions, how does that affect the "virtue as skill" thesis? Is it a point of disanalogy, but one where we should keep the expectation of articulation in virtue? Or should we instead get rid of the articulation requirement altogether?[60]

Finally, there is another reason to be concerned about the role of articulation in expertise. When Patricia Benner studied nurses with a track record of life-saving decisions in emergency situations, she found that often the nurses could not fully articulate how they knew what to do.[61] One of the most serious problems for the nurses was~~is~~ that their judgments were~~are~~ not taken as seriously as those made by doctors because of an assumption that their lack of articulation signaled a lack of knowledge, and so they were accorded less power and status within the hospital, despite their expertise.[62] So it matters that we get an accurate picture of what really goes into acquiring skills and expertise. There are important intuitive and deliberative aspects to both skill acquisition and expert performance. The psychological research helps to correct those philosophical accounts of expertise that overemphasize one aspect over the other.[63]

Skills in Virtue Epistemology

Further issues regarding the "virtue as skill" thesis arise with respect to the intellectual virtues, for skills have frequently been discussed by the two main groups within virtue epistemology—virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism.[64] One context where skills are referenced is in attempts to explain how knowledge requires some reference to features of the knower (such as her faculties, skills, or traits), instead of just focusing on properties of beliefs.[65] This is reflected in Sosa's "AAA" structure of evaluating practices with a characteristic aim. One way in which these two groups distinguish themselves is what kind of feature of the knower is picked out as relevant—faculties or character traits. Virtue reliabilists argue that knowledge consists in true beliefs that are generated by reliable and stable faculties, which would include faculties such as perception. The exercise of these faculties can be done in a tacit manner, without the knower actively reflecting on the basis for one's belief. Virtue responsibilists require more than this, as they argue that knowledge also requires a more active contribution from the knower, such as someone being open-minded (a character trait) in arriving at her beliefs. So for the responsibilist, mere faculties, such as perception, are too passive and do not require the cultivation of a trait, and so the person is essentially less responsible (or accountable) for beliefs that arise only from reliable faculties.[66]

Where do skills fall in this debate? Skill-based approaches have so far found themselves put into both camps.[67] Sosa's form of virtue reliabilism understands virtues in terms of skills, while Zagzebski's virtue responsibilism claims that virtues are associated with skills, as skills provide the knowledge of how to reach the aim of virtue. The acquisition of skills is certainly voluntary, unlike faculties, but the exercise of skills can occur tacitly, which is similar to other faculties mentioned by reliabilists. I won't get into

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further debates between these two groups, though, because both make room for skills in epistemology, and further I agree with Heather Battaly and others[68] who have argued that the distinction between reliabilists and responsibilists is itself problematic, mainly on the ground that there seems little reason thatwhy both views can't be embraced. That is, it appears that both are needed to fully explain how we come to have knowledge, since we acquire knowledge in a variety of ways.

Motivation Objection

There is, however, an important objection to the "virtue as skill" thesis that comes up quite noticeably in differences between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. In summarizing the two groups, Battaly notes that:

> T[t]he rift between Zagzebski's and Sosa''s views is exacerbated by their disagreement over whether the virtues are skills. . . . But, skills are not habits. While skills need not be exercised, habits will not exist unless they are exercised on the appropriate occasions.[69]

Given that habitual virtuous action is understood on a model of skills, the skill--habit distinction is hard to maintain. However, the real problem seems to be that the possession of a skill does not require exercising it on (almost) every appropriate occasion. Skills only represent what you can do, while virtues require that you are actually motivated to exercise them on appropriate occasions. This is the reason Zagzebski rejects virtues as skills, since she thinks virtue centrally involves motivation in a way absent in skill.[70]

This objection arises too with respect to moral virtue, such as in Gary Watson's discussion of the differences in how we evaluate skilled versus moral behavior. Certainly the performance of a skilled act will be judged according to whether it meets the end

pursued— (e.g.,i.e. in tennis, whether you won the game).[71] But when assessing one's level of virtue, it also seems to matter to what extent a person is motivated or committed to act effectively (unlike skills). Watson, for example, notes how a half-hearted tennis performance would not count against your level of skill, while a half-hearted attempt at kindness would count against your level of virtue.[72]

