US20090217039A1 - System, Method and Apparatus for Authenticating Calls - Google Patents
System, Method and Apparatus for Authenticating Calls Download PDFInfo
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- US20090217039A1 US20090217039A1 US12/366,630 US36663009A US2009217039A1 US 20090217039 A1 US20090217039 A1 US 20090217039A1 US 36663009 A US36663009 A US 36663009A US 2009217039 A1 US2009217039 A1 US 2009217039A1
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
- H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
- H04M3/42—Systems providing special services or facilities to subscribers
- H04M3/436—Arrangements for screening incoming calls, i.e. evaluating the characteristics of a call before deciding whether to answer it
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
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- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3215—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a plurality of channels
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
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- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to the field of communications and, more particularly, to a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls.
- Caller identification is one of the most trusted ways of identifying who is calling and is commonly used to effectively filtering incoming calls.
- Telecommunication networks are designed in such a way that the Caller ID is usually delivered to the called device by the telecommunication operators. With a traditional phone system, it is hard to spoof Caller ID. But with the advent of IP Telephony, a caller can easily spoof Caller ID using techniques and tools freely available on the Internet. More importantly, the caller can be anywhere in the world where Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity is available to perform these operations.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the present invention provides a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls that is a robust Anti-vishing solution.
- the present invention can identify Caller ID spoofing, verify dialed number to detect man-in-the middle and verify called party against dialed digits to detect impersonation. This solution can handle calls coming from any phone any where with little impact on user experience. Two separate solutions are tailored for smart phones (communication devices capable of running application software) and traditional phones to reduce the impact to user experience while providing robust verification.
- the present invention provides a method for authenticating a calling device in response to receiving a call from the calling device.
- a first authentication request is sent to the calling device.
- a first authentication response is received from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key.
- the caller identification and the called number are extracted from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key.
- the call is transferred to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- the present invention provides an apparatus for authenticating a calling device that includes a communications interface and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface.
- the processor (a) receives a call from the calling device, (b) sends a first authentication request to the calling device, (c) receives a first authentication response from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key, (d) extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key, (e) determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid, and (f) transfers the call to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid.
- the present invention provides a system for authenticating a calling device that includes a communications network communicably coupled to the calling device and a controller communicably coupled to the communications network.
- the controller includes a communications interface communicably coupled to the communications network and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface.
- the processor (a) receives a call from the calling device, (b) sends a first authentication request to the calling device, (c) receives a first authentication response from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key, (d) extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key, (e) determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid, and (f) transfers the call to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid.
- the calling device (a) initiates the call, (b) receives the first authentication request, (c) generates the calling device encrypted data, and (d) sends the first authentication response.
- the present invention also provides a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in response to receiving a call from the calling device.
- the call is terminated and a new call is placed to the calling device.
- the user is prompted to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device.
- the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received.
- One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys.
- the new call is transferred to a called device whenever the user is authenticated as a result of the comparison.
- this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- the present invention provides an apparatus for authenticating a user of a calling device that includes a communications interface and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface.
- the processor (a) receives a call from the calling device via the communications interface, (b) terminates the call, (c) places a new call to the calling device via the communications interface, (d) prompts the user to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device, (e) receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface, (f) authenticates the user by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys, and (g) transfers the new call to a called device whenever the user is authenticated.
- the present invention provides a system for authenticating a user of a calling device that includes a communications network communicably coupled to the calling device and a controller communicably coupled to the communications network.
- the controller includes a communications interface communicably coupled to the communications network and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface.
- the processor (a) receives a call from the calling device via the communications interface, (b) terminates the call, (c) places a new call to the calling device via the communications interface, (d) prompts the user to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device, (e) receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface, (f) authenticates the user by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys, and (g) transfers the new call to a called device whenever the user is authenticated.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an apparatus in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart depicting a registration process for a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting a registration process for a user in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
- the present invention provides a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls that is a robust Anti-vishing solution.
- the present invention can identify Caller ID spoofing, verify dialed number to detect man-in-the middle and verify called party against dialed digits to detect impersonation.
- This solution can handle calls coming from any phone any where with little impact on user experience.
- Two separate solutions are tailored for smart phones (communication devices capable of running application software) and traditional phones to reduce the impact to user experience while providing robust verification.
- the present invention can be incorporated, integrated or combined with other voice communication protection systems, such as:
- the system 100 includes a communications network 102 , a controller 104 (Anti-Vishing Controller or AVC) communicably coupled to the communications network 102 , and a calling device (smart device) 106 and/or a calling device (traditional device) 112 communicably coupled to the communications network 102 .
- Calling device 106 includes an Anti-Vishing Agent (AVA) 110 , whereas calling device 112 does not.
- AVC Anti-Vishing Controller
- the calling device 106 can be any type of user communications device, such as a phone (e.g., cell phone, PDA phone, IP Phone, softphone, etc.), a computer, a PDA or other any communications device capable of running the AVA 110 application.
- the calling device 112 can be any communications device that is not running an AVA 110 application, such as a land line phone, pay phone, cell phone, etc.
- the called device (smart device or traditional device) or called party 108 is communicably coupled to the controller 104 via integration, direct connection (as shown with called device 108 a ) or through a local network 114 (as shown with called device 108 b ).
- the controller 104 includes a processor 200 communicably coupled to a communications interface 202 and a memory or data storage device 204 .
- the communications interface 202 is communicably coupled to the communications network 102 , the called device 108 a , and the called device 108 b via the local network 114 .
- the AVC 104 can be a computer, a server, a switch, a PBX, a gateway or other suitable device and can be operated by the called party, a network provider, a service provider, a facility provider or a call center.
