



COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC  
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
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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME I

1975

Prepared by the Command History Branch


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**ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC**

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
## FOREWORD

The fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam to Communist aggression early in 1975 effectively ended almost two decades of United States support to those countries. By the end of April, both friendly governments had surrendered and the last American advisors, diplomats and dependents had been successfully evacuated.

While evacuations are not normally judged as triumphs, these were unique. Code named "Eagle Pull" and "Frequent Wind," they were characterized by American ingenuity, know-how and heroism. Our armed forces successfully evacuated a thousand Americans and over two hundred thousand Cambodians and Vietnamese most endangered by the Communist takeover. The evacuations, carried out by Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units under combat conditions, will serve as the benchmark for excellence in any operation of that kind.

Cambodian adventurism tested the United States with the seizure of the merchant ship Mayaguez on the high seas in May. The recovery operation has left no doubt as to our resolve and capabilities in that part of the world. Our marines, sailors and airmen again met the challenge. Stories of their courage abound - from the Marine who directed air strikes while swimming off-shore after his helicopter was shot down, to the sailors in the motor whale-boat who took on dug-in heavy weapons with small arms, to the Air Force pilots who forced their way into the landing zones while taking hits.


We are a Pacific nation, as the President reaffirmed in his December 7th speech in Honolulu. The men and women of the Pacific Command are charged with the defense of the United States and its interests throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. I have every confidence that a strong United States presence in these areas will continue to bias toward peace, stability and the rule of law.



NOEL GAYLER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Commander in Chief Pacific

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## PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on Southeast Asia, to a more functionalized format.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Histories of the remaining subordinate unified commands--USMACTHAI, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea--will continue to be identified as Annexes B through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

The 1975 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX)

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as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as ALPHA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters. Titles of documents cited as footnotes are unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

Appendices I through VI of this history are separately-bound monographs covering, respectively, the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia (EAGLE PULL); the off-shore movement of Vietnamese refugees; the orphan evacuation (BABYLIFT); the U.S. withdrawal from Saigon (FREQUENT WIND); the processing of refugees through the Pacific Command (NEW LIFE); and, the seizure and recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ.

Chapters II, IX, and X of this history were prepared by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman prepared Chapters I, III, IV, Section I of Chapter XI and supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and Sections II and III of Chapter XI were prepared by Major Stanley E. Henning, USA. The index was jointly compiled, and the glossary was compiled by Shirley A. Streck.

The manuscript was typed by Mrs. Streck and Specialist 6, Joseph S. Simpson, USA. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.



CARL O. CLEVER  
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(D) Military strength in the PACOM was reduced again in 1975 and was less than a third of what it had been during the height of the Vietnam buildup. Plans for further reductions continued, as discussed throughout this chapter.

(C) A comparison of military strengths by Service follows, as is customary in the history. Additionally this year, the strengths for 31 December 1960 are included for comparison purposes.

	<u>1 January 1975</u>	<u>31 December 1975</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>31 December 1960</u>
Army	63,016	58,193	- 4,823	82,373
Navy	163,647	151,164	-12,483	182,883
Marine Corps	64,363	69,033	+ 4,670	66,734
Air Force	<u>65,896</u>	<u>51,984</u>	<u>-13,912</u>	<u>59,997</u>
Total	356,922	330,374	-26,548	391,987

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1975 and the amounts of change from the year before are shown in the following table. The totals for Japan include Okinawa.


	<u>Military</u>		<u>Dependents</u>	
	<u>31 Dec 75</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>31 Dec 75</u>	<u>Change</u>
Guam	9,880	- 189	11,040	- 4,618
Hawaii	44,477	- 7,913	61,727	-16,898
Japan	49,587	- 4,322	41,727	+ 6,588
Korea	40,386	- 395	17,048	+ 1,182
Philippines	14,431	- 372	19,539	+ 696
Taiwan	2,458	- 1,788	3,052	- 491
Thailand	10,790	-12,045	2,921	- 3,831

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

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# THE PACIFIC COMMAND




SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 3.

• Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command

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# COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM



—— OP COMMAND OP CONTROL  
 - - - - - PLANNING AND/OR COORDINATION

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 7.

# COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. **OPERSHIP 1: U. S. PACIFIC (CINCPAC):** CINCPAC is the commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of its missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South, and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. Its general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 32 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Indian Ocean east of 62 degrees west longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Malayan States of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei), and the Islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Unalaska, and Little Blaine Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisory Representative to the following organizations:

- SEATO Council; U.S. Military Advisor
- AUSC Council; U.S. Military Representative
- Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers; U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board
- Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee; Member and Principal Advisor on military defense matters to the U.S. Ambassador who serves as the Chairman of the U.S. representation.

2. **PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:**

- Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
- Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate. The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the CINCPAC Subplan to the DOD Military Assistance and Plans Manual.

CINCPAC's Army Component Command, the U.S. Army Pacific, was disestablished 31 December 1974. U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Department of the Army, assumed most of the CINCPAC responsibilities. There is an Army Component Commander at this time.

3. **COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS:** There are four subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

- United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander, United States Forces, Korea (CMRUS Korea), Seoul, Korea

- United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander, United States Forces, Japan (CMRUS Japan), Yokota Air Base, Japan
- United States Taiwan Defense Command (USDC), commanded by Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command (CMRUS Taiwan), Taipei, Taiwan
- United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACV), commanded by Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (CMRUS Thailand), COMUSMACV (USMACV) concurrently as Chief, Joint United States Military Advisors Group, Thailand (CMRUSMACV Thailand)

4. **REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC):** CINCPAC's are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:

- Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACPP Guam/TTPI), Apia, Guam.
- Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACRP Philippines), Subic Bay, Philippines.
- USAF Liaison Officer to RAAF is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACRP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. **CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUPS (MAG):** Military Assistance Programs, including Foreign Military Sales are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

- Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China - Taipei, Taiwan
- Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
- Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
- Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
- Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea - Seoul, Korea
- U.S. Defense Representative India\* - New Delhi, India
- U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan\* - Islamabad, Pakistan
- Defense Attache (DATT), Vientiane, Laos\* is responsible for ROST functions for Laos

6. **SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (Coordination Authorities):**

- Korea--Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
- Japan--Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
- Taiwan and Peoples--Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
- Marianas Islands--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Guam/TTPI
- Philippines--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
- Thailand--Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
- Indonesia--Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
- Australia--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia
- Aleutians--Four under Naval Station Adak
- India--Defense Representative, India
- Pakistan--Defense Representative, Pakistan
- CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Government of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

7. **CHIEFS OF MILITARY SALES OFFICES (MISOs):** Military Sales Offices in the following countries are responsible for the Foreign Military Sales function for their respective countries:

- Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia performs the MISO functions of planning and programming for Indonesia
- DATT Malaysia is responsible for Malaysia MISO functions
- U.S. Defense Representative, Australia, Burma\*, Nepal\*, New Zealand, Singapore, and Sri Lanka

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 5.



**SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES  
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL**

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA		CINCPACREP GUAM/TIPI	
Commander in Chief/Commander	Richard G. STEIBELL, USA	RAHM	Paul J. FAPPOLE, USN
Deputy Commander	John J. BRUNS, USAF	CORNAV Marianas and CINCPACREP Guam/TIPI	Chief of Staff and Aide
Chief of Staff	James C. SMITH, USA	LT JG	WILLIAMS, JR., USN
Sp. Asst. Rmk. Mil. Aff. and Liaison	Oliver D. STELL, LTJG, USA	MAJ GEN	THOMAS, F., USN
Secretary Joint Staff	Franklyn S. BRIDSON, USA	COL	THOMAS, F., USN
Ch. Insp. Dir. (Pearl)/Secy. Int. St. Bd.	William V. WOODSIDE, USA	COL	PATRICK J. HALLORAN, USAF
and Dep. Int. Rep.	Louis F. PERKINS, USAF	COL	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J1	Albert H. BURR, USN	CINCPACREP PHIL	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J2	John J. KUEHLER, JR., USA	RAHM	Thomas J. ETTELEMI, USN
Asst. Chief of Staff/J3	Earl T. YRHOFRICK, USA	LT JG	James F. HAYES, JR., USN
Asst. Chief of Staff/J4	Leroy A. HAMILTON, USN	MAJ GEN	Leroy J. MAHUR, USAF
Asst. Chief of Staff/J5	Wardlaw O. LANG, USA	COL	William H. LARSON, USAF
Asst. Chief of Staff/J6	Terrence W. McCLAIR, USA	COL	
Ch. Arm. Affairs Div. & Secy. IIRMAC	Mark P. FRUDDEN, USN	COL	
COMNAVFOROPBA		COL	
Commander/Commander 5 AF	Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF	CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA	
Chief of Staff	Otis C. LYNN, USA	COL	Jack T. DELOUR, USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	Daryle F. BAXTER, USA	JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J1	Keith C. SPAYUL, JR., USN	COL	John P. VOLLMER, USA
Asst. Chief of Staff/J2	Reginald W. HALL, USA	OFFICE OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, PAKISTAN (ODRP)	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J3	Samuel V. DIZEL, USAF	COL	Richard T. GIBBS, USAF
Asst. Chief of Staff/J4	James M. ABRAHAM, USMC	OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, INDIA (ODRI)	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J5	Glenn M. REISLING, JR., USA	COL	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J6	Paul J. JOHNSTON, USAF	COL	
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	Robert G. KHALEY, USMC	USDRP	
Commanding General (USARV)	John R. GUTHRIE, USA	USDRP	
COMNAVFORJAPAN	Paul H. SPIER, USN	USDRP	
Commander	Edwin K. SWINER, USN	USDRP	
Chief of Staff	David D. WILLIAMS, JR., USAF	USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J1/J4	Charles R. PETERS, USAF	USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J2	Walter A. HERRITT, USN	USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J3	Charles C. CHARRIS, USN	USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J6	John C. HODGROSS, USA	USDRP	
Public Affairs Officer/007	Neil B. THOMPSON, USN	USDRP	
Legal Officer/J7	Joseph M. BATTAGLINO, USN	USDRP	
Commander, Patrol and Recon Force, 7th Fleet	Mycliffe D. TOOLE, JR., USN	USDRP	
Commander		USDRP	
Chief of Staff		USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J1/J4		USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J2		USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J3		USDRP	
Asst. Chief of Staff/J6		USDRP	
Public Affairs Officer/007		USDRP	
Legal Officer/J7		USDRP	
Commander, Patrol and Recon Force, 7th Fleet		USDRP	

NOTE: For COMUSMACV key personnel, see page 8.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 8.

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS  
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA		USMACVTHAI/USMAGTHAI	
Chief	MAJ GEN Slade WASH, USAF	Commander/Chief	MAJ GEN Harry C. ABRHOLT, USAF
Senior Ministry of National Defense Advisor	COL Hugh R. BURPAS, Jr., USMC	Deputy Commander	COL Raymond H. BLAY, USAF
Executive Officer	MAJ (P) Richard W. YAMPHLING, USAF	Chief of Staff	COL Robert L. PATERSON, USAF
Chief Operations and Training	COL James H. WELDRIDGE, USAF	Secretary Joint Staff	COL Claude H. BARROW, USAF
Chief Resources	CAPT Robert W. LARDEAP, USN	Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL Robert L. FREELY, USAF
Staff Judge Advocate	COL Earle J. LASCLEIP, USAF	Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL Francis M. EHRUN, USAF
Sr Advisor (Chinese Army)	COL George P. KELLY, USAF	Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL Everett M. RACKLEY, USAF
Sr Advisor (Chinese Navy)	CAPT Robert F. BOHMER, USN	Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL Carl C. CAMPBELL, USAF
Sr Advisor (Chinese Marine Corps)	COL Glen F. BRANCHARD, USAF	Chief, Army Division	COL Ross H. GODDARD, USAF
Sr Advisor (Chinese Air Force)	COL Joseph E. PHIBREY, USAF	Chief, Navy Division/CINCPACFLTREP/HA	COL John G. HAYES, USAF
		Chief, Air Force Division	CAPT Charles R. ABDEP, USAF
		Senior Marine Advisor	COL Charles K. ROSE III, USAF
			COL John R. HOPKINS, USAF
C.O., USMACVTHAI Support Group			
C.O., USMACVTHAI Support Group			
FRANCIS B. BOWEN, USAF			
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, KOREA			
Chief	MAJ GEN Oliver D. STREET III, USAF	Chief	ANGEL GRILLS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/ Plans and Programs	CAPT Maurice W. RUMBLE, USN	Executive Officer	MAJ Robert E. STEPHAN, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/ Development and Acquisition	CPT Robert S. YAM, USAF	Chief, Army Branch	COL Duane P. BRODER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/ Logistics	COL George M. MONTGOMERY, USAF	Chief, Navy/Marine Branch	COL Gerald H. HIGBEE, USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	COL Don R. WELLS, USAF	Chief, Air Force Branch	COL Morgan B. LAYTON, USAF
Senior Army Assistance Officer	LCOL Samuel J. AZZARELLI, USAF	Branch	COL Richard S. VAREY, USAF
Senior Naval Assistance Officer	COL Foy RICE, USAF	Chief, Communications and Electronics Branch	COL Robert D. BUREAU, USAF
Senior Air Assistance Officer	CAPT John L. EVERINGHAM, JR., USN	Chief, Personnel and Admin Branch	MAJ Donald F. LUFFJALL, USAF
Senior Marine Assistance Officer	COL Daniel G. MCINTOSH, USAF		
	COL John J. KEEFE, USMC	JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES	
		Chief	JACK R. SABLE, USAF
		Chief, Ground Forces Div	COL Kenneth T. TRIMPLER, USAF
		Chief, Navy Div	COL Bruno MUSSETTO, USN
		Chief, Air Force Div	COL Thomas H. MAI, USAF
		Chief, Joint Plans and Programs Div	COL James D. BATES, USAF
		Advisor, Philippine Marine Corps	COL George B. MANDRETT, USAF
		Chief, Personnel and Admin Div/AG	COL Francis WAT, USAF
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN			
Chief	CAPT Charles M. COLE, USMC		
Deputy Chief	CIV C. Lawrence O'REILLY		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 9.

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PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 1975

	GRAND TOTAL			MILITARY			U.S. CIVILIANS			LOCAL HELP CIVILIANS			RETIRES		
	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA
ALASKA	2635	1150	91	1150	163	271	163	163	299	299	1225	5	5	10	595
AF. PAC. IS.	1509	671	2	671	11	2	11	11	2	2	525	5	5	10	514
DEF. PAC. IS.	393	393		393							61277	22908	7192	1044	
GUAM	2003	107	347	1332	4	4094	4109	4	299	299	11040	192	42	8	47
HAWAII	15373	17706	9772	11225	11147	6494	11147	523	3684	3684	61277	19733	3101	979	14751
HONG KONG	157	7	6	90							45	18	7	3	1
INDIA	23	4	1	1	1	40	1	1	5	5	11	7	10	8	47
INDONESIA	270	89	2	17	5	19	5	5	19	19	107	42	10	8	47
JAPAN (Less Okinawa)	67506	16471	1106	3731	554	6153	435	38	983	16509	27416	3101	979	773	14751
JAPAN (Self Prefecture)	60399	13116	333	1772	2009	853	117	76	378	10273	14711	5204	758	1430	4111
KORISTON ISLAND	261	236	118	2	2	118	2	2	290	11711	1806	14711	73	23	23
KUREA	70642	40756	3805	208	935	713	272	290	9875	712	1584	17049	14866	49	1077
LAOS	2	2													
MALAYSIA	32	8													
MARSHALL ISLANDS	645	76													
MIDWAY ISLAND	1494	533													
NEW ZEALAND	672	563	9	552	38	28	38	28	512	512	595	6	15	3	53
PAKISTAN	24	8	3	1											
PHILIPPINES	39050	14431	674	4243	113	9400	331	790	10773	13948	10530	77	707	5	1490
AMERICAN SAMOA	10														
SINGAPORE	30	20		10	7	6	7	6	14	14	10	6	10	3	4
TAIWAN	6607	2458	8	693	32	1443	32	54	982	203	3062	519	774	21	1795
THAILAND	16290	10790	2351	137	53	273	53	76	2450	170	2904	115	64	14	650
HAWAII ISLAND	5	5													
WEST PAC	75271	75271		75271											
HONG KONG	7718	7718		7718											
EAST PAC	53902	53902		53902											
SUB TOTAL	509662	263914	53193	116690	2337	51074	1729	637	57301	20124	22295	22726	17914	1901	52909
COMUS	6736	6250		3428		3306									
GRAND TOTAL	57702	330364	58193	151164	69033	51074	18209	637	57301	20124	22295	22726	17914	1901	52909

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 23; J1/Memo/320-76, 14 Jul 76, Subj: Update of Command Digest.

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# CINCPAC, COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1975

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	123	72	95	127	18	15	103	86	339	300	126	0	765
USACSG	42	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	12	69	0	123
CINCPACFLT	0	0	171	358	4	13	0	0	175	371	43	0	589
CINCPACAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	450	667	450	667	309	0	1426
COMUSJAPAN	15	5	6	4	5	1	11	7	37	17	24	8	78
COMUSKOREA	71	101	26	44	10	1	55	69	162	215	232	110	609
COMUSTDC	10	7	20	20	3	1	13	7	46	35	10	7	91
COMUSMAGTHAI/ JUSMAGTHAI	84	47	14	8	7	2	55	58	160	115	29	69	304
JCRC	13	22	1	6	2	1	9	9	25	38	2	7	65
GRAND TOTAL	358	266	333	567	49	34	696	903	1436	1770	844	201	4050

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 24.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL-PACIFIC COMMAND  
ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1975

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOT MIL		US CIV	TOT US PERS	LOCAL HIRE
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
MAAG CHINA	13	6	7	2	4	0	12	1	36	9	5	50	11
MDAO JAPAN	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	7	0	5	12	5
CHJUSMAGKOREA	45	28	13	10	7	3	31	21	96	54	39	189	50
CHJUSMAGPHIL	18	4	4	3	1	0	6	4	29	11	9	49	6
USDLG INDONESIA	11	8	5	6	2	0	10	11	28	25	5	58	19
ODR INDIA	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	1	5	5
ODR PAKISTAN	2	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	4	4	0	8	6
CHJUSMAGTHAI	SEE APPENDIX TABLE PAGE 24												
TOTAL	92	41	33	22	14	3	64	38	203	104	64	371	102

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 25.

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# MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1975

	ARMY	NAVY	MC	TOTAL NAVY & MC	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED *	5,362	139,612	65,175	204,787	33,037	243,186
OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**	52,829	11,552	2,152	13,704	18,947	85,480
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM	58,191	151,164	67,327	218,491	51,984	328,666

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\* FORCES ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

\*\* FORCES PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN PACOM AREA BUT NOT ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS


SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 22; J1/Itemo/320-76, 14 Jul 76, Subj: Update of Command Digest.

# AVAILABLE FORCES

ARMY	NAVY/MARINES	AIR FORCE
<p>1 Army Headquarters                  2 Corps Headquarters                  2 Infantry Divisions (-)                  1 Missile Command                  1 Air Defense Brigade</p>	<p><b>ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC</b></p> <p>2 Numbered Fleets                  7 Attack Carriers                  14 Cruisers                  61 Destroyers/Destroyers                  10 Submarines (SSBN)                  36 Submarines (SS/SBN)                  33 Amphibious Warfare Ships*                  7 Carrier Air Wings                  35 Fighter/Attack Squadrons                  9 Reconnaissance Squadrons                  1 Photo Squadron                  7 Fleet Early Warning Units                  8 Carrier AEW Squadrons                  12 Patrol Squadrons                  6 Tanker Detachments                  1 KC-130B Maritime Refueling                  9 SP-5B Stations                  1 Fleet Marine Force (consists of                  2 Marine Amphibious Forces)</p> <p>* Includes 2 Naval Reserve Training Ships</p>	<p>2 Bombered Air Forces                  3 Air Divisions                  1 Composite Wing                  1 Tactical Fighter Wing                  1 Tactical Fighter Group                  1 Tactical Fighter Squadron                  1 Tactical Air Support Squadron                  1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron                  1 Special Operations Squadron                  9 Tactical Fighter Squadrons                  2 Tactical Air Force Squadrons                  1 Airborne Command and Control Squadron                  1 Fighter/Interceptor Squadron (Air National Guard)</p>
<p>1 Engineer Group                  1 Signal Brigade                  USARV Units in the Pacific                  Army National Guard Unit:                  1 Infantry Brigade                  Army Reserve Units                  1 Infantry Battalion                  1 Civil Affairs Group                  1 Engineer Construction Battalion                  1 Corps Headquarters (AMC)</p>	<p><b>IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC</b></p> <p>11 Destroyers (Naval Reserve Training Ships)                  9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training)                  63 Auxiliary Ships                  3 Patrol Combatants (PG/PGM)</p>	<p>1 Air Division (MAC)                  2 Strategic Wings (SAC)                  1 Air Refueling Squadron (R-119) (SAC)                  1 Bomber Squadron (Heavy) (B-52) (SAC)                  2 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadrons (SR) (MAC)                  1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (WR-119) (MAC)                  1 Test Squadron (TSC)                  Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS)                  Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCC)                  Air-Sea Rescue/Recovery Squadron (AR-110, RII-51) (MAC)                  Air Weather Service Unit (AWC)                  Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Unit (ARRC)</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 10.


# DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 13.




DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 16.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS



NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE D.E. AUTHORIZATION.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 19.

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## SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

### Key Personnel Changes in 1975

(U) Admiral Noel Gayler continued to serve as Commander in Chief Pacific during 1975, except for a period that involved extended travel outside the command and short periods of leave. From 31 January to 9 February Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, CINCPACFLT, was designated Acting CINCPAC while CINCPAC was on leave. The next occasion was during a trip to Washington, D.C., Europe, and Seattle, Washington. CINCPAC retained command during the Washington, D.C. phase of his journey, but he designated the following Acting CINCPACs: from 210500Z Jun 75 to 231800Z Jun 75, General Louis L. Wilson, Jr., CINCPACAF; from 231801Z Jun 75 to 281800Z Jun 75, LT GEN William G. Moore, Jr., CINCPAC Chief of Staff; and from 281801Z Jun 75 to 081600Z Jul 75, Admiral Weisner. CINCPACFLT, who was the senior component commander, had been absent from his headquarters during the earlier part of this trip, and the junior component commander (CINCPACAF) had been designated. When General Wilson left his headquarters, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff served as Acting CINCPAC. During a subsequent period, from 301700Z Aug 75 to 081000Z Sep 75, CINCPAC again designated Admiral Weisner as Acting CINCPAC while he took leave.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 3 September the Secretary of Defense extended Admiral Gayler's assignment as CINCPAC for one year, to end 31 August 1976.<sup>2</sup>

(U) LT GEN William G. Moore, USAF, continued to serve as Chief of Staff and COL Maurice O. Edmonds, USA, served throughout 1975 as CINCPAC's Executive Assistant and Senior Aide.

### Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) MAJ GEN William E. McLeod, USA, became Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the U.S. Army Element, Headquarters Pacific Command on 28 February, replacing MAJ GEN John R. Guthrie, who had departed on 26 February to become Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan.

### Inspector General

(U) The assignment of an officer as CINCPAC Inspector General had been an additional duty since the departure of the first IG in August 1974. The Deputy Chief of Staff had performed in this capacity from 20 August 1974 to 18 September

- 
1. CINCPAC 251900Z Jan 75, 172034Z Jun 75, and 280321Z Aug 75.
  2. OSD(PA) News Release No. 435-75 of 3 Sep 75.

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1974, at which time the Director for Personnel, BGEN Leslie R. Forney, USA, was assigned, followed by his replacement, BGEN James H. Johnson, USA, on 13 January 1975. On 1 July 1975, with the merger of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates, MAJ GEN Clarke T. Baldwin, USA, former Director of the Security Assistance Directorate, was assigned as Inspector General until his departure from the command on 8 September. On that date, BGEN Johnson, Director for Personnel, was again designated Inspector General as an additional duty.

### Director for Personnel

(U) BGEN James H. Johnson, USA, replaced BGEN Leslie R. Forney, Jr., USA, as Director for Personnel on 13 January.

### Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN Frank C. Lang, USMC, served throughout 1975 as Director for Operations. As his deputy, BGEN Fred A. Treyz, USAF, was replaced on 24 July by COL Theodore M. Hanna, USA.

### Director for Plans

(U) RADM William R. McClendon, USN, continued to serve as Director for Plans. As his deputy, BGEN John E. Stannard, USA, served until he was replaced by COL E. Gene Sprague, USA, on 1 August 1975. General Stannard was placed on the retired list on 1 September 1975. COL Sprague had formerly served on the Plans Staff.

### Comptroller

(U) CAPT W. M. Weiskopf, SC, USN, retired on 31 July. He was replaced by CAPT Bobby L. Hatch, SC, USN, on 19 August.

### Surgeon

(U) RADM Robert G. Williams, Jr., MC, USN, became CINCPAC Surgeon on 25 July replacing RADM R. C. Laning, MC, USN. The CINCPAC Surgeon was doubled-hatted as CINCPACFLT Surgeon.

### Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific

(U) Mr. Richard H. Dubois, the first Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific (AROP), departed on 30 May 1975. He was replaced on 18 August by Mr. Richard U. Scott.

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## AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 January 1975				31 December 1975				5 February 1976			
	REF	ENL	OT	TOT	REF	ENL	OT	TOT	REF	ENL	OT	TOT
CINCPAC	8	28	1	34	7	18	0	23	8	19	0	27
Inspector General	1	3	1	5	1	3	1	5	1	3	1	5
Officer for Public Governmental Affairs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chief of Staff	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2
Deputy Chief of Staff	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2
Review and Relations Office	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joint Secretariat	2	30	0	42	2	40	0	42	2	40	0	42
Personnel Directorate	10	15	0	25	10	16	0	26	10	16	0	26
Intelligence Directorate	40	72	0	112	37	67	0	104	38	67	0	105
Operations Directorate	75	50	15	140	75	53	10	138	74	50	10	134
Logistics Directorate-Logistics Security Assistance Directorate	41	24	0	65	48	20	0	68	47	20	0	67
Plans Directorate	54	26	11	91	54	27	10	91	54	27	10	91
Communications-Electronics Directorate	30	16	10	56	30	15	10	55	30	14	10	54
Comptroller	5	3	7	15	4	0	7	11	4	0	9	13
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8
Public Affairs	11	7	5	23	10	7	4	21	10	7	0	17
Protocol Office	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7	3	3	0	6
Surgeon	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3
Security Assistance Directorate	41	27	25	93	40	23	23	86	40	23	0	63
Liaison Officer to CINCPAC	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
Admin Specialist to CAC Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>760</b>
Alaskan Command Post	35	10	1	46	31	9	1	41	33	9	1	43
PACOM AEW Support Group	20	51	25	96	20	41	25	86	20	40	25	85
Intelligence Center Pacific	104	130	53	287	104	118	53	275	104	118	53	275
Management Control Detachment Pacific	10	10	0	20	10	9	0	19	10	9	0	19
Miscellaneous units	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	6	0	6
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>468</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>465</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>542</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>510</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>1,263</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>1,203</b>

1. Headquarters CINCPAC P-76 increased to P-75 (Joint Manpower proposal, pending JCS approval).
2. Public Affairs, Protocol, Legal Administrative Affairs, and General Accounting Office liaison functions consolidated in Office for Public Government Affairs, pending JCS approval.
3. Headquarters CINCPAC Intelligence Directorate (J3) and Intelligence Center Pacific internal reorganization approved by JCS 6182 251756Z Jun 75.
4. Management Control Detachment - Pacific disestablished as separate joint activity. Cadre MCD-P functions retained in Headquarters CINCPAC Operations Directorate (J3), pending JCS approval.
5. Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates consolidated as Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate (J4), pending JCS approval.
6. Position of CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCPAC Alaskan Command disestablished with disestablishment of that command, 30 Jun 75. Position of CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Commander, Alaskan Air Command established 1 Jul 75, but carried in AFD for the Plans Directorate (J5).
7. PACOM Miscellaneous Units Joint Manpower Program (approved by JCS 2767/171609Z Mar 75) was newly established to incorporate the following separate, joint, staffed activities: Australian Foreign Military Sales and Administrative Assistant in JCS, Defense Attache Office in Malaysia, Singapore, and the U.S. Military Advisory Representative, BENTU. The last mentioned agent was also authorized two spaces for Local National employees.

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KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL



WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR.  
LTGEN USAF  
Chief of Staff



WILLIAM E. MCLEOD  
MAJ GEN USA  
Deputy Chief of Staff



ROY F. LINSEMEYER  
GS-16 CIV  
Director Review and  
Analysis Office



ALFRED J. LYNN  
GS-16 CIV  
Special Assistant for  
Public and Governmental Affairs



ALAN H. BIRDSALL  
COL USAF  
Joint Secretary



ROGER W. SULLIVAN  
FSO-2 CIV  
Political Adviser



RICHARD U. SCOTT  
PL 313, GS-17E CIV  
Director AROP



ROBERT W. GARRITY  
FSIO-3 CIV  
USIA Adviser

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JAMES H. JOHNSON  
BGEN USA  
Director for Personnel and Inspector General



DOYLE E. LARSON  
BGEN USAF  
Director for Intelligence



FRANK C. LANG  
MAJ GEN USMC  
Director for Operations



HUGH A. BENTON  
RADM USN  
Director for Logistics - Security Assistance



WILLIAM R. MCCLEENDON  
RADM USN  
Director for Plans



CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, JR.  
BGEN USAF  
Director for Communications Data Processing



BOBBY L. HATCH  
CAPT SC USN  
Comptroller



HARLAND B. COPE  
CAPT JAGC USN  
Staff Judge Advocate



ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, JR.  
RADM MC USN  
Surgeon

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Joint Manpower Programs

(U) Authorization for manpower for the PACOM headquarters was contained in several Joint Tables of Distribution. These were for the CINCPAC Headquarters, the PACOM Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems Support Group, the Airborne Command Post, the Intelligence Center Pacific, and the Management Control Detachment-Pacific. On 12 November 1975 CINCPAC recommended revisions to certain of those JTDs for Fiscal Year 1976. The recommendations are outlined here; some are addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

(U) For the CINCPAC Headquarters Joint Manpower Program several changes were recommended. One was formation of an Office for Public and Governmental Affairs (J003). This consolidated the legislative affairs, General Accounting Office audit liaison, public affairs, and protocol functions. For the Intelligence Directorate, an internal reorganization accommodated billet transfers between CINCPAC and the Intelligence Center Pacific. For the Operations Directorate, internal reorganization provided for increased emphasis on current operations, command and control, and exercise functions.

~~(S)~~ Also proposed was the disestablishment of the Management Control Detachment-Pacific as a separate joint entity. CINCPAC (J32) was to perform Permissive Action Link code derivation and verification functions with the transfer of seven billets from the Management Control Detachment-Pacific Joint Manpower Program; the remaining 18 billets of the MCD-P would be returned to the Services on or about 1 April 1976 with the disestablishment of that agency.

(U) CINCPAC's Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates were to be consolidated and realigned; the new organization was to be called the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate. The CINCPAC recommendation regarding the position of Inspector General established a separate Army Major General billet to replace the existing double-hatted arrangement in which the Director for Personnel served additionally as the IG. Several other major realignments and modifications throughout the staff were recommended.

(U) The JTD recommendation for the PACOM ADP Systems Support Group transferred the Security Assistance Data Processing Division (J86) functions and required additional spaces to be assigned.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C422, 12 Nov 75, Subj: Revised FY 76 JTDs for Headquarters CINCPAC, PACOM Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems Support Group, and CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (U); CINCPAC 161921Z Dec 75.
  2. The ADP Systems Support Group had been combined with the Communications Directorate on 1 July 1973, but for budgeting and other considerations the group was considered separate.

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(U) The proposed revision for the Airborne Command Post Joint Manpower Program provided for improved enlisted billet Service mix.

(U) The FY 76 revision recommendations totaled as follows:

		<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Headquarters CINCPAC	Officers	353	351	- 2
	Enlisted	301	287	-14
	Civilian	<u>131</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>- 9</u>
	Total	785	760	-25
ADP Systems Support Group	Officers	22	26	+ 4
	Enlisted	41	46	+ 5
	Civilian	<u>25</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>+ 9</u>
	Total	88	106	+18
CINCPAC Airborne Command Post	Officers	33	33	-
	Enlisted	8	8	-
	Civilian	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	-
	Total	42	42	
Management Control Detachment-Pacific	Officers	16	0	-16
	Enlisted	9	0	- 9
	Civilian	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-</u>
	Total	25	0	-25

### Staff Organizational Changes

(U) Continuing evolutionary change is noted in the material that follows. The staff remained substantially the same size, although planning continued to reduce the staff and possibly consolidate certain staff agencies. In 1975 the major change was the consolidation of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates, as discussed below.

### Special Assistant for Public and Governmental Affairs

(U) In 1974 a new position had been created within the executive offices: a Special Assistant to CINCPAC to be coordinator for congressional matters. CINCPAC's former Public Affairs officer, COL A. J. Lynn, was assigned to that

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position following his retirement from military service. On 25 April 1975 the position was redesignated as Special Assistant for Public and Governmental Affairs, retaining the staff code J003. On 25 April he assumed the duties for administration and direction of Public Affairs (J74) and Protocol (J75) in addition to already assigned duties and responsibilities. New staff codes were J003/74 and J003/75.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 29 December 1975 additional responsibility as single point of contact for liaison with the General Accounting Office was assigned as a function within the Office of the Special Assistant. This was designed to improve coordination, responsiveness, constructive initiatives, and the capability to work problems together with the General Accounting Office. The GAO, under the direction of the Comptroller General of the United States, was charged to "assist the Congress, its committees, and its Members to carry out their legislative and overseeing responsibilities, consistent with its role as an independent nonpolitical agency in the legislative branch; carry out legal, accounting, auditing, and claims settlement functions with respect to Federal Government programs and operations as assigned by the Congress; and make recommendations designed to make Government operations more efficient and effective." Defense Audit Agency and State of Hawaii Inspector General surveys, reviews, and audits remained assigned to the CINCPAC Comptroller, J72.<sup>2</sup>

(U) By the end of 1975 the staff of the Special Assistant was organized as follows: the Director and his staff; a Legislative Affairs Office; an Audit Liaison Officer; a Public Affairs Office consisting of an Administrative Branch and two divisions, one for Plans and Policy and the other for Operations; and a Protocol Office. The authorized strength was 34 persons.<sup>3</sup>

### Operations Directorate Reorganizations

(U) A number of revisions in the Operations Directorate internal organization were designed to provide increased emphasis on current operations, command and control, and exercise functions.

(U) In a proposed Joint Table of Distribution approved by the CINCPAC Chief of Staff on 14 October, the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Division (J34) and the Operations Analysis Group (J35) were merged into a single division

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1. J01/Memo/23-75, 25 Apr 75, Subj: CINCPAC Staff Reorganization.
  2. CINCPAC Notice 5400, 29 Dec 75, Subj: General Accounting Office (GAO) Liaison - Single Point of Contact. Duties of the GAO were as listed in the U.S. Government Manual 1974/75, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, pp. 43-44.
  3. Joint Manpower Program, Headquarters CINCPAC, FY 76, Revised 1 Nov 75.

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designated the Requirements, Evaluation, and Special Projects Division (J34). The new division was tasked to monitor, review, and initiate staff actions pertaining to operational and materiel requirements, operational evaluations, staff actions pertaining to support of joint research, development, test and evaluation requirements, and special operations as determined by the Director for Operations. The division was also responsible for the CINCPAC Reference Library. The authorized strength of the division was nine persons.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 20 August it was announced that the Force Status Report (FORSTAT) and Readiness Section had been reassigned to the Operational Reports Branch (J334).<sup>2</sup>

Consolidation of Special Operations and PSYOP/Unconventional Warfare Agencies Studied

(U) A CINCPAC Manpower Management Team survey of September 1975 recommended disestablishment of the Operations Directorate's Special Operations Branch (J318) and the transfer of two O6 billets and all staff responsibilities to the Plans Directorate's Psychological Operations/Unconventional Warfare Division. The study further suggested that cognizance of Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) activities be passed to the Personnel Directorate and that disaster relief activities be passed to the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ The matter had already been under study for some time, with both the Plans and Operations Directorates favoring consolidation, but with each favoring consolidation in its own directorate. J3 continued to recommend consolidation within J3 primarily to assist in managing integrated operations throughout the PACOM; increase the importance of exercise functions; and to facilitate operational employment of special operations, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and deception in emergency or crisis actions, or in war situations. The Plans Directorate noted that the politically sensitive and potentially controversial nature of the operations required close coordination with J5 policy planners to assure alignment with national policy; the fact that PSYOP forces in the PACOM had been reduced to a minimum but that the strategic planning function had remained nearly constant; and that special operations such as the JCRC were decreasing and that although planning for personnel

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1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C422, 12 Nov 75, to JCS, Subj: Revised FY 76 JTDs for Headquarters CINCPAC, PACOM Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems Support Group, and CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (U). J34 HistSum Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC Bulletin, 20 Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC Manpower Management Team Survey of Sep 75.

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recovery actions would continue, the likelihood of implementation became increasingly remote. The matter had not been decided by the end of 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Merger of Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates

(U) A merger of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates was accomplished effective 1 July 1975, retaining the staff code of the Logistics Directorate, J4. (Security Assistance had been code J8 since its establishment in 1971.) RADM Hugh A. Benton, USN, was named director of the new organization that was known as the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate; he had been J4.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The new directorate consisted of an administrative support branch, a word processing support service branch, and divisions, as follows:<sup>3</sup>

Deputy for Logistics (J4A)

Logistics Plans and Policy Division (J41)

Resource Management Division (J42)

Interservice Support Branch (J421)

Fuels and Energy Branch/Joint Petroleum Office (J422)

Supply and Service Branch (J423)

Mobility Operations Division (J43)

Facilities Engineering Division (J44)

Deputy for Security Assistance (J4B)

Security Assistance Plans and Policy Division (J45)

East Asia Country Programs Division (J46)

South Asia Country Programs Division (J47)

Security Assistance Training Division (J48)

Evaluation and Management Division (J49)

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1. J3/Memo/0987-74, Subj: Consolidation of Special Operations, UW Plans and PSYOP Functions (U); J55/Memo/104-74, 25 Oct 74, Subj: Consolidation of UW, PSYOP, and C&D Activities Within CINCPAC Staff; J318 HistSum Sep 75.
  2. J1 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 110437Z Jul 75.
  3. Joint Manpower Program, Headquarters CINCPAC, FY 76, Revised 1 Nov 75.

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(U) The former Security Assistance Data Processing Division (J86) functions and manpower authorization were transferred to the PACOM Automatic Data Processing Systems Support Group Joint Manpower Program (and to the CINCPAC Communications-Data Processing Directorate).<sup>1</sup>

(U) Effective 1 December the Security Assistance training and materiel programming and management responsibilities merged into the Security Assistance Plans and Programs Divisions and the Security Assistance Training Division was disestablished. New plans and programs divisions and their respective areas of responsibility were:<sup>2</sup>

J46 - North Asia (Japan, Korea, Republic of China, TTPI)

J47 - East Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand)

J48 - South Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka)

### CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Commander Alaskan Air Command Billet Established

(U) With the disestablishment of the Alaskan Command on 30 June 1975 the position of CINCPAC Liaison Officer to that command was disestablished. A CINCPAC Liaison Officer billet was established, however, effective 1 July, to the senior military commander in the State of Alaska, the Commander Alaskan Air Command (COMDRAAC). Terms of reference for the position were to be incorporated in CINCPAC's instruction on command relationships (S3020.2G).<sup>3</sup>

### Defense Audit Office, Pacific Established

(U) The Defense Audit Office, Pacific, a field office of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit), was established 12 May 1975 as an attached PACOM element and located at the Headquarters.

(U) The office was responsible for conducting audits in the PACOM area, normally those requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headquarters of the unified commands, and certain other defense agencies and organizations. The audits could be

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1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C422, 12 Nov 75, to JCS, Subj: Revised FY 76 JTDs for Headquarters CINCPAC, PACOM Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems Support Group, and CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (U).
  2. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 156, 26 Jan 76, Subj: Military Assistance Activities Bulletin (MAAB) Nr. 20.
  3. CINCPAC 150143Z Jul 75.

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performed within a single organization or throughout Defense Department organizations in the PACOM. They could be performed by the staff of that agency alone or augmented by support from other Defense component audit organizations in the PACOM, as appropriate. Such audits normally were conducted in two phases, a survey phase and a subsequent verification phase that included the tests and evaluations necessary to reach a supported audit conclusion. At that time a draft report was composed and staffed for comments with responsible command elements prior to being forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit) for finalization and appropriate distribution.

(U) The office provided prior notice of visits to appropriate commanders and advised those commanders of plans, progress, and conclusions, as mutually agreed. Audit results were progressively discussed with appropriate command elements to assure factual and objective reporting. A primary office mission was to provide audit service to the staff at PACOM headquarters and the subordinate unified commands. The CINCPAC Comptroller remained the initial point of contact for audit matters for the CINCPAC staff and subordinate commands. Mr. James P. Brown was the first Defense Audit Office, Pacific Auditor-in-Charge.<sup>1</sup>

### Military Traffic Management Command Field Office-Pacific Relocated

(U) The Military Traffic Management Command Field Office-Pacific moved from Camp Smith to Fort Shafter, also on Oahu, effective 1 October. The field office had been established on 1 August 1975 to manage Defense Department personal property shipping functions that had been formerly performed by CINCPAC, as noted further in the Logistics Chapter of this history.<sup>2</sup>

### Department of Defense, Pacific Research Office Phased Out

(U) The Department of Defense, Pacific Research Office (DOD/PRO) ceased operation as of the end of 1975. By 30 June the organization had been deactivated, except for a residual communications element that continued to operate until the end of the year. The agency had been shown on CINCPAC organization charts since at least 1959.<sup>3</sup>

### Readiness Command Liaison Office Disestablished

(U) The position of Liaison Officer from the U.S. Readiness Command to CINCPAC headquarters was disestablished and the office closed on 29 July 1975. LTC Walter Baxter, USAF, was the last REDCOM liaison officer.

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1. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 11 Jul 75, Subj: Establishment of DAO, Pacific.
  2. CDRMTMC WASHDC 072020Z Aug 75; CINCPAC Daily Bulletin, No. 114, 6 Oct 75.
  3. DOD/PRO Memo D-306, 6 May 75, Subj: Phase-Out of Department of Defense, Pacific Research Office, (DOD/PRO).

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Reduction of General/Flag Officers Assigned to Military Assistance Agencies

(S) On 19 February the JCS advised CINCPAC that recent reviews of general/flag officer billets had been made by the Services and the Office of the JCS at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These had resulted in the deletion or downgrading of certain billets. They requested that CINCPAC now examine the grade structure for such positions in the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, the Missions, and the Military Groups under his command, without regard for Service affiliation, to revalidate requirements for general and flag officer authorizations. They asked that CINCPAC include a statement of the potential political impact of any such deletion or downgrading recommendations and the views of the Ambassadors concerned.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 22 March the JCS further advised that the Congress might require a provision in the FY 75 Foreign Assistance legislation that would require that the number of general/flag officers in these agencies not exceed 20 after 1 May 1975. The number then stood at 31, including the officials in the Defense Security Assistance Agency. CINCPAC was asked to list, in priority order, the billets that could be downgraded.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC furnished his reply on 26 March. He listed in order of priority for reduction the following officers:

Chief of Staff, JUSMAG Korea  
Deputy COMUSMAGTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI  
Chief Navy Section JUSMAGKOREA (dual-hatted as Commander, Navy Forces Korea and not carried on a joint document)  
Chief, MAAG China  
COMUSMAGTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI  
Chief, JUSMAG Korea  
Chief, JUSMAG Philippines  
Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia

CINCPAC noted that the billet of the Chief of Staff, JUSMAG Korea was scheduled to be reduced on 1 July 1975, and that the officer would be reassigned earlier. He recommended retention of the remainder of flag and general officers in the PACOM. He also listed his priorities for downgrading billets in the PACOM, as follows:<sup>3</sup>

Chief of Staff, JUSMAG Korea  
Defense Representative, India

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1. JCS 6403/192047Z Feb 75.
  2. JCS 8101/221551Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC 260343Z Mar 75.

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Defense Representative, Pakistan  
Deputy COMUSMACTHAI  
Chief, Navy Section, JUSMAG Korea  
Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia  
Chief, MAAG China  
COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI  
Chief, JUSMAG Korea  
Chief, JUSMAG Philippines  
Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia

(C) The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill, which was enacted into Public Law 94-11 on 26 March, required among other things that the total number of general and flag officers assigned to MAAGs, Missions, and similar organizations, or performing duties with respect to the Military Assistance Program and the Foreign Military Sales Program, should not exceed 20 after 1 May 1975. To comply with the law, the JCS advised, the Secretary of Defense had determined that no flag or general officer would be assigned or detailed to certain positions, which were listed. Those in the PACOM were as follows:

Chief of Staff, JUSMAG Korea  
Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia  
Deputy COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI  
Chief, Navy Section, JUSMAG Korea (although the incumbent was to be retained as Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was to be relieved of his dual-hatted assignment in the Security Assistance Program.)  
Director for Security Assistance, Headquarters PACOM

In regard to the CINCPAC Director for Security Assistance (J8), the Secretary had determined that the position should be retained at the general officer level, but that action must be initiated that would broaden his responsibilities so that the position clearly fell outside the intent of the law, thus, the duties "should be realigned so as not to be related primarily to SA functions." As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Security Assistance Directorate was subsequently consolidated into a Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate under the former Director for Logistics on the CINCPAC Staff, J4.

(C) With regard to the vacated positions listed, the Secretary directed that associated duties should be assigned, on an interim basis, to the senior O-6 pending nomination of replacements by the Service concerned and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where appropriate.

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1. JCS 6630/292036Z Apr 75.

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(S) CINCPAC directed the necessary reassignments on 30 April. He asked COMUS Korea to reassign BGEN Shepard to other than Security Assistance duties effective 1 May; he assigned the former Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia as a special assistant to the CINCPAC Chief of Staff until his departure; and he asked CINCPACFLT and COMUS Korea to terminate RADM Frudden's duties as Senior Naval Assistance Officer, JUSMAG Korea, effective 30 April.<sup>1</sup>

Triennial Review of Service Responsibility for  
Assignment of MAP Agency Commanders

(U) The JCS, every three years, conducted a review of the Service responsibility for assigning chiefs or commanders to Military Assistance agencies. Their request for such a review in 1975 was forwarded on 4 August.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC forwarded his recommendations on 21 November. He noted that Service balance on a regional basis was important and was closely scrutinized during his study. Overemphasis on the selection factors of predominant size or influential status of the host countries' components, CINCPAC noted, would "normally tilt all MAAG chiefs positions to Army." It was believed that any MAAG chief position, with the exceptions of the chiefs of the agencies in Korea and the Philippines could be justifiably rotated among the Services. In some cases CINCPAC's recommendations were at variance with the Ambassador's desires. CINCPAC advised the JCS that the recommendations were made to achieve a Service balance representation in the Pacific region. CINCPAC's recommendations were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

<u>Position</u>	<u>Current</u>		<u>Country Team Position</u>		<u>CINCPAC Recommendations</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
CHJUSMAG Thailand	08 (AF)	07 (AF)	07 (A)	07 (A)	08 (AF)*****	07 (AF)
CHMAAG China	08 (AF)	08 (AF)	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)*	07 (A)***
CHJUSMAG Philippines	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)
CHJUSMAG Korea	08 (A)	08 (A)	08 (A)	08 (A)	08 (A)	08 (A)
CHUSDLG Indonesia	07 (A)	06 (A)	07 (A)	06 (A)	07 (N)	06 (N)***
CHMDAO Japan	06 (N)	06 (N)	06 (AF)	06 (AF)	06 (AF)***	06 (AF)
ODR Pakistan	07 (AF)	06 (AF)	07 (A)	07 (A)	07 (A)**	06 (A)****
ODR India	07 (A)	06 (A)	07 (A)	06 (A)	07 (AF)**	06 (AF)

(Notes on next page.)

1. J13 HistSums Mar-Apr 75; CINCPAC 300329Z Apr 75.
2. JCS 3447/041323Z Aug 75.
3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S658, 21 Nov 75, Subj: Triennial Review of Service Responsibility for Assigning Chiefs/Commanders Positions in MAAGs, Missions and MILGPs.

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- \* Upon departure of incumbent, downgrade to 07 and change to Army.
- \*\* Continue to authorize 07 position, but fill with an 06 (these positions would be reviewed if additional security assistance flag billets were allocated.)
- \*\*\* Service rotational plan.
- \*\*\*\* Recommend the incumbent 06 (AF) be replaced by an 06 (A) upon completion of his normal tour.
- \*\*\*\*\* Downgrade to 07 and change to Army during 1978.

(S) On 19 March 1976 the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations, with the following exceptions. The Army was to remain responsible for manning the billet of Chief, Office of Defense Representative India and the Air Force for ODR Pakistan. The authorized grade for those two officers and the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia, was to be 06. Authorization to downgrade the position of Chief, MAAG China was still pending a decision and was considered to be a separate action.<sup>1</sup>

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1. JCS 7441/192243Z Mar 76.

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### SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

#### Unified Command Plan Changes

(U) CINCPAC was only marginally affected by the various major changes in the Unified Command Plan that became effective 1 July 1975. The Unified Command Plan was the basic charter for unified and specified commands. It was the JCS document (based on Presidential and Secretary of Defense decisions) that outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various unified commands. Revisions of the Unified Command Plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, and by which basic missions were assigned. On 24 February, according to the JCS, "highest authority" had approved certain changes to the plan. One of these changes was disestablishment of the Continental Air Defense Command and designation of the Air Force Aerospace Defense Command as a specified command in lieu thereof.

(U) A second change was disestablishment of the Alaskan Command. The National Security Act of 1947 had created the Alaskan Command simultaneously with establishment of the PACOM and a Far East Command in the Pacific area. When the Far East Command had been disestablished on 1 July 1957 the duties, responsibilities, and forces of that command had been reassigned to CINCPAC. The Alaskan Command was not replaced, but the residual Army and Air Force organizations there would be administered through the Military Departments.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The senior remaining officer in Alaska would be the Commander, Alaska Air Command. Provision was made for a joint task force organization to insure unity of effort and prompt, effective restoration of joint command if required by defense contingencies, natural disasters, emergencies, or hostilities. CINCAL discussed these joint task force situations in a 23 April message to the JCS. If JTF authority in a tactical warning or hostile crisis was to be a viable standby capability, he considered it essential that the organization, communications, and procedures be maintained in-being for prompt coordination among commands and reporting to the JCS. As a minimum he considered retention of the JCS Alert Network and the Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System capability and the dedicated communications circuit to CINCPAC essential. Also, coordinated procedures had to be developed and maintained to assure prompt and effective response among interested commands during a short duration crisis; these commands were the JCS, the Readiness Command, the Army's Forces Command, Air Force Headquarters, and the PACOM.<sup>2</sup>

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1. JCS 4002/271240Z Feb 75.
  2. CINCAL 230208Z Apr 75.

