CA1149484A - Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions

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Publication number
CA1149484A
CA1149484A CA000326898A CA326898A CA1149484A CA 1149484 A CA1149484 A CA 1149484A CA 000326898 A CA000326898 A CA 000326898A CA 326898 A CA326898 A CA 326898A CA 1149484 A CA1149484 A CA 1149484A
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CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
location
transaction
identification information
auxiliary
encoding
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired
Application number
CA000326898A
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Martin M. Atalla
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Atalla Technovations Corp
Original Assignee
Atalla Technovations Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US05/902,444 external-priority patent/US4281215A/en
Priority claimed from US06/003,898 external-priority patent/US4268715A/en
Priority claimed from US06/009,532 external-priority patent/US4283599A/en
Application filed by Atalla Technovations Corp filed Critical Atalla Technovations Corp
Priority to CA000410540A priority Critical patent/CA1159920A/en
Priority to CA000410539A priority patent/CA1159124A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA1149484A publication Critical patent/CA1149484A/en
Expired legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

Abstract of the Disclosure A method and apparatus are provided for improving the security of data transmissions between stations and for control-ling secured transactions from remote locations in a data-transfer system. The method and apparatus obviate the need for transmitting user-identification information such as personal identification number (PIN) from station to station, e.g., from the station utilized by the user to enter his PIN and initiate a transaction, to the station that processes the transaction. Also, for added security, the method and apparatus provide for encryption (encoding) and decryption (decoding) of data during a transaction using en-cryption and decryption keys produced from different (independent) PIN's. The apparatus includes at least one irreversible algorithm module, a random number generator and at least one data file (e.g., disc or magnetic tape storage). The apparatus also includes a comparator or, alternatively, an encoding algorithm module and a matching decoding algorithm module. In addition, a data-transfer system obviates the need for paired encryption/decryption modules on a data link while nevertheless maintaining a high level of security in the data transferred. This facilitates remote control of data transfers between locations within the system, enables use of conventional data links, and permits convenient changes of and additions to the files of stored codes for the system without compromising the security of data transfers or of identifying codes for authorized individuals.

Description

IMPROVED METHOD AND APPARATUS
FOR SECURING DATA TRANSMISSIONS

Background of the Invention Numerous methods and apparatus have been developed for transmitting messages in a secure manner between stations. Many of the methods and apparatus provide for coding of the message prior to transmission and for decoding of the message at its destination subsequent to transmission. Two such methods and apparatus are described, for example, in U. S. Patent No.
3,711,645 issued January 16, 1973, to Kurt Ehrat, entitled Method And Apparatus For Coding Messages, and in U. S. Patent No.
3,956,615 issued May 11, 1976, to Thomas G. Anderson, William A.
Boothroyd and Richard C. Frey, entitled Transaction Execution System With Secure Data Storage And Communications. A third method and apparatus is described, for example, in U. S. Patent No. 3,938,091 issued February 10, 1976, to Martin M. Atalla, entitled Personal Verification System.
A common feature of such apparatus is the use of fixed, predetermined encoding-decoding keys to encode and decode data, or the use of variable encoding keys transmitted with the encoded message to a destination station for processing (the variable .~, - 1 -~149~

encoding keys being supplied by the user, or generated by the apparatus from user-supplied information). At the destination station, the transmitted variable-key is utilized by a decoder of the apparatus to decode the encoded message.
Whereas the use of variable rather than fixed encoding-decoding keys would seem to provide a greater measure of security in message transmission than do fixed keys (especially variable keys supplied by a user or generate~ by the apparatus from user-supplied information), the practice of transmitting a variable key so that it can be used in the decoding process reduces the security of the operation because unauthorized users could con-ceivably gain access to the key during the transmission of the key. It would be desirable, therefore, in improving the security of such data transmission operations (especially bank transaction operations or the like which require not only secure transmission of data but also accurate identification of users) to use a technique which provides for secure transmission of data without requiring transmission of matching encoding-decoding keys or of user-identification information. Also, it would be desirable in certain applications to obviate the need for dedicated pairs of matched encoders/decoders in order to enhance the flexibility of the data-transfer system and to reduce the start-up and chanae-over time inherent in placing conventional paired modules in the proper locations. In addition, it would be desirable to encrypt messages between specific persons or entities via an intermediate or central station which can function in a manner similar to a data switch that ties numerous entities together.
Summar of the Invention y In accordance with the illustrated preferred embodiment of the present invention, a method and apparatus are provided for improving security of data transmission between stations by making it unnecessary to transmit user-identification information between the stations.
Also, to further improve security, an alternative method provides for encoding and decoding the data during each transaction, using encoding and decoding keys produced from different PIN's (Personal Identification Number entered into the apparatus by a user to initiate a transaction such as a bank deposit or withdrawal transaction). The apparatus includes at least one irreversible algorithm module, a random number generator, and at least one data file. The composite system embodiment of the present invention enables encoded data to be transferred by conventional data transmission means such as mail, voice transmission via telephone, radio, and the like, without loss of security associated with the transmitted data or the identifying code of an authorized user. Also, the system embodiment of the present invention facilitates the remote control of data-transfer operations between distant stations and permits changes of and additions to central files of identifying codes for authorized individuals from -remote stations without compromising the security of the transmission of such critical information. In addition, the system embodiment of the present invention enables messages in various formats to be transmitted in fully-secured, encrypted form between specified persons or entities via an intermediate or central station which can link any selected pair of numerous such entities.

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.~. , .

ll i9~4 Various aspects of the invention are as follows:

A method of securing a data-handling transaction initiated by an authorized individual utilizing prestored identification information about the individual and identification information supplied by the individual, the method comprising:
generating a selected number;
forming a first input as the combination of at least two of the signals selected from the data involved in the transaction, and the selected number and the identification information supplied by the individual;
forming a second input as the combination of at least another two of said signals;
logically encrypting the first and second inputs to form a transaction authorization code, according to a selected encoding scheme;
transmitting the transaction authorization code with data involved in the transaction and with the selected number to a remote location;
logically encrypting the prestored identification information about the individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number received at the remote location to form a transacticn authorization code in accordance with said selected encoding scheme; and comparing the transaction authorization codes at the remote location to provide an output indication upon parity thereof of the unaltered transmission and reception of the selected number, the transaction authorization code and the data involved in the transaction by the authorized individual.
- 3a -~' 1149~8~

The method of securing a transaction between first and second spaced locations using identification information stored at the second location, the method comprising the steps of:
encoding in logical combination at the first location the identification information and data pertaining to the transaction received thereat to produce a first encoded signal for transmission with the data to the second location, and also to produce a second encoded signal;
encoding according to the same logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction as received at the second location with the identification information stored thereat to produce a third encoded signal for comparison with the first encoded signal transmitted thereto, and also to produce fourth encoded signal;
initiating the transmission of the fourth encoded signal from the second location to the first location in response to parity in the comparison of the first and third encoded signals at the second location; and detecting parity in comparison of the fourth encoded signal as received at the first location with the second encoded signal produced thereat to signal completion of the transaction at the second location.