The psychological research on expertise, however, calls this contrast into question. Given the overall difficulty of achieving expertise discussed earlier, one of the most important factors for determining whether someone can attain that level of performance is motivation.[73] Expertise cannot be achieved without a serious commitment to high levels of performance. Furthermore, expertise cannot be maintained without this kind of commitment, as otherwise one's level of skill degrades over time. Research on age and expertise reveals that maintaining expertise requires the same kind of deliberate effort that went into achieving it in the first place.[74] Thus, skills are not accurately characterized as capacities that one could have regardless of whether one is motivated to act skillfully. Hubert Dreyfus makes a similar point when he discusses, in a way reminiscent of Ryle's distinction between single and multi-track dispositions, how we should distinguish between two kinds of skills:

> Acquiring simple skills requires only that one face risks and uncertainty without falling back on rules or fleeing into detachment, whereas acquiring hard skills requires, in addition, a motivation continually to improve—then, one needs both the willingness to take risks and a commitment to excellence that manifests itself in persistence and in high standards for what counts as having done something right.[75]

An activity like safely crossing a busy street is an acquired competence, but simple enough not to involve variable expressions across a variety of situations (i.e., it's single-track in Ryle's sense). There's no need for a strong motivation to improve with single-track competencies such as tying one's shoes. But with "hard" skills, Dreyfus draws our attention to the importance of a particular kind of motivation for achieving and maintaining expertise, which is the motivation to continually improve.

However, it might be objected at this point that it's unclear whether virtue actually requires motivation in the sense displayed in expertise of having a drive to improve one's performance and to continue to engage in practice. For example, Robert Johnson critiques virtue ethicists for failing to "make room for a genuine moral obligation to improve your character and to act in other ways that are appropriate only because you could be a better person than you are."[76] A defense of the "virtue as skill" thesis on this point can be found with Annas's concept of "the drive to aspire," which she argues is fundamental to both skill and virtue. Both skills and virtues are teachable, and Annas points out that "aspiration leads the learner to strive to *improve*, to do what he is doing better rather than taking it over by rote from the teacher."[77] Virtue, while considered to involve habitual actions, is not mere mindless or rote repetition. It takes purposeful effort and experience to acquire virtue. As Annas further argues,

> The drive to aspire stresses the equally important aspect of coming to understand what we are learning, the move to self-direction, and the point that we are always improving (or at least sustaining) virtue. Virtue is not a state you achieve and then sit back, with nothing further to do.[78]

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The possession of virtue is considered to be a matter of degree, and so for anyone there is always the possibility of improvement. Likewise, once expertise has been achieved in a skill, the same kind of deliberate practice and self-monitoring is necessary to retain expert performance. It's an advantage of the "virtue as skill" approach that it can ground an obligation for self-improvement, based on its necessity for achieving expertise.[79]

Virtue, Skill, and Commitment

Despite this, one might still object that motivation does not seem to play a role in evaluating performances in quite the same way it would for virtue. It might seem as though a strong motivation for achieving high standards of performance is merely instrumental to achieving expertise, and doesn't address the kind of commitment expressed by virtue.[80] As Abrol Fairweather remarks,: "To have an excellence of character requires a normative commitment to the end one reliably attains, whereas to have a skill simply requires that the end attained is due to a competence involving training, understanding and discipline."[81]

Although this points to an important distinction between virtues and skills, there is a way to bring our views about skills more in -line with that of virtues. If we switch our evaluations from the performance to the performer, then it looks like we can evaluate the performer in a way that brings in concerns about motivational commitments. To return to the example of less than wholehearted performances, Watson suggests,:

> My half-hearted effort on the tennis court would not support a negative evaluation of my proficiencies at that sport. Nevertheless, it might bear negatively on me as a tennis player. One can be "good at" playing tennis without being overall a good tennis player. A good tennis player, overall,

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> possesses not only a high level of skill but, among other things, a commitment to the game, a responsibility to its distinctive demands. (In this way, 'good tennis player' functions rather like 'good human being.')[82]

A good performer, as distinguished from a good performance, not only displays a "feel for the game" but also a "commitment to the game." As another example of criticizing less than wholehearted performances, we would likely regard a doctor who gives half-hearted attempts at surgery as a bad doctor, even if she can wholeheartedly perform surgery with expertise. The doctor is not being responsive to the distinctive demands of medicine, and so we could criticize her for her lack of commitment, as we would if someone acted half-heartedly with respect to a virtue like kindness.[83] Watson's suggestion closes the gap between judgments of expertise and virtue, as the expert can also be assessed in aretaic terms, where a failure of motivation does count against one being a good performer.