- the AVA 110 and AVC 104 use various in-band and out-of-band communication channels to exchange information to validate authenticity of caller ID, dialed digits and/or the called party.
- In-band communication can be done through DTMF, modem, voice signals and out-of-band communication can be done through SMS, SIP, and other VoIP control protocols where necessary.
- a registration request is received from the calling device 106 in block 302 .
- the AVC 104 creates and stores a shared secret encryption key for the calling device 106 in block 304 .
- the shared secret encryption key is an initial unique encryption key (secret) established during the registration of the calling device 106 with entities like banks or other entities dealing with confidential, personal or proprietary information.
- secret an initial unique encryption key
- the shared secret encryption key is created and known to the endpoints before the authentication process described below.
- An identifier that is unique to the calling device 106 such as a cell phone IMSI/MIN, is required to register the calling device 106 .
- the shared secret encryption key is sent to the calling device 106 in block 306 .
- the shared secret encryption key can be recycled frequently to ensure that brute-force attacks do not succeed.
- this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- FIG. 4 a flow chart depicting a method 400 for authenticating a calling device 106 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- the AVC 104 receives a call from the calling device 106 in block 402 and sends a first authentication request to the calling device 106 in block 404 . Thereafter, the AVC 104 receives a first authentication response containing a calling device encrypted data from the calling device 106 in block 406 .
- the calling device encrypted data is generated by the calling device 106 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key.
- a caller identification e.g., calling number
- Other data can be used in the generation of the calling device encrypted data, such as a random number provided by the AVC 104 , the IMEI of the calling device 106 , a random number provided by the calling device 106 , or a combination thereof, etc.
- the AVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the calling device encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key in block 408 .
- the AVC 104 determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid in decision block 410 . If the calling device 106 is not verified, as determined in decision block 410 , the AVC 104 terminates the call in block 412 .
- the AVC 104 transfers the call to a called device or called party 108 in block 414 .
- this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- a signaling diagram 500 depicting an authentication of a calling device 106 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- the calling device 106 initiates the call 502 to the called device 108 , but is intercepted by the AVC 104 .
- the AVC 104 sends a first authentication request 404 to the calling device 106 .
- the first authentication request may include a controller generated random number or controller generated encryption key.
- the AVA 110 loaded on the calling device 106 receives the first authentication request 404 , generates the calling device encrypted data 504 and sends a first authentication response 406 containing the calling device encrypted data 504 to the AVC 104 .
- the calling device encrypted data 504 can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof.
- the first authentication response 208 may include a calling device generated encryption key or a calling device random number in addition to the calling device encrypted data 504 .
- the AVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data 206 using the shared secret encryption key and determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid (collectively 408).
- the call is terminated 412 whenever the calling device 106 AVA 110 is not valid.
- the call is transferred 414 to the called party or called device 108 whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid.
- the called device or called party 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) the call 506 . It is possible for the AVA 110 to initiate the authentication. In that case, the same algorithm works except that the roles are reversed.
- the resident AVA client 110 traps the dialed digits and generates a hash of caller ID and dialed digits using the shared secret encryption key stored in the AVA client 110 .
- This encryption key is unique and different for each AVA 110 .
- On receiving the call AVC 104 in the network sends request for the hash using either in-band or out-of-band methods.
- the AVA 110 sends back computed hash either through in-band or out-of-band.
- the AVC 104 extracts the Caller ID and dialed digits from received hash using the same secret encryption key and verifies against the caller ID and called party number.
- the algorithm computes the hash per transaction such that it is unique per transaction and cannot be replayed later.
- the AVA 110 can authenticate the called number. AVA 110 interacts with the user and the call data in the phone 106 to determine if the called party needs to be verified. Now the AVC 104 responds with a hash that includes the Called Party Number and Caller ID and Dialed Digits.
- FIG. 6 a flow chart depicting a method 600 for authenticating a calling device 106 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- the AVC 104 receives a call from the calling device 106 in block 402 and sends a first authentication request to the calling device 106 in block 404 . Thereafter, the AVC 104 receives a first authentication response containing a calling device encrypted data from the calling device 106 in block 406 .
- the calling device encrypted data is generated by the calling device 106 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key.
- a caller identification e.g., calling number
- Other data can be used in the generation of the calling device encrypted data, such as a random number provided by the AVC 104 , the IMEI of the calling device 106 , a random number provided by the calling device 106 , or a combination thereof, etc.
- the AVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the calling device encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key in block 408 .
- the AVC 104 determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid in decision block 410 . If the calling device 106 is not verified, as determined in decision block 410 , the AVC 104 terminates the call in block 412 .
- the AVC 104 sends a second authentication request containing a controller encrypted data to the calling device 106 in block 602 .
- the controller encrypted data is generated by the controller 104 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key. Other data can be used in the generation of the controller encrypted data, such as a random number provided by the AVC 104 , a random number provided by the calling device 106 , or a combination thereof, etc.
- AVC 104 receives a second authentication response indicating success or failure from the calling device 106 in block 604 .
- the AVC 104 terminates the call in block 412 . If, however, the second authentication response indicates success, as determined in decision block 606 , the AVC 104 transfers the call to a called device or called party 108 in block 414 . Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- FIG. 7 a signaling diagram 700 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- This embodiment implements mutual authentication of the endpoints.
- the calling device 106 initiates the call 502 to the called device 108 , but is intercepted by the AVC 104 .
- the AVC 104 sends a first authentication request 404 to the calling device 106 .
- the first authentication request may include a controller generated random number or controller generated encryption key.
