US20070198214A1 - Trust evaluation - Google Patents
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- US20070198214A1 US20070198214A1 US11/355,719 US35571906A US2007198214A1 US 20070198214 A1 US20070198214 A1 US 20070198214A1 US 35571906 A US35571906 A US 35571906A US 2007198214 A1 US2007198214 A1 US 2007198214A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
- G06F11/34—Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation ; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment
- G06F11/3409—Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation ; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment for performance assessment
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to error detection, to error correction, and to monitoring
- G06F2201/81—Threshold
Definitions
- the invention relates generally to trust evaluation, and more particularly, to a solution for evaluating trust between a plurality of computing devices in a computer infrastructure.
- the Trusted Computing Group has defined a set of specifications for establishing trust between two or more computing devices, which are hereby incorporated herein by reference.
- the specifications define a set of information (e.g., measurements) that are maintained by a computing device and a solution for maintaining and communicating these measurements in a secure manner.
- the measurements represent the components of the computing device and the configuration thereof.
- the measurements typically reflect the various pieces of a basic input output system (BIOS) and firmware that are implemented on the computing device as well as the configuration information that controls the behavior of these pieces (e.g., “BIOS settings”).
- BIOS basic input output system
- the measurements also reflect the hardware itself, such as a type and version of a processor, a size of the main memory, types of peripheral controllers present in input/output (I/O) bus slots, and/or the like.
- the measurements are kept in a “log” that is secured by a set of Program Configuration Registers (PCRs).
- PCRs Program Configuration Registers
- FIG. 1 shows a prior art computing infrastructure 100 for evaluating trust between computing devices 102 and 104 .
- validation system 106 on computing device 102 e.g., “the challenger” requests an attestation from another computing device 104 .
- the attestation comprises the measurements and the corresponding PCR values (e.g., device measurements 110 ) combined and cryptographically signed by an attestation system 108 of the computing device 104 .
- attestation system 108 is referred to as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and comprises a chip built into a motherboard for computing device 104 .
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- validation system 106 evaluates the attestation using a set of reference measurements 112 , which represent all approved results. If the evaluation indicates that the computing device 104 may have been tampered with, a transaction can be aborted before any sensitive information is exchanged. Otherwise, the transaction can proceed with computing device 102 having established a certain level of trust with computing device 104 .
- the TCG architecture can be used to ensure that various computing devices 104 conform to an appropriate policy.
- computing device 102 can be used by a system administrator or the like, and can query multiple computing devices 104 in a network and compare the device measurements 110 received for each computing device 104 to a “golden master” set of reference measurements 112 . In this case, if device measurements 110 match reference measurements 112 , the corresponding computing device 104 is considered conformant and/or trustworthy. However, when device measurements 110 do not match reference measurements 112 , the corresponding computing device 104 can be isolated from the remaining computing devices 104 and/or repaired.
- the invention provides a solution for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure evaluate one or more other computing devices in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the other computing device(s) and a set of reference measurements.
- each of the plurality of computing devices also provides a set of device measurements for processing by the other computing device(s) in the computer infrastructure.
- the evaluations can be performed using a small amount/excess computing capacity of each computing device.
- a plurality of sub-groups can be created in which computing devices only evaluate other computing devices in the same sub-group(s). In this manner, a distributed, efficient and scalable solution is provided for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- a first aspect of the invention provides a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the system comprising: on each of a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure: a system for providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and a system for evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- a second aspect of the invention provides a method of evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the method comprising: on each of a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure: periodically providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and periodically evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- a third aspect of the invention provides a computer infrastructure comprising: a plurality of computing devices, each of the plurality of computing devices including: a system for providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and a system for evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- a fourth aspect of the invention provides a program product stored on a computer-readable medium, which when executed, enables a computer infrastructure to evaluate trust, the program product comprising computer program code for enabling a computing device in the computer infrastructure to: periodically provide device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and periodically evaluate another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- a fifth aspect of the invention provides a method of deploying a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the method comprising: providing a computer infrastructure that comprises: a plurality of computing devices, each of the plurality of computing devices operable to: provide device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and evaluate another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- a sixth aspect of the invention provides a business method for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the business method comprising managing a computer infrastructure that performs the process described herein; and receiving payment based on the managing.
- a seventh aspect of the invention provides a business method for managing trust evaluation reporting in a computer infrastructure, the business method comprising managing a computer infrastructure that performs the process described herein; and receiving payment based on the managing.
- FIG. 1 shows a prior art computing infrastructure for evaluating trust.
- FIG. 2 shows an illustrative computing infrastructure for evaluating trust according to an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 3 shows a more detailed view of one of the computing devices of FIG. 2 according to an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 4 shows an illustrative computer infrastructure that includes multiple sub-groups.
- the invention provides a solution for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure evaluate one or more other computing devices in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the other computing device(s) and a set of reference measurements.
- each of the plurality of computing devices also provides a set of device measurements for processing by the other computing device(s) in the computer infrastructure.
- the evaluations can be performed using a small amount/excess computing capacity of each computing device.
- a plurality of sub-groups can be created in which computing devices only evaluate other computing devices in the same sub-group(s). In this manner, a distributed, efficient and scalable solution is provided for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- FIG. 2 shows an illustrative computer infrastructure 12 A for evaluating trust according to an embodiment of the invention.
- Computer infrastructure 12 A includes a plurality of computing devices 14 A-C, each of which includes an attestation system 40 and a validation system 30 , which make computing devices 14 A-C operable to evaluate trust by performing the process described herein.
- validation system 30 periodically evaluates the other computing devices 14 A-C in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- validation system 30 can request and/or receive a set of device measurements 50 from attestation system 40 on the other computing devices 14 A-C and compare the device measurements 50 to reference measurements 52 . Based on this comparison, validation system 30 can evaluate the trustworthiness of the other computing devices 14 A-C.
- Computer infrastructure 12 A can comprise any type of computing infrastructure 12 A that includes a group of two or more computing devices 14 A-C. To this extent, computing devices 14 A-C can communicate over any combination of one or more types of communications links, such as a network, a shared memory, or the like, to perform the process described herein.