In taking this step, we need to reject both viewing skills as mere capacities and viewing virtues as merely motivational states. Being virtuous requires both knowing how to act well and being motivated to do so,[84] and this can be captured with the "virtue as skill" approach. The ends of a practice can be used not only to judge the skillfulness of a performance, but also the commitment of the performer. Importantly, we do not need to reach beyond a discussion of skills and expertise to incorporate a concern for responsiveness to the demands of a practice. As Watson noted, thinking in terms of what it is to be a good tennis player, brings in evaluations both of one's skillfulness in, and one's commitment to, playing tennis. We might, therefore, add another level to Sosa's "AAA" structure for practices with a characteristic aim, which seems restricted to

evaluations of performances. To move our evaluation to performers, we might also ask of a particular performance whether the person in so acting was responsive to the distinctive demands of the practice. Perhaps what we want is an *assurance* that someone has a normative commitment to the end of a practice, in which case we end up with an "-AAAA"- structure for evaluating performers.[85]

The incorporation of motivational commitment into an account of expertise is also reflected in the approach Narvaez takes in arguing that moral behavior should be understood as skilled behavior.[86] The view of expertise that she is working with includes the idea of an expert being committed to the ends of her practice. As she points out, "an expert desires excellence in the domain. Similarly, the virtuous person desires excellence in virtue, so much so that the desire is reflected not only in behavior but in preferences and choices, it is what the person likes to do."[87] As mentioned earlier, to develop expertise in a domain requires a strong commitment to achieving high levels of performance and a perseverance to engage in a long and difficult acquisition process. This shapes people in ways often overlooked when skills are thought of as mere capacities. As Narvaez goes on to explain,÷

> Learning the skill means changing oneself to be the kind of person who fully embodies the skill, consciously and intuitively. The skill flavors and modifies one's perceptions, attention, desires, and intuitions, as well as semantic, procedural, and conditional knowledge.[88]

In this sense, expertise does capture the motivational aspects of virtue that gave rise to the putative disanalogy between virtues and skills in the case of half-hearted performances.

Future Avenues of Research

One area, though, where the "virtue as skill" approach might not capture our views about virtues is with respect to practical wisdom. Virtues require being practically wise about what is good and bad for people, and how various practices fit into an overall conception of the good life. In contrast, skills do not require making these kinds of value judgments. The end to be pursued in any particular skill is essentially fixed, as in chess it's winning the game, and even being a committed expert in a skill does not require reflection on how the practice of that skill integrates into a well-lived life.

It may be, though, that we should instead understand practical wisdom to be itself a skill, as Jason Swartwood has argued.[89] While such an argument might seem to strengthen the "virtue as skill" thesis, what Swartwood discuses as practical wisdom seems to be already captured by the notion of expertise, as can be seen in Hursthouse's discussion of the "mundane" aspects of practical wisdom.[90] What remains central to practical wisdom, in terms of a broad knowledge of what is good and bad for people, does not seem to fit the model of a skill, even if that knowledge is gained through experience.[91]

Even if this is a relevant difference between virtues and skills, it would not undermine the "virtue as skill" approach. Virtues of character can be understood as specifically moral skills, and it's this connection to morality that brings in the need for practical wisdom. In any case, more work needs to be done to understand the role of practical wisdom in~~with~~ the "virtue as skill" approach.[92]

Overall, the preceding~~above~~ discussions present a strong case for viewing virtuous behavior as skilled behavior—~~. I~~in which case, what would be helpful now is further research on whether moral development is like skill acquisition. Fortunately,

some work is already being done in this area. Narvaez and Lapsley have done extensive work in applying an expertise model to moral development. In regards to the importance of practice and feedback in skill and virtue acquisition, Narvaez claims, "as Aristotle pointed out and modern research confirms, virtuous character takes a lot of immersed *practice* in an environment that provides good, rather than poor, information on performance."[93] Also, in discussing the relationship between moral virtue and practical wisdom, Narvaez, Gleason, and Mitchell have studied the differences in comprehension between moral and prudential themes, and found empirical support for moral motivations developing before practical wisdom.[94]