- the AVA 110 loaded on the calling device 106 receives the first authentication request 404 , generates the calling device encrypted data 504 and sends a first authentication response 406 containing the calling device encrypted data 504 to the AVC 104 .
- the calling device encrypted data 504 can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof.
- the first authentication response 208 may include a calling device generated encryption key or a calling device random number in addition to the calling device encrypted data 504 .
- the AVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data 206 using the shared secret encryption key and determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid (collectively 408). The call is terminated 412 whenever the calling device 106 AVA 110 is not valid.
- the AVC 104 generates a controller device encrypted data 702 whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid.
- the controller device encrypted data can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof.
- the AVC 104 sends a second authorization request 602 to the calling device 106 AVA 110 .
- the calling device 106 AVA 110 extracts the data and verifies the controller 104 or called device 108 (collectively 704) and sends a second authorization response 604 to the AVC 104 .
- the AVC 104 terminates the call 412 whenever the second authentication response 604 indicates failure.
- the AVC 104 transfers the call 312 to the called party or called device 108 whenever the second authentication response 604 indicates success.
- the called device or called party 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) the call 506 . It is possible for the AVA 110 to initiate the authentication. In that case, the same algorithm works except that the roles are reversed.
- the requests and response may include the following information:
- First authorization request 404 Server_Random where Server_Random is ‘n’ Pseudo Random digits generated on AVC 104 where the value of ‘n’ depends on the setup time desired.
- First authorization response 406 Client_Random + Client_Auth_Data where Client Random is Pseudo Random digits generated on the phone where the value of ‘n’ depends on the setup time desired, and Client_Auth_Data is First ‘m’ digits of HMAC_MD5(Shared_Secret, Caller_Number + Called_Number [+ IMEI] + Client Random + Server_Random) where the value of ‘m’ depends on the setup time. IMEI is added in case of Smart phones.
- Second authorization request 602 Server_Auth_Data or Auth_Failure
- Server_Auth_Data is First ‘m’ digits of HMAC_MD5(Shared_Secret, Called_Number + Caller_Number + Server_Random + Client_Random) where the value of ‘m’ depends on the setup time desired.
- IMEI/MIN is added in case of Smart phones, and Auth_Failure is Call be terminated.
- Second authorization response 604 Auth_Success or Auth_Failure where Auth_Success: Call will be transferred.
- FIG. 8 a flow chart depicting a registration process 800 for a user in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- a user registers his/her voice or the calling device 106 or 112 for the first time, the user preferably goes through a validation process which requires a voice prompt to be recorded on the AVC 104 .
- the user will be authenticated using standard procedures (such as calling from home phone number or teller assisted procedures).
- the user will be prompted to record his voice.
- the user will be educated to expect this message whenever he/she logs in to access his account over telephone.
- the voice prompt serves two purposes one it helps to validate biometrics and the second it validates the AVC 104 .
- the user of a calling device 106 or 112 is prompted to speak a message in block 802 .
- the spoken message is recorded and stored in block 802 .
- a biometric template based on the user's voice is then created and stored for the user in block 806 .
- the registration process 800 may also include periodically changing the stored message by prompting the calling party or user to speak a new message, and recording the new message and replacing the message with the new message. Note that the stored message should not be played to the calling party or user until the calling party or user is authenticated.
- the present invention prevents caller ID spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, record and replay attacks, called party impersonation, or a combination thereof.
- the resident AVC 104 When the user makes a call to the bank or financial entity, the resident AVC 104 first terminates the call and calls back the user. This procedure prevents Caller ID spoofing if any. Once the user answers the call the AVC 104 requests the user to speak a randomly generated phrase and sequence of dialed digits. When the phrase is repeated by the user, the AVC 104 validates biometrics, content of the phrase, and the sequence of dialed digits against the called party number. This prevents man-in-the-middle and record and replay attacks. Once this validation is complete, the AVC 104 plays the prompt recorded by the user during registration process. The user now should validate the prompt before proceeding further with the call to divulge any important information. This step prevents any called party impersonation.
- the prompt could change frequently to prevent any replay attacks.
- this algorithm requires certain modifications to user behavior when making calls related to financial matter or other important matters.
- the users voice recorded on the Bank's server will be refreshed to avoid any recording and replay through foul play.
- This algorithm ensures that the media recorded on the server is not played before the user is authenticated.
- Authentication on traditional phones relies on user voice recognition. Users are authenticated using voice biometric systems. The user authenticates the bank by hearing his/her own voice that was recorded by him/her during registration. The user will be prompted to refresh this recording periodically.
- FIG. 9 a flow chart depicting a method 900 for authenticating a user of a calling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. Note that this method can also be used with a calling device 106 .
- the AVC 104 receives a call from the calling device 112 via the communications interface in block 402 and terminates the call in block 412 . Thereafter, the AVC 104 initiates a new call to the calling device 112 via the communications interface in block 902 .
- the AVC 104 then prompts the user of the calling device 112 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device in block 904 , and receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface in block 906 .
- the AVC 104 authenticates the user of the calling device 112 by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the calling device 112 , the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys in block 908 . If the comparison is not successful, as determined in decision block 910 , the new call is terminated in block 912 .
- the AVC 104 transfers the new call to the called device or called party 108 in block 914 .
- this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- FIG. 10 a signaling diagram 1000 depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- the user or calling party initiates a call 502 to the called device or called party 108 using a traditional calling device 112 .
- the AVC 104 terminates the call 412 and initiates a new call 902 to the traditional calling device 112 .
- the AVC 104 may provide a notification to the traditional calling device 112 that the authentication process will begin following the termination of the current call 412 .