Apparatus for securing a transaction between first 25 and second spaced locations using identification informatior.
provided at the second location, the apparatus comprising:
first and second encoding means at the first and second locations, respectively, each having a pair of inputs - 3b -11'19~84 for encoding according to a logical combination of the signals applied to one input in accordance with signals applied to the other input to produce an encrypted signal at an output thereof;
means at the first location coupled to the inputs of the first encoding means for applying thereto signals representative of the identification information and the data pertaining to the transaction to produce the encrypted signal at the output of the first encoding means for 10 transmission to the second location with the signals representative of data;
means at the second location for applying to the inputs of the second encoding means the signals representative of data received at the second location and 15 the signals representative of the identification information provided at the second location to produce an encrypted signal at the output of the second encoding means;
comparator means at the second location coupled to receive the encrypted signal at the output of the second 20 encoding means, and coupled to receive the transmitted encrypted signal received from the first encoding means for producing an output indication of the favorable comparison of said encrypted signals; and circuit means responsive to the ouput indication 25 for producing a manifestation of said favorable comparison to indicate completion of the transaction.

srief ~escription of the Drawings Figures lA and lB are block diagrams showing, respectively, the apparatus and method of the present invention;

Figures 2A and 2B are block diagrams showing, respectively, alternative embodiments of the apparatus and method of the present invention;

11494~34 Figures 3A and 3B are block diagrams showing, respectively, other alternative embodiments of the apparatus and method of the present invention;
Figures 4A and 4B are block diagrams showing, respectively, still other alternative embodiments of the apparatus and method of the present invention;
Figure 5A is a schematic block diagram of another embodi-ment of the present invention in which a transaction may be securedly controlled at a remote location;
Figure 5B is a flow chart iilustrating the operation of the embodiment of Figure 5A;
Figures 6, 7A and 7B are illustrations of other embodi-ments of the present invention in which transactions may be securedly controlled at remote branch locations of remote central offices;
Figure 8 is an illustration of another embodiment of the present invention using prestored identification information about two individuals or entities in order to securedly control a trans-action at a remote branch location of a remote central office;
Figure 9 is an illustration of an embodiment of the present invention in which encoded identification information for an individual may be stored remotely using a sponsor and associated identification information;
Figure 10 is an illustration of an embodiment of the present invention in which encoded identification information for an individual that is stored remotely may be securedly changed using a sponsor and associated identification information;
and Figure 11 is an illustration of an embodiment of the present invention in which encoded messages may be transmitted 1~49484 between two users via a central station which routes the encoded message.
Description of the Preferred Embodiment Referring now to Figures lA and lB, there are shown an apparatus and a method for improving the security of transmitted data between stations. The apparatus and method offer improved security by not requiring the transmission of PIN data from the originating or user station to the destination or processing station The apparatus comprises at a transmitting location 23 a random number generator 13, and an irreversible algorithm module (I.A.M.) 15 (for example, of the type disclosed in U. S.
Patent No. 3,938,091 issued on February 10, 1976, to M. M.
Atalla and A. F. Liu), and further comprises a storage file 17, another irreversible algorithm module 19, and a comparator 21 at a receiving location 25. In response to PIN data entered by a user and in response to a random number (RN) produced by random number generator 13, algorithm module 15 produces a user identifier code (ID) which may be transmitted and applied to comparator 21 at the receiving location. The RN produced by random number generator 13 is also transmitted to an I.A.M. 19 in the receiving station 25. A predetermined authentic PIN (pre-stored in a selected register of storage file 17) may be accessed and applied to algorithm module 19 along with the received RN to produce a new user identifier code (ID') The algorithm module 19 encrypts or encodes the signals applied thereto in a manner which is identical to module 15. The previously produced user identifier code (ID) is then compared with the newly produced user identifier code (ID') by comparator 21. If a match occurs (i.e., if ID and ID' are found to be the same), an output data value is produced (or internal flag is set) indicating that the 1~49484 transaction (e.g~, user withdrawal of money from a bank) should proceed~ If no match occurs, comparator 21 produces an output value indicating that the transaction should not proceed.
From the above-described apparatus and method of Figures S lA and lB, therefore, it is seen that no personal identification number of the user (PIN) is transmitted from the originating or user location 23 to the destination or receiving location 25.
Another embodiment of the p~esent invention is shown in Figures 2A and 2B~ In this embodiment, the user identifier code (ID) is produced in response to RN and to entered PIN data in a manner similar to that shown in Figures lA and lB. However, only RN and ID are transmitted from user station 37 to file storage 31, 33 at processing station 39. In this embodiment, no PIN is transmitted between stations, nor is the PIN stored in the file 31, 33 where it may be susceptible to unauthorized access.
In this embodiment, the present apparatus operates, as shown in Figure 2B, to update the identifier code ID and the random number RN in storage files each time a proper verification of user is established~ Thus, a user's initial entry of a PIN
is combined with an RN via an irreversible algorithm module of the type previously described to produce an ID which, with the associated RN, may be transmitted and stored in files 31, 33 at the receiver station 39 (and optionally at a local file 38).
Thereafter, the authorized user again enters his PIN
(referred to herein as PIN ' ), and the RN is accessed from the file 31 (or optionally from the local file 38). The PIN ' and the retrieved RN (RNX herein) are encrypted by the algorithm module 29 to produce the ID (which should be identical to the ID in file 33) for transmission to comparator 35 at the receiving station 39~ There, the comparison is made with the ID retrieved 1~494W

from file 33. If the match is detected, the output from com-parator 35 provides the indication that the present transaction may proceed, and also initiates the generation of a new random number RNy This new random number is encrypted by the algorithm module 29 along with the PIN' which was entered in the present transaction to yield the new IDy. The new RNy and new IDy are then transmitted to files 31, 33 (and optionally to local file 38) to supplant RNX and IDX previously stored therein. In this manner, a user identifier code is dynamically stored and updated each time an authorized user is verified. More importantly, however, no PIN need be stored or transmitted in order to verify the authorized user.
Referring now to the embodiment of the present invention, as illustrated in Figures 3A and 3B, a PIN in storage 47 is used with a random number RN to produce a KEY code by which data may be encrypted (encoded). However, the KEY code used to encrypt data is not transmitted. In response to a PIN entered by a user and a random number (RN) generated by a random number generator 41, irreversible algorithm module 43 of the type previously described produces an encryption key (KEY) which is applied to encoding algorithm module 45 (e.g., an encoder such as The Bureau of Standards Chip incorporating the National Bureau of Standards' encryption-decryption algorithm which is the Federal Information Processing Standard approved by the U. S. Department of Commerce).
In response to applied data, encoding module 45 encodes the data in accordance with the encryption key (XEY). The encoded data, together with the associated random number (RN) is then trans-mitted from user station 53 to processing station 55. The random number (RN) thus received by station 55 and the prestored authentic PIN which is accessed from file 47 are applied to algorithm module 1149~4 49 which produces an encryption key (KEY') that should be identical to the KEY, and this KEY' is applied to decoding module 51. Decoding module 51 operates in accordance with the same National Bureau of Standards encoding scheme as module 45 and produces the desired decrypted (decoded) data. It should be noted that as long as the entered PIN matches the prestored PIN, KEY will match KEY', and the decrypted data will match the entered data. This embodiment of the present invention thus obviates the need to transmit the generated KEY between stations and eliminates risk of disclosure of the KEY during such trans-mission, Also, it should be noted that in this embodiment, the KEY is determined and the PIN is verified simultaneously under the control of the user. That is, the encryption and decryption of data are solely under the control of the user by virtue of his own entered PIN. Also, the user who entered the PIN is verified in response to the encrypted data being received and decrypted at the receiver station 55 using the corresponding PIN
that is retained in file 47. Further, the information which is transmitted between stations includes a random number which changes after each transaction and the encrypted data which also changes form after each transaction, even for the same data entered at station 53~
In the embodiment of the present invention shown in Figures 4A and 4B, there is no need to transmit the PIN from user station 73 to processing station 75, and no need to store PIN information in a file. As shown in Figures 4A and 4B, the system is first initialized in preparation for user transactions.
The PIN is entered by the user during initialization and random number generator 61 generates a random number (RNl) and applies the RNl to irreversible algorithm module 63 of the type previously ~49484 described. Module 63 combines the PIN and RNl information and produces therefrom a first encryption key (KEYl) to be used in later encryption of data. The RNl and KEYl are then stored for later retrieval in a storage file 65 at the processing station 75 (and optionally the random number may also be stored in a local file 72).
In commencing a transaction, the user first enters his PIN into the algorithm module 63. ~n response to the entered PIN, and in response to RNl which is accessed from file 65 (or optionally from local file 72), the module 63 reproduces the encryption key (KEYl) which is applied to the control input of the encryption module 67 (say, of the National Bureau of Standards type previously described). With the encryption module 67 set to encode in accordance with KEYl, another random number (RN2) is generated by random number generator 61, and is applied to modules 63 and 67. The module 63 is able to produce an encryption key (Æ Y2) from the applied RN2 and from the PIN that is available during the present user transaction. KEY2 and RN2 which was associated with KEY2 are included with the applied data (which data may include a fixed alphanumeric reference) for encoding by module 67 under the control of KEYl to produce the encrypted message "DATA+RN2+KEY2". This encrypted message is then trans-mitted from user station 73 to processing station 75 where de-cryption module 69 (matching encoding module 67) decrypts or decodes the encrypted message in accordance with KEYl which is accessed from the file 65 where it was originally entered during the initialization operation previously described. The DATA is thus retrieved in clear text and the RN2 and the KEY2 are also separately available for updating file 65 (and optionally local file 72) with RN2 and KEY2 in place of RNl and KEYl, respectively.

