CN110855695A - Improved SDN network security authentication method and system - Google Patents
Improved SDN network security authentication method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN110855695A CN110855695A CN201911136014.5A CN201911136014A CN110855695A CN 110855695 A CN110855695 A CN 110855695A CN 201911136014 A CN201911136014 A CN 201911136014A CN 110855695 A CN110855695 A CN 110855695A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/14—Session management
- H04L67/141—Setup of application sessions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention provides an improved SDN network security authentication method and system, wherein a security encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA is added to carry out authentication signature on the controller and the switch, bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is carried out between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving SDN network vulnerabilities in a targeted manner is realized.
Description
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of network security technologies, and in particular, to an improved SDN network security authentication method and system.
Background
In the existing SDN, a TLS security channel is not forcibly established between a controller and a switch, and a default state is a non-open state, so that the network becomes vulnerable, clear text communication may occur between the controller and the switch, and any third party can intercept or modify communication contents of both parties and is easily attacked by a man-in-the-middle.
Meanwhile, the existing SDN controller and the switch lack authentication of the certificate, an attacker can easily intercept the request sent by the controller to the switch and disguise the request as the communication between the controller and the switch, and therefore all contents of the communication between the switch and the controller are obtained.
Therefore, a security authentication method and system for improving SDN network vulnerabilities are urgently needed.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an improved SDN network security authentication method and system, wherein a security encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA is added to carry out authentication and signature on the controller and the switch, bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is carried out between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving SDN network vulnerabilities in a targeted manner is realized.
In a first aspect, the present application provides an improved SDN network security authentication method, where the method includes:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
With reference to the first aspect, in a first possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the digital signature certificate employs a hash operation.
With reference to the first aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the encryption algorithm includes any one of DES, MD5, and AES.
With reference to the first aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
In a second aspect, the present application provides an improved SDN network security authentication system, the system comprising: the system comprises a gateway server, a network intermediate trusted authority CA, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
With reference to the second aspect, in a first possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the digital signature certificate employs a hash operation.
With reference to the second aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the encryption algorithm includes any one of DES, MD5, and AES.
With reference to the second aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
The invention provides an improved SDN network security authentication method and system, wherein a security encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA is added to carry out authentication signature on the controller and the switch, bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is carried out between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving SDN network vulnerabilities in a targeted manner is realized.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of an SDN network security authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is an architecture diagram of the SDN network security authentication system improved by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings so that the advantages and features of the present invention can be more easily understood by those skilled in the art, and the scope of the present invention will be more clearly and clearly defined.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an improved SDN network security authentication method provided in the present application, where the method includes:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
In some preferred embodiments, the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
In some preferred embodiments, the encryption algorithm comprises any one of DES, MD5, AES.
In some preferred embodiments, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
Fig. 2 is an architecture diagram of an improved SDN network security authentication system provided in the present application, the system including: the system comprises a gateway server, a network intermediate trusted authority CA, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
In some preferred embodiments, the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
In some preferred embodiments, the encryption algorithm comprises any one of DES, MD5, AES.
In some preferred embodiments, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
In specific implementation, the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium may store a program, and the program may include some or all of the steps in the embodiments of the present invention when executed. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM) or a Random Access Memory (RAM).
Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that the techniques of the embodiments of the present invention may be implemented as software plus a required general purpose hardware platform. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a storage medium, such as a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method according to the embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.
The same and similar parts in the various embodiments of the present specification may be referred to each other. In particular, for the embodiments, since they are substantially similar to the method embodiments, the description is simple, and the relevant points can be referred to the description in the method embodiments.
The above-described embodiments of the present invention should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An improved SDN network security authentication method, the method comprising:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
3. The method according to any of claims 1-2, wherein the encryption algorithm comprises any of DES, MD5, AES.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the network intermediary trusted authority (CA) can be any one of a certificate server, a key server and a digital certificate server.
5. An improved SDN network security authentication system, the system comprising: the system comprises a gateway server, a network intermediate trusted authority CA, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch perform encrypted communication on the established encrypted secure connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key.
6. The system of claim 5, wherein the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
7. The system according to any of claims 5-6, wherein the encryption algorithm comprises any of DES, MD5, AES.
8. The system according to any one of claims 5-7, wherein the network intermediary trusted authority CA can be any one of a certificate server, a key server, a digital certificate server.
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| CN114650141A (en) * | 2022-02-23 | 2022-06-21 | 桂林电子科技大学 | SDN network policy validity verification method based on FPGA |
| CN114650141B (en) * | 2022-02-23 | 2024-01-30 | 桂林电子科技大学 | FPGA-based SDN network policy validity verification method |
| CN114679323A (en) * | 2022-03-30 | 2022-06-28 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Network connection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114679323B (en) * | 2022-03-30 | 2023-11-24 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Network connection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114745138A (en) * | 2022-05-20 | 2022-07-12 | 长扬科技（北京）有限公司 | Equipment authentication method, device, control platform and storage medium |
| CN114745138B (en) * | 2022-05-20 | 2022-08-26 | 长扬科技（北京）有限公司 | Equipment authentication method, device, control platform and storage medium |
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