- the traditional calling device 112 accepts the call 1002 and the user of the calling device 112 is prompted 904 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device.
- the one or more words and the one or more keys can be randomly generated by the AVC 104 .
- the one or more keys can be selected from one or more digits of a telephone number of the called party, and the one or more keys can be selected from the 0-9, * and # keys.
- the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received 906 by the AVC 104 .
- One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared 908 with a stored voice biometric template for the user or calling party, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys.
- the new call is terminated 912 if the comparison fails.
- one or more notifications can be logged or sent to the called device or called party 108 whenever the user or calling party is not authenticated.
- the new call is transferred 914 to a called party whenever the user or calling party is authenticated as a result of the comparison 908 .
- the called device or called party 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) the new call 1004 .
- FIG. 11 a flow chart depicting a method 1100 for authenticating a user of a calling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. Note that this method can also be used with a calling device 106 .
- the AVC 104 receives a call from the calling device 112 via the communications interface in block 402 and terminates the call in block 412 . Thereafter, the AVC 104 initiates a new call to the calling device 112 via the communications interface in block 902 .
- the AVC 104 then prompts the user of the calling device 112 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device in block 904 , and receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface in block 906 .
- the AVC 104 authenticates the user of the calling device 112 by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the calling device 112 , the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys in block 908 . If the comparison is not successful, as determined in decision block 910 , the new call is terminated in block 912 .
- the AVC 104 plays a stored message to the user of the calling device 112 to authenticate the called party or called device 108 in block 1102 and transfers the new call to the called device or called party 108 in block 914 .
- this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- FIG. 12 a signaling diagram 1200 depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown.
- the user of the calling device 112 initiates a call 502 to the called device or called party 108 using a traditional calling device 112 .
- the AVC 104 terminates the call 412 and initiates a new call 902 to the traditional calling device 112 .
- the AVC 104 may provide a notification to the traditional calling device 112 that the authentication process will begin following the termination of the current call 412 .
- the traditional calling device 112 accepts the call 1102 and the user of the calling device 112 is prompted 904 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device.
- the one or more words and the one or more keys can be randomly generated by the AVC 104 .
- the one or more keys can be selected from one or more digits of a telephone number of the called party, and the one or more keys can be selected from the 0-9, * and # keys.
- the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received 906 by the AVC 104 .
- One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared 908 with a stored voice biometric template for the user or calling party, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys.
- the new call is terminated 912 if the comparison fails.
- one or more notifications can be logged or sent to the called device called party 108 whenever the user or calling party is not authenticated.
- a stored message is played 1102 to the user or calling party to authenticate the called party or called device 108 if the comparison 908 is successful.
- the stored message was previously recorded by the user or calling party during the registration process 800 .
- the new call is then transferred 914 to the called device or called party 108 and the called device or called party 108 then accepts (answer) or denies (do not answer) or transfers (e.g., voicemail) the new call 1004 .
- a general purpose processor e.g., microprocessor, conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, state machine or combination of computing devices
- DSP digital signal processor
- ASIC application specific integrated circuit
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- steps of a method or process described herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two.
- a software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
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Abstract
Description
- This patent application is a non-provisional application of U.S. provisional patent application 61/026,470 filed on Feb. 5, 2008; which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
- The present invention relates generally to the field of communications and, more particularly, to a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls.
- Caller identification (Caller ID) is one of the most trusted ways of identifying who is calling and is commonly used to effectively filtering incoming calls. Telecommunication networks are designed in such a way that the Caller ID is usually delivered to the called device by the telecommunication operators. With a traditional phone system, it is hard to spoof Caller ID. But with the advent of IP Telephony, a caller can easily spoof Caller ID using techniques and tools freely available on the Internet. More importantly, the caller can be anywhere in the world where Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity is available to perform these operations.
- In addition, when someone calls a number and leaves a message to call back, the recipient commonly believes the message and callback number associated with the message. Hackers can exploit this trusted call back behavior for their scams using called ID spoofing and geographic independence.
- One such attack recently termed as “Vishing” (Voice variant of well known web/email phishing) has serious consequences to the financial and banking industry. A hacker sitting in a foreign country with freely available tools, such as asterisk PBX, can launch thousands or millions of automated calls. By spoofing Caller ID, the attacker pretends to be the bank or financial institution to solicit confidential information that could lead to theft of the target's financial assets. Similarly, the attacker can leave thousands or millions of messages to callers to call back a number different from the legitimate bank's numbers. Since banks have hundreds of numbers to provide various services, the customer is led to believe that the number is legitimate. The attacker can, with freely available tools, impersonate the bank's caller center and can collect confidential information. In addition, the attacker can act like a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the customer and bank in order to easily obtain confidential information of the target.
- As a result, Caller ID does not necessarily reveal the true identity of a caller. Moreover, in today's world of self-service and virtual customer service, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to associate Caller ID with the caller and calling number with the called party. There is, therefore, a need for a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls.
- The present invention provides a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls that is a robust Anti-vishing solution. The present invention can identify Caller ID spoofing, verify dialed number to detect man-in-the middle and verify called party against dialed digits to detect impersonation. This solution can handle calls coming from any phone any where with little impact on user experience. Two separate solutions are tailored for smart phones (communication devices capable of running application software) and traditional phones to reduce the impact to user experience while providing robust verification.