11494~4 In a subsequent transaction, the user again enters his PIN into the algorithm module 63. In response to the entered PIN, and in response to the updated RN2 accessecl from file 65 (or from local file 72), the module 63 reproduces the encryption 5 key (KEY2). With the encryption module 67 set to encode applied data in accordance with KEY2, the random number generator 61 produces another random number RN3 which is applied to the al-gorithm module 63 along with the PI~ that is available during the present transaction to produce another encryption key (KEY3).
10 KEY3 and RN3 are included with the DATA that is applied to the encoding module 67 which produces the encrypted message "DATA+RN3+KEY3" when encrypted under the control of KEY2. This encrypted message is then transmitted from user station 73 to processing station 75, where decoding module 69 decrypts the 15 encrypted message in accordance with the KEY2 which is accessed as the updated entry from file 65. The DATA is thus retrieved in clear text and the RN3 and KEY3 are again available to update the file 65 (and local file 72) for use in subsequent transactions.
The reference data previously referred to as being 20 included with the input DATA may simply be a standard code word which must be extracted at the output of module 69 as an indi-cation that the user inserted the proper PIN. In this way, the encrypted message transmitted to and received by the processing station 75 can be promptly decrypted to verify the PIN before 25 the file 65 (or local file 72) is updated with keys and random numbers which would not relate to the authorized PIN.
Thus, it can be seen from Figures 4A and 4B that not only is PIN information not stored or transmitted from user station 73 to user station 75 but, for added security, the key 30 used to encrypt data in response to a given user transaction is 11494~4 not the same key that is used to decrypt the encrypted data during such transaction. Also, it should be noted that the stored code words are updated in each transaction and that these code words are under the control of the user.
With the personal identification number of an authorized individual stored in encrypted form (PIN') along with an encrypted key for that encryption of the PIN, a system is provided which enables the authorized individual to control various secured transactions at remote locations without the need for matched pairs of modules and without compromising the security of the system In one embodiment of the system, as shown in the block diagram and flow chart of Figures 5A and 5B, respectively, the data 81 or message MSGE to be secured against alteration or unauthorized use (such as account number, amount of money being transferred, type of transfer, etc.) is combined with a sequence number (such as date and time) to supply to an encryption al-gorithm module 83. Of course, the data may be in clear text or in encoded form. In addition, the authorized person introduces his PIN via keyboard 87 or other entry device to produce another input to the module 83. This algorithm used in module 83 may be of the National Bureau of Standards type previously described, or of the type described in the aforementioned U. S. patent issued to Atalla and Liu. The module 83 accepts the two inputs (or obtains two inputs from any combination of all the entry bits involved) in a format as shown in Figure 5A and encodes the input information in accordance with the operating algorithm thereof to produce an N-bit output, one portion of which serves as the TRansfer Authorization _ode (TRAC) signal 89 and another portion of which serves as the ACKnowledgment-TRansfer Authorization Code (ACK-TRAC) signal 91. Only the data or message MSGE plus sequence ~i49484 number plus TRAC output 89 are transmitted over a data link 93 to a remote location~ Note that the PIN for the authorized individual is not transmitted from the location where introduced and is not stored in any file.
Thus, the data link 93 may be a simple and convenient data link or voice communication over telephone lines or a writing transmitted by telegram or mail, or the like. Since the TRAC signal 89 was generated using ~he PIN and the seguence number and the MSGE, any alteration of the MSGE or TRAC or se-quence number (e.g., by an unauthorized attempt to rerun a cash withdrawal transaction) will alter the transmitted TRAC which will not compare favorably with the TRAC signal regenerated at the receiving location. Thus, an unauthorized alteration of any part of the MSGE, SEQ. NO. or TRAC during transmission will re-sult in unfavorable comparison and rejection of the received transmission, as later described.
The received transmission is compared for parity of TRAC
signals by first accessing the memory 96 of a local central pro-cessing unit or computer 95 for the PIN of the authorized indi-vidual that is stored in encrypted form, together with the en-crypted key that was used to encrypt the PIN and also stored in the memory, as previously described. From this information ob-tained from the computer memory 96, the PIN of the authorized individual may be regenerated using the encryption module and is then only available internally for use in regenerating a TRAC
signal at the receiving location. The PIN thus regenerated from information accessed out of the computer memory 96 and the trans-mitted MSGE and SEQ, NO, received at the remote location are encrypted in module 97 which operates according to exactly the same algorithm as is used in module 83 on the two input signals 1149~84 that are applied in exactly the same format as is applied to module 83. The resulting TRAC 99 and ACK-TRAC 101 outputs appear as a composite N-bit output in the same format as the outputs of module 83. Thus, the transmitted and received TRAC
signal 89 must be identical to the regenerated TRAC signal 99 for the received MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals and encrypted PIN and encrypted key signals from memory 96. These two TRAC signals are ~ompared in comparator 103 to produce an output 105 in re-sponse to parity of the two TRAC signals, and this parity output signal gates out the ACK-TRAC signal 101 for retransmission back to the originating location via a convenient communication link 93. Of course, the local computer 95 is also enabled to operate on the MSGE signal, for example, to debit an account, update a file, etc. If no favorable comparison of TRAC signals in com-parator 103 is obtained, the received MSGE signal need not be acted upon and a suitable non-response signal may be returned to the originating location.
For a favorable comparison of TRAC signals, the resulting ACK-TRAC signal is retransmitted and received back at the origi-nating location and is compared in comparator 107 with the ACK-TRAC
signal that was originally generated from the MSGE and SEQ. NO.
signals and PIN signal received from the authorized individual upon initiation of the transaction. These signals must be iden-tical for the given MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals and proper PIN from the authorized individual applied in identical formats to identical modules 83 and 97. Thus, unfavorable comparison of the two ACK-TRAC signals in comparator 107 is an indication of a possible alteration of one or more of the signals from which each of the ACK-TRAC signals is generated, or of an error or alteration in the retransmitted ACK-TRAC signal 109. Of course, an output 110 ~.49~84 generated upon favorable comparison of the two ACK-TRAC signals in comparator 107 is an indication of completion of the trans-action (e.g., debiting an account, dispensing cash, etc.), which was initiated by the individual whose PIN 87 was introduced.
It should be noted that the system operated as described in connection with Figures 5A and 5B assures the proper identity of the individual whose encrypted PIN and encrypted key are on file at the receiving location (e.g', bank). Also, the MSGE
cannot be altered and cannot be replayed without detection, so that convenient less secure data-transmission links can be used without degrading the security of the over-all system. It should be noted also that the individual's PIN is not transmitted in clear text from anywhere within the system, and that ample record-producing checkpoints are provided for later, convenient auditing procedures.
Referring now to the illustration of Figure 6, there are shown the method and means for controlling a transaction such as a "wire transfer" of funds from a remote location with a high degree of security against un uthorized manipulation. In this embodiment, the components of the system which are similar to the components of the system in Figure 5A are similarl~ labeled.
Thus, an authorized individual located at correspondent office A
(e.g., a bank, trucking company, etc.) is able to control a trans-action such as the "wire transfer" of money for withdrawal from correspondent office B with the aid of the circuitry, files and operation of the central office. As in the embodiment of Figure 5A, an individual (e.g., manager or officer, etc.) whose encrypted PIN and encrypting key are on file at the central office is able to generate a TRACA signal 89, as previously described, which is transmitted to the central office over a convenient data ~494~4 transmission link 106, along with the composite signal 80 including data or message or instructions MSGE and appropriate sequence number (e.g., date and time). These signals when re-ceived at the central office are used to regenerate a PIN for the individual in the manner previously described from the infor-mation about that individual that is stored in the central com-puter 95 and memory 96. The PIN thus produced is then available only internally to produce a TRACA signal 99 for comparison with the transmitted and received TRACA signal 89 in comparator 103.
However, in this embodiment the output signal 105 that is gener-ated in response to favorable comparison is used to generate another or TRACB signal for transmission to the correspondent office B. Optionally, this signal may also be used 120 to gate out an ACK-TRACA signal for transmission back to the originating office A. The new TRACB signal is produced by accessing from storage in computer memory (which, of course, may be the same computer and memory but at a different memory address location) the encrypted PINB and encrypted KEYB for an authorized individual (e.g., manager or officer, etc.) at correspondent office B. This PIN information is used interactively with the irreversible al-gorithm module 97' (which, of course, may be the same module 97 used in the serial-state operation of the same computer 95, 96) in order to generate the PINB which is only available internally for use in generating the TRACB signal 99' in the manner pre-viously described in connection with the TRACA signal.
The TRACB signal and the MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals maythen be transmitted over the data link 112 to the correspondent office B. There, the PINB may be manually supplied via keyboard 117 by the authorized individual (or may be regenerated in the manner previously described by interactive operation of computer 115 with the encryption module 113 from PIN information accessed from storage in computer memory).
The circuitry at correspondent office B operates in the manner previously described in connection with the receiving location in Figure 5A to produce ACK-TRACB signal 119 that is transmitted back to the central office. When received there, the ACR-TRACB signal is compared with the ACX-TRACB signal locally generated in the manner previously ~escribed. The signal 118 generated in response to favorable comparison of these two signals indicates that the requested transaction was completed at office B. Optionally, the signal 118 may be used to enable the gate to transmit the ACK-TRACA signal 121 back to the correspondent office A where it is compared with the original ACK-TRACA signal gener-ated in the manner described in connection with Figure 5A, Favor-15 able comparison of all the ACK-TRAC signals would provide indi-cation at office A that the requested transaction was completed at office B .
Thus, the instructions and acknowledgments required to command a transaction at the remote office are transmitted and returned with substantial security against errors and unauthorized alterations, and with ample provisions for auditable records of the transaction. It should be readily apparent that transactions between remote offices of unassociated businesses may thus be con-ducted in this manner through one or more "central" office links, as shown, for example, in Figure 7 in connection with interbank transactions. By introducing additional circuitry similar to that which was described in connection with central office 114 for each central unit or office between the ultimate end-users, a transaction may be initiated by one BANK A 123 and be consum-mated at BANK Y 125 under command and control of BANK A and with ~94~