- the communications link(s) can comprise any combination of various types of wired and/or wireless links; comprise any combination of one or more types of networks (e.g., the Internet, a wide area network, a local area network, a virtual private network, etc.); and/or utilize any combination of various types of transmission techniques and protocols.
- computer infrastructure 12 A comprises a grid, and each computing device 14 A-C comprises a server in the grid. However, it is understood that this is only illustrative of many possible embodiments.
- FIG. 3 shows a more detailed view of one of the computing devices 14 A according to an embodiment of the invention.
- Computing device 14 A is shown including a processor 20 , a memory 22 A, an input/output (I/O) interface 24 , and a bus 26 . Further, computing device 14 A is shown in communication with an external I/O device/resource 28 and a storage system 22 B.
- processor 20 executes computer program code, such as validation system 30 , which is stored in memory 22 A and/or storage system 22 B. While executing computer program code, processor 20 can read and/or write data, such as device measurements 50 , to/from memory 22 A, storage system 22 B, and/or I/O interface 24 .
- Bus 26 provides a communications link between each of the components in computing device 14 A.
- I/O device 28 can comprise any device that enables an individual to interact with computing device 14 A or any device that enables computing device 14 A to communicate with one or more other computing devices using any type of communications link.
- computing device 14 A can comprise any general purpose computing article of manufacture capable of executing computer program code installed thereon (e.g., a personal computer, server, handheld device, etc.).
- computing device 14 A, validation system 30 and attestation system 40 are only representative of various possible equivalent computing devices that may perform the process described herein.
- the functionality provided by computing device 14 A, validation system 30 and attestation system 40 can be implemented by a computing article of manufacture that includes any combination of general and/or specific purpose hardware and/or computer program code.
- the program code and hardware can be created using standard programming and engineering techniques, respectively.
- computing devices 14 B-C FIG. 2
- computing devices 14 B-C can comprise the same components (processor, memory, I/O interface, etc.) as shown for computing device 14 A. These components have not been separately shown and discussed for brevity.
- validation system 30 and attestation system 40 enable each computing device 14 A-B in computer infrastructure 12 A to evaluate trust.
- validation system 30 is shown including a challenge system 32 , an evaluation system 34 and a management system 36 . Operation of each of these systems is discussed further herein. However, it is understood that some of the various systems shown in FIG. 3 can be implemented independently, combined, and/or stored in memory for one or more separate computing devices that are included in computer infrastructure 12 A. Further, it is understood that some of the systems and/or functionality may not be implemented, or additional systems and/or functionality may be included as part of computer infrastructure 12 A.
- computing device 14 B can evaluate a level of trust for computing device 14 A.
- computing device 14 A is shown including an attestation system 40 .
- Attestation system 40 provides a set of device measurements 50 for the corresponding computing device 14 A for processing (e.g., evaluation) by another computing device 14 B in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- attestation system 40 can comprise a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and device measurements 50 can comprise the set of measurements and Program Configuration Registers (PCRs) as defined and described in the Trusted Computing Group's specifications.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- PCRs Program Configuration Registers
- validation system 30 can include a challenge system 32 that periodically requests device measurements 50 for other computing device(s) 14 B in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- an attestation system 40 or the like in computing device 14 B can provide the device measurements 50 for processing by the requesting computing device 14 A.
- Challenge system 32 can request device measurements 50 from the other computing device(s) 14 B using any type of event-based and/or timing-based solution. For example, a user, such as a system administrator, or another system can instruct challenge system 32 to request device measurements 50 for one or more computing devices 14 B.
- challenge system 32 can request device measurements 50 after expiration of a period of time (e.g., once an hour), prior to providing sensitive data to the computing device 14 B, upon detection of an abnormal event, and/or the like.
- evaluation system 34 can evaluate the corresponding computing device 14 B based on the device measurements 50 to determine whether it can be trusted.
- evaluation system 34 can compare the device measurements 50 to a set of reference measurements 52 .
- the set of reference measurements 52 can define a set of measurements and their corresponding trust level.
- the set of reference measurements 52 can be specific to a particular computing device 14 B, e.g., reference measurements 52 can comprise device measurements 50 for each computing device 14 B in computer infrastructure 12 A, and/or reference measurements 52 can comprise a set of standard measurements that computing device(s) 14 B in computer infrastructure 12 A must meet in order to obtain a particular trust level.
- evaluation system 34 can assign computing device 14 B one of a plurality of trust levels. For each increasing trust level, evaluation system 34 can perform a more exacting comparison of device measurements 50 with reference measurements 52 . To this extent, another system can request that validation system 30 determine whether computing device 14 B meets a particular trust level. In this case, challenge system 32 can obtain a corresponding amount and/or type of device measurements 50 based on the particular trust level and/or evaluation system 34 can perform a varying amount and/or type of evaluations of device measurements 50 with respect to reference measurements 52 based on the particular trust level.
- evaluation system 34 can detect a failure of the other computing device 14 B to obtain a trust level. In this case, evaluation system 34 can respond to the failure. For example, evaluation system 34 can provide an indication of the failure to a requesting system and/or user, can generate a notification to a user of the failure, and/or can communicate the failure to the evaluated computing device 14 B and/or one or more other computing devices 14 C ( FIG. 2 ) in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- evaluation system 34 can compare the evaluation of a particular computing device 14 B with the other computing device(s) 14 C in computer infrastructure 12 A. For example, when evaluation system 34 detects a failure of a particular computing device 14 B, evaluation system 34 can respond by comparing the evaluation with the evaluation result(s) for the particular computing device 14 B that were obtained by the remaining computing device(s) 14 C. Subsequently, any additional action can be determined using any voting algorithm or the like between the other computing devices 14 A, 14 C in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- validation system 30 includes a management system 36 that manages a set (one or more) of computing devices 14 B that are evaluated by validation system 30 .
- management system 36 can isolate the computing device 14 B from communicating with the rest of the computing devices 14 C ( FIG. 2 ) in computer infrastructure 12 A and/or communicating with any other computing devices outside of computer infrastructure 12 A.
