Gilles Deleuze's Non-Ontological Philosophy

by

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A Thesis

presented to

The University of Guelph

In partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

Guelph, Ontario, Canada

ABSRACT

GILLES DELEUZE'S NON-ONTOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

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University of Guelph, 2021

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The aim of this dissertation is to develop an account of Gilles Deleuze's philosophical project as a departure from ontology and ontological thinking. Ontology can be broadly understood as the study of being or the study of the meaning of being. Traditional ontology examines the nature of being while more contemporary philosophy often understands being itself as becoming or a process. In this respect, Deleuze has often been interpreted as a process or differential ontologist. This project departs from that interpretation by arguing for a non-ontological Deleuze.

The dissertation is broken into three papers where each presents a different account of what I call the non-ontological Deleuze through his work on the major pre-Kantian modern philosophers: David Hume, Benedict Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. Each paper then uses the non-ontological Deleuze to engage with a related movement in post-Deleuzian Continental Philosophy. The first paper focuses on Deleuze's early work on Hume to argue for a re-reading of the history of modern philosophy with a basis in transcendental empiricism rather than Kantian transcendental idealism. This paper uses Deleuze's reading of Hume to respond to and critique the Speculative Realist movement's charge that post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationism. The second paper uses Deleuze's work on Spinoza to argue for what the former calls ethology as a replacement for ontology. The claim here is that we should think of things in terms of what they do rather than what they are: in terms of their motion and affects rather than their being. There I contrast my reading of Deleuze's Spinoza with those

thinkers who have recently used that work to develop what is often referred to as New Materialism. The final paper argues that understanding things in terms of what they can do requires a nomadology, which is Deleuze's play on Leibniz's monadology. This paper uses Deleuze's nomadology to create a dialogue with the emerging literature on Critical Posthumanism and subjectivity that has been influenced by Deleuze to suggest that posthumanist subjectivity should be understood in non-ontological terms.

DEDICATION

For my recently departed grandmother Marge Novak

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to the members of my committee: Dr. Antonio Calcagno, Dr. Don Dedrick, and Dr. Gregory Flaxman. This project would not have been possible without your continued guidance and support.

To Dr. Karen Houle for seeing me through the start of this project and in encouraging me to study Deleuze.

To the advisors and mentors who helped me through my undergraduate and MA degrees. After two years spent studying aviation for the Army before deciding that I should take some time to figure things out, I first came to philosophy without much confidence that I could complete a BA let alone a PhD. To Dr. Gayle Baldwin for rekindling a desire to learn and to keep learning that I had largely let myself forget. To Dr. Rebecca Rozelle-Stone for first suggesting graduate school and for introducing me to "continental" philosophy—I remember signing up for an Ethical Theory course expecting to learn more utilitarianism and virtue ethics and instead having my world changed by thinkers like Weil, Levinas, and Sartre. Thank you also to Dr. Benjamin Grazzini, Dr. Ammon Allred, and Dr. Jerry Van-Hoy at Toledo seeing me through MA and into the program at Guelph.

To Dr. Andrew Cutrofello and Dr. Ada Jaarsma for your suggestions and edits to the first and second papers respectively.

To Dr. Ivy Ken for proving it can be done.

To fellow members of my cohort: these include Joshua Grant-Young, Cameron Fioret, and Marie-Pier Lemay. Also to former graduate students. Your advice and theses have been invaluable: Dr. Vedran Grahovac, Dr. Brenton Ables, Dr. Shannon Buckley, Dr. Daniel Griffin, and Dr. Casey Ford.

Finally, thanks to Dale and Twila Novak for encouraging me even when what I was doing didn't necessarily make sense.

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Introduction

> The history of philosophy is encumbered with the problem of being, IS.…one must make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over. Substitute the AND for IS.
> —Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*

Like many other dissertations, this one has evolved far beyond the original research question. The proposal I initially defended was centered on the question: "What can a techno-social body do?" The aim of the project was to develop an account of Deleuzian subjectivity as it related to life on the internet. While subjectivity continues to play a significant role in this project, over time I became less interested in social media and more interested in the ontological implications of thinking about things in terms of what they can do. Indeed, the questions of what we are doing and what bodies can do form one of the refrains throughout the following three papers. Yet, what follows is not an ontological account of "doing" or action, or events, or processes, or becoming, or even difference. Instead each of the following papers presents an argument that we can read Gilles Deleuze's philosophy as a departure from ontology itself.

Such a reading of Deleuze is uncommon, but not without precedent. In the United States, Gregory Flaxman and Gregg Lambert have—to varying degrees and in different ways—presented non-ontological accounts of Deleuze's work. In France, the work of Anne Sauvagnargues is in the same vein, while the most overt argument for a non-ontological Deleuze likely comes from François Zourabichvili, who declared that: "If there is an orientation of the philosophy of Deleuze, it is this: *the extinction of the term "being" and therefore of ontology*."[1] However, Deleuze has typically been read as a differential ontologist or ontologist of becoming. This is especially the case in North America and—to my knowledge—the following papers

[1] Francois Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event: Together with The Vocabulary of Deleuze*, (ed.) Gregg Lambert and Daniel Smith (tr.) Kieren Aarons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 37.

constitute the most explicit argument for a non-ontological Deleuze on the continent. Nonetheless, the project is certainly indebted to prior work on the non-ontological Deleuze.

There were two events which inspired the shift of the project from the digital to the (n)ontological. The first occurred at the 2018 *Deleuze and Guattari Camp* preceding the international conference in Campinas, Brazil. At one of the courses at the camp, I recall Sauvagnargues and Flaxman emphatically claiming: "There is no ontology in Deleuze!" The comment apparently stuck, and I recall becoming fascinated with what it might mean when I revisited Martin Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*. After thirty-eight pages of reflection on the question of why there are beings instead of nothing and the question of Being as such, he suggests that:

> The word 'Being' is then finally just an empty word. It means nothing actual, tangible, real. Its meaning is an unreal vapour. So in the end Nietzsche is entirely right when he calls the 'highest concepts' such a Being 'the final wisp of evaporating reality' (*Twilight of the Idols* VIII, 78).Who would want to chase after such a vapour, the term for which is just the name for a huge error![2]

Despite this bold suggestion, he proceeds with "*a question, the question*: 'Is "Being" a mere word and its meaning a vapour, or is it the spiritual fate of the West?"[3] Much could be said about this alarming question. I will just note Heidegger first wrote the *Introduction* as part of a lecture series in 1935 after he had left rectorship at Freiberg and was still a member of the Nazi party, but his choice to publish it in 1953 created a controversy and led to denunciations from Carl Jung

[2] Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1953), (tr.) Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Yale University Press, 2000), 38.
[3] Ibid., 40.

and Jürgen Habermas.[4] That is to say, the question and Heidegger's broader arguments about Being and the West in the *Introduction* cannot simply be attributed to the political climate of the 1930's but are apparently views he held well-after the war.

My point in raising this is not to draw a verdict about Heidegger, but to explain my motivation in the project. Given the question above, it would seem—at least for Heidegger—that the project of ontology is inseparable from a Eurocentric political project for which certain concepts are necessary to defend. Less charitably, we might even say that for Heidegger ontology led to fascism and Nazism. To be clear, I am not saying that ontology is fascist or that ontological philosophy is an endorsement of Heidegger's political or philosophical views. However, the historical association between the two struck me as a reason why it might be philosophically worthwhile to be suspicious of ontology.

Given his reputation as an overtly anti-fascist philosopher who was also indebted Heidegger, the suggestion that there is no ontology in Deleuze was what sparked my search for the non-ontological Deleuze.[5] By a non-ontological Deleuze I do not mean one that is unconcerned with ontology or simply opposed to Heidegger's ontology. Rather, my interest has been in reading Deleuze while taking seriously the Nietzschean claim that being is an empty word and a vapour. One of my questions implicit in each of the following papers asks: What can philosophy say without being? On my account, to speak without being means going far beyond a rejection of the Heideggerian Being. To speak without being means rejecting *ontos* and thereby

[4] Ibid., xiv-xvi.
[5] In terms of the influence of Heidegger on Deleuze, I am thinking of Constantin Boundas' chapter on Heidegger in *Deleuze's Philosophical Heritage*: especially his claim that "I have always maintained that Deleuze's choice of the title 'Difference and Repetition' for his most important philosophical text was meant as a response to Heidegger's 'Being and Time'." Constantin V. Boundas, "Martin Heidegger," in *Deleuze's Philosophical Heritage*, (ed.) Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (Edinburgh: University Press, 2009), 321-338 here 326.

ontology itself. That is to say, non-ontology rejects being *qua* being but it also rejects being *qua* becoming and any other cognate of being.

Without even the cognates of being, non-ontological philosophy might seem like an extreme anti-realism or nihilism where nothing could be said about the world. We may recall that in *Twilight of the Idols*, shortly after declaring the "highest concepts" to be empty and evaporating, Friedrich Nietzsche tells a parable of the history of Western philosophy as the "History of an Error." In the parable he opposes the "apparent world" of lived reality with the "real world" of supposed philosophical truth, which originally took the form of Platonic Ideals. Over time, Platonism becomes Christianity and eventually Cartesianism and the objective reality of Immanuel Kant's noumena before becoming realized as something for the positivists to pass over and eventually reject. Yet, once rejected, Nietzsche concludes that "*with the real world we have also done away with the apparent one!*"[6]

Even while Nietzsche says that both the lived and ideal worlds have been lost, he does not declare an end to philosophy or conclude that it has nothing more to say. Instead, he closes the parable by pointing toward a philosophy of the future. In *Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy*, Flaxman recounts the parable and his thesis is that for Nietzsche, as well as Deleuze, philosophy must affirm the powers of the false through fabulation or the construction of new concepts and styles of thinking.[7] I don't dispute Flaxman's reading of the Nietzschean-Deleuze and having opened with the suspicion being is an empty word, it should be clear that I share his

[6] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols (1889)" in *The Nietzsche Reader*, (ed.) Keith Ansell-Pearson and Duncan Large (Blackwell Publishing 2006), 456–470 here 465.
463-465.
[7] Gregory Flaxman, *Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy*, Powers of the False, Vol. 1. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), xiv-xxi.

view that "Deleuze's thought is unthinkable without Nietzsche…."[8] Indeed, the Nietzschean maxim to philosophize with a hammer shines through in Deleuze's challenge to the Image of Thought, his creation of a new philosophical lexicon, and the anti-philosophy in his collaborations with Guattari. Nonetheless, we should recall that for Deleuze it was not Nietzsche but Spinoza who was the "Christ of philosophers…."[9] This is to say that while I discuss Nietzsche at times and his work is in the background throughout the project, this is not a dissertation on the Nietzschean-Deleuze. Accordingly, I depart from Flaxman's reading of Deleuze as a philosopher of fabulation where the creation of concepts is an affirmation of the false.

Before turning to a positive formulation, I want to highlight some other differences between this project and other literature on what I've been calling the non-ontological Deleuze. In addition to emphasizing the influence of Nietzsche on Deleuze, Flaxman also focuses on Franz Kafka and the role that literature and cinema played in Deleuze's work. Similarly, in *In Search of a New Image of Thought* (2012), Lambert emphasizes the literary Deleuze with chapters devoted to his work on Marcel Proust, Kafka, and Herman Melville. And his earlier book *The Non-philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* (2002), explores the connections between Deleuze, Jorge Luis Borges, and Antonin Artaud. In contrast, the following papers read Deleuze through his works on the early modern philosophers: David Hume, Benedict Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. Thus, this project departs from the earlier literature and makes a novel research contribution by theorizing the non-ontological Deleuze through his reading of the history of early modern philosophy. This approach no doubt entails reading Deleuze as a philosopher, so to

[8] Ibid., 13
[9] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 207

speak, but it does not mean reading Deleuze (or philosophy for that matter) to the exclusion of other disciplines. Like the earlier literature, I explore the relation of philosophy to the non-philosophy of the arts and sciences. But again, unlike Flaxman and Lambert's emphasis on the arts, my focus tends toward the relationship between philosophy and science as well as Deleuze's attempts to engage with the sciences.

Regarding that relationship, a remark by Deleuze that has been of interest to me throughout this project has been his claim "that modern science has not found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it needs. It is that metaphysics that interests me."[10] It might seem paradoxical that a non-ontological philosophy would entail a metaphysics. However, if in denying ontology we also denied the possibility of metaphysics, then it seems that we would need to remain in the position at the end of Nietzsche's parable where we have neither a "real" nor "apparent" world. Yet, as I have mentioned, Nietzsche did not view the "twilight of the idols" as the end of philosophy but as the point at which we must begin working toward a philosophy of the future. In this respect, we might just think of non-ontological metaphysics as those which are neither constrained by nor concerned with being and its cognates.

Metaphysics without reference to being requires a new approach to thinking and new concepts. A refrain which runs throughout all three papers is Deleuze's proclamation in *Dialogues* that empiricist philosophy requires "thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS…"[11] But what would it mean to think with AND instead of IS? Thinking in this style would surely go against the grain of the history of philosophy, but for Deleuze it does not require rejecting the

[10] Deleuze quoted in Jeffrey Bell, "Between Realism and Anti-Realism: Deleuze and the Spinozist Tradition in Philosophy," *Deleuze Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2011): 1–17 here 2-3.
[11] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (1977), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1991), 57.

entire canon of philosophy. Instead, Deleuze famously built his work on searching for a "minor" history of philosophy. In each of the following papers I attempt to show how Deleuze finds a *thinking with AND* in Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz by developing a transcendental empiricism, ethology, and nomadology respectively. By way of concluding this brief introduction, I will provide a brief overview of the papers. I should note that in addition to arguing for a non-ontological Deleuze, each paper situates my reading within the literature on Deleuze in a contemporary movement in Continental Philosophy: Speculative Realism, New Materialism, and Critical Posthumanism respectively.

Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism Against Speculative Realism is centered on Deleuze's reading of Hume in his first monograph, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Yet, it is as much about Kant and post-Kantian philosophy as it is about Hume. In the paper, I address Speculative Realists' recent accusation that nearly all post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationsism: i.e., that subject and object and thereby selves and the world are fundamentally independent from one-another so we can never know things-in-themselves. For the Speculative Realists, correlationism comes from Kant's distinction between subjective phenomena and objective noumena, which he developed as a response to what he took to be Hume's skepticism. The problem with correlationism on the Speculative Realist account is that it precludes the possibility of scientific certainty, and for Quentin Meillassoux the necessary response is to insist on a scientific realism that is justified by contingency rather than necessity.

While the problem of correlationsism is perhaps overstated by the Speculative Realists, it serves as an opening for the project and the Kantian compromise is one that Nietzsche identifies as a key point in his parable:

> The real world unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but the mere thought of it a consolation, an obligation, and imperative. (The old sun in the background, but seen through mist and skepticism; the idea become sublime, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)[12]

Once the transcendental deduction is made, being is already revealed as the emptiness of unattainable noumena. The alternative then seems to be between accepting the Kantian framework and working within a form of correlationism or in insisting that the universe is ordered in such a way that contingency means it is possible to have apodictic certainty about objective reality in spite of Humean skepticism. However, there is another alternative. If we view Kant's critique as an inflection point in the history of philosophy which stemmed from Hume's skepticism, then we can either accept skepticism as an inevitability of the history of philosophy or else develop an interpretation of early modern philosophy where skepticism is less of a problem. The latter is of course Deleuze's route and in his reading of Hume we do not find a thinker who is primarily concerned with apodictic certainty. Instead, we find a thinker who is concerned with what is given to us and for Deleuze this is the start of a journey of developing an empiricist philosophy as a "theory of what we are doing, not a theory of what is."[13]

If philosophy is concerned with what we are doing rather than what is, then we have departed from not only the Kantian project, but also the Cartesian approach to philosophy. While the first paper functions as a sort of un-reading or deconstruction of the history of modern philosophy, the second paper works to identify new problems for philosophy in terms of what we are doing and articulates a model for philosophy without ontology. *We Still Do Not Know What a*

[12] Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols," in *The Nietzsche Reader*, 465.
[13] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (1953), (tr.) Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 133.

Body Can Do replaces Descartes with Spinoza and ontology with what Deleuze calls ethology. The paper is guided by the refrain in Deleuze's work that comes from a problem he identifies in Spinoza: we do not know what a body can do.

Spinoza's problem is necessary for Deleuze to reckon with if philosophy is to theorize what we are doing. The body has largely been neglected in the history of philosophy and Deleuze uses Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism to move beyond both mind/body dualism as well as materialism and idealism to develop a model of embodied thinking where the problem of consciousness is replaced by the problem of the body and its capacities. In the paper, I respond to some of the theorists who have used Deleuze's Spinoza to argue for New Materialist ontologies. My argument is that Deleuze does not seem concerned with rethinking the being of matter given that his response to Spinoza's problem is that we develop ethology whereby we can understand what a body can do by learning about its motion and affects. Both motion and affect tell us what bodies do rather than what they are.

