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on Network Economics |
By: | Yann Bramoulle; Rachel Kranton |
Date: | 2005–09–09 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000417&r=net |
By: | Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles |
Abstract: | We examine the process of building social relationships in a non-cooperative game where such link formation is costly and requires mutual consent. We provide a noncooperative foundation for several link-based network stability concepts that have been studied in the literature on network formation. In our model players form myopic beliefs about the feasibility of building direct relationships with their acquaintances. These beliefs represent how each neighbor of a player is expected to respond to the initiation of a link by that player. We introduce a stability concept called “monadic stability” where agents play a best response to their formed myopic beliefs such that these beliefs are self-confirming. The resulting equilibrium networks form a class of networks that are shown to have some very appealing properties. |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-15&r=net |
By: | Sudipta Sarangi; Hans Haller; Jurjen Kamphorst |
Abstract: | For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-14&r=net |
By: | Sudipta Sarangi; Robert P. Gilles |
Abstract: | Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures. |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13&r=net |