nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2005‒01‒09
three papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP By Gert Brunekreeft; Sven Twelemann
  2. The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ça change … By Claude Crampes; Natalia Fabra
  3. Resolving the Identification Problem in Linear Social Interactions Models: Modeling with Between-Group Spillovers By Ethan Cohen-Cole

  1. By: Gert Brunekreeft; Sven Twelemann
    Abstract: The German energy industries will be subjected to regulation of network access enforced by a sector-specific regulator. Whereas the gas industry broke the regime of negotiated third party access, in electricity nTPA ‘worked’, although it clearly resulted in a margin squeeze. The government currently discusses whether to use rate-of-return or incentive regulation, to allow ex-ante approval of charges, and the length of the regulatory lag. Close examination suggests that generation capacity still is adequate, but in the longer term there is reason to be alert. The regulatory changes and emission trading system can both contribute to retain supply security by increasing investment.
    Keywords: regulation, competition, emission trading, gas, electricity
    JEL: L42 L43 L94
    Date: 2005–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0501&r=net
  2. By: Claude Crampes; Natalia Fabra
    Abstract: In this paper we describe the Spanish electricity industry and its current regulatory regime. Special emphasis is given to the description and discussion of market design issues (including stranded cost recovery), the evolution of market structure, investment in generation capacity and network activities. We also provide a critical assessment of the 1997 regulatory reform, which did not succeed in introducing effective competition, but retained an opaque regulation which has been subject to continuous governmental interventionism. Furthermore, the implementation of the Kyoto agreement could show the lack of robustness of the regulatory regime.
    Date: 2005–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0502&r=net
  3. By: Ethan Cohen-Cole (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
    Abstract: The linear-in-means model has been a theoretical and empirical workhorse of the social interactions field. As was noted by Manski (1993), the collinearity between group-level 'contextual' and 'endogenous' effects leads to an inability to identify the structural parameters of this model. Manski called this the 'reflection' problem. This paper suggests that Manksi’s reflection problem is unique to a special case of a more general context in which agents care about multiple reference groups. Specifically, the identification problem is resolved through a model generalization to include between-group and within-group effects.
    Keywords: Social Interactions, Identification, Linear-in- Means Model
    JEL: C31 D10
    Date: 2005–01–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0501001&r=net

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