- management system 36 can add and/or remove computing device(s) 14 B that are evaluated by validation system 30 .
- management system 36 can receive a communications address or the like for computing device 14 B and an instruction to add/remove computing device 14 B from a system administrator and/or another system.
- management system 36 can automatically detect the presence of a new computing device 14 B in computer infrastructure 12 A and begin evaluating it.
- a new computing device 14 B can petition to join computer infrastructure 12 A.
- the new computing device 14 B can provide various information on its system, such as device measurements 50 , which can be evaluated versus a known standard, and a particular trust level can be assigned.
- management system 36 can remove the computing device 14 B from the set of evaluated computing devices and/or isolate the computing device 14 B as no longer being trusted.
- management system 36 can detect that a threshold number of computing devices being monitored has been exceeded. In this case, management system 36 can divide computer infrastructure 12 A into a plurality of sub-groups of computing devices 14 A-B for evaluating trust. To this extent, computer infrastructure 12 A can comprise a sub-group of computing devices 14 A-B.
- FIG. 4 shows an illustrative computer infrastructure 12 B that includes a plurality of sub-groups 60 A-C. In this case, each computing device 14 A-F only evaluates trust for the other computing devices 14 A-F in the same sub-group 60 A-C.
- Management system 36 can use any threshold number to divide computer infrastructure 12 B into a multiple sub-groups 60 A-C.
- each computing device 14 A-F should be able to readily monitor the other computing devices in the same sub-group without substantially impacting a primary function of the computing device 14 A-F. Consequently, the threshold number can be selected to ensure that the impact on the overall performance of computing devices 14 A-F remains at an acceptable level.
- management system 36 can detect when a number of computing devices in a sub-group 60 A-C falls below a threshold number (e.g., three). In this case, management system 36 can combine two sub-groups 60 A-C or independently assign each computing device 14 A-F to another sub-group 60 A-C.
- a threshold number e.g., three
- management system 36 can implement any solution for assigning computing devices 14 A-F in computer infrastructure 12 B to a corresponding sub-group 60 A-C. For example, management system 36 can assign computing devices 14 A-F to different sub-groups 60 A-C based on the communications addresses, physical proximity, primary function(s), and/or the like. Further, a user, such as a system administrator, can use management system 36 to designate membership in sub-groups 60 A-C, add and/or remove computing devices 14 A-F from sub-groups 60 A-C, create and/or delete sub-groups 60 A-C, and/or the like.
- Sub-groups 60 A-C can comprise disjoint membership, e.g., no computing device 14 A-F is included in more than one sub-group 60 A-C. However, as shown, one or more computing devices 14 A-F can be included in multiple sub-groups 60 A-C. For example, computing device 14 A is shown included in both sub-group 60 A-B and computing device 14 C is shown included in both sub-groups 60 A, C. By including computing devices 14 A-F in multiple sub-groups 60 A-C, redundancy is provided for computer infrastructure 12 B and sub-groups 60 A-C may need to be created/removed less frequently. To this extent, each computing device 14 A-F can be included in two sub-groups 60 A-C.
- each sub-group 60 A-C can comprise a single computing device 14 A-F that comprises a “trusted authority” from which other computing devices 14 A-F in the sub-group 60 A-C can obtain reference measurements 52 ( FIG. 2 ). Should a trusted authority in one sub-group 60 A-C become corrupted, the corruption can be detected by the other partially overlapping sub-groups 60 A-C and trust evaluation can continue for the other computing devices 14 A-F in the corrupted sub-group 60 A-C.
- computing device 14 A-F is shown and described as including both validation system 30 ( FIG. 2 ) and attestation system 40 ( FIG. 2 ), it is understood that one or more computing devices 16 in computer infrastructure 12 B can comprise only attestation system 40 or neither system 30 , 40 .
- computing device 16 could comprise a computing device that includes a TPM.
- computing device 14 C can evaluate the trust level of computing device 16 as described herein.
- computing device 16 would not evaluate the trust of computing device 14 C or any other computing device in computer infrastructure 12 B.
- computing device 16 may not include either system 30 , 40 .
- computing device 14 C can use other solutions for evaluating computing device 16 , limit the sensitivity of data communicated to computing device 16 , and/or limit the types of transactions in which computing device 16 can participate.
- reference measurements 52 are critical to effectively evaluating other computing devices 14 A-C in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- any corruption or misrepresentation of reference measurements 52 could cause wide-spread disruption in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- insertion of a “bad” measurement into reference measurements 52 could allow unapproved software, such as a virus or other security attack, to execute on a computing device 14 A-C, thereby defeating the evaluation process.
- each computing device 14 A-C can include its own copy of reference measurements 52 . This provides protection against a compromise of one copy of reference measurements 52 at one of computing devices 14 A-C.
- validation system 30 can stop evaluating other computing devices 14 A-C until an accurate set of reference measurements 52 is obtained.
- each computing device 14 A-C comprising its own copy of reference measurements 52 is the need to distribute reference measurements 52 to each computing device 14 A-C.
- a single computing device e.g., computing device 14 A
- reference measurements 52 should be generated and/or distributed in a trusted manner, e.g., using a “clean room” solution.
- a single computing device 14 A in computer infrastructure 12 A can enable a user to add, delete, and/or modify reference measurements 52 using, for example, management system 36 ( FIG.
- management system 36 can communicate an updated reference measurements 52 to the other computing devices 14 B-C in computer infrastructure 12 A.
- Management system 36 on each of the other computing devices 14 B-C can receive the updated reference measurements 52 and ensure that they are valid.
- reference measurements 52 and validation system 30 are cryptographically signed by the creator and are only replaceable/updateable by trustworthy procedures that protect the integrity of the signed data and/or program code.
- Trust evaluation report 54 can comprise various data on the computing device(s) 14 B that are evaluated by evaluation system 34 , the results of the evaluation(s), response(s) to request(s) for device measurements 50 , and/or the like.
- trust evaluation report 54 can comprise a change log that is updated each time the trust level of an evaluated computing device 14 B changes.