- More specifically, the present invention provides a method for authenticating a calling device in response to receiving a call from the calling device. A first authentication request is sent to the calling device. A first authentication response is received from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key. The caller identification and the called number are extracted from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key. The call is transferred to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- In addition the present invention provides an apparatus for authenticating a calling device that includes a communications interface and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface. The processor (a) receives a call from the calling device, (b) sends a first authentication request to the calling device, (c) receives a first authentication response from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key, (d) extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key, (e) determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid, and (f) transfers the call to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid.
- Moreover, the present invention provides a system for authenticating a calling device that includes a communications network communicably coupled to the calling device and a controller communicably coupled to the communications network. The controller includes a communications interface communicably coupled to the communications network and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface. The processor (a) receives a call from the calling device, (b) sends a first authentication request to the calling device, (c) receives a first authentication response from the calling device, wherein the first authentication response includes a calling device encrypted data generated by the calling device using a caller identification, a called number and a shared secret encryption key, (d) extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key, (e) determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid, and (f) transfers the call to a called device whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid. The calling device (a) initiates the call, (b) receives the first authentication request, (c) generates the calling device encrypted data, and (d) sends the first authentication response.
- The present invention also provides a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in response to receiving a call from the calling device. The call is terminated and a new call is placed to the calling device. The user is prompted to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device. The spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received. One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys. The new call is transferred to a called device whenever the user is authenticated as a result of the comparison. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments.
- In addition, the present invention provides an apparatus for authenticating a user of a calling device that includes a communications interface and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface. The processor (a) receives a call from the calling device via the communications interface, (b) terminates the call, (c) places a new call to the calling device via the communications interface, (d) prompts the user to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device, (e) receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface, (f) authenticates the user by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys, and (g) transfers the new call to a called device whenever the user is authenticated.
- Moreover, the present invention provides a system for authenticating a user of a calling device that includes a communications network communicably coupled to the calling device and a controller communicably coupled to the communications network. The controller includes a communications interface communicably coupled to the communications network and a processor communicably coupled to the communications interface. The processor (a) receives a call from the calling device via the communications interface, (b) terminates the call, (c) places a new call to the calling device via the communications interface, (d) prompts the user to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device, (e) receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface, (f) authenticates the user by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for the user, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys, and (g) transfers the new call to a called device whenever the user is authenticated.
- The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
- The above and further advantages of the invention may be better understood by referring to the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an apparatus in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 3 is a flow chart depicting a registration process for a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 4 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 5 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a calling device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 6 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 7 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting a registration process for a user in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 9 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 10 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 11 is a flow chart depicting a method for authenticating a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention; and -
FIG. 12 is a signaling diagram depicting an authentication of a user of a calling device in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention. - While the making and using of various embodiments of the present invention are discussed in detail below, it should be appreciated that the present invention provides many applicable inventive concepts that can be embodied in a wide variety of specific contexts. The specific embodiments discussed herein are merely illustrative of specific ways to make and use the invention and do not delimit the scope of the invention. The discussion herein relates primarily to voice communications in a telecommunications network, but it will be understood that the concepts of the present invention are applicable to any communications session, network or device.
- The present invention provides a system, method and apparatus for authenticating calls that is a robust Anti-vishing solution. The present invention can identify Caller ID spoofing, verify dialed number to detect man-in-the middle and verify called party against dialed digits to detect impersonation. This solution can handle calls coming from any phone any where with little impact on user experience. Two separate solutions are tailored for smart phones (communication devices capable of running application software) and traditional phones to reduce the impact to user experience while providing robust verification. Note that the present invention can be incorporated, integrated or combined with other voice communication protection systems, such as:
-
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/917,771 filed Aug. 13, 2004 entitled “System and Method for Detecting and Preventing Denial of Service Attacks in a Communications System”;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/502,244 filed Aug. 9, 2006 entitled “System and Method for Providing Network Level and Nodal Level Vulnerability Protection in VoIP Networks” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/706,950 filed Aug. 9, 2005;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/521,427 filed Sep. 14, 2006 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Classifying Communications in a Communications System” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/717,065 filed Sep. 14, 2005;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/769,609 filed Jun. 27, 2007 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Classifying Communications in a Communications System” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/817,445 filed Jun. 29, 2006;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/776,509 filed Jul. 11, 2007 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Securely Exchanging Security Keys and Monitoring Links in a IP Communications Network” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/830,168 filed Jul. 12, 2006;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/776,549 filed Jul. 11, 2007 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Troubleshooting an IP Network” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/830,411 filed Jul. 12, 2006;
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/028,781 filed Feb. 8, 2008 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Clientless Two Factor Authentication in VoIP Networks” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/888,765 filed Feb. 8, 2007; and
- U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/189,151 filed Aug. 9, 2008 entitled “System, Method and Apparatus for Providing Security in an IP-Based End User Device” which is a non-provisional application of U.S. Patent Application Ser. No. 60/955,037 filed Aug. 10, 2007.