Another pressing issue is to figure out how to individuate the virtuous skills. For example, Annas says that virtue is a skill, a kind of "global skill," which is the skill of living your life well.[95] Is virtue therefore to be understood as a singular skill? A potential problem with this, as noted by Daniel Jacobson, is that "T[t]he plausibility of a skill-based epistemology was earned by arguments focusing on discrete virtues such as courage and kindness."[96] It is with these more discrete virtues that we can get more immediate feedback about how we're doing, as well as figuring out how to structure deliberate practice to improve them.[97] But if that's the case, will the moral skills map on to the traditional individual virtues such as honesty, courage, kindness, temperance, and so onetc.?

Perhaps when we take the "virtue as skill" thesis seriously, moral skills appear to be more fine-grained than traditional virtue categories admit to. Narvaez, in arguing that expertise is a model for virtue development, claims,:

> Through the course of building perceptual skills (sensibilities), motivational skills (focus), reasoning skills (judgment) and action skills (implementation), individuals move towards expertise. There are many kinds of skills necessary for moral or ethical expertise, including procedural and conditional knowledge that can be employed automatically when needed (doing the right thing at the right time in the right way).[98]

She goes on to claim that these four main types of ethical skills can be broken down into 84 separate ethical skills—many more than found on traditional lists of virtues. Is this too many skills to acquire for moral development? A related issue in individuating the skills is whether, for example, overcoming strong inclinations is the focus of a particular moral skill, like temperance, or whether that aspect is found more generally as part of any moral skill, as in the need for self-regulating behavior. This is another area where experimental research may prove insightful. Furthermore, can we conceptualize vice in the same way? As Annas notes, people do not seem to aim intentionally at cultivating vice, in the way in which people aim at acquiring virtue.[99] Also, being a good liar certainly seems to take skill, but this is not obviously the case with respect to cowardice.[100]

Finally, embracing the idea of virtue as a skill requires us to take seriously the possibility of ethical expertise. The idea of ethical expertise, though, is fairly controversial, especially in the bioethics literature.[101] Additionally, a number of social and political problems arise since experts have a great deal of power, status, and influence in society. Despite the common view that a virtuous person would be an expert in ethical matters, the controversies surrounding ethical expertise are a surprisingly neglected topic in the virtue literature. More generally, discussions of virtue and practical

wisdom have tended to neglect larger issues of power, which are more explicitly recognized in the expertise literature.[102] Neither skills nor virtues will be acquired in a political or social vacuum, and more work needs to be done to accommodate this point.[103]

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[1] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Grinnell: The Peripatetic Press, 1984), 1104a, 14–15.

[2] For example, see Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Paul Bloomfield, *Moral Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Matt Stichter, "Ethical Expertise,"~~,~~ *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10 (2007), 183–194.

[3] Julia Annas, "Virtue Ethics,"~~,~~ in David Copp (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 515–536, 518.

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[4] Daniel Narvaez and Daniel Lapsley, "The psychological foundations of everyday morality and moral expertise,", in Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power (eds.) *Character Psychology and Character Education*, edited by Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 140–165, 143.

[5] Paul Bloomfield, "Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60(1) (2000): 23–43, 23.

[6] Despite the influence of the ancient Greeks on contemporary discussions of virtue as skill, I will not be giving an historical reconstruction of their views. The focus of this chapter is instead on how the "virtue as skill" thesis plays out in contemporary debates in virtue ethics and epistemology. But for differing perspectives on the "virtue as skill" thesis in ancient Greek thought, see Tom Angier, *Techne in Aristotle's Ethics: Crafting the Moral Life* (New York: Continuum, 2010); Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*2011; D. S. Hutchinson, "Doctrines of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric, and Ethics,", *Apeiron* 21 (1988): 17–52; and Stichter, "Ethical Expertise2007."

[7] Linda Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[8] Julia Annas, "Virtue as a Skill," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 3(2) (1995): 227–243.

[9] It is important to note that while I endorse the strong form of the "virtue as skill" thesis, I will still continue to discuss the weaker forms of it that are endorsed by others, as they have insights worth building upon. I do this in part to avoid giving the

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appearance that everyone I discuss from here on out also endorses the strong form. I note this here so it's clear which form of the thesis I am defending, since the strong form basically incorporates the insights of the weaker forms. In other words, the strong form claims that the reason the weak and moderate forms find associations and structural similarities between virtue and skill just is that virtues are skills.