verification back to BANK A, all with a high deqree of immunity from errors and unauthorized alterations. This is accomplished by retaining in the files of office 124 the requisite encrypted PIN's and encrypted keys therefor for each of its branches (or the officers thereof), and by retaining in the files of office 128 the requisite encrypted PIN's and encrypted keys therefor for each of its branches (or the officers thereof). Then, the central unit 126 need only retain in its files the requisite encrypted PIN's and encrypted keys therefor for each of offices 124 and 128 (or the officers thereof) in order to complete secured transactions in the manner previously described.
In similar manner, an interchange transaction between bank A and bank B may be accomplished by using a data switch to route customer information and TRAC signals between banks A and B. Thus, data from a customer of one bank 132 which is entered on a Teller Terminal 128' such as a conventional automatic teller machine (ATM) in one bank 130 may be routed to the proper bank via the data switch 134 for comparison with data on file for that customer at bank 132. The TRAC, MSGE and SEQ. NO. generated in response to the customer's entry of his own PIN may thus be trans-ferred via switch 134 to the proper bank 132 for comparison there with data on file, all as previously described, for example, with respect to the embodiment of Figure 6.
Referring now to the illustration of Figure 8, there is snown another embodiment of the present invention in which a central office is able to implement the command and confirmation of a transaction consummated between remote offices. In this embodiment, the apparatus and method of operation for trans-ferring data between office A 131 and central office 133 is similar to the operation previously described in connection with li~9484 Figures 5A and 5B, except that upon favorable comparison of TRACA
signals, only the MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals 134 are retransmitted to the office B 135 and, optionally, the ACK-TRACA signal may also be returned to office A 131 as an acknowledgment of proper receipt of the transmitted information. At office B, the PINB signal for another authorized individual is provided for generating a TRACB
signal as previously described for transmission back to the cen-tral office 133 with the MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals 137. At the central office 133 the PINB must be regenerated from stored infor-mation in order to produce a TRACB signal therefrom in combinationwith the MSGE and SEQ. NO. signals, as previously described. Upon favorable comparison of TRACB signals at the central office 133, the ACK-TRACB signal may be transmitted back to the receiving office B 135 as a confirmation of unaltered communication of data between office B 135 and the central office 133;
Referring now to the illustration of Figure 9, there are shown the apparatus and the method involved in remotely signing on a new individual who is to receive authorization to use the system. This is accomplished with the aid of a sponsor who is already authorized to use the system and whose PIN is already stored in encrypted form in the remote (say, central) location 141. It is possible in this embodiment of the present invention to introduce a new PIN for a new individual at a remote storage file with a high degree of security while using the transmission data link 143 in a manner similar to that which was described above. Note that this embodiment requires the entry of a new PIN for the new individual as part of data (entered, for example, by a keyboard) to be encrypted by the encryption module 157.
This information, along with a sequence number (say, date and time) is then encrypted in the encryption module 157 during a 11~9484 first operating state using the PIN of the sponsor as part of the encryption key~ The data may include an indication of the bit-length of the PIN for the new individual, etc., and the en-cryption thereof yields an encrypted PIN 153 for the new indi-vidual. Also, the PIN for the sponsor, entered by keyboard 155along with other data and sequence number and encrypted PIN for the new individual can be applied to the encryption module 157 operating during a sequential state or time-shared mode to pro-duce a TRACS signal 159. This TRACS signal is transmitted along with the encrypted PIN' signal 153 for the new individual and data and the sequence number signal 161 over data link 143 to the remote or central location 141.
At the remote location, the PIN of the sponsor is de-crypted by the encryption module 166 from information including encrypted PIN ' and encrypted key for the sponsor contained in computer memory 165. Thus, once the PIN for the sponsor is re-generated, it is available (internally only) in combination with the received SEQ. NO. and other data as one input to the module 166 while the received encrypted PIN ' for the new individual serves as another input. This module then operates according to the same algorithm as module 157 to produce a TRACS signal which should compare favorably with the received TRACS 159. When so favorably compared (indicating transmission and reception without alteration), the resulting output 168 then controls the encryption of the PIN for the new individual. This is accomplished by first decrypting the received PIN' for the new individual to obtain the PIN for the new individual in clear text (internally only). This is obtained by decrypting in encryption module 166' the sequence number and the received encrypted PIN for the new individual.
The encryption module 166' operates with the same algorithm as 11~9484 module 157 (and, of course, may be the same module as module 166 operating in a sequential state or time-shared mode) to yield the PIN 172 for the new individual in clear text ~internally only).
A random number from generator 171 is then combined with the PIN
for the new individual 172 in an encryption module 166 " (which, of course, can be the same as module 166 operating in a sequential state or time-shared mode) to produce the encrypted PIN for the new individual which can be stored in memory 165 along with the random number 176 used to encrypt the PIN, Of course, the (PIN I ) for a new individual may also be transmitted over a data link 143 to a remote location 141 with additional data necessary to iden-tify the individual, the extent of his authority, data about the number of bits in the new individual's PIN, the encryption key, etc. Either way, a new individual may be incorporated into a total system from a remote or branch location and thereby obviate the need to sign on only at a central location.
With reference to the illustration of Figure 10, it should be noted that an individual may also change his own PIN
from a remote location with the aid of a sponsor. The sequence number 18i may be used to prepare a TRACS signai 183 for the sponsor and another TRACoLD signal 185 for the old PIN of an established individual, all as previously described. These TRAC
signals may be stored in a buffer 187 for assemblage into a format, as illustrated. In addition, an encrypted form of the new PIN
for such individual is also generated by the encryption module 188 using the sponsor's PIN alone or in combination with a SEQ. NO ., etc., as the encryption key. A composite signal 186, for example, in a format as illustrated, may be transmitted with the SEQ. NO.