All of the foregoing applications are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety
- Now referring to
FIGS. 1 and 2 , block diagrams of asystem 100 and anapparatus 104 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention are shown. Thesystem 100 includes acommunications network 102, a controller 104 (Anti-Vishing Controller or AVC) communicably coupled to thecommunications network 102, and a calling device (smart device) 106 and/or a calling device (traditional device) 112 communicably coupled to thecommunications network 102. Callingdevice 106 includes an Anti-Vishing Agent (AVA) 110, whereas callingdevice 112 does not. The callingdevice 106 can be any type of user communications device, such as a phone (e.g., cell phone, PDA phone, IP Phone, softphone, etc.), a computer, a PDA or other any communications device capable of running theAVA 110 application. The callingdevice 112 can be any communications device that is not running anAVA 110 application, such as a land line phone, pay phone, cell phone, etc. The called device (smart device or traditional device) or calledparty 108 is communicably coupled to thecontroller 104 via integration, direct connection (as shown with calleddevice 108 a) or through a local network 114 (as shown with calleddevice 108 b). Thecontroller 104 includes aprocessor 200 communicably coupled to acommunications interface 202 and a memory ordata storage device 204. Thecommunications interface 202 is communicably coupled to thecommunications network 102, the calleddevice 108 a, and the calleddevice 108 b via thelocal network 114. - The
AVC 104 can be a computer, a server, a switch, a PBX, a gateway or other suitable device and can be operated by the called party, a network provider, a service provider, a facility provider or a call center. TheAVA 110 andAVC 104 use various in-band and out-of-band communication channels to exchange information to validate authenticity of caller ID, dialed digits and/or the called party. In-band communication can be done through DTMF, modem, voice signals and out-of-band communication can be done through SMS, SIP, and other VoIP control protocols where necessary. - Referring now to
FIG. 3 , a flow chart depicting aregistration process 300 for acalling device 106 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention is shown. A registration request is received from the callingdevice 106 inblock 302. In response, theAVC 104 creates and stores a shared secret encryption key for thecalling device 106 inblock 304. The shared secret encryption key is an initial unique encryption key (secret) established during the registration of thecalling device 106 with entities like banks or other entities dealing with confidential, personal or proprietary information. As a result, the shared secret encryption key is created and known to the endpoints before the authentication process described below. An identifier that is unique to thecalling device 106, such as a cell phone IMSI/MIN, is required to register thecalling device 106. The shared secret encryption key is sent to thecalling device 106 inblock 306. Note that the shared secret encryption key can be recycled frequently to ensure that brute-force attacks do not succeed. Note also that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments. - Now referring to
FIG. 4 , a flow chart depicting amethod 400 for authenticating acalling device 106 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention is shown. TheAVC 104 receives a call from the callingdevice 106 inblock 402 and sends a first authentication request to thecalling device 106 inblock 404. Thereafter, theAVC 104 receives a first authentication response containing a calling device encrypted data from the callingdevice 106 inblock 406. The calling device encrypted data is generated by the callingdevice 106 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key. Other data can be used in the generation of the calling device encrypted data, such as a random number provided by theAVC 104, the IMEI of thecalling device 106, a random number provided by the callingdevice 106, or a combination thereof, etc. TheAVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the calling device encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key inblock 408. TheAVC 104 determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid indecision block 410. If thecalling device 106 is not verified, as determined indecision block 410, theAVC 104 terminates the call inblock 412. If, however, the callingdevice 106 is verified, as determined indecision block 410, theAVC 104 transfers the call to a called device or calledparty 108 inblock 414. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments. - Referring now to
FIG. 5 , a signaling diagram 500 depicting an authentication of acalling device 106 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention is shown. The callingdevice 106 initiates thecall 502 to the calleddevice 108, but is intercepted by theAVC 104. In response, theAVC 104 sends afirst authentication request 404 to thecalling device 106. The first authentication request may include a controller generated random number or controller generated encryption key. TheAVA 110 loaded on thecalling device 106 receives thefirst authentication request 404, generates the calling deviceencrypted data 504 and sends afirst authentication response 406 containing the calling deviceencrypted data 504 to theAVC 104. As previously described, the calling deviceencrypted data 504 can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof. The first authentication response 208 may include a calling device generated encryption key or a calling device random number in addition to the calling deviceencrypted data 504. TheAVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data 206 using the shared secret encryption key and determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid (collectively 408). The call is terminated 412 whenever thecalling device 106AVA 110 is not valid. The call is transferred 414 to the called party or calleddevice 108 whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid. The called device or calledparty 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) thecall 506. It is possible for theAVA 110 to initiate the authentication. In that case, the same algorithm works except that the roles are reversed. - For example, when a user makes a call from
cell phone 106, theresident AVA client 110 traps the dialed digits and generates a hash of caller ID and dialed digits using the shared secret encryption key stored in theAVA client 110. This encryption key is unique and different for eachAVA 110. On receiving thecall AVC 104 in the network sends request for the hash using either in-band or out-of-band methods. Upon receiving the request, theAVA 110 sends back computed hash either through in-band or out-of-band. TheAVC 104 extracts the Caller ID and dialed digits from received hash using the same secret encryption key and verifies against the caller ID and called party number. This ensures that the Caller ID is not spoofed and no man-in-the-middle. The algorithm computes the hash per transaction such that it is unique per transaction and cannot be replayed later. Similarly, theAVA 110 can authenticate the called number.AVA 110 interacts with the user and the call data in thephone 106 to determine if the called party needs to be verified. Now theAVC 104 responds with a hash that includes the Called Party Number and Caller ID and Dialed Digits. - Now referring to
