JP4651310B2 - Information falsification detection system, non-contact type recording medium, information falsification detection method, and computer program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention is an application having a plurality of processing objects. Each time each processing object is executed, parity data indicating that the processing has been normally performed is generated and written to a non-contact type recording medium such as an IC tag. Information falsification detection system and non-contact type recording medium capable of confirming whether data has been falsified in an intermediate processing object based on parity data recorded at the time when execution of the processing object is completed The present invention relates to an information falsification detection method and a computer program.

  It is important to manage history information from product manufacture to disposal from the viewpoint of ensuring product quality and eliminating counterfeit products, etc., since products have reached the hands of consumers through various production and distribution processes these days. The nature is increasing. In general, since a product goes through a plurality of production processes and distribution processes from production to disposal, each production process and distribution process uses a non-contact IC tag capable of storing history information for each product. Many product life cycle management systems have been developed for managing the life cycle of each product by writing history information every time it goes through.

  The non-contact type IC tag is connected to communication means such as a network, has a built-in IC chip for storing calculations and calculation results, and stores a large amount of information collected in the IC tag to a plurality of managers and a plurality of business bases. Can be shared on

  For example, it is possible to distribute or move production processes, distribution processes, etc., with IC tags attached to products, luggage, vehicles, etc., as in the case of conventional barcodes, and a wireless communication antenna and reading fixed to each processing process. The device makes it possible to retrieve / rewrite necessary information when necessary.

  As a result, it is possible to record all the information about the history of where the product is shipped from, and how long it has been carried through which delivery route, in the non-contact type IC tag. The cycle can be easily grasped.

  As a product life cycle management system as described above, for example, in Patent Document 1, an article with a non-contact IC tag is distributed through a plurality of stages, and secret information is recorded on the IC tag for each stage distributed. An access system using a non-contact IC tag is disclosed, and information recorded on the IC tag can be obtained when necessary by a necessary person.

Further, Patent Document 2 adds a tampering detection code for verifying whether or not information extraction / rewriting with an IC tag (ID tag limited to identification information) has been normally performed, together with attribute information, A management system that can detect falsification of information in the production process and the distribution process is disclosed, and it is possible to improve the reliability of the information recorded in the IC tag when going through a plurality of processes.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-307055 JP 2002-24767 A

  However, in the above-described conventional product life cycle management system, the confidential information recorded on the IC tag, the falsification detection code, or the like is given for each production process and distribution process, and normal processing is performed in each process. However, there is a problem that it is impossible to determine whether or not the processing order between a plurality of processes is correct. In other words, in a production process that originally needs to be processed in the order of A, B, and C, if the process is mistakenly performed in the order of A, C, and B, the information recorded in the IC tag is determined in the correct order. Whether or not the product has been processed cannot be determined, and there is a possibility that even a product that is out of specification depending on the production process may be shipped as a normal product.

  In addition, when information recorded in each process is leaked to a malicious third party, it becomes easy to record wrong information for each production process and distribution process, and the IC tag in the case of going through a plurality of processes There was also a problem that the reliability of the recorded information could not be maintained.

  That is, for example, when a certain production process is not performed normally, there is no means for specifying a production process that has not been performed normally in the subsequent production process to be recorded, in particular, a product with established brand trust, etc. Then, it develops into a problem related to the trust of the traders related to all of the production process and the logistics process.

  The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and the processing in which falsification is performed where information in a processing object corresponding to a plurality of processing steps has been falsified and recorded on a non-contact type recording medium. An object of the present invention is to provide an information falsification detection system, a non-contact type recording medium, an information falsification detection method, and a computer program that can be detected by a processing object executed after the object.

In order to achieve the above object, the information falsification detection system according to the first aspect of the present invention is a non-contact type recording capable of generating parity data sequentially and reading / writing data without contact each time a plurality of processing objects are executed. An information falsification detection system that detects whether or not information related to an intermediate processing object has been falsified based on parity data recorded on the medium and recorded on the non-contact type recording medium when execution of a plurality of processing objects is completed The non-contact type recording medium includes means for acquiring information on the processing object when executing each processing object, and means for generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information on each processing object. When the generated parity data, be recorded in association with the identification information of the processing object Means and, and means for the third party information about each process object acquired to protect such that unreadable when generating parity data in a predetermined processing objects, prior to processing the object from the predetermined processing object The parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated in step 1 and information on the predetermined processing object.