- trust evaluation report 54 can comprise an audit report that logs all evaluations, updates of device measurements 50 and/or reference measurements 52 , requests for evaluation data and/or device measurements 50 , and/or the like, that are processed by validation system 30 and/or attestation system 40 .
- validation system 30 and/or attestation system 40 can provide some or all of a trust evaluation report 54 for processing by another system and/or display to a user.
- the invention provides a program product stored on a computer-readable medium, which when executed, enables a computer infrastructure to evaluate trust as described herein.
- the computer-readable medium includes program code, such as validation system 30 ( FIG. 3 ) and attestation system 40 ( FIG. 3 ), which implements the process described herein.
- the term “computer-readable medium” comprises one or more of any type of physical embodiment of the program code.
- the computer-readable medium can comprise program code embodied on one or more portable storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage portions of a computing device, such as memory 22 A ( FIG. 3 ) and/or storage system 22 B ( FIG. 3 ) (e.g., a fixed disk, a read-only memory, a random access memory, a cache memory, etc.), and/or as a data signal traveling over a network (e.g., during a wired/wireless electronic distribution of the program product).
- portable storage articles of manufacture e.g., a compact disc, a magnetic disk, a tape, etc.
- data storage portions of a computing device such as memory 22 A ( FIG. 3 ) and/or storage system 22 B ( FIG. 3 ) (e.g., a fixed disk, a read-only memory, a random access memory, a cache memory, etc.)
- a data signal traveling over a network
- the invention provides a method of generating a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- a computer infrastructure such as computer infrastructure 12 A ( FIG. 2 )
- one or more systems for performing the process described herein can be obtained (e.g., created, purchased, used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the computer infrastructure.
- the deployment of each system can comprise one or more of: (1) installing program code on a computing device, such as computing device 14 A ( FIG. 3 ), from a computer-readable medium; (2) adding one or more computing devices to the computer infrastructure; and (3) incorporating and/or modifying one or more existing systems of the computer infrastructure, to enable the computer infrastructure to perform the process steps of the invention.
- the invention provides a business method that performs the process described herein on a subscription, advertising, and/or fee basis. That is, a service provider, such as a network security service provider, could offer to evaluate trust in a computer infrastructure as described herein. Similarly, a service provider could offer to manage trust evaluation reporting in a computer infrastructure. In the latter case, the service provider can manage trust evaluation report(s) 54 for computer infrastructure 12 A. Trust evaluation report(s) 54 can be used to ensure compliance with one or more laws and/or regulations. In either case, the service provider can manage (e.g., create, maintain, support, etc.) a computer infrastructure, such as computer infrastructure 12 A ( FIG. 2 ), that performs the process described herein for one or more customers. In return, the service provider can receive payment from the customer(s) under a subscription and/or fee agreement and/or the service provider can receive payment from the sale of advertising to one or more third parties.
- a service provider such as a network security service provider
- a service provider could offer to manage trust evaluation reporting in
- program code and “computer program code” are synonymous and mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a set of instructions that cause a computing device having an information processing capability to perform a particular function either directly or after any combination of the following: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; (b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) decompression.
- program code can be embodied as one or more types of program products, such as an application/software program, component software/a library of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O system/driver for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like.
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Abstract
Description
- The invention relates generally to trust evaluation, and more particularly, to a solution for evaluating trust between a plurality of computing devices in a computer infrastructure.
- It is becoming increasingly important that a computer that seeks to communicate with another computer be able to ensure that the other computer can be trusted. For example, information for financial transactions and other sensitive information are increasingly being transferred between computers over public networks such as the Internet. In order to ensure the authenticity and security of this data, it is important that a level of trust be established between the sending and receiving computers.
- To meet this need various solutions have been proposed. For example, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has defined a set of specifications for establishing trust between two or more computing devices, which are hereby incorporated herein by reference. The specifications define a set of information (e.g., measurements) that are maintained by a computing device and a solution for maintaining and communicating these measurements in a secure manner. The measurements represent the components of the computing device and the configuration thereof. For example, the measurements typically reflect the various pieces of a basic input output system (BIOS) and firmware that are implemented on the computing device as well as the configuration information that controls the behavior of these pieces (e.g., “BIOS settings”). The measurements also reflect the hardware itself, such as a type and version of a processor, a size of the main memory, types of peripheral controllers present in input/output (I/O) bus slots, and/or the like. The measurements are kept in a “log” that is secured by a set of Program Configuration Registers (PCRs). The PCRs serve as cryptographic proof that the log is intact and has not been tampered.
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FIG. 1 shows a priorart computing infrastructure 100 for evaluating trust betweencomputing devices validation system 106 on computing device 102 (e.g., “the challenger”) requests an attestation from anothercomputing device 104. The attestation comprises the measurements and the corresponding PCR values (e.g., device measurements 110) combined and cryptographically signed by anattestation system 108 of thecomputing device 104. In the TCG architecture,attestation system 108 is referred to as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and comprises a chip built into a motherboard forcomputing device 104. Subsequently,validation system 106 evaluates the attestation using a set ofreference measurements 112, which represent all approved results. If the evaluation indicates that thecomputing device 104 may have been tampered with, a transaction can be aborted before any sensitive information is exchanged. Otherwise, the transaction can proceed withcomputing device 102 having established a certain level of trust withcomputing device 104. - In another application, the TCG architecture can be used to ensure that
various computing devices 104 conform to an appropriate policy. To this extent,computing device 102 can be used by a system administrator or the like, and can querymultiple computing devices 104 in a network and compare thedevice measurements 110 received for eachcomputing device 104 to a “golden master” set ofreference measurements 112. In this case, ifdevice measurements 110match reference measurements 112, thecorresponding computing device 104 is considered conformant and/or trustworthy. However, whendevice measurements 110 do not matchreference measurements 112, thecorresponding computing device 104 can be isolated from theremaining computing devices 104 and/or repaired. - Since the process of validating measurements must account for variability in the measurements received from
various computing devices 104, e.g., different ordering of entries in a log, the validation process can be very complex. As a result, current solutions provide a centralized approach, in which asingle computing device 102, often with the direct interaction of a system administrator, evaluates numerousother computing devices 104 and/or provides any required fixes. However, these solutions do not scale well and are subject to failures and/or delays that create security lapses. - To this extent, a need exists for a solution for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure that addresses the problems discussed herein and/or other problems recognizable by one in the art.