signal 189 over the data transmission link 190 to the remote location 192 Then, using an encryption module 194 (shown in three circuit locations for clarity and comprehension, but singularly usable in different sequential states or time-shared modes for the operations indicated), the encrypted PIN and en-crypted key therefor for the sponsor stored in file.l91 may be operated with module 194 to regenerate the PIN (internally only) for the sponsor according to the same algorithm used in module 188. This can then be combined in the module 194 with the re-ceived SEQ. NO. signal 189 to produce the TRACS signal for the sponsor using the same algorithm as in module 188. Similarly, the TRAC signal for the old PIN of the individual may also be regenerated from information contained in file 191, all as pre-viously described. These two TRAC signals may thus be compared in comparator 199 with the received TRAC signals in the same format. If comparison is favorable, indicating that the TR~C
signal for the sponsor's PIN and the TRAC signai for the old PIN
are all right, then the resulting output signal 198 controls the decryption of the encrypted new PIN for the individual using that individual's old PIN (available only internally) as the decryption key in the module 194'. The resulting new PIN for the individual may be encrypted in module 194'' using a random number from generator 201 to yield the encrypted new PIN and encryption key therefor for storage in file 191, as previously described. Thus, when an individual is to be introduced into the system for the first time, he may merely be given a PIN that is set into a central file solely for the purpose of enabling him to change the PIN to one of his own, secret selections as the first trans-action.
Referring now to the illustration in Figure 11, the present invention may be used to transmit a secured memo or other message between two users via a central station which contains the identification information for the two users and which provides the requisite routing of the encoded message. In this embodiment of the invention, the sender A at station 205 introduces his PINA, identifies himself and his intended receiver B at location 209, and also introduces a SEQ. NO. (such as date and time), all via keyboard means 211 which may contain a full complement of 26 letters and 10 digits for convenient encoding of textual messages. In addition, sender A introduces his message to be encoded for secure transmission over the data link 203 to the central station 213 for further processing.
At the initiating station 205, the keyboard means 211 may contain conventional,addressable buffer registers for se-lecting the portions of input information introduced via the key-board keys for separate treatment and routing. Thus, for a National Bureau of Standards encryption module 207 of the type previously described, the keyboard means 211 may supply two separate inputs to the module 207 in the format illustrated (or in other suitable sets of the input information, as desired) and may also supply the identity of A and B (and optionally the se-quence number) in clear text. The module 207, operating on thesignals applied to it, produces an encoded ~essage 215 which can be sent along with the identity information about A and B over data link 203 of any type, as previously described, to the cen-tral station 213. There, the received encoded message 215 is decoded using information about the sender A that is on file and is then reencrypted for retransmission using information about receiver B which is also on file. Specifically, the received information 206 (in clear text usually) which identifies the sender A enables the encoded PIN for sender A and the encrypted key therefor to be withdrawn from file 219 for decoding using 1~9484 the encrypted key, as previously described, to produce PINA
~internally only) that is then used to decrypt the received message 215 in encryption module 217. Once decrypted (and avail-able internally only), the message may now be reencrypted using the PINB for the receiver B. The PINB may be reproduced (avail-able internally only) by decrypting the encrypted PINB and the encrypted keyB therefor applied to encryption module 217 in the manner previously described to produce the PINB for reencrypting the message that was decrypted using the PINA. Thus the en-crypted message 221 that is transmitted via data link 223 to station 209 along with the information 206 about the sender A
and the receiver B is newly encrypted with respect to the identity of the intended receiver B.
At the remote station 209, the received encrypted message 221 and the received information 206 about the sender A and receiver B may be decoded under B's control to yield the encoded message in clear text. Specifically, the receiver B need only enter his PIN via keyboard means 225 for combining with the re-ceived sequence number, and the like, to provide the input signal in requisite format to apply to the encryption module 227. The key for decrypting the received encrypted méssage 221 is thus supplied by B himself to operate the module 227 according to the inverse of the algorithm by which module 217 reencrypted the message. Of course, TRAC signals and ACK-TRAC siqnals may be furnished and transmitted along with the encoded messages in the manner previously described. However, in this application where an entire memo or letter is being encoded, for example, in elec-tronic mail transmission, the entire memo will either decode or not decode depending upon whether error or tampering occurred in transmission, or upon whether unauthorized persons attempted to 11~ 4 transmit or decode messages within this system embodiment of the present invention. Thus, a "scrambled" memo remaining after an attempted decryption by receiver B at station 209 indicates that error or alteration occurred during transmission or that un-authorized persons other than those whose encrypted PIN's andencrypted keys are on file at station 213 attempted to transmit or decode the memo.
It should be noted that for enhanced security or control, two or more individuals, each having a PIN that is stored remotely in encrypted form along with the encryption keys therefor, may combine their PIN's to produce a composite TRAC signal, for example, as described in connection with Figure 5A, that can then be compared with a TRAC signal regenerated from the two PIN's and encryption keys therefor stored in the remote file. The rest of the acknowledgment message may proceed as described in connection with Figure 5A.
In each of the embodiments above, additional information such as a MSGE or DATA signal may always be sent to the remote location along with the TRAC s~ignal(s) transmitted. Such MSC7E
or DATA signals may identify the first number of characters of one input to an encryption module that represent the number of bits in the PIN, or the like. Also, it should be understood that in each of the embodiments of the present invention described above sequential numbers may be used in place of random numbers used in the identification or encoding schemes, or random numbers may be used in place of sequential numbers. This permits the systems to exclude the repeating of the same data or information in subsequent transactions by enabling a check for parity of either random or sequential numbers at the receiving stations.
Also, as used herein, "individual" may refer to a person or an institution such as a correspondent bank, or the like.