In the latter part of the paper I argue that to depart from ontology requires that we not only change how we think about things but how we think about thinking itself. I use Deleuze's discussion of problems in the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and his claim in *Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza* that Spinoza's problem "is practically a war cry" to argue that the ethological model of philosophy requires the replacement of morality with ethics where ontology itself is a form of morality that has led philosophy toward transcendent approaches to thinking and away from immanence.[14] Departing from ontological approaches to thinking, I

[14] Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968), (tr.) M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 255.

suggest, means moving away from questions with the Socratic form "What is…?" Spinoza's problem does this in that he asks "What can a body do?" rather than "What is a body?"

The problem of the body returns in *Thinking as Folding: Nomadology as a Non-ontological Approach to Posthumanist Subjectivity*. This paper draws on the Critical Posthumanism of thinkers like Rosi Braidotti to argue that for posthumanist thought to overcome the human it must also overcome ontology because being is one of the constituent concepts of the figure of the human arising from the *Cogito*. For Braidotti, Critical Posthumanism is grounded in Deleuze's Spinoza. However, I argue that to understand Deleuze's project we cannot stop with his Spinoza, but must include his work on Leibniz as it is only through that work that he seems to resolve the problem that we do not know what a body can do.

At the conclusion of his work on Leibniz, Deleuze calls for a nomadology which he develops through Leibniz's calculus and the concepts of the function and folding. Nomadology allows Deleuze to account for how things change by using the differentiation of the calculus to develop an account of difference-in-itself. Through its grounding in difference rather than identity, nomadology conceives of things as events through folding rather than as entities. Folding has its origins in Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and I use the concept to show Deleuze's departure from phenomenology toward a new empiricism. I also show how posthumanist thought developed out of post-war French philosophers including phenomenologists like Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, but ultimately originated in Nietzsche.

Unlike the phenomenologists who viewed the "End of Man" as part of a greater crisis for philosophy, Deleuze was enthusiastic about the possibilities for new subjectivities and he and

Guattari conclude their collaboration together with a prediction of a "people to come…."[15] I argue that nomadology enables us to start theorizing this people yet to come by overcoming ontology which prefigures the human. Moving beyond the human has profound implications for subjectivity itself and in the final section of the paper I look at the literature on Deleuze and the brain to show how he and Guattari use the figure of the Thought-brain to move beyond the subjectivity of subject/object and develop a tripartite figure of the superject, inject, and eject through philosophy, art, and science respectively.

My hope is that the following study will be of value to those who view Deleuze as a philosopher working in the Nietzschean tradition of reevaluating all values and for whom philosophy is not merely the study of the history of ideas but also the discipline of developing new concepts and styles of thinking. Perhaps it is the case that we remain all too human and that the overcoming of being and ontology will not be so easy. Nonetheless, the papers that follow attempt to explore different styles of thinking beyond the limits of ontology and they have been written in the Deleuzian spirit of philosophy as a creative project of affirmation for life.

[15] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy*?, 218.

Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism Against Speculative Realism: How Deleuze's Hume Avoids the Challenge of Correlationism

Abstract

Speculative Realists argue that almost all post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationism. Correlationism, they claim, originated with Kant's response to Hume. However, one of the major figures associated with the Speculative Realist movement, Levi Bryant, has argued that Gilles Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is able to confront the challenge of correlationism. My central claim is that while Bryant is correct not to label Deleuze as a correlationist, his analysis does not go far enough in that it takes Speculative Realism on its own terms and does not move beyond the logic of correlationism. Drawing from recent literature on Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and Deleuze's first book on Hume, I argue that Deleuze does not read Hume to produce a non-correlationist ontology, but rather develops a non-ontological philosophy. Transcendental empiricism, as he later comes to call it, conceives of philosophy in such a way that avoids the problem of correlationsism. I show how this transcendental empiricism reveals that the Speculative Realist project itself fails to move beyond the logic of correlationism.

Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what is.
—Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*

Introduction

In this article I argue that Deleuze's reading of David Hume in his early work *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953) avoids the central claim made by Speculative Realists that all post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationism. My claim is not that Deleuze's reading of Hume produces a non-correlationist ontology, but that it leads him to a non-ontological philosophy. In Deleuze's terms, this produces a *transcendental empiricism* of "thinking with AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS."[1]

I begin with a recap of the argument that Immanuel Kant understood Hume as an epistemological skeptic and that Kant's use of the transcendental deduction to respond to Hume led him to what Speculative Realists call correlationism. Following that, I explain correlationism itself and Speculative Realism more generally with emphasis on Quentin Meillassoux's *After Finitude* to suggest that Speculative Realism itself fails to escape from the disjunctive logic that underlies correlationism. Finally, I show how Deleuze's reading of Hume does not rest on disjunction and instead produces the non-ontological philosophy he calls transcendental empiricism. Throughout the article I anchor my analysis around the difference between the Deleuze-Humean and Kantian understanding of the terms *transcendental*, *empiricism*, and the *subject*.

[1] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (1977), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1991), 57.

Kant's Interpretation of and Response to Hume's Problem

In *Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Jon Roffe argues that the standard interpretation of Hume follows from the Kantian reading. On that interpretation, Hume is primarily concerned with the problem of induction—that is, how can we ever be justified in concluding that event B will follow from or be caused by event A?[2] In both the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and *Treatise on Human Nature*, Hume famously uses the example of billiards to argue that reason could allow us to conceptualize "a hundred different" events following from one ball striking another, but we nonetheless always expect a particular outcome.[3] Common sense might say we acquire those expectation from experience, but because we cannot have experience of future events, Hume concludes that "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience."[4]

That familiar version of Hume's problem raises one of the most famous and difficult epistemological challenges in the history of philosophy in that he seems to cast doubt on the possibility of justifying generalizations or attaining universal knowledge or certainty in the sciences. If neither reason nor experience can justify our beliefs that things we haven't experienced will resemble things we have experienced, then there seems to be no way to justify the general claims we habitually make. However, most of modern science—as well as most of the things humans do on a daily basis—is predicated on a belief in generalizations.

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[2] Jon Roffe, *Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 3.
[3] David Hume, *Essays and Treatises on Philosophical Subjects* (1758/1777), (ed.) L. Falkenstein and N. McArthur (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2013), sec. 4, pt. 1, 10.
[4] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-1740), (ed.) D. Fate Norton and M. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), book 1, pt. 3, sec. 6, 5.

One reading of Hume's own answer to the problem of induction is that we make generalizations simply because our repeated experiences lead us to form habits wherein we believe that the future will resemble the past, but ultimately there is nothing that can justify that belief and thus nothing to prevent the future from differing from the past. This reading of Hume is recognizable in Kant, who writes in the preface to his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* that for Hume:

> reason completely and fully deceives herself with this concept [cause], falsely taking it for her own child, when really it is nothing but a bastard of the imagination, which, impregnated by experience, and having brought certain representations under the law of association, passes off the resulting subjective necessity (i.e. habit) for an objective necessity (from insight).[5]

For Kant, Hume refutes the sort of rationalism found in Gottfried Leibniz, but instead of replacing it with some alternative satisfactory account of knowledge, he leaves us with a skeptical empiricism that seems to undermine most knowledge. Rather than attempting to resurrect either tradition, Kant understood his project to go beyond both rationalism and empiricism.[6] As Levi Bryant points out, in place of either he proposed the creation of a *transcendental* philosophy.[7]

Here I want draw attention to Kant's conceptions of *empiricism*, *transcendental philosophy*, and *subjectivity*. *Empiricism* in the Kantian sense is an epistemological concept. But

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[5] Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), (tr.) G. Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7.

[6] Marc Rölli, *Gilles Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism: From Tradition to Difference*, (tr.) Peter Hertz-Ohmes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 37.

[7] Levi. R. Bryant, "Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism: Notes Towards a Transcendental Materialism," in *Thinking between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange Encounter*, (ed.) E. Willatt and M. Lee (New York: Continuum, 2009), 29. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as TE.

as Jeffrey Bell observes, quoting William James, "Ordinary empiricism has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions."[8] In both epistemological empiricism and rationalism, the starting point is the disjunction—i.e., a disconnection between the mind and the world that needs to be resolved—and what is needed is a way toward conjunction.[9] In other words, because mind and world are disconnected, we need some third term to bridge the two that would allow us to know that the world consists of things with determinate properties and that every event has an objective cause. For Kant, transcendental philosophy is the way to resolve that challenge.

Transcendental philosophy is, for Bryant, a method for examining the *a priori* structures of consciousness that provide a universal structure to experience. Through the development of his method, Kant hoped "to discover the conditions for *all possible experience* and the limits of knowledge." (TE, 29) Transcendental philosophy aims to establish a limit of knowledge such that the untenable metaphysical claims of rationalism are avoided. But unlike the traditional interpretation of Hume's empiricism, it does not end in skepticism. By uncovering a universal structure to experience that could reveal the necessary connections between our minds and the world, Kant hoped to go beyond the mere "subjective necessity (i.e., habit)" of Hume and attain objective and universal knowledge.[10]

As Daniel W. Smith has observed, of the strengths of transcendental philosophy is that it is—or is at least an attempt at—a purely immanent philosophy: i.e., a philosophy that does not

[8] Jeffery A. Bell, *Deleuze's Hume: Philosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 20.
[9] Paul Ennis and Peter Gratton, *The Meillassoux Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 145–46.
[10] Rölli, *Gilles Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism*, 9.

appeal to objects that transcend possible experience.[11] Because he began with the epistemological disjunction, however, Kant needed a third term to connect subjects to objects. According to Christian Kerslake, Kant's early writings located God as the third term that could serve as the connective between mind and world. However, through the development of transcendental philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), he came to argue that "time and experience in general" could serve as the third term.[12] Thus, Kant's philosophy was able to provide a justification for objective knowledge without recourse to the cumbersome metaphysical assumptions that burdened most pre-Humean philosophy. In place of any transcendent being or realm providing the third term between subjects and objects, transcendental philosophy locates the third term within subjectivity through time as a form of intuition rather than something we experience directly. That is to say, we can never have an experience of time itself since time is the form of inner sense. It follows that the concept of time is also non-empirical. However, everything that can be known empirically is only known through experience and that experience always happens in time. Accordingly, we must affirm the necessary existence of time as a necessary precondition that structures the possibility of all experience.[13] As a necessary precondition for experience, time serves as an objective structure of experience and, for Kant, the necessary structures of experience provide the grounds to establish causality and other types of universal knowledge.

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[11] Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze, Hegel, and the Post-Kantian Tradition," *Philosophy Today: SPEP Supplement*, vol. 44 (2000), 125.
[12] Christian Kerslake, "Deleuze's 'Reconstruction of Reason': From Leibniz and Kant to *Difference and Repetition*," in *Thinking between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange Encounter*, (ed.) E. Willatt and M. Lee (London: Continuum, 2009), 111.
[13] Michael J. Olson, "Transcendental Idealism, Deleuze and Guattari, and the Metaphysics of Objects," in *Thinking between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange Encounter*, (ed.) E. Willatt and M. Lee (London: Continuum, 2009), 155.

What is significant about transcendental philosophy's solution to the problem of knowledge is the type of *subject* that it requires. Following Deleuze's argument in *Difference and Repetition*, Bryant argues that Kant's transcendental philosophy retains a version of the Cartesian *cogito*. Rene Descartes takes the experience of thought and identifies it as the "I think," which leads him to assert the existence of an "I" which not only is, but which has unmediated knowledge of itself through itself. Kant criticizes Descartes for thinking he can know that he is a thinking substance, but he takes a similar route to self-certainty by asserting that through transcendental reflection on experience itself, his transcendental subject can acquire knowledge of the structures of its own mind. As Bryant points out, the Kantian subject's knowledge of itself is not immediate like the cogito's because its self-knowledge is mediated through experience. That is, the "I think" from which we assure ourselves of self-knowledge is itself an experience and therefore necessarily occurs "*within"* time. Therefore, the knowledge of the self is not direct or unmediated and "is fractured or split by the form of time." (TE, 38-41)

The conclusions that Kant arrives at both in terms of our knowledge of the world and our knowledge of ourselves leads to two closely related problems for Kant's project. First, there is the familiar problem that the transcendental deduction only guarantees knowledge of phenomena instead of knowledge of noumenal things-in-themselves. Second, because our knowledge of ourselves is always mediated through the experience of time, self-knowledge is also phenomenal. Thus, if our knowledge of the structures of mind is mediated in the same way as our knowledge of objects, then the transcendental deduction may undermine itself in that our knowledge of the mind might not be any more objective than our knowledge of objects. In both cases, it seems that because Kant only establishes phenomenal knowledge of ourselves and objects, he does not move beyond the "subjective necessity" (i.e., habit) that he found in Hume.

The Speculative Realist Challenge

The first difficulty, that we only have knowledge of phenomenal objects, has received extra attention in recent years through the Speculative Realist movement, especially as it is presented in Quentin Meillassoux's *After Finitude*. Speculative Realists criticize Kant—and nearly all subsequent philosophers—for what they call correlationism. For Meillassoux:

> Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realm of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object "in itself," in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an object.[14]

According to Speculative Realism, correlationism means that we can never have knowledge of ourselves except through our relation to objects and we can only have knowledge of objects as they are for us.

In addition to their opposition to correlationism, Meillassoux and other Speculative Realists advocate scientific realism. After a certain point of verification, we can say that scientific knowledge presents us with at least an approximation of mind-independent reality.[15] The project of Speculative Realism, then, shares a similarity with Kant's attempt to discover universal scientific laws. However, on their account, Kant not only failed in that project, his work undermined the very possibility of scientific knowledge and divorced humans from the world.

[14] Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude*, (tr.) R. Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 5.
[15] Ennis and Gratton, *The Meillassoux Dictionary*, 152.

The Speculative Realist response to Kant and post-Kantian philosophy is interesting in two respects. First, to the extent that their reading of the history philosophy is correct, they illustrate what is at stake in the way Hume is interpreted. If we cast Hume's problem in a negative epistemological light that presents us with a disjunction, then it may be that the only path to take leads to a correlationism from which we apparently cannot—but, according to the Speculative Realists, must—escape. Second, Speculative Realists seem to put themselves at a disadvantage in their confrontation with Kant by engaging with him on some of his own terms: i.e., by relying on a similarly limited interpretation of Hume's project.

Meillassoux devotes the last two chapters of *After Finitude* to resolving Hume's problem and refuting the Kantian solution. Although he rejects what he calls the metaphysical (i.e., Cartesian or Leibnizian), skeptical (i.e., Humean), and transcendental (i.e., Kantian) solutions to the problem, Meillassoux takes the problem itself at face value. After posing Hume's billiard ball problem, he says that the reason why the balls behave predictably is not due to a necessary structure of the universe. Instead, he argues that it is only through contingency that they behave as they do. On the surface, Meillassoux's conclusion resembles the one that he attributes to Hume—that the exact same billiard shot on two different occasions could produce different outcomes and it is just happy coincidence when things go as we predict. But his claim is stronger as he asserts there are manifestly stable natural laws, but which are contingent rather than necessary.[16]

I won't further detail Meillassoux's argument in defense of the existence of contingent yet stable natural laws. The preceding paragraph merely shows how his response to the problem still operates within a Kantian framework. Jeffrey Bell again points out that while the syntheses

[16] Meillassoux, *After Finitude*, 87–92.

of all our experiences in a totality (whether necessary or contingent) is a problem for Kant—and for Meillassoux—it isn't really a concern for Hume.[17]

Insofar as they take Kant's approach to Hume's problem for granted, Speculative Realists put themselves in a position in which they must conceive of all post-Kantian philosophy as either responding or succumbing to correlationism. Bryant himself poses the following challenge to Deleuze: "Just how does Deleuze escape the correlationist circle wherein objects are only ever encountered in relation to a subject and subjects are always correlated with an object?" (TE, 31) While Bryant ultimately argues that Deleuze can escape the correlationist circle, his question only makes sense if the Deleuzian project is imprisoned by correlationism from its outset.

Deleuze's Alternative: Transcendental Empiricism

The fact that Bryant raises the question is not surprising given that he doesn't refer to Deleuze's work on Hume. But by raising the question, Bryant fails to acknowledge that Deleuze's concern, and his concern with Hume, is not primarily epistemological. As Jon Roffe argues in *Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze is only concerned with Hume's epistemological challenge insofar as it orients Hume's larger project.[18]

What is the Humean project according to Deleuze? The Humean question is phrased in a couple of different ways at the outset of *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. First, he asks: "*How does the mind become human nature?*"[19] Then, he rephrases the question as "*How does the mind become a subject*?" (ES, 23) Although those formulations invite us to ask what the *subject* is for Deleuze, the prior concept to consider is *empiricism*. By shifting the Humean question away

[17] Bell, *Deleuze's Hume*, 93.
[18] Roffe, *Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 6.
[19] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, (tr.) Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 22. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as ES.

from the problem of induction, Deleuze opens up the possibility for thinking of empiricism differently. He claims that "knowledge is not the most important thing for empiricism, but only the means to some practical activity." (ES, 107) Thus, empiricism ceases to be fundamentally epistemological and knowledge itself becomes subordinate to what he will call "purposiveness" (ES, 132).