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(U) Disestablishment of the Alaskan Command was effective at 2400 hours on 30 June (or 0900Z on 1 July) 1975. CINCPAC's message to CINCAL on that occasion noted that "our nation is stronger as a result of the Alaskan Command's dedicated service.... The Pacific Command has been privileged to have served as a close neighbor during the historical changes that have occurred in these past years. As the pages of history now close on your command, it is most appropriate that we extend our appreciation for the many years of assistance and cooperation that have epitomized our relationship....our thanks for a job well done."

(C) Following receipt of authority to disestablish, CINCPAC had requested JCS authority to retain a liaison officer to the senior military command in Alaska; he had also requested that the CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL recommend changes in Terms of Reference in anticipation of assignment of a liaison officer to the Commander, Alaskan Air Command. On 1 August CINCPAC forwarded to the Alaskan Air Command the proposed terms; they were to be incorporated in the CINCPAC Instruction on command relationships in the Pacific Command (S3020.2 series). It was noted that the JCS had directed CINCPAC on 8 June 1971 to establish a liaison billet in the CINCAL headquarters. On 7 July they had concurred in retention of such a billet in the senior military command. The responsibilities and functions as spelled out on 1 August were as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- Maintain close and continuous liaison relative to activities jointly affecting the Pacific Command and the Alaskan Air Command.

- Monitor the provisions of the current Memorandum of Agreement between the CINCPAC and Commander, Alaskan Air Command concerning responsibilities relative to Alaska and the waters contiguous thereto.

- Assist the Alaskan Air Command staff in the development of special studies and general war, contingency, evacuation, and special and exercise plans which may require PACOM support.

- As required, represent CINCPAC at conferences and meetings convened by the Commander, Alaskan Air Command.

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1. Hq Alaskan Command Special Order G-32 of 18 Jun 75 and CINCAL 010900Z Jul 75, both of which cited JCS 180044Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 242224Z Jun 75.
  2. CINCPAC 012241Z Aug 75.

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- When directed by CINCPAC, and with the concurrence of COMDRAAC, represent CINCPAC and/or his subordinate commanders to Federal or State of Alaska agencies on Mainland Alaska matters affecting CINCPAC or his subordinate commands.

- When requested by the CINCPAC Single Senior Military Representative Aleutians, represent him on Mainland Alaska on matters affecting the Aleutian Islands.

- Maintain liaison with Commander, Seventeenth Coast Guard District on matters mutually affecting CINCPAC and the U.S. Coast Guard in Alaska.

- Keep CINCPAC informed of matters on Mainland Alaska that affect or could affect his mission or those of his subordinate commanders.

- Coordinate requirements of CINCPAC and other PACOM personnel visiting Mainland Alaska.

- Upon approval of CINCPAC, provide support to PACOM subordinate commands relative to operations or exercises on Mainland Alaska and contiguous waters.

- Discharge other U.S. military responsibilities as directed by CINCPAC.

These Terms of Reference were effective on receipt of the 1 August message.

(C) On 8 October the JCS advised that responsibility for joint planning for the defense of Alaska, other than aerospace defense, was more appropriately performed within the unified command structure than through a Chief of Service acting as executive agent. Hence, they assigned the function to the CINC of the Readiness Command. USCINCREP was tasked to prepare certain plans. He was directed to coordinate his planning for the defense of Alaska with CINCPAC, who was tasked with the planning for and defense of the sea approaches to Alaska, and with the CINC of the Aerospace Defense Command, who was responsible for aerospace defense.

(C) A third announcement by the JCS in their 27 February message had indicated that final approval of proposals related to disestablishment of the U.S. Southern Command had been held in abeyance.

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1. JCS 4474/081840Z Oct 75.

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(U) On 24 December the Defense Department announced to the press the details of a reorganization of the USSOUTHCOM headquarters and Service component commands. The reorganization, which had been announced early in November, made the headquarters a smaller organization. The missions and responsibilities of the headquarters remained the same, but the CINC was downgraded from a full general to a lieutenant general. It was estimated that the civilian reductions resulting from the action would be approximately 58. Also disestablished were Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command and Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces Southern Command. The missions and tasks of those two headquarters were to be assumed by reduced organizations within the Navy and Air Force and by the U.S. Southern Command. Further details of internal reorganization of the Southern Command were announced on 14 January 1976.<sup>1</sup>

### CINCPAC Component Command Organizations

(U) There continued to be some uncertainty among the military commands in Hawaii regarding future organizational concepts, headquarters locations, and command relationships. The Army component command, the former U.S. Army Pacific, had been disestablished on 31 December 1974. This event was described in considerable detail in the CINCPAC Command History for 1974, as was the establishment, simultaneously, of a follow-on organization, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. The new organization was located at Fort Shafter, as USARPAC had been, and was a field operating agency of the U.S. Army, not a CINCPAC component command. Its mission, however, was to provide liaison, advice, and assistance and have coordination authority with CINCPAC headquarters and the PACOM Service components on U.S. Army matters, and to assist CINCPAC headquarters in the preparation of plans and to prepare the primary U.S. Army supporting plans for all areas of the PACOM except Korea and Japan.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The transition had been well planned and was well executed. Much of the success was attributed to the positive attitude of all concerned and the fact that action officers had worked on the reorganization. The terms of reference had been jointly developed by the CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC staffs and were promulgated by a message from Department of the Army.

(U) Meanwhile, the CINCPAC Support Group had performed well in crisis situations, such as the latter days of Phnom Penh and Saigon and the refugee center on Guam. The fact that this unique organization was workable notwithstanding, CINCPAC still believed in the requirement for Service component commands in the PACOM.<sup>3</sup>

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1. SECDEF 4492/241659Z Dec 75; USCINCSO 142302Z Jan 76.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 63-80.
  3. J561 Point Paper, 22 Sep 75, Subj: Phaseout of USARPAC; J561 Point Paper, 4 Nov 75, Subj: CINCPAC/USACSG Relations.

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(S) Regarding the Navy, for example, it was believed that there was a need for a separate Pacific Fleet headquarters. CINCPAC believed that the optimum organization was a Pacific Command properly supported by subordinate uni-Service commands to handle Service-unique matters. He had stressed this for several years. When a matter such as the possible consolidation of the two headquarters--CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT--had come under study, it was the CINCPAC position that a requirement would be created for assumption of Service functions at the unified command level, significantly increasing the size of the CINCPAC staff (and operating plant), infringe on Service prerogatives, and unnecessarily involve operational headquarters in Service support activities.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Within the CINCPACFLT organization two new commands, the Naval Surface Forces Pacific and the Naval Logistics Command, had replaced three previous "type" commands, the Cruiser-Destroyer Force Pacific, the Amphibious Force Pacific, and the Service Force Pacific; this reorganization had resulted in significant personnel savings.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Air Force had introduced a proposal in 1974 that had called for the disestablishment of Pacific Air Force headquarters, although the concept of an Air Force component commander to CINCPAC was retained (unlike the Army's reorganization). In November of that year CINCPAC had expressed his concern with the tendency to treat Service organizations in the PACOM as independent variables rather than as part of a unified fighting force. He had noted that fundamental to his view was the firm belief that retention of the PACOM as a unified command, supported by subordinate unified commands, was essential throughout the area. Throughout 1975 a number of plans were addressed by the Air Force, but no action was taken regarding major organizational change.<sup>3</sup>

#### Disestablishment of Southeast Asia Organizations

(U) Details of the evacuation operations in Southeast Asia are detailed in appendices to this history. Certain of the organizations were disestablished by specific authorities, as noted in the material that follows.

#### Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia

(U) With the execution of Operation EAGLE PULL, Americans were evacuated from Cambodia on 12 April. On 2 May CINCPAC directed disestablishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia to be effective 15 May 1975. From

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1. J563 Point Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: The Need for Separate Naval Headquarters.
  2. J563 Point Paper, 2 May 75, Subj: PACOM Reorganizations 1975-1980.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 80-83.

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that time until 1 June 1975, residual personnel, administration, supply, and finance functions were performed at a residual office at Camp Samae San, Thailand. CINCPAC directed COMUSMACTHAI to incorporate a manpower authorization to perform residual MEDT-C functions in the MACTHAI Support Group FY 76 Joint Manpower Program if the functions continued beyond 30 June 1975. The section was to be named the "Joint Liaison Office."<sup>1</sup>

### USMACTHAI Training & Logistics Division and Detachment for Training & Logistics

(U) The same message that disestablished the MEDT-C, on 2 May, also directed disestablishment of the MACTHAI Training and Logistics Division and Detachment for Training and Logistics, USMACTHAI, effective 30 June 1975. The formation of these organizations was discussed in the Command History of 1974. MACTHAI announced the disestablishment on 17 June.<sup>2</sup>

### U.S. Support Activities Group Thailand (USSAG)/7th Air Force

(U) Following a directive from the JCS, on 11 June CINCPAC directed the disestablishment of USSAG/7th Air Force. CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to redeploy all PACAF aircraft from Thailand that had been designated by the JCS, to close Ubon Air Base, and to assist in the disestablishment. COMUSMACTHAI was directed to insure that the Ambassador in Bangkok was fully aware of actions prior to their execution. The disestablishment was effective at 1700Z on 30 June.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Headquarters 7th Air Force was inactivated by Hq PACAF Special Order GA-20 of 28 June 1975, effective 30 June. Also inactivated was the 13th ADVON (advance echelon). Concurrent with the disestablishment of the 7th Air Force and 13th ADVON, a 17th Air Division was activated to support residual USAF missions. The air division was established at U-Tapao with a detachment at Udorn and operating locations in Bangkok and Nakhon Phanom. The Air Staff limited the 17AD manning authorization to a maximum of 66 military and civilian spaces at the several locations.<sup>4</sup>

(U) With the disestablishment of USSAG/7AF, control of the Four Party Joint Military Team, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and the Residual Defense Attaché Office/Defense Resources Support and Termination Office, Saigon reverted to CINCPAC.<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 020220Z May 75.
  2. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 101; USMACTHAI 170835Z Jun 75.
  3. CINCPAC 110257Z Jun 75, and 142126Z Jun 75; USSAG/7AF 300100Z Jun 75.
  4. 13AF Clark AB 130900Z Aug 75, which promulgated 13AF Programmed Action Directive 76-13-4, 17AD. Also, 17AD was activated effective 1 Jul by Hq PACAF Special Order GA-19 of 28 Jun 75.
  5. CINCPAC 142126Z Jun 75.

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BLUE CHIP

(C) The USSAG/7AF Tactical Air Control Center at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base had been called BLUE CHIP since the formation of the activity. With the deactivation of that agency as of 240001Z August, CINCPAC commented on the "professional performance chalked up by BLUE CHIP during the long years of conflict in Southeast Asia." CINCPAC concluded, "When the going got rough especially during EAGLE PULL, FREQUENT WIND, and the MAYAGUEZ incident, BLUE CHIP covered all bets. BLUE CHIP can close its doors with pride. Well done." All activities were transferred to the 17th Air Division Command Center (Detachment 1) at Udorn.<sup>1</sup>

Defense Attaché Office, Saigon

(U) With the signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam on 27 January 1973, a unique organization had been created in the Republic of Vietnam to assume all Defense Department responsibilities following disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on 29 March 1973. This jointly staffed activity performed traditional attaché functions.

(S) The office was also responsible to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for military and political-military intelligence functions. Most unique, however, were the attaché's Military Assistance Program functions. The Defense Attaché was the representative of the Secretary of Defense (and CINCPAC) with respect to the U.S. security assistance program in the RVN and he coordinated with the Service divisions their planning and management of the respective Military Assistance Service Funded programs that supported the RVNAF. The number of military personnel in Vietnam was limited to 50; the DAO Saigon was unique among attaché offices because of the sometimes over 1,000 civilians assigned in addition to a large number of contractor personnel. This number of civilians had been reduced substantially, as discussed in the FREQUENT WIND appendix to this History, before the actual withdrawal in the spring of 1975.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 29 April 1975 the evacuation of the Americans from Saigon was completed and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam surrendered 301200H April 1975. This effectively terminated the existence of the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon, but on 29 April a DAO Residual Office had been established at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.<sup>3</sup>

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1. 17AD Det 1 OLIB NKP 240001Z Aug 75; CINCPAC 301526Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 50-57.
  3. CINCPAC 292259Z Apr 75.

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(U) A complete discussion of the evacuation of Americans and others from Saigon is included in an Appendix, FREQUENT WIND, in this History.

(S) Earlier, the size of the DAO in Saigon had been reduced several times. (Parenthetically, requirements continued and as late as 3 February General Homer D. Smith, Jr., USA, the DATT, had asked CINCPAC and the Services to try to control short-fuse reporting requirements and official visitors whose week-end field trips often involved civilian overtime. He noted that the 144 recurring reports being provided contained the bulk of the information normally requested, even during periods of heightened interest.)<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 1 April the JCS had forwarded approved reductions in the manpower authorization for the DAO. Just two days later, however, in view of "diminishing functions and the need to divert maximum resources to the RVNAF," additional manpower reductions were authorized. The JCS authorized CINCPAC, in conjunction with the Ambassador, to reduce the DAO Saigon to a "discretionary" manpower level, in addition to the authorized reduction of 218 made on 1 April. The JCS urged that these reductions be "rapidly implemented" to reduce to the minimum essential personnel required to perform the remaining functions.<sup>2</sup>

(U) There had been several attempts to move portions of the DAO organization to some place outside Vietnam when the function could be performed effectively out of country. This was particularly true as the combat situation deteriorated. One example was the establishment of an Alternate DAO Programs Activity Office, which was established at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand to administer RVNAF security assistance matters. The Chief of the Security Assistance Division was directed on 18 April by the DAO to proceed to Nakhon Phanom; it was anticipated that nearly 100 personnel would be moved to that location. Although the Division Chief departed on 19 April, most of those destined for the activity had not arrived before the dramatic events of late April. On 2 May the Division Chief was moved again to join the DAO Residual Office at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. In another attempt to move personnel out of Vietnam, the Air Force DAO programs element was relocated to Clark Air Base in the Philippines, as was the VNAF supply account.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The Residual DAO, Saigon, as noted above, was established under General Smith's direction at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, with those selected for continued

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1. USDAO Saigon 030533Z Feb 75.
  2. JCS 8802/032040Z Apr 75, which cited JCS 6920/012344Z Apr 75.
  3. USDAO Saigon 170201Z Apr 75; USSAG 171140Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 171917Z Apr 75; Letter of Instruction, General Smith, USDAO Saigon to COL Robert L. Hall, Chief, Security Assistance Division, 18 Apr 75; DAO Programs Activity Saigon 210210Z Apr 75; J871 HistSum Apr 75.

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assignment arriving shortly after the withdrawal. General Smith requested that a number of his key officers write their personal accounts of the events preceding the withdrawal. Extracts from a number of these reports as well as the data available to prepare a final report were incorporated in the final publication of that office, the "RVNAF Final Assessment, January through April 1975."

(X) On 24 May the Secretary of Defense requested retention of a skeleton Residual DAO until 31 August 1975 because of continuing Congressional interest and inquiries concerning Vietnam, required Congressional reports, and such incomplete matters as equipment, funding, contracts, and widely scattered employees remaining on DAO rolls. Subsequent legislation, the authorization and appropriation bills for assistance to the refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia, required a report to the Committees on the Judiciary, Appropriations, and International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Judiciary in the Senate. The report was due not more than 30 days after date of enactment of the legislation (23 May 1975) and every 90 days thereafter. Although much of the information required to comply with this reporting requirement would be provided by the Service Departments, input would also be required from the Pacific Command.

(U) The Secretary continued that these factors indicated the need for retention of the USDAO records and some residual functions after 31 August. Accordingly, he designated CINCPAC to assume responsibility for remaining USDAO Saigon Defense Assistance Vietnam functions and records as of 31 August.

(U) The Secretary noted that the Defense Assistance Vietnam appropriation was for one year and funds would not be available subsequent to 30 June 1975 to cover any costs associated with the DAO. As the Department of the Navy had administrative agent responsibility for the PACOM area, funding of all costs associated either with payments of salaries in FY 76 of DAO employees awaiting separation or the FY 76 cost of the Residual DAO organization would be a responsibility of the Navy Department.

(U) The DAO Residual Office at Ft. Shafter closed on 31 August and the CINCPAC staff assumed any residual functions. CINCPAC so advised the Secretary of Defense on 5 September. Earlier, on 12 July, CINCPAC had forwarded to the Secretary a requested concept outline for transition of functions to CINCPAC after deactivation of the DAO. This concept plan was concerned with records management and disposition. The only known PACOM actions that would be required after 31 August involved the Comptroller (budget execution, contract

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1. SECDEF 5116/122100Z Jun 75, which referenced SECDEF 241650Z May 75 and STATE 250814Z May 75.

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payments, civilian personnel payroll, accounting) and Judge Advocate (investigations). Future requirements or taskings were to be handled by applicable PACOM staff agencies as normal staff actions. Existing or anticipated records and files disposition, where known, was listed. CINCPAC asked that the Secretary advise of any known requirements to assure that pertinent documentation remained available.<sup>1</sup>

#### U.S. Delegation to Four Party Joint Military Team

(U) On 27 January 1973 in Paris the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam was signed by representatives of four governments: the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. Article 16 required each party to designate representatives to form a Four Party Joint Military Commission, which functioned for 60 days to insure joint action by the parties to implement specific provisions of the agreement. When the Commission ended its activities, a Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) carried on the tasks. The mission of the U.S. Delegation had been to represent the U.S. Government on the FPJMT to obtain information about U.S. and allied military and civilians missing in action, and to obtain information about the location of the graves of those who died in captivity or were killed in action and to negotiate the repatriation of their remains, and to negotiate entry rights for U.S. search operations into areas where unrecovered remains were believed to be.

(U) The revised Joint Manpower Program for the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, approved by the JCS on 10 October, noted discontinuance of the FPJMT with the manpower spaces returned to the Services.<sup>2</sup>

#### Office of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand

(S) On 7 October 1962 the Chief of the former Military Assistance Advisory Group Laos had become the Deputy Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand. His mission was to continue support of the non-communist elements of the Laos coalition government including the Royal Laotian Army by performing the Military Assistance Program functions of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage of material [REDACTED] for use in Laos. This organization had functioned in this general capacity over the years. In 1973, however, with the ceasefire agreement of 21 February and the 14 September 1973 Protocol to that agreement, the groundwork had been laid for establishment of a Provisional Government of National Union on 5 April 1974. The Protocol had stipulated that

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1. CINCPAC 050630Z Sep 75, and 120035Z Jul 75.
  2. JCS 6948/102226Z Oct 75.

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all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from Laos within 60 days after the PGNU was established. On 15 August 1973 the position of Defense Attaché within the Defense Attaché Office Vientiane had been established and action begun to withdraw U.S. military personnel from Laos except for the 30 military positions accredited to the U.S. Mission as part of the DAO. The Defense Attaché had managed the Military Assistance Program and Military Assistance Service Funded program for Laos, supported by the Deputy Chief, JUSMAG Thailand, who assisted and supported the Attaché from Udorn, Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By 1975, however, the funds had run out. There would be no FY 76 Security Assistance Program for Laos. The residual FY 75 program was to be terminated when funds for rice and POL were exhausted. On 1 June 1975 the Deputy Chief provided future plans for the Lao program. He anticipated that the Deputy Chief JUSMAGTHAI would be deactivated 45 days after the deactivation of the DAO Support Element, which was expected to be about 30 June. According to this plan, the Support Element was to take immediate steps to close, meanwhile managing the residual aid (rice and POL) until the program was terminated. Any records or equipment that could be evacuated were to be evacuated to the Deputy Chief. The remaining equipment and records were to be abandoned or destroyed at the discretion of the Attaché depending on the prevailing political situation.

(S) The Deputy Chief was to take immediate action for the orderly disposal of all station property, vehicles, and assigned C-47 aircraft in order to be able to deactivate in 45 days after deactivation of the Support Element. Immediate action was to be taken to cancel all projected training for the 4th quarter of FY 75 and all of FY 76. COMUSMACTHAI was to assume responsibility for the excess actions associated with all MAP Laos army and air assets on hand or due [REDACTED]. All incoming cargo was to be immediately declared "frustrated cargo."<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 26 June the Secretary of Defense approved the planning with certain modifications and restrictions. Based on this approval, on 28 June the Deputy Chief announced that office would be inactivated on 15 August, with a residual force comprised of selected staff members reassigned to MACTHAI to assist in the orderly close out of the MAP logistics and comptroller functions.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 4 August COMUSMACTHAI assumed responsibility for MAP Laos logistic functions and disposition of MAP Lao assets. Effective 1 August the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand assumed caretaker status, with disestablishment on 15 August.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 417.
  2. DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG UDORN THAI 010800Z Jun 75.
  3. SECDEF 7476/262204Z Jun 75; DEPCHJUSMAGT UDORN 281630Z Jun 75.
  4. USMACTHAI 040737Z Aug 75.

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(C) Two officers and two noncommissioned officers had been assigned to MACTHAI; by November all had been reassigned but one and he was scheduled to be reassigned in January 1976, with no further residual function anticipated beyond that date. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended that the Joint Manpower Program document be closed and on 20 November 1975 the JCS approved this recommendation. The 94 manpower spaces were returned to the Services.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries

(U) In 1973 the possibility of Defense Department coordinators had first been explored. Throughout many countries of the PACOM there were a large number of semi-independent Defense Department organizations--not PACOM agencies--that reported to parent organizations outside the host country and that were without any mechanism for in-country coordination. The result was redundancy, and possible confusion to host governments and other U.S. agencies. The first specific study of the matter was made for the Manila area in 1973. In a longer range view, however, CINCPAC considered it desirable to have the Department authorize a single U.S. military coordinator in each country to provide a unified PACOM voice with non-Defense Department agencies and host governments.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The idea came to fruition in 1975. (A JCS draft Terms of Reference had been forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June 1974 and the action had remained there for a year.) On 15 July 1975 Defense Department Directive 5105.47 provided the Terms of Reference for U.S. Defense Representatives (USDR) in foreign countries to improve the interface between noncombat Defense Department elements, the U.S. Ambassador, and the host country defense establishment. The JCS clarified responsibilities for implementing the directive on 20 August. They directed that CINCPAC designate USDRs for all countries within his assigned general geographic (Unified Command Plan) area of responsibility, and for all countries on the Asian mainland north to the USSR border. They specifically excluded the Malagasy Republic.<sup>3</sup>

(U) CINCPAC's implementing instruction was CINCPAC Instruction 5400.20 of 24 September 1975. An attempt was made to remain as broad and general as possible in the instruction, so the areas of policy, relationships, responsibilities, and authority closely paralleled those of the Department's directive.

(U) In summary, the position of the USDR would normally, but not necessarily, be that occupied by the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and

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1. CINCPAC 080252Z Nov 75; JCS 2303/201955Z Nov 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 45.
  3. DOD Directive 5105.47 of 15 Jul 75, Subj: U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries; JCS 2295/202019Z Aug 75.

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responsibility in the country. The responsibilities would be in addition to his primary duty assignment. The position of USDR was established for U.S. governmental administrative coordination only. (In both the Department's directive and CINCPAC's instruction the word "coordination" was underscored.) The CINCPAC instruction did not change existing command relationships, authorities, functions, responsibilities, access, roles, or normal reporting channels. The USDR was to coordinate general data concerning noncombat Defense Department elements in a foreign country; provide advice and information to the Ambassador; inform the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and CINCPAC of appropriate in-country Defense Department activities; and act as the Department's Coordinating Authority to eliminate redundant administrative and support functions. He was also to take local initiative to improve the interface between the Departments of Defense and State and the host-country defense establishment, and to perform representational responsibilities to the latter two, not otherwise assigned. The USDR had authority over all Department personnel in cases of emergency when U.S. national interest or Defense Department interest were involved and the urgency of the situation precluded referral of the matter up the chain of command to CINCPAC.

(U) CINCPAC designated the following USDRs within the PACOM:

- Afghanistan: Defense Attaché
- Australia: CINCPAC Representative, Australia
- Burma: Defense Attaché
- Republic of China: Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
- Hong Kong: U.S. Defense Liaison Office Representative
- India: U.S. Defense Representative, India
- Indonesia: Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group
- Japan: Commander, U.S. Forces Japan
- Republic of Korea: Commander, U.S. Forces Korea
- Laos: Defense Attaché
- Malaysia: Defense Attaché
- Nepal: Defense Attaché
- New Zealand: Defense Attaché
- Pakistan: U.S. Defense Representative, Pakistan
- Philippines: CINCPAC Representative, Philippines
- Singapore: Defense Attaché
- Sri Lanka: Defense Attaché
- Thailand: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand

For those USDRs not otherwise in the PACOM chain of command, CINCPAC was to provide a letter of evaluation to be included as part of routine fitness/

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effectiveness/efficiency reports to pertain exclusively to their performance in the USDR role.<sup>1</sup>

### Terms of Reference for Subordinate Agencies

~~(S)~~ Southeast Asia agencies underwent major changes with the withdrawal of Americans from Vietnam and Cambodia and the drawdown of forces in Thailand. These are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter. On 23 July, however, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS a number of changes or cancellations to Terms of Reference. These concerned two deletions from COMUSMACTHAI's TOR, deleting the requirement to support the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand (effective 15 August 1975) and the Training and Logistics Detachment command function. The TOR's CINCPAC proposed for cancellation concerned the U.S. Support Activity Group/7th Air Force, the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, and the Defense Attaché Office, Saigon (to be effective 31 August 1975). The JCS approved these recommendations on 1 August.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In 1975 CINCPAC had appointed one officer in each PACOM country to be Defense Representative, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. This task was incorporated in Terms of Reference for a number of such officers as the TOR were revised.

~~(C)~~ On 3 October the JCS had requested that CINCPAC review the Terms of Reference for the U.S. Defense Attaché in Singapore. These were revised to reflect added duties as the U.S. Defense Representative in CINCPAC's revision, which was forwarded to the JCS on 18 October. The same addition for the Defense Attaché in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia was recommended by CINCPAC on 5 November.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ Terms of Reference for the Defense Attaché in Vientiane, Laos were revised and forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC on 11 November, again with Defense Representative duties added.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ Terms of Reference for the Defense Attaché in Rangoon, Burma, had not included his Security Assistance duties. The terms submitted to the JCS by CINCPAC on 11 November included both the Security Assistance function and the U.S. Defense Representative duties.<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 5400.20, 24 Sep 75, Subj: U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries.
  2. CINCPAC 230026Z Jul 75; JCS 2377/012337Z Aug 75; J5122 HistSum Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC 180155Z Oct 75 and 050216Z Nov 75.
  4. CINCPAC 112016Z Nov 75.
  5. CINCPAC 112015Z Nov 75; J455 Point Paper, 11 Sep 75, Subj: Terms of Reference, DAO, Rangoon.

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CINCEUR-CINCPAC Command Arrangements Agreement

(S) The subject of a command arrangements agreement between the CINCs of the European and Pacific Commands had been raised in 1974. As the matter of command structure for the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas had remained under study, CINCPAC believed that it was prudent to hold in abeyance the planning for such an agreement.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In January 1975 CINCPAC proposed a conference with the Deputy CINC European Command to be held at PACOM headquarters to discuss several matters of common responsibility. The conference was held at Camp Smith on 17-18 March.

(S) Topics covered encompassed common responsibilities and support. In the event of U.S./NATO-USSR/Warsaw Pact conflict, it was agreed that the priority U.S. military effort was in support of NATO; for considering a decision to redeploy PACOM forces, national command authorities must weigh the feasibility of disengagement from combat with USSR forces in the PACOM, disengagement or transit losses to attack, the noncontribution of forces during transit time, and the relative effect of forces in the PACOM versus the NATO areas. Discussion of CINCEUR OPLAN 4224 and CONPLAN 4274 and supporting CINCPAC OPLANS identified areas for further refinement and realistic appraisal. Those areas included the size and composition of PACOM forces, the level of the Soviet threat, and specific physical objectives and geographical constraints. The CINCPAC and CINCEUR staffs would continue to develop a command arrangements agreement designed to enhance coordination and mutual effort of Naval forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea areas. Discussion of sea lines of communication to the Mid-East area focused on the viability of alternate routes through the PACOM area in the event Atlantic routes were denied for political or military reasons. Admiral Gayler and General George J. Eade, USAF, the Deputy CINCEUR, agreed on the great value of the discussions, particularly in light of the increasing PACOM support requirement to the Mid-East. On 1 April CINCPAC provided a summary of the conference to the JCS.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 88-89.
  2. (S) Subsequently, CINCPAC's Logistics Directorate developed a detailed study on lines of communication for support of Israel through the PACOM area. It provided several air and water LOC and indicated places where foreign government approvals would be required for U.S. vessel or aircraft transit. Options included both use and denial of use of bases in Thailand and the Philippines. CINCPAC 010223Z Apr 75; J52 HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 194 discussed the numbered plans; J41 HistSum Jul 75 discussed the J4 study noted above.

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(S) When Admiral Gayler visited Europe in June he visited EUCOM Headquarters for discussions of matters of mutual concern. The two commanders agreed to take another look at their plans in the light of perhaps making them more realistic. Admiral Gayler was to provide EUCOM with any specific problems involved in PACOM support, particularly for plans for Israel and Iran; then the staffs were to work together to resolve any problems.

(S) The proposed command arrangement agreement was discussed. They reached a conceptual agreement as to the basis on which such an agreement could be concluded. The discussions were considered to continue the "vital dialogue" necessary to effect planning and coordination for the two commands to effectively complement each other in those areas where both might become involved in contingency operations or general war.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Work continued on the proposed agreement and a meeting was scheduled for February 1976.<sup>2</sup>

#### Revised Terms of Reference for CINCPAC-USCINCREC Command Arrangements

(U) With the disestablishment of U.S. Army Pacific and establishment of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG), Terms of Reference regarding Army forces from the Readiness Command were revised as follows:<sup>3</sup>

...For in-transit PACOM-assigned Army augmentation forces, CINCPAC will exercise OPCOM through the CDRUSACSG, as outlined...above, from arrival in the PACOM area until such forces arrive at a staging area within a subordinate unified command (joint task force) area of responsibility/operations. Upon arrival at a staging area, CINCPAC will exercise OPCOM of these forces as outlined...above. If an Army component commander has not been designated for the CINCPAC subordinate command, the senior Army commander will exercise the Army responsibilities as outlined in para 30234, JCS Pub 2. With regard to redeployment of augmentation forces to the supporting commander, CINCPAC will return operational command of U.S. Army augmentation forces, exercised through the CDRUSACSG during the in-transit movement through the PACOM, to USCINCREC when such forces depart the PACOM area of responsibility as reflected in the Unified Command Plan.

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1. USCINCEUR 110800Z Jul 75.
  2. CINCPAC 120030Z Dec 75.
  3. CINCPAC 161825Z Apr 75, which revised CINCPAC/USCINCREC Command Arrangements Agreement dated 13 Jun 73. Appendix I to the CINCPAC Command History 1974 contains the text of JCS Pub 2, para 30234.

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The CINC of the Readiness Command concurred in the rewording and the proposal to consider the text "For Official Use Only."<sup>1</sup>

Procedures for Evacuation/Destruction of CINCONAD Facilities in PACOM

(S) In December 1974 the CINC of the Continental Air Defense Command had proposed that CINCPAC agree to certain evacuation/destruction procedures for his activities in the PACOM. In a situation in which time was not critical and U.S. personnel were not in immediate jeopardy, CINCPAC was to coordinate with CINCONAD and order evacuation or destruction of the host base only after CINCONAD approval. CINCONAD would retain operational control of his units and order evacuation or destruction through his own channels. In a situation in which time was critical, CINCPAC would assume operational control of CINCONAD units and order evacuation or destruction, keeping CINCONAD advised.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 28 November CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF and the commanders of areas where CINCONAD units were located for their comments. He visualized that operational control would be exercised through CINCPACAF. CINCPAC advised CINCONAD on 10 January 1975 that he agreed, and provided implementing procedures. The CONAD units in the PACOM covered by the agreement were:<sup>3</sup>

16th Surveillance Squadron, Shemya AFB, Alaska  
Det 1, 10 Aerospace Defense Squadron, Johnston AFB  
Det 2, 18 Surveillance Squadron, Johnston AFB  
Det 1, 18 Surveillance Squadron, Timaru, New Zealand  
5th Defense Space Communication Squadron, Woomera, Australia  
17th Radar Squadron, Ko Kha Air Station, Thailand  
14th Communications Squadron, Tokorozawa, Japan  
Det 1, 14th Communications Squadron, Chitose Air Base, Japan  
Det 2, 14th Communications Squadron, Wallace Air Station, Philippines  
Det 3, 14th Communications Squadron, Awase, Japan

The three sites in Japan were the 440L Over-the-Horizon radar sites scheduled to be closed in June 1975, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

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1. USCINCRD 181757Z Apr 75.
  2. CINCONAD 131330Z Nov 74.
  3. CINCPAC 280210Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 132020Z Dec 74; COMUSMACTHAI 040600Z Dec 74; CINCPACREPPHIL 160850Z Dec 74; USAFLO/CINCPACREP Australia 130058Z Dec 74; USDAO Wellington 020130Z Dec 74; COMUSJ 130601Z Dec and 160704Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 100256Z Jan 75 and 100300Z Jan 75. This last message contained the agreement.

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(S) In February the CINC of the Alaskan Command requested confirmation that host base personnel of his command supporting the CONAD unit at Shemya would be evacuated coincident with CONAD personnel. On 10 March CINCPAC advised him that consistent with CINCPAC's Unified Command Plan responsibility for defense of the Aleutians and as specified in CINCPAC's agreement with CINCONAD, Alaskan Air Command host base personnel at Shemya would be evacuated with CONAD personnel.<sup>1</sup>

#### Planning for Pacific Regional Commands

(S) In 1974, as the matter of changes to the Unified Command Plan had been under study, the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare contingency plans for the activation and support of a Northeast Asia Command, a Southwest Pacific Command, and other regional commands, as necessary, any of which could be activated by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The required plans were forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS on 12 February 1975 for a NEACOM and a SWPACOM (pronounced knee-com, swap-a-com by the staff). Admiral Gayler advised that the plans met the requirement, but "I do not endorse either." Both plans hinged on acceptance of the premise that regional commands offered advantages over the existing PACOM command structure and would thus be activated in the event of war or other contingency. "There are weaknesses in that premise," CINCPAC said.

(S) In Northeast Asia there were "decisive factors across the board. South Koreans perceive a major threat; the Japanese do not." CINCPAC continued:<sup>3</sup>

South Korea maintains a large defense establishment supported by conscription; Japan has a small constitutionally-limited voluntary self-defense force. Attitudes toward nuclear weapons are poles apart. Bilateral cooperation on key issues of air defense is a long-standing unresolved problem. Two entirely different types of military operations are foreseen: landmass warfare on the Korean peninsula; an air/naval campaign in defense of insular Japan. In contingencies, short of all-out freeworld/communist war (WW III), these divergencies create an environment that will not support establishment of an effective U.S. Regional Unified Command structure with headquarters in either country. Finally,

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1. J5245 HistSum Mar 75; CINCAL 202010Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 102251Z Mar 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 49-56.
  3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S111-75 of 12 Feb 75, Subj: Contingency Plans for Activation and Support of Pacific Regional Commands (NEACOM/SWPACOM) (C).

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animosities between Japan and Korea may make it impossible for them to act as allies except in separate relation to the United States.

...A Southwest Pacific area command in the Philippines may be politically infeasible in peacetime. It may be less than an optimum arrangement/location in wartime or contingency operations unless Philippine national interests are directly threatened from external sources. Unlike NEACOM, SWPACOM is not confined to two locations for contingency operations. Therefore, Headquarters SWPACOM would need to be mobile. If not mobile, additional commands, subordinate to SWPACOM, would be required. Such commands could just as well be established within the present PACOM organizational structure. I see nothing gained by planning for a U.S. Regional Unified Command in the Philippines, or elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific area, when actual deployment of forces and force/headquarters location/composition is so scenario dependent.

...The existing PACOM command structure appears more appropriate politically and militarily for any realistic contingency postulated for the two regions. We currently have sufficient organizational and force flexibility to quickly tailor a command for contingency operations. By planning for activation of Regional Unified Commands with designated commanders, command locations, and areas of responsibility, we unnecessarily limit our inherent flexibility to respond to specific contingencies with optimum force and command structure.

... Accordingly, recommend further planning for regional commands be discontinued....

~~(C)~~ Upon receipt of the plans, the JCS advised CINCPAC that they could be considered a point of departure in the event that activation of such a command was directed. They were to be modified, however, to include provisions for both commands to be activated as either regional commands reporting through the JCS or as subordinate unified commands reporting to CINCPAC. They were to be maintained only as concept plans.<sup>1</sup>

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1. JCS 9810/231840Z Apr 75.

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### CINCPAC Command Center

(U) A major evaluation of the CINCPAC Command Center was undertaken in 1972. The first phase concerned short-term projects and was completed that year. The second concerned improvements that would take place in the mid- and late 1970s. These were to be specified in a plan that provided basic guidance and objectives for the planning and development of command and control systems within the PACOM.<sup>1</sup>

(U) CINCPAC's Command and Control Master Plan was forwarded to the JCS on 29 January 1975. (A plan was to be submitted annually at that time.) CINCPAC's plan contained overall guidance for the development of the system and also contained nine formal statements of Required Operational Capabilities. The JCS directive to implement the program had also outlined procedures for transmission of command and control Operational Requirements. Essentially, CINCPAC was to forward all CINCPAC-originated Operational Requirements to the JCS for validation. He was also to validate Operational Requirements from his subordinate unified commands, which did not include commitment of resources, and forward them to the JCS. He was also to comment upon all component Service command Operational Requirements prior to their submission to their parent Service organization. Detailed information, however, on developing or developed Service systems that must ultimately be accommodated within the unified command was not available within the existing structure. It was believed that the interface requirements of the various Service strategic and tactical systems had to be planned for by the unified commands in the development of their own command and control systems.<sup>2</sup>

(U) CINCPAC's Command and Control Master Plan was well received by the JCS. The nine Required Operational Capabilities, as had been expected, were being handled as separate programs, but some were treated together as larger programs. The PACOM Integrated Information Network, which contained a "Conferenceable Secure Voice" Required Operational Capability, was being sponsored by the Communications-Data Processing Directorate and the MITRE Corporation with success. The CINCPAC Display and Information System (CINDIS) and the Operations/Intelligence Interface Required Operational Capabilities were being treated as a single program, which was also part of a military construction improvement called the Command Center Development Program, which is discussed below.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 38-40.
  2. J335 Point Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S71 of 29 Jan 75, Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan.

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(U) Technical Analysis and Cost Estimate (TACE) processing of requirements began on 14 October when a contract study team from Aeronutronic-Ford arrived at CINCPAC headquarters to prepare TACE for the CINDIS systems. (CINDIS was also called the CINCPAC Information Processing and Display System.) The study was conducted jointly under the control of the Operations Directorate and the Navy's Electronic Systems Command.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Four of the Required Operational Capabilities had to do with enhancement of the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post. These were being allowed to take their formal time paths and it was expected that they would be developed into another major program sometime after the beginning of the next fiscal year.

(U) The construction program mentioned above was the Command Center Development Program, which called for a completely remodeled third floor in Buildings 4 and 80 at Camp Smith. Building 4 housed the "old" Command Center and was connected to Building 80, the newer command center building that had been completed in 1967. In April 1975 CINCPAC began actions regarding a major budgetary submission aimed at an initial occupancy capability in Fiscal Year 1978 and the engineering necessary for the submission of a major military construction project. Total program costs were estimated at \$15 million. On 27 May CINCPAC forwarded Military Construction Project Data (form 1391) for the project. The goal was to establish a Consolidated Command Center containing Operations Watch Personnel, Intelligence Center Pacific Watch Personnel, a command briefing room, and crisis management augmentation facilities.<sup>2</sup>

(U) To man facilities that were available in crisis situations, CINCPAC provided new guidance on staff organization and procedures for crisis action in an instruction on 22 September. The CINCPAC Battle Staff consisted of the Chief of Staff and the six principal directors (J1-J6), augmented by the Political Adviser, Public Affairs Officer, and others as directed by the Chief of Staff. As a crisis developed the Battle Staff assessed the situation and developed planning guidance, which might include formation of an Operations Action Group (OAG), which was responsible for the coordination of all actions arising during a crisis, and an Operations Planning Group (OPG) that was responsible for all planning support in those instances where the crisis encompassed actions that were not covered by existing contingency plans, where extensive tailoring of such plans was required, or where implementation of existing plans would require extensive coordination. In the instruction it had been acknowledged that it was not possible to set forth in detail the various organizations and procedures needed to cope with the spectrum of crisis

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1. J3 WEB 14-17 Oct 75.
  2. J335 HistSums Feb, Apr 75; J335 HistSum May 75, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser 147 of 27 May.

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possibilities. The basic approach, therefore, was to establish the mechanism for these groups that might be required. Emphasis had to be placed on the speed and accuracy of the response to decision-making requirements.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 17 December the Operations Directorate conducted a Crisis Action Workshop for the members of the organizations that had been formed for crisis management. Members of the Operations Action Group and the Operations Planning Group attended the first of what was planned to be a series of workshops designed to facilitate coordination prior to a crisis or exercise situation.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Earlier, in February, six short-range projects in support of the Command Center had been initiated, two to enhance communications and four to improve computer support. The projects were full-time connectivity to the computer (elimination of timeout breaks), establishment of a mechanism for priority allocation of computer resources to the Command Center, automation of emergency checklists, an Emergency Action Message generation system, improvement of All-Source Information Center Communications (ASICOMM), and ASICOMM extension to Embassies on the Indian Ocean littoral.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In an unrelated Command Center matter, in August the Air Force Chief of Staff had transmitted a directive within Air Force channels prohibiting the recording of conversations with USAF command centers without the use of warning tones to advise of the recording process. In September, however, the JCS advised of a Defense Department directive that stated that command centers might conduct a telephone recording without using the warning tones. A message reiterating JCS policy in that regard was promulgated by CINCPAC. Recording was permitted for Emergency Action Message conferences, missile warning conferences, communications tests, and operational reports.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ Regarding Service command and control systems, CINCPAC was particularly interested in the progress of CINCPACFLT's command center. Both CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT had basically the same requirements in that both had to receive, process, and display (or distribute) information and disseminate orders. Both operated primarily in the manual mode in 1975. CINCPACFLT, however, was testing a system that would automate information handling to some extent. A prototype of the Lockheed-developed Multisource Correlation Center was being installed as an "interim" Fleet Command Center (FCC). This interim system would provide displays and automatic information exchange with comparable systems already

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1. CINCPACINST 3120.2, 22 Sep 75, Subj: CINCPAC Staff Organization and Procedures for Crisis Action.
  2. J332 HistSum Dec 75.
  3. J3 WEB 3-9 Feb 75.
  4. J3 WEB 10-14 Nov 75, which cited DOD Directive 4640.1.

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installed on USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63), called a Tactical Flag Command Center. CINCPACFLT was not sure what the interim FCC would achieve, but it was resorted to because years of attempting to define requirements for a full-fledged FCC had not provided adequate systems. The intention was to try it out and evolve an effective system by examining and demonstrating its utility rather than by elaborate theoretical justifications. It was hoped to capitalize on FCC background research at CINCPAC headquarters. CINCPAC-stated requirements for a CINCPAC Display and Information System (CINDIS) and an Operations/Intelligence Interface program were conceptually almost identical to those of the Fleet. The level of forces being controlled and the elements of information that would be processed on a CINCPAC system would be different, and those differences would mean major modifications to the FCC software. The FCC did not include acquisition of an "intelligent" terminal (discussed elsewhere in this chapter), but it was believed that the interim FCC was a good prototype for a CINCPAC system.<sup>1</sup>

#### Airborne Command Post Activities

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), nicknamed BLUE EAGLE, celebrated ten years of operation on 3 October 1975 with a ceremony at the Armed Forces' new Hale Koa Hotel at Fort DeRussy, Hawaii. Admiral Gayler led the official cutting of the anniversary cake.<sup>2</sup>

1965-1975

(C) The ABNCP had begun what was to be continuous airborne watch on 4 October 1965, but the continuous airborne alert had been cancelled on 1 January 1970 and BLUE EAGLE had maintained a ground alert status since that time.

(U) On 11 October the first of three EC-135J aircraft to be assigned was received. The aircraft had the same communications capability as the "P" model had, but the addition of fan jet engines and improved navigational equipment enhanced the system. The addition of the fan jet engines increased endurance or range by approximately 12 percent.<sup>3</sup>

(C) A VERDIN Shipboard Receive Terminal was temporarily placed on an ABNCP aircraft in February for a special JCS-directed test by the Defense Communications Agency. The transmitter was on a TACAMO aircraft of the Atlantic Command. (TACAMO was the nickname for airborne Very Low Frequency radio broadcasting done from Navy EC-130 aircraft and associated operations.) The tests of this long-range communication means were conducted between

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1. J335 Point Paper, 21 Aug 75, Subj: Command Centers/Command Support.
  2. J3310 HistSum Oct 75.
  3. Ibid.

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28 February and 5 March. The equipment was removed from Aircraft 011 immediately after completion of the test. Initial results indicated an assured range of 4,400 nautical miles. The Defense Communications Agency evaluated test results of this type.<sup>1</sup>

✓ ~~(C)~~ In its ground alert posture, two kinds of training exercises were conducted regularly throughout the year. The exercises were initiated by the CINCPAC Command Center, normally about five a month. In 1975 ten exercises were conducted while the ABNCP was deployed in the PACOM, rather than at its home base at Hickam Air Force Base. These deployed alerts were conducted at Kadena (Okinawa), Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and Yokota, Japan. There were two basic BLUE EAGLE exercises: BLUE EAGLE TWO was an alert training exercise in which the aircraft taxied to a runway hold area, BLUE EAGLE FOUR was an exercise that launched the aircraft on a local flight. In 1975 all of the exercises in both series were successful in that all were completed within the 15 minutes allowed. BLUE EAGLE TWO exercises took an average of 7.4 minutes each and BLUE EAGLE FOUR just 8 minutes.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ An Alternate Command Authority program, a series of briefings and optional orientation flights for certain general and flag officers, continued in 1975. Five members of CINCPAC's staff received the briefing and 15 members of other commands in the PACOM were also briefed, principally when the ABNCP was deployed in the Western Pacific area. Additionally, orientation briefs and a tour of the aircraft were conducted on 28 September for officers from the COMUS Korea Command Center and the Osan Operations Center.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ Operations continued to test Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency (LF/VLF) capabilities. These missions consisted of continuous wave and secure teletype communications among TACAMO, nuclear-powered submarines, designated Naval Communications stations (air-to-ground), and the Airborne Command Post. In 1975 nearly half of the scheduled test operations were cancelled for various reasons, including aircraft equipment problems, communications equipment problems, or weather.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ In November, Battle Staff One rendezvoused with Admiral Gayler at McChord Air Force Base. CINCPAC directed the deployment to exercise deployment flexibility and to utilize communications areas that were normally not exercised. Discussions with the Admiral included ABNCP missions and requirements, operational factors, and other considerations, such as the Airborne Command and Control Center role for the ABNCP.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J33115 and J335 HistSums Feb 75.
  2. J3310 HistSums Jan-Dec 75.
  3. J3310 HistSums Jan, Apr, Jul-Nov 75.
  4. J3310 HistSums Jan-Mar, May-Dec 75.
  5. J3310(A) HistSum Nov 75.

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(S) In one other Western Pacific deployment, in September Battle Staff One, accompanied by the JCS Director for Operations and his party, demonstrated a survivable Alternate Command Facility, exercised Western Pacific command and control systems and communications facilities, conducted Alternate Command Authority training, and provided an orientation briefing.<sup>1</sup>

(U) See also the subject "Specialized Weapons Systems" elsewhere in this chapter.

#### All-Source Information Centers

(S) Command Centers at certain locations in the PACOM served as All-Source Information Centers (ASIC). The ASIC mission was to gather, correlate, and display on a near-real-time basis all-source information on land, sea, and air activities and, in an emergency, to pass that information vertically and laterally to commanders as soon as possible. ASICs were linked to one another in the PACOM by voice and teletype command communications systems to include the ASICOM teletype system for special intelligence information.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Early in 1975 CINCPAC advised his component commands and subordinate commands in the system as well as 13th Air Force and the Alaskan Command that CINCPAC had experienced numerous difficulties in communicating with subscribers in the Western Pacific. The major reason was the poor reliability of circuit paths used. The ASIC net problems were further compounded by the combining of the two loops. When both loops were combined, any subscriber experiencing difficulty simply relayed the trouble to the entire net, making isolation extremely hard, and time consuming at best. New procedures were placed in effect to alleviate these difficulties, restoring a two-loop concept of operations. Subscribers wishing to communicate with a subscriber not in their loop requested entry to the other loop through CINCPAC.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In late October CINCPAC's ASIC project officer visited all ASIC facilities in the PACOM, at each of which the new BENCHLINE warning system was a primary area of interest.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J3310 HistSum Sep 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 94.
  3. CINCPAC 162329Z Jan 75.
  4. J3321 HistSum Oct 75.

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## PACOM Computer Support<sup>1</sup>

### Facilities and Equipment

(U) During 1975 significant improvements were made in the computer support provided CINCPAC headquarters. Computer equipment was selected to meet the growing automatic data processing needs of the staff and component and subordinate unified commands. Computer hardware upgrading included acquisition and installation of the following items. A computer core that increased the size of the Camp Smith Honeywell computer to 384K and of the Kunia computer to 256K. (Kunia was the location of CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility, in central Oahu about 18 miles from CINCPAC's Camp Smith Headquarters.) Part of this upgrading for Camp Smith was done with equipment that had been declared surplus to the needs of the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information System. Nine disc units (six for Camp Smith and three for Kunia) provided greater storage capability. Eight Visual Information Processors (VIP) (six at Camp Smith, two at Kunia) were installed to increase user capability for direct interaction with the computer using the time-sharing system. A remote line printer was installed at Camp Smith to support the Logistics and Plans Directorates. Also installed was a Control Data Corporation (CDC) tape certifier for the Camp Smith computer center. Future additions planned for both Camp Smith and Kunia had included a control console, printer, card reader, and secure data link between Camp Smith and Kunia. Increasing system redundancy, it was believed, would overcome the "single-thread" shortcomings of the existing computer systems, thereby improving system reliability. By the end of the year, however, many proposals regarding Kunia were being held in abeyance as continued use of the facility by CINCPAC was under study.

