

Pansentient Monism

Formulating Panpsychism as a Genuine Psycho-Physical Identity Theory

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Abstract

The thesis that follows proffers a solution to the mind-matter problem, the problem as to how mind and matter relate. The proposed solution herein is a variant of *panpsychism* – the theory that all (*pan*) has minds (*psyche*) – that we name *pansentient monism*. By defining the suffix ‘psyche’ of panpsychism, i.e. by analysing what ‘mind’ is (Chapter 1), we thereby initiate the effacement of the distinction between mind and matter, and thus advance a monism. We thereafter critically examine the prevalent view, antithetical to a pansentient monism, that mind is *not identical* to matter but *emergent* therefrom (Chapter 2). This anti-emergentist critique acts also as a fortification of the Genetic Argument for panpsychism: if mind is not emergent (nor distinct) from matter, mind must always have existed with matter. But what is ‘matter’? Chapter 3 investigates what we understand by ‘matter’, or ‘the physical’, and *exposes it* as a highly deficient concept and percept that *in concreto* points to its identity with that denoted by ‘mind’. This also acts as a fortification of the Abstraction Argument for panpsychism, employing a new taxonomy of physicalism and a new taxonomy of the varieties of abstraction. Thus do we reach a monism that is a parsimonious psycho-physical identity theory. But here we face what can be called *The Identity Problem for Panpsychism*: if our panpsychism is a psycho-physical identity theory, how can it respond to the powerful objections that beset the identity theory of the twentieth century? In Chapter 4 it will be argued that, like emergentism, this psycho-neural identity theory presupposed a deficient concept of ‘matter’, down to which mind was reduced away, let alone identified. But to identify down phenomena to what is actually an abstraction is to commit failure of explanation. When the theory is amended accordingly, we move from a psycho-neural identity theory to a *genuine psycho-physical identity theory* that as such can overcome the aforementioned identity problem. Furthermore, as Chapter 5 clarifies, our pansentient monism has, in addition to parsimony, the explanatory power to resolve the problem of mental causation that afflicts both the reductive physicalism of psycho-neural identity theory and the non-reductive physicalism of emergentism, by *genuinely* identifying physical and mental causation. Jaegwon Kim considers the place of consciousness in a physical world and the nature of mental causation to be the two key components of the mind-matter problem. Through the critical analysis of our prosaic understanding of mind and matter in this thesis, which incorporates the thought of both classical and contemporary thinkers through a novel fusion, it is hoped that both components are addressed and redressed. That is to say that I present this pansentient monism as a plausible, parsimonious, explanatory, and thus, I think, powerful position towards this ever-perplexing mind-matter mystery.

CONTENTS

Abstract	2
List of Figures	8
List of Appendices	9
Acknowledgements and Author's Declaration	10
Abbreviations	11
Introduction	14
§1: What is Panpsychism?	14
– Classification	
– Contemporary Importance	
§2: Contemporary Overview of Panpsychism	23
§3: General Arguments for Panpsychism	25
1. Genetic Argument (Anti-Emergence Argument)	
a. Logical	
b. Diachronic	
i. Evolutionary	
ii. Generational	
2. Inferential Argument	
3. Abstraction Argument (Intrinsic Nature Argument)	
§4: Challenges to Panpsychism	34
§5: My Inquiry	37
Chapter 1: Sentience	39
§1 Distinctions of Sentience	41
i. Space and Sentience	
ii. Intentionality	
iii. Privacy	
§2 Contents of Sentience	63
i. Qualia: Sensibility	
ii. Qualia: Emotivity	
iii. Cognition	
§3 Modes of Sentience	75
i. A-consciousness to P-sentience	
ii. Rhythm of Duration	
iii. Veridicality	
§4 Alternate States of Sentience	83
End Remarks	86
Chapter 2: Emergence	88
<i>Part 1: Explication of Emergentism</i>	
Historic Overview:	90
– British emergentists	
– Reductive materialism	
– Non-Reductive materialism (post-1970s) as emergentism	
Aspects:	
i. Epistemic Bifurcation ('non-reductivism')	93
a. Matter as structurally describable	
b. Mind as not of necessity structurally describable	
c. Epistemic dualism but ontological (material) monism	
ii. Correlation (of mental events and material events)	96
a. Supervenient events (§) and subvenient events (<u>s</u>)	
b. Strong and weak supervenience	
c. <i>Type-asymmetric</i> and <i>token-symmetric</i> correlation	