11~9484 Therefore, the present invention may operate without paired modules at remote ends of a data transmission link, pro-vided, of course, that encryption modules of similar type and operable according to the identical algorithm are contained in each location. Then, the secret PIN of an individual remains secret at the entry point (and is either stored in encrypted form or regenerated internally only elsewhere in the system) This facilitates the convenient generation of a TRAC signal, for example, by a simple calculator-type device containing an encryption module, and this TRAC signal may then be openly com-municated to the remote location by telephone, telegram, etc., along with the transaction message or data, all without possi-bility of unauthorized alteration. Such a user's device may simply calculate a TRAC number for all the data, PIN and SEQ. NO.
supplied, and this TRAC number becomes that user's unique signa-ture for that single transaction. Audit records pertaining to all such transactions are therefore amply available and more readily recallable than the microfilmed records of paper trans-actions currently in use.

Claims (28)

WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:
1. A method of securing a data-handling transaction initiated by an authorized individual utilizing prestored identification information about the individual and identification information supplied by the individual, the method comprising:
generating a selected number;
forming a first input as the combination of at least two of the signals selected from the data involved in the transaction, and the selected number and the identification information supplied by the individual;
forming a second input as the combination of at least another two of said signals;
logically encrypting the first and second inputs to form a transaction authorization code, according to a selected encoding scheme;
transmitting the transaction authorization code with data involved in the transaction and with the selected number to a remote location;
logically encrypting the prestored identification information about the individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number received at the remote location to form a transaction authorization code in accordance with said selected encoding scheme; and comparing the transaction authorization codes at the remote location to provide an output indication upon parity thereof of the unaltered transmission and reception of the selected number, the transaction authorization code and the data involved in the transaction by the authorized individual.
2. The method according to claim 1 wherein:
the step of logically encrypting the first and second inputs also forms an acknowledgment code in accordance with one encoding scheme;
the step of logically encrypting at the remote location also forms an acknowledgment code in accordance with said one encoding scheme;
the output indication of parity upon comparison of said transaction authorization codes enables the retransmission of the acknowledgment code from the remote location to the initiating location; and including comparing the acknowledgment codes at the initiating location to provide a manifestation upon parity thereof of the unaltered transmission and reception of the selected number, the transaction authorization code, and the data involved in the transaction by the authorized individual.
3. The method according to claim 1 comprising the additional steps of:
encoding a secret personal identification number for the authorized individual with a key code according to an encryption scheme;

storing at the remote location the resultant encoded personal identification number and the key code therefor; and the step of logically encrypting the prestored identification information includes decoding the stored encoded personal identification number using the stored key code therefor in accordance with said encryption scheme to provide the personal identification number for the individual.
4. The method according to claim 1 for controlling a data-handling transaction at a second location via data-handling transactions at a remote location involving a second authorized individual whose identification information is prestored at the second and remote locations, the method comprising:
said output indication initiates the logic encryption of the prestored identification information for the second authorized individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number to form a second transaction authorization code in accordance with one encoding scheme;
transmitting the second transaction authorization code with the data involved in the transaction and with the selected number to the second location;
logically encrypting the prestored identification information about the second individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number received at the second location to form a second transaction authorization code in accordance with said one encoding scheme; and comparing said second transaction authorization codes at said second location to provide a second output indication upon parity thereof of the unaltered transmission and reception via the remote location of the selected number, the data involved in the transaction, and the two transaction authorization codes for the two authorized individuals.
5. The method according to claim 4 wherein:
the step of logically encrypting the prestored identification information about the second individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number received at the second location also forms a second acknowledgment code in accordance with a second encoding scheme;
said second output indication enables retransmission of the second acknowledgment code from the second location to the remote location;
the step of logically encrypting at the remote location the prestored identification information for the stored authorized individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number also forms a second acknowledgment code in accordance with said second encoding scheme;
said second authorization codes are compared at said remote location to provide an output manifestation of unaltered transmission and reception of data involved in the transaction and selected number;
the logical encryption of the prestored identification information about the individual and the data involved in the transaction and the selected number received at the remote location also forms a third acknowledgment code in accordance with a third encoding scheme;
said output manifestation at the remote location enables retransmission of the third acknowledgment code from the remote location to the initial location;
the step of logically encrypting the first and second composite signals at the initial location also forms a third acknowledgment code in accordance with said third encoding scheme; and said third acknowledgment codes are compared at the initial location to produce a resultant output representative of the unaltered transmission and reception of the selected number and data involved in the transaction from the initial location to the second location via the remote location and of acknowledgment codes from the second location to the initial location via the remote location.
6. The method according to claim 1 for controlling a data-handling transaction at a second location having prestored identification information about a second individual on file at the second and remote locations, the method comprising the steps of:
enabling the transmission of the selected number and the data involved in the transmission from the remote location to the second location in response to said output indication at the remote location;
logically encrypting at the second location the prestored identification information for the second individual, and the selected number and the data involved in the transaction as received from the remote location to form a transaction authorization code in accordance with a second selected encoding scheme;

transmitting to the remote location from the second location the data involved in the transaction and the selected number and the transaction authorization code formed in accordance with the second selected encoding scheme;
logically encrypting at the remote location the prestored identification information for the second individual, the selected number and the data involved in the transaction for forming a transaction authorization code in accordance with said second selected encoding scheme;
comparing at the remote location said transaction authorization codes formed in accordance with said second selected encoding schemes to provide an output manifestation of unaltered transmission and reception from the second location to the remote location of the data involved in the transaction, the selected number and the transaction authorization code for the second individual; and transmitting to the initiating location a signal representation of the output manifestation in response to detection of parity at the remote location of the transaction authorization codes for the second individual.
7. The method according to claim 6 wherein:
the step of logically encrypting the first and second composite signals also forms an acknowledgment code in accordance with one encoding scheme;
said output manifestation at said remote location enables the logical encryption of the prestored identification information about the authorized individual, the selected number and the data involved in the transaction to form an acknowledgment code in accordance with said one encoding scheme;

said acknowledgment code is transmitted from said remote location to the initiating location for comparison of said acknowledgment codes to provide an indication upon parity thereof of the unaltered transmission and reception for the initiating location to the second location via the remote location of the data involved in the transaction and the selected number and of the unaltered transmission and reception of the acknowledgment code from the second location to the initiating location via the remote location.
8. The method according to claim 1 for storing additional identification information at a remote location wherein the data involved in the transaction includes the additional identification information encrypted in accordance with an auxiliary encoding scheme;
and including the step of decrypting the additional identification information at the remote location in accordance with said auxiliary encoding scheme in response to said output indication providing an encoding key code;
encoding the decrypted additional identification information in accordance with a logical encryption scheme;
and storing the encoded additional identification information and the encoding key code therefor at the remote location.
9. The method of securing a transaction between first and second spaced locations using identification information stored at the second location, the method comprising the steps of:
encoding in logical combination at the first location the identification information and data pertaining to the transaction received thereat to produce a first encoded signal for transmission with the data to the second location, and also to produce a second encoded signal;
encoding according to the same logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction as received at the second location with the identification information stored thereat to produce a third encoded signal for comparison with the first encoded signal transmitted thereto, and also to produce fourth encoded signal;
initiating the transmission of the fourth encoded signal from the second location to the first location in response to parity in the comparison of the first and third encoded signals at the second location; and detecting parity in comparison of the fourth encoded signal as received at the first location with the second encoded signal produced thereat to signal completion of the transaction at the second location.
10. The method of securing a transaction between first and third spaced locations using identification information and auxiliary identification information stored at a second location, the method comprising the steps of:
encoding in logical combination at the first location the identification information and data pertaining to the transaction received thereat to produce an encoded signal for transmission with the data to the second location;
encoding according to the same logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction as received at the second location with the identification information stored thereat to produce an encoded signal for comparison with the encoded signal transmitted thereto;