  In the information falsification detection system according to the first invention, at the time of execution of each processing object, not only information about the processing object but also parity data generated by another processing object executed before the processing object is used. Generate parity data for the processing object. As a result, the processing object after the processing object to be executed secondly generates new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that, and therefore corresponds to the intermediate processing object. It is difficult to generate illegal parity data, and when parity data is illegally replaced, it is detected by detecting that the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next is different from the appropriate value. Thus, it is possible to reliably specify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

In addition, the non-contact type recording medium according to the second invention includes an IC chip capable of reading and writing data and a wireless communication means capable of wirelessly transmitting and receiving data, and each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, In a non-contact type recording medium that sequentially generates and records parity data, a means for acquiring information on each processing object at the time of execution of each processing object and a parity for each processing object based on the acquired information on each processing object Means for generating data, means for recording the generated parity data in association with identification information of the processing object, and means for protecting the acquired information about each processing object so that a third party cannot read the information. And when generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the predetermined processing object Based on the previous processing object parity data and information on the predetermined processing objects created in a more-objects, characterized in that it is configured to generate parity data corresponding to the predetermined processing object.

  In the non-contact type recording medium according to the second invention, when each processing object is executed, not only information on the processing object but also parity data generated by another processing object executed before the processing object is used. Parity data of the processing object is generated. As a result, the processing object after the processing object to be executed secondly generates new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that, and therefore corresponds to the intermediate processing object. It is difficult to generate illegal parity data, and when parity data is illegally replaced, it is detected by detecting that the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next is different from the appropriate value. Thus, it is possible to reliably specify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

  Further, the non-contact type recording medium according to the third invention prohibits reading and writing of information relating to the processing object before the predetermined processing object when the parity data is generated by the predetermined processing object in the second invention. It is comprised so that it may be comprised.

  In the non-contact type recording medium according to the third invention, when parity data is generated by the processing object, the information on the processing object executed before the processing object is read from the non-contact type recording medium and the information is updated. Prohibit writing for As a result, an arbitrary processing object can read only parity data generated by the processing object executed before the processing object from the non-contact type recording medium, and newly generates parity data for the already executed processing object. This can be prevented in advance.

Further, the information falsification detection method according to the fourth aspect of the invention generates parity data sequentially each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, and records the data on a non-contact type recording medium capable of reading and writing data in a non-contact manner. In the information tampering detection method for detecting whether or not information related to an intermediate processing object has been tampered with based on parity data recorded on the non-contact type recording medium when all the processing objects are completed, the non-contact type recording The medium acquires information on the processing object at the time of execution of each processing object, generates parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information on each processing object, and generates the generated parity data on the processing object. recorded in association with the identification information, the information on each process object obtained third There was protected as a unreadable when generating parity data in a predetermined processing object, based on information relating to the predetermined processing parity data and the predetermined processing objects created in the previous processing object from the object, Parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated.

  In the information falsification detection method according to the fourth aspect of the present invention, at the time of execution of each processing object, not only information about the processing object but also parity data generated by another processing object executed before the processing object is used. Generate parity data for the processing object. As a result, the processing object after the processing object to be executed secondly generates new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that, and therefore corresponds to the intermediate processing object. It is difficult to generate illegal parity data, and when parity data is illegally replaced, it is detected by detecting that the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next is different from the appropriate value. Thus, it is possible to reliably specify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

The computer program according to the fifth aspect of the invention generates parity data sequentially each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, and based on the parity data recorded when execution of all the processing objects is completed, In a computer program that can be executed by a non-contact type recording medium that functions as a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data in a non-contact manner so as to detect whether or not information relating to the tampering is detected, when execution of the processing object, and obtaining information about the processing object, based on information about each process object acquired, and generating parity data for each processing object, the generated parity data, the processing object scan to be recorded in association with the identification information And-up, if the third party information related to the processing object acquired comprises the steps of protecting so that unreadable, generates parity data in a predetermined processing object, the processing before the said predetermined processing object The parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated by the object and information on the predetermined processing object.