(U) In planning for the future needs of CINCPAC, a list of ADP requirements in priority for FY 76 and FY 77 was submitted in November to the Chief of Naval Operations, an Operations Procurement (OP)-913 process.

(U) In 1975 the JCS established the AN/GYQ-21(V) as standard hardware as part of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for use as a network and front-end processor. It identified a family of variable configured mini-computer systems that were designed for flexible application to user needs. Analysis was begun for possible CINCPAC procurement of the system.

(U) Plans for developing a PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC) to provide support for CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT computer operations progressed

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1. Information on this subject was derived entirely from J631 HistSums Jan-Dec 75, unless otherwise noted. Subsequent citations pertain only to the paragraphs so identified.

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throughout the year. This project had been initiated in 1974 as on-going reorganizations and reductions generated a requirement to develop one center to provide such support. In January 1975 planning and working groups were formed to conduct a feasibility study. The headquarters, besides CINCPAC, were the component commands, the Army CINCPAC Support Group, the Intelligence Center Pacific, the Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific, and the Naval Command Systems Support Activity Detachment Pacific. Data on existing computer facilities and organization structures was collected and analyzed. A final report was issued locally in June recommending consolidation of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT automated data processing. Congress approved funds for construction of such a facility. The building being used by the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) was examined as a feasible location and floor plans had been developed for computer equipment. Action continued as the year ended with CINCPACFLT tasked by the Chief of Naval Operations to advise on plans for centralization.

(U) An "intelligent" terminal for use at CINCPAC headquarters was demonstrated from 7 to 15 July at Camp Smith by a team from the Center for Advanced Computation at the University of Illinois. This was an experimental Touch Terminal device. It was a piece of equipment like a portable television set. By touching the screen, it became activated and printed a range of things within its capability. By physically touching one of these, it printed the requested material electronically on the screen, or provided a further selection choice. It could draw a map and then cross-hatch portions, it could print statistics as numbers, or it could draw a graph. After a briefing for Admiral Gayler (also attended by representatives from PACAF, FMFPAC, and the Army's CINCPAC Support Group), the program was endorsed by the Admiral. CINCPAC requested authority from the Chief of Naval Operations for sole-source procurement of two PDP 11/10 mini-computer systems, an additional 8K memory, and two RX-11 floppy discs to support the terminal and display system. In November a representative from the Center for Advanced Computation proposed that a team be sent to CINCPAC for three months beginning in January 1976 to act as study consultant for touch terminal development. Evaluation of this proposal was almost complete as the year ended. Generally it looked cost-effective. The Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity Pacific was supporting the touch terminal development by providing CINCPAC with computer time on their PDP 11/40 to develop software.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The Naval Command Systems Support Activity Detachment Pacific was designing a data base for the Dynamic Planning system. Their proposed development schedule estimated a limited demonstration capability by March 1976 and system turnover beginning in July of that year. The Strategic Air

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1. J335 HistSums Jul and Dec 75 also provided information on this subject.

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Command had provided CINCPAC with a copy of their Force Management Information System tapes. These were to be evaluated by a CINCPAC team.

### Staff Support

(U) Throughout the year extensive automatic data processing support was provided to the CINCPAC staff before and during exercises and special operations. To assist Crisis Action Teams in the Cambodia and Vietnam withdrawal operations, the Operations Directorate requested ADP support. ADP support teams provided direct assistance to Command Center Watch personnel when confronted with an ADP-related problem. They also developed software, relocated terminals, and trained staff personnel.

(U) Earlier, from 3 to 14 March, during Exercise PRIME RATE, the biggest exercise conducted during the year, ADP support had been provided. Support for PRIME RATE included development of exercise-related software, temporary relocation of Visual Information Processor terminals, special preventive maintenance on hardware, participation on each player team by analyst/programmers, and designation of an ADP evaluation team to record problems and identify ways to improve ADP support in the future. Some equipment failures resulted in brief periods of downtime and demonstrated the vulnerabilities inherent in relying on a "single-thread" configuration to support time-critical reporting functions. Both Kunia and Camp Smith computers were involved in exercise play, and some problems occurred in transmission of data between those facilities.

(U) From PRIME RATE, the Southeast Asia withdrawal operations, and other exercises and operations, it became apparent to CINCPAC that time-critical ADP information and reporting functions could be more responsive to the decision makers and planners in the Command Center. CINCPAC tasked the Director of the ADP Systems Support Group (J63) to provide Crisis Action Teams with rapid access to critical information during contingency operations. As a result of this, a Dynamic Planning Group (DPG) was formed in July to study the problem and formulate actions to broaden and accelerate existing ADP crisis action support. The team's work centered around development of a Touch Panel computer terminal and software, the touch terminal discussed above.

(U) Also under development by the DPG were the Flexible Reporting System (FLEXREP) and the General On-Line Display System (GOLDS). These systems would allow transfer of status displays between commands. Work was expected to continue throughout 1976 by the team in development of human-terminal and terminal-WWMCCS interface techniques and software.

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(U) Program development for the CINCPAC staff to aid in planning and decision making continued in a number of areas during the year. Much work went into debugging and streamlining operational programs according to the user's needs. New programs and modules to existing programs were implemented for specific applications, a few of which are described below.

(U) A Message Output Processor (MOP) became operational in January. Developed by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity, the system provided the capability to create both narrative and data pattern messages in the WWMCCS Honeywell 6060, and output to tape that could be directly put into the Camp Smith Telecommunication Center's Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX). Installation in April allowed messages to be released directly into the LDMX and the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) system by a Visual Information Processor terminal user.

(U) As explained in the 1974 CINCPAC Command History, the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Interim Software (JIS) system had been developed through a coordinated effort among USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCREC, the JCS, and CINCPAC. Development of modules and their associated programs was accomplished by dividing the work up among the participating commands: CINCREC produced a Force Requirements Generator, CINCLANT a Transportation Feasibility Estimator, CINCPAC a Movement Requirements Generator, and USCINCEUR an Interface/Utility Subsystem. The JIS was an integral part of the WWMCCS. The baseline system, JOPS III, was scheduled for delivery by the JCS in 1975.

(U) The JOPS provided the capability to improve joint operation planning through the use of automated assistance in plan development, review, preliminary movement planning, and execution planning. Modules were added to the JIS during 1975. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) File Interface Module was installed in January by the Readiness Command. This JOPS module provided an interface among several existing data files, resulting in increased automation of the deployment planning process. The Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE) subsystem of the JOPS was installed on the Camp Smith WWMCCS computer in August by a team from CINCLANT. The LANTCOM-developed TFE estimated air and sea movements to determine adequacy of port and transportation resources.

(U) With these installations, the JOPS III system was considered installed and operational in November 1975.

(U) An Electronic Warfare Information System (EWIS) was a major ADP application that became operational in August on the Camp Smith Honeywell 6060 computer. It had been developed by the National Military Command System Support Center. EWIS provided a data base of information from many sources on

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the status and capabilities of friendly electronic warfare elements and electromagnetic threats.

(U) In 1974 the JCS had advised of the availability of the Single Integrated Damage Assessment Capability (SIDAC) system and asked whether it was required by CINCPAC. It was determined that it was required, and a team from the JCS installed functional software and provided necessary training 12-15 May 1975. The system provided a means to estimate damage from nuclear attack, either by blast and thermal effects or by fallout. It provided a means for developing wind vectors for fallout prediction throughout much of the PACOM. Later, when an anticipated installation of a Defense Support Program terminal was accomplished, CINCPAC would have the capability to predict damage from a nuclear blast. It had application within the Residual Capabilities Assessment (RECA) System, discussed below, as well as in planning the use of friendly weapons or the effects of enemy employed weapons. The anticipated indirect assessment capability from SIDAC was expected to greatly enhance CINCPAC's RECA capability.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A separate program, the Nuclear Operational Monitoring System (NOMS), which used the SIDAC data base, had been developed by the National Military Command System Support Center as a replacement for the SIOP Following System (Single Integrated Operation Plan). It was being installed on the Kunia H6060 computer. NOMS provided for resource monitoring and damage assessment worldwide through automatic processing of Coordination of Atomic Operations Standard Operating Procedures (CAOSOP) messages.

(U) The Residual Capabilities Assessment (RECA) System was an ADP software system developed by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity. It was installed on the Camp Smith H6060 in December. It was capable of assessing friendly residual capabilities following actual nuclear attack and during exercises.

(U) A Location Report (LOCREP) System was developed by CINCPAC's ADP Systems Support Group for the Operations Directorate. It provided new and timely information on current ship movement data. Another program was the PACOM Area Airfield Capabilities (PAACA), which printed out detailed information on airfields throughout the PACOM. Both provided information especially needed during crisis and exercise situations by the Crisis Action Team leaders.

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1. Information on SIDAC provided in J334 HistSum May 75 and J3 WEB 5-11 May 75.

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### Support to Other Commands

(U) During 1975 CINCPAC headquarters provided ADP support to other commands in Hawaii and to subordinate unified commands throughout the command. In Hawaii computer time was made available to both component commands and to the PACFLT Data Processing Service Center, Pearl Harbor. As tasked by the JCS in January, CINCPAC began providing the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group with ADP support on the same basis as other non-Headquarters CINCPAC users. A KG-13 was loaned to FMFPAC to link that headquarters with the CINCPACFLT H6060. Plans were being developed to provide FMFPAC with access to the Camp Smith H6060 computer.

(U) For Thailand, there had been plans under development throughout the first half of 1975 to interconnect a remote computer terminal at Camp Samae San with the Camp Smith H6060. The Chief of Naval Operations had authorized funds, but the project was terminated when it was learned that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Thailand. Essential ADP support in Thailand was being transferred to the State Department there.

(U) For Taiwan, in June a JCS-approved dedicated Defense Satellite Communications circuit became operational between the Camp Smith H6060 and the TDC remote computer terminal, a Honeywell H716. Since that time, COMUSTDC had received and successfully tested 11 computer programs for use of the TDC remote terminal. This terminal was hosted by the Camp Smith WWMCCS computer. Programs provided support for operations, logistics, communications, and personnel functions. The Naval Command Systems Support Activity installed the programs and trained TDC personnel in their use. The JCS also authorized the test of using dial-up Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) service to provide a communications link between the TDC WWMCCS terminal and the CINCPAC WWMCCS computer. CINCPAC provided funds to fabricate needed interface units. Testing was scheduled for February 1976.

(U) The Korea WWMCCS computer, a Honeywell 6060, installation was completed in May. Operational testing was completed in October. A package of ADP-related documents was forwarded to COMUS Korea in December describing CINCPAC software and development programs that might be useful in Korea.

(U) COMUS Japan had identified a need for teleprocessing facilities to support both his mission and the PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan. (The plan is discussed elsewhere in this chapter.) Proposed facilities would permit interchange of data among COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, and CINCPAC. Through a remote job entry terminal, U.S. Forces Japan data processing requirements would be satisfied by existing WWMCCS Honeywell computers and would support crisis control, logistic planning, and status monitoring. In accordance with a request from COMUS Japan, CINCPAC provided technical assistance in development of a detailed statement of Required Operational Capabilities.

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(U) As requested by the JCS, CINCPAC was reviewing data exchange requirements for the WWMCCS ADP link between CINCPAC and the Alaskan Air Command. (The disestablishment of the Alaskan Command, a unified command, is discussed elsewhere in this chapter.) Under review were the data files previously identified in justification for the link: Bering Sea data to support contingency operations, and intelligence data exchange among the Readiness Command, Alaska, and the PACOM.

(U) Installation of the CINCPAC-developed Movement Requirements Generator module, discussed above with the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), in the Atlantic Command was completed on 5 February. This completed CINCPAC's responsibility to create and export this module. It had already been installed at the JCS and the European and Readiness Commands.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Another CINCPAC-developed program was the PACOM Automated Target File (PATF), which provided staff users with installation characteristics, Designated Ground Zero, and weapon data on each target specified in Operation Plans. CINCPAC personnel completed installation of this program for the WWMCCS computer program at Atlantic Command headquarters in early August.<sup>2</sup>

#### Keeping CINCPAC Informed

~~(TS)~~ On 16 April the State Department advised all Chiefs of Mission in the PACOM of the importance of keeping CINCPAC and his Political Adviser abreast of significant events in the area. It was noted that both in the field and in the bureau for East Asian affairs they had been "letting CINCPAC down" by overlooking him and his POLAD as proper addressees on telegraphic messages. This omission, the message continued, had "materially affected" CINCPAC's ability to perform his "functions which are so closely inter-related with our own." The various categories of message traffic were listed and guidelines for the inclusion of CINCPAC were passed to the Chiefs of Mission as "helpful reminders" to their staffs.<sup>3</sup>

#### CINC Availability--Alternate Execution Procedures

~~(TS)~~ In November the matter of the availability of the Commander in Chief and JCS definitions of that availability were addressed. The JCS Emergency Action Procedures concerned with alternate procedures contained the following information regarding CINC availability. "Peacetime: In the event a commander ascertains that he will not be available as an executing authority for a period

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1. J6 WEB 2-9 Feb 75.
  2. J6 WEB 4-8 Aug 75.
  3. STATE 087337/162052Z Apr 75; for additional discussion, see Chapter X, Political-Military Relationships.

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of 24 hours or more, he will require that his primary command center notify the ...[National Military Command Center via secure means]....Periods of Tension: During periods of tension (commencing at JCS DEFCON 3 [Defense Readiness Condition]), a CINC availability conference will be initiated each 24 hours by the primary command center to obtain from the CINC command centers the availability of the CINC's and their alternates for the next 24 hour period." On 13 November the JCS provided a detailed definition of "CINC availability," as follows:<sup>1</sup>

A CINCPAC will be considered available when he personally has immediate access to the following:

a. A staff that can assist him in formulating [REDACTED] recommendations for presentation to the NCA [National Command Authorities].

b. A command and control team [REDACTED] as directed by the NCA.

c. Communications systems for transmitting [REDACTED] messages to executing commanders.

Determination of availability would remain with the individual CINC, and, during peacetime, notifications would be required only when the period of non-availability was expected to exceed 24 hours.

#### Command and Control Communications in a Severe Nuclear Environment

(U) On 2 December 1974 the JCS had advised CINCPAC and the other unified commanders of an informational briefing on the effects of nuclear weapons on command and control communications systems that had been prepared by the Office of the JCS and already presented to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. They suggested it would be useful to CINCPAC and his staff, and the briefing was given at CINCPAC headquarters on 23-24 January 1975.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J3 WEB 17-21 Nov 75, which cited JCS 131748Z Nov 75.  
2. J3352 HistSum Dec 75; JCS 2936/022031Z Dec 74.

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Commanders' Conference

(C) On 14 August CINCPAC attended a conference called by the Chairman of the JCS of the CINCs of the unified and specified commands and the Service Chiefs; it was held at the headquarters of the CINC Alaskan Command. Each of the CINCs had expressed interest in specific topics to be considered at the meeting. Those proposed by CINCPAC were lessons learned in the operations of the spring of 1975 (EAGLE PULL, FREQUENT WIND, MAYAGUEZ, etc.), Pacific-Indian Ocean strategy, tactical nuclear weapons issues, U.S. logistical support to the Mid-East, and the force posture in the Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

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1. JCS 4942/052157Z Aug 75 (EX); J74 HistSum Aug 75.

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SECTION IV--FORCE POSTURE

Readiness of PACOM Forces

(U) The state of readiness of PACOM forces, particularly in the light of reduced funds, was studied both in the PACOM and at the Washington level throughout 1975.

(C) In 1974 CINCPAC had studied the impact of the POL crisis of late 1972 and early 1973 and the continuing impact of fuel availability on force readiness. At that time CINCPAC had advised that although readiness decreases due to fuel reductions did not show, he did not believe that this picture was accurate. The difficulty in precise assessment lay in the inability to isolate and measure the fuel contribution relative to numerous other resource contributions within existing reporting systems.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 14 February 1975 the JCS asked the CINCs of the unified and specified commands to assess the impact on readiness and training caused by inflation and by Congressional fiscal limitations on the availability of funds to execute planned programs. CINCPAC sought information from his component commands, his subordinate unified commands in Korea and Japan, the Army commander in Japan and the Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the commanding general of FMFPAC to assist in formulation of a response to the JCS.<sup>2</sup>


(C) CINCPAC's reply of 27 March advised that his review indicated that force adjustments and managerial actions to consolidate and conserve assets had lessened the impact of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding shortages. The reductions had not yet caused severe degradation of operational and combat readiness. The delayed, long-term impact, however, was difficult to measure. He then listed the impact on specific agencies as had been reported to him. For CINCPACFLT the most immediate effect had been deferral of ships, aircraft, and component parts from scheduled overhaul and rework periods and on increasing backlogs of underfunded projects affecting the capabilities of shore stations to support fleet operations. Funding relief could resolve near-term problems, but continued postponements of overhauls and reworks would degrade combat readiness to where management actions alone could not overcome the adverse impact of shortages. CINCPACAF reported that combat readiness had not been affected by the funding constraints. "Savings resulting from base closures, force drawdowns, etc., along with strong managerial direction have enabled PACAF to apply available funds to mission essential areas including aircrew

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 253-254.
  2. JCS 3336/142057Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 200210Z Feb 75.

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
training and exercises." COMUS Korea had advised that funding constraints had not significantly degraded combat readiness to that time.



1. CINCPAC 272126Z Mar 75; J361 HistSum Mar 75.
2. CINCPAC 251755Z Apr 75; J363 HistSum Apr 75.

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


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1. CINCPAC 060008Z Nov 75 as amended by CINCPAC 131645Z Nov 75.

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


1. CINCPAC 270800Z Oct 75.

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1. JCS 9817/081720Z Nov 75 (EX); CINCPAC 260419Z Nov 75.

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(U) CINCPAC continued to seek ways to retain the maximum capability in the PACOM as the cumulative effects of the incremental Service reductions became more and more apparent.


Reduction of Forces and Capabilities



1. CINCPAC 260419Z Nov 75; J5322 HistSum Nov 75.

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1. J5311 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: Recent Erosion of PACOM Forces/Capabilities.
2. J563 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: PACOM Reorganization Overview.

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1. CINCPAC 052305Z Jun 75.
2. JCS 2566/062214Z Jun 75.
3. CINCPAC 162254Z Jul 75.
4. JCS 7498/151802Z Aug 75.


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- 1. CINCPAC 201942Z Aug 75.
- 2. JCS 4695/292116Z Aug 75.
- 3. CSAF 111845Z Sep 75.
- 4. CINCPAC 232030Z Sep 75.
- 5. JCS 1100/062003Z Oct 75.

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


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1. CINCPAC 070356Z Oct 75.


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1. CINCPACAF 222100Z Oct 75.
2. CINCPAC 040232Z Dec 75 and 040233Z Dec 75.
3. CINCPAC 052305Z Jun 75.
4. CINCPAC 040010Z Dec 75.

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In 1975 the JCS made a number of other decisions regarding the disposition of aircraft around the world. Certain of these decisions were as follows:

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
(S) On 24 July the JCS outlined a proposal made by the Secretary of the Air Force to realign USAF worldwide F-4 assets in order to facilitate the maintenance of a 26 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) force structure previously approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force proposal would reduce

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1. JCS 2194/102238Z Dec 75.
  2. CINCPACAF 300145Z Dec 75.
  3. USCINCREC MACDILL AFB 022015Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 110432Z Jun 75; JCS 9482/181723Z Jun 75.



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
PACOM USAF F-4 Tactical Fighter Squadrons to eight, instead of the previously approved nine to follow the Thailand withdrawal. The total F-4 fighter strength would also be reduced to 180 airframes.<sup>1</sup>



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1. JCS 4336/242338Z Jul 75.
  2. CINCPAC 300313Z Jul 75.
  3. J5313 HistSum Dec 75, which cited JCS Memo 2417/578-1 of 15 August.


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1. JCS 9925/021924Z May 75; J311 Talking Paper, 6 Nov 75, Subj: Response Times.
  2. JCS 6650/051736Z Nov 75; J311 Talking Paper, 6 Nov 75, Subj: Response Times.
  3. JCS 6650/051736Z Nov 75.

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
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1. CINCPACFLT 122214Z Sep 75, which retransmitted CNO 082207Z Sep 75.

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SECTION V--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(S) Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) continued to be the subject of special attention. In the TTPI negotiations continued to terminate the U.S. trusteeship that had been assigned by the United Nations in 1946. As negotiations continued, U.S. goals were to deny access to third countries and to establish the U.S. right to use the TTPI if required. The TTPI could not replace forward bases in the PACOM, but offered a fallback position. In addition to maintaining important bases on Guam, the United States had an option on Tinian in the event forward bases were denied. Support facilities in the TTPI served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM. Particulars about the size, population, and political development of the TTPI have been included in the CINCPAC Command Histories for the past several years.<sup>1</sup>

(U) For the areas other than the Northern Marianas, no particular activities of CINCPAC interest occurred in 1975, although the possibility of further "fragmentation" is discussed below. The eighth round of Micronesian Status Negotiations, originally set for January 1975, had been postponed indefinitely.

(U) The fifth session of the Marianas Status Negotiations resulted on 15 February 1975 in the signing of a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The covenant was approved by the District Legislature on 20 February and submitted to a plebiscite on 17 June, at which time it was approved by 79.8 percent of the Marianas people and submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Agreement had been reached on Defense Department land requirements, including 18,182 acres of land for U.S. defense purposes in the Marianas, as follows. On Tinian, 17,799 acres including the airport and harbor, with 6,458 acres to be leased back. Defense land was to be used for joint Service land, sea, and air training and maneuvers, ammunition storage, and forward logistics, with an operational joint Service airfield and developed harbor to support those activities. In the near term, only training use was called for. The Tanapag Harbor area on Saipan was to provide 177 acres for future contingency use. Of these, for the time being, 133 acres were to be developed as a public

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1. J5322 Point Paper, 25 Aug 75, Subj: PACOM Bases/Forward Deployments/Alternate Base Strategy (U).
  2. ADMIN CINCPACREP GUAM 150430Z Feb 75; J512 Point Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: Political-Military Situation - TTPI (U).

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memorial park and the other 44 were to be leased back. At Farallon de Medinilla 206 acres were for a target area.

(U) The lease was to be for 50 years with an option to renew for another 50 years. The United States was to make a lump sum payment of \$19,520,000, covering both the initial and optional renewal period. The 6,592 acres to be leased back were in five-year leases at \$1 per acre per year. The tentative "Commonwealth" agreement called for establishing a Joint Commission on Transition with \$1.2 million in financing by the United States and an initial seven-year U.S. financial assistance program of \$14 million annually.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ In 1975 CINCPAC and his staff studied both mid-range plans for Guam and Tinian and further fragmentation in the rest of Micronesia. The Deputy Secretary of Defense had directed the Navy and the Air Force to prepare mid-range plans for Guam and Tinian.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ The major military activities located on Guam at the time were the Commander Naval Forces Marianas and his staff (he was also the CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the TTPI; the Naval Station Guam; the Naval Air Station at Agana (with VQ-1, VQ-3, and a VP Detachment); a Naval Ship Repair Facility; a Naval Hospital, a Naval Communication Station, a Naval Magazine, a Naval Supply Depot; Submarine Squadron 15 (POLARIS); and Andersen Air Force Base (Strategic Air Command) with the 54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 23 October CINCPAC provided his comments on the study prepared by the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command. He recommended that the JCS endorse it to the Secretary of Defense with the following comments. (The study assumed that the United States would retain its existing bases in Japan and the Philippines.) There was a need to retain the Naval Magazine, Guam. CINCPAC recommended consolidation of special weapons at Andersen. He concurred in a requirement for updating at least every three years; CINCPAC could provide recommended force stationing. The Agana Naval Air Station should be relocated to Andersen AFB only if the Guam Government provided sufficient quid pro quo. Military Construction funds should not be programmed for relocation now in anticipation of such a quid pro quo arrangement. CINCPAC concurred in the need to retain a POL tank farm area east of Apra Harbor (one of the long-range options) as a replacement for or addition to the existing tank farm.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J512 Point Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: Political-Military Situation - TTPI.
  2. JCS 7462/301426Z Apr 75.
  3. J512 Point Paper, 13 Nov 75, Subj: Military Requirements in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)(U).
  4. CINCPAC AIRBORNE 231420Z Oct 75.

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(S) Regarding the rest of Micronesia, as noted above, the JCS had asked for CINCPAC's views and recommendations concerning the impact on U.S. security of further political fragmentation in Micronesia. Comments were also solicited as to the requirement for the United States to exercise full authority over defense matters in the TTPI.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI provided his thoughts on 15 July. He noted that Micronesia was an artificially created entity that could not be considered as having any mature political entity. The various districts existed independently under "other than a subsistence economy" and therefore needed close affiliation with some economically wealthier state to develop. The U.S. military had strong and continuing interests in both the Palau and Marshall Districts, a premise that was considered of increasing importance in light of events in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1975. Neither the Congress of Micronesia nor the many elected leaders of the various districts represented the true feelings of the people either in the districts or the outer islands. The views and desires expressed by them were usually either those of the U.S. legal counsels rather than the members, or else represented the personal ambitions or business interests of individual congressmen. The majority of the people desired either continuation of the status quo or some form of political affiliation with the United States, a belief reaffirmed by a recent political referendum. There also remained a considerable reservoir of good will toward the U.S. military. U.S. policy had been to deal with Micronesia as a whole, despite the fact that the Marianas separation had been a contradicting precedent. The CINCPACREP also noted that denial of this area of the Pacific to other powers was of the "utmost importance."

(S) He continued, recommending that he did not believe solicitation from any district for separate status discussions should be rejected out of hand. The Marianas precedent had been set and U.S. statements of the past had been only that the United States desires and intentions were to treat Micronesia as a whole, but he believed that a willingness to listen to any petition would be neither a breach of promise nor an unfair act. U.S. objectives were well known by all districts. He recommended that the United States ask any district petitioning for separate status how separate discussions would better achieve mutual goals. If the answer had logic and merit, the CINCPACREP recommended consideration of separate talks. He concluded that these recommendations would be "somewhat less than palatable" to the State Department, which supported Micronesian unity, and even less acceptable to the United States representatives to the United Nations who had had to argue and justify the Marianas precedent in the world forum. Also, the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, which had begun a projected four-month term on 13 July, was to address the issue of unity,

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1. JCS 4134/101953Z Jul 75.

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and any open announcement by the U.S. Government or an implied willingness to deal separately with another district during that time would "certainly be taken as a frontal assault on Micronesian unity."<sup>1</sup>

(C) CINCPAC advised the JCS on 29 July that he concurred with the views expressed by his representative with certain additional thoughts and comments. He believed that we could anticipate that Micronesians would move toward further fragmentation or the formation of a "federation of Micronesia" built around a weak central government. In this later case, the districts would probably reserve the right to deal directly with the United States on military requirements. Unity, even if weak, was preferable and afforded the best chance to obtain security objectives in the area. Protracted, multiple negotiations with separate districts increased the opportunity for a third country to exploit the situation politically. Also, relations with several entities could complicate security arrangements and increase requirements for military presence. CINCPAC considered it essential that the United States exercise full authority over defense matters in all districts. All islands within the TTPI were considered as potential military outposts. Though differing in degree, all of the islands were of strategic value. Accordingly, any agreements for dissolution of the TTPI should include provisions effectively denying use of the islands for foreign basing. Admittedly, U.S. military control of the Trust Territory would not guarantee denial through the South Pacific, but satisfactory alignment of the TTPI would preserve our options and help secure a vast area of the Pacific, the potential military and economic importance of which, though not fully defined, should not be underestimated.<sup>2</sup>

#### Civic Action Program

(U) A Civic Action Team program had been begun in the TTPI in 1969, and by 1970 it was a joint Army-Navy-Air Force effort, designed to provide needed facilities and improvements, but also to create much good will toward the United States. There had been as many as seven 13-man teams at one time. Since 1970 the cost of operating a team had been considered to be \$128,160 annually. In December 1974 it was learned that increased costs over the years had raised the figure to \$203,096, an increase that was to result in fewer teams.

(U) On 25 February CINCPAC's Representative to Guam and the TTPI noted that viewed in broad terms and over the long run, the Civic Action program had been a most valuable asset to the military in that part of the world. "In districts such as Palau and the Marianas the work done by the CAT teams has kept the luster of the WWII image bright. Consequently, military influence and

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1. CINCPACREP Guam 150310Z Jul 75.

2. CINCPAC 290116Z Jul 75.

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prestige exceeds that of any other group in the TTPI." He continued that this had been especially useful in U.S. efforts to acquire land for military use in the Marianas and "should be even more significant with regard to Palau." He discussed various funding options, hoping that the Department of the Interior could continue paying their share of the program, as the existing financial arrangement appeared to be the most fair for all concerned. Despite the increased price, the program remained "the most cost effective contribution to economic development in the TT."<sup>1</sup>

(U) Effective 30 June the Army's CAT, which had been operating in the Marshall Islands District, was disestablished, bringing to a close five years of Army participation in the program. As of 1 July teams remained deployed in the Palau, Yap, Truk, and Ponape Districts. It was possible that the number of teams would be further reduced in FY 77.<sup>2</sup>

#### Development of Port Pacific in Palau

(S) In 1974 an international attempt had been begun to create a major oil transshipment port in Palau entitled "Port Pacific." The program had originally been billed as a consortium of four parties, Japan, Palau, Iran, and an international group of U.S. and European persons, sharing equally. The project coordinator was a Mr. Robert Panero, of Palau. Subsequently, it became apparent this was to be an Iran-Japan venture, the first stage of which was to be a year-long, \$3 million feasibility study. A Japanese agreement to participate was expected only after the results of the study had been examined in relationship to the economic merits of other proposals, and only after the attitude of the U.S. Government was clearly known. Nevertheless, Japanese planning moved forward.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Frequently representing the United States in these matters was the Interior Department's Director of the Department of Territorial Affairs, Mr. Fred Zeder. The United States wanted to be sure the people of Palau understood that the United States would withhold all judgment in the matter (like Japan) until the results of the feasibility study were complete, but that the United States would be the final arbiter in the matter. By the end of the year it appeared that the study would have funding approval, but the cost had already escalated from \$3 to \$5 million. The requirement for some close and continuing political affiliation between Palau and the United States was considered to be an absolutely vital requirement if Port Pacific was to come to be.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPACREP Guam 250500Z Feb 75.
  2. J512 HistSum Aug 75; CINCPACREP Guam 260815Z Nov 75.
  3. CINCPACREP Guam 030224Z Aug 75, 040758Z Sep 75, and 170630Z Oct 75.
  4. CINCPACREP Guam 210738Z Oct 75 and 060134Z Dec 75.

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U.S. Forces and Bases in Japan

(S) One important aspect of the U.S. strategic concept in the PACOM was the requirement for forward deployment and basing. Japan, which of course included Okinawa, was considered the cornerstone to area stability. Asian peace and stability depended, to a degree, on the character and direction of Japan's political, economic, and military evolution. No other nation in the Pacific had the industrial capacity or could give us as much assistance where we had common interests. Our bases in Japan were the key to our forward deployment strategy. They allowed the United States to operate on the eastern flank of the U.S.S.R. Logistic installations were also essential; about 40 percent of the PACOM petroleum was stored in Japan. The only aircraft carrier-capable drydocks west of the United States were there; the PACOM accomplished one-third of all Western Pacific ship repairs at Japanese bases. Replacement costs of Japan bases and facilities would be prohibitive, an estimated \$5 billion. There were no suitable alternatives to bases in Japan. Loss of bases there weakened treaty commitments; reduced deterrent symbolism; could cause U.S. strategy to be viewed as retrenchment; reduced surge capability; eliminated LOC coverage; reduced intelligence gathering and early warning systems; and reduced antisubmarine warfare coverage.

(U) In the material that follows the 1975 actions to reduce U.S. Forces and bases are addressed.

Consultations with Japan Regarding Bases and Facilities

(S) The problem of the Services acting unilaterally in the matter of reducing and closing facilities had been a matter of continuing CINCPAC concern. It seemed to be agreed at all levels that the "piecemeal" or "meat-ax" approach was not desirable. CINCPAC kept trying to achieve a more coordinated approach, not only for dealings with the host government, but because the Services were sometimes dependent on one another for support.

(S) When the Secretary of State authorized the closing of the 440L sites on 28 February, discussed below, CINCPAC received additional tasking. For those actions that involved the release of real property, CINCPAC was to determine whether or not the property was required to meet other U.S. Forces requirements in order that Japan could be informed during the consultative process

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1. J5322 Point Paper, 25 Aug 75, Subj: PACOM Bases/Forward Deployments/Alternate Base Strategy; J5322 Point Paper, 22 Nov 75, Subj: Analysis of U.S. Basing in Pacific/Asian Area (U).

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regarding the proposed disposition of the property. CINCPAC was also to consider the quid pro quos for the Japanese properties that could be released.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Following a 30 January Embassy staff meeting, the subject of early consultation was addressed and the Ambassador and COMUS Japan both stressed the importance of early consultation on changes and reorganizations to avoid unnecessary problems and surprises. CINCPAC reiterated his concern to the Secretary of Defense. He emphasized the need to consult with Japan prior to Congressional briefings on 1 March on revisions to the Unified Command Plan and the proposed PACAF reorganization. The JCS agreed with CINCPAC's assessment of the need for timely consultation. They considered it premature, however, to discuss Air Force plans as those plans in the PACOM were not firm.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The Secretary of State also indicated that future force structure changes in the Western Pacific were still under review. On completion of that review, prior consultation would be accomplished before public announcement.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 28 February the Secretary of State provided authority to consult the Japanese government on the closure of the 440L sites, but did not include Navy and Air Force force structure changes.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 5 March the Secretary of State provided the Secretary of Defense's press announcement on further 1975 base realignments. Secretary Schlesinger, the release said, had announced the initiation of 17 actions to realign installations and facilities in overseas areas. These actions would involve the elimination of about 3,300 military positions and reduce about 730 civilian positions, mostly foreign nationals. Once those actions were completed by 1976, it was estimated that defense costs would be reduced by over \$523 million in the subsequent decade, "which will make it possible to provide that much more combat capability and effectiveness over the period."<sup>5</sup>


(S) On 6 March COMUS Japan and the Embassy in Tokyo both addressed the matter of proposed Army reductions. The Ambassador noted that the Army had requested authority to RIF 4,150 local employees, mostly on Okinawa. This action "must be integrated into a coordinated, overall U.S. Forces approach to changes now under way and informed to GOJ before separate related actions taken." The Embassy noted that serious concern had already been expressed about the dangers of a Service-by-Service, piecemeal approach to the command

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1. SECSTATE 045431/1/281700Z Feb 75.
  2. JCS 8562/220042Z Feb 75.
  3. J5113 HistSum Feb 75, which cited SECSTATE 043703/262210Z Feb 75 (EX).
  4. SECSTATE 045431/1/281700Z Feb 75.
  5. SECSTATE 048824/051440Z Mar 75.

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and force deployment changes underway or expected in the Western Pacific. It had been stressed that a comprehensive approach that provided a convincing rationale for the changes in terms of U.S. long-term security intentions would be essential to meaningful consultations with the Japanese.



1. AMEMB Tokyo 2949/060822Z Mar 75; COMUS Japan 060742Z Mar 75.
2. CINCPAC 082139Z Mar 75.
3. JCS 3847/181652Z Mar 75.
4. CINCPAC 290340Z Mar 75, which cited COMUS Japan 280630Z Mar 75 (BOM).

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(U) In amplification of CINCPAC initiatives to consult with the Government of Japan on U.S. military restructuring in Japan, CINCPAC dispatched a message to the Chairman of the JCS on 16 July reiterating the importance of the unified command being privy to Service reorganization plans, primarily those affecting facilities and bases.<sup>2</sup>

Army-Navy-Marine Corps Drawdowns and Relocations

(U) As discussed above, Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decisions were made in 1975 concerning Army and Navy force and base reductions in Japan. An Army review had been directed by the Secretary of Defense with the goal of reducing the Army support structure in the Western Pacific, particularly Japan. Known as WESTPAC II, the program had been submitted to the Secretary, whose adopted position became known as Program Budget Decision 280CR. At the time of promulgation of that PBD, the Army had been tasked to submit a formal plan for reduction; this became PBD 253.

(S) The JCS had requested a facilities reduction/realignment package to complement an overall personnel reduction package. Upon receipt of this study, the JCS would coordinate the matter with Washington agencies, integrate proposed actions with other planned Service actions, and then grant approval to discuss the matter with the Japanese.

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1. SECSTATE 077020/042220Z Apr 75.
  2. J5111 HistSum, which cited CINCPAC 162251Z Jul 75 (EX).

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(S) COMUS Japan also noted that CINCPACFLT-announced Navy actions to implement provisions of PBD 280CR concerned Fleet activities at Sasebo. Of concern in the joint operations arena, COMUS Japan continued, was the continuing or contingency access to the naval facility at Sasebo and attendant capability to service in-port fleet assets. If anticipated dates were to be met, it was imperative that facility releases and joint use dialogue regarding Sasebo be surfaced through joint channels soonest to protect U.S. interests.

(S) PBD 280CR actions were not required by the Air Force. Another planned action, however, the relocation of the 345th Tactical Aircraft Squadron from Kadena to Yokota required early coordination with the Japanese to prepare responses to the "inevitable" opposition questions. Also, of future concern was the matter of proposed Air Force Pacific reorganization.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Army's concept plan included proposed manpower ceilings and reductions, based on Department of the Army guidance, as recapitulated below.<sup>2</sup>

	Department of the Army Guidance				U.S. Army Japan Concept Plan			
	Military	DH	IDH	Aggregate	Military	DH	IDH	Aggregate
End FY 75	3,063	1,256	10,396	14,715	3,063	1,256	10,396	14,715
(Changes)	-667	+4	-4,003	-4,666	-1,130	-440	-4,149	-5,719
End FY 76(T)	2,396	1,260	6,393	10,049	1,933	816	6,247	8,996
(Changes)	-1,487	-16	-2,100	-3,603	-1,024	-214	-1,954	-3,192
End FY 77	909	1,244	4,293	6,446	909	602	4,293	5,804

(S) The posture of Army forces in Japan in the proposed concept was as follows. At the end of FY 75, U.S. Army Japan would consist of a Major Army Command headquarters, two garrisons, and a Medical Department activity. The garrison commands performed normal base support and specific logistic missions. The Medical Department Activity operated the Western Pacific Medical Laboratory, a Medical Depot, and the Environmental Health Engineering Agency. The posture at the end of FY 76 would involve the transfer of the U.S. Army Hospital, Okinawa to another Service; reorganization of Headquarters U.S. Army Japan and the IX Corps; the transfer of the Facility Engineer to Taiwan and the Air Transportation Coordination Office support function to the Philippines; termination of calibration support; and relocation of the Adjutant General printing and publication support. The end FY 77 posture would see U.S. Army Japan consolidated into a

1. JCS 3847/181652Z Mar 75; COMUS Japan 182330Z Apr 75.

2. J533 Point Paper, 30 Apr 75, Subj: PBD 280CR and USARJ WESTPAC II Plan (U).

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single command concept; elimination of Headquarters U.S. Army Garrison Honshu, leaving only a small health clinic for the Camp Zama area; and elimination of the U.S. Army Garrison, Okinawa, with residual U.S. Army Japan forces consolidated into an Army Storage Activity.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Meetings had been held at CINCPAC headquarters on 22 March and again on 20 April to discuss implementation of PBD 280CR. On 13 May CINCPAC provided an interim response to the JCS, noting that as a result of those meetings it was evident that agreement for transfer of Army missions to other Services would not be resolved at the CINCPAC level in the matters listed below. He further believed that such resolution could be expedited if they were resolved by the Services rather than the JCS. The following areas requiring resolution were listed:<sup>2</sup>

- Okinawa

- Operation of bulk subsistence supply depot
- Operation/maintenance of cold storage plant
- Management of GOKO Milk Plant (funded by Army stock fund)
- Operation of commissary division to provide ration breakdown point
- Consolidation of Service requirements and representing contract officer for local procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables, beverages, syrups, etc.
- Operation of ice manufacturing plant
- Operation of the Fort Buckner commissary
- Acquisition/storage/issue of Mount-Out subsistence for Marine Corps (funded by Army stock fund)

- Mainland Japan

- Operation of cold storage plant
- Management of the GOKO Milk Plant (funded by Army stock fund)
- Nonperishable subsistence support through Dicomss [Direct Commissary Support System] for Army troop issue/resale, and as available, brand name support for Navy/Marine Corps exchanges.

- Veterinary capability would become nonexistent with planned phase-down of the USARJ Medical Mission, incapacitating veterinary support for USARJ subsistence function.

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1. Ibid.

2. CINCPAC 130050Z May 75.

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- Mortuary services
- Medical services
- Base facilities engineering
- POL distribution system and facilities
- Common User Land Transportation
- Calibration services
- Laundry/dry cleaning services
- Port operations (Naha)
- Other support and services such as family housing, printing/  
binding, Stars and Stripes, etc.

(C) In view of Army reductions in Japan and Okinawa, on 1 May COMUS Japan proposed that the responsibilities of the Okinawa Area Coordinator (OAC) be transferred to the Commanding General, Camp Butler, a Marine Corps officer. The position of OAC had been established to provide necessary coordinating services upon reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The Commander of the U.S. Army Base Command Okinawa (subsequently the Army Garrison Okinawa) had been so designated. (The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force though senior in rank, had not been appointed because of contingency responsibilities and possible deployments.) At the time of the consideration of the matter in 1975, it had been proposed to designate the Commander of the 313th Air Division, but the 5th Air Force had nonconcurred because of a pending Air Force reorganization of its command structure in the PACOM. CINCPAC's component commands concurred in the Marine-designate proposal. The Commander of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group concurred in principle, noting, however, that the deployability of a Marine OAC continued to be a possibility. He suggested that a non-deployable deputy should be appointed to insure continuity. On 24 May CINCPAC approved transfer of the responsibility effective after the departure of the incumbent OAC in the first quarter of FY 76.<sup>1</sup>

(C) A proposed move of Marine headquarters to vacated Army space at Camp Zukeran came under study. On 26 May the American Consul at Naha expressed his

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 49; COMUS Japan 012316Z May 75. CINCPACFLT 102010Z May 75; CINCPACAF 070412Z May 75; CDRUSACSG 130444Z May 75; CINCPAC 240357Z May 75.

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concern over the possible political ramifications in Okinawa should a major Marine Corps operational command so relocate. The Ambassador in Tokyo, however, indicated that close liaison had been conducted with U.S. Forces Japan on planned Marine moves and he foresaw no problem. In view of the expressed concern and the lack of information available to CINCPAC concerning any proposed Marine relocations, COMUS Japan and the Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific were requested to provide comments and planning information concerning these Marine relocations.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Both replies indicated that liaison had been conducted with all concerned parties in Japan, to include the Japanese Government, on these matters; they agreed with the Ambassador's assessment of the situation. The Marine Corps Bases Commander also noted that the consolidation of the Army forces into the Makiminato Service Area had made the majority of Camp Zukeran available for Marine use. It was the desire of his headquarters to collocate Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing with Headquarters III Marine Amphibious Force and Headquarters, III Marine Division on Okinawa. They were examining various siting alternatives regarding those headquarters and that of the Camp Butler Marine Corps Base.

Initial steps had included the closure of Camp Hauge and the move of the 12th Marine Regiment to Zukeran. This had already been approved by the Marine Corps Commandant; final approval of the further relocations was also to be made by the Commandant.<sup>2</sup>

1. AMCONSUL Naha 260016Z May 75; AMEMB Tokyo 7058/290800Z May 75; CINCPAC 300413Z May 75.
2. COMUS Japan 050800Z Jun 75; COMMARCORBASESPAC Camp Smith 050019Z Jun 75; J5113 HistSum May 75.

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(S) On 11 July the Commandant advised CINCPAC of the long-desired relocation of the 1st Marine Air Wing from Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in Japan to Okinawa Prefecture. This would be similar to the collocation of CONUS-based Marine divisions and aircraft wings in order to realize the known benefits and efficiencies in training, operations, and planning that accrued to the air-ground team from such proximity. Relocation of the 1st MAW would involve the movement of 1,200 Marines and 8 aircraft during the period August 1975 to January 1976, with a by-product of the move the easing of the seriously overcrowded troop facilities at Iwakuni. The Commandant solicited CINCPAC's support, both in U.S. channels and in explaining and clearing the way for this relocation with the Japanese. On 26 July CINCPAC advised the JCS of his support for the proposal; he requested that the Commandant provide rationale on the move, implementation details, and other points of concern for use in negotiations with the Japanese.<sup>2</sup>

(S) From August to October rumors persisted in the Japanese press; the United States had not addressed the matter pending approval by the Secretary of Defense. In mid-October the Embassy in Tokyo was authorized to inform the Government of Japan on the general scope of the Commandant's proposal. On 8 December the Secretary of Defense approved the relocation.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The move was to be accomplished in three phases. The first would include personnel and equipment necessary to establish the headquarters operating area and support functions prior to the command element moving. The second phase would be the relocation of the Commanding General, major staff sections, and those support functions required to support the Wing headquarters. Phase three was to entail movement of the remainder of the Headquarters support forces. CINCPAC requested implementation details, and the Commander of Marine Corps Bases in the Pacific provided full details and rationale. The Embassy in Tokyo provided these details to the Japanese and received no adverse reaction to the move that was scheduled to begin in mid-February 1976. Phase two was expected to be completed by 31 March 1976.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The Navy planned to restructure the Sasebo complex in order to comply with the Secretary of Defense's PBD 280CR. CINCPACFLT provided a list of the

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1. J535 HistSum Apr 75; JCS 2714/131619Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 210420Z Jan 75, 301730Z Jan 75, 032017Z Feb 75, and 110830Z Feb 75.
  2. CMC Washington 112345Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 260013Z Jul 75.
  3. AMEMB Tokyo 14754/170135Z Oct 75; CMC 181312Z Dec 75.
  4. J5312 HistSum Dec 75.

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"milestones" that had been provided to accomplish the proposed action. First, Naval Forces Japan would discuss the matter confidentially with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. Homeport of the WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4) was to be changed to Yokosuka effective 1 August 1975; homeport changes for the two other ships were to be announced later. The Marine Barracks was to be disestablished on 30 March 1976, and on 30 June the Fleet Activity Sasebo was to be disestablished. New missions, tasks, and functions for the follow-on organization, the Naval Ordnance Facility (NOF), Sasebo, were to be effective 1 July 1976. The Navy would retain ammunition and POL complexes with other waterfront areas in, combined use with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In regard to the decision to close the operating port and fleet activities at Sasebo, CINCPACFLT had requested revalidation of the contingency requirements for the 15 Military Sealift Command LSTs located there. These ships were in Ready Reserve Status for contingencies. 3

[REDACTED] CINCPAC OPLAN 5083, regarding Southeast Asia and still under development, would identify intra-theater movement requirements that were expected to equal those for Northeast Asia. The Military Sealift Command was the appropriate agency for quantification of numbers and type vessels to meet such contingency requirements. He remarked, however, that it remained highly desirable that the designated ship mix include shallow-draft, over-the-beach capability. The Commander of the Military Sealift Command advised that the retention of the LSTs in Sasebo was highly desirable to augment the shallow draft assets necessary to meet PACOM contingency requirements, but that funding for retention and relocation from Sasebo were matters under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The posture of U.S. Forces in Japan (and Okinawa) near the end of 1975 was as follows. From a total of 3,848 U.S. facilities on Mainland Japan in 1952, it was expected that U.S. facilities would be reduced to 111 by the end of FY 76, 66 on the Mainland, 45 on Okinawa. Major forces and facilities were as follows.

(S) U.S. Forces Japan was collocated at Yokota Air Base with Headquarters 5th Air Force (the commander was dual-hatted). The other principal Air Force facility was at Kadena on Okinawa. The Air Force maintained ready support facilities for deployed forces.

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1. CINCPACFLT 250055Z Mar 75; J5111 Point Paper, 23 Sep 75, Subj: Political/Military Situation - Japan (U).
  2. J537 HistSum Mar 75; CINCPACFLT 212343Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 072157Z Mar 75; COMSC 201441Z Mar 75.

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(S) The Army maintained a logistic base, but no combat forces. U.S. Army Japan was the Army component of COMUS Japan. The Honshu and Okinawa garrisons and medical activities operated the logistic system. Headquarters IX Corps was a JCS-assigned, deployable force; personnel were dual-hatted on the USARJ staff. Deployment would require a marry-up with reserve augmentation located in Hawaii. There were no major facilities: small facilities were at Camp Zama, Sagami, and the Akizuki complex on the Mainland; and at Makiminato Service Area and the Camp Kuwae hospital in Okinawa. The Secretary of Defense's PBD 280CR would have a major impact on the Army, with a major mission change: to maintain a logistic storage capability instead of a logistic base.

(S) The Navy had air facilities at Atsugi and Misawa. In the Yokosuka complex were fleet activities, a communication station, a ship repair facility, and a supply depot. These were Seventh Fleet support activities. The drawdown at Sasebo was described above.

(S) Marine Corps facilities included air stations at Iwakuni and Futema and Camps Butler, Courtney, Hansen, McTureous, Schwab, and Zukeran. These were support facilities for deployed Fleet Marine forces. The Deputy Commanding General Marine Corps Bases in the Pacific (Commanding General of the Marine Corps Base at Camp Butler) was coordinating authority on Marine Corps presence and facilities.

#### 440L Over-the-Horizon Radar Sites

(S) In 1974 CINCPAC had learned that the Air Force intended to close the 440L sites at Tokorozawa, Chitose, and Awase. These were sites for forward scatter over-the-horizon radars, designed to detect disturbances caused in the

1. J5111 Point Paper, 23 Sep 75, Subj: Political/Military Situation - Japan (U); J5312 Point Paper, 11 Nov 75, Subj: U.S. Force and Base Structure - Japan (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 73-80 and all of the subsequent histories to the present; COMUS Japan 130030Z May 75.