initiating the transmission of the data pertaining to the transaction to a third location in response to parity in comparison of the encoded signals at the second location;
encoding in logical combination at the third location the data pertaining to the transaction as received thereat and auxiliary identification information provided thereat to produce a second encoded signal for transmission back to the second location;
encoding at the second location according to said logical combination at the third location the data pertaining to the transaction and auxiliary identification information provided at the second location to produce a second encoded signal for comparison with the second encoded signal received thereat; and signalling completion of the transaction at the third location in response to detection of parity in comparison of the second encoded signals at the second location.
11. The method of securing a transaction between first and second spaced locations using identification information stored at the second location where the introduction of auxiliary identification information into the second location from the first location is the secured transaction, the method comprising the steps of:
encoding in logical combination at the first location the identification information and the auxiliary identification information and data pertaining to the transaction received thereat to produce an encoded signal and an encoded auxiliary identification information signal for transmission with the data to the second location;

encoding according to the same logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction as received at the second location with the identification information stored thereat to produce an encoded signal for comparison with the encoded signal transmitted thereto;
detecting parity in comparison of said encoded signals as received at the second location with the encoded signal produced thereat;
decoding with respect to said logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction and the encoded auxiliary identification information signal received at the second location to reproduce said auxiliary identification information at the second location in response to the detection of parity in said comparison of said encoded signals at the second location; and encoding said auxiliary identification information at the second location with a coding key according to a logical combination thereof to produce encrypted auxiliary identification information for storage with said coding key at the second location.
12. The method according to claim 11 for altering auxiliary identification information in storage at the second location as the secured transaction, the method comprising, in the step of encoding at the first location, encoding the original auxiliary identification information, the altered auxiliary identification information, the data, and the identification information according to said logical combination to produce an encoded auxiliary identification information signal, an encoded signal and an auxiliary encoded signal for transmission to the second location;

encoding according to said logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction and the identification information provided at the second location to produce an encoded signal and an auxiliary encoded signal for comparison, respectively, with the encoded signal and auxiliary encoded signal received thereat;
decoding at the second location with respect to said logical combination the encoded auxiliary identification information signal received thereat and the original auxiliary identification information provides at the second location to reproduce the altered auxiliary identification information in response to detection of parity in comparison of said encoded signals and auxiliary encoded signals; and encrypting the altered auxiliary identification information at the second location with an associated coding key according to a logical combination thereof to produce encrypted altered auxiliary identification information for substitution in storage with the associated coding key at the second location.
13. The method of securing a transaction between two entities at first and second spaced locations using identification information about the two entities stored at an intermediate location, the method comprising the steps of:
encoding in logical combination at the first location the identification information about one entity and data pertaining to the transaction to produce an encoded signal for transmission with the data to the intermediate location;

encoding according to the same logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction as received at the intermediate location with identification information stored thereat about the one entity to produce an encoded signal for comparison with the encoded signal received at the intermediate location;
detecting parity of the compared encoded signals to encode in logical combination the data pertaining to the transaction with stored identifying information about the other entity to produce an auxiliary encoded signal for transmission with the data to the second location; and encoding at the second location and in the same logical combination as used at the intermediate location to produce the auxiliary encoded signal, both the data received at the second location and the identifying information about the second entity to produce an auxiliary encoded signal for comparison with the auxiliary encoded signal received at the second location; and signalling the completion of the transaction in response to parity in the comparison of said auxiliary encoded signals.
14. The method according to claim 13 in which the steps of encoding at the first and intermediate locations include forming second encoded signals in response to said logical combination at the first and intermediate locations of the data and identifying information about the first entity;
transmitting the second encoded signal from the intermediate location to the first location; and comparing the second encoded signal received at the first location with the second encoded signal produced thereat to signal proper transmission and reception of the data and the encoded signal from the first to the intermediate location in response to detection of parity of compared second encoded signals.
15. The method according to claim 13 in which the steps of encoding at the intermediate and second locations include forming second auxiliary encoded signals in response to said logical combination at the intermediate and second locations of the data and identifying information about the second entity;
transmitting the second auxiliary encoded signal from the second location to the first intermediate location;
and comparing the second auxiliary encoded signal received at the first intermediate location with the second auxiliary encoded signal produced thereat to signal proper transmission and reception of the data and the auxiliary encoded signal from the first intermediate to the second location in response to detection of parity of compared second auxiliary encoded signals.
16. The method according to claim 14 or 15 comprising the step of initiating the transmission to the first location of the second encoded signal in response to detection of parity in comparison of the second auxiliary encoded signal received at the intermediate location with the second auxiliary encoded signal produced thereat.
17. Apparatus for securing a transaction between first and second spaced locations using identification information provided at the second location, the apparatus comprising:
first and second encoding means at the first and second locations, respectively, each having a pair of inputs for encoding according to a logical combination of the signals applied to one input in accordance with signals applied to the other input to produce an encrypted signal at an output thereof;
means at the first location coupled to the inputs of the first encoding means for applying thereto signals representative of the identification information and the data pertaining to the transaction to produce the encrypted signal at the output of the first encoding means for transmission to the second location with the signals representative of data;
means at the second location for applying to the inputs of the second encoding means the signals representative of data received at the second location and the signals representative of the identification information provided at the second location to produce an encrypted signal at the output of the second encoding means;
comparator means at the second location coupled to receive the encrypted signal at the output of the second encoding means, and coupled to receive the transmitted encrypted signal received from the first encoding means for producing an output indication of the favorable comparison of said encrypted signals; and circuit means responsive to the ouput indication for producing a manifestation of said favorable comparison to indicate completion of the transaction.
18. Apparatus as in claim 17 wherein:
said first and second encoding means each produces a second encrypted signal from the signals applied to the inputs thereof;