  In the computer program according to the fifth invention, at the time of execution of each processing object, not only the information on the processing object but also the parity data generated by another processing object executed before the processing object, the processing object Parity data is generated. As a result, the processing object after the processing object to be executed secondly generates new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that, and therefore corresponds to the intermediate processing object. It is difficult to generate illegal parity data, and when parity data is illegally replaced, it is detected by detecting that the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next is different from the appropriate value. Thus, it is possible to reliably specify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

  According to the first invention, the second invention, the fourth invention, and the fifth invention, the processing objects subsequent to the processing object to be executed secondly are referred to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that, and new It is difficult to generate illegal parity data corresponding to a halfway processing object, and when parity data is illegally replaced, it is generated by the next executed processing object. By detecting that the parity data is different from the appropriate value, it is possible to reliably identify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

  According to the third invention, in any processing object, only parity data generated by the processing object executed before the processing object can be read from the non-contact type recording medium. It is possible to prevent the generation of parity data.

(Embodiment 1)
Hereinafter, the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention will be specifically described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of an information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. In the first embodiment, a product with the IC tag 4 as a non-contact type recording medium is manufactured through four geographically separated factories. That is, each of the four factories corresponds to a processing object, and after the execution of one processing object is completed, the product with the IC tag 4 is transferred to the next factory, and the processing objects are sequentially executed. The central device 1 provided at the head office and the terminal devices 2, 2,... Provided at the four factories are connected to each other via a communication means such as the Internet 3 so that data can be transmitted and received between them. The terminal devices 2, 2,... Provided in each factory and the IC tag 4 can transmit and receive data without contact. The number of factories is not limited to four, and the central device 1 is not limited to being installed at the head office.

  The central device 1 aggregates the data read from the IC tag 4 by the terminal devices 2, 2,... Of each factory and the information generated in each processing object, and in each processing object based on the value of the parity data. Verify whether it is running normally.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the central device 1 of the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The central device 1 includes at least a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 11, a storage unit 12, a RAM 13, a communication interface 14 connected to an external communication unit such as the Internet 3, an input unit 15, an output unit 16, and a DVD, a CD, and the like. The auxiliary storage means 17 uses a portable recording medium 18.

  The CPU 11 is connected to the above-described hardware units of the central device 1 via the internal bus 19 and controls the above-described hardware units, and also stores a processing program stored in the storage unit 12, for example, each processing Various software functions are executed in accordance with a program or the like for verifying whether the parity data generated based on the information about the object is correct.

  The storage unit 12 includes a built-in fixed storage device (hard disk), a ROM, and the like, and is obtained from an external computer via the communication interface 14 or a portable recording medium 18 such as a DVD or CD-ROM. A processing program necessary for causing the device 1 to function is stored. The storage unit 12 is generated when execution of the processing object is completed in association with information identifying not only the processing program but also the terminal devices 2, 2,... Connected via a network such as the Internet 3. The power parity value is stored.

  The RAM 13 is composed of a DRAM or the like, and stores temporary data generated when the software is executed. The communication interface 14 is connected to the internal bus 19 and transmits / receives data required for processing by connecting so as to be able to communicate with the Internet 3 or the like.

  The input means 15 is a pointing device such as a mouse for selecting a word displayed on the screen, or a keyboard for inputting text data on the screen by keystroke. The output means 16 is a display device such as a liquid crystal display (LCD) or a display (CRT) that displays and outputs an image.

  The auxiliary storage means 17 uses a portable recording medium 18 such as a CD or DVD, and downloads programs, data, and the like to be processed by the CPU 11 to the storage means 12. It is also possible to write the data processed by the CPU 11 for backup.

  FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the terminal device 2 of the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The terminal device 2 includes at least a CPU (central processing unit) 21, a storage unit 22, a RAM 23, a communication interface 24 connected to an external communication unit such as the Internet 3, an input unit 25, an output unit 26, and a non-contact type recording medium. The IC tag reader / writer 27 can transmit and receive data to and from the IC tag 4.

  The CPU 21 is connected to the above-described hardware units of the terminal device 2 via the internal bus 28, and controls the above-described hardware units and also stores a processing program stored in the storage unit 22, for example, non-contact Based on data read from the IC tag 4 which is a type recording medium, parity data is newly calculated, and various software functions are executed according to a program or the like to be written to the IC tag 4.