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ionosphere by flying objects beyond the horizon. 

(S) On 9 February CINCPAC informed the Secretary of Defense of continued concern over the absence of State or Defense Department guidance regarding notification of the Japanese. He also reemphasized the need for prior consultation with Japan on the anticipated deactivation.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 28 February a joint State-Defense Department message authorized both the closings and consultations with host governments. The three stations were to be closed by July 1975 at an anticipated saving of 155 U.S. military, 17 U.S. civilian, and 75 Local National personnel. The message noted that this was part of a worldwide phasedown of the 440L system, and that while financial constraints were a major factor, the decision was based on the ability of other detection systems to provide advance warning and assessment of enemy attack.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In reply to the 28 February message, CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense that deactivation of the over-the-horizon stations would not automatically result in closure and release of facilities to the Japanese. He listed the specific impacts of each. 

Releases would not be announced to Japan until coordination had been effected among the Services. Initial Embassy discussions would be limited to the fact that the over-the-horizon facilities were closing; facility releases would be addressed through normal channels.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 136-137.
  2. CINCPAC 090132Z Feb 75.
  3. SECSTATE 045431/1/281700Z Feb 75.
  4. CINCPAC 052053Z Mar 75.

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(U) On 2 April CINCPACAF asked about the status of the notification of the Japanese and the current classification of the sites for the purpose of notifying Local National employees and implementing real property release proceedings. CINCPAC advised on 12 April that the Japanese were fully aware of the phaseout plan and PACAF was to proceed with appropriate follow-on actions to implement the deactivation.<sup>1</sup>

Command Arrangements and Basing - Korea

(S) The presence of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea provided a stabilizing influence in Northeast Asia and should be maintained. It was still difficult to predict, but the best estimate was that moderation, dialogue, international pressures, and self restraint added up to no major war. South Korea provided a secure base for important U.S. activities in Northeast Asia and excellent training areas unavailable to the United States elsewhere in the PACOM. The force level was believed to be about right. It was psychologically and militarily detrimental to U.S. interests to withdraw its forces from Korea; unplanned reductions of U.S. ground forces without improvement of Republic of Korea ground forces could result in a dangerous shift of the military balance in the ROK and greatly increase the danger of renewed conflict.<sup>2</sup>

(S) A specific study was made in response to a JCS request of 5 February. The JCS were preparing a study in anticipation of Congressional pressure for relocation or removal of the 2d Infantry Division. COMUS Korea provided cost data for relocation of the division south of Seoul, a FY 76-81 threat analysis, and relocation/phasedown plans. He also provided rationale on why the 2d Division should not be relocated or reduced.<sup>3</sup>

(S) CINCPAC believed that the plans provided by COMUS Korea were acceptable, but he did not recommend any drawdown in the near term of U.S. Army combat forces beyond those already programmed, concerning the 4th Missile Command and the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. He did not believe that relocating part or all of the division was feasible because of the cost, the degradation of training, the nonavailability of suitable real estate, and the political and psychological implications of such a move. He recognized that the existing force structure was not "forever," but he believed that the pure military requirement was not as important as the political and psychological factors. The need was expected to lessen as the Korean forces matured and modernized. The division was a

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1. CINCPACAF 020300Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 120056Z Apr 75; J5113 HistSum Apr 75.
  2. J5322 Point Paper, 25 Aug 75, Subj: PACOM Bases/Forward Deployments/Alternate Base Strategy (U).
  3. J537 HistSum Mar 75; JCS 4324/312059Z Dec 74; COMUS Korea 220610Z Jan 75, 250315Z Jan 75, and 250520Z Jan 75.

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Q significant factor for deterrence, and arbitrary withdrawal could be perceived by North Korea as a loss of U.S. resolve to help defend the ROK, and make a military option more inviting. Also, the division was a bargaining lever in dealings with the ROK. It helped restrain the ROK from over reacting to provocations and minimized the chance the ROK would initiate action to commit the United States automatically. Also, it was a significant factor in legitimizing U.S. control of ROK forces. Additionally, removal would likely adversely affect relations with our other Asian allies; they would perceive it as another step in abandoning our commitments in Asia. Japan, in particular, had consistently expressed concern for the maintenance of security on the Korean Peninsula, and would be alarmed by any U.S. unilateral withdrawal in the absence of adequate substitute security arrangements. Even the Russians and the Chinese could have reservations about unilateral withdrawal, indications noted, as the U.S. presence was considered a stabilizing influence.

(S) CINCPAC believed that these same arguments pertained to relocation, because of the implied change of mission that could reinforce the view that the United States was withdrawing its commitment to the ROK. Relocation could also indicate to Congress that the division was no longer necessary. In a concluding summary he noted that military deployments in Korea were part of an integrated whole, providing visible evidence to our allies of continuing interest in the Western Pacific and determination to promote and maintain stability in Korea. In particular, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand could view the phasedown or withdrawal of the division as another vacillation in U.S. security responsibilities. Any decision affecting the 2d Division would require the most careful review of overall U.S. policy and objectives in the Pacific area, a complete time-phased schedule, and fully coordinated high-level discussions with the ROK.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The matter of reduction of the headquarters in Korea was addressed by COMUS Korea in mid-December. He noted that the basic premise "that the U.S. debouchment from SEA must afford opportunity for economies in HQ structure throughout PACOM is inapplicable to this command." His headquarters had not been reinforced to support activity in Southeast Asia; in fact, austerity had been the by-word during the active years in Southeast Asia. He viewed further headquarters reductions as "neither prudent nor feasible without substantive changes in the mission and responsibilities of this command."<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 24 July the Department of the Army advised that it had been designated Executive Agent for the merged UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters. (The merger had taken place in 1974.) It was necessary for the Army and Navy to make necessary inter-Service support arrangements to allow the Army to assume

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1. CINCPAC 051947Z Feb 75.
  2. COMUS Korea 150933Z Dec 75.

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responsibility for providing or arranging for administrative and logistic support of the merged headquarters. As it was unlikely that the transfer of Navy resources to the Army could be made for FY 76, several tasks were directed for formulation of the FY 77 Command Budget Estimate. The Navy would continue to function as Executive Agent for the JUSMAG-Korea and would continue to budget and fund for this function; the Navy would retain manpower spaces and funds to finance the World-Wide Military Command and Control System; and the Army would budget and fund for operational and base operations support costs of the merged headquarters. COMUS Korea was asked to identify the manpower and funding resources that were to be transferred from the Navy to the Army.<sup>1</sup>

### I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group

(S) A "temporary" combined U.S.-Korean headquarters had been formed following a May 1970 decision to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea. This I Corps Group was to assume the functions of similar U.S. elements until the Koreans were capable of unilaterally assuming responsibility. The phase-out of that headquarters had been under study ever since, and on 26 December 1974 the Secretary of Defense directed that such phase-out be accomplished expeditiously, but not later than 30 August 1975, to be effected before the annual United Nations General Assembly debates.<sup>2</sup>

(S) COMUS Korea, after coordination with the Ambassador, opened negotiations with ROK Minister of National Defense Suh Jyong Chul on the deactivation. Minister Suh acknowledged the Secretary's decision and presented proposed guidelines for replacement of the I Corps Group by the Third ROK Army.

(S) On 31 January, however, the U.S. Ambassador proposed to postpone disestablishment. The JCS advised that the proposal appeared to have gained support in both the State Department and the National Security Council. They asked about space savings, noting that they understood that 500 spaces would be saved, and about whether there were any advantages to adjusting the deactivation timing to coincide with the dissolution of the United Nations Command (addressed below). COMUS Korea's reply addressed space savings, although this estimate could not be precise because of the variable in the area of required communications support. The rough estimate was an FY 76 saving of 350 to 400 personnel. CINCPAC supported a phaseout before the U.N. meeting in New York. He opposed linking the disestablishment of I Corps Group with dissolution of the UNC. He believed there was little change of getting concurrent UNC and I Corps disestablishment dates.<sup>3</sup>

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1. DA WASH DC 242033Z Jul 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 123-125; SECDEF 1837/261752Z Dec 74.
  3. JCS 1142/062327Z Feb 75; CINCUNC 180556Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 210253Z Feb 75.

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(S) Events in Southeast Asia (the rapidly deteriorating situation in Cambodia and Vietnam) prompted the Secretary of Defense to request a review of the impact of delay of certain approved force posture realignments in the PACOM. CINCPAC recommended continued PBD 280CR drawdowns in Japan, USAF reorganization, and the continued disestablishment of the I Corps Group. Subsequently the matter of slipping the date of disestablishment was raised.

(S) The President of Korea, however, requested that the United States postpone all on-going actions on the disestablishment. The Secretary of State advised the Ambassador in Seoul that the United States would comply with the President's request and would consult subsequently with the Korean Government on the future of I Corps. No further dissolution action was taken in 1975.<sup>1</sup>

#### Alternative Command Arrangements to the United Nations Command

(S) The matter of alternative command arrangements in Korea in the event the United Nations Command (UNC) was disestablished had been under study since 1973. By January 1974 CINCPAC had urged that planning among the State and Defense Departments, the Country Team, and representatives of the Korean Government should begin at the earliest practicable date as the "handwriting appears to be on the wall regarding long term retention of UNC." CINCPAC had proposed a time-phased transfer of operational control of U.S. and ROK forces in Korea, first from the UNC to a ROK-U.S. combined headquarters under CINCPAC (with the United States to retain OPCON of ROK forces); subsequently to U.S. Forces Korea as a sub-unified command under CINCPAC dependent upon the size of residual U.S. Forces (with command and control of ROK forces reverting to the ROK Government); and ultimately to withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Korea. Armistice responsibilities would gradually transfer to ROK cognizance a step at a time or to another instrumentality when the UNC was terminated. The CINCUNC also stated a clear preference for the activation of a combined command, but not subordinate to CINCPAC, because he believed that the ROK Government would not accept an arrangement that involved a less direct channel to the U.S. JCS than they had under existing arrangements. At the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in 1974 the UNC had not been dissolved.<sup>2</sup>

(S) But the vote had been 48 to 48, and the State Department believed that another debate was almost certain with little prospect for another "win" in the UNGA. Therefore, in order to counter or defuse support of another hostile resolution, the Department developed the strategy of lowering the UNC profile in the ROK.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J511 HistSum Apr 75; SECSTATE 096296/252012Z Apr 75; J5112 Point Paper, 7 Apr 75, Subj: I Corps (US/ROK) Group (U).
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. 1, pp. 120-123.
  3. STATE 097867/272243Z Apr 75.

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(S) CINCUNC advised the JCS that what the Department proposed involved a scenario with three intertwined objectives. The first was to stave off an adverse vote in the UNGA. A second, clearly affirmed, was to assure continuity of the armistice arrangements. A third, unstated but of particular moment in 1975, was to maintain the viability of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Whatever the prospect for attaining the first, CINCUNC continued, was in his view inconsistent with the second and endangered the third. It would be easy enough to physically lower the profile by casing the colors and repainting the signs. It was quite a different matter, however, he noted, to reallocate CINCUNC's substantive responsibilities without jeopardizing the very armistice agreement we sought to preserve.

(S) He described his armistice role as a "very major one" that could not be carried out without forces under his direct command/control. The armistice agreement bound the signers and their "successors in command" to enforcement of the cessation of hostilities, avoidance of hostile acts within or from the Demilitarized Zone, and control of all access into the DMZ. "OPCON of forces is a self-evident requirement for discharge of these functions." CINCUNC continued, "Notably, the agreement places the five islands in the western sea under military control of CINCUNC. Like it or not, the ROK forces thereon are under his aegis."

(S) He continued that if a decision was made to decouple CINCUNC from the forces and generally reduce his armistice functions, the United States or the Koreans "had best be ready to" inform a wide audience of exactly how we were reallocating responsibilities for enforcement of the armistice agreement, explain to the local populace why the U.N. flags were being lowered, open up rules of engagement for renegotiation, effectively counter North Korean/Chinese charges of unilateral abrogation of the principal provisions of the agreement, and to inform the local diplomatic corps that as CINCUNC no longer had operative responsibility for the DMZ, his objection to entry (for tunnel inspection or whatever) was withdrawn.

(S) He discussed the three alternatives proposed by the State Department. Alternative A, in peacetime, would have two parallel commands with the ROK and the United States controlling their own forces; CINCUNC would be restricted to armistice affairs. In wartime, the UNC would assume a unified command role to include OPCON of ROK forces. In Alternative B, a combined headquarters with a U.S. general officer would be established. ROK forces would be under the OPCON of the combined headquarters; CINCUNC would be restricted to armistice affairs. In Alternative C, the status quo was to be maintained, with the exception of separating CINCUNC and a small combined staff from the existing headquarters. CINCUNC would retain OPCON of ROK forces. CINCUNC offered Alternative D, which proposed terminating the UNC and organizing a combined

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headquarters to replace the UNC "in toto." The United States would tell the U.N. that there were two successors in command to CINCUNC, one Korean and one U.S. Both governments, jointly and severally, would insure full compliance with all the provisions of the armistice agreement. The United States was prepared to deactivate the UNC and implement this alternative arrangement as of 1 January 1976 unless the Security Council directed otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In what he called a footnote to that 3 May message, CINCUNC observed that May 1975 was not the most propitious time for discussion of command restructuring with the ROK military. In the wake of developments in Southeast Asia, "they are even more sensitive to the NK offensive indicators of the past several months; and they are particularly concerned about the Western Islands. They are also very finely attuned to anything which might suggest diminution of U.S. force presence or commitment. Thus, one may assume that the ROK military will press for a stronger U.S. umbrella to replace the UNC one."<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC commented on CINCUNC's proposal on 8 May. He noted that the overriding U.S. security objective on the Korean peninsula was to deter North Korean aggression. Any U.N. action the United States initiated should support this objective. Also, it was important to keep U.S. Forces in the ROK, especially in the short run. Reasons included a forward-deployment strategy, regional stability, the beddown of significant PACOM ground forces, and to avoid adverse signals. CINCPAC said that the gut military issues involved OPCON of forces, both ROK and U.S., Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasking and war planning, Rules of Engagement, and a real capability to keep the parties to the armistice honest. CINCPAC recognized that "time was running out" for the UNC. Nevertheless, the alternatives for restructuring that command by the 27 April message from the Secretary of State offered little on balance. Accordingly, he believed that planning or negotiation should focus on the post-UNC situation. It was important to work with both the ROK military and the U.S. Congress from the start. Military considerations had to be heard prior to an irreversible decision. He recognized that the JCS and others in Washington favored a combined command, but "Congress may perceive any change as increased commitment and kill such arrangement." He was concerned that a combined command concept might trigger a fast pullout of U.S. Forces. He foresaw other problems with classified communications, nuclear weapons, and special intelligence. He could support CINCUNC's proposed alternative as a first step toward a long-range solution. He wanted to retain COMUS Korea under CINCPAC. The impact of all of this on Japan was unclear. "Best reading indicates elimination of honor guard

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1. CINCUNC Seoul 030917Z May 75; J5112 Point Paper 20 Jun 75, Subj: United Nations Command (UNC)(U).
  2. Ibid.

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can terminate UN SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement], thus legal basis for retaining Thai Detachment or UNC Rear in Japan lost."<sup>1</sup>

(S) By the end of May the State Department was prepared to terminate the UNC, subject to a satisfactory agreement on the maintenance of the armistice agreement. On 27 May, in a message to the Ambassador in Seoul, the Department noted that in talks with the Koreans on a new combined command the U.S. position was that we would expect to retain a U.S. four-star general officer as CINC of the combined command (double hatted as COMUS Korea) as long as there was a significant U.S. military presence in Korea. As such, the CINC of the combined command would exercise OPCON over those ROK forces assigned to the command. In this regard, no U.S. units would thus be placed under OPCON of the combined command. However, in the event of armed attack on Korea within the meaning of Article III of the Mutual Security Treaty, the Eighth U.S. Army and the 314th Air Division combat units would be dedicated to the combined command, subject to our treaty provisions of "constitutional processes."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The initial ROK Government reaction was favorable. They agreed with the U.S. proposal to send a letter to the Security Council and concurred in taking steps to lower the U.N. profile. The Koreans were ready to open discussions on planning for alternate command arrangements.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Planning for eventual arrangements continued throughout the year, but for the most part CINCPAC was an "information" addressee on message traffic between CINCUNC and the State Department (both the department in Washington and the Embassy in Seoul). Several thoughts relayed in those messages are repeated here. On 15 July the CINCUNC outlined three areas that could present problems to the Koreans. What forces would be placed under the operational control of a combined command headed by an American? What would be the basis for readdressing the question of the nationality of the commander? What was to be the configuration and role of bilateral authorities? The State Department considered it desirable that a U.S. four-star general officer (who was concurrently COMUS Korea) be retained as CINC of the combined command so long as the present level of U.S. military presence was maintained in Korea. Also, the ROK Government considered it necessary to establish a U.S.-ROK military committee as an organ superior to the combined command.<sup>4</sup>

(U) When the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations addressed the Political and Security Committee of that agency on 23 October, he reiterated the position

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1. CINCPAC 081600Z May 75.
  2. SECSTATE 122429/270012Z May 75.
  3. J5112 HistSum May 75.
  4. CINCUNC 150940Z Jul and 221312Z Jul 75 (both EX).

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of the U.S. Government that had been presented to the President of the Security Council on 22 September. In these presentations the distinction between the UNC and U.S. Forces in Korea was stressed. Ambassador Moynihan said:<sup>1</sup>

...The U.N. Command today is comprised of those military personnel directly involved in the performance by the U.N. Command of its armistice agreement responsibilities and includes less than 300 non-Korean personnel. Most of these are U.S. military personnel assigned as staff personnel to the command itself and the remainder are part of the ceremonial honor guard of the command. American forces serving in Korea in accordance with the U.S.-Republic of Korea mutual security treaty of 1954 are not part of the U.N. Command.

...[Regarding a resolution that proposed to withdraw U.S. troops in Korea as a result of the 1954 treaty],...It presumes to make this a matter of U.N. business by referring to them as forces under the U.N. flag. The fact is, as I have already stated, that with the exception of those less-than-300 personnel in the U.N. Command, these troops are not under the U.N. flag and are not a matter of U.N. business.

The presence of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea will continue to be a matter between the U.S. Government and the Republic of Korea under our Mutual Defense Treaty. They will remain there as long as they are needed and as long as their presence is mutually desired by the Republic of Korea and the United States.

(S) Commenting on this position, CINCUNC said that in order to stave off a diplomatic setback in the U.N. General Assembly, the United States, with the concurrence of the ROK Government, had gone to great lengths to tell the world that the role of the UNC was very limited--more or less that of policing the DMZ, sustaining the military armistice commission, and reporting or discussing violations through that mechanism. He continued:<sup>2</sup>

...We have stressed that only a handful of U.S. personnel are associated with the UNC; and, through emphasis on lowering flags, suggested that the bulk of ROK forces operate outside UNC aegis. In other words, we have inferred that the UNC is

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1. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 73, No. 1902 of 8 Dec 75, pp. 817-820, Statement by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan to Committee I on 23 Oct 75.
  2. CINCUNC 290555Z Sep 75.

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a truce supervisory organization only, not the command which would deal with a major breach of the truce. The implications of all this have not gone unnoticed by the ROKs. After all, the ROKs entrusted OPCON of their forces to the USG through CINCUNC for other purposes: to insure a fully adequate deterrent posture and, if need be, to defend against external aggression. [Minister of National Defense]...Suh recently opined that it would be prudent to go to a combined command soonest, said command to function side by side with a UNC charged solely with proforma armistice supervisory functions. So it may well be that, from the ROK point of view, the advent of the combined command is no longer geared to the dissolution of the UNC. Aside from a pragmatic military motive, this reflects a desire to get into a posture where it won't matter much what future UNGAs may resolve about the UNC.

...The central issue with the ROKs is that the combined command must be, in appearance and in fact, an undertaking between equals. They have accepted a U.S. commander provided he reports directly to the two (ROK and U.S.) national authorities, each with equal voice and with some mechanism (as in NATO) to concert and issue guidance and instructions. They understand the U.S. NCA - SECDEF - JCS - CINCUNC relationship; they simply want to make that bilateral. No sovereign nation could settle for less.

...In ROK eyes, bi-lateralism must also be manifest in the forces assigned to the combined command. Any argument that the current arrangement (only ROK forces under OPCON) should continue to pertain will be unavailing....In my view the price of having no U.S. forces assigned to the combined command will be to have no ROK forces either. This is a prospect which must give us great pause.

...I am more than ever convinced that the U.S. must agree to assign our in-country air defense assets to the combined command. The military essentiality of preserving the ROK/U.S. interceptor/SAM integration we now have is self-evident. We will not preserve it unless subordinated to the combined command.

(U) CINCUNC next discussed possible command arrangements involving the 314th Air Division. The existing arrangements regarding Commander 314th Air

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Division merit attention. He served in four capacities and in each he had different authorities and answered to a different superior, as follows.

- As Commander 314th Air Division he had normal command responsibilities. His immediate superior was Commander, 5th Air Force in Yokota, Japan. CINCPAC exercised operational command over 314th AD assets through CINCPACAF to Commander, 5th Air Force. As Commander 314th AD he was not under COMUS Korea or the CINCUNC unless specifically "chopped" - which would probably occur in a major emergency or war.

- As Commander, Korean Air Defense Sector (COMKADS) he was responsible for the U.S. air defense effort in Korea. His immediate superior was the Commander, WESTPAC North Air Defense Region (who was also Commander, 5th Air Force).

- As Commander, Air Forces Korea he was the air component commander to COMUS Korea of U.S. Forces Korea. He had no control of USAF assets in peacetime, but would have operational control of all air forces under COMUS Korea in time of war. He had peacetime operational control of the U.S. Army's 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade.

- As United Nations Command Air Component Commander he answered directly to CINCUNC. He had peacetime operational control of most of the ROK Air Force and non-divisional ROK Army air defense assets.

(U) All of these functions were tied together through the Tactical Air Control Center at Osan, which was joint (USA and USAF), combined (U.S. and ROK), and bilingual (English and Korean).<sup>1</sup>

(S) Meanwhile, back at the United Nations, two resolutions had been introduced, as had been the case the year before, one on behalf of North Korea and one on behalf of the South, the "friendly" resolution. Both resolutions were passed on 18 November, leaving the Korean question unresolved. The "enemy" resolution called for the end of the UNC and the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. There remained a legal question regarding whether the General Assembly could disestablish an organization established by the Security Council (in which the United States had veto power). The "friendly" resolution explained how few UNC forces there were in the ROK, called for lowering of the U.N. flag and the UNC profile. Both the U.S. and ROK Governments would agree to the dissolution of

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1. J561 Point Paper, 6 Aug 75, Subj: Multi-Hatting of COM 314th AD.

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the UNC if the terms of armistice continued to be met and the other side would accept the United States and the ROK as guarantors of successors in command to CINCUNC.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ As the year ended the matter had not been resolved. There were three basic alternative command arrangements. One was to designate COMUS Korea as a successor to CINCUNC and give him operational control of ROK forces. A second was to develop a combined command. A third was to establish parallel chains of command with each nation retaining operational control of its own forces. The ROK Government favored a combined command with operational control of both ROK and U.S. Forces with a bilateral military committee imposed over the combined CINC.

~~(S)~~ CINCUNC favored the combined command with operational control of the same ROK forces that were currently under the UNC and with OPCON of the U.S. 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and the 314th Air Division, for air defense only.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC supported the idea of a combined command as proposed by CINCUNC, with two exceptions. First, no U.S. Forces would be assigned to the operational control of the combined command; the 38th ADA and the 314th AD would be "in support of and under tactical control of combined CINC." Secondly, he believed CINCPAC should be placed over the combined CINC or become a member of a five-man military committee.

~~(S)~~ It appeared that in Washington the Army and the Office of the JCS supported CINCUNC's position. The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps did not support putting U.S. Forces under the operational control of a combined CINC. A memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to the JCS on 12 November advised that discussions with members of Congress indicated that attempts to establish a combined command to replace the UNC might arouse some opposition and endanger overall Korean policy. The form of the successor organization was becoming a matter of increasing urgency, as the United States was committed to dissolution of the UNC on 1 January 1976 if certain conditions were met. The U.S. position in favor of the combined command had been adopted two years earlier and the Assistant Secretary's memo suggested that a reevaluation was due because of significant changes since that time. He believed that two separate chains of command (one U.S., one ROK) with a combined headquarters would be acceptable for peacetime planning.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the end of the year the matter was still being studied. Existing command relationships were as shown on the accompanying chart.

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1. J561 Point Paper, 20 Nov 75, Subj: Status of Combined Command in Korea.
  2. J561 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: UNC Successor Command in Korea.


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# COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, KOREA

1975

UNCLASSIFIED



LEGEND  
 — STRATEGIC GUIDANCE  
 - - - - - OP/COM/OP/CON  
 ..... COMMAND  
 — C — COORDINATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: J561 POINT PAPER, 19 NOV 75

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Military Use of Cheju-Do

(S) Cheju-Do was an island off the southern coast of Korea. During a visit to Korea by the Air Force Chief of Staff, President Park again raised the issue of possible use of Cheju-Do for basing of USAF units. COMUS Korea recommended that we officially inform the ROK Government that, on the basis of a military review, we saw no use for the island. The Koreans had already been told that mainland sites should enjoy first priority in planning for additional airfields. At the same time the Embassy in Seoul requested permission and received clearance to officially inform the Koreans of the U.S. decision. On 28 February CINCUNC informed the Ministry of National Defense that there was no requirement for developing Cheju-Do for basing U.S. units.<sup>1</sup>

Bases and Facilities in the Philippines

(U) The status of U.S. bases in the Philippines remained unchanged in 1975. Activities leading up to bilateral talks and a Military Bases Agreement, proposed for 1976 but often delayed, are discussed in the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history. A few specific subjects are discussed here regarding bases and their use.

(S) Clark Air Base came under study in a couple of ways in 1975. In May the U.S. Ambassador had advanced the possibility that the United States no longer had an exclusively American rationale for retention of Clark, and considered that changing U.S. interests and responsibilities on Mainland Southeast Asia made air defense the only reason for USAF deployment to Clark. CINCPAC provided his views to the Ambassador, the JCS, and the Departments of Defense and State on 10 May.<sup>2</sup>

...In my view Clark remains strategically essential to PACOM. See no change in national policy relative U.S. commitments in Pacific and Far East that would lessen its importance. U.S. PACOM military strategy depends on forward presence as key to support of U.S. national interests.... Clark AB most important part of forward base structure in PACOM: provides essential link in U.S. capability to project CONUS-based forces into Southwest Pacific, Northeast Asia, and Indian Ocean/Middle East areas; accents U.S. resolve and commitment to Pacific affairs; contains only large aerial port capability in Southwest Pacific.... Appreciate that our

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1. J5112 HistSum Feb 75; COMUS Korea 010018Z Feb 75; AMEMB Seoul 0730/03851Z Feb 75; SECSTATE 025761/042317Z Feb 75; AMEMB Seoul 1534/080348Z Mar 75.
  2. CINCPAC 102120Z May 75.

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military posture will undergo reassessment, but see no reason to believe that Clark will not remain a key requirement.

(S) Use of Clark Air Base as a "safe haven" for B-52 aircraft from typhoon-prone Guam came under study in 1975. On 9 August CINCPAC advised CINCSAC and CINCPACAF of his increasing concern about usable safe haven bases. "Continuing base closures and local political sensitivities may reduce options." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Looking for alternative bases, the use of Clark appeared desirable. Upgrading of runways and taxiways would be required before B-52s could use Clark, even occasionally, and would cost over \$1 million, but this would increase its general capabilities also, which was highly desirable.<sup>1</sup>

(D) Both CINCSAC and CINCPACAF agreed, and PACAF requested Air Staff concurrence. The Air Force Chief of Staff recommended that the decision be held in abeyance for 6 to 12 months because of anticipated base negotiations and a Defense Department hold on new construction in the Philippines. There was reluctance to increase the value and importance of Clark during those exchanges. Maintenance and repair were being kept to a minimum.<sup>2</sup>

(U) CINCSAC forwarded a study to CINCPAC with options for upgrading Clark and requested comments on suitability, costs, and political ramifications. CINCPAC's reply recommended one of the proposals advanced (Option 4 with Option 3 as a fall-back position) and commented on costs. He advised, however, that political ramifications were the most significant factor. Embassy response by that time (22 November) had not been favorable, but no final response had been provided. CINCPAC believed that his first comments on the matter, on 9 August, remained valid, but he recognized that agreement must be reached with the Government of the Philippines. He believed that a strong case could be presented to the Philippines, pointing out the long-term benefits of upgrading Clark facilities and the fact that the base would be used rarely by B-52s, and only in an emergency as a safe haven.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 27 November CINCPAC's Representative in the Philippines advised that the Embassy was reluctant to respond directly in this matter and would prefer that a request in this regard be forwarded through the JCS to the Defense Department to the State Department. He provided his own comments, however. He believed that a very small, but very vocal and influential group was pressing President Marcos to push for sovereignty over bases and for reduction of risk

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1. CINCPAC 090253Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCSAC 132250Z Aug 75; CINCPACAF 260110Z Aug 75 and 200305Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC 222117Z Nov 75; J5124 HistSum Nov 75.

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to the Philippines. In spite of the obviously harmless intention of "Safe Haven," they would reason that the Philippines should not even allow the appearance of providing any encouragement to such support. Many there were quite concerned that an offensive capability based there would only invite eventual aggression. He believed that the subject should be best pursued as a part of the base negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In another matter, on 15 July the Secretary of Defense advised of plans to activate at Clark an "Agressor" squadron for air combat training with PACAF units, using T-38 aircraft. The U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines had no objection to the proposal, but he believed that F-5E aircraft "would make much more sense for our long term interests here." He said he understood that two F-5E squadrons were being formed from Indochina stocks; if this was the case, he recommended that one squadron be assigned for the combat training role proposed for Clark.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 2 August CINCPAC recommended that the Secretary of Defense consider the use of F-5E aircraft instead of T-38s, and the matter was considered favorably. CINCPAC advised that the use of T-38 aircraft had been an interim PACAF position; it was planned to equip the squadron with F-5Es when they were available and supportable.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Meanwhile, Air Force Program Document 77-2 activated a T-38 squadron at Clark, designated the 26th Tactical Fighter Training Squadron. The Air Force did not have sufficient F-5E aircraft ground support equipment spare parts or spare engines to equip the squadron by July 1976, as had been hoped. Worldwide Foreign Military Sales had intensified already critical shortages of support equipment and aircraft spares. The shortages had caused other Air Force F-5E programs to be slipped as much as a year. The Air Force program called for F-5Es to be assigned to Clark in the fourth quarter of FY 78.<sup>4</sup>

(S) In one other basing matter in the Philippines, the Kawasaki firm of Japan had approached the Government of the Philippines regarding a possible ship repair facility to be located in the Philippines. The Ambassador had advised the State Department that he had told President Marcos "off the record" how he thought the U.S. Navy would react to a Kawasaki project in Subic Bay. The Ambassador had replied that if Kawasaki stayed on the north side of the bay, he would expect no problems, but that if the company had any designs on the Subic base, "I would expect the U.S. Navy to 'sink them.' (Laughter.)"<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPACREP Philippines 270114Z Nov 75.
  2. AMEMB Manila 9892/180940Z Jul 75.
  3. CINCPAC 022101Z Aug 75.
  4. SECSTATE 197816/201839Z Aug 75; J5313 HistSum Aug 75.
  5. AMEMB Manila 12820/110821Z Sep 75.

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(S) CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT's views on the proposed Kawasaki project. CINCPACFLT advised that the major impact was considered to be the increased coordination requirements in port control, additional security measures, and eventually a more independent work force due to competition for skilled labor. He advised that he did not know particulars of the Kawasaki proposal; location of such a project was possibly to be at the Cabangan Point area near Subic City, but development elsewhere was not restricted. No efforts preliminary to such a project had been visible, but the company could be waiting for the results of the base negotiations. CINCPACFLT advised that from his viewpoint it was not desirable to share Subic Bay with Kawasaki, that there would be problems. If forced to accept the facility, problems would be fewer if Kawasaki facilities were located at the northern end of the bay near Subic City.<sup>1</sup>

(U) No further information on the proposal was received by CINCPAC in 1975.<sup>2</sup>

#### U.S. Forces and Bases on Taiwan

(U) President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 was followed by plans for drawdowns of U.S. Forces and the closing of U.S. bases on Taiwan. In the "Shanghai Communique" issued by the President and Premier Chou En-Lai, the United States reaffirmed its interest "in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves" and the "ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces and military installations from Taiwan." The communique continued, "[the United States] will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as tension in the area diminishes." Such actions had been begun at that time and continued throughout 1975. A rather complete discussion of the history of command arrangements in Taiwan and force and base reductions to that time was included in the 1974 CINCPAC Command History.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Plans to merge the Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group had almost reached fulfillment in 1958, and off and on the subject had surfaced in the 17 years since. It was a matter that was studied again in 1975. A CINCPAC Manpower Management Team had been scheduled to conduct a study of the two headquarters in October and November. On 20 September CINCPAC advised the JCS of this study. He noted that the required reduced strength levels had been achieved. He also advised that the study would result in a new Joint Manpower Program to be effective 1 October 1976, which would give the Embassy the time requested to prepare the Republic of China's Government should

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1. CINCPACFLT 190101Z Sep 75.
  2. J5124 HistSum Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 137-145.

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merger again be recommended. CINCPAC advised that his position favoring the merger remained unchanged.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 7 October, however, the JCS advised that the Joint Staff had the matter of a merger under review, and that the results of that review would be forwarded when available. On 9 October CINCPAC advised the commands in Taiwan that the CINCPAC manpower study had been postponed indefinitely.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 18 November the JCS advised that they had concluded that it was militarily practicable to merge the TDC and the MAAG. Because of a pending trip by President Ford to the PRC, however, and the possible issuance of policy guidance on Republic of China matters subsequent to the trip, it was decided not to forward such a position to the Secretary of Defense at that time. Upon receipt of any such guidance, the JCS would, as necessary, initiate a review of the U.S. military presence on Taiwan to include other options for fulfilling military requirements with organizational arrangements that were both efficient and responsive.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Tainan Air Base had been phased down to caretaker status by December 1974. On 1 April 1975 the JCS advised that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had requested views regarding the military requirement for continued P-3 and related operations that continued out of Tainan, along with reasonable alternatives to Tainan basing.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Subsequently, as a result of an action initiated by the National Security Council, with the objective of reducing the U.S. military population at Tainan, all P-3 operations were terminated as of 9 June. On 20 August, however, the JCS advised that they had information that indicated that some support personnel for P-3 operations remained at Tainan. (The State Department had also expressed concern regarding the reduction of military personnel at Tainan.) The JCS advised that unless unusual circumstances existed that warranted the reopening of the issue of retention with higher authority, they were requesting that all P-3 support personnel be redeployed at the earliest possible date in accordance with previous directives.<sup>5</sup>

(S) In May the second F-4 squadron was withdrawn from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, with the final squadron of 18 F-4Cs departing for Kadena between

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1. CINCPAC 200317Z Sep 75.
  2. JCS 3558/072155Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 090219Z Oct 75.
  3. JCS 9114/182200Z Nov 75.
  4. J511 Point Paper, 17 Aug 75, Subj: Overview - Taiwan (U); JCS 6916/012341Z Apr 75.
  5. JCS 2296/202019Z Aug 75, which cited CINCPAC 190005Z Jun 75.

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27 and 30 May. By June that base had been placed in caretaker status, terminating COMMANDO DOMINO.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 11 November CINCPAC was advised in a joint State-Defense Department message that a decision had been reached to proceed with inactivation of the 327th Air Division and related support activities at Taipei Air Station and the return of the station to the Republic of China. Approval was also given for retention of a small USAF contingent of air control personnel at the Republic of China's operations center there. These actions were to be accomplished as early as feasible, but on a low-key basis to minimize public attention, publicity, and personnel turbulence. As the Chinese already anticipated those moves, it was believed that a routine, low-key approach through military channels was the best way of informing them of the decision, and this was left to the discretion of the Country Team. As usual, no announcement was to be made by the United States, and it was assumed that the Chinese would not wish to make one either.<sup>2</sup>

(S) A recapitulation of assigned strength of activities in Taiwan as of 31 July was as follows:

American Embassy	28
Joint Commands	283
Army	519
Navy	450
Air Force	1,684
Other Defense Department	<u>13</u>
Total	2,977

To this should be added 66 non-Defense Department civilians at the Embassy and one at Taipei Transportation Management Agency, for a grand total of 3,044, distributed as follows:<sup>3</sup>

Taipei	1,500
Shu Linkou	814
Tai Chung - Ching Chuan Kang	517
Tainan	120
Kaohsiung/Tsoying	68
Five other locations	<u>25</u>
Total	3,044

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1. J311 HistSum Jun 75; CINCPACAF 282245Z Apr 75; 5th AF 270710Z May 75.
  2. SECSTATE 266318/110247Z Nov 75.
  3. J511 Point Paper, 27 Aug 75, Subj: Overview - Taiwan (U).

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
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Thailand Forces and Bases

(U) Although plans had been under way for a long time to reduce the residual force and base levels in Thailand, the U.S. withdrawals from other Southeast Asia countries and political pressures from the Thai Government increased the rate of withdrawal and the closures of U.S. bases precipitously.

(S) In October 1973 the military government of Thanom Kittikachorn had fallen, replaced by a caretaker government. By October 1974 a new constitution had been approved and parliamentary elections had been held in January 1975. In March 1975, after failure of another coalition to get a vote of confidence, such a vote was obtained by a coalition led by Khukrit Pramoj. The parliament was made up of 22 political parties. Despite predictions of short tenure, the Khukrit government remained in power. Pressures brought out leadership qualities in Prime Minister Khukrit, who strengthened his position by swift handling of potentially damaging situations and personal diplomatic activities abroad. While the government faced increased militancy in the labor movement in the Bangkok area, student activism, and insurgency in the hinterlands, the country had regained self-confidence in diplomatic matters, quickly reorienting its foreign policies to meet the new political realities of the region. Thailand also saw the need for continuing close ties with the United States, but demanded and got the removal of U.S. combat forces.<sup>1</sup>

(S) As 1975 began the United States had envisioned a residual force level of about 10,000. The Thai Foreign Minister, however, announced that beginning 27 March steps would be taken regarding the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. That same day the JCS advised that they had been requested to reexamine, on an urgent basis "with precision and as coldly as possible" whether, and to what extent, there were long-term requirements for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Thailand that were not related to potential combat requirements of the still-ongoing war in Indochina. They asked a number of specific questions.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 20 Mar 75, Subj: New Thai Government/Implication for U.S.; J5122 Point Paper, 24 Sep 75, Subj: Political-Military Situation Report - Thailand.
  2. SECSTATE 069349/271709Z Mar 75; JCS 3617/272248Z Mar 75.

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~~(S)~~ The same day he replied to the JCS, CINCPAC tasked his subordinate commands to provide a 12-month drawdown plan to reach a manning level of 3,000 by 30 June 1976. On 6 May he provided the JCS with some general concepts for such a reduction. Those precepts were: redeploy forces and close bases in the most economical manner with minimum turbulence of personnel, forces, and logistic support; maximum aircraft redeployment during the first 90 days; retain adequate logistics support personnel until June 1976; a 60-day separation between base closures for transportation and property disposal; retrograde major items of equipment and supplies no longer mission required as soon as possible instead of phasing with base closures; transfer functions out of Thailand where feasible; use contract support rather than U.S. military spaces where possible (State Department assistance would be required); MACTHAI headquarters to continue operations at essentially existing manning until the end of the drawdown period, then phase out to JUSMAG; retain U-Tapao and Ramasun facilities with entry-exit rights at Sattahip and Vayama, with residual storage rights at Samae San to be determined; in-country intelligence spaces were subject to continuous review and reduction as requirements diminished; and that there was immediate authorization to discuss the turnover of the Integrated Communications System with the Thai Government.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 160024Z Apr 75.
  2. CINCPAC 160210Z Apr 75 and 060305Z May 75.

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(S) The JCS concurred in CINCPAC's proposals, with certain modifications. The base closure schedule to be followed, in order, was Ubon, Nakhon Phanom, Udorn, and Korat. By further JCS direction, CINCPAC was to receive a concept plan for a 6-month drawdown to about 3,075 spaces by the end of 1975, and a prioritized phasedown plan from the 3,075-space level to a zero baseline. They requested that CINCPAC submit a detailed plan. In the matter of the telecommunications planning associated with withdrawal plans, they acknowledged the importance of the turnover of the Integrated Communications System. The Secretary of Defense had been requested to assist in expediting the tendering of the offer of the turnover to the Thai government.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In response to CINCPAC's request for comments from commanders in the PACOM, the Commander USSAG/7th Air Force advised that with completion of FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Saigon, there "no longer exists a need for current Thailand force levels." He proposed withdrawal to a level consistent with logistic constraints and agreement between the two governments. His headquarters should be disestablished on 30 June 1975, as planned.<sup>2</sup>

(S) During this turbulent period, there was an attempt to avoid creating the impression that there was some direct link between withdrawal actions and events in Saigon. A statement to the press by the Thai Government on 5 May, however, announced that a reduction of 10,000 had already occurred, and that following consultations between representatives of the two governments, a decision had been reached to further reduce U.S. Forces there. The then-authorized strength of 27,000 was to be reduced by 7,500.<sup>3</sup>

(S) And thus the specific orders began to arrive. On 2 June the JCS directed the redeployment of all B-52 and F-111 aircraft from Thailand, the closure of Ubon, and reduction of associated personnel by about 30 June. All Air Force actions were to be coordinated with CINCPAC, who was to insure through his representatives that the Ambassador in Bangkok was fully aware of any proposed actions prior to their execution. CINCPAC's directions to execute these instructions were forwarded the same day to his Air Force component command and COMUSMACTHAI.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In a briefing for the news media by personnel of the 307th Strategic Wing (SAC) just prior to redeployment of the B-52s, it was noted that the aircraft had begun flying strategic bombing missions from U-Tapao over Vietnam

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1. JCS 1761/291607Z May 75.
  2. USSAG/7AF 061010Z May 75.
  3. SECSTATE 097023/281316Z Apr 75, which retransmitted Bangkok 7476; SECSTATE 099959/292335Z Apr 75; CINCPAC PA LNO Bangkok 050452Z May 75.
  4. JCS 1819/021919Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 022210Z Jun 75.

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in April 1967. Those aircraft had had a particularly significant impact on the LINEBACKER II campaign of December 1972, which occurred shortly prior to the Paris peace accord. On 15 August 1973 a bombing halt had been effected, and the initial drawdown of B-52s had begun in May 1974. More were deployed later that year, and in June the remaining 16 aircraft would be redeployed. The aircraft were destined for March AFB, California, or Dyess or Carswell AFBs in Texas. The B-52s of the ARC LIGHT missions flew a total of 250,000 flying hours from U-Tapao before the August 1973 bombing halt. (Many ARC LIGHT missions had been flown out of Andersen on Guam, of course. Although use of the B-52 in Southeast Asia had actually begun in June 1965, not one was lost until 22 November 1972, but 15 had been lost before the end of LINEBACKER II.)<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 10 June the JCS directed further reductions in aircraft and the disestablishment of the U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force. Again, the Ambassador was to be kept fully informed in advance of the actions. The Secretary of State advised the Ambassador of the proposed reductions, which were to be accomplished by the end of June or early July, as follows:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Redeploy</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Authorizations</u>
KC-135	12	U-Tapao	672
AC-130A	9	Korat	601
RF-4	18	Udorn	618
F-4D	24	Udorn	742
OV-10	20	Nakhom Phanom	304 (includes Tactical Air Command ground forces)
DC-130	2	U-Tapao	125
CH-3	2	Nakhon Phanom	45

The disestablishment of USSAG was expected to provide a reduction of 428 spaces, the 7th Air Force, 101 spaces, and the 13th ADVON, 55 spaces.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Beddown of U.S. Forces by 1 August was as shown:<sup>3</sup>

Korat

388 Tactical Fighter Wing: 3 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 24 A-7Ds  
34 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 24 F-4Ds  
16 Special Operations Squadron, 8 AC-130Hs

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1. CINCSAC 031531Z Jun 75, which retransmitted 307SW 031200Z and 030630Z Jun 75; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 165-166.
  2. JCS 3878/102323Z Jun 75; SECSTATE 137759/122212Z Jun 75.
  3. J311 Point Paper, 1 Aug 75, Subj: Air Force Units in PACOM (U).

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Udorn

432 Tactical Fighter Wing: 4 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 24 F-4Ds  
25 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 24 F-4Es (of  
which two were on 10-minute alert)  
421 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 24 F-4Es

40 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, 2 HH-43s

U-Tapao

40 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, 12 KC-135s and 3 HH-43s

Nakhon Phanom

56 Special Operations Wing: 21 Special Operations Squadron, 5 CH-53s  
23 Tactical Air Support Squadron, 20 OV-10s

40 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, 10 HH-53s

~~(S)~~ Army aircraft in Thailand at the time were 13 U-21As and 2 UH-1s.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ In September, members of CINCPAC's Plans Directorate visited facilities and installations in Bangkok, Don Muang, Samae San/Vayama/Sattahip, U-Tapao, Ko Kha, Chiang Mai, Udorn, Nakhon Phanom, Korat, and Ramasun Station. Their general impressions were as follows.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Commanders there were anxiously awaiting a Washington decision on one of three options concerning U.S. Forces reductions. Preparations were under way, however, at all locations affected to turn in excess material that was nonessential to mission readiness. Progress in meeting the 31 October anticipated closure of Nakhon Phanom looked good. The officer in charge of that closure believed that the deadline would be met and had programmed all related actions to be completed by 26 October. It was believed doubtful that the Thai could maintain vacated U.S. facilities in a ready-to-be-occupied state of readiness because of limited funds. "The idea that U.S. forces could reoccupy vacated facilities with minimum rehabilitation is a facade." Ubon, just recently vacated, already had dilapidated buildings and grass growing through the runway/taxiway/ramp areas. (The Thai Foreign Minister had already approached

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1. Ibid.
  2. J5317 HistSum Sep 75, which contained J53/Memo/C18-75 of 29 Sep 75, Subj: Thailand Trip Report. The CINCPAC officers were COL Charles L. Nowalk, USA, and LCOL Glenn A. Bethany, USAF.

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the United States on the matter of the United States paying the cost of maintaining bases after the U.S. drawdown so they could be used in some eventuality. When advised we were closing the bases and turning them over to them, the Foreign Minister had said he only wanted the "combat forces" to leave, that other units could stay if they were under the JUSMAG.)<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ Further findings of the CINCPAC staff members included that Thai military and local civilians at the various locations wanted to retain the U.S. presence. They were already feeling the impact on the local economy. Thefts of U.S. material were on the increase, but U.S. commanders believed they were within manageable bounds.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC, the officers believed, could facilitate base closures in Thailand by requesting the major commands (Military Airlift Command, Strategic Air Command, etc.) to forward disposition instructions concerning their respective tenant units within five days of the date of execution. A case in point was a van with U-2 downlink equipment at Nakhon Phanom that had been prepared for retrograde for six weeks awaiting SAC disposition instructions.

~~(C)~~ Further, there was a need for a plan that outlined future organization and command arrangements of residual U.S. Forces. It was believed that work should commence in this area without waiting for a Washington decision on which of three options would be selected. The plan should outline such arrangements for all three options and be refined later when a decision had been made regarding a specific option.

~~(C)~~ Specific comments pertaining to specific parts of their visit were also outlined. Consultations with the Political-Military Counselor revealed they were watching the increased Laotian military buildup across the Mekong River east of Nakhon Phanom. It was believed that the Thai by now felt there was a need for a U.S. presence in Thailand as part of the stability equation in the region and to partially balance the Chinese and Soviet presence and interests in Southeast Asia. It appeared the Prime Minister was in firm control, and no change in administration was anticipated in the near future.

~~(S)~~ The whole matter of U.S. presence, of course, continued in the political arena. The Ambassador and the Department in Washington were in constant communication on this subject in an attempt to reach some mutual agreement with the Thai on long-range plans.

~~(S)~~ Here, however, it is appropriate to outline the "options" that had been under consideration, and some of the earlier recommendations. As noted

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1. SECSTATE 196245/190004Z Aug 75, which retransmitted AMEMB Bangkok 17091.

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above, on 6 May CINCPAC had provided a concept plan for a residual force of some 3,075 spaces by the end of FY 76. On 29 May the JCS had tasked CINCPAC for detailed plans, one for a 6-month accelerated withdrawal, the other for a more gradual 9-month withdrawal. On 15 July CINCPAC had provided a three-option plan to the JCS. Option I left one tactical fighter squadron (F-4s) in Thailand plus intelligence activities; 4,800 military spaces would be required. Option II retained the Defense Attaché Office and the JUSMAGTHAI and required only 450 military spaces. Option III, the option CINCPAC preferred, was the same as Option II, except for a combat force in the Philippines; it called for a military force of 3,500.

(S) On 2 August the JCS forwarded their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: two options, both with a starting date of 1 September 1975. Option I was a gradual drawdown to 3,800 spaces by the end of FY 76. This included a combat and support force in Thailand (at U-Tapao and Don Muang); retention of the DAO, the JUSMAGTHAI, and the SEATO medical laboratory at Bangkok; retention of intelligence activities at Ramasun, Ko Kha, and Chiang Mai; and disestablishment of COMUSMAGTHAI by 30 March 1976. Option II concerned an accelerated drawdown to 300 spaces by March 1976, retaining only the DAO and the JUSMAG.

(S) The JCS recommendations were forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs), from which they were forwarded to the National Security Council. Forwarded were the two JCS options plus an OSD Option III, which was the same as JCS Option I, except for a combat force out of Thailand (probably in the Philippines), which had been CINCPAC's preferred option. The OSD also recommended disestablishment of COMUSMAGTHAI on 30 June 1976. At this time (late August) the U.S. strength was 17,854 (Army, 2,716; Navy, 259; Air Force, 14,852; and Marine Corps, 27).<sup>1</sup>

(S) The options that finally went to the National Security Council were in the form of a joint State-Defense Department recommendation. Option I was a gradual drawdown to 3,800 spaces, with a combat force in-country (six F-4s). Option II was an accelerated drawdown to 300 spaces, with retention of the DAO, the JUSMAG, and the SEATO medical laboratory. Option III, the one preferred by the Secretary of Defense, was similar to the one that had been preferred by CINCPAC, with a gradual drawdown to 3,000 spaces and with combat forces out-of-country. To be retained, in addition to the DAO, JUSMAG, and SEATO laboratory, were Chiang Mai (FOREST GREEN); Ramasun (the 7th Radio Research Field Station); U-Tapao, 3 to 6 C-130s, 3 P-3s, 2 U-2Rs, and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Central Identification Laboratory; Don Muang

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1. J5317 Point Paper, 18 Aug 75, Subj: U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand (U).