Hume's subordination of knowledge to practical activity does not mean his empiricism is merely an antitheoretical pragmatism. Instead, the inversion is significant for Deleuze in that it allows him to theorize the *subject* in terms whereby it is not primarily a knowing-subject. Rather than beginning his empiricist question with the given of sensory experience and asking how we achieve knowledge beyond the given, Deleuze poses the question: "how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?" (ES, 86) The subject here is not primarily a being capable of transcending what is given to it through a deduction. To be a subject is to participate in transcendence from the first move. To explain what that means, more needs to be said about Deleuze's particular understanding of the terms *subject* and *transcendence*. He claims that "believing and inventing is what makes the subject a subject." (ES, 85) Unlike the transcendental subject that becomes aware of itself through self-knowledge of its own structures of consciousness, Deleuze's Humean subject becomes a subject through the acts of belief and invention.

This distinction means that the Humean subject differs significantly from Kant's. Because the subject is not primarily a knower of itself, it avoids the second problem for Kant that I mentioned above, namely, that the subject's self-knowledge is mediated and *phenomenal,* which therefore precludes knowledge of the self as it really IS. Instead, as Roffe points out, Hume famously denies such a self for "a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which

succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity."[20] The dissolution of the "I" or self which is concerned with what it IS opens the door for the Humean becoming-subject.

Deleuze says that the subject is constituted in the given and the bundle of perceptions is what is given in the first place. However, what is given is not merely the bundle of perceptions. Belief and invention are also given. *Transcendental empiricism* is the combination of those two aspects of the given and is an immanent dualism (ES, 108). The bundle of perceptions is both "the flux of sensible collections of impressions and images" and "it is also the movement and change without identity or law." (ES, 87) The movement and change of sensible collections and impressions is marked by separation and distinguishability. Rather than posit a subject which then comes to perceive objects, perception as differentiation of the given is primary. In a foreshadowing of his account of difference-in-itself in *Difference and Repetition*, he calls experience itself the "principle of difference" where difference "does not presuppose anything else and nothing else precedes it." (ES, 88)

But the differentiation of the bundle of perceptions is of course not enough to constitute a subject. The transcendence of perception through belief and invention marks the becoming of the subject. Although belief and invention are a type of transcendence and signify the second part of Deleuze's dualism, we should not think of them as transcendental in the Kantian sense. For Deleuze's Hume, the transcendence of the subject is not determined through a deduction of the non-empirical structures of consciousness. Perception itself is transcended, but transcendental empiricism remains fully immanent because belief and invention are still part of the given.

According to Deleuze, these two factors represent two sets of principles of human nature: principles of association, which constitute belief; and principles of passion, which constitute

[20] Hume, *Treatise*, book 1, pt. 4, sec. 6, 4; Roffe, *Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 8.

invention. He says that to believe "is to infer one part of nature from another…." (ES, 86) It is a fact that we affirm more than what perception provides us with. In addition to affirming, or making a claim to know, the Humean subject invents or makes artifices. Deleuze explains invention as the fact that we create norms and systems of rules that only exist in perception insofar as we actively create them. Thus, it is a given that we believe and invent.

Belief and invention could be understood as having ontological existence as the principles of human nature. But to say we believe and invent is a non-ontological claim. At the conclusion of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* Deleuze claims: "Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what is." (ES, 133) In other words, philosophy, for Deleuze, is non-ontological in that it is not meant to tell us what IS. Instead, for Deleuze, philosophy is a project of thinking with the conjunction AND. Belief and invention are principles that describe our relationship with the given, not what the world IS itself. In believing and inventing we are claiming that we expect a particular relationship between our actions and what is given to us.

We end with a return to purposiveness, which Deleuze defines in two ways. First, he says that purposiveness is "the agreement of the subject with the given", (ES, 112) and he also says that it is an "agreement between intentional finality and nature." (ES, 133) In a sense, purposiveness seems to function as a sort of third term, but it does not rely on the logic of disjunction in that the subject and the given are initially conceived through their relationship to one another. Unlike Kant who sees a need to discover the connection between the subject and the object in order to establish knowledge, Deleuze's Hume uses purposiveness to describe the way we relate to nature or the given.

As a final retort, the Speculative Realist might object that Deleuze simply falls back into the correlationist trap with his conclusion because purposiveness functions as a third term between subject and object and thereby operates in much the same way as Kant's transcendental deduction. They might go further and claim that Deleuze denies knowledge of things in-themselves and undermines science or even reality itself. However, those claims would only be justifiable if we were to grant the Speculative Realist premise that reality refers to a totality of objects that ARE but exist separately from ourselves. And that premise is incompatible with the non-ontological and relational structure of transcendental empiricism.

Deleuze claims that the given is not "given to a subject; rather the subject constitutes itself in the given." (ES, 87) Instead of starting with a subject and then discovering what IS, Deleuze's empiricism starts within the given where subjectivity is the relationship, the AND, within that givenness. Philosophy then begins and continues with conjunction and avoids the pitfalls of both disjunctive correlationisms and realisms.

We Still Do Not Know What a Body Can Do:
The Replacement of Ontology with Ethology in Deleuze's Spinoza

Abstract

Throughout his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: “we do not even know what a body can do.” The problem is closely associated with Deleuze’s *parallelist* reading of Spinoza and what he calls *ethology*. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which is meant to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze’s suggestion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of thinking with AND rather than thinking for IS. The argument is developed through Deleuze’s monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought.

For indeed, no one has yet determined what the body can do…
—Spinoza, *Ethics*

Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*…
– Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

When Spinoza says that we do not even know what a body can do, this is practically a war cry.
– Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*

Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body….*but we do not even know what the body can do*.
–Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*

Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the body…we do not yet know what a body is capable of…'
– Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*

Spinoza asks: What can a body do?...We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do…
–Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

We do not even know what a body can do…
–Deleuze, *Cinema 2*

Introduction

Gilles Deleuze's repeated confrontation with *Spinoza's problem* that *we do not know what a body can do* forms a thread in his philosophy that runs through most of his career. In addition to his explicit formulations, the problem is implicitly raised in his first book on David Hume (1953) through his later work on Gottfried Leibniz (1988) to his final collection of essays, *Critique et Clinique* (1993).[1] As with many of the threads in Deleuze's work, this is not one that could be exhausted in a single paper; but if we accept the invitation to follow, we might do as Deleuze

[1] The importance of Deleuze's reading of Hume in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* to Spinoza and the problem of the body is argued in Ian Buchanan, "The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?," *Body & Society*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1997): 73–91, here 80. The body is also the subject of the third part of *The Fold*. See Gilles, Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988), (tr.) T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Finally, see Gilles Deleuze, "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics,'" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1993), (tr.) D. Smith and M. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 138–151 here 141.

suggests for reading Benedict Spinoza and begin in the middle, so to speak, with *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* where Deleuze first suggests that Spinoza offers philosophy a new model through posing the problem.[2]

Deleuze will call this new model for philosophy *ethology* (*SPP*, 27, 125).[3] As a new philosophical model, ethology is closely connected to Deleuze's larger philosophical project of searching for what he calls a new Image of Thought. In *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, Deleuze provides a concise yet cryptic summation of this new image for thought as: "Thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking *for* IS…."[4] My understanding of that claim, which will form the central thesis of this paper, is that *Deleuze wants to replace ontology with ethology*. In making this claim I am not suggesting that Deleuze wanted to abandon or overcome metaphysics, which was something he explicitly rejected.[5] Instead, I am keeping in line with the understanding that Deleuze wanted to develop new metaphysics, and am suggesting that the development of new metaphysics need not be bound to ontology or understood in ontological terms.[6] Accordingly, while Deleuze has often been portrayed as a process or differential ontologist, I intend to show that Deleuze's work on ethology points less toward a new understanding of ontology than it does toward a reorientation of philosophy away from ontology.

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[2] Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970/1981), (tr.) R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 17. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *SPP*. See also Deleuze's more detailed discussion of the doctrine of parallelism in Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968), (tr.) M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990). Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *EPS*.

[3] See also: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), (tr.) B Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 257. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *ATP*.

[4] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (1977), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1991), 57.

[5] "Philosophy is always a matter of inventing concepts. I've never been worried about going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy." Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (1990), (tr.) M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 136.

[6] For more details on the claim that Deleuze wanted to develop a new metaphysics, see Bell, Jeffrey Bell, "Between Realism and Anti-Realism: Deleuze and the Spinozist Tradition in Philosophy," *Deleuze Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2011): 1–17.

To advance my argument the paper will proceed in four sections. In the first part I show how Deleuze's understanding of ethology is grounded in what he calls Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. Next, I provide an account of ethology itself and emphasize the role that *kinesis* plays in ethology, which is something that has typically been left out of the secondary literature on ethology. There I show how Deleuze uses ethology to depart from traditional forms of ontology such as ousiology and taxonomy. The third section picks up on that point but takes the argument further by advancing the claim that Deleuze's call to do ethology through constructing a plane of immanence is a more radical turn away from understanding things in a broader ontological sense. Finally, I turn to Deleuze's critique of what he calls the Moral Image of Thought and especially his argument against ready-made problems and questions to advance the argument that the *form* of Spinoza's problem and its corresponding question (What can a body do?) is intended to orient thinking away from ontology (thinking IS) and toward ethology (thinking AND).

Spinoza's War Cry: The Doctrine of Parallelism Prefigures Ethology

In order to illustrate the relationship between Spinoza's problem that we do not know what a body can do and ethology, we must first understand how Spinoza conceives of the body and how this concept of the body informs both Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza and his own philosophy. Spinoza opens Part II of the *Ethics* with a general definition of the body. He explains that: "By body I understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as God is considered as an extended thing". [7] The opening propositions of Part II are particularly significant for Deleuze as this is where he sees Spinoza developing the *doctrine*

[7] Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677), (tr.) E. Curley (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), 2D1. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *E*.

of parallelism.[8] The doctrine holds that the entire universe exists as one infinite substance—God—which is simultaneously yet independently expressed through the attributes of thought and extension (E2P1–E2P2). Or, as Beth Lord summarily explains: "Spinoza's so-called 'parallelism' thesis [is] the view that mind and body are one thing, expressed in two different ways."[9] While bodies correspond to extension, ideas correspond to thought. To say that they are different attributes is to say they have different essences and so one can never be the cause of the other (E2P6). That is, the mind cannot cause changes in the body and the body does not affect change in the mind (E1D2). Instead, God or the universe is the efficient cause of both thoughts and bodies where both are caused *in parallel* with one another although they do not interact (E2P9, E5P). Despite their lack of interaction, thoughts and bodies are still attributes of the same substance, where substances are things, while—as Brent Adkins helpfully puts it—"attributes are not things; they are 'ways of perceiving substance.'"[10] Spinoza explains that while mind and body are not causally linked, parallelism demands that each idea has a corresponding object, so "the human mind is united to the body" (E2P13S). In other words, we have an idea of "the human mind" which means the mind necessarily exists in thought, and because it exists in thought it must also exist as a mode of extension—*i.e.*, the mind must have a body. In Spinoza's words: "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body." (E2P13)

Through the doctrine of parallelism, Deleuze sees Spinoza unifying the body and mind which has profound importance in that it "disallows any primacy of the one over the other." (SPP, 18) In Deleuze's Spinoza, neither the mind nor the body can be understood in opposition

[8] Note that Deleuze traces the origin of the term "parallelism" to Leibniz rather than Spinoza. EPS, 107.
[9] Beth Lord, *Spinoza Beyond Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 2. For a detailed introduction to the doctrine of parallelism that is influenced by and sympathetic to Deleuze's interpretation see also the discussion in Beth Lord, *Spinoza's Ethics: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 53–57.
[10] Brent Adkins, *True Freedom: Spinoza's Practical Philosophy* (Lexington Books, 2009), 38–39.

to or separate from one another. But it is precisely this insight which, for Deleuze, prefigures the problem that we do not know what a body can do (EPS, 389).

Deleuze locates the problem in *E*IIIP2S where Spinoza observes that most people confidently believe "that the body now moves, now is at rest, solely from the mind's command…." For Spinoza, these people "dream with open eyes" because no one knows how it could be that the mind moves the body. In order for us to know how the mind moves the body we would need to know the mind, but we cannot suppose that such knowledge is pregiven to us. Indeed, at the conclusion of the section on parallelism, Spinoza reminds us that his aim in the book is to provide an account of the human mind, and that to do so we must understand the object of the mind, which is the body. But from the fact that our bodies are always limited by and dependent upon other bodies, we can "see the cause why we have only a completely confused knowledge of our body…." (EIIP13S) Thus, on the surface, the doctrine of parallelism seems to lead to a sort of paradox where we cannot know the mind without knowing the body. But unless we baselessly claim to know the body and how it comes to move, we must admit that we do not know the body either. However, this paradox does not show a deficiency with parallelism. Instead, it invites us to begin thinking beyond the traditional dualism of mind/body.

Parallelism is important in the first place because it avoids some of the limitations on more conventional modernist approaches to philosophy. Beth Lord again points out that Spinoza's "materiality" is a departure from both Cartesian dualisms as well as materialisms and idealisms which attempt to "reduce matter to thought" or vice-versa. [11] This vision of a unified mind and body in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza is at the heart of the so-called Vital New Materialism associated with thinkers such as Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, and Rosi Braidotti.

[11] Lord, *Spinoza Beyond Philosophy*, 9.

For example, Braidotti suggests the advantage of Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza is that it allows us to "think with the entire body, or rather, we have to acknowledge the embodiment of the brain and the embrainment of the body."[12] However, I think it would be a mistake to say the importance of parallelism for Deleuze is that it can lead us to develop new materialist ontologies. By way of introducing his discussion of parallelism in *SPP* he claims that "Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body" (SPP, 17). But notice that he does not then raise the problem or question "We do not know what a body is/what is a body?" (*e.g.*, as thinking matter or embodied brain etc.) Instead, he returns to the familiar problem: "[Spinoza] proposes to establish the body as a model: 'We do not know what the body can do….'" (SPP, 17) That is, the new model that Spinoza offers to philosophy is not one that invites us to rethink old dualisms, materialisms, or idealisms to better conceive of things in ontological terms of what they *are*. Rather, the new model invites us to think of things in terms of what they *do*, which is to say, ethologically.

Before turning to give an account of ethology itself, I want to clarify what is at stake here for Deleuze. He claims that Spinoza's problem is "practically a war cry" (EPS, 255). Under the doctrine of parallelism where the mind and the body are the same thing, the understanding is not limited to *consciousness—i.e.*, thinking which would only involve a mind and not a body. For Deleuze, pure consciousness in this respect is an impossibility. Parallelism devalues consciousness and replaces it with a notion of *thinking* which is always in relationship to the body's capacities and ability for action (EPS, 257; SPP, 18). The move away from consciousness and toward thinking is at the heart of the war cry in that Deleuze argues it is a key for freeing thought from "moral chattering" (EPS, 255). In short, Deleuze thinks Spinoza can help us move

[12] Rosi Braidotti, "Four Theses on Posthuman Feminism," in *Anthropocene Feminism*, (ed.) R. Grusin, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017) 33.

from morality (*i.e.*, "transcendent values" that include moral responsibility, duties, divine command, and good/evil) to ethics (*i.e.*, ethology or "a typology of immanent modes of existence") (SPP, 23). The complicated distinction—which involves Friedrich Nietzsche as much as Spinoza—is the subject of the second chapter of *SPP*, aptly titled: "On the Difference Between the *Ethics* and a Morality" (SPP, 17-29). This distinction is very important for what Deleuze considers appropriate for philosophy and for where he wants philosophy to move. Accordingly, it will reappear throughout the paper, but it is not the main part of the problem that I want to emphasize. Note that while Deleuze is concerned with articulating a framework of ethics in opposition to what he calls morality, he does not say that morality has merely replaced or distracted us from ethics. Instead, his exact claim, in context, is as follows:

> When Spinoza says that we do not even know what a body can do, this is practically a war cry. He adds that we speak of consciousness, mind, soul, of the power of the soul over the body; we chatter away about these things, but do not even know what bodies can do. *Moral chattering replaces true philosophy*. (EPS, 255; my emphasis)[13]

Morality, then, is not only a threat to ethics. If we take Deleuze's claim seriously, morality has replaced "true philosophy" itself. A return to philosophy requires us to turn away from morality and as Deleuze later points out in *SPP*: "The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness" (SPP, 18). Thus, the final significance of

[13] C.f. "Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for." Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1963), (tr.) H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 39.

parallelism is that it allows us to turn from morality toward true philosophy, which Deleuze says we can do with ethology (SPP, 27).

Ethology: The Kinetic and Dynamic Definitions of the Body

The term ethology is particularly difficult to define for several reasons. First, as Deleuze and some commentators have observed, it has connotations not only with ethics and Spinoza's *Ethics,* but also with physics and biology. Second, as a philosophical approach for understanding bodies in terms of what they can do, it entails a double-definition of the body through both a *kinetic proposition* (motion) and a *dynamic proposition* (affect); but he (along with Felix Guattari) does not always refer to both when using the term. Furthermore, while Deleuze will praise Spinoza as an ethologist and claim that "the *Ethics* is an *ethology*" he and Guattari depart from both Spinoza's terminology and his ousiology (SPP, 27). In my discussion of ethology which follows, I will argue that adequately accounting for both the kinetic and dynamic propositions provides us with a non-ontological approach to philosophy. To begin, I will return to Spinoza to show how his physics leads Deleuze to the kinetic proposition as a starting point for philosophy.