  The storage unit 22 includes a built-in fixed storage device (hard disk), a ROM, and the like, and is acquired from an external computer via a communication interface 24 or a portable recording medium such as a DVD or a CD-ROM. 2 stores a processing program necessary to function as 2. The storage means 22 stores not only processing programs but also information on processing objects necessary for the IC tag 4 to calculate parity data, such as information for identifying products, processing time, information for identifying processing plants, process numbers, etc. I remember it.

  The RAM 23 is composed of a DRAM or the like, and stores temporary data generated when the software is executed. The communication interface 24 is connected to the internal bus 28, and transmits / receives data required for processing by connecting so as to be able to communicate with the Internet 3 or the like.

  The input means 25 is a pointing device such as a mouse for selecting a word displayed on the screen, or a keyboard for inputting text data by keystroke on the screen. The output means 26 is a display device such as a liquid crystal display (LCD) or a display (CRT) that displays and outputs an image.

  The IC tag reader / writer 27 wirelessly communicates with the IC tag 4 that is a non-contact type recording medium, and transmits and writes information on the processing object stored in the storage unit 22 to the IC tag 4. The parity data calculated and recorded by the tag 4 is read and stored in the storage means 22.

  FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the IC tag 4 used in the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The IC tag 4 includes at least an IC chip 41 and wireless communication means 42, and the IC chip 41 includes a calculation unit 411, a storage unit 412, a power supply rectification unit 413, and a transmission / reception unit 414. The wireless communication means 42 is a coiled antenna 421 connected to the transmission / reception unit 414 of the IC chip 41, and transmits / receives data via the antenna 421.

  When the antenna 421 receives a radio wave signal from the IC tag reader / writer 27, an electromotive force is generated by a resonance action because the antenna wire of the antenna 421 is coiled. The IC chip 41 is activated by the generated electromotive force, converts the information stored in the storage unit 412 into a signal, performs calculation processing in the calculation unit 411 based on the signal received from the transmission / reception unit 414, and calculates the calculation result. Store in the storage unit 412. The calculation unit 411 transmits the calculation result stored in the storage unit 412 from the antenna 421 to the IC tag reader / writer 27 via the transmission / reception unit 414.

  FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure of the IC chip 41 of the IC tag 4 used in the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. When the IC tag 4 is brought close to the IC tag reader / writer 27 of the terminal device 2, the IC chip 41 is activated by the induced electromotive force, and receives information on the processing object transmitted from the IC tag reader / writer 27 (step S501). . The information regarding the processing object received by the IC chip 41 includes, for example, information for identifying a product, processing time, information for identifying a processing factory, a process number, and the like.

  The IC chip 41 reads the parity data calculated by the stored processing object that has already been executed (step S502), and reads the read parity data and information on the processing object received from the IC tag reader / writer 27. Based on this, new parity data is calculated (step S503).

  In the first embodiment, a terminal device 2 is provided for each processing object. When the execution of each processing object is completed, the worker brings the IC tag 4 close to the IC tag reader / writer 27 of the terminal device 2. The IC tag 4 obtains information about the processing object corresponding to the terminal device 2 including the IC tag reader / writer 27 via the IC tag reader / writer 27, and stores the processing object that has already been executed and is stored. Along with the parity data, the parity data of the processing object is calculated.

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram of a parity data calculation method used in the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Upon initial process object 1 performed on the basis of the information D ₁ on the processing object 1, and calculates the parity data P ₁ as the processing object 1 Information D ₁ of the function f (D _1).

During the second process object 2 run, and information D ₂ on the processing object 2, already using the parity data P ₁ that is calculated to calculate the parity data P ₂ of the processing object 2. That is, parity data P ₂ is calculated as the information relating to the processing object 2 D ₂ and the parity data P ₁ of the function _{f (P 1, D 2)} .

Hereinafter, the parity data is calculated sequentially in the same manner until the execution of the four processing objects is completed. In general, when the n-th (n is a natural number) processing object n is executed, information D _n regarding the processing object _n and already calculated parity data P ₁ , P ₂ ,..., P _n-1 are used. Thus, the parity data P _n of the processing object n is calculated. That is, parity data P _n, as shown in equation (1), processing information about objects n D _n and the parity data P _1, P _2, · · ·, P _n-1 of the function f (P _1, P ₂ ,..., P _n−1 , D _n ).