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with 5 U-21s and 2 UH-1Hs; plus support activity. Nakhon Phanom, Udorn, and Korat were to be closed, and MACTHAI disestablished. Ko Kha was to be terminated at a date to be determined later. Human Intelligence activities were to be discontinued at Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group and Detachment 5 of the 7602nd Air Intelligence Group.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The national level decisions were not to be made known until late October, however. Meanwhile, the reductions continued, as earlier scheduled. On 3 September the JCS directed CINCPAC to close Nakhon Phanom and reduce associated personnel by 31 October. He was directed to relocate 10 HH-53s to Korat by the end of September and retrograde 20 OV-10s and 5 CH-53s through U-Tapao in the same time frame. CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF and COMUSMACTHAI to take appropriate action in this regard.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 6 September CINCPACAF advised that the OV-10s and CH-53s would relocate from Nakhon Phanom to U-Tapao by 30 September, but would be retrograded out of Thailand at a later time. On 5 September the Air Force Chief of Staff provided for final disposition of the aircraft: four OV-10s were for Osan, Korea, six to the Tactical Air Command, and ten OV-10s and five CH-53s to the Air Force in Europe. CINCPAC initiated a reclama to the JCS for retention of the aircraft assets in the PACOM, which was acknowledged on 19 September. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, however, many of CINCPAC's requests for PACOM-owned or dedicated assets were not granted; the trend was toward CONUS centralization of scarce assets, principally for reasons of economy.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The Nakhon Phanom drawdown toward closure continued on schedule. On 20 October CINCPACAF provided some lessons learned in this closure as well as those already completed regarding time-required planning factors that were critical to an efficient retrograde program. His message was addressed principally to the Air Staff, but was, of course, of interest in the joint arena too. He noted the following time-required factors:

- 30 days to relocate aircraft from each base.
- 90 days after departure of last aircraft to close the installation.

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1. J5317 Point Paper, 6 Oct 75, Subj: U.S. Force Reduction in Thailand (U).
  2. JCS 7213/032222Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 040109Z Sep 75.
  3. J5317 HistSum Sep 75; which cited CINCPAC 172326Z Sep 75 and JCS 192148Z Sep 75; CSAF 052140Z Sep 75; CINCPACAF 050440Z Sep 75; 13AF 050900Z Sep 75.

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- because of the limited availability of surface transportation, the initial 60 days of retrograde at one base (Udorn) should not overlap with the start of heavy retrograde at another (Korat).

He noted that the delay of authority to begin execution of plans to close Udorn and Korat would make it extremely difficult to achieve the closure dates sought (Udorn on 31 January 1976, Korat on 31 March 1976). He requested the assistance of the Air Staff to preclude ongoing negotiations with the Thai from locking the United States into the hard base closure dates being considered. The time requirements he had stated above "should be computed from date of execute and are essential to efficient accomplishment of base closure requirements."<sup>1</sup>

(U) Nakhon Phanom was officially closed as a USAF base on 27 October and formally turned over to the Royal Thai Government. COMUSMACTHAI described it as the most trouble-free air base closure thus far; the last shipment of retrograde equipment was expected to be out on schedule, 31 October.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Still further redeployments of aircraft were directed by the JCS following a Washington decision on residual force posture. The Washington decision will be discussed below. The 14 November JCS direction required redeployment from Udorn of 24 F-4D aircraft by mid-December and 48 F-4Es by the end of December. Official turnover of Udorn was to be 31 January 1976. From Korat, 24 A-7s were to be redeployed by mid-December, and by the end of that month 8 AC-130s and 24 F-4Ds also. By mid-January 1976 redeployment of 4 HC-130s was directed plus the retrograde of 10 HH-53s. Korat was to be turned over by the end of February 1976. The JCS directed CINCPAC, regarding U-Tapao, to coordinate with SAC for the redeployment of the KC-135s then on rotational duty to insure tanker support to redeploying tactical aircraft. By March 1976 those portions of U-Tapao that the United States would not retain were to be turned over officially to the Thai Government.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The last of the U.S. military combat aircraft were redeployed on 15 December with the departure from Korat of 24 A-7s. The last SAC KC-135 tanker departed from U-Tapao on 21 December.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ Earlier, on 3 October, when they were advising CINCPAC of the options recommended for a residual force, the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to provide


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1. CINCPACAF 202000Z Oct 75.
  2. COMUSMACTHAI 281005Z Oct 75 (BOM).
  3. J311 HistSum Nov 75; JCS 6381/142240Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 150246Z Nov 75; CINCPACAF 152300Z Nov 75.
  4. CINCPAC PA LNO Bangkok 120515Z Dec 75; 3AD Andersen AFB 150650Z Dec 75.

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recommendations concerning alternative command arrangements, reaffirmation and prioritization of re-entry rights requirements, and possible Thai use for U.S.-vacated facilities and installations. The proposed alternative command arrangements for residual forces will be discussed below.



(S) In the matter of use of vacated U.S. facilities to preserve the property investments and combat support capabilities of the installations, CINCPAC advised the JCS on 7 November that operations and maintenance funding

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1. CINCPAC 100325Z Oct 75.

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costs dictated joint Thai military and civilian/commercial use. Feasible alternatives for such use could include joint use of airfield operations and facilities (shared flight operations, flying training, aircraft maintenance, and technical and vocational training); conversion to industrial park uses, such as light industry and manufacturing or aircraft maintenance; civil and municipal uses such as schools, hospitals, orphanages, or low-income housing; joint operation of port facilities; and reclamation of the land for agriculture. It was believed that any unsolicited U.S. proposals or advice might be interpreted as U.S. interest in participating and it was recommended that the United States respond to any Thai-initiated requests for advice or assistance on a case-by-case basis.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Additional facility turnovers or closures in 1975 included the PEPPERGRINDER ammunition storage facility near Udorn which was turned over to the Thai on 1 August (the turnover had been delayed slightly at Thai request) and the Camp Vayama ammunition facility near Sattahip, which was officially closed on 16 December. At Vayama the real property transferred to the Thai consisted of 173 facilities with a value of approximately \$2.7 million and other personal property, primarily administrative-type furnishing with a value of about \$75,000.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Coast Guard LORAN stations were closed and property turned over at Udorn on 16 September, Lampang on 17 September, and Sattahip on 19 September.<sup>3</sup>

#### Residual Force Structure

(S) As noted above, throughout the year various options for the residual force in Thailand had been under study at all levels of government. On 24 October the decision was announced. A memorandum from the White House to the Secretaries of State and Defense stated a desire to retain Ramasun, the Chiang Mai seismic station, U-2R operations, P-3 surveillance, and an air operations and re-entry capability at U-Tapao. Retention of the Ko Kha space-track station was also desired but was not considered essential. No more than 3,000 residual military spaces were authorized.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 25 October the Secretary of State outlined the Department's position for the Ambassador's discussions with Thai Prime Minister Khukrit. The Ambassador was to advise Khukrit that the United States welcomed his decision to permit a non-combat military presence after March 1976 when all combat

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1. CINCPAC 070222Z Nov 75.
  2. COMUSMACTHAI 040925Z Aug 75 and 190358Z Dec 75 (both EX).
  3. COMUSMACTHAI 191030Z Sep 75 (EX).
  4. J5314 Point Paper, 2 Jan 76, Subj: Thailand Drawdown (U).

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units would have been withdrawn. He was to be advised of the nature of the residual presence the United States sought to maintain and the main facilities. Personnel were to be reduced to no more than 4,000 military spaces by March 1976 and to 3,000 by the early summer of 1976. As for re-entry of U.S. aircraft, the United States had in mind such movements as typhoon safe havens, training exercises, and transit flights to and from other bases.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 3 November the Ambassador advised that American officials had met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Thai officials, who had agreed with most of the U.S. proposals. They objected, however, to the presence of any U-2 aircraft. They requested that Americans at U-Tapao live elsewhere, to keep a lower profile; they planned to use the base as an international airport. The Ambassador next requested a list of firm base closure dates.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC advised the JCS that the established closure dates were acceptable, providing the Thai understood that all combat aircraft would have been moved out and the flag hauled down, but that subsequent retrograde actions would still have to be completed, 30 days to remove aircraft and 90 days thereafter to complete all actions. He saw use of another cantonment area for personnel as more costly, but believed we should be responsive to the Thai request for minimum visibility at U-Tapao. He noted that at that base, as a minimum, the United States needed provision for essentials such as navigational and tower facilities, crash and rescue capabilities, and aircraft maintenance, all of which would require U.S. personnel present. He saw no great problem, however, in turning over refueling and certain other support to the Thai. He believed that critical repairs, security, and flight safety related matters had to be retained by U.S. hands.

(S) While the Thai had requested 48 hours notice if bases were to be used as weather safe havens, CINCPAC urged that negotiators seek a minimum of only 12 hours because of unpredictable typhoon tracks in the PACOM; we would provide all of the notification we could. (The Thai had also requested about two weeks notice before a joint training exercise.) CINCPAC had other uses for the U-2 aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 10 November COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that he had provided the Ambassador with information he had requested, including a statement of residual troop strength and the disposition of those forces. The total was 3,786. On 11 November, however, CINCPAC reminded COMUSMACTHAI that the decision not to

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1. SECSTATE 254872/1/251949Z Oct 75.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 23079/031255Z Nov 75 (EX); SECSTATE 260802/041812Z Nov 75, which retransmitted Bangkok 23189.
  3. CINCPAC 062245Z Nov 75.


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exceed 3,000 U.S. spaces in Thailand in the post FY 76 period had been made by "highest authority" and formed the basis for U.S.-Thai negotiations. He requested that COMUSMACTHAI inform the Ambassador in advance of anticipated negotiations that U.S. military planning envisioned a U.S. presence of no more than 3,000.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 15 November, as discussions reached final stages on the residual force posture, CINCPAC reiterated PACOM objectives to all concerned. He stressed that the facilities were for an operational location near the Indian Ocean for aerial surveillance, a staging base, and area contingencies; for contingency access to strategic port and storage areas for the area itself and for Middle East resupply; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The mission and functions and command relationships of the new U.S. Support Agency Thailand were outlined; these will be discussed below.



(S) In the matter of operations, CINCPAC confirmed the need for U-Tapao as a typhoon safe haven in the event political sensitivities precluded the use of Kadena and Yokota. Especially for B-52s, re-entry rights for the use of U-Tapao were "essential." He foresaw a minimal effect of the drawdown from Thailand on the bilateral exercise program. U.S. Naval forces involved were external to the Thai based resources except in the case of antisubmarine

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1. MACTHAI 100830Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 110016Z Nov 75.

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warfare exercises that employed P-3 aircraft from the U-Tapao detachment. CINCPAC said the two governments might desire to expand future bilateral exercises to compensate for reduced SEATO activity, but "we will have a hard time finding the money." If it were politically feasible, he recommended relocating the Joint Casualty Resolution Center from Thailand as part of the drawdown. A Thailand location was not required for the center and relocation would reduce the visibility of U.S. activities.

(S) Regarding communications, CINCPAC advised they would be reduced to the minimum necessary to support the residual force. He was looking at possible replacement with tactical, mobile systems including satellite earth terminals and high frequency/single side band where suitable. He intended to implement a "very austere" but reliable system, reducing both manpower and funding.

(S) Logistics facilities were discussed. Retention of Sattahip port was necessary until retrograde operations were complete, after which port operations could be transferred to Thai port authority, with sufficient warehouse and ship berthing rights retained by the U.S. Support Agency Thailand. C-130 support would be required as long as U.S. Forces were located up-country. He envisioned rotational aircraft, not permanently assigned. The war reserve munitions storage facility site at U-Tapao was excellent, well situated to meet PACOM needs. Clark Air Base in the Philippines was the nearest alternate site. The facilities at Samae San were excellent and built for specific use: the mortuary, the Central Identification Laboratory, a confinement building, and a recreation area. They should be retained, but, after the redeployment actions, if costs proved excessive other arrangements could be made. Facilities could be centralized at U-Tapao or transferred out of Thailand. The DeLong pier was to be relocated to Korea after completion of ammunition retrograde; the pier at Vayama was considered adequate for Thai munitions support after the DeLong was retrograded. The Sattahip POL jetty, tank farm, pipelines, and U-Tapao POL distribution and storage system were required. Estimated monthly consumption for the residual force was 30-35,000 barrels, with a 90 day supply for normal operations and the remaining capacity for contingency operations. PX operations were to be continued in Bangkok, Ramasun, and U-Tapao and were considered a critical morale factor for the residual forces.

(S) Unresolved issues in U.S.-Thai negotiations in early December were C-130 operations, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the Central Identification Laboratory location, [REDACTED]. In a message to the Ambassador on 3 December CINCPAC reemphasized the need for C-130 support for residual forces and requested confirmation that the issue was or would be

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1. CINCPAC 150135Z Nov 75.


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resolved. The U.S. Ambassador reported on 10 December that he and CINCPACAF had agreed that it seemed best not to discuss details of C-130 operations with the Thai at that time. Moreover, there would be no need to get Thai Government approval of a C-130 presence after 20 March 1976 as the Thai already expected C-130s and other aircraft to operate in and out of Thailand [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If there was a requirement to gain Thai approval for C-130 operations for long-term in-country support, the Ambassador believed it could be done without difficulty.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Higher authority had confirmed the State and Defense Departments' desire to retain both the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory in Thailand for at least one additional year for (American) political reasons and recommended U-Tapao as the future location. CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACTHAI take the lead to develop a plan to close Camp Samae San and to consider U-Tapao as the future location for both facilities. The plan was expected in January 1976.<sup>2</sup>



(S) CINCPAC took the lead in December to reduce the residual forces in Thailand to the minimum essential. On 24 December he requested that the headquarters of all organizations and agencies with forces to be retained past March 1976 review and reduce their manning to the minimum consistent with their assigned mission and to provide results by 9 January 1976.<sup>4</sup>

(S) In reply to a MACTHAI status report, on 25 December CINCPAC advised that authorized military spaces in the residual force should not be confused with nor specifically aligned to military personnel in Thailand. The U.S. objective was to retain the minimum personnel in mission-essential authorized spaces. COMUSMACTHAI was also informed that CINCPAC would take the lead in requesting the non-PACOM organizations with units in the Thailand residual

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1. J5317 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC 030311Z Dec 75; AMEMB Bangkok 25788/100255Z Dec 75.
  2. SECSTATE 280901/270046Z Nov 75; JCS 6393/041834Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 190514Z Dec 75.
  3. J5317 HistSum Dec 75, which cited Bangkok 275/281146Z and CIA 051444Z Dec 75 (both EX).
  4. CINCPAC 242359Z Dec 75.

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force "scrub down" their manning to the minimum required. There had been two terms used in the acronym "USSAT." CINCPAC advised that the word "activity" was not correct; the correct title was the U.S. Support Agency Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In order to preclude log jams of excess property at base closure time, CINCPAC developed and the Secretary of Defense approved in August special procedures for screening and turnover of property to the Thai Government. Time saved ranged from 7 to 17 days for secondary items and from 20 to 30 days for major items. Further modification of Major Item Excess Program (MIMEX) turnover procedures was directed by the Secretary of Defense on 17 November. A meeting at CINCPAC headquarters in November formulated draft procedures that were approved by the Secretary on 3 December. Excess Defense Article disposal exceptions were to be on a one-time exception to MIMEX procedures.<sup>2</sup>

(S) At the end of 1975, the U.S. force level in Thailand after 20 March 1976 was expected to be as follows:<sup>3</sup>

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy/MC</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bangkok/Don Muang	96	23	35	76	( 459
JUSMAG	131	27	71		(
Takhli			6		6
Ramasun	882	20	200		1,102
Ko Kha			160		160
Korat	9				9
Chiang Mai	11		45		56
Ubon	11				11
U-Tapao		115	885	3	(
JCRC	34	19	23		(1,130
JUSMAG/U.S. Support					(
Agency Thailand (USSAT)	42	4	5		(
Integrated Communications					
System Sites	<u>18</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>18</u>
Totals	1,234	208	1,430	79	2,951

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1. CINCPAC 250001Z Dec 75.
  2. J4/Memo/TS-8-76, 8 Sep 76, Subj: Draft Chapter I--The Status of the Command.
  3. J5314 Point Paper, 2 Jan 76, Subj: Thailand Drawdown (U).

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Command Arrangements

(S) Even before the White House policy announcement of 24 October regarding the residual force in Thailand, CINCPAC had provided his proposed alternative command arrangements. The general concept was that MACTHAI and the MACTHAI Support Group were to be phased out and replaced by the USSAT. The Chief of the JUSMAG would continue under direct CINCPAC operational command. JUSMAGTHAI personnel, other than the Chief, would deal solely with JUSMAG matters. The Chief would be dual-hatted as Commander USSAT, who would also be under direct CINCPAC operational command. USSAT would be a joint administrative and support command providing residual common support functions such as airbase operations and maintenance, POL management, land transportation, Sattahip port operation, procurement, and customs clearance. Commander USSAT (CDRUSSAT) would be the U.S. Defense Representative and would be coordinating authority for all Defense Department elements in Thailand. He would answer to the JCS through CINCPAC in this regard. He would also be the CINCPAC Representative in Thailand, to perform planning, coordinating, and associated functions as directed by CINCPAC. He would also be the representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC with respect to the Security Assistance program.

(S) USSAT would supervise support of all Defense Department agencies in Thailand. The division of effort among the Services and the MACTHAI Support Group would remain in effect. The joint U-Tapao area commander would be responsible to CDRUSSAT, subject to concurrence by the Air Force Chief of Staff; he would also be commander of the residual air base unit at U-Tapao and would provide most common user supply items. The Services would continue to be responsible for Service-peculiar support. This arrangement, CINCPAC noted, would avoid major renegotiation of support arrangements.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC believed that this was a logical arrangement that satisfied all administrative and logistic support requirements in Thailand, that satisfied the Thai Government's objection to MACTHAI (as a combat-associated headquarters), that complied with provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, that economized on people and money, and that was responsive to CINCPAC guidance.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The reason behind the new organizational arrangements, as noted above, was the desire on the part of the Thai Government to remove all traces of the combat-associated aircraft and headquarters designations, as soon as possible. COMUSMACTHAI had advised as early as August that the Thai were willing to transfer all of their agreements with COMUSMACTHAI to CHJUSMAGTHAI. (In 1974

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1. CINCPAC AIRBORNE 180430Z Oct 75.
  2. J561 Point Paper, 31 Oct 75, Subj: Alternative Command and Support Arrangements for Thailand.

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the continuation of MACTHAI as an entity had been described by that agency as "essential" because of their role as single coordination interface with Thailand; there was no Status of Forces Agreement with Thailand and most arrangements were memos of understanding or verbal agreements and had resulted in a special relationship between MACTHAI and the Thai Government.)<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Thai Prime Minister had stressed to the U.S. Ambassador that while he wanted all combat forces withdrawn, non-combat elements could remain if they were blanketed under the JUSMAG. On 4 September, however, the JCS advised CINCPAC of recent Congressional legislation that precluded the JUSMAG from absorbing residual MACTHAI functions. They requested alternative arrangements, and CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI, his component commands, and the Army's CINCPAC Support Group for their recommendations. They offered a variety of possible alternatives, which CINCPAC considered in preparing his proposal of 18 October, which was outlined above.<sup>2</sup>

(U) It soon became apparent in discussions and message traffic among the staffs at MACTHAI, CINCPACAF, the JCS, and CINCPAC that there were varying interpretations of the proposed arrangements. The areas of major concern were the specific functions of the new command and the role and relationships of the Air Force air base commander who was to be dual-hatted under USSAT and PACAF.<sup>3</sup>

(U) CINCPAC then amplified his concept and restructured the original dual-hat proposal. Rather than dual-hatting, a separate person would be designated Deputy Commander USSAT, at U-Tapao, an arrangement that would provide the Commander USSAT a firm hand in the U-Tapao area without impinging on Air Force prerogatives.

(C) USSAT would be a joint administrative organization with a small headquarters and staff in Bangkok. USSAT would provide the majority of support required by the JUSMAGTHAI, such as personnel, administration, public affairs, legal and medical services, etc. It would also provide some services for all Defense Department elements in Thailand, such as legal, customs, real estate, medical, port operation, procurement, land transportation, and overall coordination of logistic support. The Deputy USSAT, at U-Tapao, would have a detachment of the USSAT staff and would carry out Commander USSAT responsibilities

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1. J564 HistSum Dec 75, which cited COMUSMACTHAI 151002Z Aug 75 (BOM); CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 107-108.
  2. Ibid., which cited SECSTATE 291818Z Aug 75 (EX); JCS 042222Z Sep and 032158Z Oct 75; CINCPACAF 070340Z Oct 75; CDRUSACSG 070451Z Oct 75; COMUSMACTHAI 071224Z Oct 75; CINCPACFLT 080721Z Oct 75. (CINCPAC's proposal had been forwarded as CINCPAC AIRBORNE 180430Z Oct 75.)
  3. J564 HistSum Dec 75; COMUSMACTHAI 300930Z Oct 75.

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for Southeast Asia and aerial port customs matters, Thai security guard programs, and monitoring of general logistic operations in the U-Tapao area. Support tasks required further refinement, but the Air Force unit at U-Tapao would perform the bulk of support tasks for all Defense Department elements in Thailand under Inter-Service Support Agreements, including most common-user supply items. Service-peculiar items were to be requisitioned by the Services, but USSAT would arrange for shipment in-country.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In early December a long-term support planning conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters attended by MACTHAI and component command representatives. The few remaining questions concerning command and support arrangements were resolved at this meeting.

(C) Meanwhile, the JCS had recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the alternative command arrangement proposed by CINCPAC be approved for planning purposes. The JCS informed CINCPAC on 3 December that the arrangements had been approved for planning purposes. By the end of the year CINCPAC and MACTHAI staff personnel had completed initial manpower revisions designed to move MACTHAI into the new USSAT configuration. Terms of Reference for the new USSAT and the on-going JUSMAGTHAI organization were forwarded from CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI in December, and would subsequently be incorporated in CINCPAC's Instruction on that matter.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 062316Z Nov 75.

2. J564 HistSum Dec 75; JCS 5508/032004Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 060142Z Dec 75.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE THREAT

#### SECTION I--RUSSIA

##### The Awakening Media

(U) In previous Pacific Command histories, the threat has been addressed by physical descriptions of potential enemy military capabilities. The subject of deterrence was treated along with strategy and force posture, and the political concept of detente was discussed in the chapters devoted to politico-military relationships. The relationship of these subjects to each other was readily apparent to military historians and analysts. In 1975 there was convincing evidence that this relationship, as it applied to Soviet Russia, was slowly dawning on the American public--journalists, newspaper editors, and, more importantly, the Congress. For the past several years our military histories had enumerated, between classified covers, the growing Russian military threat. Meanwhile, the public information media had adhered to the concept of detente, arms limitations and accommodation with Russia. Perhaps the most significant phenomenon in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam was a perceptible increase in media coverage of the Russian threat in conjunction with detente, deterrence, and strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Equally interesting was the amount of news space allocated to this coverage by the two Honolulu newspapers which, although co-located with the nerve center of U.S. military strength in the Pacific, had consistently espoused the salutary aspects of detente and SALT.

##### Detente and Nuclear Strategy Coverage

(U) On 30 April 1975 (the day after the U.S. withdrawal from Saigon) one Honolulu newspaper allocated a full page to a book review by Edwin F. Black, brigadier general, USA (retired). The book was Kissinger on the Couch by Chester Ward, rear admiral, USN (retired) and Phyllis Schlafly. As reviewed, the book postulated a triangular superpower nuclear war scenario in which the United States and China combined nuclear forces to overcome a preponderance of Soviet missiles. Also, according to the review, the book advanced four principles of nuclear war strategy, the first of which was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's formula for deterrence: "Deterrence = currently available strategic nuclear power x the national will to use it to preserve vital interests x the potential aggressor's own estimate of the reality of these [other] two factors." The authors also attributed to Kissinger the observation that, since deterrence is the product, not the sum, of the three factors, it fails if any one of them is zero. The noteworthy aspect was not the predictable theme of the book, but

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rather the allocation of news space to the discussion.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In July there was considerable coverage locally of various aspects of U.S.-Russia relations. On 5 July an editorial prompted by the well-publicized utterances of exiled Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn posed the "searing" question, "What are the tangible benefits that we have received from detente?" Solzhenitsyn had bluntly described detente as a "senseless process" of making concessions to aggressors. The editor himself, however, had summarized U.S.-Soviet relationships in the following fashion:<sup>2</sup>

...We stood up to Russia and backed her off when Russian-backed guerrillas tried to take over Greece, when North Korea invaded South Korea, when the land routes to Berlin were closed to us, and when she planted ballistic missiles in Cuba.

But we gave her Eastern Europe at the end of World War II on Josef Stalin's promise at Yalta to hold free elections, sat by as spectators as Czechoslovakian and Hungarian freedom movements were crushed, and were the eventual losers as she armed North Vietnam for the takeover of Indochina.

In the interest of detente, which we pursued even while the Indochina war raged, we have given Russia access to our advanced technology for industrial and agricultural development.

We have shared our much-advanced space technology with her in the Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission. And we have cleared the Suez Canal, which gives Russian war vessels direct access to the Indian Ocean and benefits her much more than us.

We have watched the economic, political and military power balances shift so that our tremendous superiority over all other nations at the end of World War II has now subsided to one of approximate equality with Russia, and large voices for Japan, China and Europe as well....

(U) On 7 July space was given to a wire service story of a Russian buildup of forces in Mongolia, and, on 10 July, another Solzhenitsyn story covered his 100-minute speech to an AFL-CIO meeting and his month-long tour of the United States hosted by AFL-CIO president George Meany, "...who shares the Russian

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 30 Apr 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jul 75, edit.

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writer's distrust of detente...."<sup>1</sup>

(U) Coverage on two successive days in July was given to an accusation by Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, that Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was "belligerent" and "bellicose" because of statements that the United States was ready to resort to nuclear weapons as an alternative to defeat. He was also quoted as not ruling out a first strike with nuclear weapons in such cases as a full-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe. One of the articles speculated that:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

One reason for the Kremlin's vehemence could be concern that in the aftermath of last spring's debacle in Southeast Asia, Schlesinger's blunt warnings about Soviet military strength and his reminders of U.S. military capabilities may be getting a more sympathetic hearing in Washington.

Schlesinger has been notably successful in recent weeks in calling attention to the Soviet deployment of new missile systems and the establishment of an alleged Soviet naval base at the Red Sea port of Berbera, Somalia [Ed note: q.v.].

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(U) Also in July, New York Times Service analyst Drew Middleton's article appeared concerning U.S. force posture and strategic planning as a result of, "...a new global situation that results from the withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the crumbling of NATO solidarity." Later in July an article by a local (University of Hawaii) political scientist was carried which discussed the illusion of detente as practiced by Kissinger. This writer had previously received considerable publicity for his computer-based theorem that transactions, collaboration and interlocking economic interests would not prevent war. In this article he reiterated his contention that there was no historical, scholarly, scientific nor quantitative empirical evidence that cooperative agreements would promote peace. Attributing to Kissinger this equation: Peace = defensive power plus cooperative agreements, the writer supported published views of Solzhenitsyn that the Soviet Union was being aided and abetted by its

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 Jul 75, dateline London (AP) and 10 Jul 75, dateline New York (AP); for previous mention of George Meany, see CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 547-550.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 12 Jul 75, dateline Moscow (AP) and Sunday Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, 13 Jul 75, dateline Moscow (Wash. Post News Service).

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potential victim. "...They have given every indication of continuing the Cold War behind a detente facade, of conducting a political war while preparing for a hot one which they could win through nuclear blackmail or a surprise attack."<sup>1</sup>

(U) Shortly thereafter the newspaper published another article by the same writer which, by comparing the strategic capabilities and expenditures of the United States and Russia between 1960 and 1974, purported to prove that the United States had been unilaterally disarming. Stating that, "...the arms race is a myth," the writer maintained that such terms as mutually assured destruction, sufficiency, structure of peace and detente were euphemisms for, "...the long term aim of pacifists, idealists, and internationalists..." toward unilateral disarmament. The writer used specific figures to illustrate the decline in U.S. military capability and the increase in Russia strength. No sources were provided, but the following table, also without attribution, was printed.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Accompanying the foregoing article was an editorial acknowledging the, "...sobering statistics..." cited above and noting similar articles by high naval officers accusing Russia of cheating on the balance of force agreements already in effect. The editorial also noted former defense secretary Melvin Laird's contention that the Russians were cheating, and concluded that there was growing reason to believe that "...we should take a stiffer attitude toward Russia and keep our guard high as we do."<sup>3</sup>


(U) Two rebuttals to the "Myth" story were printed shortly thereafter. One, by the local program secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, used purported quotations by high U.S. officials claiming approximate parity in the relative military strengths of Russia and the United States to disprove the "Myth" allegations. The other, by a local television news editor, was a purported comparison of Warsaw Pact-NATO strength which concluded that NATO was the superior force. The writer also labeled the political scientist, "...an old cold warrior." Again, the significant aspect of these articles lay not in the polemics involved but in the amount of news space given to them.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In September a Honolulu newspaper ran a series of three excerpts from Drew Middleton's book, "Can America Win the Next War?" These articles explored the communist and western world military strengths and weaknesses, the political

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jul 75, "U.S. Strategic Planning" by Drew Middleton, N.Y.T.S. and 25 Jul 75, "Kissinger vs Solzhenitsyn" by R.J. Rummel.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Aug 75, "The Myth of a Soviet-U.S. Arms Race" by R.J. Rummel.
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Aug 75, edit.
  4. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 9 Aug 75, "Myth of Soviet Superiority" by Ian Y. Lind and "NATO vs Warsaw Pact" by Bob Jones.

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Source: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Aug 75.

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environment and the moral fabric of each, and quoted Leonid Brezhnev's statement that, "...We all well know that wars and acute international crises are far from being a matter of the past." In one paragraph, Middleton stated:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

To some degree, our present situation is comparable with that in Britain between 1936 and the outbreak of war in 1939. On the one hand, there is an authoritarian state arming, in every field, to a degree far beyond what is necessary for self-defense. On the other, there is a rich, maturely powerful democracy whose people are disillusioned by their most recent experience in war and whose leaders hesitate, because of political expediency, to explain the magnitude of the threat to the country.

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(U) On 25 September the Associated Press reported retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's prediction that, by 1980, the United States would be so weak militarily that an American president would have to back down in any confrontation with the Russians. Zumwalt also stated that the Russians were cheating under current arms control agreements and had taken a steadily increasing lead in nuclear arms over the United States.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On the other side of the coin, the Christian Science Monitor Service reported an analysis by Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which held that the Soviet Navy's rapid buildup during the past decade was cause for concern, but not for alarm. The Soviet Navy, he said, had some distance to go before it acquired the range and versatility of U.S. naval power projection. On the same day of this report from London, Vice President Rockefeller was quoted from Newport News, Virginia, "The strength of the U.S. Navy is critical to the future of freedom of the world. And in the face of all this, while the red fleets have been growing, ours have been cut in half--back to the days before Pearl Harbor."<sup>3</sup>

(U) Soviet party secretary Leonid Brezhnev warned the West on 14 October 1975 that detente, "by no means eliminates the struggle of ideas...." Three days later, on 17 October, Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf was reported by the Associated Press to have cited a weakened Navy as a major

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 8 Sep 75, 9 Sep 75, 10 Sep 75, by Drew Middleton, N.Y.T.S.
  2. CINCPAC ALPHA 47/250321Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC ALPHA 5/122109Z Oct 75.

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reason for the fact that, "...the nation is more vulnerable than ever before in its history." He also reportedly stated that the threat was so big that most people have not focused on it, noting that the U.S. Navy had 40 percent fewer operational warships than at the time of Pearl Harbor. On the same day, the Associated Press reported that, reacting to a report that the Soviet Union soon could possess a first-strike capability, several senators would promote a resolution urging negotiations to reduce U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and underground nuclear test explosions, and to embargo nuclear fuel and technology exports unless accompanied by safeguards against weapon production.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's press conference regarding the House defense appropriation reduction of \$7.6 billion was reported by Associated Press on 20 October. He said the reduction would have harmful effects on the posture of the United States, that Soviet spending had increased, and that the U.S. defense budget was, "...lower than it has been in years...." At this press conference, Schlesinger also admitted, "...some differences..." within the Ford administration on its negotiating position at the SALT talks with the Russians, but said recent reports of differences between himself and Secretary of State Kissinger had been "...grossly overstated...."<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 21 October Associated Press reported Rear Admiral J.T. Coughlin's statement that the U.S. merchant marine fleet needed strengthening to protect against slowdowns in imports and exports by major foreign shippers. Coughlin also urged that American military vessels be brought back into numerical balance with the, "...larger Soviet Union fleet." On the same day, United Press International reported one of the most significant acknowledgments of the emerging Soviet threat. To protect the United States against possible Soviet blackmail, 52 members of the House of Representatives publicly warned President Ford against making, "additional concessions" in the current U.S.-Soviet SALT negotiations. As reported by UPI, a joint letter stated, "As the Russians develop their MIRV capability and improve their warhead accuracy the U.S. deterrent force could become vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce strike or to blackmail." One representative was quoted thus: "We want the President to know that any agreement like the disastrous SALT I accord is unacceptable to Congress and the American people." The 52 congressmen specifically asked President Ford to instruct Kissinger to resolve four issues to the advantage of the United States:<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 29/142339Z Oct 75 and ALPHA 94/172146Z Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC ALPHA 135/202155Z Oct 75.
  3. CINCPAC ALPHA 157/212200Z Oct 75 and ALPHA 189/232210Z Oct 75.

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- Count any Soviet missile which has been tested with multiple warheads as being operationally deployed with multiple warheads and, therefore, countable under the 1,320 ceiling.

- Insist that the Soviet "Backfire" bomber--which the Russians assert is a tactical aircraft--is really a strategic bomber capable of striking the United States and, therefore, to be counted under the 2,400 ceiling.

- Insist that U.S. cruise missiles with a range of no more than 3,600 miles not be counted against the 2,400 ceiling.

- Work for U.S.-Soviet equality in "throw-weight."

(U) Meanwhile, in June Secretary Schlesinger made two speeches which stressed the ephemeral quality of the detente policy. In the first, to the Air Force Academy commencement exercises, Schlesinger stated:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...When the Soviet Union ceases to regard peaceful coexistence--Lenin's phrase invariably employed in place of "detente"--as nothing more than an altered form of the ideological struggle and a different phase of the class war, we may ultimately reach a common acceptance of the meaning of international stability. Until such time, however, power will remain the ultimate arbiter of international developments and the power balance will be essential to the preservation of stability. Detente itself, which we actively pursue, will by necessity remain undergirded by an equilibrium of force.

(U) In the second speech, to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, Schlesinger warned that the power of the Warsaw Pact nations continued to grow, in spite of the atmosphere of detente:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...It is quite clear, I think, that the Soviet Union perceives detente in a somewhat different mode from the way

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1. SECDEF 8917/041542Z Jun 75.

2. SECDEF 1441/191532Z Jun 75.

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that we perceive it, and it is quite clearly stated in the Soviet literature that detente represents a kind of milestone, symbolizing the gradual shift of what is called the correlation of forces against the west and in favor of the Soviet Union. Suslov put it quite bluntly a few short weeks ago that this shift of the correlation of forces and the growing power of the Soviet Union is what is the basis of detente.

In short, in this interpretation, detente represents a gradual accommodation by the west to the growing military might of the Soviet Union and her allies. So we must recognize, I think, that if we want detente to succeed in the sense that we employ it, of a gradual improvement of the relation between ourselves and the powers of the Warsaw Pact, a gradual diminution of political tensions, that that detente rests upon the maintenance of a fundamental equilibrium of force. Without that fundamental equilibrium of force, the hopes of detente will disappear and there will be political adjustments which all of us in this room would find to be quite uncomfortable....

(U) Perhaps the most confusing aspect of threat perception, as attributed to various government dignitaries, was the conflict reported by various news and governmental sources. On 25 October, for example, Associated Press reported Middendorf's claim that, with the Soviet Union beefing up its aircraft carrier force, the United States was more vulnerable than ever. He reportedly said that the number of Navy ships had been reduced by one-half in the past six years in spite of, "...the fact that the threat has been growing at a tremendous rate." In the same report, however, Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, was reported to have said that, "...despite reductions in the fleet, the Navy can do what is expected of it and put up a hell of a tough fight...."1

(U) That the controversy had not escaped our allies was evident by United Press International coverage of an article in the Tokyo Shimbun quoting the alarm of Japan's military men over the growing strength of Soviet naval forces in the Pacific, compared to the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Planners in the Japan Self Defense Agency told the newspaper that the Soviets had outstripped the United States in numbers of ships, total tonnage and submarine strength in the Western Pacific. The Agency stated that the Soviet Force included 125 submarines, 400 surface warships, and 230 support vessels of various kinds,

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 236/251850Z Oct 75.

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although the U.S. Navy retained an advantage in aircraft strengths. During the past twelve months, Soviet tonnage had increased from 970,000 to 1.2 million, and the total number of vessels from 540 to 755. Soviet naval vessels and aircraft had become increasingly active in the vicinity of Japan.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On the other side of the world, an American columnist in Paris described the complacency of the Western nations, noting the enormous Soviet buildup in Central Europe and an equal buildup along the Russo-Chinese border:<sup>2</sup>

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Indeed, the enormous Russian investment in ships, guns, arms and nuclear weapons over the past ten years, a military buildup almost unrivaled in history, probably speaks more accurately of Soviet ambitions and intentions than anything Leonid Brezhnev may have whispered secretly to Dr. Kissinger.

\* \* \* \* \*

(U) Since in the course of the foregoing unclassified narrative, some absence of unanimity was shown, this review of the overall Soviet threat as published in the public domain is concluded with excerpts from Secretary Schlesinger's farewell remarks on 10 November 1975:<sup>3</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...our own military strength will continue to dwindle, perhaps absolutely, but certainly in relation to that of the Soviet Union. Irrespective of foreign policy debates, and foreign policy alternatives, this nation's Military Establishment plays a critical role. Whether we are successful in pursuing detente or we hedge against the possible failure of detente, a military balance remains necessary....The contribution of the United States to the worldwide military balance remains indispensable to all other foreign policies.

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The adverse trend in military power, in the production of military hardware, military manpower, military expenditures

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 240/261928Z Oct 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 28 Oct 75, "Soviet Build-up and West" by Patrick J. Buchanan.
  3. SECDEF 2002/110032Z Nov 75.

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has repeatedly been underscored. It is not a matter of theory; it is a matter of simple arithmetic. A continuation of this trend will inevitably bring a drastic and unwelcome alteration to the preferred way of life in the United States and among our allies.

Though we should pursue detente--vigorously--we should pursue it without illusion. Detente rests upon an underlying equilibrium of force, the maintenance of a military balance. Only the United States can serve as a counterweight to the power of the Soviet Union. There will be no deus ex machina; there is no one else waiting in the wings....

### Soviet Spring Exercise (OKEAN 75)

(U) Specific clues as to the Soviet threat were also provided in unclassified wire service news coverage and Department of Defense news briefings. On 17 April a Honolulu newspaper carried the Associated Press story on a worldwide Soviet naval maneuver as released by "Pentagon sources." The report described the deployment of at least 200 Russian ships including surface warships, submarines, aircraft and merchant ships. The "sources" speculated that the focus of the exercise could be the Indian Ocean, increasingly important because of the oil tanker routes passing through it. However, "other activity" was noted in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea and the Pacific. This report also recalled the 1970 exercise OKEAN, which had lasted three weeks and had demonstrated Soviet ability to conduct worldwide blue-water operations. This report was publicly confirmed during the Defense Department morning news briefing on 18 April, when the Department spokesman discussed the exercise in details essentially the same as the above cited report. The spokesman could not provide the overall theme of the exercise, but speculated that it would build on the 1970 exercise to test and evaluate new weapon systems, tactics and doctrine. The reporters in attendance were assured that the U.S. Navy was "tracking" the Soviet forces, although no official word of the start of the exercise had been received since the original 10 April Soviet news agency announcement.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 30 April a Jack Anderson by-lined article stated that, "Intercepted messages and reconnaissance reports reveal that gigantic month-long Soviet naval exercise just concluded was a mock nuclear attack on the United States." The article also attributed reports that the Russians were building super-sophisticated, bomb-proof underground installations around Moscow to intelligence

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Apr 75, "Soviet Navy Begins Massive Exercise" by Fred S. Hoffman, datelined Washington (AP); SECDEF 5639/182301Z Apr 75.

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reports compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Department. What Anderson called a top intelligence official was quoted: "We live with the possibility of nuclear war every day... but no one really believes it will ever happen. Now here are the Russians actually practicing for such a thing. It's really scary." Nevertheless, Anderson reported, his sources cautioned that the Soviets, "...show no indication that they are abandoning the detente with the United States."<sup>1</sup>

### Media Track Soviet Missiles

(U) On 31 May and 1 June both Honolulu newspapers reported on the deployment of Soviet missile-tracking ships to the vicinity of Midway in the Pacific, apparently in preparation for long-range tests of, "...huge new missiles armed with multiple warheads."<sup>2</sup>

(U) The beginning of a month-long series of SS-18 multiple warhead tests was reported by the Associated Press on 5 June. Pentagon officials reportedly stated that an SS-18 was fired from central Russia and landed about 600 miles north of Midway Island after ejecting "several" dummy warheads. This report noted that the Russian tests coincide with a pause in sessions between U.S. and Soviet negotiators attempting to reach agreement on the SALT II specifications.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The joint Sunday issue of the two Honolulu newspapers, on 8 June, carried a Christian Science Monitor dispatch which reported a New York Times account of U.S. submarines on intelligence gathering missions entering Soviet waters within the three mile limit. This was followed on 9 June by one local newspaper Associated Press dispatch reporting the presence of Soviet missile-firing submarines operating within 350 miles of Cape Cod and Norfolk, Virginia. According to the reporter, Pentagon officials were puzzled at this change in Russian submarine patrol path which was 1,000 miles closer than the Y-class nuclear submarine had normally traveled. The change brought much more of the United States within the 1,300 to 1,600 mile range of the SS-N6 missiles on the Y-class submarine. The article also noted that the Russian Y-class was similar to the U.S. Polaris subs, each armed with 16 missiles and targeted to destroy cities. Although the Polaris had nearly twice the range of the SS-N6,

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 30 Apr 75, "Mock Attack by Soviets" by Jack Anderson with Less Whitten, United Features Syndicate.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 31 May 75, dateline Washington (AP); Honolulu Advertiser, 1 Jun 75, dateline Washington (AP).
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jun 75, dateline Washington (AP).

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the report stated that the new Soviet D-class submarine carried missiles with a range of 4,900 miles.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 20 June a Honolulu newspaper headlined Secretary Schlesinger's announcement that Russia had begun to deploy three powerful new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), two of them with multiple warheads. Schlesinger also said that recent Soviet long-range missile tests into the Pacific indicated improved accuracy of the Soviet multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) system. He deplored the, "...acquisition of a major ability to destroy an opponent's missiles in a surprise first strike," according to the article. Schlesinger reported that the Russians had deployed 50 SS-19 missiles with six MIRVs each and 10 SS-17 missiles with four MIRVs each. Also, 10 single warhead SS-18s were operational and these were expected to be converted to MIRV capability, "on the basis of tests to date."<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 22 June a report from London speculated that the development of the SSX-18 ICBM--the world's largest military rocket--cast a shadow over the SALT negotiations scheduled for resumption the next day. The article reported, "secret information" obtained by the U.S. Air Force "Big Bird" satellite which included telephoto detail of silo modifications to accommodate the SSX-18. Other U.S. tracking stations which followed the April tests in the Pacific reported a "flock" of dummy MIRVs being ejected which would place the silo-based U.S. ballistic missile deterrent force of 1,000 MINUTE-MAN and 54 TITAN-2 ICBMs in jeopardy. This development was seen as complicating the SALT negotiations, along with the new U.S. cruise missile. The SALT II negotiations were to be conducted within the framework of a proposed 10-year limitation on both sides of 2,400 land based, airborne and submarine delivery systems. Of these, according to the preliminary agreement reached at Vladivostok in November 1974, 1,320 could be MIRVed with no limit on warhead lifting power or throw-weight. The report speculated that:<sup>3</sup>

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A few years ago, it seemed that the United States was far ahead with MIRV technology but the Soviet Union's determination to catch up and apply big MIRV warheads to their

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1. Honolulu Sunday Advertiser and Bulletin, 8 Jun 75, CSM Service; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 9 Jun 75, "Russia Changes Sub Patrol Path" by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 20 Jun 75, "Soviet Missile Progress Bared by Schlesinger" by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP).
  3. Sunday Star-Bulletin & Advertiser, 22 Jun 75, "Well-Armed Soviet Resumes Weapon Talks" by Kenneth W. Gatland, dateline London (CSM Service).

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heavier throw-weight ICBMs could seriously disturb the strategic balance:

(U) The Defense Department released the text of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's news conference of 20 June in a 21 June message which corroborated the previously cited news article relative to Soviet missile development. During a question and answer period, Schlesinger maintained that the Vladivostok guideline (1,320 MIRVed missiles) would be subject to close verification in view of the latest Soviet missile advances and that the means therefore would be part of the SALT II negotiations. According to the transcript of the press conference, however, the statement regarding a "first strike" capability by Russia was not made by Schlesinger. A reporter asked, "...Do you think there could be any first strike potential?" Schlesinger's reply, as transmitted by the Defense message, was:

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...Let me say that I find it disappointing that we have been unable to arrange a situation in which both sides fail to see the mutual advantages of avoiding the acquisition of major counter force capabilities. I am not surprised, however, by this thrust of the Soviet program, it is quite similar to the thrust about which we have had previous briefings. It is plain that with the emphasis upon improved guidance, improved reentry bodies and acquisition of greater throw-weight, that there has been designed into their forces the potentiality of major counter-force capabilities.

I do not think that that is beneficial to stability in the large: on the other hand I reiterate what I have previously said that the United States intends to maintain essential equivalence. We would prefer that both sides avoid the acquisition of major counter-force capabilities. We might have preferred that the Soviets exhibit a greater degree of restraint with regard to the utilization of the very large throw-weights that they have built into their forces, but we cannot achieve that unilaterally. As I have indicated before, arms control, like politics, like diplomacy, is the art of the possible and we have not been able, as yet, to achieve a mutual restraint with regard to the acquisition of major counter-force capabilities. We will not allow our own position in this area to become secondary.

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1. SECDEF 3316/210544Z Jun 75.

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Congress Verifies Somalia Buildup

(U) On 10 June 1975 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the need for a U.S. base facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. During the statement, Schlesinger reviewed the steady growth of Soviet military activity in the region. He acknowledged that a missile storage and handling facility operated by Russia had been positively identified at Berbera, Somalia--a significant new facility capable of supporting Soviet naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean. Moreover, additional Soviet activity had been noted at the port of Aden, South Yemen and a new port of Umm Qasr at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf in Iraq. During the worldwide Soviet naval exercise in April, the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately doubled, with activity centered in the northern Arabian Sea at the crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. The exercise was supported by long range aircraft operating from the Soviet Union, and, for the first time, by maritime patrol aircraft operating from airfields in Somalia. In support of his statement, Schlesinger provided the Senate committee with photos and charts illustrating, "...the source of our concern."

(U) During a news conference following his statement to the Senate committee, the Secretary received the following question and gave the following answer:

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Q. How recent are the Soviet missiles at Berbera? I think you've announced for the first time that there are missiles. Could you describe them in terms of different categories -- surface-to-surface?

A. We have spotted surface-to-surface missiles and it is of very recent development.

(U) On 5 July and 7 July a Honolulu newspaper carried reports of a visit to Somalia by an American congressional delegation led by Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma. Bartlett was accompanied by "top military specialists," and his group was to be followed by a delegation from the House Armed Services Committee. At a news conference on 6 July, Bartlett stated that, "Our trip absolutely confirms this [Schlesinger's] contention." The Senator stated that what his group saw was a missile handling, storage and refueling facility of

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1. SECDEF 3761/102052Z Jun 75; for source of photos and charts, see Chapter IX, Intelligence, section on photo reconnaissance.

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Soviet design, construction, techniques, material and equipment with substantial numbers of Russians in the area. Bartlett said he saw a STYX missile crate, fuel tanks of Soviet construction and a Soviet barracks ship, as well as an airport under construction.

(U) These articles were followed on 8 July with another Associated Press story citing, "U.S. intelligence..." reports that about 3,000 Soviet specialists were manning the growing Russian military complex at Somalia. At least one Soviet admiral was said to have been seen on shore and was believed to be in command. This article also reported the construction of an underground facility reinforced with thousands of tons of concrete and steel about eight miles southwest of Berbera but, "U.S. analysts do not yet know its purpose." A major new Soviet airfield was expected to be operational by the end of the year, "...an intelligence report says." The Soviet communication station at Berbera would serve the Russian naval force in the Indian Ocean, the article stated, also noting that Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean were expected to increase with the reopening of the Suez Canal.<sup>2</sup>

### The Intelligence Assessment<sup>3</sup>

(S) Although the U.S.-Russian SALT II negotiations were begun in January 1975, negotiations became deadlocked over technical issues such as the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and U.S. cruise missiles. As a result, the planned Brezhnev-Ford summit to announce the final terms of a 10-year SAL Treaty was not held in 1975. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders repeatedly stated that detente would not be allowed to interfere with their efforts in the ideological conflict with the West.

(S) In the Soviet armed forces, the main trends of Soviet naval activity continued. The upgrading of conventional naval and merchant marine fleet capabilities was paralleled by improvements in naval strategic systems. Although worldwide deployed ship days decreased by 9.4 percent from 1974--the first such decline in at least 11 years, the Soviet Navy's ability to conduct coordinated "blue water" operations was thoroughly demonstrated during the April 1975 worldwide naval exercise. Submarine activity out-of-area (OOA) decreased 7.8 percent, but Pacific submarine activity increased by 4.1 percent.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jul 75 and 7 Jul 75, datelines Mogadishu, Somalia (UPI) and Washington (AP) resp.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 8 Jul 75, dateline Washington (AP).
  3. This assessment is based on COMIPAC Special Rpt 02-76, DTG 142245Z Feb 76, unless otherwise noted.