Spinoza follows the claim that we have only a completely confused knowledge of our bodies with an interlude that might seem banal at first glance. Here he provides a preliminary physics explaining what bodies can do. He begins with two axioms. First: "All bodies either move or are at rest." (E2A1') Second: "Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly." (E2A2') We can start to see the significance of these two axioms when he follows them with the lemma: "*Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.*" (E2L1) In other words, we can make distinctions

between bodies through *kinesis* or an account of motion itself which does not require ousiology or an account of substance. He emphasizes this claim by positing that the simplest bodies "are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness...." (E2A") These simple bodies, which are distinguishable *only* kinetically, can come to constitute "composite" bodies when they have some contact with one another and move relative to one another, although not necessarily at the same speed (E2D). He also implies that there are what we might think of as complex-composite or multi-composite—to borrow a term from Lord—bodies which are constituted by multiple composites.[14] Humans are one such example as per his first postulate: "The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite." (E2Pos1) But the human body itself is not a limit point as it too is only part of more multiple composites. Lord illustrates this with a helpful example wherein she suggests that a human body moving with a wheelchair—and we could add a bicycle, car, etc.—forms its own composite body that moves as one.[15] Spinoza famously extends this framework to suggest everything is a mode rather than discrete entity and that the only singular thing is the universe as a whole.[16] He explicitly says:

> If we now turn to a [multi-composite body] we shall find it also can be altered in many other ways while still retaining its form. And if we carry this line of thought on to infinity, we shall easily grasp that the whole of Nature is one individual whose parts—that is, all bodies—vary in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual. (E2L4–L7N)

[14] Lord, *Spinoza's Ethics*, 62–63.
[15] Ibid; 62.
[16] Brent Adkins again has a straightforward explanation of this in *True Freedom*, 32–33.

Thus, in addition to what we think of as concrete physical entities like humans or rocks or galaxies, Spinoza's physics is also applicable to more abstract composites like the body politic of a nation, the Dutch East India Company, etc. Deleuze is likewise clear that bodies are not limited to living things and that the concept does not rest on a notion of matter or *extensa*. "A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity." (SPP, 127) His claim that a body can be anything is worth emphasizing since Deleuze's ethology is sometimes presented in the more limited biological sense of the study of an animal's behaviour in its habitat.[17] While it certainly is appropriate on Deleuze's account to understand animals ethologically in terms of what they do, the point is that he also seems to think we can use ethology to understand anything.

Despite Deleuze's claim that a body can be anything, there does appear to be a tension in *SPP*. Spinoza's insight that bodies can be distinguished from each other kinetically without reference to substance is what Deleuze refers to as the "kinetic proposition." In *SPP* he phrases the proposition as follows: "a body however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slowness between particles that define a body, the individuality of a body." (SPP, 123) Deleuze says the significance of the proposition is that by defining bodies by the relative speed and slowness or motion and rest between particles it is not necessary to define bodies according to either form or function. Yet, his wording means that bodies must be composed of particles. Later in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari move away from thinking of simple bodies as particles to suggest that

[17] C.f., "I am thinking here about the ethology of ethologists, in the sense Deleuze gives to the word ethology, as that of a practical study of modes of being, that is to say, the practical study of what humans or animals can do; not of what they are, of their essence, but of what they're capable, of what they're doing, of the powers that are theirs, of the tests that they undergo." Brett Buchanan, Matthew Chrulew, and Jeffrey Bussolini, "On Asking the Right Questions: An Interview with Vinciane Despret," *Angelaki*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2015): 165–78, here 166.

Spinoza is speaking of "elements that no longer have either form or function…." (ATP, 253) Elements here should not be understood in terms of atomic theory which merely indicates the limit point of a certain form of matter: *e.g.*, Hydrogen is the form of an element with one proton, Helium has two protons, and so on. Nor are these elements like the atoms in the Democritean sense because while the element is indivisible like the ancient concept of the atom, it does not have a definite form as iron or fire etc. Instead, *element* signifies a pre-formal something like an infinitesimal. Because simple bodies or elements are non-formal, it is only through the relations of motion and rest into which they enter that composite bodies or things manifest themselves. In other words, although they talk of particles and elements, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari are looking for the language to describe things *solely* in terms of *kinesis* or their motion.

In his guide to *ATP*, Brent Adkins points out that for Deleuze and Guattari the significance of this kinetic proposition is "quite startling and radical."[18] On their adaptation of Spinoza, substance becomes superfluous because the kinetic proposition provides us with an account of differentiation that is independent of substance. Metaphysics, for Deleuze and Guattari, can *begin with the kinetic proposition* which conceives of things only in their motion rather than in-themselves or through their being as stable things that ARE. *Kinesis* as a starting point for Deleuze and Guattari is certainly a departure from pantheistic and ousiological account that Spinoza starts with in the *Ethics*, but it is consistent with Deleuze's suggestion that we "understand Spinoza by way of the middle...." (SPP, 122) As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd have similarly observed, the ethological approach that Deleuze begins to develop in *SPP* is useful because "it remains faithful to Spinoza's naturalism, his 'physics of bodies', at the same time as it offers a contemporary re-conceptualization of his metaphysics of Substance (God or

[18] Brent Adkins, "Chapter 10 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…," in *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 141–170 here 152.

Nature)."[19] In this respect the kinetic proposition means that ethology is not only a matter of ethics and biology, but is also a matter of physics. I will include more details later as to why ethology's emphasis on *kinesis* is significant for my claim that it leads to a non-ontological approach to philosophy; but before doing so we need to account for the dynamic proposition given that ethology is a matter of affect as much as motion.

Although we can begin with the kinetic proposition, we should recall that the body is also always expressed through the dynamic proposition. Deleuze locates this proposition in Part 3 of the *Ethics*, on "The Affects" and defines it as follows "a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality." (SPP, 123) Ethology, then, seeks to determine what bodies can do through both their motions and their affects.

I will briefly discuss the dynamic proposition through some of the examples Deleuze uses repeatedly to explain affect, but I will refrain from giving a full account of affect for a couple reasons. First, the term has been discussed at length in other secondary literature on Deleuze's ethology.[20] In fact, the term has been so emphasized that some commentators have reduced ethology to affect by defining it as "a theory of the capacities of bodies for affecting and being affected."[21] While scholars outside of Deleuze studies cannot be faulted for not remaining faithful to Deleuze, this notion that ethology is ultimately a theory of affect has worked its way back into some Deleuze scholarship.[22] The second reason why I want to avoid a lengthy discussion of affect has to with the amount of literature on affect outside of the work on

[19] Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (Routledge, 2002), 100.
[20] See, for example, Anthony Uhlmann, "Deleuze, Ethics, Ethology, and Art," in *Deleuze and Ethics,* (ed.) D. Smith and N. Jun (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 154–69.
[21] Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings*, 147.
[22] See Tamsin E. Lorraine, "Spinozist Ethology," in *Deleuze and Guattari's Immanent Ethics: Theory, Subjectivity, and Duration*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 147–154.

Deleuze's ethology. Deleuze's work on affect in relation to Spinoza has been foundational to what Patricia Clough referred to as an "affective turn" in the humanities as early as 2008.[23] For Clough, the thinkers most relevant to the affective turn are those "critics and theorists who, indebted to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, conceptualize affect as pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body's capacity to act."[24] However, as Clough and other thinkers like Nigel Thrift had noted even earlier, there are several different conceptions of the term affect.[25] As a Deleuzian concept, the term is unrelated to its use by other thinkers who "often focused on the circuit from affect to emotion, ending up with subjectively felt states of emotion—a return to the subject as the subject of emotion."[26] All of this is to say that Deleuze's work on affect has been tremendously influential to the emerging field of affect studies, so to say something substantial about affect would require engaging with the field, which is not my aim here. That said, I think it is worth noting that affect is not a concept that Deleuze takes in isolation but is instead always one aspect of ethology along with motion.

For Deleuze, the way we understand a body in its individuality according to the dynamic proposition is through counting its affects (SPP, 124; ATP 257). In *SPP* he illustrates this by asking us to imagine an animal and ask the following questions: "what is this animal unaffected by in the infinite world? What does it react to positively or negatively? What are its nutrients and poisons? What does it 'take' in its world? Every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and the fly." (SPP, 125) Here we again see ethology's indebtedness to biology

[23] Patricia T. Clough, "The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia and Bodies," *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 25, no. 1 (2008): 1–22.
[24] Ibid., 1.
[25] For an explanation of four different approaches to the study of affect including that following Deleuze's work on Spinoza, see Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, vol. 86, no. 1 (2004): 57–78.
[26] Clough, "The Affective Turn," 1.

and Deleuze's favourite example when talking about affect comes from the biologist Jakob Von Uexküll's description of the lifeworld of the tick which only has three affects: light (climbing to the top of branch), olfactory (falling on a mammal that is detected beneath the branch), and thermal (finding a warm spot on which to feed) (SPP, 124; ATP, 257; D, 60).[27] With its mere three affects the tick serves as a simple example of how the dynamic proposition allows ethology to account for things qualitatively. By understanding things through affect Deleuze claims that ethology departs from taxonomy, which for him always implies moral thinking (SPP, 27). Instead of differentiating things through genus and species, ethology looks at affect to differentiate things through their capacities. Deleuze repeatedly illustrates this through another example where he says that a work horse has more in common with an ox than a race horse because the first two share more affects with one-another than with the race horse (SPP, 124; ATP, 257). By conceiving of things affectively in terms of what they DO, ethology again is unconcerned with understanding things in terms of what they ARE through the imposition of categories.

Just as the kinetic proposition de-ontologizes philosophy by moving it away from ousiology, the dynamic proposition de-ontologizes philosophy by moving it away from taxonomy. I will expand this claim in the following section, but before moving on—and now that we have covered both propositions—I want to consider a claim that Deleuze makes regarding ethology and ethics. He says: "Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for affecting and being affected on this plane of immanence" (SPP, 125). Here we can see both propositions at

[27] See also Deleuze, *The Fold*, 92–93 and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 185–186. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *WIP*.

work in Deleuze's definition of ethology and we can also see that ethology involves what Deleuze calls the *plane of immanence*. Understanding—or rather doing—ethology then requires "the construction of the plane of immanence or consistency." (SPP, 125)

Lines, Bodies, and Planes of Immanence

As I indicated earlier—and as Gatens and Lloyd suggest—Deleuze (and Guattari) wants to adopt Spinoza's physics but to do so without also following his substance ontology. As early as *SPP*, Deleuze proposes the plane of immanence as an alternative to substance with the claim that: "What is involved is no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a *common plane of immanence* in which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated." (SPP, 122) Deleuze and Guattari echo this later in *WIP* where they suggest that the plane of immanence does not presuppose substance: "Immanence does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes but, on the contrary, the Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence as their presupposition." (WIP, 48) The two also express a similar sentiment in *ATP* in "Memories of a Spinozist, I" where they interchange the plane of immanence with a plane of life: "What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life." (ATP, 254) Thus, in the first place, by reading Spinoza as beginning with *kinesis* and in positing a plane of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari are explicit about their departure from ousiology.

Whether we call it the plane of immanence or plane of life, the plane is not merely an alternative to substance. Much like both parallelism (body/mind) and ethology (motion/affect) it entails the conjunction of two simultaneous aspects. Deleuze and Guattari claim that "The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as *Nous* and as *Physis.*" (WIP, 38) The

former facet of the plane of immanence will ground my argument in the following section, so here I will limit my discussion to the latter. As Nature or *Physis*, we might think of the plane of immanence as the wherein-bodies-move-and-affect or the wherein-life-unfolds. In this respect, when Uexküll or Deleuze talk about the lifeworld of the tick, they are talking about its place on the plane of immanence. This leads us to another sense in which Deleuze means that ethology is an ethics. As other scholars have noted, ethics and ethology both share the root-word *ethos* which can be understood to mean a dwelling, living space, or habitat.[28] Thus, when Deleuze says ethics is ethology and is not morality he means that ethics does not concern moral responsibility or passing judgments about actions that may be deemed blameworthy or commendable. Instead, ethics is about understanding how enter things into relationships in their environment where the creation of good relationships enables them to maintain their compositions while those that are bad lead to their decomposition. To use Deleuze's example, if we are to say that Adam sins or acts badly by eating a certain fruit, we must mean that the fruit poisons him and eventually leads to his death. In contrast, eating is usually good for an organism in that nutrition is necessary for persisting in one's composition, but the process is bad for whatever is eaten as it necessarily undergoes decomposition which results in the loss of its individuality. To borrow a term from Hasana Sharp, we might say then that Deleuze renaturalizes philosophy through his ethics as ethology which, in Nietzschean fashion, replaces good and evil (morality) for an account of good and bad as a function of motion and affect (ethics).[29]

To say that ethology renaturalizes philosophy is to say that it moves philosophy away from transcendence and back to immanence, which is a key part of Deleuze's larger

[28] Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings*, 147–148.
[29] For a more detailed account of Deleuze's Spinozist ethics which proposes ethology as a model for posthumanist politics see Hasana Sharp, "Ethics as Ethology?" in *Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 210–220.

philosophical project. Indeed, immanence is so important that Deleuze and Guattari describe Spinoza as the prince of philosophers because he was "the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere." (WIP, 48)[30] Here I want to suggest that the move from transcendent to immanent philosophy is also illustrative for thinking about the move to ethology as a move away from ontology. But what does Deleuze mean by transcendence vs. immanence? In a certain sense we have been talking about this difference already because the things that Deleuze regards as moral—moral judgments, values such as good/evil, taxonomic categorization—are all products of transcendent philosophy, whereas ethology comes from a philosophy of immanence. Robert Hurley notes that Deleuze distinguishes the two in *SPP* with different uses of the French "*plan*" to refer to almost every sense of the English words "plan" and "plane." Whereas *plane* is used to refer to Immanence or Nature, plan connotes a map or diagram and it points to transcendence or what Deleuze also calls the theological plan. The transcendent plan, according to Deleuze, is never given to us but must always be inferred from some authority and its basic feature is a "development of forms and formation of subjects…." (SPP, 128) Deleuze does not give examples here but seems to be warning against ways of conceiving of subjects that do not ask what they can DO as an open question but instead make proclamations as to what they ARE according to some *a priori* image or plan: *e.g.*, the *imago dei*, the *zoon logon echon*, *Dasein*, Man, the human, etc.[31] The contrast between the plane of immanence and plans is, I think, also clarifying as to why Deleuze takes ethology to be a departure from taxonomy. In conceiving of things in terms of what they DO

[30] See also Deleuze and Guattari claim that he is the "Christ of philosophers" because "he showed, drew up, and thought the 'best' plane of immanence—that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions." (WIP, 60).

[31] Other representatives of transcendence that Deleuze mentions are the three personages of the sad passions who use transcendent values to turn life against itself: the slave, the tyrant, and the priest. (SPP, 25–26)

(*e.g.*, plowing or racing), ethology resists categorizing them in terms of what they ARE according to plans whereby species (*e.g.*, horse or oxen) or subject forms are predetermined by whatever authority happens to be making the determination.

By renaturalizing philosophy toward immanence and away from transcendent plans, ethology departs not only from ontology as ousiology or taxonomy, but from ontology more broadly. I think this becomes clear by considering the following point of contrast: Although Deleuze's specific account of ethics as dwelling is original, the idea itself came to popularity through Martin Heidegger. In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger claims that while ethics following Aristotle understood *ethos* in the more usual contemporary sense as having to do with one's character, in Heraclitus "*Ēthos* means abode, dwelling place."[32] For Heidegger, this "original ethics" must mean that "'ethics' ponders the abode of man.…"[33] We might expect then that for Heidegger, like Deleuze, ethics is an ethology concerned with how things form relations in their habitat. But according to Heidegger: "However, this thinking [*i.e.*, original ethics] is not ethics in the first instance, because it is ontology."[34] Thus, whereas ethics is ethology for Deleuze, it is ontology for Heidegger, which—as he goes on to explain in his usual fashion—has little to do with how things actually live or dwell and is more concerned with "being-in-the-world" learning to properly think about Being so as to be able to think properly about the more primodial meaning of concepts like "house" or "dwelling."[35] The suggestion that ethics is primarily about thinking Being and the suggestion that dwelling refers to something other than what bodies do would both be evidence of a transcendent philosophy for Deleuze. Heidegger is

[32] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," (1947) in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)* (ed.) D. Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 213–266 here 256.
[33] Ibid., 258.
[34] Ibid., 258.
[35] Ibid., 260. The account that Heidegger eventually gives for those terms comes later in the essay "Building Dwelling Thinking."

of course a bit of an extreme case and therefore easy target, but I think that even with a looser conception of ontology than we find in Heidegger we can see that the way ethology understands things is distinct from ontology. In asking us to understand thing in terms of what they DO rather than what they ARE, ethology is unconcerned with things in terms of being. In other words, unlike ontology which is concerned with the being of beings—if not the being of being—ethology is concerned with the way that bodies move. In this respect, ethology on the plane of immanence as *Physis* is a matter of physics as well as ethics.

