| Abstract: |
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can
lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need
the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political
moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an agent of the
elite but may turn against them in order to create a regime more in line with
their own objectives. The political moral hazard problem increases the cost of
using repression in nondemocratic regimes and in particular, necessitates high
wages and policy concessions to the military. When these concessions are not
su¢ cient, the military can take action against a nondemocratic regime in
order to create its own dictatorship. A more important consequence of the
presence of a strong military is that once transition to democracy takes
place, the military poses a coup threat against the nascent democratic regime
until it is reformed. The anticipation that the military will be reformed in
the future acts as an additional motivation for the military to undertake
coups against democratic governments. We show that greater inequality makes
the use of the military in nondemocratic regimes more likely and also makes it
more di¢ cult for democracies to prevent military coups. In addition, greater
inequality also makes it more likely that nondemocratic regimes are unable to
solve the political moral hazard problem and thus creates another channel for
the emergence of military dictatorships. We also show that greater natural
resource rents make military coups against democracies more likely, but have
ambiguous e¤ects on the political equilibrium in nondemocracies (because with
abundant natural resources, repression becomes more valuable to the elite, but
also more expensive to maintain because of the more severe political moral
hazard problem that natural resources induce). Finally, we discuss how the
national defense role of the military interacts with its involvement in
domestic politics. |