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(S) The average number of deployed naval units in the Pacific was 18-19 ships and in the Indian Ocean 19-20 ships. Total naval activity in ship days was 8.7 percent less in the Pacific and over 33 percent less in the Indian Ocean. The latter figure reflected the decrease from inflated 1972-74 Indian Ocean ship days caused by harbor/minelclearing operations. Amphibious activity increased more than 16 percent worldwide, and intelligence collection patrols were resumed off the U.S. West Coast in July for the first time since January 1973.

(S) One DELTA-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) completed sea trials and was considered to have reached operational status during 1975. In late November a new KRIVAK-class destroyer arrived in Pacific waters after operations in the Indian Ocean. Support capabilities in the Western Indian Ocean improved in December with the arrival of a floating dry dock at Berbera, Somalia, and naval reconnaissance aircraft operated successfully from Somalia on two occasions during the year. The established Soviet presence in Somalia provided the Soviet Union with an excellent logistic base from which to monitor or interdict vital oil routes to and from the Persian Gulf.

(S) Soviet air defense and tactical air forces in the Far East received the latest generation aircraft during 1975. The SU-19 FENCER was added in April; the MIG-23 FLOGGER was added in Mongolia in June; the initial appearance of IL-20 COOT-A intelligence collectors was noted in July; and MIG-25 FOXBATS appeared in August. Other air activities included commercial supersonic transport operations; vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) tests from the KIEV carrier; the initial assignment of FENCERS to the Soviet Navy; and the operational deployment of BACKFIRE bombers to the Naval Air Force and long range aviation.

(S) In air defense, the Soviets introduced the SA-5 GAMMON surface-to-air (SAM) missile system to Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Although a decrease of two maneuver divisions in the Soviet Far East occurred in 1975, the strength estimate remained relatively equal based on the recognition of two new airmobile brigades, one new motorized rifle training division, and the upgrading of one tank and one motorized rifle division.

(S) The Soviet equipment modernization program was continued during 1975, including new generations of fighting vehicles, self-propelled field artillery, new SAMs, river crossing equipment and improved communications equipment.

(S) A 12 June working paper produced by the Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) detailed the airfield development in Somalia, citing four airfields with permanent surface runways greater than 7,500 feet and one airfield under construction. Other facilities available to the Russians in the Indian Ocean

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region included areas of Aden, the Iraqi ports of Umm Qaṣr and Al Basrah and bunkering rights at Port Louis, Mauritius. Anchorage areas included Socotra, the Chagos Archipelago, Fortune Bank, the Seychelles and Cargados Carajos.<sup>1</sup>

(S) A 9 July 1975 [REDACTED] message confirmed the speculative press reports regarding the Berbera buildup by the Soviet Union as related by the congressional delegation. When members of the inspection group identified a STYX missile crate, they were told that the Somalis had STYX missiles but did not yet have the boats on which to install them. U.S. technicians with the group confirmed that the check-out building was capable of handling a wide range of Soviet Navy missiles and was larger than would be required to handle the STYX missile alone.<sup>2</sup>

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1. IPAC Point Paper, 12 Jun 75, Subj: Soviet Naval Activities and Facilities in the Indian Ocean.
  2. CIA 716327/090042Z Jul 75.

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## SECTION II--PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

### The Unclassified Threat

(U) In mid-August a New York Times Service article datelined Hong Kong asserted that the PRC had quietly built up the world's third largest navy. Although PRC naval vessels continued to confine operations to the Yellow, East, and South China Seas, "...military specialists acknowledge that the Chinese Navy has become a formidable fighting force." The article attributed to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London a figure of 230,000 officers and men in the PRC Navy. This was more than the French and British navies combined. The Chinese were reported to have more than 1,000 vessels in their Fleet, 60 submarines including one possibly nuclear powered, and 600 aircraft in their land-based naval arm. The JSDF director general was alleged to have disclosed that Chinese planes were observing Soviet naval maneuvers in the Yellow Sea. The article continued that, according to naval specialists, the PRC had developed a fleet of 700 fast missile, gun and torpedo boats, more than 100 of which were comparable to the Soviet KOMAR armed with surface-to-surface missiles.<sup>1</sup>

(U) This article from Hong Kong was followed by a Honolulu newspaper editorial which repeated the information and noted that the emergence of the PRC Navy was quite a change for a nation with no past naval tradition and leaders who came to power as land-based guerrillas. The editorial noted that the new PRC naval power was an additional factor for Russia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian nations to consider.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 17 October the Associated Press carried a denial by, "military intelligence sources" that Communist China had deployed long range missiles capable of striking Moscow. The "sources" stated that three or four silos for such missiles had been built in Western China, but that the silos were empty. This was followed by a United Press International release stating that U.S. intelligence sources had told Congress that the PRC had, "encountered difficulty in developing a POLARIS-type nuclear submarine or a long-range missile capable of hitting the United States." The story attributed these statements to Lieutenant General Graham, DIA director and William Colby, CIA director.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 14 Aug 75, "China Quietly Builds World's 3rd Largest Navy" by Fox Butterfield, dateline Hong Kong (N.Y.T.S.).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 15 Aug 75, edit.
  3. CINCPAC ALPHA 94/172146Z Oct 75 and ALPHA 240/261928Z Oct 75.

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The Intelligence Assessment<sup>1</sup>

(S) Communist Chinese military affairs were highlighted by signs of growing concentration on professional development, improvement of weapon systems and a more extensive role for the Navy. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) appeared to have acquired growing respectability and gave some evidence of support to military professionalism. All major PLA leadership positions had been filled, mostly with professionals including a number of rehabilitated officers purged during the cultural revolution.

(S) Leadership changes at regional and lower levels, rumors of major unit movements and the adoption of a new unit designation system all suggested housecleaning by a newly-confident general staff. The use of PLA forces in quelling disturbances seemed to indicate confidence in the military and possibly consensus between government moderates and the Army.

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1. Based on COMIPAC Spec Rpt 02-76, DTG 142245Z Feb 76.

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## SECTION III--NORTH KOREA

### The Unclassified Nuclear Flap

(U) In the wake of withdrawal from Southeast Asia, speculation ensued as to whether North Korea would probe for reaction by the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). On 5 June an Associated Press dispatch once again cited, "U.S. intelligence sources" for a report that North Korea had moved strong armored forces close to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Pentagon officials expressed concern but not alarm and no special alert was ordered for U.S. troops in Korea. The one U.S. Army division in South Korea was strategically located to block any invasion before it reached Seoul, and, according to the dispatch, "Nuclear-armed U.S. missile and artillery batteries also back up South Korea divisions."<sup>1</sup>

(U) In the same newspaper, on the same page, an article by a Honolulu reporter was based on comments by three ROK national assemblymen of six passing through Hawaii enroute to Washington. The lawmakers, including two former ministers of national defense, said U.S. determination to use nuclear weapons in the event of a North Korean attack would act as a strong deterrent. They also stated that the atmosphere in South Korea was tense, with reports of North Korean reinforcements along the DMZ and discoveries of secret tunnels dug by the communists. The local reporter cited the Washington Post Service as the source for the assertion that the U.S. infantry division was equipped with nuclear weapons. One of the visitors said the delegates would urge the U.S. Congress to make it clear to North Korea that the United States would fully support South Korea--with nuclear weapons, if necessary--if the communists launched an invasion. "But," he said, "don't put that in the headline." Another ROK delegate agreed, saying, "Off the record."<sup>2</sup>

(U) During the 20 June press conference previously cited, Secretary Schlesinger was asked if the United States would use nuclear weapons against North Korea if South Korea were invaded. His answer and subsequent related questions and answers follow:<sup>3</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jun 75, "N. Korean Buildup Seen Along DMZ" by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP).
  2. Ibid., "Koreans Urge U.S. Nuclear Backing" by Leslie Wilcox.
  3. Op. Cit., SECDEF 3316/210544Z Jun 75.

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A: As I indicated earlier, we cannot foreclose any option. We have deployed in Korea the tactical nuclear weapons as is, I believe, well known. I think that it would depend upon the judgment of the leadership under such circumstances but we have now gone since 1945 without any nuclear weapon being detonated in anger and we would strongly hope that that historical record is maintained. If circumstances were to require the use of tactical nuclear weapons, of course, I think that that would be carefully considered, but the ground forces balance in the Korean Peninsula is not unsatisfactory...

...Q: Mr. Secretary, you're talking about--you know you can't rule out the use of nuclear weapons in case of a North Korean attack. How do you view the threat from South Korea from the North with the tunnels and the supposed movement of armored forces in there, is it a serious threat to the South or is this just some flag waving and drum beating?

A: We don't know the answer to that, we don't know the answer, and until we do know the answer to that we should be very careful to remain alert to the possibilities and to keep our powder dry. Let me say with regard to the first part of your question, that the major effort that I have made since I have been here has been to provide us with a conventional capability which is the only way to keep the nuclear threshold high. It is the reduction of our conventional capabilities which creates a problem in which one has no alternatives but early recourse to nuclear weapons if one is to resist at all. So, associated with our desire to avoid use of nuclear weapons which has not occurred since 1945, we must be serious about the consequence of that which is to maintain conventional capability thereby keeping the threshold high....

(U) A few days later, in a National Town Meeting television series, Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado said she feared the presence of small U.S. tactical nuclear weapons near the border of North and South Korea could trigger nuclear war in a conflict no longer worth a life and death struggle between the United States and the Russians.

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 47/250321Z Sep 75.

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The Intelligence View

(S) Although North Korea was capable of initiating a major attack against the ROK, the intelligence estimate was that, without logistic support from the PRC and Russia, operations could not be sustained for more than 90 days. Available evidence indicated that the PRC and Russia would not support an attack by North Korea.<sup>1</sup>

(S) After the discovery of the first North Korean tunnel through the DMZ on 15 November 1974, drilling operations were begun to determine whether more than one tunnel existed. In March 1975 a second tunnel was discovered. This tunnel was two meters high, slightly more than two meters wide and an estimated 2,500 meters in length. Although cross ties were found, no rails had been laid.<sup>2</sup>

(S) During 1975 there were three naval incidents in the vicinity of the Northern Limit Line off both coasts. One North Korean vessel was sunk by South Korea off the East Coast on 18 February and another off the West Coast eight days later. The third incident occurred on 11 July, when ROK marines stationed on the neighbor island of Paengnyong-Do (P-Y-Do) fired a warning shot at three North Korean fishing boats.<sup>3</sup>

(S) A refinement of analytical estimates during the year raised the strength of the North Korea Army to 417,000 at 90 percent of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). An increase in armored vehicle inventory was noted, particularly medium tanks, and a second armored division was formed. The North Korean Air Force continued to upgrade its air and air defense capabilities, receiving 22 additional MI-4 helicopters in 1975. The North Korean Navy continued its shipbuilding program and naval units were moved to more southern bases. Three additional ROMEO-class submarines were constructed and construction also continued on amphibious support craft. The Navy possessed 63 fast fire-support boats (PTFS) and 51 fast personnel landing craft (LCPF), and one guided missile boat became operational on the West Coast.<sup>4</sup>

Conventional War Game<sup>5</sup>

(S) After the 1974 ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, the CINCPAC Review and Analysis Office was directed to determine the effectiveness of ROK

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1. IPAC Point Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Korea Threat Assessment.
  2. IPAC Point Paper, 1 Apr 75, Subj: Second North Korean Tunnel.
  3. IPAC Spec Rpt 02-76, DTG 142245Z Feb 76.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Draft Working Paper, HQ CINCPAC (RAO), 3 Apr 75, "North Korea-South Korea Computer War Game" by CDR Karl H. Eulenstein, USN.

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Armed Forces against a North Korean invasion using current orders of battle plus U.S. in-country forces. The consequent draft war gaming paper, while not an official view or finding of the Commander in Chief Pacific, did represent, within the assumptions, one Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology (BALFRAM) result.

(S) The principal threat used to create the scenario of the study was a major, unilateral aggression by North Korean forces attacking along the DMZ. Tank and infantry surprise assaults with strong close air support were used to attempt penetration of the well prepared positions of the ROK forces.

(S) The assumptions upon which the scenario was based included:

1. The threat of North Korean aggression in the 1975-76 timeframe was real.
2. The most likely form of North Korean aggression would be a unilateral surprise attack.
3. An armed conflict between North and South Korea would be limited to non-nuclear weapons.
4. During the first 90 days of a conflict the participation of armed forces of other countries would be limited to U.S. Forces already stationed in Korea. Additional involvement of other countries would consist of logistic aid.
5. Any major intervention by non-Korean powers would not occur during (approximately) the first 90 days.

(S) North Korean ground forces were assigned a strength of 23.67 divisions. All were located on, or within one day's march of, the DMZ. The North Korean Air Force assumed strength was 300 MIG-17s; 96 MIG-19s; 120 MIG-21s; 23 SU-7s; and 54 IL-28s. Initially, only the MIG-17s, SU-7s and IL-28s were used as ground support aircraft.

(S) The North Korean Navy was primarily a coastal defense force capable of limited offensive missions. Although it could conduct occasional attacks on surface shipping and lay some offensive mine fields, it would have no significant effect on the outcome of a war with South Korea. Therefore, the North Korean Navy was not included in the BALFRAM simulation. The ROK Navy was excluded for the same reasons.

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(S) The ROK ground forces were assigned a strength of 26 Army divisions, one Marine division and one U.S. Army division. Three of the ROK Army divisions were reserves not activated until 10 days after the attack. Another 3.5 divisions were reserves not activated until the 30th day of the war. The assumed strength of the ROK Air Force included 100 F-86s; 40 F-5As; 34 F-4Ds; and 54 U.S. Air Force F-4Ds.


(S) The model predicted that, with its current military resources, including one U.S. Army division and 54 U.S. fighter aircraft, the ROK was able to prevent the capture of Seoul during the first 90 days. The deepest penetration into ROK territory occurred along the Chorwon valley path. The North Korean advance along this line was temporarily halted 30 nautical miles from Seoul--a penetration of 51 miles from the border. Along the Kaesong approach, the battle stabilized temporarily at the border approximately 33 nautical miles from Seoul. The east coast battle was a stalemate. The North Koreans achieved air superiority by day 30. Predicted attrition was:

REMAINING UNITS	DAYS					
	0	10	20	30	60	90
ROK Ground (Div)	28.2	27.3	26.3	25.5	23.1	20.9
ROK Air (A/C)	228	153	86	0	0	0
NK Ground (Div)	23.7	23.0	22.3	21.6	19.6	17.9
NK Air (A/C)	594	518	460	428	335	263
ROK Minus NK (Ground)	4.5	4.3	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.0

(S) Neither side was depleted to the extent that a victory was obvious at the end of 90 days. However, the fact that the difference between the ROK and North Korean remaining orders of battle was decreasing, together with the defeat of the ROK-U.S. air power, indicated that North Korea would prevail eventually if no outside assistance was introduced for South Korea.

(S) A simulation to the conclusion of the conflict produced the first North Korean breakthrough on day 174 along the Chorwon approach. Fighting reached the outskirts of Seoul by day 180, and the city was taken on day 190. Ultimate defeat of South Korea occurred on the 216th day, between Seoul and Pusan.

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## SECTION IV--VIETNAM

### Hanoi - A Threat?

(U) On 14 May, two weeks after the American withdrawal from Saigon and the surrender to North Vietnam, a long article was carried in a Honolulu newspaper by Drew Middleton of the New York Times Service on "Hanoi's Military Power." North Vietnam had emerged as the primary military power in Southeast Asia, according to Middleton's "U.S. military analysts." These sources expected the gradual consolidation of North and South Vietnam, with the unified state exercising hegemony over Laos and Cambodia. The resulting power structure would exert political influence from Singapore and Indonesia on the west to the Philippines on the east. The Defense Department, according to this article, estimated that the North captured 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters during the campaign. The biggest prizes were said to be 87 F-5 fighters and 434 helicopters, plus attack planes, gunships and transports. At the moment, "military analysts" said that Hanoi commanded the largest and best military force in South Asia east of India.<sup>1</sup>

(U) According to these same sources, the article stated that the Soviet Union had asked for the use of Cam Ranh Bay as an air and naval base. Such a base would be a convenient link between Vladivostok, the Pacific Fleet home port, and the units operating in the Indian Ocean. It would also balance, to some extent, the American strength in the Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

(U) However, in response to questions during the previously cited 20 June Schlesinger news conference, the Secretary stated that, while obviously the end of the war added considerable military potential to Vietnam, the acquisition of the American equipment added to only a limited degree to the very large potential that had already existed. The Secretary did not have any information as to whether Hanoi was expanding its influence to other areas of Southeast Asia.<sup>3</sup>

(U) By July the press cited Pentagon sources as stating that the North Vietnamese were shipping north some of the two billion dollars worth of planes, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and other serviceable equipment captured when South Vietnam fell. An additional three billion dollars of equipment was believed to be unusable because of damage or lack of spare parts and maintenance.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 14 May 75, "Hanoi's Military Power" by Drew Middleton, dateline New York (N.Y.T.S.).
  2. Ibid.
  3. Op. Cit., SECDEF 3316/210544Z Jun 75.

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The "sources" also reported the formation of four new air force regiments in South Vietnam, and one reported instance, since the surrender, of the North Vietnamese using captured A-37 bombers in battles with Communist Cambodia over disputed off-shore islands.<sup>1</sup>

Intelligence Wrap-Up

(S) In its yearly wrap-up, IPAC noted that, following its victory over the South, North Vietnam had the largest battle-tested and best-equipped armed force in South Asia. It had emerged as the major military and political power in the area, dominating Laos and potentially, Cambodia and even Thailand.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 25 Jul 75, dateline Washington (AP).
  2. COMIPAC Spec Rpt 02-76, DTG 222106Z Feb 76.

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# COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

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	USSR*	CHINA	VIETNAM
<p><b>MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY</b></p> <p>3 Combined Arms Army Headquarters                  2 Corps Headquarters (TO 12,164)                  27 Motorized Rifle Divisions (TO 9,479)                  4 Tank Divisions                  7 Artillery (Gun) Divisions                  2 Motorized Rifle Brigades                  4 Artillery Brigades                  5 SS-1 (SSBN) Brigades</p> <p>PERSONNEL: 335,000**                  * Includes Transbaikal and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.                  ** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (TAD); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews and support elements of the air forces; (d) internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (33,250 and 8,750).</p> <p><b>NORTH KOREA</b></p> <p>3 Corps                  23 Infantry Divisions (3 Motorized) (TO 7,316)                  2 Armored Divisions (TO 8,185)                  3 Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions (TO 3,507)                  4 Surface-to-Air Missile Brigades (TO 2,000)                  2 Infantry Brigades (TO 8,374)                  10 Artillery Regiments (Non-Divisional) (TO 1,833)                  2 Howitzer Regiments (Reinforced) (TO 1,023)                  3 Heavy Mortar Regiments (TO 838)                  7 Rocket Launcher Regiments (TO 925)                  5 Armored Regiments (TO 1,721)                  3 FROG Battalions (TO 167)                  10 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments (TO 451)</p> <p>PERSONNEL:                  Current estimated strength 417,000                  Paramilitary/Security Forces 38,000</p>	<p>37 Armies:                  120 Infantry Divisions (TO 12,606)                  47 Artillery Divisions:                  20 Field Artillery (TO HQW 6,621)                  4 Anti-Tank (TO 4,462)                  18 Antiaircraft Artillery* (TO 4,086)                  11 Armored Divisions (TO 9,549)                  1 Cavalry Division (Security) (TO 4,818)                  3 Airborne/Air Transportable Divisions (TO 9,730)                  41 Border Defense/ID Divisions (TO 6,939)                  32 Garrison Divisions (TO 7,993)                  16 Railway Engineer Divisions (TO 11,583)                  70 Independent Regiments**</p> <p>PERSONNEL (Army): 3,524,000**</p> <p>* 24 additional AAA divisions subordinate to the Air Defense Command of the CAF.                  ** Includes approximately 10,000-12,000 PRC troops believed to be in Laos, several hundred PKC troops in Burma, and a few hundred military advisors and technicians in North Vietnam.</p>	<p><b>REGULAR FORCES</b></p> <p>26 Infantry Divisions (TO 10,400)                  2 Training Divisions (TO 10-15,330)                  1 Training Group (TO 6,000)                  9 Artillery Regiments (TO 1,200)                  1 Sapper Command (9 Battalions) (TO 5,000)                  7 Independent Infantry Regiments (TO 3,000)                  6 Armored Regiments (TO 1,500)                  34-38 Antiaircraft Artillery Pool (TO 1,000)                  17 SA-2 Regiments (TO 2,100)                  10 Independent Engineer Regiments (TO 2,000)</p> <p><b>MILITIA:</b>                  Class 1 - Full-time militia members armed with semi- and automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons.</p> <p><b>SECURITY FORCES:</b>                  Armed Peoples Security Forces 16,500</p> <p><b>PERSONNEL:</b>                  Regular Army 633,500 704,500                  Militia - estimated to consist of 1.6 million people's militia/self-defense forces and 3 million reserve forces.</p>	

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 61.

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# COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH FAR EAST & PACIFIC

CATEGORY		USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA	NORTH KOREA	VIETNAM	TOTAL
SUBMARINES	NUCLEAR					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	15	0	0	0	15
	CRUISE MISSILE	15	0	0	0	15
	TORPEDO ATTACK	10	1	0	0	11
	DIESEL					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	12	1	0	0	13
	CRUISE MISSILE	6 (1)	0	0	0	6 (1)
	LONG RANGE ATTACK	20	0	0	0	20
	MED RANGE ATTACK	21 (15)	65	0	0	86 (15)
	SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)	0	0	0	0	0
	UNDETERMINED TYPE	0	0	0	0	0
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	LIGHT CRUISERS (COMMAND AND CONTROL)	1	0	0	0	1
	LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)	4	0	0	0	4
	LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)	2 (1)	0	0	0	2 (1)
	DESTROYERS (MISSILE)	0 (1)	10	0	0	10 (1)
	DESTROYERS (GUN)	13 (6)	0	0	0	13 (6)
	ESCORTS (DE, MISSILE)	0	5	0	0	5
	ESCORTS (DE, GUN)	27 (2)	5	2	2	36 (2)
	MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS	168 (2)	916	314	414	1,812 (2)
	MINE WARFARE TYPES	90 (10)	43	0	20	161 (10)
	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES	37 (25)	496	71	504	1,008 (25)
SUPPORT SHIPS	NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES	203	232	0	197	632
	SERVICE CRAFT TYPES	8	805	100	82	997
PERSONNEL STRENGTH		124,000 <sup>b</sup>	277,000 <sup>c</sup>	25,000 <sup>d</sup>	3,000	


a. Included in Auxiliary Count.  
 b. Includes personnel in Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry, does not include Coastal Defense or training.  
 c. Does not include 30,890 personnel of Naval Air Force.  
 d. Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 63.

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# COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION



\* FIGURES IN PARENTHESES INDICATE ADDITIONAL UNITS IN RESERVE

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 64.

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# SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

	USSR 1		CHINA		NORTH KOREA		VIETNAM		TOTAL
	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	
<b>COMBAT AIRCRAFT<sup>2</sup></b>									
Jet Fighter (Day)	64	0	3,439	484	521 (Day & N/M)	0	321 (Day & N/M)	0	4,889
Jet Fighter (All Weather)	1,360	0	177	43	0	0	0	0	1,580
Piston Attack	460	0	0	0	0	0	36	0	496
Jet Attack	0	0	454	19	0	0	112	0	585
Jet Light Bomber	77	0	300	143	74	0	0	0	594
Jet Medium Bomber	124	0	58	5	0	0	0	0	263
Piston Light Bomber	0	0	166	28	0	0	0	0	194
Piston Medium Bomber	49	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	12
Jet Heavy Bomber	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77
Turboprop Heavy Bomber	0	1345	0	0	0	0	0	0	44
Antisubmarine Warfare	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	134
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,178</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>4,606</b>	<b>722</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8,868</b>
<b>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT<sup>3</sup></b>									
Piston Transport, Light	48	8	370 <sup>6</sup>	39	223	0	112	0	800
Piston Transport, Medium	16	0	0	0	0	0	40	0	40
Jet & Turboprop Transport, Light	0	4	40	5	6	0	10	0	83
Jet Transport, Medium	0	2	11	0	0	0	0	0	13
Turboprop Transport, Medium	116	10	22	0	3	0	14	0	165
Jet Trainer	903	0	861	17	26	0	11	0	1,818
Piston Trainer	22	0	956	99	50	0	22	0	1,749
Helicopter	1,188	19	335	29	68	0	510	0	2,149
Reconnaissance	124	50	11	26	27	0	70 (Est)	0	258
Trop Transport <sup>7</sup>	129	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	129
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,548</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>2,606</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6,604</b>
<b>TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>2,416</b>		<b>5,328</b>		<b>595</b>		<b>529</b>		<b>8,868</b>
<b>TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>2,641</b>		<b>2,821</b>		<b>423</b>		<b>739</b>		<b>6,604</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>5,057</b>		<b>8,149</b>		<b>998</b>		<b>1,268</b>		<b>15,472</b>
<b>PERSONNEL STRENGTHS</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>13,500</b>	<b>401,000<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>44,000</b>		<b>10,000 (Est)</b>		<b>598,900</b>

1. Includes aircraft within the Far East, Transbaikai, Siberian, Central Asian, and Turkestan Military Districts which are a threat to PACOM.  
 2. Combat Aircraft: fighter and bomber aircraft only which are used in fighter, ground attack, bomber/interceptor, or antisubmarine warfare roles.  
 3. Combat Support Aircraft: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of reconnaissance aircraft, all types of utility/liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers.  
 4. Includes 173,900 personnel assigned to the Far East Missile Forces.  
 5. Includes 85 antisubmarine warfare helicopters.  
 6. Includes 157 COLIS used for liaison.  
 7. Does not include general transportation units.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 66.

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### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES


USSR		PRC		NORTH KOREA		VIETNAM	
TYPE	SITES LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE*							
ICBM	220 241	ICBM	3 3	ICBM		ICBM	
IRBM	0 0	IRBM	30 30	IRBM		IRBM	
MRBM	0 0	MRBM	14 17	MRBM		MRBM	
TOTAL	220 241	UNK./VARIOUS	7 7	COASTAL DEFENSE		COASTAL DEFENSE	
SURFACE TO AIR**							
SA-2	88	COASTAL DEFENSE	10 36	TOTAL		TOTAL	
SA-3	54	TOTAL	64 93	SURFACE TO AIR		SURFACE TO AIR	
SA-5c	14	SA-2a	73 177-295	SA-2	76 SITES	SA-2b	87 170
		SA-3		SA-3d	38 OCC	SA-3d	24 41

\* East of 100° E  
 \*\* Occupied sites East of 100° E.

a. 5. occupied, CH C-4 SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.  
 b. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between company sites. 2-45 sites estimated to be occupied at one time.  
 c. SA-3 complex may consist of 3 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.  
 d. Battalions now between prepared sites, some of which is known to be outside the Hanoi, Hanoi, Hanoi, Hanoi Triangles. 12 sites estimated to be occupied at one time.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 68.

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CHAPTER III--PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 77 Posture Statement

(TS) Since 1973 the Chairman of the JCS had annually asked the CINCs of the regional unified commands to provide input for his annual Posture Statement. On 19 September he asked for such an input for the FY 77 statement. He requested that CINCPAC emphasize regional appraisals using an overview of the world situation and its implications for U.S. military forces in terms of mission accomplishments, force structure, and force levels. CINCPAC requested and received inputs from his component commanders and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to assist in preparation of his reply. The main thrust of CINCPAC's input was the impact of lack of funding on readiness, training, research and development, and existing force levels.

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1. J5322 HistSum Oct 75, which cited CJCS 8154/191244Z Sep 75 and CINCPAC 112139Z Oct 75 (both EX).

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[REDACTED]

(S) When the Chairman thanked CINCPAC for his comments and recommendations he asked him to advance suggestions on ways to maintain readiness posture and capabilities within limitations imposed by political realities and budget limitations. CINCPAC's reply is outlined in Chapter I of this history in a study of the "Readiness of PACOM Forces."<sup>2</sup>

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan FY 78-85

(U) The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan was the JCS mid-range planning vehicle and a major document in military planning. It was published in two volumes, the first concerned with military strategy and force planning guidance, and the second with force levels designed in relation to that strategy. CINCPAC provided input for both volumes of the FY 78-85 plan in 1975.

(S) The JCS had invited CINCPAC's views and comments for Volume I on 19 December 1974. In a departure from the requests of previous years, and in order to gain greater utility for Volume I, views were solicited on trends either military or political that might have an impact on strategic planning guidance. Of special interest, the JCS said, were new and innovative ideas on strategic concepts for the various world regions. Additionally, this edition of the JSOP would include treatment of areas of military interest not previously addressed: [REDACTED]

(S) CINCPAC outlined the military and political trends in the PACOM area that might impact on strategic planning. In an overview it was noted that the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas were undergoing profound changes. Four great powers and a host of lesser ones all competed and cooperated for power and influence. All had vested interests in the region. The area contained major energy sources and raw materials. Trade, industry, and travel were growing rapidly. Economic and political aspirations, unrest, and uncertainty were increasing. Most of the people were poor and the gap between rich and poor, both for nations and individuals was increasing. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The area had great growth potential, and great

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1. J5322 HistSum Nov 75, which cited CINCPAC 100106Z Nov 75 (EX).
  2. JCS 9817/081720Z Nov 74 (EX); CINCPAC 260419Z Nov 75.
  3. JCS 7203/192029Z Dec 74.

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potential for conflict. Major conflict was not foreseen, but peace was still elusive. Insurgencies, with foreign support, continued to harass many nations. They needed relative security and freedom from external threat to develop according to their individual desires and capabilities. The United States could help provide, through our physical presence and aid, the stability necessary for them to achieve their full potential. Finally, the United States must be prepared to defend itself and assist its friends against threats or actual military aggression. Perception of U.S. presence and power as a force for peace and stability was vital to the healthy evolution of the area. CINCPAC then addressed the various specific countries or areas of the PACOM of principal concern.

(S) The USSR was the only world power with the potential to defeat the United States militarily, and was therefore the primary military concern. Although several factors had led to stability, the Soviet Union could be expected to pursue all forms of competition, short of direct conflict with the United States, to enhance its position throughout the world. Although the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence did not exclude the use of armed conflict, intimidation through the use of economic power and the display of military might had largely replaced "wars of liberation" as Soviet means to its end.

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~~(S)~~ For Korea, the outlook suggested little change on either side. North Korea remained the military threat, but had no clear-cut military advantage. The North was expected to continue to employ subversion, espionage, and harassment against the South. The best estimate was that moderation, dialogue, international pressures, and self restraint added up to no major hostilities. U.S. Forces in Korea were an important stabilizing influence in Northeast Asia and should remain until Republic of Korea security was more certain.

~~(S)~~ The Republic of the Philippines faced a continuing struggle to become a stronger, more modern society. Insurgency in the south was a major hindrance to progress. There continued to be strong ties and mutual benefit from the U.S. bases. The Philippines needed U.S. assistance for local and regional security; the United States needed Philippine naval and air bases as a vital part of a forward deployed presence.

~~(S)~~ Regarding Vietnam and Cambodia, "situation very uncertain with trend not favorable to U.S. interests."

~~(S)~~ Regarding the Indian Ocean area, CINCPAC believed that the Soviet Union was in the area to stay. The USSR naval presence enhanced its influence and power in Asia. The presence included combatants, air transport, minesweeping, bases, facilities, and maritime shipping. It could be expected that the USSR would seek out and build more support facilities. As those developed, the United States could expect greater naval presence and increased efforts to influence nations in or bordering on the Indian Ocean away from Western orientation. The British and French also operated naval units in the Indian Ocean.

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We should support any pro-Western presence. The United States should continue to operate there, periodically in some strength. Our presence balanced Soviet efforts. The United States did not seek dominance in the area, but did not concede it to any other power. Because U.S. military presence served political purposes, we should portray the U.S. presence in terms most advantageous to the United States and acceptable to the nations of the region.

(S) Food and energy deficiencies were seen as areas of potential trouble.

(S) Addressing the matter of forward deployments, it was noted that changes in the size and location of U.S. Forces in the PACOM were indicators of U.S. intent and immediate reaction capability. It was expected that there would be continuing U.S. political pressure to give up bases and cut back on forces in the Pacific. Also, citizen concern and uncertainty of U.S. intentions in the area could induce certain friendly governments to encourage U.S. withdrawals. CINCPAC continued, "Reiterate, cannot work problem without forward basing and forces." [REDACTED]


(S) CINCPAC next provided his views on strategic concepts. The existing PACOM strategy remained valid. Forward deployments and basing provided the best means to implement this strategy. U.S. ground troops in Korea and Okinawa, Seventh Fleet, and forward tactical Air Forces helped deter aggression and reassure our allies that we would honor our commitments. [REDACTED] provided a nuclear and conventional umbrella for friends and allies, facilitation, supporting access by all nations to area markets and raw materials. Our presence contributed to a reduction of tensions, stability, and orderly change throughout the area. [REDACTED]

(S) Although the basic strategy for Asia and the Pacific was valid, certain concepts in Volume I of the JSOP needed reevaluation. [REDACTED]


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(8) In the matter of support of NATO, CINCPAC noted that in the event of aggression by the Warsaw Pact in Europe while U.S. Forces were engaged in a PACOM conflict the defense of NATO may take precedence. CINCPAC also noted, however, that disengaging forces in combat was both difficult and costly. He believed that specific criteria should be established for doing so. He recommended incorporation of the following redeployment concept:



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[REDACTED]

(U) CINCPAC then provided a number of specific recommendations for changes throughout Volume I.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Volume II concerned the levels of forces recommended to accomplish the objectives outlined in Volume I. For the JSOP FY 78-85, objectives shared by the JCS and CINCPAC were to enhance the utility of Volume II and reduce the time and expense incident to its publication. In 1974 CINCPAC had sought to reduce this time and expense by updating rather than completely revising Volume II. JCS guidelines in 1975 encouraged the use of a corrigendum format to update the previous year's book.<sup>2</sup>

(TS) On 19 July CINCPAC's recommendations for the JSOP FY 78-85 Volume II were forwarded to the JCS. CINCPAC again questioned the utility of a JSOP in which stereotyped scenarios and questionable numbers stemming from artificial conditions drove force developments. CINCPAC recommended, therefore, that the JCS task the unified and specified commands to provide objective forces that reflected existing or probable situations for the next revision of the JSOP; these concerned realistic strategy, response times, budget constraints, and political limitations.

[REDACTED]

#### Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the near-term planning document in the JCS Joint Program for Planning. Its purpose was to provide a statement of military strategy to support national security objectives based on capabilities during the following fiscal year, FY 76. It was published in two volumes. The first expressed strategic objectives, concepts, assumptions,


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1. CINCPAC 010150Z Feb 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 178; J532 HistSum Jul 75, which cited SM-196-75 of 11 Apr 75.
  3. J532 HistSum Jul 75, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser T111 of 19 Jul 75.

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and tasking. The second identified specific combat force levels available for planning for specific contingencies, in order to accomplish the tasks and conduct the operations that were prescribed in Volume I.

(U) The new JSCP for FY 76 was promulgated by the JCS on 10 July. It was effective for planning on receipt, and for operations on 1 November 1975. The JCS advised that if it was not feasible to prepare new plans or revise existing plans to meet JSCP tasking requirements by 1 November, commanders of unified commands were requested to submit status reports to the JCS at the time such a determination was made.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Tasking was modified in a number of respects; tasks were added, changed, or deleted. These modifications are summarized briefly below.




- Planning will reflect the mutually supporting and interdependent character of U.S. Forces and focus on inter-Service cooperation and support.

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1. J5/Memo/00038-75, 13 Aug 75, Subj: Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-76), which also cited JCS SM-381-75 of 10 July, the new JSCP.


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
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1. J5221 Summary Paper, 7 Aug 75, Subj: ~~JSCP-76 Changes in Tasking~~ CINCPAC (U), which was Enc1 (1) to J5/Memo/00038-75, 13 Aug 75, Subj: Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-76).

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1. CINCPAC 252251Z Aug 75; JCS 8086/091058Z Sep 75.

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
Secretary of Defense Program Decision Memorandums

(S) In 1975 the Secretary of Defense made decisions affecting defense program development for the period FY 77-81. These decisions were forwarded as Program Decision Memorandums to the JCS, who forwarded them to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The JCS also forwarded for such review their reclamations to the Secretary on his decisions. The JCS advised that distribution of the PDMs was severely limited and requested that they be closely held.



(S) Amended Program Decisions Memorandums were received by the JCS on 21 August, following a JCS-Secretary of Defense conference. The JCS advised that restrictions on reproduction and distribution applied to the original decisions were reaffirmed by the Office of the Secretary. Commanders of unified and specified commands would not receive the amended decision memorandums directly. They would be informed of applicable Secretary of Defense decisions by their component commanders, based on planning, programming, and budgeting information provided by their respective Services. This announcement terminated the planning and programming phases of the 1975 Planning/Programming/Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 13 September CINCPAC requested that the component commanders and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group provide him with information as it became available, and they did so.



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1. JCS 3780/042025Z Aug 75; J5321 HistSum Sep 75.
  2. JCS 5493/252144Z Aug 75.
  3. J5321 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC 132002Z Sep 75.

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### Biennial Review of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume I

(U) On 19 November the JCS requested that the Service Chiefs, commanders of unified and specified commands, and the directors of the Defense Intelligence and Communications Agencies make a comprehensive review of Volume I of the JOPS. JOPS was the system that had been established by the JCS in 1970, culminating several years of effort to simplify and improve the contingency planning of the unified and specified commands. CINCPAC considered the comments and recommendations of the component commanders and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group when he provided his reply on 26 December.<sup>1</sup>

(U) One of CINCPAC's recommendations concerned addition of a paragraph describing the JCS planning structure, selected documents, and information and reporting procedures in joint planning. As these matters were basic to the planning process and alluded to frequently, the CINCPAC recommendation for inclusion is quoted at some length here:<sup>2</sup>

...The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS): the planning system approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed for use in joint planning. JOPS formalizes and standardizes administrative procedures, data exchange and storage, and plan format. JOPS provides a common basis for understanding within the operational planning community; establishes a basic automated data bank and standard application programs used in force deployment and support. It enhances the early identification of shortfalls; facilitates feasibility testing and review; and structures execution planning.

...Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS): the JSPS is the planning system in which the JCS translates national security policy into strategic guidance, direction and objectives for force structuring, resource programming and operational planning. As part of the JSPS the JCS annually prepare seven planning documents of specific application in planning at unified and specified command level and in programming and budgeting at Military Department level. They are:

- The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP): The purpose of the JIEP is to provide the principal intelligence basis for the development of the JSOP, JFM, JSCP, and

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1. JCS 9964/191618Z Nov 75.  
2. CINCPAC 261758Z Dec 75.

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the midrange period of the JRDD [these acronyms are defined in the material that follows]. The JIEP is prepared annually.

- The Joint Long-Range Estimate Intelligence Document (JLREID): The purpose of the JLREID is to provide the principal intelligence basis for the development of the JLRSS and the long-range period of the JRDD. The JLREID is prepared annually.

- The Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS): The purpose of the JLRSS is to outline the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the role of the United States military power in the long-range period. It contains broad strategic implications which should be considered in the preparation of studies, estimates, appraisals, policies, plans and research and development objectives. The JLRSS is reviewed annually to cover the ten-year period following the current JSOP period. The JLREID provides the principal intelligence basis for its preparation.

- The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP): The purpose of the JSOP is to advise the President, the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and the Military Departments on the military strategy and force structure requirements for attaining the national security objective of the United States. It also provides planning guidance to commanders of unified and specified commands and Services. In addition, it serves as a vehicle to present the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the recommendations of the Service chiefs and the commanders of unified and specified commands on the force levels and deployments required to execute the national military strategy. The JSOP is prepared in two volumes: Volume I, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance; Volume II, Analyses and Force tabulations. Inputs to Volume II are provided by the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of unified and specified commands. It contains, among other things, tables showing objective force levels in comparison with the major forces programmed for the end of each fiscal year in the five year defense program. The JSOP covers the eight-year period following the current JSCP. The JIEP provides the military intelligence basis for the preparation of the JSCP.

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- The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): The JSCP serves as a planning directive to the commanders of unified and specified commands and to the chiefs of the Services for the accomplishment of military tasks based on projected military capabilities and conditions during the short-range period. The JSCP provides military strategy to support national security objectives based on capabilities and also planning guidance on forces, logistics, intelligence, and the development of multi-national and bilateral plans.

The JSCP is prepared in two volumes, Volume I, Concept, Tasks, and Planning Guidance; and Volume II, Forces. Volume I contains the basic plan. It provides strategic military concepts for each of the major regions corresponding to the unified command areas. It also includes assignments of tasks to the commanders of unified and specified commands and planning guidance to the Services for the support of the unified and specified commands in the execution of assigned tasks. Volume II identified the major combat forces available to the commanders of unified and specified commands for the development of operation plans, and cites the applicable Service documents to aid in determining, for planning purposes, the availability of forces not specifically shown in Volume II.

JSCP tasking sets the requirement for Joint Operation Plans and will normally specify the type of operation plan (i.e., OPLAN or CONPLAN) required. It is normally published in January, becomes effective for planning upon receipt and effective for operations on 1 July. A current edition remains effective until superseded. The JSCP is reviewed annually and published biennially; however, it is revised between cycles as necessary.

- The Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD): The purpose of the JRDOD is to support the JLRSS and the JSOP by translating the broad trends and long-range operational requirements of the JLRSS and the strategic concept and force level objectives of the JSOP into research and development (R&D) objectives. The JRDOD discusses the R&D objectives required to furnish military forces with the mid- and long-range capabilities to meet the roles prescribed for them in the JSOP and in the JLRSS respectively. The JRDOD is reviewed annually and updated as required.

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- Joint Force Memorandum (JFM): The purpose of the JFM is to provide the Secretary of Defense with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on fiscally constrained force levels. It contains a summary of analyses and assessments of risks associated with the constrained force levels as measured against the military objectives and strategic concepts in JSOP; highlights major force issues which require decisions during the current year; and compares costs of the constrained force levels with costs of the FYDP [Five Year Defense Program] baseline. The JFM, published annually, is based on the JSOP; strategic, fiscal, and logistic guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in his planning and programming guidance memorandum; the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP); and Service inputs.

...Joint Reporting Structure (JRS): The Joint Reporting Structure is the approved reporting structure in which information, direction, and response regarding military operations are documented for transmission from, to, and between military commanders. It employs both narrative style and ADP [automated data processing] format and is used as a command, control, and management tool for status reporting, situation monitoring, operational support monitoring, and operation planning. JRS data is exchanged in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and provides National Command Authorities (NCA) with the means essential for accurate and timely decisions for the direction of U.S. military forces under all conditions in peace and war. The major systems used in the JRS and described in JCS Publication 6 for joint planning are: (1) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM); (2) Commander's Situations Report (SITREP); (3) Crisis Action System (JOPS Vol. IV); (4) Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT); and (5) Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP).

(U) Another CINCPAC recommendation concerned including definitions of certain terms, as follows:

- ...C-Day -- The unnamed day on which deployment operations commence.
- ...D-Day -- The unnamed day on which the operation plan is executed.
- ...M-Day -- The unnamed day on which mobilization of forces begins.

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...H-Hour -- The specific (Greenwich Mean Time) hour on D-Day when a particular operation commences.

A number of other editorial and clarifying recommendations were submitted on the JOPS.


(S) Earlier, CINCPACAF had had a question about interpretation of the term "D-Day." One PACAF interpretation was that D-Day was a full 24-hour period commencing on notification time. A second was that it was a specific point in time for execution of designated operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Dates and times for planning were to be expressed in Greenwich (ZULU) time.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In another JOPS matter, on 9 October CINCPAC requested that the JCS clarify JOPS Deployment Reporting (DEPREP) guidance regarding a supported commander's tasking of Service components to provide certain location and transportation information for notional units during the initial stages of operation plan development. The JCS replied that the provisions for optional instead of mandatory submission of this information in DEPREP C Card format were incorporated in JCS Publication 6, Part 5, Chapter I of 31 March 1974 to accommodate Service positions regarding data on notional forces. Several Services desired that C Cards be submitted in DEPREP Step 1 for CINC possessed procedures while other Services did not desire that such notional data be provided, particularly on mobile units, until after JCS plan review and approval. The JCS authorized the submission of C Cards on an optional basis during Step 1 and required submission after approval/Step 2A in both JCS Pub 6, as noted above, and JOPS Volume I to accommodate both positions.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J5231 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPACAF 080430Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 121951Z Nov 75.
  2. J5241 HistSum Oct 75; CINCPAC 091841Z Oct 75; JCS 6009/212237Z Oct 75.

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


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SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

(8) The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the requirements for planning for many contingencies and operations. Most numbered CINCPAC Operation Plans were the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed functional annexes to plans. Some plans were prepared or revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were usually promulgated by letter or message.



1. J52 Reports "Plans Status," Ser T49 of 19 Mar 75, Ser T106 of 9 Jul 75, Ser T135 of 2 Oct 75, and Ser T163 of 2 Jan 76, as modified by J5/Memo/T55-76, 9 Sep 76, Subj: 1975 CINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft.

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
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


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


5060	Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (NEMVAC) (U)	29 Nov 73/ 10 Apr 74
5061	Special Contingency Evacuation (U)	29 Mar 73/ 16 Jul 73
5064	Establishment of U.S. Supply and Training Mission in Laos (S)	
5065	Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)	3 Aug 73/ 12 Feb 75
5066	Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Nuclear Weapons Tests (C) (NICE DOG) (U)	


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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Dates of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
5068	CINCPAC/Federal Aviation Administration-Pacific Relationships (U)	29 Mar 73/ 6 Sep 74	(U) Under revision.



5100	Personnel Recovery Operations (U)		(U) Cancelled in second quarter 1975.
5104	Continuity of Operations Plan (U)	27 Nov 73	(U) Under revision.
5111	(No basic CINCPAC OPLAN) Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction C3461.1, Policies/Procedures for Processing Formerly Captured U.S. Military Per- sonnel within the PACOM (EGRESS RECAP) (Project HOMECOMING)	3 Aug 72	(U) Current.



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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Dates of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
5119	Casualty Resolution (U)		(U) Cancelled by JCRC Terms of Reference.
5125	Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (U)	18 Oct 74/ 11 Apr 75	(U) Current.
5127	Operational Order for Airborne Command Post Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency Test of Evaluation	Jun 74	(U) Current.
5131	Operational Order for Airborne Command Post Ground Alert (U)	22 Apr 74	(U) Current.
5136	Plan for Airlift of U.S. Agency for International Development Rice/POL from Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam to Pochentong, Cambodia.	Feb 75	Operations terminated 17 April 1975.
0100	Evacuation of U.S. Nationals from Africa, South of the Sahara (C) (JCS Support Plan)	2 Jun 75 (JCS) 3 Jul 73 (CINCPAC)	(U) Revised. Supporting CINCPAC CONPLAN of 13 Feb 75, pending JCS approval, will be incorporated in CINCPAC plan 5060.
0200	Disaster Relief in Africa, South of the Sahara (C) (JCS Support Plan)	22 Mar 75 (JCS) 7 Sep 73 (CINCPAC)	(U) Supporting CINCPAC CONPLAN scheduled for review.


Unnumbered Contingency Plans

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
Air Defense of PACOM (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction C3320.2, Air Defense of PACOM, Responsibility and Command Authority for.)	20 Apr 70	(U) Under revision.

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<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
Alaska-Western Canada-Western United States Emergency Defense Plan (ALCANUS-EDP) (U)	1 Jan 73	
Base/Installation Security (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 5510.12, Base/Installation Security During Defense Readiness Conditions and other Emergency Situations (U))	5 Nov 74	(U) Current.
Canada-United States Maritime OPLAN (West) (MARWESTOP) (U). CINCPAC planning agent is CINCPACFLT.	16 Sep 75	(U) Pending approval. Bilateral plan forwarded to JCS for approval. To replace ALCANUS-EDP plan.
Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (U) JCS publishes as SM-485-74	16 Sep 74	<del>(S)</del> Current. Names CINCPAC as U.S. planning agent for Pacific naval operations. Also see MARWESTOP.
Civil Defense (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 3025.1A, Military Support of Civil Defense (U))	6 Dec 74	(U) Current.
Civil Disturbance (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 3050.3C, Employment of Military Resources in Event of Civil Disturbances within the PACOM area.)	3 Dec 74	(U) Current. Supports Department of the Army plan GARDEN PLOT. Provides for establishment of Joint Task Force 110 for civil disturbance operations. Review scheduled for January 1976.


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<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
Disaster Relief (U) (Supported documents are CINCPAC Instructions 3050.1 and 3050.2, dealing with employment of military resources in natural disaster emergencies, foreign and domestic.)	29 Jun 71 (3050.1) 6 Nov 72 (3050.2)	(U) Current.
Emergency Relief to Insular Areas (U) (Supported docu- ment is CINCPAC Instruction C3050.5.	13 Jul 72/ 13 Aug 74	(U) Under review
FORMAL MIST (U) (CINCPAC planning agent is COMUS Japan)	1 Jan 75	(U) Current. Limited distri- bution OPLAN.
GARDEN PLOT (Commander U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group is CINCPAC planning agent.)	15 Aug 75	(U) Under review. See also Civil Disturbances. This is a PACOM supporting plan to Depart- ment of the Army OPLAN GARDEN PLOT.
Hijacking of Civil Aircraft in PACOM (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 3722.2.)	22 Mar 69	(U) Current.
Joint Task Force 110 (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 3050.3, Employment of Military Resources in Event of Civil Disturbance within the PACOM Area (U).)	3 Dec 74	(U) Current. See Civil Dis- turbance plans.
Joint Task Force 119 (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction 3020.6, Defense of Hawaii against Overt Aerospace Attack (U).)	10 Oct 72	(U) Current. This is to be incorporated in CINCPAC OPLAN 5001, which is under revision.

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<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board OPLAN 1-70 (U) (CINCPAC Representative Philippines is CINCPAC planning agent.)	3 May 71/ 17 Dec 74	(U) Under revision. CINCPAC 150054Z Jul 75 tasked CINCPAC-REPPHIL for bilateral plan developed in coordination with the Philippine Government.
Peacetime Reconnaissance and Sensitive Military Operations in PACOM (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Directive T66.)	24 Feb 72	(U) Current. Consolidates in one document the provisions and guidance for operations outlined in JCS SM-700-68 and SM-701-68.
		