[10] James Wallace, *Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[11] Zagzebski, ~~*1996*~~*Virtues of the Mind*, 107.

[12] Or in the case of intellectual virtue, a connection to truth or understanding.

[13] Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*~~1996~~, 137.

[14] Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*, Vol.~~ume~~ 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23.

[15] Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology*~~2007~~, 88.

[16] At this point, I will focus primarily on the moral virtues, and return in a later section to the intellectual virtues.

[17] Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology*~~2007~~, 88.

[18] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*~~1984~~.

[19] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~, 20.

[20] Sosa denies that reasons always need to be articulable, see *A Virtue Epistemology*~~2009~~, <AU: Please verify.>84–85. Problems with articulation will be raised in a later section.

[21] Gilbert Ryle is credited with pushing the distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that," with skills being a primary example of know-how, in *The*

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Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). For critiques of this distinction, see Jason Stanley, *Know How* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For responses to Stanley, see Ellen Fridland, "Knowing How: Problems and Considerations," *European Journal of Philosophy* 25(3) (2015): 703-727~~(forthcoming)~~ <AU: Please update.>; and Ellen Fridland, "Problems with Intellectualism," *Philosophical Studies* 165(~~:~~3) (2013): ~~-~~ 879–891.

[22] Ryle doesn't use the phrase "multi-track," it appears instead in the ~~forward~~foreword: Julia Tanney, "Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of *The Concept of Mind,*" in Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*~~,~~ (New York: Routledge, 2009), xxviii.

[23] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*~~2009~~, 31.

[24] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*~~2009~~, 32.

[25] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*~~2009~~, 34.

[26] This leaves it open to what extent articulation is required in expertise and virtue.

[27] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*~~1984~~, 1103a32–~~–~~1103b3.

[28] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~, 21.

[29] K. Anders Ericsson, *The Road to Excellence* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996).

[30] John Horn and Hiromi Masunaga, "A Merging Theory of Expertise and Intelligence," in ~~K. Anders Ericsson (ed.)~~ *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 587–612, 601.

[31] Darcia Narvaez, "The Neo-Kohlbergian ~~t~~Tradition and Beyond: Schemas, Expertise and ~~c~~Character," in ~~Gustav Carlo and Carolyn Pope Edwards (eds.)~~ *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 51: Moral Motivation through the Lifespan*,

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edited by Gustav Carlo and Carolyn Pope-Edwards (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 119–163.

[32] Christian Miller, "The Problem of Character," in Stan Van Hooft (ed.) *The Handbook of Virtue Ethics*, edited by Stan Van Hooft (New York: Routledge, 2014), 418–429, 421. Though, when it comes to virtue epistemology, it might be problematic if the standard for knowledge is having developed intellectual skills to the level of expertise. This point is raised by Lauren Olin and John M. Doris, "Vicious Minds: Virtue Epistemology, Cognition, and Skepticism," *Philosophical Studies* 168 (2014): 665–692, 676.

[33] "Because high levels of skill must be practiced and adapted personally to dynamic contexts, aspiring experts need to develop a self-disciplined approach to learning and practice to gain consistency." Barry J. Zimmerman, "Development and Adaptation of Expertise: The Role of Self-Regulatory Processes and Beliefs," in K. Anders Ericsson (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 705–722, 706.

[34] See Paul J. Feltovich, Michael J. Prietula, and K. Anders Ericsson, "Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives," in K. Anders Ericsson (ed.) *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41–68, 56.

[35] Bob Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," *The Philosophical Review* 93(2) (1984): 227–247.

[36] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* 2009, 60.

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[37] Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues,"~~1984,~~ 238.

[38] This is a controversial view of courage. It may be that instead of identifying the self-regulating behavior that defines some virtues, he has identified the importance of self-regulating behavior in all virtues.

[39] Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*~~1996~~, 108.

[40] Wallace, *Virtues and Vices*~~1978~~, 44.

[41] Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues,"~~1984,~~ 239.

[42] There is, for example, a fair amount of literature in business ethics on what honesty requires in business negotiations. The medical ethics literature also presents many difficult cases that would seem to fall under honesty, such as issues regarding informed consent and confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship.