(Equation 1)
P _n = f (P ₁ , P ₂ ,..., P _n−1 , D _n )

  The IC chip 41 stores the calculated parity data in association with information for identifying the processing object (step S504), and transmits the stored parity data to the terminal device 2 (step S505).

  Information regarding the processing object is set so that it cannot be read by a third party who has acquired the IC tag 4 (step S506). In FIG. 6, the hatched portion shows an area protected so that reading by a third party is impossible. The method for preventing a third party from reading is not particularly limited, and may be a method of applying a security lock or a method of erasing from the IC chip 41.

  In this way, even if a third party who illegally obtained the IC tag 4 attempts to calculate parity data, the third party cannot obtain information about each processing object, and correct parity data is obtained. Therefore, it is possible to prevent fraudulent acts such as data tampering.

  The CPU 21 of the terminal device 2 that has received the parity data calculated from the IC tag 4 stores the parity data in the storage means 22 and transmits it to the central device 1 via the communication interface 24. The timing for transmission to the central device 1 is not particularly limited. For example, it may be the timing at which the acquisition request signal from the central device 1 is received, or may be transmitted to the central device 1 at regular time intervals. There may be.

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure of the CPU 11 of the central apparatus 1 of the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The CPU 11 of the central device 1 calculates, in advance, an appropriate value of parity data to be calculated when execution is properly completed for each processing object in advance and stores it in the storage unit 12 (step S701).

  FIG. 8 is an exemplary diagram of a data configuration of parity data stored in the storage unit 12 of the central apparatus 1. As shown in FIG. 8, each time the execution of the processing object is completed, the calculated parity data is stored in association with information for identifying the processing object, for example, the processing object number.

  The CPU 11 acquires the last parity data transmitted from the terminal device 2 when the execution of the last processing object is completed (step S702). Then, the CPU 11 determines whether or not the appropriate value of the parity data calculated in advance and stored in the storage unit 12 matches the acquired parity data (step S703).

  If the CPU 11 determines that the two match (step S703: YES), the processing object is determined to have been properly executed, and the process ends.

  When the CPU 11 determines that the two do not match (step S703: NO), the CPU 11 acquires, from the terminal device 2, the parity data at the completion of execution of the processing object immediately before the processing object that acquired the previous parity data ( In step S704), it is determined whether or not the appropriate value of the parity data stored in the storage unit 12 matches the acquired parity data (step S705).

  If the CPU 11 determines that the two match (step S705: YES), the CPU 11 determines that an illegal process has been executed on the processing object executed next to the processing object that acquired the parity data that matches the appropriate value. Then, information for identifying the processing object is output to the output means 16 (step S706). If the CPU 11 determines that the two do not match (step S705: NO), the CPU 11 returns to step S704.

  Thereafter, by performing the parity data comparison process in the same manner, it is possible to identify which processing object has executed the illegal process, and it is possible to confirm by the output to the output means 16.

  As described above, according to the first embodiment, the processing objects subsequent to the processing object to be executed secondly generate new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed before that. Therefore, it is difficult to generate illegal parity data corresponding to a halfway processing object, and when parity data is illegally replaced, the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next is an appropriate value. It is possible to reliably identify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed by detecting that the processing is different from the above.

(Embodiment 2)
Hereinafter, the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention will be specifically described with reference to the drawings. Since the configuration of the information tampering detection system according to the second embodiment is the same as that of the first embodiment, detailed description thereof is omitted by attaching the same reference numerals. The second embodiment is different from the first embodiment in the method for generating piety data.

  FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure of the IC chip 41 of the IC tag 4 used in the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. When the IC tag 4 is brought close to the IC tag reader / writer 27 of the terminal device 2, the IC chip 41 is activated by the induced electromotive force, and receives information on the processing object transmitted from the IC tag reader / writer 27 (step S901). . The information regarding the processing object received by the IC chip 41 includes, for example, information for identifying a product, processing time, information for identifying a processing factory, a process number, and the like.