- The invention provides a solution for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure. In particular, a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure evaluate one or more other computing devices in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the other computing device(s) and a set of reference measurements. To this extent, each of the plurality of computing devices also provides a set of device measurements for processing by the other computing device(s) in the computer infrastructure. The evaluations can be performed using a small amount/excess computing capacity of each computing device. When the number of computing devices in the computer infrastructure becomes too great, a plurality of sub-groups can be created in which computing devices only evaluate other computing devices in the same sub-group(s). In this manner, a distributed, efficient and scalable solution is provided for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- A first aspect of the invention provides a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the system comprising: on each of a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure: a system for providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and a system for evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- A second aspect of the invention provides a method of evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the method comprising: on each of a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure: periodically providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and periodically evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- A third aspect of the invention provides a computer infrastructure comprising: a plurality of computing devices, each of the plurality of computing devices including: a system for providing device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and a system for evaluating another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- A fourth aspect of the invention provides a program product stored on a computer-readable medium, which when executed, enables a computer infrastructure to evaluate trust, the program product comprising computer program code for enabling a computing device in the computer infrastructure to: periodically provide device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and periodically evaluate another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- A fifth aspect of the invention provides a method of deploying a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the method comprising: providing a computer infrastructure that comprises: a plurality of computing devices, each of the plurality of computing devices operable to: provide device measurements for the computing device for processing by another computing device in the computer infrastructure; and evaluate another computing device in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the another computing device and a set of reference measurements.
- A sixth aspect of the invention provides a business method for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, the business method comprising managing a computer infrastructure that performs the process described herein; and receiving payment based on the managing.
- A seventh aspect of the invention provides a business method for managing trust evaluation reporting in a computer infrastructure, the business method comprising managing a computer infrastructure that performs the process described herein; and receiving payment based on the managing.
- The illustrative aspects of the present invention are designed to solve the problems herein described and other problems not discussed, which are discoverable by one in the art.
- These and other features of the invention will be more readily understood from the following detailed description of the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings that depict various embodiments of the invention, in which:
-
FIG. 1 shows a prior art computing infrastructure for evaluating trust. -
FIG. 2 shows an illustrative computing infrastructure for evaluating trust according to an embodiment of the invention. -
FIG. 3 shows a more detailed view of one of the computing devices ofFIG. 2 according to an embodiment of the invention. -
FIG. 4 shows an illustrative computer infrastructure that includes multiple sub-groups. - It is noted that the drawings are not to scale. The drawings are intended to depict only typical aspects of the invention, and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering represents like elements between the drawings.
- As indicated above, the invention provides a solution for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure. In particular, a plurality of computing devices in the computer infrastructure evaluate one or more other computing devices in the computer infrastructure based on a set of device measurements for the other computing device(s) and a set of reference measurements. To this extent, each of the plurality of computing devices also provides a set of device measurements for processing by the other computing device(s) in the computer infrastructure. The evaluations can be performed using a small amount/excess computing capacity of each computing device. When the number of computing devices in the computer infrastructure becomes too great, a plurality of sub-groups can be created in which computing devices only evaluate other computing devices in the same sub-group(s). In this manner, a distributed, efficient and scalable solution is provided for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure.
- Turning to the drawings,
FIG. 2 shows anillustrative computer infrastructure 12A for evaluating trust according to an embodiment of the invention.Computer infrastructure 12A includes a plurality ofcomputing devices 14A-C, each of which includes anattestation system 40 and avalidation system 30, which makecomputing devices 14A-C operable to evaluate trust by performing the process described herein. In general,validation system 30 periodically evaluates theother computing devices 14A-C incomputer infrastructure 12A. To this extent,validation system 30 can request and/or receive a set ofdevice measurements 50 fromattestation system 40 on theother computing devices 14A-C and compare thedevice measurements 50 toreference measurements 52. Based on this comparison,validation system 30 can evaluate the trustworthiness of theother computing devices 14A-C. -
Computer infrastructure 12A can comprise any type ofcomputing infrastructure 12A that includes a group of two ormore computing devices 14A-C. To this extent,computing devices 14A-C can communicate over any combination of one or more types of communications links, such as a network, a shared memory, or the like, to perform the process described herein. The communications link(s) can comprise any combination of various types of wired and/or wireless links; comprise any combination of one or more types of networks (e.g., the Internet, a wide area network, a local area network, a virtual private network, etc.); and/or utilize any combination of various types of transmission techniques and protocols. In one embodiment,computer infrastructure 12A comprises a grid, and eachcomputing device 14A-C comprises a server in the grid. However, it is understood that this is only illustrative of many possible embodiments. -