Deleuze argues that for philosophy to express immanence, it must go beyond—and not solely refer back to—itself. Indeed, he says that Spinoza, as "the most philosophic of philosophers…teaches the philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher." (SPP, 130) Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari conclude *WIP* by emphasizing that "*Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience*." (WIP, 218) Ethology does this by beginning with *kinesis* which concerns physics as much as philosophy, despite its often having been regarded as belonging solely to the former. In his recent opus *Being and Motion*—which aims to develop a comprehensive philosophical account of motion—Thomas Nail observes that "Motion, for the most part, has been treated as a nonphilosophical category best left to physics."[36] Despite its neglect, Nail finds philosophies of motion in thinkers such as Lucretius, Marx, Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze (especially in relation to his work on Spinoza); who Nail reads as a process ontologist or ontologist of becoming.[37] Similarly, as the title implies, Nail treats his philosophical account of motion as an ontology. He is emphatic that, for himself, ontology does not mean fundamental ontology—the study of being *qua* being, which he regards as an

[36] Thomas Nail, *Being and Motion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 14.
[37] Ibid., 40–45.

impossible task—but he is nonetheless concerned with the ontological task of "describing the being of motion and the motion of beings."[38] I raise this point not to dispute Nail's thesis but to suggest a point of contrast. That is, by considering some classical examples of motion as a matter of physics we can once again see how Deleuze's interest in motion is ethological but not necessarily ontological in that he is concerned with motion as a way of accounting for what things do rather than in terms of the being of motion or motion of beings.

If philosophy needs nonphilosophy then the two cannot be exclusive and indeed they often were not in the ancient and early modern periods. Prior to Newton, the dominant Western views on physics came from Aristotle. And we should remember that two of the three books of Newton's *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathemathica* are both titled: "The Motion of Bodies." Similarly the first of his axioms, which he calls "laws of motion," concerns how bodies persist or change with respect to their rest or motion.[39] Ironically, a helpful comparison of Aristotle and Newton can be found by turning once more to Heidegger, who observes that "they share from the start the experience that beings, in the general sense of nature—earth, sky, and stars—are in motion or at rest. Rest means only a special case of motion. It is everywhere a question of the motion of bodies."[40] Despite their shared concern, Heidegger details eight ways that Newton's account differed from Aristotle's and thereby revolutionized our understanding of Nature. For our concerns, two points are significant. First, for Aristotle the way a body moves will depend on the *kind* of body that it is; so earth is surrounded by water, then air, then, fire and each will tend linearly toward their respective sphere. In addition to the earthly bodies there are

[38] Ibid., 13.
[39] Isaac Newton, *The Principia: The Authoritative Translation: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687), (tr.) I. Cohen and A. Whitman. (Oakland: University of California Press, 1999. Reprint, 2016), 62.
[40] Selection from "What is a Thing?" (1962) as Martin Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, (ed.) David Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 271–305 here 283.

also the celestial bodies which move in a perpetual circle. Newton revolutionizes both bodies and motion by extending the first law to *every body* which eliminates the need for either kinds of bodies or kinds of motion. In the second place, then, rather than viewing things as kinds, Newton would account for them in terms of how they move.[41] All of this is to say that what might be at stake is not the relationship of motion to being(s) (ontology), but the relationship of motion to bodies (ethology). And while Deleuze is clearly interested in the latter he seems unconcerned with the former.

The previous example is not meant to imply that Spinoza or Deleuze are Newtonians, but we can see that Spinoza anticipates Newton by conceiving of every body as a complex or multi-complex body which is an aggregate of simple bodies that are only distinguishable with respect to differences in their motion. But—at least on Deleuze's reading—Spinoza also goes beyond Newton. For Newton, a body is also a mass which is only a "measure of matter" and in this way Newton is limited to classical materialism.[42] In contrast, as we've seen, the doctrine of parallelism takes body to be expressed in parallel with thinking. Likewise, the distinction and relationship between the kinetic proposition and the dynamic proposition means that motion always entails affect and affect entails motion, so bodies are not reducible to matter. For Deleuze, the difference between motion and affect is a difference in what he calls *extension* and *intension*. He asks how relations compound to form new "extensive" relations or how capacities compound "to constitute a more 'intense' capacity or power." (SPP, 126) Extension is correlated to relations (motion/kinetics) while intension is correlated to capacities and degrees of power (affect/dynamics). Borrowing from geography he says that we can understand bodies in terms of their "*longitude* and *latitude*" (SPP, 127; ATP, 256–257). The combination of latitude and

[41] Ibid., 283–287.
[42] Newton, *The Principia*, 48–49.

longitude allows us to create a cartography or "construct a map of a body." (SPP, 128; ATP 12, 253)[43]

The ethological map of the body (cartography) is constructed on the physical plane of immanence and is thereby freed from the limitations and impositions of transcendent plans (SPP, 127). Because the relations and capacities of a body are always in motion, cartography is both iterative and open-ended. In this respect, cartography is ethological which also means it is non-moral. We may recall that "moral chattering" which replaces "true philosophy" is concerned with making judgments, but for Deleuze it also takes the form of Law as any set of imperatives which demand obedience. At one point he is fairly explicit that ontology itself is a form of morality that has distracted philosophy from knowing:

> In this, as we shall see, there is a confusion that compromises the whole of ontology; the history of a *long error* whereby the command is mistaken for something to be understood, obedience for knowledge itself, and Being for a *Fiat*. Law is always the transcendent instance that determines the opposition of values (Good-Evil), but knowledge is always the immanent power that determines the qualitative difference of modes of existence (good-bad). (SPP, 24-25)[44]

Whereas ethology as an ethics can give us knowledge of bodies, it would seem that ontology which makes declarations of about the nature of being or beings must lead to error in that such declarations demand fidelity to the accounts that are given. To avoid such errors, for Deleuze, philosophy must resist falling back into morality or Law. As I mentioned earlier, *Physis* or

[43] Although it is not always associated with ethology, Deleuze's call for cartographies has also been methodologically influential on critical posthumanism. C.f., Rosi Braidotti, "A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities," *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 36, no. 6 (2018): 31-61. [https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418771486].

[44] Note the reference to Friedrich Nietzsche's "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fiction: History of an Error" in *Twilight of the Idols* (1889), (tr.) R. Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 23–24.

Nature is only one facet of the plane of immanence, but its other facet is *Nous* or Thought. This means that to avoid compromising with transcendence, philosophy must orient thought itself toward immanence. Thus, in the final section which follows, I will argue that the replacement of ontology with ethology applies not only to Deleuze's understanding of natural bodies, but to his understanding of philosophical thinking itself.

Thinking with AND instead of Thinking IS

In the introduction I suggested that by replacing ontology with ethology we can understand what Deleuze (and Parnet) meant with the cryptic call for "Thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking *for* IS…." (D, 57) In doing so, we can see the role of Spinoza's problem of the body in relation to Deleuze's meta-philosophical project of critiquing what he calls the Moral Image of Thought. Up to this point I have mostly limited my discussion to Deleuze's monographs on Spinoza and his collaborations with Guattari insofar as they concern Spinoza. Here, however, I will briefly turn the discussion to the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, "The Image of Thought," which Deleuze would later call the "most necessary and most concrete" introduction to all his subsequent work, including that with Guattari.[45]

Deleuze's aim in the chapter is to reveal how philosophy has subjected thinking to a sort of blackmail by presupposing that certain concepts, questions, and problem are necessary. Such "subjective presuppositions"—as Deleuze calls them—ironically tend to work their way into philosophy when philosophers profess to disavow all presuppositions. The most famous example of such presuppositions that Deleuze talks about is found in René Descartes who, in his exercise of radical self-doubt, finds it *necessary* to conclude that he exists as a thing which thinks. As

[45] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), (tr.) P. Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xvii. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *DR*.

Deleuze points out, doing so is only possible if we begin with and proceed from a sort of pure non-conceptual immediate understanding of the terms expressed therein: "self, thinking, and being." He acknowledges that Hegel makes the same critique of Descartes but then commits the same error in writing about "pure being," and he also points out that Heidegger is guilty of asserting that everyone has a pre-ontological or everyday understanding of Being that we invoke every time we state or ask about something that IS (DR, 129). Given its relation to our topic, this final example that Deleuze provides is worth some further consideration.

Deleuze says we that can recognize subjective presuppositions as those which take the form "Everybody knows…." (DR, 129) For Heidegger we find that "everyone understands 'The sky *is* blue', 'I *am* merry', and the like (BT, 23).[46] In taking that form, subjective presuppositions perform a double function. By designating some claim as *knowledge that is held by everyone* the presupposition posits itself as universal and necessary. And in doing so the presupposition demands to be understood as an objective or apodictic fact that *does not and cannot* reveal itself as a presupposition (DR, 131). We see this where Heidegger claims that "even if we ask, 'What *is* "Being"?', we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies…*But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact*."[47] Yet, if we recognize that such claims are presuppositions, then we see that these so-called facts are neither proven nor can they admit to any challenge and are therefore "opinions" instead (DR, 129). For Deleuze, we need not recognize such presuppositions or their related postulates as "*pre-philosophical*" necessities but should instead "denounce" them as "*non-*

[46] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1927), (tr.) J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 23.
[47] Ibid., 25.

philosophical" (DR, 132).[48] As philosophers we need not acquiesce to *doxa* or common sense approaches to thinking if we are open to engaging in a radical critique of thinking itself—as Deleuze thinks we ought to do—but doing so is not easy as it once again requires an opposition to moral thinking.

Deleuze points out that it would be an outrage to dismiss as opinion that which, by definition, everybody knows. But it is precisely through presupposing what everybody knows that philosophy subjects thinking to a sort of blackmail where the thinker must uncritically accept what everybody knows and conform to "a dogmatic, orthodox, or moral image [of thought]." (DR, 131) Deleuze alludes to Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Immanuel Kant to suggest that this image is characterized by common sense and good will and he invokes Nietzsche's observation that "the most general presuppositions of philosophy…are essentially moral, since Morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will…." (DR, 132) As a moral image, the Image of Thought has predetermined a certain way that we as philosophers *ought* to think about thinking itself and as a result there have been certain trends that have tended to pervade Western philosophy.

Deleuze notes that one of the most pervasive of these is the tendency of philosophers to consider problems ready-made, which he calls an "infantile prejudice [wherein] the master sets the problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority" (DR, 158). In contrast to that approach, Deleuze—as early as his work on Bergson—argued that for philosophy to think freely, philosophers need to posit their own problems and identify those false problems that result from a confusion of terms or badly stated questions.[49]

[48] Note the distinction between the "non-philosophical" which Deleuze says we should denounce and the "nonphilosophical" which he claims philosophy needs.
[49] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism* (1966), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 15–21.

But the fact that philosophers have so often failed to do that has led certain problems to dominate. In *Dialogues* again, Deleuze/Parnet observe that "the history of philosophy is encumbered with the problem of being, IS." (D, 56) The problem, they say, has always concerned the judgments of attribution and existence which means that philosophy must continually resort back to certain forms of questioning and thinking. Some of these question forms have been so pervasive that they have been incorrectly taken to be not only ready-made but eternal. The most persistent of these has been the ontological Socratic question which takes the form "What is…?" By taking that question form as a given, philosophy restricts the paths that thinking can take.[50] For Deleuze and Parnet, conjunctions and relations serve as an alternative to thinking with the verb *to be*:

> Substitute the AND for IS. A *and* B. The AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole. (D, 57)

Reenter Spinoza. Deleuze and Parnet ask: "Why write about Spinoza? Here again, let us take him by the middle and not by the first principle (a single substance for all the attributes). The soul AND the body; no one has ever had such an original feeling for the conjunction 'and'...." (D, 59) It should now be clear the extent to which Spinoza's problem is practically a war cry. His parallelism which grounds the problem of the body offers a new model for philosophy in that thinking itself need no longer be encumbered by the IS but can begin with the AND. In asking "What can a body do?" rather than "What is a body?" Spinoza dissolves the

[50] See Daniel W. Smith's comments in Constantin V. Boundas, Daniel W. Smith, and Ada S. Jaarsma. "Encounters with Deleuze: An Interview with Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith." *Symposium*, vol. 24, no. 1 (2020): 139–74, here 144–146.

Socratic approach to thinking and opens up a new path for thought itself. Ethology, as we have seen, de-ontologizes philosophy by both moving away from ousiology and taxonomy and by providing us with the means of understanding bodies immanently. But it also de-ontologizes philosophy by providing us with the means of an orientation to thought that is no longer bound to the problem of the IS and subject to the Moral Image of Thought. In doing so, the construction of the plane of immanence can be realized in thinking so that philosophy might enable "thought's 'engagement with the maximum perspective possible…'"[51]

[51] Robert Hurley (*SPP*, iii) quoting Deleuze, qtd. in Karen Houle, "Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics as Extension or Becoming?" *Symposium* 19, no. 2 (2015): 37–56, here 40.

Thinking as Folding: Nomadology as a Non-ontological Approach to Posthumanist Subjectivity

Abstract

Rosi Braidotti has recently argued that the emerging scholarship on posthumanism should employ that she calls nomadic thinking. Braidotti identifies Deleuze's work on Spinoza as the genesis of posthumanist ontology, yet Deleuze's claims about nomadic thinking or nomadology come from his work on Leibniz. In this paper I argue that with nomadology posthumanist thought can and must overcome ontology if it is to theorize subjectivity beyond the human. For Deleuze and Guattari, the figure of the Thought-brain is a model for subjectivity that goes beyond the subject itself. Accordingly, I also look at some of the recent scholarship on Deleuze and the brain to illustrate what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the Thought-brain and how it could be used for thinking posthuman subjectivity.

> They identify variation and trajectory, and overtake monadology with a "nomadology…." We are all still Leibnizian, although accords no longer convey our world or our text. We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we all remain Leibnizian because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding.
>
> —Deleuze, *The Fold*

Introduction

Gilles Deleuze concludes his final monograph, *The Fold* (1988), with a call for philosophers to adopt what he calls a *nomadology*: a play on Gottfried Leibniz's monadology which—in very broad terms—aims to emphasize the continuous change and movement involved in the processes of the world and thinking itself. Nomadology has recently been the subject of focus for a number of Deleuze scholars, especially in relation to Critical Posthumanism and the areas of New Materialism related to Deleuze studies. Notably, Rosi Braidotti has recently advocated for nomadic thinking as a method by which the humanities might create new nomadic ontologies suitable for posthumanist studies. The calls for nomadic ontologies echo those readings of Deleuze as a process or differential ontologist. However, writing on Deleuze's work on the brain in relation to the neurosciences, David R. Gruber has recently suggested that nomadic theories suitable for posthumanism might be understood in terms of (de)ontology rather than ontology.[1]

Using Gruber's suggestion as a cue, my central argument here is that we can read Deleuze's call for nomadology as a call for a non-ontological philosophy which is needed for posthumanism to overcome the figure of the human. In the first section I show where posthumanism figures into the broader post-Nietzschean philosophical tradition of challenging

[1] David R. Gruber. "There Is No Brain: Rethinking Neuroscience through a Nomadic Ontology." *Body & Society* 25, no. 2 (2019): 56–87, 80, 57. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as NB.

the traditionally fundamental philosophical concepts and argue that the task of overcoming the human entails overcoming ontology. In the second section I establish the connection between posthumanism and embodiment and show how Deleuze's work on Benedict Spinoza and Leibniz leads him to a problem of the body which prefigures the need for a nomadology. Following that, I explain how Deleuze develops nomadology through calculus, functions, and folding as an approach to philosophy which I argue is non-ontological. Finally, I return to the question of subjectivity and show how Deleuze's nomadology leads him (and Guattari) to the posthumanist figure of the Thought-brain.

The Place for Non-ontological Philosophy in Critical Posthumanism

The term "Posthumanism" is one that evades a simple definition due to both its popularity and affiliation with varying intellectual trends. One of the most popular iterations of posthumanism—and the one that draws most clearly from Deleuze's work—has been termed Critical Posthumanism. Rosi Braidotti, one of its leading proponents, has recently published a theoretical framework for Critical Posthumanism where she defines the term as "the critique of the humanist ideal of 'Man' as the allegedly universal measure of all things…."[2] As Braidotti explains with reference to *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), Man refers to the ideal humanist subject as one that is "male/white/heterosexual/owning wives and children/urbanized/speaking a standard language" etc. Man is not a figure of simple inclusion/exclusion but represents the ideal of the figure of Anthropos (the human) where every individual is more or less human to the degree that they align with the ideal (CP, 36).

[2] Rosi Braidotti. "A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities," *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 36, no. 6 (2018): 31-61, 32. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as CP.