  The IC chip 41 reads only the parity data calculated by the processing object executed immediately before among the stored parity data calculated by the processing object that has already been executed (step S902). Based on the information on the processing object received from the IC tag reader / writer 27, new parity data is calculated (step S903).

  Also in the second embodiment, the terminal device 2 is provided for each processing object. When the execution of each processing object is completed, the worker brings the IC tag 4 close to the IC tag reader / writer 27 of the terminal device 2. The IC tag 4 obtains information about the processing object corresponding to the terminal device 2 including the IC tag reader / writer 27 via the IC tag reader / writer 27, and stores the processing object that has already been executed and is stored. Among them, the parity data of the processing object is calculated together with the parity data calculated immediately before, that is, the parity data calculated by the processing object executed immediately before.

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram of a parity data calculation method used in the information falsification detection system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. Upon initial process object 1 performed on the basis of the information D ₁ on the processing object 1, it is calculated as the parity data P ₁ processing object for information D ₁ of the function f (D _1).

During the second process object 2 run, and information D ₂ on the processing object 2, already using the parity data P ₁ that is calculated to calculate the parity data P ₂ of the processing object 2. That is, parity data P ₂ is calculated as the information relating to the processing object 2 D ₂ and the parity data P ₁ of the function _{f (P 1, D 2)} .

During the third processing object 3 run, the information D ₃ on the processing object 3, of the parity data have already been calculated, by using the parity data P ₂ calculated immediately before, the parity data P ₃ of the processing object 3 Is calculated. That is, the parity data P ₃ is calculated as the information relating to the processing object 3 D ₃ and the parity data P ₂ functions _{f (P 2, D 3)} .

Hereinafter, the parity data is calculated sequentially in the same manner until the execution of the four processing objects is completed. Generally, n-th (n is a natural number) during execution of the processing object n of the information D _n on the processing object n, the parity data P _1, P _2, which have already been calculated, ..., among the P _n-1, using the parity data P _n-1 calculated in the processing object that performed immediately before (n-1), calculates the parity data P _n of the processing object n. That is, the parity data P _n is calculated as a function f (P _n−1 , D _n ) of the information D _n regarding the processing object _n and the parity data P _n−1 as shown in (Expression 2).

(Equation 2)
P _n = f (P _n−1 , D _n )

  The IC chip 41 stores the calculated parity data in association with the information for identifying the processing object (step S904), and transmits the stored parity data to the terminal device 2 (step S905).

  Information relating to the processing object is set so that it cannot be read by a third party who has acquired the IC tag 4 (step S906). Similarly, the parity data calculated by the processing object executed before the processing object executed immediately before is also set to be unreadable so that the third party who obtains the IC tag 4 cannot read it ( Step S907).

  In FIG. 10, the hatched portion shows an area protected so that reading by a third party is impossible. Unlike the first embodiment, in addition to the information about the processing object that has already been executed, the parity data calculated by the processing object that has already been executed is set so that it cannot be read by a third party. The method for preventing a third party from reading is not particularly limited, and may be a method of applying a security lock or a method of erasing from the IC chip 41.

  By doing so, even if a third party who illegally obtained the IC tag 4 attempts to calculate parity data, not only the information about each processing object but also the processing object that has already been executed. Since the calculated parity data cannot be acquired and correct parity data cannot be calculated, it is possible to prevent illegal acts such as data tampering.

  The CPU 21 of the terminal device 2 that has received the parity data calculated from the IC tag 4 stores the parity data in the storage means 22 and transmits it to the central device 1 via the communication interface 24. The timing for transmission to the central device 1 is not particularly limited. For example, it may be the timing at which the acquisition request signal from the central device 1 is received, or may be transmitted to the central device 1 at regular time intervals. There may be.

  FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure of the CPU 11 of the central device 1 of the information tampering detection system according to the second embodiment of the present invention. The CPU 11 of the central device 1 calculates in advance an appropriate value of parity data to be calculated when execution is properly completed for each processing object in advance, and stores it in the storage means 12 (step S1101). The data structure of the parity data stored in the storage unit 12 of the central device 1 is the same as in the first embodiment. Each time the execution of the processing object is sequentially completed, information for identifying the processing object, for example, processing data, for example, processing It is stored in association with the object number.