[43] Respectively, Nancy E. Snow, "Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9 (2006):~~,~~ 545–561; and Julia Annas, "The ~~p~~Phenomenology of ~~v~~Virtue," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7 (2008):~~,~~ 21–34.

[44] Feltovich, Prietula, and Ericsson, "Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives~~2006~~."

[45] Lapsley and Narvaez take a similar approach in Daniel K. Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez, "A Social-~~c~~Cognitive ~~a~~Approach to the Moral Personality," in ~~Daniel K. Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez (eds.)~~ *Moral Development, Self and ~~i~~Identity: Essays in ~~h~~Honor of Augusto Blasi*, edited by Daniel K. Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004), 189–212~~)~~. Though they put the reference to mental representations of goals in the language of "schemas," claiming that

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"~~W~~[w]e argue that the moral personality is better understood in terms of the chronic accessibility of moral schemas for construing social events" (see page 18).

[46] Nancy E. Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 43.

[47] Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence*~~2010~~, 52.

[48] Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

[49] Annas, "The Phenomenology of Virtue,"~~2008,~~ 30.

[50] Annas also notes how the "flow" experience can vindicate Aristotle's claim that virtuous activity should be in some sense pleasant. See Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~, ~~e~~Chap~~ter~~ 5.

[51] Dual-processing theory in cognitive science is especially helpful for understanding the contrast between our automatic/intuitive and controlled/deliberative mental processes. See Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); and Matt Stichter, "Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts," *Humana.Mente*~~——~~*Journal of Philosophical Studies* 28: Experts and Expertise. Interdisciplinary Issues (2015): 105–128.

[52] The psychological research "locates automaticity on the backend of development. It is the outcome of repeated experience, of instruction, intentional coaching and socialisation." Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill, "On Dual Processing and Heuristic Approaches to Moral Cognition," *Journal of Moral Education* ~~Vol.~~ 37(~~:~~3) (2008):~~;~~ 313–332, 324–325.

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[53] Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*~~2011~~, 11.

[54] So from here on out, when I refer to intuitions, I intend specifically the kind of intuitions that arise from expertise.

[55] As Bloomfield notes, ~~:~~ "The sense of 'intuition' here is quite different from the a priori intuitions posited by moral intuitions like Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, and Prichard. The relevant intuitions for virtue epistemology and moral epistemology are a posteriori." ~~:~~ Bloomfield, "Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue," ~~2000,~~ 39. As another example of moral intuitionism, see Robert Audi, *The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[56] The research shows that "experts often cannot articulate their knowledge because much of their knowledge is tacit and their overt intuitions can be flawed." See Michelene T. H. Chi, "Two Approaches to the Study of Experts' Characteristics," in ~~K. Anders Ericsson (ed.)~~ *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21–30, 24.

[57] Ericsson points out that "they cannot report why only one of several logically possible thoughts entered their attention, they must make inferences or confabulate answers to such questions." K. Anders Ericsson, "Protocol Analysis and Expert Thought: Concurrent Verbalizations of Thinking during Experts' Performance on Representative Tasks," in ~~K. Anders Ericsson (ed.)~~ *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 223–241, 230.

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[58] Annas, "Virtue as a Skill,"~~1995,~~ 233.

[59] Connected to this is the issue of whether moral knowledge is codifiable, since the lack of articulation would make it more difficult to codify the knowledge of the virtuous person.

[60] For contrasting points of view, see Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~; and Stichter, "Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts~~2015~~."

[61] Patricia Benner, *From Novice to Expert* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.~~New Jersey~~: Prentice Hall Health, 2001), 32. <AU: Please provide city of publication.>Benner was applying the Dreyfus account of skill acquisition;~~,~~ see Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, "Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise," *Human Studies* 14 (1991):~~,~~ 229–250.

[62] Of course another reason is due to gender discrimination, since the doctors tend to be male and the nurses female.

[63] For example, Dreyfus seems to underestimate the role of deliberation in expertise, while Annas seems to overstate it.

[64] Sosa is representative of reliabilism, while Zagzebski is representative of responsibilism.

[65] Though~~,~~ this is by no means the only thing that virtue epistemologists focus on in applying virtue concepts to epistemological debates.