SEATO Force Commander's Plans (U)	1972-3	Held in abeyance. CINCPAC monitors and maintains basic plans, but they can be revised only by agreement of the SEATO Military Advisers.
Space Recovery Contingency (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction S3121.10, Manned Space Flight Contingency Recovery in Pacific Command Area (U).)	13 Feb 70	(U) Current. Revision held in abeyance pending JCS publication of new guidance for forthcoming space shuttle missions.
Ships Subjected to Harassing or Hostile Actions (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction S3100.4.)	3 Sep 68	(U) Current.

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<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Issue/ Last Change</u>	<u>Status/Remarks</u>
Unauthorized Aircraft Landing at U.S. Bases (U) (Supported document is CINCPAC Instruction S3700.1E, Policy Concerning Aircraft from the USSR, PRC or Aligned Countries Landing on Airfields where US Military Operational Units are Based (U).)	31 May 74	(U) Current.
FRIDAY GUEST (U) Naval Deployments to the Indian Ocean		(U) Cancelled in third quarter 1975.

#### OPLAN 5001


(U) The planning directive for the revised CINCPAC OPLAN 5001 had been distributed by CINCPAC on 16 April 1974. Subsequent concept development conferences, preparation of planning estimates, and coordination of the concept with the component commanders had been completed by June 1974. The period between June 1974 and August 1975, however, had been marked by major changes in the Unified Command Plan, PACOM organization and manning, force levels, the JCS planning system, and inter-unified command arrangement proposals. The revised Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 76 issued by the JCS in August 1975 (discussed elsewhere in this chapter) provided sufficient guidance to permit resumption of 5001 planning.

(U) In October the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide an estimate of completion date for the plan, which was to be retitled from "General War Plan" to "Pacific Command Defense Plan." CINCPAC replied that the initial draft of the plan would be available in late March 1976. CINCPAC tasking directive was issued on 3 November with initial inputs due from the staff and subordinate commands by the end of the year.<sup>1</sup>


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1. J5221 HistSum Oct 75; CINCPAC 250101Z Oct 75.

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(U) On 24 July CINCPAC cancelled OPLAN 5020Y, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 230416Z Jan 75; J5222 HistSum Jan 75.
  2. CINCPAC 011950Z and 240046Z Jul 75.
  3. J5231 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 031950Z and 310209Z Jul 75.



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1. J417 HistSum Sep 75; J444 HistSums Oct-Dec 75.
  2. J5/Memo/T55-76, 9 Sep 76, Subj: 1975 CINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft

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*P* His proposed concept concerned a threat from [redacted] North Korea; no U.S. ground combat units other than the U.S. 2d Infantry Division (already in Korea) which would not be committed without U.S. Government approval; [redacted]; and rapid augmentation by U.S. air, air defense, naval, and logistic forces. It assumed no general war; [redacted], [redacted] Chinese and U.S.S.R. support limited to logistic and political support; the use of bases in Japan (for logistic support and staging) and the Philippines was authorized; no additional air base construction in the ROK; and no U.S. mobilization. (Subsequently, by October, the force concept had been expanded to include as U.S. ground combat units the 2d Infantry Division, as noted above, plus the U.S. Army 82d Airborne Division and 25th

1. J5221 Point Paper, 19 May 75, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 Defense of Korea (6), which also cited JCS SM-207-75 of 17 Apr 75.
2. CINCPAC 012317Z Aug 75.

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1. Ibid.; J5222 Point Paper, 7 Aug 75, Subj: Proposed Concept for Defeat of NK Aggression (U); J4/Memo/TS 9-76, 2 Sep 76, Subj: 1975 CINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft.
  2. CDRUSACSG 152248Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPACFLT 181845Z Aug 75.

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1. CINCPACAF 190320Z Aug 75.
  2. JCS 1617/111832Z Sep 75.


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1. COMUS Korea 160950Z Sep 75.


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1. CINCPAC 230145Z Sep 75.
  2. CINCPACAF 020045Z Oct 75.
  3. CINCPAC 102040Z Oct 75.

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1. J5222 Point Paper, 15 Aug 75, Subj: Contingency Plans for Korea (U).
  2. JCS 3082/112317Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 130136Z Nov 75.
  3. COMUS Korea 260800Z Nov 75.

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
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1. COMUS Korea 150211Z Dec 75.
  2. CINCPAC 152320Z Dec 75.


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1. Ibid.; JCS 9160/190009Z Dec 75 (EX).
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 12486/080455Z Sep 75; SECDEF 7706/092116Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCPACFLT 182252Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 302220Z Oct 75.
  4. J423 Point Paper, 7 Apr 75, Subj: OPlan 5027 Base Development Plan (BDP).


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(S) CINCPACAF listed specific shortfalls, noting that some shortages might be filled through normal CONUS supply channels, but that more detailed study would be required by Air Force Headquarters in connection with the Air Force Logistics Command.<sup>2</sup>

b1.5 a (S) The Eighth Army advised that they could only examine pre-positioned war reserve material stocks as they had "no visibility" of CONUS stocks. Their review was based on the assumption that only BDP requirements 

 (order and shipping time from CONUS). The dollar value of this requirement was approximately \$115 million versus authorized pre-positioned stockage of \$29.3 million, a shortfall of \$85.7 million. Their pre-positioned stock levels were in the process of recomputation, however, an action that should result in increased stockage authorizations that would provide sufficient assets to meet the requirements of the 


 Assets were also available from the local economy, such as lumber and concrete, that could satisfy the majority of requirements not supported from in-country U.S. resources.<sup>3</sup>



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1. CINCPACFLT 020447Z Oct 75.
  2. CINCPACAF 082100Z Oct 75.
  3. CDR USAEIGHT Seoul 170437Z Oct 75.

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b1.5(a)  
Further effort in the PACOM in this regard was considered to be unproductive as the components were dependent on their Services for support. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS task the Services to further resolve BDP deficiencies and specifically identify instances of non-supportability for consideration [REDACTED]. The JCS advised that the CINCPAC recommendation would be circulated for Joint Staff and Service review; CINCPAC would be advised of the results of joint action.<sup>1</sup>



b1.5(a)  
[REDACTED] was the subject of the first analysis of new computerized programs concerning the deployment of forces in a contingency. JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 had directed that at least every two years the forces identified in Volume II of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) be supported by a Joint Strategic Movements Capability Analysis, with which CINCPAC's Logistics Directorate would be involved. The FY 76 analysis was to be conducted by the Office of the JCS in coordination with the Services, the European and Pacific Commands, and the Transportation Operating Agencies. Terms of Reference for the analysis were approved on 9 January 1975. [REDACTED] analysis concerning the PACOM would examine a PRC-North Korean aggression in Northeast Asia, while maintaining forward deployments in the NATO area (CINCPAC [REDACTED]). The PACOM analysis was to be in two parts. Part I was

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1. CINCPAC 300242Z Oct 75; JCS 2050/302237Z Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC 160414Z Nov 75; COMUS Korea 220531Z Nov 75; CDR USAEIGHT 210925Z Nov 75; CDRUSACSG 262026Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 060440Z Dec 75; J444 HistSum Dec 75.
  3. CINCPAC 292054Z Nov 75; COMUS Korea 290920Z Dec 75.

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b1.5(a).  
a gross movement analysis of intertheater requirements. Part II was to be conducted after approval by the JCS [REDACTED] and would consist of a more detailed intertheater analysis with different excursions as outlined in the Terms of Reference plus analysis by the Transportation Operating Authorities, and an intratheater analysis by CINCPAC.

(S) Base line conditions were set forth in the TOR. In lieu of JSCP FY 76 Volume II forces, which were still being coordinated in the Office of the JCS, that office provided an interim list of forces as the basis for preparation of the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to be developed by CINCPAC in order for the JCS Movement Analysis Coordination Group to perform their required strategic movement analysis.

b1.5(a) (S) CINCPAC benefits to be derived from this action were expected to be multi-fold. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It would also provide needed experience and training for involved agencies and commands in preparation of plans data and corresponding use of the new Joint Operations Planning System automatic data processing support modules in manipulation of this data. (See "PACOM Computer Support" in Chapter I of this history.) The overall result of such coordinated actions should be a gross time reduction in future planning cycles.

(U) In accordance with the TOR, the Office of the JCS formed a Movement Analysis Coordination Group to monitor, coordinate, and control the conduct of the analysis. It was composed of representatives of the participating agencies listed above.<sup>1</sup>

(U) By August the Logistics Directorate had received Time Phased Force and Deployment Lists (TPFDLs) from the component commands to support the movement analysis. These were used to generate unit and non-unit movement requirements. Those requirements, in turn, were analyzed against available transportation assets and port constraints to determine the feasibility of movement within the required time frame. The initial transportation feasibility analysis was accomplished by the Logistics Directorate, with further analysis and approval of the movement requirements accomplished by the Logistics Directorate of the JCS. The year 1975 ended with the JSCP FY 76 movement analysis not yet completed. All automatic data processing runs had been completed; these provided the necessary data for analysis. The analysis required for Part I, intertheater movement from ports of embarkation to ports of debarkation, was expected to be completed in June 1976.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J4122 HistSum Apr 75.
  2. J414 HistSum Aug 75.


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b1. (S)




(U) Off the west coast of the Republic of Korea were five islands that, according to the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953, "shall remain under the military control of CINUNC." The islands were Paengnyong-Do, Taechong-Do, Sochong-Do, Yonpyong-Do, and U-Do. (Americans referred to Paengnyong-Do as P-Y-Do and to Yonpyong-Do and Y-P-Do.)

(S) Events such as North Korean vessels crossing the Northern Limit Line in November 1973 and a North Korean demand that permission be sought before UNC vessels transited to the UNC-controlled islands had led the ROK to reinforce the islands.



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1. J5112 Point Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Defense of ROK Western Islands (U).
  2. Ibid.


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(S) CINCUNC provided periodic reports to the JCS on the progress of his discussions and planning with his ROK counterparts.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCUNC Seoul 220935Z May 75.
  2. SECSTATE 230192/262029Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCUNC Seoul 080751Z Nov 75; HQDA 262020Z Nov 75.

~~SECRET~~



(S) COMUS Korea concluded, however, that he was prepared to send a staff officer to Hawaii if his alternative was not adopted. The CINCPAC conference convened in Hawaii on 2 December, with representatives from all of the invited commands. Agenda items included [redacted] mission, assumptions, concept of operations, administrative support, intelligence estimates, command arrangements, and military options. Work on the plan continued through the end of the year.<sup>3</sup>

CONPLAN 5060

(S) This concept plan was concerned with Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC) planning. It provided for military support by the PACOM to assist the Department of State in the emergency care, protection, and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens located in countries in the PACOM. As discussed in the 1974 History, it had been decided to create one omnibus plan in this regard with separate appendixes for each of the PACOM countries to eliminate a great number of separate supporting plans. Preparation of the 5060 plan continued throughout 1975.<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. CINCPACAF 122200Z Jul 75, which cited CINCPAC 280407Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 130213Z Nov 75.
  2. COMUS Korea 250848Z Nov 75.
  3. J5241 HistSum Nov 75.
  4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 189-191.

~~SECRET~~

(U) The evacuation of Americans and others was dramatically demonstrated in both Cambodia (EAGLE PULL) and Vietnam (FREQUENT WIND) in the spring of 1975. Both of these operations are addressed in detail in appendixes to this history. Planning continued for the other countries in the PACOM.

(S) Laos came under special study because of the deteriorating political situation and the planned withdrawal of U.S. combat and combat support forces from Thailand. In December 1974 CINCPAC had directed that CINCPACFLT assume NEMVAC responsibility for Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand. After the evacuation of Cambodia and Vietnam it became apparent that evacuation of Laos would have to be accomplished by air and ground transportation. It was decided to transfer the evacuation planning from USSAG to PACAF and rescind the tasking of CINCPACFLT. On 16 May CINCPAC designated CINCPACAF or a designated subordinate command to act as coordinating authority for CINCPAC and assume responsibility for NEMVAC planning for Laos not later than 30 June 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In May and June both the Embassy in Vientiane and the State Department were concerned about the number of people potentially involved in any proposed evacuation. The Department had concurred with the Ambassador's proposal to begin quietly to thin out Mission personnel, with particular concern expressed for those in outlying areas where unrest and potential danger appeared greatest. This was subsequently accelerated, although the Ambassador noted on 19 May that he believed that even if the Lao government was completely dominated by the Pathet Lao it would still wish to have diplomatic relations with the United States and permit the normal functioning of an embassy with a few military attaches. He said Vientiane was not Saigon or Phnom Penh. "We are going through a transitional period which is necessarily uncertain; we are not heading to a show-down at high noon, and at such times we should handle ourselves with dignity."<sup>2</sup>

(U) By late June there were 57 "official" Americans at their post in Laos and an identical number of "non-official" Americans.<sup>3</sup>


(S) On 28 June the 13th Air Force promulgated its OPLAN 5060L-1-75, for NEMVAC for Laos. This plan was called "TALON BLADE." "QUICK SNATCH" was the name of the helicopter evacuation option in the event of a non-permissive environment.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 120410Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 160223Z May 75.
  2. SECSTATE 109657/101650Z May 75; SECSTATE 114561/180754Z May 75; SECSTATE 6335/240108Z May 75; AMEMB Vientiane 190525Z May 75.
  3. AMEMB Vientiane 250950Z Jun 75.
  4. 13AF Clark AB 280500Z Jun 75. (This message was the plan; it was 167 pages.) QUICK SNATCH was addressed in CINCPACAF 152400Z Oct 75.

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


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(S) On 14 November, however, the JCS directed execution of the retrograde of all Air Force combat and appropriate supporting units from Thailand. The JCS relieved affected Thailand-based Air Force units of all missions, functions, and responsibilities associated with their Southeast Asia deployment. CINCPAC therefore, directed cancellation of TALON BLADE/QUICK SNATCH effective 5 December 1975. Future evacuation planning for Laos would be developed within the scope of the revised CINCPAC CONPLAN 5060.<sup>1</sup>



NEMVAC Planning for Bangladesh

(S) On 15 August Bangladesh President Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed became President/

On 3 November a second coup, led by Khalid

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1. JCS 6381/142240Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 290114Z Nov 75.
  2. CINCPACFLT 210334Z May 75 and CINCPACAF 240445Z May 75, both of which cited CINCPAC 170522Z May 75; USMACTHAI 170951Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 232117Z Dec 75; J521 HistSum Dec 75.
  3. J5232 HistSum Dec 75.
  4. U.S. Forces Japan ltr, 21 Oct 75, Subj: Proposed Change 3 to COMUSJAPAN CONPLAN 5060; CINCPAC 200431Z Dec 75.

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Mosharraf, Chief of the General Staff, ousted Mushtaque, and previous coup leaders fled the country. Supreme Court Justice A. M. Sayem was installed as a [REDACTED] president. On 7 November Mosharraf was overthrown by Army Chief of Staff Ziaur Rahman and assassinated, although President Sayem was retained [REDACTED]. There was continuing disorder and killing among the military factions, no firm control [REDACTED]. Thus the Embassy and CINCPAC began reviewing evacuation plans.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 2 December the State Department advised that a regional security officer had been appointed to assist with emergency and evacuation (E&E) planning and related security programming. He met with CINCPAC personnel and CINCPAC's Political Adviser in Honolulu on his way to Dacca to discuss requirements of integrated State-CINCPAC E&E planning prior to the occurrence of a crisis in Bangladesh.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Following the review, the Ambassador advised CINCPAC that any required evacuation would probably have to be by air using military resources; he asked whether planning for the use of rotary wing aircraft was feasible or realistic. He outlined deficiencies in equipment and facilities to support such activity. He also noted that they envisioned a standfast situation in that country with several security situations occurring prior to any phased evacuation, which might provide the necessary alert leadtime required for military assistance.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 15 December CINCPAC advised that he was considering evacuation plans based on both a fixed wing option (using C-141/C-130 aircraft) and helicopter evacuation from designated and secured helicopter landing zones. Either option could be reinforced by ground tactical forces to provide security and protection for evacuees and evacuation equipment if this was required. He recognized the difficulty of overland transportation to Chittagong, but advised that it might be prudent to examine the feasibility of transporting evacuees by small craft to ships off shore. He provided an initial estimate, but advised that it was difficult to develop a detailed plan without on-the-scene assessment and coordination between CINCPAC and Embassy E&E planners. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] CINCPAC concluded his 15 December

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1. J5133 Point Paper, 5 Dec 75, Subj: Recent Military-Political Events, South Asia/Indian Ocean Areas (U)
  2. J521 HistSum Dec 75; SECSTATE 283933/022209Z Dec 75.
  3. AMEMB Dacca 6088/091120Z Dec 75.

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message noting that a low key visit by PACOM evacuation planners was still necessary for planning coordination of support.<sup>1</sup>

(G) The Embassy invited the PACOM representatives and a visit was scheduled for early January. The four CINCPAC staff officers requested that the Embassy assemble specific required materials so that the visit could be concluded within 72 hours.<sup>2</sup>



NUCLEAR  
CONTINGENCY  
PLANS  
(p.xii)

1. CINCPAC 151840Z Dec 75; AMEMB Dacca 5719/010750Z Dec 75.
2. CINCPAC 202054Z Dec 75.
3. CINCPAC 051953Z Sep 75; JCS 3543/122141Z Sep 75.
4. J5222 HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC 150222Z Apr 75.
5. CINCPAC 011950Z Jul 75.



(U) Upon authority from the JCS, CINCPAC cancelled the plans as recommended effective 1 August 1975.<sup>1</sup>



FRIDAY GUEST

~~(S)~~ This plan had been promulgated in September 1970 to provide for an increase in the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Since that time, U.S. Navy task forces of varying sizes had routinely deployed to those areas. Since 1 January 1971 there had been 11 deployments ranging in size from 3 to 15 ships. In February 1975 the JCS had provided guidance on a continuing basis for such deployments.

freedom of access to and transit of the Indian Ocean through the Sunda Strait and the Strait of Malacca, or, for that matter, any restricted waterway, "can best be achieved during peacetime by exercising that freedom on a regular basis." Routine deployments in response to the JCS guidance provided in February satisfied this requirement with respect to those two straits and the Indian Ocean. On 25 September, therefore, CINCPAC advised the JCS and CINCPACFLT that he was cancelling

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1. CINCPAC 240046Z Jul 75.
  2. CINCPAC 011950Z Jul 75.

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
the CINCPAC CONPLAN "FRIDAY GUEST," because it was no longer applicable. It was to be retained on file for two years in accordance with JOPS principles, then transferred to the applicable Federal Records Center.<sup>1</sup>

Bilateral Planning

(U) CINCPAC conducted bilateral planning with various other countries as required by national policy. Certain events in that regard occurred in 1975.

Canada-U.S. Planning


(S) The Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) at a meeting held in January at Fort Monroe, Virginia recommended that the single Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan, MCC 100/(Series) (U) be expanded with three supporting plans to be effective 1 January 1976.



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1. J5233 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC 250050Z Sep 75, which cited JCS 9187/112225Z Feb 75.
  2. J5233 HistSum Dec 75.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 166; JCS 1130/302027Z Jun 75.

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Philippines Planning

(U) On 24 March the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines advised CINCPAC that the Plans Committee of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board was of the opinion that Operation Plan 1-70 was no longer necessary and that a concept plan was all that was necessary. The committee was to be tasked to

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1. CINCPAC 191910Z Jul 75.
  2. CINCPAC 182146Z Sep 75.

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write such a concept plan using a parallel command concept and the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) format. CINCPAC concurred. On 15 July CINCPAC tasked his Representative in the Philippines to prepare such a bilateral concept plan with the Philippine Government for the defense of that country.



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1. J5133 HistSum Mar 75; CINCPACREPPHIL 240333Z Mar 75; J5231 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 150054Z Jul 75.

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### SECTION III--PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

#### FY 76 PACOM Psychological Operations Program

(S) CINCPAC, on 29 April, requested that the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group coordinate support for the FY 76 PACOM PSYOP program totaling \$1,210,000. Of this amount, only \$160,000 needed to be funded at the time; the balance was to support contingency plans and was to be made available if plans were implemented. The Department of the Army advised in June that \$160,000 was included in the Forces Command Program Budget Guidance for FY 76, and would be available to support programs subject to final approval of the PBG on 30 June.<sup>1</sup>

#### Southeast Asia PSYOP Programs

(U) With the fall of the Government of Vietnam, the Public Communication (PUBCOM) campaign of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center was suspended indefinitely.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The PSYOP program for Cambodia was known as Operation BIG SHOW; it consisted of magazines, pamphlets, educational material, and health kits, etc., and had been funded by Army Operations and Maintenance Funds. In December 1974 the Congress had amended the Foreign Assistance Act to require that all military support to Cambodia be charged to the Military Assistance Program fund ceiling. BIG SHOW support was included. With the concurrence of the Ambassador in Phnom Penh, the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team in January requested poster printing support but stated that no MAP funds were available. CINCPAC advised him of the Foreign Assistance Act fund restrictions and indicated CINCPAC's willingness to investigate other possibilities. The team chief decided to produce the posters with in-country assets. The posters were for the Cambodian troops, stressing the urgent need to conserve ammunition.<sup>3</sup>

#### Voice of America

(S) The U.S. Information Service had been operating a Voice of America transmitter in Korea since June 1971, when it had replaced an operation that had been called the Voice of the United Nations Command. During a 1974 realignment of PSYOP efforts in the PACOM, the JCS had directed that the simultaneous

- 
1. J553 HistSum Jun 75; CINCPAC 290333Z Apr 75; DA 252047Z Jun 75.
  2. J553 HistSum May 75.
  3. J553 HistSum Feb 75; CHMEDTC 111040Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 280059Z Jan 75.

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relay of Voice of America programming to North Korea by U.S. Army transmitters be continued through 30 June 1975 with USIA funding the operation for the first half of 1975. Upon review of its budgetary requirements, however, the USIA determined that it could not support the operations and requested that they be terminated. The ROK government was notified of this decision. Operations actually ceased on 15 February, and CINCPAC was to coordinate the disposition of the equipment. COMUS Korea had recommended transferring it to the ROK government as the most economic means of disposing of it. Because the Ambassador in Phnom Penh had expressed a desire for parts of the transmitters, the Secretary of Defense withheld approval pending a Washington-level review. On 16 April the Secretary of State approved COMUS Korea's recommendation, with the proviso that the ROK government operate it in such a way that it could not be construed as a successor to the Voice of the United Nations Command.<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 199; SECSTATE 6337/132109Z Dec 74; COMUS Korea 130531Z Jan 75; SECDEF 3230/141835Z Feb 75; SECSTATE 8472/160151Z Apr 75.

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SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES


Air Defense

(S) On 4 February the JCS advised of a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense that would require planning that continued movement toward providing a pool of strategic and general purpose tri-Service and allied assets from which resources could be drawn to perform air defense of threatened areas, including air and sea lines of communication, on a worldwide basis, as required. They asked the CINCs of the unified commands to provide a list of contingency plans for their areas that addressed air defense, a concept of employment for augmentation forces made available to them for air defense, and the anticipated interface between the unified commands and allied air defense forces.<sup>1</sup>

1. JCS 3775/042251Z Feb 75.

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


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
Nuclear Planning

(U) As reported in the Honolulu Advertiser in June, for a couple of years the Secretary of Defense had championed a more flexible nuclear strategy, one that would enable the United States to respond in kind to a nuclear attack on a few targets as distinguished from massive destruction of cities and the people in them. Such ideas had been advanced before, but during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations there had been adopted a mutual-deterrence strategy of "assured destruction" for the 1960s. Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs said he could not comment on the specifics of the new, more-flexible military planning, it was reported that under development for what were called limited nuclear options.<sup>2</sup>



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1. CINCPAC 041840Z Apr 75.
  2. Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Jun 75, p. 1.
  3. See also CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 527-531.
  4. J542 Point Paper, 10 Mar 75, Subj: Regional and Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs/RNOs) (U).


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99-45H  
RHH  
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DUKE  
DEPLOYMENT  
(p.Xii)

1. JCS 4810/162335Z May 75, which cited CJCS 4657/302140Z Jan 75 and JCS 5055/072136Z May 75 (EX).
2. JCS 6645/042234Z Dec 75 (EX).
3. J54 HistSum Dec 75, which cited ISA Memo I-26499/74.
4. Ibid., which cited CINCUNC 220831Z Feb 75.
5. J54 HistSum Dec 75, which cited CINCPAC 200303Z Mar 75.





UTILITY  
OF  
TAC  
NUC  
(p. xii)

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1. J54 HistSum Dec 75, which cited CINCPAC 042003Z Jun 75.
  2. Ibid., which cited JCS 082141Z Aug 75.
  3. J54 HistSum Dec 75, which cited JCS 081324Z Mar 75 and CINCPAC 162353Z May 75.
  4. J54 HistSum Dec 75, which cited USAFSS 052135Z Feb 75 and CINCPAC 111934Z Mar 75.

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Status of Johnston Atoll Operations

~~(S)~~ In 1969 it had been decided to relocate all toxic chemical munitions from Okinawa and after considerable study because of the sensitive nature of these munitions they were moved to Johnston Island. They were referred to as "RED HAT" munitions and they were still there.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 18 October 1975 CINCPAC advised the JCS that he had information that indicated probable congressional reductions in operations and maintenance funding for Johnston Atoll, with attendant personnel manning, which he believed might well impact on the safety and security of RED HAT munitions and herbicide Orange. He said he believed that two speedy and effective actions were necessary. The first was to make every effort to dispose "now" of the chemical and herbicide stockpile. He saw no requirement for those items and "rising maintenance costs [were] fast becoming prohibitive." Second, until resolution of disposal problems, sufficient funding "must be provided to maintain proper security, safety and storage, and orderly phasedown of operations." He requested the support of the JCS.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ The JCS reply of 24 October noted that the possible effect of funding cuts on the Defense Nuclear Agency were being addressed, particularly with regard to the future of the National Nuclear Test Readiness Program (NNTRP). The DNA, with support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was appealing the proposed reduction. The Army, the JCS continued, saw no immediate safety or security problem in adequately maintaining the munitions. It was recognized, however, that should a decision be made to terminate the NNTRP, a basic realignment in the operation of Johnston Atoll would be required.

~~(C)~~ RED HAT munitions were considered part of the national deterrent/retaliatory chemical munitions stockpile and were being retained in support of national policy and to meet stated requirements. The Army had no plans to dispose of its stocks at this time, the JCS continued. The Air Force was planning to dispose of the orange stocks as soon as an environmentally acceptable disposal method could be found. The JCS concluded that CINCPAC would be kept informed of any actions affecting the future status of Johnston Atoll.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories, Vol. 1, in 1969, pp. 121-130, and in 1970, pp. 198-199 contained extensive background on these munitions and plans for moving them.
2. CINCPAC 180400Z Oct 75.
3. JCS 8454/241726Z Oct 75.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### Coastal Zone Management Coordination Meeting

(U) On 22 May a Federal Agency Coastal Zone Management Coordination meeting was held in Juneau, Alaska. The meeting was sponsored by the Division of Policy Development and Planning, Office of the Governor of Alaska. The purpose was to identify all Federal and State interests affected by the Coastal Zone Management Program. The goals of the State's program were to attempt to minimize environmental damage, encourage reasonable and acceptable development, and eliminate conflicts within the coastal zone. CINCPAC's Liaison Officer to the Alaskan Command represented the Single Senior Military Representative, Aleutians at this meeting.<sup>1</sup>

### CINCPAC Staff Presentation to Australian Joint Services Staff College

(U) Late in 1974 the Commandant of the Australian Joint Services Staff College requested that a CINCPAC team again give a presentation to the College. He proposed as subjects a detailed explanation of unified and specified commands, to include the organization, staffing, and general responsibilities of such commands as stated in the Unified Command Plan. It would also include the command and control authority of the unified commander in respect to component commands, joint task forces, uni-Service forces, subordinate unified commands, attachments of elements of one force to another, and overseas air defense. A second major topic concerned CINCPAC responsibilities, command, control, and deployment. He also suggested group seminars on such topics as U.S. interests in Northeast Asia and reaction to events in that region; the U.S. position in the Indian Ocean; the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia; treaty obligations to include the future of NATO; disarmament (SALT); and the character, morale, and standing in the community of the U.S. armed forces. The CINCPAC team, headed by CINCPAC's Deputy Director for Plans, departed on 15 February. This was in a continuing series of bi-annual visits, and once again the lectures and seminars were well received.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J5131 HistSum May 75.

2. J513 HistSum Feb 75; USAFLO/CINCPACREP Australia 260516Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 160005Z Feb 75.

UNCLASSIFIED

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both primary and secondary data collection techniques. The primary data was gathered through direct observation and interviews with key personnel. Secondary data was obtained from internal company reports and industry publications.

The analysis of the data revealed several key trends and patterns. One significant finding was the correlation between certain variables, which suggests a causal relationship. This insight is crucial for developing effective strategies and policies.

The final section of the document provides a comprehensive summary of the findings and offers practical recommendations for future actions. It stresses the need for continuous monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the implemented measures remain effective and relevant over time.

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CHAPTER IV--MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I--RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia

(TS) Operating authorities for Southeast Asia had last been promulgated by the JCS on 15 August 1973. On 9 May 1975 those authorities were rescinded, and any authorities required for operations in that area were to be submitted to the JCS for approval on a case-by-case basis.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) Basic Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asia, which had been last promulgated in JCS 2475/142338Z August 1973, were also rescinded and new ROE were promulgated by the JCS on 15 August 1975. They are quoted:<sup>2</sup>

...The following basic ROE will govern operations of US Forces in Southeast Asia and are effective upon receipt. These ROE may be modified by separately published operating authorities as appropriate.

...DEFINITIONS

...SEASIA: For purposes of these ROE, SEASIA includes

(1) The airspace, landmass, and territorial/ internal waters of Thailand, Laos, North Vietnam (NVN), South Vietnam, and Cambodia.

(2) The international waters and airspace of the Gulfs of Siam and Tonkin and the South China Sea in or over which US Forces operate in relation to US objectives in SEASIA.

...Territorial Seas: A belt of sea adjacent to the coastal state 3 nautical miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast; however, for these ROE, the claimed distance by each state shall be observed up to 12 NM as if it were the width of their territorial seas.

- 
1. JCS 7232/092230Z May 75; the 1973 operating authorities were promulgated in JCS 2474/142336Z Aug 73. See the CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 205-207.
  2. JCS 7456/151710Z Aug 75.

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The following are the state claims with regard to territorial seas:

- (1) Thailand - 12 NM.
- (2) Cambodia - 12 NM.
- (3) NVN - 12 NM.
- (4) PRC - 12 NM.
- (5) South Vietnam - assumed to be 12 NM for purposes of these ROE.

...Internal Waters: Waters to landward of the territorial sea.

...Territorial Air Space: Airspace above the land territory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign country.

...Friendly Forces: All Royal Thai air, ground, and naval units and such quasi-official organizations as Air America.

...Hostile Aircraft: An aircraft observed attacking or acting in a hostile manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack US Forces or installations.

...Hostile Vessel (surface or subsurface): A vessel in Thai internal waters or territorial seas or SEASIA international waters which is engaged in attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty and intent to attack US Forces or installations.

...Hostile Ground Forces (encountered within Thailand): Ground forces which attack US Forces or facilities.

...Immediate Pursuit: Pursuit initiated in response to attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these ROE. The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be continued as necessary and feasible in international and territorial airspace/seas or in internal waters as prescribed herein. Immediate pursuit may be conducted only until the hostile aircraft or vessel no longer poses an immediate threat against US Forces.

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...GENERAL RULES

...US Forces operating in SEASIA are authorized to attack and destroy any hostile aircraft or vessel as herein defined, except where operating authorities promulgated separately limit this authority or preclude introduction of US Forces into the area.

...US Forces in SEASIA are authorized to attack and destroy hostile ground forces as defined herein.

...Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above, subject to the following conditions and limitations.

(1) In the event US Forces are attacked by hostile forces in Thailand or SEASIA international waters/airspace, US Forces may conduct immediate pursuit into international waters/airspace and, if fired on, into territorial seas/airspace of South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, NVN, and Cambodia.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into territorial seas or airspace of the PRC [People's Republic of China].

(3) US Forces which, under the limitations of these ROE, enter unfriendly territorial seas or airspace in immediate pursuit are not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered, unless attacked first by them, and then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.

(4) Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur wherein the destruction of aircraft and vessels would be contrary to US and allied interest. All available information and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to be taken.

(U) The final two paragraphs of the ROE were unclassified. They are also quoted:

...Nothing in these rules shall be construed as precluding a commander from using all means at his disposal to

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exercise the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations for self-defense of his forces.

...Request CINCPAC advise the appropriate Ambassador of those ROE which are of direct concern or relate to their respective geographical areas of responsibility. This message, in its entirety, will retain the overall classification of Top Secret. To facilitate necessary dissemination to proper operating levels, individual ROE may be downgraded to Secret and transmitted verbatim....

The Yellow Sea Incident, 26-27 February

(S) What came to be known as the Yellow Sea incident began as a confrontation on the high seas. It subsequently led to major discussion of the role of the United States in support of Korean forces against North Korean provocations and to restudy of the Rules of Engagement for U.S. and Korean forces.

(S) On 26 February at 1505 local time, ROK radar reported two unidentified boats in international waters south of Paengnyong-Do. At the direction of the Commander, Naval Forces, Korea, RADM H. S. Morgan, Jr., USN, the Commander, ROK Fleet ordered capture of the two North Korean boats using minimum force without main battery fire. During the night, a ROK destroyer collided with a North Korean fishing boat. No survivors were found. On 27 February two North Korean surface craft headed toward the ROK Navy ships, but seven miles short they diverted to the north.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Paengnyong-Do, mentioned above, was one of five principal islands that had been named specifically by the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 as remaining "under the military control of CINCUNC." These islands were just south of a "Northern Limit Line," an arbitrary (and curving) line established about 1952 by an operational order issued by Commander, Naval Forces Korea to govern the northern limit for ROK Navy patrols. Unilaterally established, the line had no basis in international law and was not part of the armistice agreement. With few exceptions, however, North Korea had respected this line until 1973, at which time North Korean gun boats and torpedo boats had begun operations south of the NLL. On 1 December 1973 at a Military Armistice Commission meeting a North Korean spokesman laid claim to the waters around the five UNC-controlled islands and demanded that ships, except possibly those on routine ferry service, get advance North Korean approval to sail to the islands. A UNC

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1. COMNAVFORKOREA Seoul 261031Z Feb 75, 261211Z Feb 75, 261457Z Feb 75, 261831Z Feb 75; CINCUNC 270345Z Feb 75.

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spokesman rejected the North Korean claim and declared that the islands were within UNC territorial waters and UNC naval vessels operated in either international waters or the area contiguous to the islands.<sup>1</sup>

(C) There was another line, a fishing limit line that had been established by ROK law in the 1950s to avoid a clash between North and South Korean fishing boats and because of incidents involving seizure of ROK boats that went too far north. (The fisherman followed the migratory patterns of the fish, which, generally, went south for the winter; thus the fisherman of both countries were farthest south during that time.) The fishing limit line had been established originally on the west coast at 37°-30'N east of 124°-45'E and 37°-50'N to the west of 124°-45'E. On the east coast that line was 38°-37'N. Because of tension and the sinking of two boats between September 1973 and February 1974, the line had been moved south to 37°-20'N on the west coast and 38°-30'N on the east coast. The ROK government agencies had agreed to enforce the southern line, but it had not been announced publicly for political reasons; North Korea was known to use a similar system to keep their boats north of 38°-30'N on the west and 38°-40'N on the east.<sup>2</sup>

(S) A report from the CINCUNC on 27 February, summing up activities of the previous two days noted that North Korean fishing boats were active in a new area, well south of the NLL. The larger armed North Korean vessels had proceeded toward the area, were challenged by the ROK Navy vessels, ignored the challenge, and were pursued. They merged with fishing boats they were possibly tasked to join and escort. In the darkness one of the ROK Navy ships collided with a fishing boat, which sank. There were no known survivors. The arrival of the North Korean ships, CINCUNC said, could presage a new pattern for the North Korean fishing fleet. "This is first time a group of NK fishing boats has been noted south of NLL, suggesting that short of violating ROK territorial waters, and in absence of international fishing agreement, NK fishermen will go where fish are. NKN [North Korean Navy] also demonstrated increased resolve to go south of NLL to protect NK fishing boats." He noted that the possibility existed that North Korea had "smarted" from a ROK Navy sinking of a North Korean patrol boat off the east coast, in ROK territorial waters, a few days earlier, with no North Korean armed force intervention. Thus, North Korea "may have reacted more aggressively than usual in this case." He concluded that if North Korean fishing boats did start fishing in new areas south of the NLL and refused to respond to ROK Navy identification challenges, recurrences of this nature might be possible.<sup>3</sup>

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1. HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA 1975 Annual Historical Report, 17 Jun 76, p. 31. See also Chapter III of this CINCPAC history regarding the off-shore islands.
  2. AMEMB Seoul 1680/130823Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCUNC 270345Z Feb 75.

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(S) In the matter of command and control, CINCUNC advised that CINCUNC, Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and Commander, Air Forces Korea were in their respective Tactical Operations Centers (TOC), in constant communication. Both the ROK Navy and Air Force responded "completely" to CINCUNC operational control. CINCUNC's Rules of Engagement and international law were followed.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCUNC provided further rationale for his actions on 28 February after concern had been expressed by the staffs of the JCS and CINCPAC. He said that at the time of the encounter two armed boats, probably North Korean, were proceeding south in the general direction in which ROK fishing boats would be found about 15 miles distant. While they outwardly appeared to be fishery associated, there was no assurance that they did not have a high speed capability such as had been encountered in the past. "There is likewise no case in many years of a North Korean boat being encountered in that area on an innocent mission." At that time there was no evidence that other North Korean boats were in the area. CINCUNC continued:

...While the boats were on the high seas, they were subject to the historic right of approach and identification. In the Korean area, because of the state of suspended hostilities which exists and by long and extensive history of miscellaneous hostile action by the North at sea, there is long standing precedent as an exercise of the right of self defense, for establishing beyond doubt the identity and mission of any ship or craft in the area, especially of a suspicious or potentially hostile nature. This leads to frequent cases of approach and challenge....

...When the two boats failed to respond either to demands to heave to or warning shots, and continued on their course, the CO of ARD-82 knew that he had no right to open fire because the boats were on the high seas and had committed no hostile act. This latter is unique in recent years, as armed NK boats nearly always instantly open fire when challenged. The CO also knew that some action was mandatory because of the approach of darkness....He therefore kept as close as possible...and awaited instructions, this unique situation not being covered specifically by his ROE and other standing orders. When consulted by COMROKFLT, the UN Naval Component Commander, after considering all of the foregoing, knowing that darkness would probably lead to loss of contact

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1. Ibid.

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because of encountering ROK small craft, and that there was no evidence as yet of NK air or naval activity, directed that the action now called in question be taken as soon as a second ship arrived, so that an adequate force should be available to accomplish the task peacefully if possible. The objective was both to establish their identity beyond doubt and to frustrate their capability to take hostile action or accomplish their possibly unfriendly mission.

(S) CINCUNC continued, briefly describing the descent of darkness and the "surprising encounter" with the North Korean fishing boats and subsequent collision. After searching for survivors the ROK ships were ordered to withdraw to the east. He concluded:<sup>1</sup>

...By that time it was apparent that NK Navy and air units were active, and all non-ROK contacts had turned north so the ROKN ships were withdrawn to avoid a surprise encounter with NK warships in darkness, which might have led to hostilities.

...The actions of the UNC Naval Component Commander are considered the minimum prudent steps to maintain seaward defense while complying with international law and avoiding hostilities.

(S) On 7 March the Department of State commented on the action. It recognized that no boarding or seizure took place and that the sinking of the North Korean ship was through inadvertent collision. "At the same time, there is no justification under international law for boarding or seizure of vessels on the high seas except in the most narrowly defined instances as specified by convention or international treaties." The Department described the right to "approach and challenge" and other aspects of encounters on the high seas. "Nevertheless, exercise or attempted exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign warship on the high seas is a serious breach of international law and custom." This joint State and Defense Department message continued:<sup>2</sup>

...Aside from legal consideration involved, seizure or successful boarding would have created serious political problems. Seizure would have constituted apparent parallel to NK actions in case of PUEBLO and ROK fishing boats attacked

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1. CINCUNC/COMUS Korea 282310Z Feb 75.
  2. SECSTATE 051364/1/071659Z Mar 75.

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February 15, 1974. In both instances we raised strong protest over seizure on high seas in cases where vessels were outside territorial waters, but much closer to NK mainland. Others would be quick to cite apparent inconsistency. Global mobility of US naval and merchant fleet depends in large measure on strict observance of international law even when suspicious of a vessels' intent.

...More immediate problem would have been charges relative to United Nations Command role and authority. Legitimacy of present UNC relationship came under strong attack in UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] last year and we can expect similar move this year. Plausible charges that US was exceeding its role as UNC in support of ROKG fishing or "operational waters" claims would be highly damaging to US/ROK political interests in UNGA and difficult if not impossible to counter.

...In this regard, it is imperative that all concerned avoid US involvement in future actions which appear to violate accepted principles of international law and insure that ROK forces do not participate in similar actions while under UNC control. You should exert appropriate influence to discourage ROKG from unilaterally participating in such actions as well.

#### Air Support During the Yellow Sea Incident

(S) Shortly after the pursuit of the unidentified ships was begun, the ROK Navy requested stand-by air support. As reported by the CINCUNC, "consistent with SOPs which have been in effect for several years - and frequently invoked - a counter-infiltration air package (2 F-5A, 1 AT-33, 1 flare ship) took to the air, beginning 260912Z and was capped [combat air patrol] by 2 ROKAF F-4D at 37-00N/126-30E." At no time, CINCUNC continued, "was the counter-infiltration package ever called for by the on-scene naval commander. Indeed, at 261005Z my UNC naval commander (CNFK) informed my UNC air commander (CAFK) that air support would not be needed. This is a fundamental point: protection/support of ROK Navy elements was not the basis for subsequent friendly activity."

(S) CINCUNC continued to describe subsequent air activity:<sup>1</sup>

...Whether in reaction to the appearance of the counter-infiltration air package or other reason, high performance

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1. CINCUNC/COMUS Korea 282055Z Feb 75 (EX).

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aircraft began penetrating the Korean ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone] (these were, incidentally, the first such penetrations on record and numbered 48 over the next few hours). In reaction thereto, ROKAF F-4s were scrambled and established a defensive orbit....as more penetrations of the Korean ADIZ occurred, additional ROKAF aircraft were scrambled and a total of three defensive CAP points were established along 37°N with ROKAF assets. F-4D aircraft were utilized due to climatic conditions, location, and darkness....The NKAF kept a constant force of three flights of aircraft in the vicinity of P-Y-Do [Paengnyong-Do] from 261030Z Feb to 261330Z Feb and again from 261430Z Feb to 261830Z Feb. The maintenance of ROKAF defensive turn-arounds of...ROKAF assets due to limited AIM-7 resources on hand; and the distance from the orbit points to the turn-around base (Taegu) complicated the problem. When the fuel state of ROKAF aircraft diminished the CAP capability to two flights, CMDR AFK established a BARCAP (barrier CAP) in the vicinity of 37°N, 126°30'E with USAF assets until the ROKAF could regenerate their resources. The F-4E aircraft were established in orbit at 25,000 feet between the area of NKAF activity and Osan Air Base....These aircraft were maintained on station (about 1 hour) until ROKAF F-4s from Taegu AB returned to the offshore orbit points.

(S) After about an hour's lull, the North Korean aircraft again began probing south of 38°N and again ROKAF aircraft were scrambled and again supported by USAF F-4Es.

(S) Altogether in the two days the North Korean Air Force flew 68 sorties (aircraft were believed to have been MIG-21s) and the ROK Air Force flew 71 sorties of F-4Ds and F-5s, one AT-33, and one C-46 flareship. The USAF flew four F-4E sorties. The North Korean aircraft did cross the Northern Limit Line and some overflow Paengnyong-Do. The maximum aircraft in the air at one time was seven. Farthest penetration was 40 nautical miles south of Paenyong-Do near the scene of the collision. Both sides flew defensive type missions and opposing aircraft did not get closer than 40 nautical miles of one another.<sup>1</sup>

(S) All ROKAF sorties were controlled by the Tactical Air Control Center at Osan Air Base and were under the operational control of BGEN W. P. Paluch, Jr., USAF, who was UNC Air Component Commander and Commander, Korean Air

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1. J561 Point Paper, 27 Mar 75, Subj: Yellow Sea Incident, 26-27 Feb 75.

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Defense Sector. All USAF sorties were controlled by General Paluch in his role as Commander, U.S. 314th Air Division and Commander, Korea Air Defense Sector.<sup>1</sup>

(S) When Admiral Gayler learned of the use of USAF aircraft, he advised COMUS Korea that he was "greatly concerned," although he appreciated the first-hand knowledge of the on-scene commander. He said that the potential threat to U.S. installations of small MIG flights appeared to be so small that protective reaction, while technically provided for in the Rules of Engagement, appeared "imprudent." He said, "Let us keep them [U.S. aircraft] on the ground unless threat to American installations is clear, positive, imminent and serious." His previous guidance on Rules of Engagement continued to apply.<sup>2</sup>

(S) General Stilwell (COMUS Korea) replied that he appreciated and shared the concern that prompted CINCPAC's message. "Like all commanders, I am constantly attuned to the imperative that every action involving protection, or exercise of my forces strictly accord with national policy and the derivative instructions issued by my superiors. I am equally attuned to the responsibilities explicit in operational command of the ROK armed forces for the purpose of external defense." He continued:

...Review of the events of 26-27 February convinces me that our actions were entirely consistent with the standing instructions which govern the exercise of US Forces....Nonetheless, I have passed to CDR, 314th AD CINCPAC guidance to keep USAF aircraft on the ground unless "threat to American installations is clear, positive, imminent, and serious."

(S) He noted that erroneous press accounts may have been misleading and recapitulated the events of the incident (as described above). He noted that put the commitment of the four USAF aircraft in perspective, they were airborne 2 hours and 39 minutes of the total 14 hours and 25 minutes during which ROKAF aircraft were aloft. They were at Osan and geographically well-suited for their limited mission and their employment was "essential to the maintenance of an adequate BARCAP. Moreover, it is likely that NK knowledge that USAF aircraft were aloft had a strong deterrent effect." He continued:<sup>3</sup>

...As stated earlier, I have passed...[CINCPAC's 262355Z Feb 75 (EX)] to Commander, 314th AD (concurrently UNC Air Component Commander). However, I submit that such constraints

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1. Ibid.
  2. CINCPAC 262355Z Feb 75 (EX).
  3. CINCUNC/COMUS Korea 282055Z Feb 75 (EX).

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jeopardize our ability to accomplish the missions with which we are charged in our several capacities....[The CINCPAC guidance], literally interpreted, greatly reduces the effectiveness of the 314th AD in defending US troops and installations in the ROK. The juxtaposition of forward NK airfields and US units in the Seoul area and northward, coupled with the speed of jet aircraft, reduces reaction time to minutes. Only rarely is a threat unambiguous. If the air component commander must keep his forces on the ground in the face of a developing threat until its dimensions and direction are crystal clear, the effectiveness of those forces in deterring conflict or coping with aggression at the outset is severely diminished.

...Surely the basic intent of ROE is to control the employment of forces. One can accept severe constraints with respect to geographic limits of movement, what and how of target engagement, levels of activity. Constraining a commander from bringing his forces to maximum readiness, within his own area, is something else again.

...The CINCUNC mission transcends the protection of US Forces. In the context of defense of Korea, the UNC Air Component Commander must have authority to orchestrate the total air assets, taking into account the threat, the location of bases and their complement, and the available air ordnance. This is not to say that ROKAF assets should not be used first; that should be and is the policy. But USAF assets ought not to be fettered when their employment is needed and consistent with mission statement. There is a collateral concern. If we cannot use US assets, to supplement the ROKAF, when the integrity of ROK airspace is threatened, the ROKs are more likely to make their own decisions and our OPCON may become nominal only.

(S) General Stilwell concluded by recommending that CINCPAC and the JCS conduct a study, taking CINCPAC's guidance into account, to determine what modification should be made to existing Rules of Engagement.

(S) During CINCPAC's Rules of Engagement conference held 24 and 25 March, CINCPACAF representatives took exception to CINCPAC's 26 February message to COMUS Korea to keep the USAF aircraft on the ground unless the threat was "clear, positive, imminent and serious." They said this restriction violated "prudent, time-tested air defense procedures" They also maintained that a

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"scramble" was an air defense procedure, and thus not controlled by the ROE. Whether the scrambled aircraft fired or not was determined by the ROE.

(S) On 14 April the CINCUNC made a series of points in a letter to the Chairman of the JCS. The North Korean Air Force had stepped up provocative penetrations of the Korean ADIZ in an apparent attempt to test the resolve of the UNC/U.S. Forces Korea. The NKAFF apparently respected the ROK Air Force's F-4 aircraft and withdrew when they scrambled, but ignored the ROKAF F-5As. Introduction of the F-5E, which was scheduled in the coming year, would help, but until then the ROKAF modest inventory of 33 F-4s limited their capability to respond to repeated provocations. It might be essential, therefore, to launch USAF F-4s to relieve pressure on the ROKAF. This would also assure the ROK Government that the United States was serious about the defense of the ROK. General Stilwell concluded, "All these considerations support my contention that the current temporary restriction on the use of USAF assets should be lifted."

(S) On 2 August CINCPACAF advised the Air Force Chief of Staff that the ROKAF did not have a sufficient inventory of AIM-7E missiles to keep adequate sortie generation for ROK air space protection. The necessity of using USAF aircraft would be reduced if the ROKAF had more AIM-7Es. CINCPACAF requested that the ROKAF be allowed to procure four missiles for each of their F-4 aircraft, despite the worldwide shortage.