FIG. 6 , a flow chart depicting amethod 600 for authenticating acalling device 106 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. TheAVC 104 receives a call from the callingdevice 106 inblock 402 and sends a first authentication request to thecalling device 106 inblock 404. Thereafter, theAVC 104 receives a first authentication response containing a calling device encrypted data from the callingdevice 106 inblock 406. The calling device encrypted data is generated by the callingdevice 106 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key. Other data can be used in the generation of the calling device encrypted data, such as a random number provided by theAVC 104, the IMEI of thecalling device 106, a random number provided by the callingdevice 106, or a combination thereof, etc. TheAVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the calling device encrypted data using the shared secret encryption key inblock 408. TheAVC 104 determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid indecision block 410. If thecalling device 106 is not verified, as determined indecision block 410, theAVC 104 terminates the call inblock 412. If, however, the callingdevice 106 is verified, as determined indecision block 410, theAVC 104 sends a second authentication request containing a controller encrypted data to thecalling device 106 inblock 602. The controller encrypted data is generated by thecontroller 104 using a caller identification (e.g., calling number), a called number and the shared secret encryption key. Other data can be used in the generation of the controller encrypted data, such as a random number provided by theAVC 104, a random number provided by the callingdevice 106, or a combination thereof, etc. Thereafter,AVC 104 receives a second authentication response indicating success or failure from the callingdevice 106 inblock 604. If the second authentication response indicates failure, as determined indecision block 606, theAVC 104 terminates the call inblock 412. If, however, the second authentication response indicates success, as determined indecision block 606, theAVC 104 transfers the call to a called device or calledparty 108 inblock 414. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments. - Referring now to
FIG. 7 , a signaling diagram 700 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. This embodiment implements mutual authentication of the endpoints. The callingdevice 106 initiates thecall 502 to the calleddevice 108, but is intercepted by theAVC 104. In response, theAVC 104 sends afirst authentication request 404 to thecalling device 106. The first authentication request may include a controller generated random number or controller generated encryption key. TheAVA 110 loaded on thecalling device 106 receives thefirst authentication request 404, generates the calling deviceencrypted data 504 and sends afirst authentication response 406 containing the calling deviceencrypted data 504 to theAVC 104. As previously described, the calling deviceencrypted data 504 can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof. The first authentication response 208 may include a calling device generated encryption key or a calling device random number in addition to the calling deviceencrypted data 504. TheAVC 104 extracts the caller identification and the called number from the encrypted data 206 using the shared secret encryption key and determines whether the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid (collectively 408). The call is terminated 412 whenever thecalling device 106AVA 110 is not valid. - The
AVC 104 generates a controller deviceencrypted data 702 whenever the extracted caller identification and the extracted called number are valid. The controller device encrypted data can be generated using the caller identification (e.g., calling number), the called number, the called device generated encryption key, the controller generated encryption key, the shared secret encryption key, etc. or a combination thereof. TheAVC 104 sends asecond authorization request 602 to thecalling device 106AVA 110. The callingdevice 106AVA 110 extracts the data and verifies thecontroller 104 or called device 108 (collectively 704) and sends asecond authorization response 604 to theAVC 104. TheAVC 104 terminates thecall 412 whenever thesecond authentication response 604 indicates failure. TheAVC 104 transfers the call 312 to the called party or calleddevice 108 whenever thesecond authentication response 604 indicates success. The called device or calledparty 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) thecall 506. It is possible for theAVA 110 to initiate the authentication. In that case, the same algorithm works except that the roles are reversed. - For example, the requests and response may include the following information:
-
First authorization request 404 = Server_Randomwhere Server_Random is ‘n’ Pseudo Random digits generated on AVC 104where the value of ‘n’ depends on the setup time desired. First authorization response 406 = Client_Random + Client_Auth_Datawhere Client Random is Pseudo Random digits generated on the phone where the value of ‘n’ depends on the setup time desired, and Client_Auth_Data is First ‘m’ digits of HMAC_MD5(Shared_Secret, Caller_Number + Called_Number [+ IMEI] + Client Random + Server_Random) where the value of ‘m’ depends on the setup time. IMEI is added in case of Smart phones. Second authorization request 602 = Server_Auth_Data or Auth_Failurewhere Server_Auth_Data is First ‘m’ digits of HMAC_MD5(Shared_Secret, Called_Number + Caller_Number + Server_Random + Client_Random) where the value of ‘m’ depends on the setup time desired. IMEI/MIN is added in case of Smart phones, and Auth_Failure is Call be terminated. Second authorization response 604 = Auth_Success or Auth_Failurewhere Auth_Success: Call will be transferred. - Now referring to
FIG. 8 , a flow chart depicting aregistration process 800 for a user in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. When a user registers his/her voice or thecalling device AVC 104. During registration, the user will be authenticated using standard procedures (such as calling from home phone number or teller assisted procedures). Once the user is authenticated, the user will be prompted to record his voice. The user will be educated to expect this message whenever he/she logs in to access his account over telephone. The voice prompt serves two purposes one it helps to validate biometrics and the second it validates theAVC 104. More specifically, after the user initiates theregistration process 800, the user of acalling device block 802. The spoken message is recorded and stored inblock 802. A biometric template based on the user's voice is then created and stored for the user inblock 806. Theregistration process 800 may also include periodically changing the stored message by prompting the calling party or user to speak a new message, and recording the new message and replacing the message with the new message. Note that the stored message should not be played to the calling party or user until the calling party or user is authenticated. As a result, the present invention prevents caller ID spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, record and replay attacks, called party impersonation, or a combination thereof. - When the user makes a call to the bank or financial entity, the
resident AVC 104 first terminates the call and calls back the user. This procedure prevents Caller ID spoofing if any. Once the user answers the call theAVC 104 requests the user to speak a randomly generated phrase and sequence of dialed digits. When the phrase is repeated by the user, theAVC 104 validates biometrics, content of the phrase, and the sequence of dialed digits against the called party number. This prevents man-in-the-middle and record and replay attacks. Once this validation is complete, theAVC 104 plays the prompt recorded by the user during registration process. The user now should validate the prompt before proceeding further with the call to divulge any important information. This step prevents any called party impersonation. The prompt could change frequently to prevent any replay attacks. Just like the case with email phishing, this algorithm requires certain modifications to user behavior when making calls related to financial matter or other important matters. The users voice recorded on the Bank's server will be refreshed to avoid any recording and replay through foul play. This algorithm ensures that the media recorded on the server is not played before the user is authenticated. Authentication on traditional phones relies on user voice recognition. Users are authenticated using voice biometric systems. The user authenticates the bank by hearing his/her own voice that was recorded by him/her during registration. The user will be prompted to refresh this recording periodically. - Referring now to