FIG. 3 shows a more detailed view of one of thecomputing devices 14A according to an embodiment of the invention.Computing device 14A is shown including aprocessor 20, amemory 22A, an input/output (I/O)interface 24, and abus 26. Further,computing device 14A is shown in communication with an external I/O device/resource 28 and astorage system 22B. As is known in the art, in general,processor 20 executes computer program code, such asvalidation system 30, which is stored inmemory 22A and/orstorage system 22B. While executing computer program code,processor 20 can read and/or write data, such asdevice measurements 50, to/frommemory 22A,storage system 22B, and/or I/O interface 24.Bus 26 provides a communications link between each of the components incomputing device 14A. I/O device 28 can comprise any device that enables an individual to interact withcomputing device 14A or any device that enablescomputing device 14A to communicate with one or more other computing devices using any type of communications link. - In any event,
computing device 14A can comprise any general purpose computing article of manufacture capable of executing computer program code installed thereon (e.g., a personal computer, server, handheld device, etc.). However, it is understood thatcomputing device 14A,validation system 30 andattestation system 40 are only representative of various possible equivalent computing devices that may perform the process described herein. To this extent, in other embodiments, the functionality provided bycomputing device 14A,validation system 30 andattestation system 40 can be implemented by a computing article of manufacture that includes any combination of general and/or specific purpose hardware and/or computer program code. In each embodiment, the program code and hardware can be created using standard programming and engineering techniques, respectively. Regardless, it is understood that computingdevices 14B-C (FIG. 2 ) can comprise the same components (processor, memory, I/O interface, etc.) as shown forcomputing device 14A. These components have not been separately shown and discussed for brevity. - As discussed further herein,
validation system 30 andattestation system 40 enable eachcomputing device 14A-B incomputer infrastructure 12A to evaluate trust. To this extent,validation system 30 is shown including achallenge system 32, anevaluation system 34 and amanagement system 36. Operation of each of these systems is discussed further herein. However, it is understood that some of the various systems shown inFIG. 3 can be implemented independently, combined, and/or stored in memory for one or more separate computing devices that are included incomputer infrastructure 12A. Further, it is understood that some of the systems and/or functionality may not be implemented, or additional systems and/or functionality may be included as part ofcomputer infrastructure 12A. - Regardless, the invention provides a solution for evaluating trust in a
computer infrastructure 12A. For example,computing device 14B can evaluate a level of trust forcomputing device 14A. To perform such an evaluation,computing device 14A is shown including anattestation system 40.Attestation system 40 provides a set ofdevice measurements 50 for thecorresponding computing device 14A for processing (e.g., evaluation) by anothercomputing device 14B incomputer infrastructure 12A. To this extent,attestation system 40 can comprise a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) anddevice measurements 50 can comprise the set of measurements and Program Configuration Registers (PCRs) as defined and described in the Trusted Computing Group's specifications. However, it is understood that this is only an illustrative embodiment, and numerous alternative embodiments are possible under the invention. - Similarly,
computing device 14A can evaluate a level of trust forcomputing device 14B. In this case,validation system 30 can include achallenge system 32 that periodically requestsdevice measurements 50 for other computing device(s) 14B incomputer infrastructure 12A. In response, anattestation system 40 or the like incomputing device 14B can provide thedevice measurements 50 for processing by the requestingcomputing device 14A.Challenge system 32 can requestdevice measurements 50 from the other computing device(s) 14B using any type of event-based and/or timing-based solution. For example, a user, such as a system administrator, or another system can instructchallenge system 32 to requestdevice measurements 50 for one ormore computing devices 14B. Alternatively,challenge system 32 can requestdevice measurements 50 after expiration of a period of time (e.g., once an hour), prior to providing sensitive data to thecomputing device 14B, upon detection of an abnormal event, and/or the like. - When
challenge system 32 receivesdevice measurements 50,evaluation system 34 can evaluate thecorresponding computing device 14B based on thedevice measurements 50 to determine whether it can be trusted. In particular,evaluation system 34 can compare thedevice measurements 50 to a set ofreference measurements 52. The set ofreference measurements 52 can define a set of measurements and their corresponding trust level. The set ofreference measurements 52 can be specific to aparticular computing device 14B, e.g.,reference measurements 52 can comprisedevice measurements 50 for eachcomputing device 14B incomputer infrastructure 12A, and/orreference measurements 52 can comprise a set of standard measurements that computing device(s) 14B incomputer infrastructure 12A must meet in order to obtain a particular trust level. - In one embodiment,
evaluation system 34 can assigncomputing device 14B one of a plurality of trust levels. For each increasing trust level,evaluation system 34 can perform a more exacting comparison ofdevice measurements 50 withreference measurements 52. To this extent, another system can request thatvalidation system 30 determine whethercomputing device 14B meets a particular trust level. In this case,challenge system 32 can obtain a corresponding amount and/or type ofdevice measurements 50 based on the particular trust level and/orevaluation system 34 can perform a varying amount and/or type of evaluations ofdevice measurements 50 with respect toreference measurements 52 based on the particular trust level. - Regardless,
evaluation system 34 can detect a failure of theother computing device 14B to obtain a trust level. In this case,evaluation system 34 can respond to the failure. For example,evaluation system 34 can provide an indication of the failure to a requesting system and/or user, can generate a notification to a user of the failure, and/or can communicate the failure to the evaluatedcomputing device 14B and/or one or moreother computing devices 14C (FIG. 2 ) incomputer infrastructure 12A. - When
computer infrastructure 12A includes three ormore computing devices 14A-C as shown inFIG. 2 ,evaluation system 34 can compare the evaluation of aparticular computing device 14B with the other computing device(s) 14C incomputer infrastructure 12A. For example, whenevaluation system 34 detects a failure of aparticular computing device 14B,evaluation system 34 can respond by comparing the evaluation with the evaluation result(s) for theparticular computing device 14B that were obtained by the remaining computing device(s) 14C. Subsequently, any additional action can be determined using any voting algorithm or the like between theother computing devices computer infrastructure 12A. - In one embodiment,
validation system 30 includes amanagement system 36 that manages a set (one or more) ofcomputing devices 14B that are evaluated byvalidation system 30. To this extent, in response to a failure of aparticular computing device 14B,management system 36 can isolate thecomputing device 14B from communicating with the rest of thecomputing devices 14C (FIG. 2 ) incomputer infrastructure 12A and/or communicating with any other computing devices outside ofcomputer infrastructure 12A. - Further,