The challenges that have been made to the ideal of Man have elicited a range of responses. On the one hand, Braidotti points out that thinkers like Jürgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Peter Sloterdijk, and even Jacques Derrida have all expressed "intense anxiety bordering on moral panic about the future of the human and humanist legacy in our advanced technological times." (CP, 35) For the defenders of liberal humanism, the most appropriate path would be to retain humanist values while making the figure of the human more inclusive by expanding a notion of personhood to include not only humans, but other forms of life through measures such as animal rights. For some, an anxiety about new technologies stems from a fear that the challenges of those technologies and the threats of relativism, nihilism, and despotism might lead to a loss of Enlightenment values. On the other hand, there are the "transhumanists" who are unconcerned about the human subject as such and uncritically embrace the belief that the full integration of biology with technology will usher in a new utopian age in humanity's evolution.[3] Critical Posthumanism takes a middle ground by regarding technological innovation itself as neutral while celebrating the possibilities for new subject formations beyond the ideal of Man, figure of the human, or values of humanism.

Braidotti argues that bringing about those subject formations will require the humanities to embrace posthuman scholarship. To do this, she recommends working with a "conceptual frame of nomadic becoming" which is grounded in what she calls the "neo-Spinozist vital ontologies" that are found in Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968) and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1981) (CP, 33). Braidotti follows Deleuze by suggesting that his work can help us to create *cartographies* for ourselves that can tell us where we have been—like Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault's genealogy—and which also articulate possibilities for

[3] Stefan Herbrechter, *Posthumanism* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), viii.

becoming (virtualities) whereby the actualization of those virtualities could help us build a better future (CP, 37). The creation of those cartographies requires us "to provide an *adequate* expression of what bodies—as both embodied and embrained—can do and think and enact." (CP, 49) The reason for this, Braidotti explains, is that the human itself is only one possible vector of becoming, so the creation of cartographies can help us uncover or create new vectors. The uncovering of these vectors which emphasize the movement and becomings of various individuals and groups of people leads us to a "nomadic critical posthumanities." For Braidotti, the nomadic approach to the humanities which is grounded in neo-Spinozist and neo-materialist ontology presents the greatest opportunity for resisting a sedentary vision of the posthuman which is hegemonic, capitalist, and meta-rationalist (CP, 48).

While Braidotti emphasizes looking forward to use nomadic Critical Posthumanism to work toward a brighter future, I think that conceptual clarity can be gained by looking backward at the larger tradition and spirit of which posthumanism is only a part and ask: what is the philosophical justification behind the effort to theorize subjectivity as posthuman subjectivity? In other words, what is the purpose of the term "posthuman" when we could retain the well-established term "human" for describing any actual and possible subject formations for *homo sapiens*? To answer these questions we can recall Martin Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism" (1947) where—in opposition to Jean-Paul Sartre's thesis that "Existentialism is a Humanism"—he puts forward the argument that "human" does not refer to a member of a certain biological species, but to a concept that signifies a mode of being originating from the Roman *animal rationale* which is a modification of the Greek *zoon logon echon*.[4] Heidegger proposes that a

[4] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," (1947) in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, (tr.) D. Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 213–266 here 226.

more stable and general term for *homo sapiens* is *Dasein*: the type of being that asks about its being. The human is only one of the modes of being for *Dasein* and despite its Ancient origins, our Modern understanding of the term is rooted in the Cartesian *Cogito* where to be a human is to understand oneself as a conscious subject encountering the world as object(s).[5] The significance of Heidegger's claim is that by accepting the human as historically contingent rather than biologically determined, we must also accept that the human subject must eventually come to an end.

In 20th century Continental philosophy, the eventual end of the human became a subject of fascination for the generation of French philosophers following Heidegger. For example, Foucault concludes *The Order of Things* (1966) with the claim that "man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end."[6] Similarly and shortly thereafter in an address published as "The Ends of Man," (1969) Derrida proposes that philosophy has two alternatives where it could either attempt a "deconstruction without changing ground" of its fundamental concepts or else change not only its ground but also the style by which philosophical thinking happens.[7] The suggestion to change style comes from Nietzsche and we should recall that his *Ubermensch* prefigures both the end of Man and the posthuman. Moreover, the call to change style is an invocation of Nietzsche's meta-philosophical project of the reevaluation of all values and the overturning of fundamental concepts. Accordingly, the posthumanist tradition is not solely grounded in a critique of Man, or the human, or liberal humanism, but is part of a broader critique of philosophy's fundamental concepts.

[5] Ibid., 243.
[6] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences* (1966) (Routledge, 2005), 422.
[7] Jacques Derrida. "The Ends of Man," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 30, no. 1 (1969): 31–57, 57.

Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze all worked in response to Nietzsche's project with varying degrees of enthusiasm or apprehension. Deleuze's masterpiece, *Difference and Repetition* (1968) sustains an engagement with Nietzsche that centers around an attack on what Deleuze calls the dogmatic or moral Image of Thought: a notion he first developed in his second monograph, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962). The Image represents what philosophers have taken to be the necessary components of thinking such as the processes of recognition of objects, ways of identifying erroneous thinking, and a reliance on "prephilosophical" fundamental concepts such as "thinking" itself.[8] Such concepts have tended to appear necessary to philosophers when they are acknowledged at all. For example, Deleuze acknowledges that Kant developed a total critique that extended to "all claims to knowledge and truth," but then failed to extend critique itself to "knowledge and truth themselves" and thereby places an *a priori* limit on philosophy without justification.[9] The most recognizable and ubiquitous are—not coincidentally—the constituents of the human as *Cogito*: "I," "thinking," and "being." (DR, 132) The foundation of modern philosophy, then, is the human as the subject which necessarily exists by virtue of its awareness of its existence. Thus, the posthuman challenge to the human is a challenge to the *Cogito* and *vice versa*.

The lineage of posthumanism is clear in Gruber's call for a posthumanist "(de)ontology," which is not in any way Kantian, but is instead the term he uses to place himself within the tradition of anti-Platonic and anti-Cartesian philosophers. With references to Nietzsche and Heidegger he declares that the loss of the Platonic ideal means there is no longer any standard by which to orient ourselves: whether it be God, truth, Being, or the figure of Man "nothing more

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), (tr.) P. Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xvi. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *DR*.
[9] Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), (tr.) H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 89.

remains." (NB, 73) In the absence of any standard we have two choices. On the one hand, we can invent new standards in the same form as the old: scientific knowledge could stand in for the light of Divine Truth, or "the brain" could replace Man as the measure of all things. The problem with such a move is—since we now must recognize them as inventions—these standards cannot authentically replicate the form of the old standards which were held to be immutable. Instead, Gruber proposes that we reject those forms of knowledge and valuation that rest on the pretensions of absolutism and immutability and instead try to develop a "nomadic ontology" that values "the constant flux inherent in life." (NB, 74)

However, here I would suggest that we can go a step further. Note that whereas Gruber talks about a "nomadic ontology," Braidotti uses the terms "nomadic theory" or "nomadic thought" but also speaks of "vital ontologies" or "process ontology." That is, both are eager for posthumanism to critique standards such as the human or traditional ontology. Yet, even while Gruber suggests a (de)ontology, neither he nor Bradiotti seem to take the next step and challenge the concept of ontology itself. But it seems that the nomadic approach to thinking allows us to do exactly that. Furthermore, when we keep in mind Deleuze's attack on the Image of Thought we must not presuppose that ontology is beyond questioning. In other words, if nomadic thinking (i.e. nomadology) is a means to theorize the posthuman instead of the human, and given that the human itself is rooted in part in the fundamental concept of being, then we can think of Deleuze's nomadology as a replacement for ontology. In other words, we can think of nomadology as a non-ontological approach to philosophy.

Spinoza and Leibniz: From Cartography to Nomadology

In order to develop my claim that Deleuze's nomadology can replace ontology, I will proceed by considering the place of nomadology in Deleuze's philosophy before moving onto a discussion of the concept itself: that is, what philosophical problem does Deleuze identify which would require nomadology?

As we have seen, unlike the human which is fundamentally a subject which thinks, posthumans are embrained and embodied. To theorize posthumans we need to be able to express what their bodies can do. The question of what a body can do plays a significant role in Deleuze's overall project, especially in his work on Spinoza. Therefore, it is not surprising that Braidotti grounds her reading of Deleuze on his books on Spinoza, but given her frequent allusions to Deleuze's nomadic thinking it is worth pointing out that *The Fold* is where Deleuze proposes nomadology as a subversion of Leibniz's monadology.[10] What I want to suggest here is that while Spinoza led Deleuze to a philosophy centered on bodies, it was his work on Leibniz—and to a lesser degree, Foucault—which allowed him to adequately theorize the body. In short, then, it is the problem of the body which eventually leads Deleuze to a nomadology and it is to that problem which I will now turn.

Deleuze's theory of the body is difficult in part because he develops it throughout his works on David Hume, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Foucault, and Leibniz; but also because it is haunted by Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's infamous Body without Organs (BwO) and their call in *A Thousand Plateaus* that one "make oneself a BwO."[11] As early as 1997, Ian Buchanan had noted

[10] Deleuze and Guattari do devote a plateau to nomadology in *A Thousand Plateaus*, but that account revolves around the politics of the war machine and it is only in *The Fold* that Deleuze develops a full account of the concept.
[11] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), (tr.) B Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 158. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *ATP*.

that among academics the BwO had already "been the cause of much confusion, as well as anxiety and outrage." The confusion, he argues, likely stems from "a mistaken perception that because bodies and bodies without organs are both examples of what Deleuze and Guattari call assemblages—which effectively means neither have what is traditionally known as organs—there must not be any real difference between the two notions." Furthermore, he suggests that scholars have erred by assuming that the BwO is the basis for Deleuze's concept of the body when in fact the opposite is the case. [12] I mention this here to dispel any suspicions that the problem of the body for Deleuze relies on the BwO. Instead, for Deleuze, the problem is that because philosophy has so often focused on the *Cogito* and matters of thinking or consciousness, the body has been either ignored or made to be synonymous with error. As a result, *we do not know what a body can do*.

That problem is one Deleuze first identified in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, where he writes: "Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for."[13] The problem that we do not know what a body can do and its accompanying question—what can a body do?—would become a refrain in Deleuze's work that appears at least six times through the original publication of *Cinema 2* in 1985. The problem is always one that he attributes to Spinoza and he repeatedly claims that understanding a body in terms of what it can do requires cartographies of the body. Doing cartography consists of the creation of a map that has two axes: the longitudinal allows us to conceptualize things in terms of extension and the

[12] Ian Buchanan, "The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?," *Body & Society*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1997): 73–91, here, 73.
[13] Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 39.

relation between things through their motion while the latitudinal concerns intension which is correlated to affect and capacities or degrees of power (ATP, 256-257).[14]

A full account of cartography would require quite a bit more detail. I raise it again here just to show that it is both Deleuze's response to the problem of the body in relation to Spinoza as well as Braidotti's proposed method for nomadic critical posthumanities. However, for Deleuze it would not seem to be a fully adequate method for theorizing the body given that the problem that we do not know what a body can do persists in his writing until his work on Foucault and Leibniz. Nomadology therefore becomes necessary because there is a limitation to accounting for bodies through cartography. While it can tell us what an already individuated body can do at a given time, it does not account for the prior question of how bodies are individuated in the first place or for the changes that bodies have undergone up to a given time and will undergo in the future. Cartography still bears a shadow of ontology in that it only shows us what an actual body can do in a given time and so takes the body to be a static being, but as a philosopher of becoming Deleuze needs to be able to account for the possibilities and processes of differentiation that are constantly happening to and forming bodies in the world. Or as James Williams says, Deleuze thinks that in order to fully account for something, we must be able to comprehend it in terms of what is has been previously and will be subsequently.[15]

Matthew Hammond has argued that Deleuze's engagements with Leibniz enabled him to do exactly that. Hammond claims that *The Fold* is crucial in that it transforms Deleuze's view of Spinoza to be "now understood as not only as the supreme philosopher of nature [from *A*

[14] See also: Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970/1981), (tr.) R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 125-127.
[15] James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition* (2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 42.

Thousand Plateaus], but also the 'Christ of Philosophy' [in *What is Philosophy?*] who obliges the philosopher (Deleuze) to engage with non-philosophic worlds…[and] whose John the Baptist is no doubt revealed to be Leibniz."[16] Hagiography aside, these attributions emphasize the importance of Leibniz's thinking for Deleuze's broader philosophical project. The transformation in Deleuze's thought is possible because Leibniz's account of *differencing* allows Deleuze to theorize the possible *expressions* of unformed matter into individuated bodies.[17]

To explain how Leibniz transforms Deleuze's approach to theorizing the body and his wider thinking, we first need an account of Deleuze's understanding of differencing and expression in Leibniz. I will give such an account here by drawing largely from Daniel W. Smith's reading of Deleuze's Leibniz through not only *The Fold*, but also Deleuze's engagements with Leibniz in *Difference and Repetition*, *The Logic of Sense* (1969), and his 1980 series of lectures on the polymath.

Smith explains the concept of expression in Leibniz through Deleuze's inference of a *principle of difference* in Leibniz's thought. According to Smith, there is no overt mention of such a principle in Leibniz's work but it can be seen in his work on the principles of identity and sufficient reason.[18] To briefly summarize the role of each, Leibniz recognized that the *principle of identity* in the formulation "A is A" implies a vector which moves from the predicate to the subject. This vectoring becomes clear when we consider judgements of attribution such as "The sky is blue" or "A is B" where the subject and predicate are obviously not identical but where the

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[16] Matthew Hammond, "Capacity or Plasicity: So Just What Is a Body?," in *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader*, (ed.) S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 225-242, 242.
[17] Ibid., 236.
[18] Daniel W. Smith. "Genesis and Difference: Deleuze, Maimon, and the Post-Kantian Reading of Leibniz," in *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader*, (ed.) S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 132-154. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as GD.

predicate is attributed to the subject (GD, 140). Smith says such an insight is still basic logic, so the surprising thing comes when Leibniz tries to account for *existing* things rather than just *essences* through a second *principle of sufficient reason*. This second principle is necessary because the principle of identity is unable to account for the quality of existing. [19] To use Smith's example, the principle of identity can tell us what unicorns are, even though we know that they do not exist. As Deleuze explains in *The Fold,* a principle of sufficient reason is needed to explain existing things because: "Everything is everything that happens, no matter what happens. Everything that happens has a reason!"[20] Leibniz's specific formulations of the principle that Deleuze uses states: "All predication is grounded in the nature of things." and "'Every predicate is in the subject,' the subject or nature of things being the notion, the concept of the thing" (TF, 42). In other words, the principle of sufficient reason accounts for the existence of a thing by asserting that everything which is predicated on the thing is included in its concept (GD, 141).

By explaining the existence of things in such a way, Deleuze argues that Leibniz radicalizes the meaning of the predicate, the concept, and the individual. Note that Deleuze describes "everything" as "what happens" where "an event is called what happens to a thing, whether it undergoes the event or makes it happen…." (TF, 41) Predication, then, no longer concerns the attribution of a property to a subject or substance, but rather we have "predicates-as-events." By replacing attributes with events in predicates, Deleuze claims that "Leibniz brings

[19] For Deleuze, the need for philosophy to be able to account for existing things was something that concerned him throughout his career. In an early essay on Bergson, he writes that contra to Kant "it is not the conditions of all possible experience that must be reached, but the conditions of real experience." Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974* (2002), (ed.) D. Lapoujade (tr.) Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004) Similarly, in *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari credit Spinoza and Fichte with the insight that "we must make use of fictions and abstractions, but only so far as is necessary to get to a plane where we go from real being to real being and advance through the construction of concepts." Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 207. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as WIP.

[20] Gilles, Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988), (tr.) T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 41. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as TF.

a new conception to the concept [*concetto*], with which he transforms philosophy" (TF, 42). The concept as *concetto* no longer refers to a general notion or idea that we can represent clearly and distinctly, but instead designates existing things: i.e. individuals where they themselves are definable by their events rather than through properties or an identity. The examples Deleuze uses in *The Logic of Sense* and *TF*—which he takes from Leibniz—are that if "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is a true statement, then "crossed the Rubicon" must be contained in the concept "Caesar." Similarly, "to live in a garden, to be the first man, to sin" all designate the concept "Adam."[21]

As Smith explains, Leibniz thereby transforms philosophy by moving beyond Aristotle's logic and metaphysics. In Aristotle and afterwards, concepts are distinct from individuals because the former take the form of generalizations while the latter are particulars or singularities; but Leibniz extends the concept to the individual. This departs from Aristotle's metaphysics which include a principle of *anankstenai* or stopping the analysis of a concept after a certain point. Instead, the Leibnizian analysis is *infinite* because it not only requires that we account for what a thing undergoes, but also requires us to account for the ways that the thing relates to and affects other things: e.g. the event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon is directly related to the creation of the Roman Empire. It is also indirectly related to all other events in the world leading up to that point as well as all every event that resulted from the creation of the Empire. An apparent difficulty of Leibniz's position, then, is that any conceptual analysis of any subject necessarily includes the entire world. Leibniz's solution to the apparent impossibility of his position is the articulation of expression, which states: "the concept of the subject expresses

[21] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (1969), (tr.) M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 114.

the entirety of the world." He couples expression with the concept of *point-of-view* and by doing so he precedes Nietzsche in the development of perspectivism in philosophy.[22] The claim then becomes: the subject expresses the entirety of the world but only from a particular perspective. Smith is clear that Leibniz does not resort to relativism where everything becomes relative to the point-of-view of the subject. The point-of-view is prior to the subject and "the subject is constituted by the point of view; points of view are the sufficient reason of subjects" (GD, 142-143). Accordingly, the determination of the point-of-view is a function of that *finite* part of the world which we call the *body*. And the body can now be defined as a particular point-of-view through which the infinity of the world is expressed.