FIG. 9 , a flow chart depicting amethod 900 for authenticating a user of acalling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. Note that this method can also be used with acalling device 106. TheAVC 104 receives a call from the callingdevice 112 via the communications interface inblock 402 and terminates the call inblock 412. Thereafter, theAVC 104 initiates a new call to thecalling device 112 via the communications interface inblock 902. TheAVC 104 then prompts the user of thecalling device 112 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device inblock 904, and receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface inblock 906. TheAVC 104 authenticates the user of thecalling device 112 by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for thecalling device 112, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys inblock 908. If the comparison is not successful, as determined indecision block 910, the new call is terminated inblock 912. If, however, the comparison is successfully, as determined indecision block 910, theAVC 104 transfers the new call to the called device or calledparty 108 inblock 914. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments. - Now referring to
FIG. 10 , a signaling diagram 1000 depicting an authentication of a user of acalling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. The user or calling party initiates acall 502 to the called device or calledparty 108 using atraditional calling device 112. TheAVC 104 terminates thecall 412 and initiates anew call 902 to thetraditional calling device 112. Note that theAVC 104 may provide a notification to thetraditional calling device 112 that the authentication process will begin following the termination of thecurrent call 412. Thetraditional calling device 112 accepts thecall 1002 and the user of thecalling device 112 is prompted 904 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device. The one or more words and the one or more keys can be randomly generated by theAVC 104. The one or more keys can be selected from one or more digits of a telephone number of the called party, and the one or more keys can be selected from the 0-9, * and # keys. The spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received 906 by theAVC 104. One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared 908 with a stored voice biometric template for the user or calling party, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys. The new call is terminated 912 if the comparison fails. In addition, one or more notifications can be logged or sent to the called device or calledparty 108 whenever the user or calling party is not authenticated. The new call is transferred 914 to a called party whenever the user or calling party is authenticated as a result of thecomparison 908. The called device or calledparty 108 then can accept (answer) or deny (do not answer) or transfer (e.g., voicemail) thenew call 1004. - Referring now to
FIG. 11 , a flow chart depicting amethod 1100 for authenticating a user of acalling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. Note that this method can also be used with acalling device 106. TheAVC 104 receives a call from the callingdevice 112 via the communications interface inblock 402 and terminates the call inblock 412. Thereafter, theAVC 104 initiates a new call to thecalling device 112 via the communications interface inblock 902. TheAVC 104 then prompts the user of thecalling device 112 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on the calling device inblock 904, and receives the spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys via the communication interface inblock 906. TheAVC 104 authenticates the user of thecalling device 112 by comparing one or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words with a stored voice biometric template for thecalling device 112, the received spoken words with the prompted words and the received signals with the signals associated with the prompted keys inblock 908. If the comparison is not successful, as determined indecision block 910, the new call is terminated inblock 912. If, however, the comparison is successfully, as determined indecision block 910, theAVC 104 plays a stored message to the user of thecalling device 112 to authenticate the called party or calleddevice 108 inblock 1102 and transfers the new call to the called device or calledparty 108 inblock 914. Note that this method can be implemented on a computer readable medium wherein the steps are performed by one or more code segments. - Now referring to
FIG. 12 , a signaling diagram 1200 depicting an authentication of a user of acalling device 112 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention is shown. The user of thecalling device 112 initiates acall 502 to the called device or calledparty 108 using atraditional calling device 112. TheAVC 104 terminates thecall 412 and initiates anew call 902 to thetraditional calling device 112. Note that theAVC 104 may provide a notification to thetraditional calling device 112 that the authentication process will begin following the termination of thecurrent call 412. Thetraditional calling device 112 accepts thecall 1102 and the user of thecalling device 112 is prompted 904 to speak one or more words and depress one or more keys on a calling device. The one or more words and the one or more keys can be randomly generated by theAVC 104. The one or more keys can be selected from one or more digits of a telephone number of the called party, and the one or more keys can be selected from the 0-9, * and # keys. The spoken words and one or more signals associated with the depressed keys are received 906 by theAVC 104. One or more biometric parameters of the received spoken words are compared 908 with a stored voice biometric template for the user or calling party, the received spoken words are compared with the prompted words and the received signals are compared with the signals associated with the prompted keys. The new call is terminated 912 if the comparison fails. In addition, one or more notifications can be logged or sent to the called device calledparty 108 whenever the user or calling party is not authenticated. A stored message is played 1102 to the user or calling party to authenticate the called party or calleddevice 108 if thecomparison 908 is successful. The stored message was previously recorded by the user or calling party during theregistration process 800. The new call is then transferred 914 to the called device or calledparty 108 and the called device or calledparty 108 then accepts (answer) or denies (do not answer) or transfers (e.g., voicemail) thenew call 1004. - It will be understood by those of skill in the art that information and signals may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques (e.g., data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or particles, optical fields or particles, or any combination thereof). Likewise, the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both, depending on the application and functionality. Moreover, the various logical blocks, modules, and circuits described herein may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor (e.g., microprocessor, conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, state machine or combination of computing devices), a digital signal processor (“DSP”), an application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”), a field programmable gate array (“FPGA”) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. Similarly, steps of a method or process described herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims.
Claims (20)
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US20150124945A1 (en) | 2015-05-07 |
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