management system 36 can add and/or remove computing device(s) 14B that are evaluated byvalidation system 30. For example,management system 36 can receive a communications address or the like forcomputing device 14B and an instruction to add/removecomputing device 14B from a system administrator and/or another system. Alternatively,management system 36 can automatically detect the presence of anew computing device 14B incomputer infrastructure 12A and begin evaluating it. For example, anew computing device 14B can petition to joincomputer infrastructure 12A. As part of this process, thenew computing device 14B can provide various information on its system, such asdevice measurements 50, which can be evaluated versus a known standard, and a particular trust level can be assigned. Further, whenchallenge system 32 does not receive a response to a request fordevice measurements 50 of aparticular computing device 14B,management system 36 can remove thecomputing device 14B from the set of evaluated computing devices and/or isolate thecomputing device 14B as no longer being trusted. - When adding
computing devices 14B to the set of computing devices being monitored,management system 36 can detect that a threshold number of computing devices being monitored has been exceeded. In this case,management system 36 can dividecomputer infrastructure 12A into a plurality of sub-groups ofcomputing devices 14A-B for evaluating trust. To this extent,computer infrastructure 12A can comprise a sub-group ofcomputing devices 14A-B. For example,FIG. 4 shows anillustrative computer infrastructure 12B that includes a plurality ofsub-groups 60A-C. In this case, eachcomputing device 14A-F only evaluates trust for theother computing devices 14A-F in thesame sub-group 60A-C. -
Management system 36 can use any threshold number to dividecomputer infrastructure 12B into amultiple sub-groups 60A-C. In general, eachcomputing device 14A-F should be able to readily monitor the other computing devices in the same sub-group without substantially impacting a primary function of thecomputing device 14A-F. Consequently, the threshold number can be selected to ensure that the impact on the overall performance ofcomputing devices 14A-F remains at an acceptable level. Similarly,management system 36 can detect when a number of computing devices in asub-group 60A-C falls below a threshold number (e.g., three). In this case,management system 36 can combine twosub-groups 60A-C or independently assign eachcomputing device 14A-F to anothersub-group 60A-C. - In any event,
management system 36 can implement any solution for assigningcomputing devices 14A-F incomputer infrastructure 12B to acorresponding sub-group 60A-C. For example,management system 36 can assigncomputing devices 14A-F todifferent sub-groups 60A-C based on the communications addresses, physical proximity, primary function(s), and/or the like. Further, a user, such as a system administrator, can usemanagement system 36 to designate membership insub-groups 60A-C, add and/or removecomputing devices 14A-F from sub-groups 60A-C, create and/or delete sub-groups 60A-C, and/or the like. -
Sub-groups 60A-C can comprise disjoint membership, e.g., nocomputing device 14A-F is included in more than onesub-group 60A-C. However, as shown, one ormore computing devices 14A-F can be included inmultiple sub-groups 60A-C. For example,computing device 14A is shown included in bothsub-group 60A-B andcomputing device 14C is shown included in bothsub-groups 60A, C. By includingcomputing devices 14A-F inmultiple sub-groups 60A-C, redundancy is provided forcomputer infrastructure 12B and sub-groups 60A-C may need to be created/removed less frequently. To this extent, eachcomputing device 14A-F can be included in twosub-groups 60A-C. In this case, eachsub-group 60A-C can comprise asingle computing device 14A-F that comprises a “trusted authority” from whichother computing devices 14A-F in thesub-group 60A-C can obtain reference measurements 52 (FIG. 2 ). Should a trusted authority in onesub-group 60A-C become corrupted, the corruption can be detected by the other partially overlappingsub-groups 60A-C and trust evaluation can continue for theother computing devices 14A-F in the corruptedsub-group 60A-C. - While each
computing device 14A-F is shown and described as including both validation system 30 (FIG. 2 ) and attestation system 40 (FIG. 2 ), it is understood that one ormore computing devices 16 incomputer infrastructure 12B can compriseonly attestation system 40 or neithersystem computing device 16 could comprise a computing device that includes a TPM. In this case,computing device 14C can evaluate the trust level ofcomputing device 16 as described herein. However,computing device 16 would not evaluate the trust ofcomputing device 14C or any other computing device incomputer infrastructure 12B. Alternatively,computing device 16 may not include eithersystem computing device 14C can use other solutions for evaluatingcomputing device 16, limit the sensitivity of data communicated tocomputing device 16, and/or limit the types of transactions in whichcomputing device 16 can participate. - Returning to
FIG. 2 ,reference measurements 52 are critical to effectively evaluatingother computing devices 14A-C incomputer infrastructure 12A. In particular, any corruption or misrepresentation ofreference measurements 52 could cause wide-spread disruption incomputer infrastructure 12A. For example, insertion of a “bad” measurement intoreference measurements 52 could allow unapproved software, such as a virus or other security attack, to execute on acomputing device 14A-C, thereby defeating the evaluation process. As shown, eachcomputing device 14A-C can include its own copy ofreference measurements 52. This provides protection against a compromise of one copy ofreference measurements 52 at one ofcomputing devices 14A-C. Further, when voting, or the like, is used to determine a trust level for acomputing device 14A-C that fails an evaluation, a compromised set ofreference measurements 52 may be detected. In this case,validation system 30 can stop evaluatingother computing devices 14A-C until an accurate set ofreference measurements 52 is obtained. - One problem with each
computing device 14A-C comprising its own copy ofreference measurements 52 is the need to distributereference measurements 52 to eachcomputing device 14A-C. In an alternative embodiment, a single computing device, e.g.,computing device 14A, could comprise a copy ofreference measurements 52 andvalidation systems 30 on theother computing devices 14B-C could request and obtain data fromreference measurements 52 using secure communications on an as needed basis. Regardless,reference measurements 52 should be generated and/or distributed in a trusted manner, e.g., using a “clean room” solution. To this extent, asingle computing device 14A incomputer infrastructure 12A can enable a user to add, delete, and/or modifyreference measurements 52 using, for example, management system 36 (FIG. 3 ), and subsequently,management system 36 can communicate an updatedreference measurements 52 to theother computing devices 14B-C incomputer infrastructure 12A.Management system 36 on each of theother computing devices 14B-C can receive the updatedreference measurements 52 and ensure that they are valid. In one embodiment,reference measurements 52 andvalidation system 30 are cryptographically signed by the creator and are only replaceable/updateable by trustworthy procedures that protect the integrity of the signed data and/or program code. -