Such a framework gives Deleuze a way to account for how bodies are expressed or actualized within the world. But how do we go beyond cartography to overcome the problem of the body and account for what those bodies can do; which is to say, how do we account for things in terms of all their possible events? One option could be to account for all the events pertaining to a certain concept: "to walk" might be an event which applies to humans but not to oak trees. However, for Leibniz, we cannot adequately comprehend things through categorization. We might correctly say that Adam and Caesar are both men, but a concept like "men" is insufficient for comprehending the concepts Adam or Caesar. Because of this, Deleuze locates a third *principle of indiscernibles* in Leibniz that says: "there is one and only one thing per concept." (DR, 12) Although this principle enables the infinite analysis, we are led back to the problem where even if we limit the analysis to a body itself we must be able to account for the infinitesimal changes of relations that bodies are continuously undergoing through processes

[22] Note that while Leibniz's point-of-view is a type of perspectivism, Deleuze claims that perspectivism itself is not full developed until Nietzsche. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 174.

of differencing. Yet, such an infinite analysis is exactly what Deleuze needs to account for what bodies can do, and by extension it is what we would need for a genuinely nomadic posthumanism.

Leibniz's famous solution for reconciling the infinite analysis with the determination of possible worlds was to suggest that there are infinite compossible worlds which are not logically incompatible (e.g. one in which Adam is not a sinner), but where only the best possible world is actualized thanks to a harmony that God has pre-established (GD, 144). Of course, a theological solution would not be acceptable for Deleuze or any other thinkers in the post-Nietzschean tradition which seeks to challenge and overthrow all allegedly fundamental concepts. Indeed, while Deleuze praised Leibniz for being the first philosopher of the event, he would repeatedly recount Leibniz's "shameful declaration" that philosophy should create new truths and concepts, but only if they do not "overthrow" existing sentiments.[23] Even so, while Leibniz imposed a limit on his own philosophy he also developed the means for overcoming it. Those limitations and how Deleuze overcomes them to move from ontological monadology to non-ontological nomadology will be the subject of the next section.

From Monad to Nomad: Leibniz's Limit and the Need for Folding in Nomadology

In addition to his theology and unwillingness to challenge prevailing sentiment, Leibniz further compromises with transcendence for Deleuze in that his monadology resorts back to identity through the substance ontology of the monad. The individual concepts which express the infinity of the world are ultimately reduced by Leibniz to "simple substances" that still lack any

[23] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 116. See also: Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 104.

attributes (e.g. parts, extension, shape) and are therefore unable to change themselves and cannot be altered externally. Instead they are enclosed and "Monads have no windows through which anything could enter them or depart from them."[24] Leibniz's reliance on the monads is, for Deleuze, a type of *infinite representation* where the infinite process of differencing in the principle of sufficient reason is subordinated to the principle of identity through the identities of the monad (DR, 49). As a result, Deleuze claims that Leibniz ultimately confuses "the concept of difference-in-itself with the inscription of difference in the identity of the concept in general" (DR, 50). Since part of Deleuze's aim in *DR* is to articulate concept of difference-in-itself without resorting to conceptual difference, difference cannot be subordinated to the identity of the concept (DR, 26-27). Accordingly, the subordination of the processes of differencing to identity is unfounded as Deleuze argues that identity itself is subordinate to the difference principle or difference-in-itself. The way to overcome the principle of identity for Deleuze is to comprehend existing things not through identity, but through continuity (GD, 149). What this requires is a way to shift from the monad to the nomadic, which Deleuze locates in Leibniz's calculus. Thus, even while Leibniz places a limit on his own philosophy, he also provides the means for overcoming that limit: for overtaking monadology with nomadology.

Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus provides the means for comprehending the continuity between things without reference to any determinate terms. A fundamental operation of the calculus is differentiation which allows us to determine the rate of change at a given position in an infinite series expressed as the curvature of a line in a function. Leibniz views curves as infinitangular polygons where continuity is defined as "a variable ranging over an infinite

[24] G.W Leibniz. *Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide*, (tr.) L. Strickland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 14-15.

sequence of values."[25] Leibniz proposes the differential relation as a way to determine the rate of change (i.e. slope of the curve) over an infinitely small duration (i.e. at a given instant). The relation is the quotient between differentials (dy/dx) where the differential is taken to be an infinitesimal quantity or "an infinitely small nonzero increment" on either the x or y axis (LM, 91-92). In using infinitesimal numbers to make finite determinations, Leibniz's calculus is as revolutionary as it is surprising. While it works for accurately determining rates of change, the infinitesimal was not rigorously defined by Leibniz and seems to contradict our understanding of mathematics through algebra and arithmetic. That is, the infinitesimal, by definition, lacks a quantity and is conceptually no different from zero in that respect. However, it is functionally different from zero in that any division by zero ought to yield zero and yet the stipulation of the infinitesimal makes the calculus possible (LM, 96). Accordingly, the infinitesimal was the subject of suspicion for centuries and it was not given a rigorous foundation until the 1960s (LM, 98).

The development of the calculus marks a shift from algebra which makes it possible to account for continuous change that is not reducible to the identity of the terms involved. In *TF*, Deleuze writes:

> To be sure, in a fractional number or even in an algebraic formula, variability is not considered as such, since each of the terms has or must have a particular value. The same no longer holds either for the irrational number and

[25] For an in depth account of Leibniz's calculus and the way that Deleuze will operationalize it in *The Fold* in light of the contributions from Weierstrass and Poincaré, see: Simon Duffy. "Leibniz, Mathematics and the Monad," in *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader*, (ed.) S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 89–111, here 91. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as LM.

> corresponding serial calculus, or for the differential quotient and differential calculus, in which variation becomes presently infinite.[26]

The shift from algebra to calculus was only part of a broader shift from thinking about mathematics in relation to geometric objects toward thinking about relations between numbers as well as symbols. Such a shift was monumental because geometry had been the standard from Euclid until the 17th century. We can see its influence in the geometric method of Spinoza's *Ethics* and even Isaac Newton adhered to it despite having invented the calculus himself independently of Leibniz.[27] The shift itself would lead to the development of the concept of the function, which was introduced by none other than Leibniz although it only later developed its contemporary meaning as "a relation that uniquely associates members of one set with members of another set." The expression of the differential relation as a function was developed by Euler which replaced the differential with the derivative. As a function, the calculus no longer needs to be conceptualized through the geometric curvature of infinitangular polygons but can be understood through the changing relations of sets of numbers (LM, 98). The takeaway here is that for Deleuze the development of the calculus and shift to thinking of mathematics in terms of functions can be used as a heuristic for how philosophers think about metaphysics and epistemology.[28]

As it concerns philosophy, the determination of terms through the differential relation is what grounds Deleuze's understanding of empiricism—a term he uses to describe his own

[26] *The Fold*., 17.
[27] Note that Newton's calculus was not infinitesimal and instead functioned through what he called fluxions, but it is Leibniz's notation that would eventually become the standard.
[28] Henry Sommers-Hall has a detailed account of the metaphysical implications of differing interpretations of the calculus in Hegel and Deleuze. On his read, the main takeaway for Deleuze is that a Leibnizian interpretation allows thought to depart from both finite and infinite representation. Henry Somers-Hall. "Hegel and Deleuze on the Metaphysical Interpretation of the Calculus," *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 42, no. 4 (2010): 555–72.

philosophy. In his first monograph, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953) on Hume, he declares: "We will call 'nonempiricist' every theory according to which, *in one way or another*, relations are derived from the nature of things."[29] In contrast, for nomadology, the differential relation is a formulation of pure difference where differencing is not determined by the terms involved, but the terms themselves are determined through the process of differencing. As Smith puts it: "the differential relation is not only *external* to its terms (which was Bertrand Russell's empiricist dictum), but it also *determines* its term. In other words, difference here becomes *constitutive* of identity" (GD, 149).

Nomadology which conceives of things through differentiation is clearly a departure from traditional ontology which grounds being in God or substances, but how is it that nomadology replaces ontology itself? Could we not say that nomadology is a process or that differential ontology that understands being as becoming? I think we can see that it is not best understood in those ways if we recall Deleuze's other well-known formulation of empiricism in *Dialogues* (1977), which I will quote in some detail:

> This geography of relations is particularly important to the extent that philosophy, the history of philosophy, is encumbered with the problem of being, IS. They discuss the judgement of attribution (the sky is blue) and the judgement of existence (God is), which presupposes the other. But it is always the verb *to be*… Precisely speaking, it is not enough to create a logic of relations, to recognize the rights of the judgement of relation as an autonomous sphere, distinct from judgement of existence and attribution…One must go further: one must make the

[29] Deleuze, Gilles. *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. Translated by Constantin V. Boundas. 1953. Reprint, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 109.

> encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over. Substitute the AND for IS. A *and* B....Thinking *with* AND, instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking *for* IS: empiricism has never had another secret.[30]

Here the movement from IS to AND is a movement from identification to conjunction and also an opening up of relationality that—as we have seen—carries it beyond what could be signified by the terms in question. Accordingly, what we have is not a formulation of being as becoming or even the articulation of being(s) through differencing. Instead, in the Nietzschean spirit that guided Deleuze's work, the call is an invocation to undermine and topple being. This call is not only directed at the concept of being but at any approach to philosophy itself with operates with the verb *be to* and seeks to understand something in terms of what it IS: in other words, it is directed at ontology. Nomadology as an empiricism which thinks with AND appears as the alternative to ontology. Deleuze provides an example of undermining the IS that comes about when we understand predication as a matter of events rather than attribution when he says: "I can no more reduce 'I travel' to 'I am a traveling being' than I can reduce 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being.' Thought is not a constant attribute, but a predicate passing endlessly from one thought to another" (TF, 53).

We have seen nomadology which uses the infinitesimal calculus as a heuristic for developing a philosophy of differencing that thinks with AND rather than IS. The previous example shows Deleuze using this nomadology to depart from the *Cogito*. We begin to come full-circle by following Ian Buchanan's claim that "according to Deleuze, the determination that

[30] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (1977), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1991), 56-57.

relations are external to their terms is the condition of possibility for a solution to the empiricist problem: *how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given*?"[31] To put it slightly differently, if nomadology provides us with the means for theorizing subjectivity, how does it conceptualize subjectivity in a way that is appropriate for nomadic Critical Posthumanism? To answer that question, we must recall that while the infinitesimal calculus provides Deleuze with a heuristic for nomadic thinking, he develops his nomadology through a concept of *folding*.

In the first section we saw that reckoning with the end of Man was a concern for the phenomenologists working in response to Nietzsche. Likewise, the concept of folding was introduced by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In the introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Constantin Boundas suggests that Deleuze's late work which centered on the fold and folding is an attempt to utilize their concepts to elucidate the processes of subjectivity. Deleuze's work, Boundas suggests, is not an attempt to radicalize phenomenology, but a "transition from phenomenology to nomadic sensation…."[32] This transition is in part significant in that it signals a departure from both a dominant school of—and method for—doing philosophy in post-war 20th century French and German philosophy. [33] But more importantly, by using folding to subvert phenomenology in favour of nomadology, Deleuze is able to avoid the *aporias* and crisis for philosophy itself that Heidegger and Derrida saw as a consequence of the end of Man. For Heidegger, even while phenomenology aims to uncover the existential condition of humanity

[31] Ian Buchanan, *Deleuzism: A Metacommentary*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 85.
[32] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 4-5.
[33] For a detailed account of *The Fold* as an attack on the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre; see: Sjoerd van Tuinen. "A Transcendental Philosophy of the Event: Deleuze's Non-Phenomenological Reading of Leibniz," in *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader*, (ed.) S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 155-183.

through the analytic of *Dasein* and to articulate the fundamental question of philosophy as the question of the meaning of Being, it eventually leads him to declare the end of philosophy and the coming dominance of the sciences which he regards as separate and independent from philosophy.[34] Similarly, for Derrida, phenomenology which finds that Being is empty also signals the end of Man for philosophy as: "Man is that which is proper to Being, which speaks into his ear from very near. Being is that which is proper to man."[35] Thus, phenomenology points toward the need for philosophy that can think beyond the figure of Man as the figure of subjectivity that has dominated the Modern era, but is largely unable to do so itself because it is grounded in consciousness. In contrast, nomadology through folding departs from the *Cogito* which allows for the investigation of "nonhuman" or "superhuman" worlds.[36]

While Deleuze does not develop a full account of folding until *TF*, he first utilizes the term with an evocative example in a section on Spinoza in *ATP* that illustrates its role in thinking about nonhuman worlds. He and Guattari reference Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire's pre-Darwinian theory that species of animals could evolve over time. For Saint-Hilaire, they write, a vertebrate could become a cephalopod by folding it's back fast enough while moving the pelvis to the neck and extremities outward "like 'a clown who throws his head and shoulders back and walks on his head and hand.' *Plication*" (ATP, 255). Deleuze uses the example again in *F* as part of a broader discussion where he shows that folding was used by early biologists—including Charles Darwin—to explain the commonalities and variations among life-forms (F, 128-129).

[34] Martin Heidegger. "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1969)*, (ed.) D. Krell, (HarperCollins, 1993), 427-449, 432-433.
[35] Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 54.
[36] Boundas. *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 5.

In *TF*, Deleuze once again uses Leibniz's calculus to theorize the fold. For our purposes, we can note that the calculus conceives of things in terms of rates of change that are expressed through the slope of a curve. By better approximating the slope of a curve we better express the change that is occurring. We might imagine that we could identify static points on a curve, but because the calculus allows for higher-order derivatives or the differentiation of the differential, any point is itself expressible as a process of change. For example, if we have a function between change in position and change in time (displacement), the first derivative will show us changes in terms of velocity (rate of change of displacement), while the second derivative will show change in terms of acceleration (rate of change of velocity).[37] For Deleuze, the calculus leads to the insight that there are neither points nor discrete units of matter. Drawing from one of Leibniz's plays, Deleuze quotes his assertion that: "The division of the continuous must not be taken as of sand dividing into grains, but as that of a sheet of paper or of a tunic in folds, in such a way that an infinite number of folds can be produced, some smaller than others, but without a body ever dissolving into points or minima." In place of points or separate objects, the fold as the basic unit of matter is "a simple extremity of the line" (TF, 6).

Deleuze suggests that in taking the fold to be a basic unit which prioritizes lines characterized by their movement, variation becomes primary so objects themselves become functional where: "The new status of the object no longer refers its condition to a spatial mold—in other words, to a relation of form matter—but to a temporal modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous development of form." Under this new conception, Deleuze asks us to conceive of objects themselves as events. Borrowing a

[37] The third derivative of position which shows rate of change of acceleration is called jerk. We can also take the fourth, fifth, and sixth derivatives which are called snap/jounce, crackle/flounce, and pop/pounce respectively.

term from Bernard Cache, he suggests that the object now becomes the *objectile*. And Deleuze points out that: "If the status of the object is profoundly changed, so also is that of the subject" (TF, 19).

Conclusion: Human to Posthuman, Chaos to Brain, Subject to Eject

As we have seen, the figure of the human as *Cogito* is fundamentally a conscious being characterized as a subject encountering the world as object. Under Deleuze's nomadological framework this figure becomes untenable. Nomadic philosophy adds to the posthumanist critique of the figure of Man by undermining the fundamental concepts of the human: consciousness, being, and subject/object. Nomadology replaces consciousness with embodied thinking and sensation, AND ontological being with the event. With the transformation of the object to the objectile, Deleuze finds a correlative transformation where the subject as point-of-view becomes the *superject* where the point-of-view is a point-of-view on variation rather than objects (TF, 20). Yet, in his final book, *What is Philosophy*? (1991), written with Guattari, the superject itself is only one part of a tripartite structure of subjectivity.