  The CPU 11 acquires the last parity data transmitted from the terminal device 2 when the execution of the last processing object is completed (step S1102). Then, the CPU 11 determines whether or not the appropriate value of the parity data calculated in advance and stored in the storage unit 12 matches the acquired parity data (step S1103).

  When the CPU 11 determines that the two match (step S1103: YES), the processing object is determined to have been properly executed, and the process ends.

  When the CPU 11 determines that the two do not match (step S1103: NO), the CPU 11 acquires from the terminal device 2 the parity data at the completion of execution of the processing object immediately before the processing object that acquired the previous parity data ( In step S1104, it is determined whether or not the appropriate value of the parity data stored in the storage unit 12 matches the acquired parity data (step S1105).

  If the CPU 11 determines that the two match (step S1105: YES), the CPU 11 determines that an illegal process has been executed on the processing object executed next to the processing object that acquired the parity data that matches the appropriate value. Then, information for identifying the processing object is output to the output means 16 (step S1106). When the CPU 11 determines that the two do not match (step S1105: NO), the CPU 11 returns to step S1104.

  Thereafter, by performing the parity data comparison process in the same manner, it is possible to identify which processing object has executed the illegal process, and it is possible to confirm by the output to the output means 16.

  As described above, according to the second embodiment, the processing object after the processing object to be executed secondly generates new parity data with reference to the parity data generated by the processing object executed immediately before the processing object. Therefore, when it is difficult to generate illegal parity data corresponding to an intermediate processing object and the parity data is illegally replaced, the parity data generated by the processing object to be executed next becomes an appropriate value. By detecting the difference, it is possible to reliably identify a processing object for which normal processing is not executed.

  In the first and second embodiments described above, a case is described in which sequential processing is performed such that one processing object is executed next to one processing object, and the next one processing object is executed. The same effect can be expected in various processing steps such as a processing step in which one processing object is executed after completion of execution of a plurality of processing objects, or a processing step in which a plurality of processing objects are executed after completion of execution of one processing object. .

  The following is added.

(Appendix 1)
Each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, parity data is sequentially generated, recorded on a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data without contact, and the non-contact type recording is performed when execution of the plurality of processing objects is completed. In an information falsification detection system that detects whether or not information about a processing object in the middle has been falsified based on parity data recorded on a medium,
The non-contact type recording medium is
Means for obtaining information about the processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Means for generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Means for recording the generated parity data,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. An information falsification detection system characterized by being configured to do so.

(Appendix 2)
The non-contact type recording medium is configured to prohibit reading and writing of information related to a processing object prior to the predetermined processing object when parity data is generated by the predetermined processing object. 1. The information falsification detection system according to 1.

(Appendix 3)
When the parity data is generated by a predetermined processing object, the non-contact type recording medium is configured to generate the predetermined data based on the parity data generated by the processing object immediately before the predetermined processing object and information on the predetermined processing object. The information falsification detection system according to appendix 1 or 2, wherein parity data corresponding to the processing object is generated.

(Appendix 4)
Any one of Supplementary notes 1 to 3, wherein the non-contact type recording medium is an IC tag including an IC chip capable of reading and writing data and wireless communication means capable of wirelessly transmitting and receiving data. The information falsification detection system as described in one.

(Appendix 5)
Non-contact type recording medium comprising an IC chip capable of reading and writing data and wireless communication means capable of wirelessly transmitting and receiving data, and sequentially generating and recording parity data each time a plurality of processing objects are executed In
Means for obtaining information about each processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Means for generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Means for recording the generated parity data,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, parity data corresponding to the predetermined processing object based on parity data generated with a processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object A non-contact type recording medium configured to generate

(Appendix 6)
The contactless recording medium according to appendix 5, wherein reading and writing of information relating to a processing object prior to the predetermined processing object is prohibited when parity data is generated by the predetermined processing object. .