said circuit means responsive to the output indication initiates transmission to the first location of the second encrypted signal from the second encoding means at the second location; and second comparator at the first location coupled to receive the second encrypted signal received from the second location and the second encrypted signal produced by the first encoding means to produce an output manifestation of parity of comparison between said second encrypted signals.
19. Apparatus according to claim 17 wherein:
said circuit means initiates transmission of the data pertaining to the transaction to a third location in response to said output indication;
a third encoding means at said third location for encoding signals applied thereto according to a logical combination, said third encoding means having inputs coupled to receive the signals representing data pertaining to the transaction transmitted thereto from the second location and signals representing auxiliary identification information provided at the third location for producing an auxiliary encrypted signal;
means for transmitting the auxiliary encrypted signal to the second location;
auxiliary encoding means at the second location for encoding signals applied thereto according to the logical combination as in the third encoding means, said auxiliary encoding means being coupled to receive the signals representing data pertaining to the transaction and signals representing auxiliary identification information provided at the second location to produce an auxiliary encrypted signal; and auxiliary comparator means at the second location coupled to receive the auxiliary encrypted signal produced thereat and the auxiliary encrypted signal received thereat from the third location for producing an output manifestation of completion of the transaction.
20. Apparatus as in claim 19 comprising means responsive to the output manifestation from said auxiliary comparator means for initiating the transmission to the third location of a signal for indicating completion of the transaction at the third location.
21. Apparatus as in claim 17 for introducing auxiliary identification information into the second location from the first location as the secured transaction, wherein:
said means connected to the encoding means at the first location applies to inputs thereof signals representative of the identification information, the auxiliary identification information and data pertaining to the transaction to produce at the output of the encoding means an auxiliary encrypted signal for transmission to the second location;
decoding means at the second location for decoding with respect to said logical combination of the first encoding means the received auxiliary encrypted signal and the signal representative of the data pertaining to the transaction to reproduce the auxiliary identification information;
source means of key coding signal;
auxiliary encoding means at the second location coupled to receive the key coding signal from the source means and the reproduced auxiliary identification information from the decoding means to produce an encrypted form of the auxiliary identification means in accordance with the key coding signal; and storage means at the second location for storing the encrypted auxiliary identification information and the key coding signal therefor.
22. Apparatus as in claim 21 comprising means responsive to the output indication from the comparator means for enabling the encryption of the auxiliary identification information by the auxiliary encoding means in response to favorable comparison in said comparator means.
23. Apparatus for securing a transaction between first and second spaced locations using identification information provided at the second location where the secured transaction is the alteration of signals representative of auxiliary identification information stored at the second location, the apparatus comprising:
first and second encoding means at the first and second locations, respectively, each having a pair of inputs for encoding according to a logical combination of the signals applied to one input in accordance with signals applied to the other input to produce an encrypted signal at an output thereof, said first encoding means producing an auxiliary encrypted signal from the signals applied thereto, and said second encoding means at the second location producing an auxiliary encrypted signal from signals applied thereto;
means at the first location coupled to the inputs of the first encoding means for applying thereto signals representative of the identification information, the auxiliary identification information, the auxiliary identification information in altered form, and the data pertaining to the transaction for encoding said signals in accordance with said logical combination to produce at the output of the first encoding means an encrypted signal, an auxiliary encrypted signal and an encrypted auxiliary identification information signal for transmission to the second location;
means at the second location for applying to the inputs of the second encoding means the signals representative of data received at the second location and the signals representative of the identification information provided at the second location to produce an encrypted signal at the output of the second encoding means;
decoding means at the second location for decoding with respect to said logical combination of the first encoding means the received auxiliary encrypted signal and the signal representative of the data pertaining to the transaction to reproduce the auxiliary identification information;
auxiliary decoding means at the second location coupled to receive the encrypted auxiliary identification information signal received thereat and the signal representative of the auxiliary identification information provided at the second location for decoding the same with respect to said logical combination to produce the altered auxiliary identification information signal;
comparator means at the second location coupled to receive the encrypted signal at the output of the second encoding means, coupled to receive the transmitted encrypted signal received from the first encoding means for producing an output indication of the favorable comparison of said encrypted signals, and coupled to compare the encrypted signals and auxiliary encrypted signals, respectively, received from the first location and produced at the second location;
source means of key coding signal;
auxiliary encoding means at the second location coupled to receive the key coding signal from the source means and the reproduced auxiliary identification information from the decoding means to produce an encrypted form of the auxiliary identification means in accordance with the key coding signal; and encryption means coupled to receive the altered auxiliary identification information for encryption thereof with a key coding signal from said source means.
24. Apparatus as in claim 23 wherein said comparator means at the second location is coupled to receive said encrypted signals and auxiliary encrypted signals produced thereat and received thereat from the first location for enabling the decoding of the altered auxiliary identification information.
25. Apparatus for securing a transaction between two entities at first and second spaced locations using identification information about the two entities stored at an intermediate location, the apparatus comprising:
first and second encoding means at the first and intermediate locations, respectively, each for producing an encoded signal in accordance with a logical combination of signals applied to the inputs thereof;
means for applying to inputs of the first encoding means signals representative of the identification information about the one entity, and of the data pertaining to the transaction to produce an encoded signal at the output of said first encoding means for transmission to the intermediate location with the signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction;
means for applying to inputs of the second encoding means the signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction as received from the first location and signals representative of the identification information about the one entity stored at the intermediate location to produce an encoded signal at the output of said second encoding means;
first and second comparator means at the intermediate and second locations, respectively, for comparing encoded signals applied to the inputs thereof;
means coupled to the fist comparator means for applying to the inputs thereof the encoded signal received from the first location and the encoded signal produced at the intermediate location;
third and fourth encoding means at the intermediate and second locations, respectively, each for producing an encoded signal in accordance with the logical combination of signals applied to the inputs thereof;
means responsive to the output of the first comparator means for enabling the encoding in the third encoding means of signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction received from the first location and signals representative of identification information about the other of the two entities to produce an encoded signal at the output of the third encoding means for transmission to the second location with signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction;

means at the second location for applying to inputs of the fourth encoding means signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction as received from the intermediate location and signals representative of identification information about the other of the two entities provided at the second location for producing an encoded signal at the output of the fourth encoding means;
and means at the second location for applying to the inputs of the second comparator the encoded signal received from the intermediate location and the encoded signal from the fourth encoding means for producing at the output of the second comparator means an output manifestation for completion of the transaction in response to favorable comparison of the encoded signals applied thereto.
26. Apparatus as in claim 25 for securing a transaction, wherein:
said first and second encoding means at the first and intermediate location also produce second encoded signals as the logical combination of the signals representative of the data and of the identifying information applied to the inputs thereof;
means for transmitting the second encoded signal from the intermediate location to the first location; and third comparator means at the first location coupled to receive the second encoded signals received from the intermediate location and from the first encoding means for producing an output manifestation of the completed transmission to the intermediate location of signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction.
27. Apparatus as in claim 25 for securing a transaction, wherein:
said third and fourth encoding means at the intermediate and second locations also produce second encoded signals as the logical combination of the signals representative of the data and of the identifying information applied to the inputs thereof;
means for transmitting the second encoded signal from the second location to the intermediate location; and auxiliary comparator means at the intermediate location coupled to receive the second encoded signals received from the second location and from the third encoding means for producing an output manifestation of the completed transmission to the second location of signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction.
28. Apparatus as in claim 27 comprising:
means responsive to the output manifestation from the auxiliary comparator means for initiating transmission of the second encoded signal from the intermediate location to the first location; and third comparator means at the first location coupled to receive the second encoded signals from the intermediate location and from said first encoding means for producing an output manifestation of the completed transmission to the second location of signals representative of the data pertaining to the transaction.
CA000326898A 1978-05-03 1979-05-02 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions Expired CA1149484A (en)

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CA000410540A CA1159920A (en) 1978-05-03 1982-08-31 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
CA000410539A CA1159124A (en) 1978-05-03 1982-08-31 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions

Applications Claiming Priority (6)

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US902,444 1978-05-03
US05/902,444 US4281215A (en) 1978-05-03 1978-05-03 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US06/003,898 US4268715A (en) 1978-05-03 1979-01-16 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US003,898 1979-01-16
US009,532 1979-02-05
US06/009,532 US4283599A (en) 1979-01-16 1979-02-05 Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions

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CA (1) CA1149484A (en)
CH (1) CH646558A5 (en)
DE (1) DE2916454C2 (en)
FR (1) FR2425114A1 (en)
GB (3) GB2020513B (en)

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Publication number Publication date
GB2099195A (en) 1982-12-01
DE2916454C2 (en) 1983-12-22
GB2047506A (en) 1980-11-26
DE2916454A1 (en) 1979-11-15
GB2020513B (en) 1982-12-22
JPS54148402A (en) 1979-11-20
CH646558A5 (en) 1984-11-30
GB2099195B (en) 1983-05-18
GB2047506B (en) 1982-11-24
FR2425114A1 (en) 1979-11-30
FR2425114B1 (en) 1985-01-18
GB2020513A (en) 1979-11-14

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