The figure of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari describe in the conclusion of the book is what they call the Thought-brain.[38] Before discussing this figure we should recall that our starting point was Gruber's argument that Deleuze's work on the brain might lead us to (de)ontologize subjectivity in a way that could be of use to the neurosciences. Gruber's article is itself a response to an earlier article by Nikolas Rose which also centers on Deleuze, the brain, and neuroscience. I want to recount a couple of their central claims very briefly in order to say

[38] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), (tr.) H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 185–186. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *WIP*.

what the Thought-brain is *not*. Rose's argument is that for Deleuze: "It is the brain that thinks and not man…."[39] The phrase comes from the conclusion of *WIP* and for Rose it means that the brain-organ is the locus of subjectivity and thanks to new technologies in neurosciences which—to some degree—permit researchers to determine the neural mechanisms in the brain that cause or underpin thinking, we now have a medium by which we can directly observe subjectivity itself. This claim, Rose contends, is what Deleuze may have meant by "that enigmatic phrase 'the brain is a screen'".[40] There are, however, two major problems with this reading of Deleuze. First, by taking the brain as an object that could be read, Rose resorts to the same form of representational thinking that Deleuze sought to overcome. Second, in isolating the brain as an organ, he is limited to an organic conception of the body which is at odds with Deleuze's aim of understanding a body in terms of what it does. Gruber notes both of these and, as we have seen, posits a nomadic body as a more open and undetermined model for thinking subjectivity beyond the form of man. Yet, if Rose's brain is too representational and organic then Gruber goes too far in the opposite direction. He tries to reconcile Deleuze's comment that the brain is a screen with another "famous Deleuzian saying" that one "make oneself a Body without Organs." The result, he says, is a "concept of brainlessness, or the body's full braininess in the positive version" (NB, 61). Such a paradoxical formulation is—I think it is fair to say—vague if not outright untenable. A brainless subject seems unlikely given that Deleuze and Guattari's final work is dedicated to articulating an account of subjectivity through the Thought-brain. As I discussed earlier, Gruber's error seems to arise from equivocating the BwO to the body and concluding that Deleuze wants to deny the existence of organs.

[39] Nikolas Rose. "Reading the Human Brain: How the Mind Became Legible," *Body & Society* 22, no. 2 (2016) 140–77, 159.
[40] Ibid.

Although Rose and Gruber err in their reading of Deleuze's (and Guattari's) understanding of the brain, the errors are productive. Somewhat ironically, both Rose and Gruber note the familiar criticisms of vagueness made against attempts to develop theories in relation to existing things or the sciences using Deleuzian concepts. Yet both understand Deleuze as a thinker who is reducible to "intentionally ambiguous" and enigmatic phrases and sayings (NB, 65. However, as we have seen, Deleuze's work is a rigorous engagement with the history of philosophy that aims to identify and overcome the most fundamental concepts and presuppositions of the discipline. In doing so, Deleuze, like other major figures of the 20th century, saw the end of the human as the *Cogito*; but unlike those thinkers who saw that end as a crisis which might spell the end for philosophy itself, Deleuze saw an opportunity for philosophy to reinvent itself with new figures resulting from new approaches to thinking. Nomadology which overcomes ontology is a new model for thinking subjectivity and we could see Deleuze and Guattari's Thought-brain as the starting point for developing such figures that cannot be reduced to a saying like the BwO. Accordingly, I will conclude with a brief outline of their account of the brain.

The Deleuzeguattarian Thought-brain is both a philosophical figure of subjectivity and the existing finite part of the world where philosophy, art, and science meet. It forms part of their larger argument which is an attack on opinion and a defense of thinking. Opinions those beliefs which are uncritical or else grounded in appeals to common sense and they are difficult to resist because they shield us from the *chaos* that is the world we experience without understanding it. [41] Yet, wherever there is opinion there not thinking. *Thinking* happens by creating art, philosophy,

[41] The duo seems to echo C.S. Peirce's influential essay on the fixation of belief. For Peirce, doubt is an inherently uncomfortable condition that we naturally try to avoid by forming beliefs, but of the many ways to form beliefs science is the only method which can give us factual beliefs: Charles Sanders Peirce. "The Fixation of Belief," *Popular Science Monthly*, no. 12 (November 1877): 1–15.

or science. The three are distinct but meet in the brain and "are not the mental objects of an objectified brain but the three aspects under which the brain becomes subject, Thought-brain."[42] For subjectivity which now concerns variation rather than objects: philosophy brings with it *variations* of associations for the creation of concepts, science concerns itself with the *variables* that are used to determine functions, and art develops *varieties* of compositions that elicit sensation (WIP, 202). Through philosophy the brain-subject becomes the *superject* which says "I conceive" rather than "I think" (plane of immanence). Meanwhile, through art it says "I feel" and becomes the *inject* where sensation is a type of contemplation as self-enjoying (plane of composition) (WIP, 212). Finally, through the activity of knowing it says "I function" and becomes the *eject* "because it extracts elements whose principle characteristic is distinction, discrimination: limits, constants, variables, and functions, all those functives and prospects that form the terms of the scientific operation" (plane of knowledge [reference]) (WIP, 215).

A full account of the Thought-brain as the junction of philosophy, art, and science is beyond the scope of this paper, but this brief outline should show how Deleuze and Guattari use it to develop a nomadic posthumanist account of subjectivity that rests on neither the terms of the human nor the verb *to be.* Instead, there is conceiving and sensing and knowing and… Philosophy, art, and science go beyond their own terms so that thought cannot be neatly categorized into the disciplines. Deleuze and Guattari close by envisioning a future where each recognizes the need for what it is not and the result is a "'people to come' in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth: mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people—" (WIP, 218). Here we come full-circle as for Braidotti, "posthuman ethical praxis involves the formation of a new alliance, a new people." (CP, 51) The significance of moving

[42] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. "WIP," 210.

beyond the human is that it has continually missed more people than it has included and the "people yet to come" refers not only to future people but to those currently living and in the past who have been neglected by Modern accounts of subjectivity. Yet, as I have argued, we cannot make the move beyond the human without also going beyond the fundamental concepts that constitute the human. As we have seen, on Deleuze's account, this does not so much require a neo-Spinozist ontology as it does a still-Spinozist but also neo-Leibnizian nomadology. As Deleuze remarks in the final sentence of *TF:* "We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we all remain Leibnizian because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding." (*TF*, 137)

Conclusion

The project comes once again full-circle, so to speak, from Deleuze's first monograph to his final collaboration with Guattari. The preceding papers constitute an engagement with Deleuze throughout his career that attempts to maximize his commitment to the Nietzschean call to reevaluate all values through his reading of the pre-Kantian modern philosophers.

By focusing on Deleuze's Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz the papers present a conceptual whole in several respects. First, each philosopher represents a different period in Deleuze's career from his first monograph *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (1953); through his mature work in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) which was published the same year as his *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968) and followed with *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970) as well as his earlier collaborations with Guattari; to his late work on nomadic thinking and folding such as *Foucault* (1986) and *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988), and finally *What is Philosophy?* (1991) with Guattari once again. In this respect, the non-ontological Deleuze is not a figure that could be dismissed as failing to account for his full oeuvre. However, taking Deleuze through his an early, middle, and late periods is not to suggest that there is a separate Deleuze in each, and I have highlighted much of the continuity in his interests and concerns throughout the decades of his career. In each paper we see a line unravelling in Deleuze's thinking where through his work on Hume he first suggests that his philosophy—which he would later call transcendental empiricism—would seek to theorize what things do rather than what they are. Moving into his works on Nietzsche and Spinoza we see him confront the challenge that we do not know what a body can do with the development of what he calls ethology. And in the later works he conceives of what we are doing through a complex and

highly developed nomadic philosophy of folding that culminates in the figure of the Thought-brain.

In addition to unravelling this line as a non-ontological philosophy of thinking with AND instead of IS, the choice of Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz is significant for how we read the history of philosophy through Deleuze. In the introduction I discussed how his choice of Hume set him on a path of reading a minor history of philosophy that would not follow the same history of an error that Nietzsche identified and which led to the crisis in philosophy for Heidegger. If Kant represents an inflection point in the history of philosophy, then it is one whose limitations Deleuze subverts through Hume and the other two pre-Kantian Modern philosophers. Similarly, the parallelism he finds in Spinoza frees him from the Cartesian *Cogito* and dualisms while his engagements with Leibniz provides him with accounts of differentiation that are not constrained by Hegelian negation or dialectic and of folding through with he departs from the phenomenologists. This is, of course, not to suggest that Deleuze simply ignores those philosophers with whom he has less common ground. That much is clear from his third monograph, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant* (1963), as well as his regular confrontations with Hegel and Heidegger throughout his work. Rather, in invoking an inflection point we can recall Deleuze's imagery of the fold and view these and other great thinkers as inflection points in the unfolding of the history of philosophy where each point presents us with the opportunity to follow a particular line of thought with its own problems and questions that may converge with or diverge from other lines.

There is a final significance of Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz that I have not discussed in this project but is worth noting. The trio were also the thinkers who were the focus of Salomon Maïmon prior to his confrontations with Kant's philosophy. As Daniel W. Smith suggests,

Deleuze's choice to also publish on the same pre-Kantian trio points to the influence of Maïmon on his work and we might view Deleuze's work on Maïmon, Nietzsche, and Bergson as a similarly post-Kantian "minor" trilogy that displaces the major figures at the time: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.[1] The role of the former two are apparent in Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962) and *Bergsonism* (1966) as well as his early essay "Bergson's Conception of Difference" (1956). Yet, as Anne Sauvagnargues has pointed out, Deleuze would praise Maïmon from a 1960 lecture series through the publication of *The Fold*.[2] I mention this to suggest that while this study has focused on the pre-Kantians, perhaps a subsequent search for the non-ontological Deleuze could take up his work on those post-Kantians.

Indeed, while I hope this study has itself been successful in presenting an image of the non-ontological Deleuze, I think its importance also lies in its place for thinking further about non-ontology, both in relation to Deleuze and other movements in contemporary philosophy. Accordingly, I will conclude with a brief discussion of what this study contributes to the movements that I have addressed in the papers (Speculative Realism, New Materialism, and Critical Posthumanism) and provide a few more suggestions for further research.

Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism Against Speculative Realism takes up the Speculative Realist challenge of correlationsism to show how Deleuze both avoids falling into correlationism and that his work reveals a disjunctive and correlationist attitude inherent to Speculative Realism itself. While my focus there is on Meillassoux and Bryant, the critique

[1] Daniel W. Smith. "Genesis and Difference: Deleuze, Maimon, and the Post-Kantian Reading of Leibniz," in *Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader*, (ed.) S. van Tuinen and N. McDonnell. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 132-154 here 138.
[2] Anne Sauvagnargues, "Neo-Kantianism and Maimon's Role in Deleuze's Thought," in *At the Edges of Thought : Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy*, (ed.) Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) 44–59 here 44.

could be extended farther. Specifically, if I am correct that it is possible to give a non-ontological account of the world, then the sort of object-oriented ontology (OOO) promoted by Graham Harman would be unnecessary and unjustified; as would the multitude of "weird ontologies" that have been developed in response to his work. Admittedly, Harman and his supporters have been so widely criticized that another critique is probably not needed, but an engagement with non-ontological philosophy could be illuminating. Here I will briefly note that for Harman, Deleuze and "Deleuzians" are guilty of "overmining" objects, by which he means they place too much emphasis on events, effects, and relationality while denying "pre-existent unified entities that have individual shapes prior to being encountered by some observer."[3] Yet, as we saw with Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, bodies are never just unified entities because they can always be conceived of through their more simple constituents and through their relations with other or more complex bodies. Similarly, following the principle of sufficient reason in Deleuze's Leibniz, denying the ontological existence of a thing as an object does not artificially limit our ability to understand it because of the infinite analysis where the entire world is expressed through the perspective of the objectile. All of this is to say, in addition to what Deleuze's Hume shows us about the disjunctive logic of Speculative Realism, a non-ontological read of Deleuze's Spinoza and Leibniz could reveal some shortcomings of OOO while providing the means to satisfactorily give an account of the world.

Criticism aside, there is an interesting observation that Harman makes regarding the New Materialism of thinkers like Jane Bennett. At the end of *Vibrant Matter*, Bennett declares a belief in "one matter-energy, the maker of things seen and unseen."[4] However, Harman claims that for

[3] Graham Harman, *Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything* (Penguin Random House UK, 2018), 241.
[44] Jane Bennet, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press 2010), 122.

OOO, objects need not be reducible to any conception of matter, especially since objects include immaterial things like ideas. Similarly, in *We Still Do Not Know What a Body Can Do: The Replacement of Ontology with Ethology in Deleuze's Spinoza*, I discuss how for Spinoza and Deleuze, bodies can refer to anything and cannot be reduced to or ontologized as matter—although as in the preceding paragraph, I also don't think they can be reduced to objects. Of course, the New Materialists' understanding of matter differs significantly from the original concept and different theorists have different ways of conceiving of it.

Writing recently in *Angelaki*, Christopher Gamble along with Joshua Hanan and Thomas Nail have argued that there are broadly three versions of New Materialism. The first group to claim the title include some Speculative Realists and OOO followers, but Gamble et al. suggest that neither of these are really materialists.[5] The second group—who they call the Vibrant New Materialists—is of interest to us here because it includes Bennett as well as other Deleuzians like Elizabeth Grosz. The defining feature of this Vibrant New Materialism is an indebtedness to Deleuze's Spinoza and occasionally his Leibniz. Gamble et al. claim that for these thinkers "matter is nothing other than an expression of force itself." For them, then, Deleuze and subsequent generations of Deleuzians have produced an "an *ontology of forces*, not matter."[6] To say that Deleuze does not produce a materialist ontology is consistent with the claims in my paper and I suggest that Deleuze's "materiality" is empiricist which is itself non-ontological. A future study could use my papers on Deleuze's Spinoza and Leibniz to engage more closely with the Vibrant New Materialists to interpret their scholarship without ontologizing it in terms of either matter or force. A productive encounter here could be with the group of thinkers who

[55] Christopher N. Gamble, Joshua S. Hanan, and Thomas Nail. "WHAT IS NEW MATERIALISM?," *Angelaki*, vol. 24, no. 6 (2019): 111–134 here 121.
[6] Ibid., 119.

Gamble et al. call the Performative Materialists. A founding figure of this camp is Karen Barad for whom matter "is...a doing."[7] Nail also places himself in this camp and for him: "Matter *is* what it does or 'how it moves,'...."[8] Such accounts seem remarkably similar to Deleuze's call for understanding bodies in terms of what they can do through an ethology that concerns itself with motion and affect. While I do suggest that Nail is not quite correct in *Being and Motion* when he describes Deleuze's philosophy of motion as ontological, it would be interesting to see whether Deleuze's ethology and nomadology could complement Performative Materialism by making the leap from thinking IS to thinking with AND.

There is one other item I want to mention briefly in relation to Deleuze's Spinoza and beyond. In *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism,* Adrian Johnston claims that one of the "primary antagonisms" in Continental Philosophy today "is that between neo-Spinozist and neo-Hegelian tendencies...."[9] For Johnston, neo-Hegelians want to preserve consciousness and the subject while the neo-Spinozists "are united in their common cause to liquidate *Cogito*-like subjectivity *à la* Descartes, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel."[10] Johnston is certainly correct in his charge that thinkers like Deleuze inspired by Spinoza are opposed to the *Cogito*. Yet, as I argued in *Thinking as Folding: Nomadology as a Non-ontological Approach to Posthumanist Subjectivity* it is not only through Spinoza but also Leibniz that Deleuze attacks the figures of the human and the *Cogito*. I mention this to raise two concluding thoughts. First, if Johnston is correct about the tension between neo-Spinozism and neo-Hegelianism, I think it is clear that such "neo-Spinozism" resulting from Deleuze's work is not reducible to Spinoza himself but is also the

[7] Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham: Duke University Press 2007), 151.
[8] Gamble et al., "WHAT IS NEW MATERIALISM?," 112.
[9] Adrian Johnston, *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 21.
[10] Ibid, 51.

product of Deleuze's other *conceptual personae* which include not only Hume and Leibniz, but also Maïmon, Nietzsche, Bergson, etc. With this in mind, it becomes harder to reduce post-Deleuzian philosophy to neo-Spinozism and even those scholars who support Deleuze's Spinoza—such as critical posthumanists like Braidotti and the Vibrant New Materialists—would benefit by keeping in mind his wider minor history of philosophy. Second, while this project has articulated a positive version of Deleuze as a non-ontological philosopher committed to overcoming the fundamental traditional concepts of philosophy, it has not engaged with Deleuze's Hegelian critics. For Johnston, the subject as *Cogito* remains necessary. A future study could see post-Deleuzian scholarship on the defensive against Hegelian attackers. If such a defense could not hold, then much like Nietzsche's madman, we might find that posthumanist thought has "come too early" and we are not yet ready to go beyond being or the human.[11] Nonetheless, I am optimistic that such a defense would be successful. For Johnston, the neo-Spinozist and broader posthumanist denial of the *Cogito* amounts to a form of epiphenomenalism which he regards as nominalist and therefore anti-realist. However, such a criticism seems to miss the point of Deleuze's project and post-Deleuzian philosophy for which thinking need not be blackmailed into conforming to the terms or concepts put forth by either traditional or 20th century Anglo-American philosophy. Indeed, I think this study has been successful if it has shown some of the possibilities for approaches to philosophy that do not predetermine a limit on the concepts, questions, and problems that philosophy can enable us to think.

[11] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (1887), (tr.) W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 182.

Appendix

Note that a version of *Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism Against Speculative Realism* has previously appeared in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 34, no. 3 (2020): 297-308.

Also note that *We Still Do Not Know What a Body Can Do: The Replacement of Ontology with Ethology in Deleuze's Spinoza* will appear in a forthcoming edition of *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy*.

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