(Appendix 7)
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data corresponding to the predetermined processing object based on the parity data generated with the processing object immediately before the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object The non-contact type recording medium according to appendix 5 or 6, wherein the non-contact type recording medium is configured to generate

(Appendix 8)
Each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, parity data is sequentially generated and recorded on a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data in a non-contact manner. When all processing objects are completed, the parity data is recorded on the non-contact type recording medium. In the information tampering detection method for detecting whether information on the intermediate processing object is tampered based on the recorded parity data,
The non-contact type recording medium is
When executing each processing object, obtain information about the processing object,
Based on the acquired information about each processing object, generate parity data for each processing object,
Record the generated parity data,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. An information falsification detection method characterized by:

(Appendix 9)
Parity data is generated sequentially each time multiple processing objects are executed, and it is detected whether or not information about intermediate processing objects has been falsified based on the parity data recorded when execution of all processing objects is completed. In a computer program that can be executed on a non-contact type recording medium that functions a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data in a non-contact manner,
Obtaining information about the processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Recording the generated parity data,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. A computer program characterized by that.

It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the central apparatus of the information falsification detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the terminal device of the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the IC tag used with the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the process sequence of the IC chip of an IC tag used with the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is explanatory drawing of the parity data calculation method used with the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the process sequence of CPU of the central apparatus of the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is an illustration figure of the data structure of the parity data memorize | stored in the memory | storage means of a central apparatus. It is a flowchart which shows the process sequence of the IC chip of an IC tag used with the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 2 of this invention. It is explanatory drawing of the parity data calculation method used with the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 2 of this invention. It is a flowchart which shows the process sequence of CPU of the central apparatus of the information alteration detection system which concerns on Embodiment 2 of this invention.

Explanation of symbols

1 Central device 2 Terminal device 3 Internet 4 IC tag 11, 21 CPU
12, 22 Storage means 13, 23 RAM
14, 24 Communication interface 15, 25 Input means 16, 26 Output means 17 Auxiliary storage means 27 IC tag reader / writer 41 IC chip 42 Wireless communication means

Claims (5)

Each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, parity data is sequentially generated, recorded on a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data without contact, and the non-contact type recording is performed when execution of the plurality of processing objects is completed. In an information falsification detection system that detects whether or not information about a processing object in the middle has been falsified based on parity data recorded on a medium,
The non-contact type recording medium is
Means for obtaining information about the processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Means for generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Means for recording the generated parity data in association with the identification information of the processing object ;
Means for protecting the acquired information on each processing object from being read by a third party ,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. An information falsification detection system characterized by being configured to do so. Non-contact type recording medium comprising an IC chip capable of reading and writing data and wireless communication means capable of wirelessly transmitting and receiving data, and sequentially generating and recording parity data each time a plurality of processing objects are executed In
Means for obtaining information about each processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Means for generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Means for recording the generated parity data in association with the identification information of the processing object ;
Means for protecting the acquired information on each processing object from being read by a third party ,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, parity data corresponding to the predetermined processing object based on parity data generated with a processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object A non-contact type recording medium configured to generate   3. The non-contact type recording according to claim 2, wherein when parity data is generated by a predetermined processing object, reading and writing of information relating to the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object is prohibited. Medium. Each time a plurality of processing objects are executed, parity data is sequentially generated and recorded on a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data in a non-contact manner. When all processing objects are completed, the parity data is recorded on the non-contact type recording medium. In the information tampering detection method for detecting whether information on the intermediate processing object is tampered based on the recorded parity data,
The non-contact type recording medium is
When executing each processing object, obtain information about the processing object,
Based on the acquired information about each processing object, generate parity data for each processing object,
Record the generated parity data in association with the identification information of the processing object ,
Protect the acquired information about each processing object so that it cannot be read by a third party,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. An information falsification detection method characterized by: Parity data is generated sequentially each time multiple processing objects are executed, and it is detected whether or not information about intermediate processing objects has been falsified based on the parity data recorded when execution of all processing objects is completed. In a computer program that can be executed on a non-contact type recording medium that functions a non-contact type recording medium that can read and write data in a non-contact manner,
Obtaining information about the processing object at the time of execution of each processing object;
Generating parity data for each processing object based on the acquired information about each processing object;
Recording the generated parity data in association with the identification information of the processing object ;
Protecting the acquired information about each processing object so that it cannot be read by a third party ,
When generating parity data with a predetermined processing object, the parity data of the predetermined processing object is generated based on the parity data generated with the processing object prior to the predetermined processing object and information about the predetermined processing object. A computer program characterized by that.

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