[66] A related debate about skills in virtue epistemology concerns whether the relevant kind of success in epistemology (truth) allows intellectual virtues to be modeled on ethical virtues. Annas, contra Zagzebski, argues that there are different kinds of success, which prevents the intellectual to be modeled on the ethical. See Julia

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Annas, "The Structure of Virtue," in ~~Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds.)~~ *Intellectual Virtue*, edited by Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 15–33. For a reply, see Matt Stichter, "Virtues as Skills in Virtue Epistemology," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 38 (2013): 331–346.

[67] See Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology*~~(2011)~~ <AU: Please verify.>; Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*~~(1996)~~; and John Greco, "Virtues and ~~v~~Vices of Virtue Epistemology," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23 (1993): 413–432.

[68] See Heather Battaly, "Epistemic Self-Indulgence," *Metaphilosophy*, 41 (2010): 214–234.; and Abrol Fairweather, "Duhem-Quine Virtue Epistemology," *Synthese* 187 (2012): 673–692, 678–679.

[69] Heather Battaly, "What ~~i~~Is Virtue Epistemology?," *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*, www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuBatt.htm.

[70] As she puts it, "the motivational component of a virtue defines it more than external effectiveness does, whereas it is the reverse in the case of skills. Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*~~1996~~, 115.

[71] Though I do not mean to suggest that is the only way a performance is judged. One could play poorly but still win due to facing a much less experienced opponent, in which case having won the game will not exhaust the factors relevant to assessing the performance.

[72] Gary Watson, "Two Faces of Responsibility," in Watson, *Agency and Answerability* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Appendix.

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[73] See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Kevin Rathunde, and Samuel Whalen, *Talented Teenagers: The ~~r~~Roots of ~~s~~Success and ~~f~~Failure* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 31–32.

[74] Ralf Krampe and Neil Charness, "Aging and Expertise," in ~~K. Anders Ericsson (ed.)~~ *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance*, edited by K. Anders Ericsson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 723–742.

[75] Hubert Dreyfus, "Could Anything Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I of Being and Time in the light of Division II," in ~~James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall, (eds.)~~ *Appropriating Heidegger*, edited by James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge~~, UK~~: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ~~foot~~note vii.

[76] Robert Johnson, "Virtue and Right," *Ethics* 113 (2003): 810–834, 811. For responses to his challenge, see Annas, ~~2001~~2011,<AU: Not found in Ref list; please verify.> 42–43; and Matt Stichter, "Virtues, Skills, and Right Action," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 14 (2011): 73–86.

[77] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~, 18. [~~H~~her emphasis].

[78] Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*~~2011~~, 25.

[79] Annas's focus on the "drive to aspire" also helps rebut another objection to the "virtue as skill" thesis. Ryle and Wallace both view the regular practice involved with skills as signaling a disanalogy between skills and virtues. Skills might be forgotten if not exercised over time, whereas virtues are more firmly entrenched and are in no danger of being forgotten if a person does not exercise the virtue over time. But Annas is clear that Ryle is mistaken in regard~~s~~ to his views about

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virtue, as he implies that virtue is a static state in that once you achieve it, no further practice is necessary.

[80] That is to say, with respect to virtue, being motivated to be just is not viewed as merely instrumentally necessary to being able to act justly; rather, the commitment to justice is part of what it is to be just. Whereas with skill, it might be thought that the motivation discussed earlier~~above~~ is merely instrumentally necessary to overcoming all the obstacles to achieving expertise, but otherwise expresses no further commitments.

[81] Fairweather, "Duhem-Quine Virtue Epistemology,"~~2012,~~ 678. See also Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology*~~2009~~, 73–74.<AU: Please verify.>

[82] Watson, "Two Faces of Responsibility," ~~2004,~~ Appendix.

[83] See Angier, *Techne in Aristotle's Ethics*~~2010~~, 7, 40.

[84] This isn't to deny that we can assess whether an act is virtuous or instead vicious without knowing the actor's motivations (e.g., whether she is doing the right thing but for the wrong reason).

[85] This would also cover how we think there is something of value to those who are committed to good ends, even when they fail in practice to achieve them.

[86] By "moral behavior,"~~,~~ I intended the idea of not only doing the right thing, but also going about it in the right way;~~.~~ ~~T~~that is, one can do the right thing by accident, in which case the moral behavior would not be a product of a skill.

[87] Darcia Narvaez, "Integrative Ethical Education," in ~~Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana (eds.)~~ *Handbook of Moral Development*, edited by Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), 703–733, 719.