Validation system 30 and/orattestation system 40 can maintain a set of trust evaluation reports 54.Trust evaluation report 54 can comprise various data on the computing device(s) 14B that are evaluated byevaluation system 34, the results of the evaluation(s), response(s) to request(s) fordevice measurements 50, and/or the like. For example, in one embodiment, trustevaluation report 54 can comprise a change log that is updated each time the trust level of an evaluatedcomputing device 14B changes. Similarly, trustevaluation report 54 can comprise an audit report that logs all evaluations, updates ofdevice measurements 50 and/orreference measurements 52, requests for evaluation data and/ordevice measurements 50, and/or the like, that are processed byvalidation system 30 and/orattestation system 40. In any event,validation system 30 and/orattestation system 40 can provide some or all of atrust evaluation report 54 for processing by another system and/or display to a user. - While shown and described herein as a method and system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure, it is understood that the invention further provides various alternative embodiments. For example, in one embodiment, the invention provides a program product stored on a computer-readable medium, which when executed, enables a computer infrastructure to evaluate trust as described herein. To this extent, the computer-readable medium includes program code, such as validation system 30 (
FIG. 3 ) and attestation system 40 (FIG. 3 ), which implements the process described herein. It is understood that the term “computer-readable medium” comprises one or more of any type of physical embodiment of the program code. In particular, the computer-readable medium can comprise program code embodied on one or more portable storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage portions of a computing device, such asmemory 22A (FIG. 3 ) and/orstorage system 22B (FIG. 3 ) (e.g., a fixed disk, a read-only memory, a random access memory, a cache memory, etc.), and/or as a data signal traveling over a network (e.g., during a wired/wireless electronic distribution of the program product). - In another embodiment, the invention provides a method of generating a system for evaluating trust in a computer infrastructure. In this case, a computer infrastructure, such as
computer infrastructure 12A (FIG. 2 ), can be obtained (e.g., created, maintained, having made available to, etc.) and one or more systems for performing the process described herein can be obtained (e.g., created, purchased, used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the computer infrastructure. To this extent, the deployment of each system can comprise one or more of: (1) installing program code on a computing device, such ascomputing device 14A (FIG. 3 ), from a computer-readable medium; (2) adding one or more computing devices to the computer infrastructure; and (3) incorporating and/or modifying one or more existing systems of the computer infrastructure, to enable the computer infrastructure to perform the process steps of the invention. - In still another embodiment, the invention provides a business method that performs the process described herein on a subscription, advertising, and/or fee basis. That is, a service provider, such as a network security service provider, could offer to evaluate trust in a computer infrastructure as described herein. Similarly, a service provider could offer to manage trust evaluation reporting in a computer infrastructure. In the latter case, the service provider can manage trust evaluation report(s) 54 for
computer infrastructure 12A. Trust evaluation report(s) 54 can be used to ensure compliance with one or more laws and/or regulations. In either case, the service provider can manage (e.g., create, maintain, support, etc.) a computer infrastructure, such ascomputer infrastructure 12A (FIG. 2 ), that performs the process described herein for one or more customers. In return, the service provider can receive payment from the customer(s) under a subscription and/or fee agreement and/or the service provider can receive payment from the sale of advertising to one or more third parties. - As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program code” and “computer program code” are synonymous and mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a set of instructions that cause a computing device having an information processing capability to perform a particular function either directly or after any combination of the following: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; (b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) decompression. To this extent, program code can be embodied as one or more types of program products, such as an application/software program, component software/a library of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O system/driver for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like.
- The foregoing description of various aspects of the invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously, many modifications and variations are possible. Such modifications and variations that may be apparent to an individual in the art are included within the scope of the invention as defined by the accompanying claims.
Claims (23)
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2007
- 2007-02-16 CN CN200780005691.2A patent/CN101385092B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2007-02-16 WO PCT/US2007/062315 patent/WO2007098406A2/en active Application Filing
- 2007-02-16 JP JP2008555518A patent/JP2009527826A/en active Pending
- 2007-02-16 US US11/913,193 patent/US7809821B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2007-02-16 EP EP07757119A patent/EP1987521A4/en not_active Withdrawn
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US20150169920A1 (en) * | 2005-12-23 | 2015-06-18 | Geofence Data Access Controls Llc | System and Method for Conveying Event Information Based on Varying Levels of Administrative Privilege under Multiple Levels of Access Controls |
US9680941B2 (en) * | 2005-12-23 | 2017-06-13 | Perdiemco Llc | Location tracking system conveying event information based on administrator authorizations |
US9497210B2 (en) | 2008-01-07 | 2016-11-15 | Intel Corporation | Stateless attestation system |
US9342683B2 (en) * | 2008-01-07 | 2016-05-17 | Intel Corporation | Stateless attestation system |
US20090228986A1 (en) * | 2008-03-04 | 2009-09-10 | Adler Mitchell D | Trust exception management |
US8739292B2 (en) * | 2008-03-04 | 2014-05-27 | Apple Inc. | Trust exception management |
US20150229627A1 (en) * | 2014-02-12 | 2015-08-13 | Canon Kabushiki Kaisha | Communication apparatus, communication system, method of controlling communication apparatus, and storage medium |
US9661000B2 (en) * | 2014-02-12 | 2017-05-23 | Canon Kabushiki Kaisha | Communication apparatus, communication system, method of controlling communication apparatus, and storage medium |
US9473513B2 (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2016-10-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Authentication based on proximate devices |
US9503461B2 (en) * | 2014-12-30 | 2016-11-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Authentication based on proximate devices |
US20220255916A1 (en) * | 2019-09-30 | 2022-08-11 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus to attest objects in edge computing environments |
US20240095368A1 (en) * | 2022-03-31 | 2024-03-21 | Drata Inc. | Automated trust center for real-time security and compliance monitoring |
US12105808B2 (en) * | 2022-03-31 | 2024-10-01 | Drata Inc. | Automated trust center for real-time security and compliance monitoring |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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EP1987521A2 (en) | 2008-11-05 |
US7809821B2 (en) | 2010-10-05 |
CN101385092B (en) | 2012-07-04 |
WO2007098406A3 (en) | 2008-04-17 |
CN101385092A (en) | 2009-03-11 |
EP1987521A4 (en) | 2011-09-14 |
US20090006597A1 (en) | 2009-01-01 |
WO2007098406A2 (en) | 2007-08-30 |
US7266475B1 (en) | 2007-09-04 |
JP2009527826A (en) | 2009-07-30 |
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