d.	Correlation indicative of various relations	
e.	<i>Neural (and other) correlates of consciousness</i>	
iii.	Multiple Realization	100
a.	š can have a multiplicity of <u>s</u> .	
i.	Thus relation of š and <u>s</u> is not psycho-neural <i>identity</i>	
b.	Types of Multiple Realization	
c.	The Modality Necessary for Multiple Realization Discourse	
iv.	Novelty	110
a.	š have 'properties' not in <u>s</u>	
b.	Distinction between š as <i>constituted by</i> <u>s</u> , and <u>š</u> as <i>caused by</i> <u>s</u>	
i.	<i>aggregate</i> and <i>emergent</i> , or <i>homogeneous</i> and <i>heterogeneous</i>	
c.	Distinction between <i>determination</i> and <i>explanation</i> (of š by <u>s</u>)	
d.	Distinction between <i>theoretical unpredictability</i> (of š by <u>s</u>) and part <i>inductive predictability</i> (of š by <u>s</u>)	
e.	A chief novelty is <i>non-structural describability</i> of š	
f.	Another, crucial, novelty is <i>downward causation</i> :	
v.	Causation	114
a.	Twelve kinds of causation illustrated, subsumed under:	
i.	Mechanical (Lateral)	
ii.	Upward	
iii.	Downward	
1.	<i>Vis-à-vis</i> obstacles: epiphenomenalism, causal exclusion, causal closure, overdetermination, nomology, teleology, explanatory gap, double emergence, antinomies.	
	<i>Part 2: Critique of Emergentism</i>	125
i.	Defining, summarizing and adding terms	126
ii.	Arguments Internal	133
	Argument A: Mental causation and causal closure	
	Argument B: Epistemic bifurcation and physicalism	
	Argument C: Epiphenomenalism and causal closure	
	Argument D: Epiphenomenalism and the inconsistency problem	
	Argument E: Multiple realization and non-reductivism	
iii.	Arguments External	142
	Argument F: The Big Pang Problem	
	Argument G: Emergence Category Mistake	
	End Remarks	147
	Chapter 3: The Physical as Abstraction	149
	Preamble	
	§1: The Problem of defining 'the Physical' (Hempel's Dilemma)	149
	– Immediate Rejection of <i>currentism</i>	
	– Immediate Rejection of <i>futurism</i>	
	§2: The Components of Physicalism	157
	– Physics:	
	o Nomology, Substance, Interactions, Micro-elements, Properties, Space, Time	
	– Philosophy:	
	o Causal closure, strict nomology, no-fundamental-mentality principle, no-fundamental-teleology principle, no third realm, transordinal nomology, cross-categorial nomology, mathematical nomology, logical nomology	
	– Further problems of physicalism thus emerge	

§3: The Varieties of Abstraction	178
i. Fractionality	
ii. Deficient Extension	
iii. Space Contraction of Extension	
iv. Arbitrary Perceptons for Perception	
v. Sentience blindness of Classic Sensation	
vi. The Common Concept of Perception as itself Abstraction	

§4: Bridging to Panpsychism	192
End Remarks	197

Chapter 4: Panpsychism as Identity Theory 199

Preliminary Remarks	
§1: Types of Identity	201
○ 1. Strict/Numerical	
○ 2. Qualitative	
○ 3. Subclass	
○ 4. Mereological	
○ 5. Necessary	
○ 6. Contingent	
§2: Three Mind-Matter Identity Relations	204
○ i. Phype-Mype	
○ ii. Phoken-Mype	
○ iii. Phype-Moken	
§3: The Psycho-Neural Identity Theory (PN-IdT)	205
§4: Critique of PN-IdT for Elaboration of PM	212
○ 1i: PN-IdT and the Physical as Abstraction	
○ 1ii: Parsimony	
○ 2: Property Objections	
▪ 2i: General (Identity of Indiscernibles)	
▪ 2ii: Privacy	
▪ 2iii: Space	
• 2iii–1-SPO: Onefold Space Property Objection	
• 2iii–2-SPO: Twofold Space Property Objection	
○ 2iii–2-SPO-b: Hyperspace Condition for Twofold Identity	
▪ 2iv – Return to Privacy	
○ 3: Multiple Realization	
End Remarks	243

Chapter 5: Panpsychism and Mental Causation 245

Preamble	
§1: Causation: Epistemic/Ontological and Anomalous/Nomological	248
§2: The Varieties of Mental Causation	252

- Transitive
 - Diachronic psycho-psychological
 - Synchronic upward psycho-psychological
 - Synchronic downward psycho-psychological
 - Diachronic psycho-physical
- Cognitive
 - Wilful
 - Intellectual
- Qualitative
 - PMPI
 - Demetepual
 - Perceptual
 - PMCE

- Cognizant
 - o Conscious
 - o Subconscious
- Restrictive
 - o Free
 - Non-Physical
 - Non-Motivational
 - Anomalous
 - Super-structural
 - Intra-structural
 - o Determined
 - Physical
 - Motivational
 - Nomological
 - Psycho-physical Aetiological

§3: The Problem of Mental Causation Resolved	263
i. physical causal closure	
ii. causal exclusion	
iii. mind-body supervenience	
iv. mental/physical property dualism	
End Remarks	270
Appendices	272
Reference List	304