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[88] Narvaez, "Integrative Ethical Education,"2006, 722.

[89] Jason Swartwood, "Wisdom as an Expert Skill," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 16 (2013): 511–528.

[90] Rosalind Hursthouse, "Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 106 (2006): 285–309.

[91] For more detail, see Matt Stichter, "Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94(3) (2016): 435-448(forthcoming).<AU: Please update.> See also Angier, *Techne in Aristotle's Ethics*2010, 48–56.

[92] Whether practical wisdom is involved with the intellectual virtues is another issue worthy of more attention.

[93] Darcia Narvaez, "Wisdom as Mature Moral Functioning: Insights from Developmental Psychology and nNeurobiology," in Mark Jones, Paul Lewis, and Kelly Reffitt (Eds.), *Toward Human Flourishing: Character, Practical Wisdom and Professional Formation*, edited by Mark Jones, Paul Lewis, and Kelly Reffitt (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2013). [Hher emphasis], 24-40.<AU: Please add page numbers.>

[94] Darcia Narvaez, Tracy Gleason, and Christyan Mitchell, "Moral vVirtue and Practical Wisdom: Theme Comprehension in Children, Youth and aAdults," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 171(:4) (2010): 1–26.

[95] Annas, "The Structure of Virtue,"2003.

[96] Daniel Jacobson, "Seeing by Feeling," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8 (2005): 401.

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[97] Though Jacobson also notes how the virtues need to be unified in some respect, so that the virtuous person can come to an all-things-considered judgment about how to act. One way to try to meet both of these demands is to claim that while virtue does aim at the overall end of living well, we cannot do this without thinking in terms of constitutive ends that make up living well (*eudaimonia*). This would be a role for practical wisdom to play, since practical wisdom is centrally about how various ends fit into an overall picture of the good life. These constitutive ends would give us more concrete ends to aim at relative to just aiming at living well (which would help with knowing what counts as success, how to structure deliberate practice, providing for better feedback, etc.), without giving up the idea of an overall unity that binds these ends together.

[98] Narvaez, "Wisdom as Mature Moral Functioning: Insights from Developmental Psychology and Neurobiology."~~2013.~~

[99] Julia Annas, "Virtue, Skill and Vice," Presented at Virtue and Skill workshop, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, Norway (June 1–2, 2015).

[100] If we cannot model vice on skill, does this undermine the "virtue as skill" thesis? As noted earlier~~above~~, the "virtue as skill" thesis will likely require us to re-think traditional virtue categories, and we may need to do the same with vice. Furthermore, it takes skill to reliably act rightly, because as Aristotle noted, there's only one way to hit a bullseye, but there are countless ways to miss it. Vices might pick out instead a fairly diverse set of factors that can lead one to reliably act wrongly, in which case we need not think that vices would have to be conceptualized as skills on this approach.

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[101] See Norbert L. Steinkamp, Bert Gordijn, and Henk A. M. J. ten Have, "Debating Ethical Expertise," *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 18(~~:~~2) (2008)~~:~~ 173–192; and Sarah McGrath, "Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise," in ~~Shafer-Landau (Ed.),~~ *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 3, edited by R. Shafer-Landau (~~2005~~2008): 87–107, Oxford: Oxford University Press.<AU: Please add first name of editor and publication details.>

[102] Bent Flyvbjerg helpfully brings to our attention what has been left out of such discussions: "the classical interpretation of *phronesis* is strong on values but weak on issues of power . . . practical wisdom involves not only appreciative judgements in terms of values but also an understanding of the practical political realities of any situation as part of an integrated judgement in terms of power." Bent Flyvbjerg, "Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections," *Planning Theory & Practice*~~:~~ 5(~~:~~3) (2004)~~:~~ 283–306, 284. Flyvbjerg's point is that reflections on our conceptions of the good life, and the value of the activities we are engaged in, cannot be carried out in complete isolation from the social, political, legal, and economic circumstances in which we find ourselves. It is not that one is merely asking questions about power alongside the questions about value, but that there are power dynamics in our own thinking about morality, what is valuable, and what the good life consists in. The context of capitalism, for example, problematically leads us to overestimate the value of money, material goods, and competitive practices.

[103] My thanks to Nancy Snow and Christian Miller for very helpful feedback on this chapter.

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