(S) On 9 August CINCPAC supported CINCPACAF's position regarding the AIM-7Es in a message to the CSAF. He noted that the USAF had no current mission to protect ROK airspace, although it was to be noted that existing Rules of Engagement for Korea did authorize U.S. Forces to engage North Korean aircraft declared hostile. An upgraded ROKAF capability would reduce the necessity for American forces to "get into the act."<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPACAF questioned CINCPAC's statement that there was no current USAF mission in Korea to "protect ROK air space." He requested clarification. CINCPAC's reply was as follows:

...None of references cited...nor any others I am aware of, contain mission statement or tasking of USAF elements to defend ROK air space in day-to-day, peacetime conditions. There is, however, requirement to maintain air defense preparedness for self protection of U.S. Forces/installations and in event of overt aggression in which case U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty would apply and all appropriate U.S. Forces will be tasked.

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1. J561 Point Paper, 14 Aug 75, Subj: Air Defense Procedures in Korea (U).

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...My position regarding all of U.S. air defense forces in Korea during peacetime:

All U.S. air defense forces in, or operating within, supporting distance of the Republic of Korea, will maintain a high state of readiness and be prepared to respond immediately when U.S. Forces or installations are attacked or clearly threatened with attack by hostile forces. U.S. air defense forces will also be prepared to provide immediate assistance to the ROK, when directed by JCS or higher authority, in meeting commitments under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The air defense forces of the ROK, under the operational control of the United Nations Command, have the mission and responsibility for protection of ROK air space.

...This position in no way degrades the United States Government resolve to meet its commitments to come to the defense of the ROK but is intended to clarify responsibility for protection of ROK air space.

CINCPAC concluded that the existing Rules of Engagement were not fully consistent with this statement and would therefore be rewritten.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC's Rules of Engagement for Korea were defensive in nature, in that they granted authority to engage other forces only after being declared hostile by competent authority. Specific criteria were provided to be utilized in determination of hostile intent. These ROE applied only to U.S. Forces under CINCPAC Operational Control. In general, U.S. Forces were authorized to take action against, including attacking and destroying, if necessary, any hostile aircraft, vessel, or ground forces (as described). Immediate pursuit could be conducted in international waters and airspace in the event U.S. or friendly forces were threatened by a hostile aircraft or vessel. If actually fired upon it might be continued into territorial seas or airspace of North Korea and may be conducted only until the hostile aircraft or vessel no longer posed an immediate threat to the U.S. or friendly forces. No pursuit was authorized into the territorial seas or airspace of China or the U.S.S.R. In the event U.S. or friendly ground forces were attacked by hostile ground forces, quick reaction forces could pursue the hostile forces into the Demilitarized Zone short of the Military Demarcation Line, providing continuous contact was maintained.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 172332Z Sep 75.

2. J5221 Point Paper, 6 Aug 75, Subj: Rules of Engagement (ROE) - Korea (U).

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(S) Criteria were provided to determine whether an aircraft, a vessel, or ground forces were "hostile." The rules were effective, as noted above, only for forces under CINCPAC OPCON; they could also apply when U.S. Forces were under the OPCON of CINCUNC, at his discretion. In furtherance of CINCUNC's mission to provide for defense of the off-shore islands against overt provocation by North Korea, CINCUNC had authorized (upon his approval) UNC aircraft to enter the airspace over the territory within the claimed 12 nautical mile territorial waters for certain named specific reasons, such as immediate pursuit or when authorized by higher authority.

(S) CINCPAC's guidance on the use of USAF aircraft as provided on 26 February remained in effect throughout 1975.

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1. Ibid.

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1. J3142 HistSum Dec 75, which cited JCS 00673/222026Z Jan 75 and 05809/281227Z May 75 (both BOM); JCS 1143/062341Z Feb 75; JCS 4374/172305Z Apr 75.
2. J3141 HistSum Aug 75; J3142 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC 170250Z Jun and 130020Z Aug 75; Letter of Agreement between Commander Thirteenth Air Force and Commander Seventh Fleet, 6 Sep 75.
3. J3142 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC 242231Z Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 292251Z Sep 75; CINCPACAF 292145Z Sep 75; COMUS Korea 300019Z Sep 75.


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(S) A CINCPAC-CINCSAC Memorandum of Agreement for PARPRO operations became effective 1 April 1975. It was provided with Change 12 to CINCPAC's 24 February 1972 guidance. The purpose of the memorandum was to insure effective coordination and mutual support regarding PARPRO operations in the PACOM area in consonance with JCS guidance. Requirements for each command were specified.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC reviewed and approved on 15 August CINCPACAF's OPLAN C-105 of 1 June, which comprised direction for the protection of U.S. aircraft conducting peacetime reconnaissance and certain sensitive operations within the PACOM. Subsequent liaison between the Joint Reconnaissance Centers for CINCPAC and the JCS confirmed that the JCS center had reviewed the C-105 plan and interposed no objection.<sup>2</sup>

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
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1. CINCPAC 260454Z Mar 75.
  2. J3141 HistSum Aug 75; CINCPAC 150229Z Aug 75.
  3. J5241 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 041857Z Jul 75.
  4. CINCPAC 100259Z Jul and 120305Z Jul 75.

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
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1. J313 HistSum Dec 75.
  2. J5241 HistSum Dec 75, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 3554 of 10 Sep 75.
  3. DIA 2805/111356Z Dec 75.
  4. CINCPAC 121400Z Dec 75.
  5. J3141 HistSum Dec 75; JCS 1394/062108Z Jan 76.

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## SECTION III--EXERCISES

### Joint Exercises

(S) Funding constraints continued to take a heavy toll on exercise planning in the PACOM, and in 1975 no end was in sight. The subject of improvements in the joint exercise program in light of limited funds was discussed at the conference of unified and specified commanders in August 1975 (see Chapter I). It had been noted that while there had been a nearly five-fold increase in funds for joint exercises since Fiscal Year 1971, inflation had absorbed any corresponding growth in the level of effort. While the contribution of joint exercises to the readiness of forces was recognized, it was expected that the program would continue to compete for dollars with other high priority Service programs. The JCS noted on 2 September that as a result of fuel and funding shortfalls in both FY 74 and 75 exercise sponsors were required to consider modifying exercises on an urgent basis by such means as conversion to command post exercises, reduction in scope, consolidation, relocation, and the like. They thought, however, that these measures should be extended to initial exercise development stages whenever feasible. Further, investigation should be conducted into innovative methods of structuring and conducting exercises to reduce costs. For example, they noted, an extended command post exercise could culminate with movement of segments of joint task force staffs and limited advance elements of selected units. The JCS continued that they realized that sponsors were in the best position to judge the value and effect of techniques to reduce costs. They requested, therefore, that the unified and specified commanders look closely at all available measures to achieve exercise objectives at the least possible cost at each stage of exercise development.<sup>1</sup>

(S) As discussed in the 1974 CINCPAC Command History, a significant part of the support to be provided by the USAF for the FY 75 exercises had been contingent on Congressional approval of funding for additional C-141 and C-5 flying hours to support an increase in Military Airlift Command active duty aircrew ratios. Congress disapproved the proposal, and the JCS advised that they were seeking alternate sources of funding in order to maintain the FY 75 exercise program at planned levels. As such funding might not be obtained, however, exercise sponsors should explore all available alternatives to MAC airlift in structuring exercises to achieve exercise objectives. As a minimum, consideration should be given to substitution of organic theater airlift capability or other modes of transportation, consolidation, and relocation or reduction of scope to eliminate the MAC requirement. "Exercises should be considered for cancellation only as a last resort," the JCS stated.<sup>2</sup>

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1. JCS 6186/022003Z Sep 75
  2. JCS 2590/131340Z Jan 75.

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(U) In November the JCS responded to a CINCPAC recommendation that exercise airlift funds be allocated by the Defense Department directly to each unified command. The JCS advised that their Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, charged the Services, among other things, with administering the funds made available for training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to the unified and specified commands. Inherent in this responsibility was the requirement to achieve stability, continuity, and economy and to conduct long-range planning. The JCS noted that the Air Force had the mission and funding responsibility for providing airlift for JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercises. The airlift portion of the USAF funding allocations constituted only one element of the total appropriation. Direct allocation of exercise airlift funds would serve to reduce the flexibility to reprogram and reallocate funds within the Operations and Maintenance appropriation. Such a piecemeal approach would not be conducive to the achievement of stability and economy that accrued from centralized direction and accounting. The JCS concluded, therefore, that in the interest of sound financial management and adherence to established joint doctrine and Service policy, that the existing system of funding allocation from the Defense Department to the Services should be retained. With regard to the flexibility to make changes to approved exercise programs, the JCS advised that exercise sponsors could cancel or modify JCS-coordinated exercises in certain instances. This was construed to mean, the JCS continued, that unified and specified commands had the authority to make modifications to such JCS-coordinated programs, as long as overall exercise funding allocations were not exceeded and the exercises continued to be conducted in accordance with established joint doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

(D) Planning for the exercise programs continued. In January the JCS approved CINCPAC's 12-month exercise schedule for the period beginning 1 October 1974; that same month the scheduling conference for FY 76 was held, as noted below, and on 6 August the JCS requested CINCPAC's input for the proposed schedule for FY 77-81. Pending Congressional action, the planning figures were provided, based on Service Program Objective Memorandums and the Five-Year Defense Plan for FY 77 and 78, as follows, in millions of dollars:<sup>2</sup>

	Army		Air Force	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
PACOM	1.069	.650	9.503	9,700

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1. JCS 7856/171918Z Nov 75, which cited CINCPAC 260219Z Sep 75.

2. JCS 4443/151506Z Jan 75; JCS 5463/061243Z Aug 75.

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(C) Earlier, at the January 1975 JCS Annual World-wide Joint Exercise Scheduling Conference held at the Pentagon, conferees had met to adjust and compile the JCS Joint Exercise Schedule for FY 76. The exercises that had been proposed in September 1974 by the unified commanders for FY 76 would have cost \$228.9 million, but only \$87.5 million was approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Program Budget Decision. CINCPAC's proposal had totaled \$77.8 million, computed at 1974 fuel costs, but the command was granted only \$9.9 million, computed at 1975 fuel costs. The resulting FY 76 exercise schedule for CINCPAC was as follows:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Dollars Requested</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>Exercise Name</u>	<u>Dollars Granted</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>Airlift Hour</u> <u>Shortfall</u>
3.9	OPPORTUNE JOURNEY	.2	508
1.2	COMMANDO ELITE	1.548	
3.7	CAPTAIN COOK III	2.61	
3.7	CAPTAIN COOK IV	0	1,400
.39	FOAL EAGLE	0	
8.07	VARSITY SPIRIT	(moved to FY 77)	
.130	DART/CAX	(cancelled)	
55.7	CAPTIVE LIGHTNING	2.37	
1.01	FLY-A-WAY	1.18	
New exercise	LAND/AIR FTX NEW ZEALAND	2.03	

(U) Still further approval by the Congress was necessary, and both Army and Air Force appropriations were lower than those approved by the Defense Department.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In September CINCPAC asked that the Office of the JCS make distribution of exercise documents directly to CINCPAC subordinate commands. The JCS advised that they would continue to provide documents to unified commanders for further distribution, for several reasons. Many of the documents contained sensitive information directly and/or indirectly related to real-world information; such information should be selectively disseminated. Most of the

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1. J361 HistSum Jan 75.
  2. JCS 4345/021712Z and 2799/111334Z Dec 75.

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commands did not need all of the information in JCS documents even if it was not sensitive, especially for worldwide exercises such as POLE VAULT; the JCS assumed that unified commanders would publish their own exercise plans and related documents in order to provide subordinate commands with only essential information.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In another exercise matter, the JCS advised in November that they had recently completed a report of the Defense Science Board task force on "Identification Friend, Foe, or Neutral." One conclusion that had received particular attention was that inadequate consideration was given to identification functions in field exercises conducted by the Services or the JCS. It was considered that the function should be introduced. The JCS, therefore, requested that unified commanders have their planning reflect, when appropriate, the evaluation of IFFN as an integral element of future field exercises and maneuvers. "This evaluation should focus on identifying requirements for the effective integration of the identification function with command and control and be based on all inputs available, such as radar homing and warning, enemy IFF, cooperative IFF systems, navigation, known position of friendlies, and intelligence (including Special Intelligence) data."<sup>2</sup>

(U) The worldwide Soviet naval exercise in April that involved 200 ships and six oceans is discussed in Chapter II of this history, "The Threat."

(U) Certain specific joint and combined exercises are discussed in the material that follows:

PRIME RATE-75

(U) Exercise PRIME RATE-75 was one in a series of biennial, worldwide, procedural, general war, command post exercises, sponsored and conducted by the JCS in conjunction with the biennial NATO exercise WINTEX 75. The last exercise had been conducted under the name HIGH HEELS in March 1973. Planning for PRIME RATE had begun in 1974. An initial planning conference had been held in Washington from 19 to 21 June that year. Future conferences with such worldwide participation were necessary before the exercise actually took place. (In many of the previous exercises in this series, CINCPAC and his staff had been involved in real-world activities in Southeast Asia to such an extent that participation was sometimes limited.)<sup>3</sup>

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1. JCS 1950/231630Z Sep 75. The JCS also advised that they were not staffed to handle the task.
  2. JCS 7857/171919Z Nov 75.
  3. J3321 HistSum Jun 75.

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(TS) On 2 November 1974, CINCPAC provided his comments to the JCS on simulated redeployment of forces from the PACOM to augment the Atlantic and European Commands in time of a crisis. He did not believe PACOM forces should be required to redeploy to Europe at such a time, as he had repeatedly advised the JCS. The JCS believed, however, that the United States should play PRIME RATE in consonance with approved strategic concepts, which provided for such redeployment. They advised that CINCPAC might wish to address this matter in subsequent revisions of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. CINCPAC continued to provide his beliefs in this regard to the JCS in JSCP preparation and at other times strategic concepts came under discussion, as noted in Chapter III.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By January 1975 the PACOM Master Scenario Events List had been submitted for PACOM participants for implementation during exercise play. The PACOM directory of players and controllers had also been submitted to the JCS for incorporation into a worldwide directory.

(S) A training program for Crisis Management and the Joint Operation Planning System and its Interim Software System was completed and was scheduled to be implemented prior to execution of the exercise. A Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP) course was given to Service component and staff member exercise participants during the week of 27-31 January, to instruct key action officers in the details of DEPREP necessary to perform their respective functions. In conjunction with the Crisis Management play of the exercise, CINCPAC Operation Plan 5020X, Reinforcement of the Republic of Korea, had been constructed and submitted to the JCS on 23 January.

(S) In other planning, automated data processing support was provided by the CINCPAC ADP Systems Support group during January for automated pre-formatted Crisis Management Reporting message generation, an improved Status of Actions file, as well as the Master Scenario Events List comments and status programs.

(S) In February extensive planning, briefing, team assignments, team training, and final preparations took place. Special emphasis was placed on player and controller preparation and training in Crisis Management Reporting procedures.<sup>2</sup>

(U) PRIME RATE-75 was conducted "successfully" from 3 to 14 March. It was designed to provide for participation of government officials, exercise civilian and military staffs and appropriate plans, as well as evaluating the Worldwide Military Command and Control System during a period of escalating

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1. JCS 4576/161953Z Dec 74.
  2. J361 HistSums Jan, Feb 75.

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international crisis, culminating in strategic nuclear exchange. PACOM participation included the CINCPAC headquarters, the Service component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, the subordinate unified commands, CINCPAC representatives, the U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force, the Defense Communications Agency Pacific, the Coast Guard, Pacific, and, in addition to the United States for certain aspects of the exercise, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The JCS sponsored a critique conference 30 April to 2 May in order to present participants' critique items, present the preliminary analysis of the exercise, discuss lessons learned, and identify major problem areas. A follow-on exercise, POLE VAULT 76, would use a scenario utilizing conditions existing at the termination of PRIME RATE as a point of departure, or "to test reconstitution of the rubble of PRIME RATE 75."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The next exercise in this series was scheduled to be conducted in the spring of 1977; it was called PRIME TARGET. On 24 September 1975 CINCPAC advised the JCS that a year earlier he had provided an assessment that the quality of worldwide command post exercises could be improved. One vehicle he had suggested was a no-notice exercise concept that tested capabilities in crisis management and at the same time exercised readiness. His concept had proposed that exercise scenarios that led to nuclear exchange be reevaluated; he believed they were "defeatist and dangerous." The continued emphasis on the use of the ultimate weapon in scenarios de-emphasized conventional capability and readiness. He believed that design of scenarios with minimum nuclear play (reserving nuclear scenarios for a last-resort retaliatory defensive role) would provide a realistic exercise reemphasizing conventional capability and readiness as a viable means to accomplish national objectives. He recommended design of a no-notice non-nuclear worldwide exercise commencing with PRIME TARGET 77. He observed that although PRIME RATE 75 had been non-nuclear during its early stages, he believed that staff thinking and judgments were tempered by the knowledge that conventional play would escalate to a nuclear scenario.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The Acting Chairman of the JCS advised that he appreciated the proposal, but he noted that large-scale exercises in that series interfaced with large-scale general war exercises sponsored by NATO. PRIME TARGET 77 was thus already committed to NATO Exercise WINTEX 77. As the dates and master scenario for those exercises had been approved, it would be inappropriate to attempt to adopt CINCPAC's proposal at the time. His recommendation would be given a high

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1. J361 HistSum Mar 75.
  2. J361 HistSum Mar, Apr 75; J6221 HistSum Dec 74.
  3. CINCPAC 240355Z Sep 75.

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priority, however, for the design and conduct of a subsequent JCS-sponsored U.S. unilateral worldwide command post exercise.<sup>1</sup>

POLE VAULT-76

(U) Planning began in April 1975 for an exercise scheduled for March 1976. POLE VAULT, as noted earlier, was an exercise to evaluate reconstitution and redirection procedures following a strategic nuclear exchange. The exercise scenario was to utilize conditions existing at the termination of JCS Exercise PRIME RATE 75 as a point of departure.

(S) Commenting on the proposed exercise on 5 April the Commander of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group had noted that the exercise of civil defense capabilities in a post-nuclear strike environment should not be limited to the Continental United States, but expanded to include Hawaii. The effectiveness of military-civil operations in accomplishing redirection and reconstitution should be exercised in all areas where those relationships existed, he continued. The National Guard Bureau and civil defense agencies at the national level should be encouraged to participate and be included in the exercise scenario. Local state Guard and civil defense units, he believed, would be more apt to respond to local requirements if they were encouraged through their respective organizational chains.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A PACOM planning conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters 30 September to 2 October to finalize exercise controller inputs. Conference objectives were to:

- Insure that the approved concept and objectives were reflected in the PACOM design of the exercise.
- Review the exercise calendar.
- Finalize development of the PACOM controller documents (the Master Scenario Events List, Special Briefings (Annex X), and communications systems rejuvenation).
- Development of a PACOM logistics scenario.
- Address the civil-military interface during the time frame of the active play of the exercise.

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1. JCS 9974/032017Z Oct 75.  
2. CDRUSACSG 050712Z Apr 75.

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- Consider participation levels and simulation of headquarters and agencies.

- Discuss Residual Capability Assessment (RECA). RECA information together with civil residual resources inputs would be required to support National Command Authority discussions concerning allocation of resources and strategic direction of forces.

Exercise inputs developed and approved during the conference were to focus player actions on defending the nation, and providing for the welfare of the populace in Hawaii and Guam.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By the end of the year, however, the matter of political sensitivities regarding the exercise had been addressed by CINCPAC to the JCS. He was advised that the exercise had been approved by the Chairman of the JCS, pending White House approval. As the exercise had been designed for participation by all unified and specified commands, and planning was in the final stages, CINCPAC was requested to continue to support the exercise with at least a response cell in PACOM headquarters, as had been recommended by CINCPAC.<sup>2</sup>

#### IVORY HUNTER

(S) IVORY HUNTER was a no-notice regional crisis exercise sponsored by the JCS. Active play was initiated on 8 September. The scenario depicted a crisis situation in Korea. The objectives of the exercise were to provide for participation of senior government officials, to exercise civilian and military staffs, to evaluate selected portions of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, and to test selected portions of the JCS-proposed Crisis Action System. PACOM participants were the Service components and the subordinate unified commanders in Korea and Japan, with COMUSMCTC and COMUSMCTHAI in a monitoring role only.

(S) The exercise intelligence buildup was initiated by the JCS on 2 September; that buildup culminated in the shoot-down of a ROK F-5. This precipitated activation of the JCS Crisis Action Team and the beginning of active play. Intelligence reports continued to depict a steadily deteriorating military-political situation. CINCPAC's mission had been, when directed by the JCS, to counter aggression against the ROK by providing U.S. air, air defense artillery, naval, and logistic forces to support COMUS Korea's military operations in defense of Korea. The JCS tasked CINCPAC in a Warning Order to provide a

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1. J361 HistSums Mar, Sep 75; J41 HistSum Sep 75.
  2. JCS 7457/311350Z Dec 75 (EX), which cited CINCPAC 042305Z Dec 75.

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commander's estimate of the situation, including alternative courses of action and a recommendation. CINCPAC recommended commitment of all available combat power without requiring mobilization or excessive introduction of ground combat forces to a ground war in Asia. Primary responsibility for ground defense was placed on the ROK with the United States providing air and naval power and logistic support to assist in restoring boundaries created by the Korean Military Armistice. CINCPAC's recommendation also provided for offensive action by coordinated joint amphibious landing/airborne operations in North Korea to sever lines of communication.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By the last day of active play, a North Korean invasion across the Demilitarized Zone appeared imminent. The JCS, in an alert order, directed CINCPAC to commence execution planning. The course of action directed by the JCS was as had been recommended by CINCPAC, less the I and III Marine Amphibious Force ground forces and the 25th Infantry Division. Exercise play ended on 12 September.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The exercise was considered to have been realistic and productive, an excellent vehicle for exercising crisis procedures. The Crisis Action System procedures had worked well, and the no-notice start had enhanced realism. It was observed by CINCPAC staff officers that command relationships concerning Korea required clarification at the Washington level (see also Chapter I).<sup>3</sup>

#### FOCUS WEST

(S) On 5 August CINCPAC advised his PACOM commanders and the JCS of a series of crisis management exercises, which were to be periodic command post exercises to be initiated by CINCPAC to evaluate capabilities to handle contingencies in the PACOM. His concept was that these exercises would be conducted at least quarterly on a no-notice basis. Scenarios would be unexpected with sparse intelligence buildup and short planning time. The focus would be on areas of political and military sensitivity. Moderately large joint forces would be simulated. Initially the exercises would involve only the PACOM; during later exercises participation would be requested of the JCS and, eventually, National Command Authorities. Exercises would be a rigorous test for operational and logistic feasibility and for command, control, communications, and computers. Command relationships would be evaluated; joint commands might be tailored for special situations. Problems in command relationships would

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1. J362 Point Paper, 20 Sep 75, Subj: Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75; the commander's estimate was contained in CINCPAC 110915Z Sep 75.
  2. JCS 3504/122030Z Sep 75.
  3. J362 Point Paper, 20 Sep 75, Subj: Exercise IVORY HUNTER 75.

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be discussed and resolved during exercise planning. Components and other cognizant subordinate commands would participate in planning and conduct of the exercises. CINCPAC advised that planning for the first such command post exercise would be completed by mid-August. The exercise series was known as FOCUS WEST.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The first exercise in the series was initiated on 21 August. There was no notice and no intelligence buildup. In the scenario, assassination of key government leaders in Burma precipitated rioting and Communist-led demonstrations. The situation ultimately required evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rangoon. A selected course of action ultimately developed into an operational order by the joint task force commander. The exercise terminated shortly after the execute order was issued on 22 August. Participants were the staffs of CINCPAC, his component commanders, and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. The Crisis Action System was used for the first time and an Operations Planning Group was formed. A CINCPAC Control/Simulation Group simulated National level play. Each component headquarters simulated its respective subordinates. CINCPAC advised the JCS that in time of crisis, staff actions must be rapid, accurate, and fully coordinated. "In our view the exercise was a success and all objectives were met. Future FOCUS WEST exercises will be conducted in a similar manner."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The second, FOCUS WEST II, was conducted from 3 to 5 November. The scenario concerned an attack on a U.S. data collection site at Ramasun, Thailand. U.S. intervention was required to extract approximately 1,300 personnel from the station. A joint task force was formed in order to deploy two Marine rifle companies, a tactical fighter squadron, and associated airlift forces into Thailand to conduct the rescue operation. On the CINCPAC staff an Operations Actions Group, an Operations Planning Group, and a Current Operations Support Element were formed. Other players were CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific, and the Intelligence Center Pacific; all other participants were simulated.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The chronology of the exercise was as follows. Active play commenced with two to three Communist Terrorist battalions targeted against Ramasun. Initial staff actions centered on sizing the problem, alerting/deploying/requesting forces and planning a course of action. The JCS issued a warning order with the mission to protect or evacuate personnel and selected equipment from Ramasun.

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1. CINCPAC 050137Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCPAC 240130Z Sep 75; J3321 HistSum Aug 73; J362 Point Paper, 24 Aug 75, Subj: Exercise FOCUS WEST I.
  3. J3321 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC 041748Z Nov 75.

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CINCPAC recommended evacuation from Highway 2 in the vicinity of Ramasun to U-Tapao by C-130 aircraft. A ground support force of up to one Marine brigade (minus) was to provide security. Udorn was to be used if Highway 2 was not feasible. Two tactical fighter squadrons, deployed to Korat, were to provide air cover. The JCS ordered execution of this course of action without delay. It was later determined that Highway 2 was too narrow for C-130 operations. Also, insurgent attacks on Korat and Udorn resulted in those fields being closed to operations. The final course of action called for a Marine Corps battalion (reinforced) flown into Nam Phong via C-130. The battalion was to secure Nam Phong as a staging base. Two rifle companies (reinforced) were to shuttle to Ramasun in HH-53s. Evacuees would transfer to C-130s at Nam Phong and go on to U-Tapao. The four USAF HH-53s used were from Kadena and had flown in via Brunei. The joint task force had been commanded by a Marine brigadier general.

(S) It was noted that in the post-drawdown environment, the defense, protection, or evacuation of a site such as Ramasun Station or a similar remote site in the PACOM became increasingly difficult. It was necessary to be alert to early signs of trouble. Forces had to be requested, alerted, and deployed at the earliest sign of crisis, specifically aircraft carriers, Marine Amphibious Ready Groups, helicopters (which were key assets), and assets based in the Continental United States. (See "Specialized Weapons Systems" in Chapter I for a discussion of CONUS-based assets and their responsiveness to a fast-breaking crisis in the PACOM.) No-notice command post exercises such as those in this FOCUS WEST series demonstrated the time and distance factors in a PACOM crisis, and demonstrated the shortage of selected forces and equipment and excessive time required for deployment from CONUS.<sup>1</sup>

#### Air Defense Exercises in the Vicinity of Taiwan

(C) An inadvertent penetration of the Asian Coastal Buffer Zone on the border of the People's Republic of China border occurred during Exercise BLUE-SKY on 28 January. BLUESKY was an air defense exercise conducted on Taiwan in which faker aircraft from carriers of the Seventh Fleet tested the Republic of China's air defense capabilities. As a result of the penetration, a formal protest was lodged through diplomatic channels, which triggered a review of exercise procedures at all levels. As a result of this review, a new no-fly-line was established to insure a minimum of 50 nautical miles from the PRC coastline, and procedures were instituted for positive control of the faker aircraft at all times.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J362 HistSum Nov 75, which enclosed J362 Point Paper, 5 Nov 75, Subj: Exercise FOCUS WEST II.
  2. J361 Hist Sum Feb 75. Precautionary measures were outlined in a joint COMUSTDC-AMEMB Taipei message 080430Z Feb 75, as noted in JCS 9489/041517Z Mar 75.

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~~(S)~~ On 4 March the JCS requested cancellation of the BLUESKY exercise scheduled for 7 March, although subsequent exercises in the series could be scheduled during the last quarter of FY 75 and later, provided that the precautionary measures be an integral part of such exercises, and provided that the Departments of State and Defense were informed in advance of future exercises.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ When BLUESKY was rescheduled for 18 December, however, the JCS advised that "higher authority" had directed that it be postponed until after the first of the year. "Resumption of this exercise with its unusually sensitive activity so soon after the President's PRC visit is not desired and is the reason for the postponement decision."<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 11 December COMUSTDC advised CINCPAC regarding policy guidance from the State Department given to the Ambassador by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Philip C. Habib, during a visit to the Embassy on 10 December. There was to be a return to "normal" operations. There should be nothing in future exercises that could be perceived by the PRC as indicating an increase in U.S. military involvement in the Republic of China. Exercises (BLUESKY, EAGLE/LARK, and SHARKHUNT) should not be doubled up or scheduled in such a way that the PRC perception of activity would result in the conclusion that an increased level of U.S. participation was involved. Accordingly, the January scheduling with SHARKHUNT and BLUESKY overlapping was not consistent with this policy. COMUSTDC believed that future exercise scheduling guidelines should be such that overlap or back-to-back scheduling was not permitted.<sup>3</sup>

#### Japanese Self-Defense Force Training Exercise

~~(S)~~ On 10 April COMUS Japan advised CINCPAC that the Japan Joint Staff Office was planning a command post exercise to involve Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces and had solicited the assistance of COMUS Japan.

 CINCPAC was pleased to hear of this Japanese initiative and urged COMUS Japan to provide maximum cooperation and assistance.<sup>4</sup>

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1. JCS 9489/041517Z Mar 75.
  2. JCS 3233/011642Z Dec 75.
  3. COMUSTDC 110930Z Dec 75.
  4. COMUS Japan 100451Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 150236Z Apr 75.

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## SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/OPERATIONS ANALYSIS

### Joint Research and Development Objectives Document for FY 77-94/FY 78-95

(U) The Joint Research and Development Objectives Document was the JCS document by which the broad trends and long-range operational requirements of other JCS documents were translated into research and development objectives (see Chapter III of this history, "Biennial Review of the Joint Operation Planning System.") CINCPAC's contribution for the FY 77-94 document was provided on 26 September 1975, an additional critical objective was recommended for inclusion in the JRDOD for FY 78-95.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The recommended additional objective concerned "Alternative Sources of Energy." CINCPAC's rationale was that combat effectiveness of all military units was dependent on petroleum products. Interdiction of the Free World's POL lines of communication could result in reduced accessibility and could restrain mobility. The POL crisis of the early 1970's, though minor in scale to total deprivation, exemplified the world's reliance on second and third country oil products. The crisis forced domestic and military reduction in consumption. To be militarily effective, a nation of the 1980-1990's must develop alternative energy sources. Near term conservation of petroleum products was also required. The two R&D objectives were energy usage reduction and alternative sources of energy.

(U) In the matter of usage reduction, CINCPAC's objectives were to expand military participation and knowledge in energy reduction techniques that extended the life of existing fuel reserves. There was a requirement to develop economical fuel resources for propulsion devices that would reduce petroleum consumption, such as natural/liquified gas for vehicle propulsion, char-oil-energy development for ship propulsion, etc. This development would prolong existing petroleum reserves until alternative sources of energy were developed. In that regard, CINCPAC proposed that the JCS sponsor military R&D programs for advanced studies in alternative energy sources. Such studies should include, but not be limited to, solar energy utilization for base installations, fuel cell development for vehicular and ship propulsion, and propulsion sources for high-speed aircraft. The military importance of these programs was considered to be critical because of the impact on strategic and tactical objectives; they were required in the period 1978-1990.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J343 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC ltr Ser S579, 26 Sep 75, Subj: Review and Update of Joint Research & Development Objectives Document for FY 1977 through FY 1994 (JRDOD FY 77-94) and the Development of JRDOD FY 78-95.
  2. Ibid.

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Joint Operational Test and Evaluation Programs to be initiated in FY 77

(U) On 20 September CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his annual nominations for programs to be initiated in FY 77, based on inputs from his component commanders and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.<sup>1</sup>

- Secure Voice Conferencing. To evaluate the operational utility of secure voice/data conferencing for command control of crisis/contingency operations down to and including tactical units. Develop, explore, and evaluate alternative operational concepts/doctrines. (CINCPAC, Army, Navy, USAF/DCA)

- All-Source Ocean Surveillance Data. To evaluate acquisition, transmission, receipt, processing, analysis, and command dissemination of ocean surveillance information from all data sources. (CINCPAC, Navy, USAF, DCA, ARPA)

- War Reserve Munitions. To evaluate adequacy of existing and planned WRM for joint operations. (Army, Navy, USAF, USMC)

- Electronic Warfare. To determine joint command, control, and communications requirements for management of electronic countermeasures and electronic support measures support in a battle area including protection of conventional B-52 strikes in a surface-to-air missile environment. (Army, Navy, USAF, USMC)

- Standardized Aircraft Availability Reporting. Develop standardized mission-oriented measures for use by all Services in reporting aircraft readiness/availability. (Army, Navy, USAF, USMC)

Over-the Horizon Radar

(S) On 25 November a team from the Naval Research Laboratory briefed CINCPAC on new Soviet over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) developments and their proposed "brigand like" method for signal exploitation. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he knew of no stated requirement using this method for continuous, real-time exploitation of Soviet OTHR systems, which might have unprecedented capabilities. He believed that it was important that the United States determine the OTHR purpose, capabilities, and tasking as soon as possible. "We need to know what the Soviets are actually seeing." CINCPAC thought it would be particularly valuable if the United States could accomplish this unknown to the Soviets. He suggested that the JCS support development and deployment of a covert exploitation capability "now."<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 200055Z Sep 75.
  2. CINCPAC 022347Z Dec 75.

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CINCPAC Review of ARPA Programs

(U) In accordance with Defense Department directives, unified commanders were required to review, at least annually, the status of projects conducted in the theater by the Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The sixth such review was accomplished at CINCPAC's headquarters on 26 February 1975. Scope of participants was reduced from previous years primarily because of travel and temporary duty funding constraints imposed by higher authority. ARPA's programs in foreign countries within the PACOM involved Korea and Australia. The director of the Korea unit provided a review of activities there: North Korean tunnel detection (NIGHT FISHING) and the Joint ARPA/Korean Agency for Defense Development laser program. The director of the Australia unit addressed over-the-horizon radar (JINDALEE), the long-towed array (BOOLEE), advanced small arms evaluation, and a laser program. In addition, briefs of ARPA programs that did not fall within the purview of the Department's directives but were of interest to CINCPAC were presented. The main subjects were ARPA communications-related programs and their implications for the Pacific Theater, and space object identification and the Maui site.<sup>1</sup>

CINCPAC Sixth Requirements and Development Conference

(U) The annual CINCPAC Requirements and Development conference, which had been scheduled 3-5 February 1975, was cancelled based on temporary duty and travel fund constraints imposed by congressional action.<sup>2</sup>

Review and Analysis Office Working Papers - 1975

(U) CINCPAC's Review and Analysis Office published a number of working papers during 1975. Summaries were taken from the papers themselves.

(C) Working Paper No. 1-75 concerned an "Analysis of Sea and Air Lines of Communication for U.S. Contingency Operations East of Suez (U)--Options and Problems." Comparisons were made with the relative capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union to provide logistic support to their respective military operations in the area east of Suez. The conclusions of the study were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

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1. J3 HistSum Feb 75.
  2. CINCPAC 140232Z Jan 75.
  3. Review and Analysis Office Working Paper No. 1-75, Analysis of Sea and Air Lines of Communications for U.S. Contingency Operations East of Suez (U)--Options and Problems, 13 Mar 75.

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- Air and sea LOC from the Continental United States to the east-of-Suez area through the PACOM were politically and militarily less vulnerable than through the Atlantic and European Commands if the United States and U.S.S.R. were at war.

- In situations east of Suez involving the United States or U.S.S.R. either directly or in support of other countries, it was best from the United States viewpoint for the Suez Canal to be closed to both sides.

- On the basis of existing scheduled service, the capability of Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) to support Soviet interests east of Suez was greater than that of U.S. flag airlines to support U.S. interests. Aeroflot operations, it was believed, should be monitored.

- The air early warning and air defense capabilities of Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan to warn and/or defend against U.S.S.R. air penetrations toward the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Arabian Peninsula should be improved with U.S. assistance where needed. Associated with this capability, a flash telling net to CINCPAC headquarters was highly desirable.

- The submarine surveillance systems in PACOM needed expansion into the Indian Ocean area in the Arabian Sea, Diego Garcia to Southwest Australia, and from Malacca to Colombo; in the South Pacific, they needed expansion along the San Diego-Tahiti-Auckland route and in the general Indonesian straits.

(U) Working Paper No. 2-75 concerned a North Korea-South Korea Computer War Game. The 90-day game was conducted using the Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology (BALFRAM) model. U.S. air and ground forces stationed in the Republic of Korea were included in the scenario. The predictions of the model were subjected to a sensitivity analysis to ascertain value ranges and outcome validity. The principal conclusion was that Seoul would not be captured within 90 days or less.

(S) Working Paper No. 3-75 concerned the antisubmarine warfare capabilities of the Republic of China's Navy. The study described the results of an analysis of existing capabilities with a view toward developing future ASW systems and force structure alternatives. Existing capabilities were tested against proposed changes in force structure, tactics, and operating doctrine. An ASW system and associated set of tactics was hypothesized that would optimize the chance of successfully overcoming a PRC submarine blockade of merchant

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1. Review and Analysis Office Draft Working Paper No. 2-75, North Korea-South Korea Computer War Game, 3 Apr 75; also see Chapter II, The Threat.

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shipping traffic in and out of major Taiwan seaports. Additionally, a FORTRAN IV computer program was made available to the ROC Navy by which various mixes of ASW platform sensors, weapons, and tactics could be tested in their role of defeating a submarine blockade of the island of Taiwan.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Working Paper No. 4-75 concerned basing options for patrol squadron forces in the PACOM. Various alternative PACOM base structures for patrol squadron (VP) maritime patrol and ASW operations were examined for their relative provision for squadron coverage of the areas of interest to the PACOM and the efficiency of the VP operations conducted from them. Those included the existing base structure and two cases of reduced bases. According to this analysis, the existing VP base structure, because of the long distances between most bases, was marginally adequate given the speed and endurance of the P-3 aircraft of the existing VP force (63 percent coverage at 59 percent efficiency). Declining numbers of bases would require more P-3 aircraft to produce the same effectiveness within the smaller area that could be covered. At the lower end (five bases versus the existing ten), the existing VP force could cover only 22 percent of the critical areas and only 54 percent of the broad ocean areas of interest. With substitution of the future Navy VPX for the P-3, however, this same five-base structure would provide coverage of 100 percent of the critical areas and 84 percent of the broad ocean area of interest. There were two courses of action: maintain the existing base structure insofar as possible, and accelerate procurement of the VPX that was scheduled for the mid to late 1980's.<sup>2</sup>

#### Mekong River Security

(S) The value of river-borne resupply of Phnom Penh had been recognized when highways were closed by enemy activity in 1973, leaving the Mekong as the lifeline of the Cambodian republic. In August of that year the Commander, USSAG had noted that effective river security was one of the critical factors that would determine whether the Cambodian government would survive.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Toward the latter part of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, during the enemy's dry-season offensive, the use of protection of convoys along the Mekong to and from the RVN became more critical. POL, ammunition, and food supplies had been virtually cut off from Phnom Penh. Supplies were being flown into

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1. Review and Analysis Office Working Paper No. 3-75, Republic of China Navy ASW Capabilities and Requirements (U), 1 Jul 75.
  2. Review and Analysis Office Working Paper No. 4-75, Basing Options for VP Forces in PACOM (U), 1 Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 218.

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Pochentong airfield on the outskirts of the city, but the airfield had come under intense rocket attack during January and February. Success of the convoys became paramount to survival of the capital.

~~(C)~~ The presence of naval mines in the Mekong became evident when losses to mines were reported by convoys PT 113 and TP 114. (PT indicated down-river convoys from Phnom Penh to Tan Chau in Vietnam; TP were up-river runs.) The length of the trip was approximately 60 miles. The use of mines to interdict convoys was a serious threat and severely taxed the limited mine countermeasure forces in Cambodia.

[REDACTED] pre-  
liminary analysis revealed that there were indications that the enemy was using a minefield technique, not random mining; the identification of other suitable barrier minefield sites along the river; the need for close mine countermeasure escort sweeping tactics; the proposed use of bottom drags or sweeps as the surest sweep method since mine firing influence was unknown; the need to mark the swept path just in advance of the convoy; the need to minimize the time lapse between sweeping and transiting; and the need to keep the entire formation as tight as operational considerations permitted.

~~(C)~~ As all previous countermeasure information forwarded to USSAG had been to counter isolated mines, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additional mine warfare experts from the Continental United States were scheduled to arrive in Saigon.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's Operational Analysis Group also provided information on mine countermeasures to Southeast Asia agencies. On 17 January they had provided copies of "Riverine Mining and Mine Countermeasures," by the Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory in Florida. This document provided a thorough background into types of mines likely to be encountered, their construction, and techniques for countering them. By the end of the month, two full sets of mine countermeasure reference materials from the Florida laboratory had been forwarded. These documents were also provided to a team from the Ballistics Research Laboratory visiting CINCPAC headquarters 18 January - 4 February.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J021 HistSum Jan 75.
  2. J35 HistSum Feb 75.

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(U) Protection of ammunition barges on the river from non-mine explosions was also studied. A team of experts from the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (Aberdeen, Maryland), the Ballistics Research Laboratory, and the Naval Ship Research and Development Center (Bethesda, Maryland) visited CINCPAC headquarters and the DAO Saigon during the period 27 January - 7 February to assist in survivability studies of convoys and ammunition depots. Explosive-shaped charge penetration tests were conducted in Hawaii by 25th Infantry Division personnel to assess survivability of ammunition stores when protected by rice cargo in standard Container Exchange (CONEX) containers rather than by the conventional dead weight sandbags that had been standard. During the visit the team concluded that rice was an adequate substitute for sand as a barrier material, using four feet of rice bags to replace three feet of sand for equal protection. No contamination was found after large caliber explosive shaped charge tests were made at 10 and 5 meters. The rice was still fit for human consumption after three closely spaced explosive penetrations. Efficient loading and unloading procedures were available for CONEX containers.

(U) Other conclusions were that the use of smoke on enemy firing positions from 4.2" mortar appeared feasible; pulse jet smoke generators on tugs might also be used to help conceal both barges and tugs from sight of enemy gunners. Ammunition barges should have trigger screens forward and aft as well as on the sides. Most vulnerable ammunition, such as 155mm propellant charges, should be buried under less vulnerable ammunition, such as mortar and small arms. Ammunition pallets should be positioned to allow water to reach areas to fight a fire. POL should be transported in low freeboard self-propelled tankers, using water in fuel tanks for the return voyage down-river.

(U) The use of rice bags for protection and some of the other recommendations were implemented to some extent, but the rapidly deteriorating military situation at the time soon resulted in the complete closing of the Mekong and the subsequent fall of Phnom Penh.<sup>1</sup>

#### Infra-Red Countermeasures

(C) The SA-7 infrared homing missile had been a highly effective enemy weapon in Southeast Asia following its introduction in April 1972. The need for infrared countermeasures (IRCM) for this weapon had been a matter of continuing CINCPAC concern. The Vietnamese Air Force lost three CH-47 helicopters to the SA-7 in the first two months of 1975. An Army agency, the Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) in St. Louis, had the matter under study, and the Program Manager for Aircraft Survivability Equipment from that agency visited

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1. J021 HistSum Feb 75.

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both PACOM headquarters and Saigon. (Earlier the DAO in Saigon had advised that the VNAF was not likely to commit funds for suppressors or infrared jammers at the time out of very limited funds; at this juncture CINCPAC had suggested a visit by the program manager.) The program manager described two courses of action for IRCM protection of CH-47s using jammers. Tests to be conducted through June would determine if one jammer would overcome the CH-47 IR "signature." If it did, the VNAF could choose between a \$5.5 million program equipping all of their CH-47s, or a \$3.5 million program equipping 25 of their aircraft. In that latter case, all aircraft would be equipped with a kit that would allow the jammer to be installed or removed within an hour. The VNAF could then choose which 25 aircraft would use the jammers, depending on the mission. The program manager recommended that the VNAF choose the \$3.5 million program. This whole matter was subsequently overtaken by events.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ In the matter of IRCM for U.S. Army aircraft, however, concern continued. Upon the return of the program manager from Saigon, he discussed the availability of electronic countermeasures and IRCM devices with the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks. The two countermeasures discussed were radar warning receivers and IRCM paint. He advised that the U.S. Army in Europe had stated a requirement for 350 radar warning receivers for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. A requirement stated at that time by the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group would be timely in making one Army procurement package, which would hold down costs. Radar warning receivers for helicopters cost \$8,000, for fixed wing aircraft \$70,000. The program manager had stored enough IRCM paint for PACOM aircraft. It was free; the only cost would be shipping and application.

~~(C)~~ It was learned, however, that the ready availability of paint had been overstated. The paint on hand had not been type classified and application procedures had not been approved by the Department of the Army. The 25th Division prepared a statement of requirements for submission to the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, who provided a schedule for IRCM paint to be available early in FY 76, for heat-suppressor kits to be available in mid-FY 76, and for radar warning receivers to be available in FY 78.<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ Planned installation of a limited number of engine suppression kits and IRCM paint for Army UH-1 and AH-1 helicopters in the PACOM was as follows: for Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, heat kits were to be installed from December 1975

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1. J3 HistSums Jan-Mar 75; CINCUSARPAC 302025Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 160219Z Jan 75; USDAO Saigon 060106Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 210214Z Feb 75. See also CINCPAC Command Histories 1973, Vol. I, pp. 265-266; and 1974, Vol I, pp. 246-248.
  2. J3 HistSums Apr, May 75.

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through February 1976 and IRCM paint from December 1975 to May 1976; for the 25th Division in Hawaii, heat kits were to be installed from April 1976 to May 1976 and IRCM paint between May and July 1976.<sup>1</sup>

### Tactical Surveillance

~~(S)~~ On 3 February the Air Force Chief of Staff advised of a symposium to be held in February on infrared (IR) tactical surveillance from space (S). During the Middle-East war of 1973 spaceborne IR sensors had demonstrated a potential for detecting activity associated with battlefield events. Analysis of data collected at that time had indicated that IR ocean and battlefield surveillance to determine the character of heat-generating activity in near real-time might be feasible. Examples of classes of events that IR space systems might detect were certain surface-to-air missile launches and warhead detonations, ground and air explosions, short-range ballistic missile launches, ground fires, and nuclear detonations. "Current spaceborne infrared systems have demonstrated that the basic technology to conduct tactical ocean and battlefield surveillance from space exists," the Air Force Chief continued. CINCPAC was among the commanders invited to the symposium, and he sent representatives. The symposium covered the existing Defense Support Program (DSP), DSP improvements, DSP in the Middle-East war of 1973, and the use of space for tactical surveillance.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's requirements under such a program were forwarded to the Air Force on 15 April; they were based on the use of a system similar to the DSP. These were developed and coordinated with the Services in Hawaii and concerned both area surveillance during peacetime and tactical surveillance during hostilities. The CINCPAC requirements stated accuracy of location, time urgency, frequency of update after first fix, and identification.<sup>3</sup>

### Hard Structure Munitions Program

~~(S)~~ The Air Force was testing munitions designed to destroy hard structures. The first of three demonstration tests was conducted on 3 August and was considered an unqualified success. A two-stage HSM warhead impacted with a massive 1,100-ton reinforced concrete block target, 15 feet thick, at 90° and reduced it to rubble. The first stage warhead (a penetrator) was a shaped charge that bored through the target surface and delivered the second stage, a follow-through warhead, deep into the target. Penetrator/follow-through (unfuzed

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1. J343 HistSum Aug 75; ADRAVSCOM 221925Z Aug 75.
  2. J3 HistSum Feb 75; CSAF 031803Z Feb 75.
  3. J342 HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC 151803Z Apr 75.

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explosive) warheads had survived high velocity (1,600 feet per second) impacts against concrete targets, 10 feet thick, at angles between 90° and 30°. Tests had demonstrated that the follow-through warhead survival and ricochet problems that delayed using this munition as a weapon had been solved.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC provided his thoughts to the Air Force Chief of Staff on this matter on 10 September. He described the test results thus far as impressive and provided his wholehearted support for development plans for the warhead. He was concerned, however, with the longer-term weaponization program. "Hanging our hats on GBU-15 glide bomb [as had been planned] could cause developmental problems as we attempt to meet required operational capabilities...including all weather. I am not convinced that combination of electro-optical and distance measuring equipment meets all weather requirement...We would expect that cost of GBU/HSM (about 55K) would limit number for world-wide delivery, leaving even more limited number for deployment to PACOM. While I understand desire for stand-off capability, we are also faced with realities of delivering other types of ordnance with enemy's air defense coverage. We will have to penetrate defenses and get the targets." CINCPAC continued that experience in Southeast Asia had shown that we could deliver iron bombs with pinpoint accuracy. With the relatively large number of delivery systems for the existing family of bombs, including electro-optical capabilities, he suggested that the HSM program also investigate incorporating the warhead in a bomb capable of using laser designators and laser guided bomb kits. CINCPAC concluded:<sup>2</sup>

...In sum, I support warhead development program and suggest that it be accelerated and expanded to include more full-up lower velocity shots; and I suggest that weaponization program be accelerated and expanded to include use of our more numerous, cheaper, and more available means of delivery. In short, would much rather have penetration capability soonest to meet Korean and other hard target requirements than pie in the sky by and by.

(C) The Air Force Chief of Staff advised CINCPAC that the Air Staff was reevaluating the program and priorities, but there were still development problems to be solved. CINCPAC would be kept informed of program developments.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The third sled test was conducted on 11 December. The warhead impacted on a 375-ton reinforced concrete target (20x20x12 feet thick) at 1,200 feet per second. The target was destroyed. This test completed the advanced development

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1. J343 HistSum Aug 75; AFATL Eglin AFB Florida 041845Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCPAC 100343Z Sep 75.
  3. CSAF 232026Z Sep 75.

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efforts for the HSM warhead program; eight tests had demonstrated the feasibility of the concept. Subsequent to that test CINCPAC again addressed the matter to the Air Force Chief of Staff. He said he appreciated technical problems of fuzing, terminal boost, and angle of attack. Despite these, "the combination of current delivery systems and success at lower velocities should be exploited. Urge you include a full evaluation of a bomb system in your next test and weaponization phase."<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 202052Z Dec 75.

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SECTION V--MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Flexible Carrier Deployment

~~(S)~~ On 12 March the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had directed the Navy to program the reduction of routine forward deployment of carriers to two in the Western Pacific by the end of Fiscal Year 1976 (and stated that consideration should be given to future reductions to one carrier in the European Theater). The Chief of Naval Operations had proposed that, commencing with USS HANCOCK's deployment in April 1975, the requirement for three forward-deployed carriers would be reduced to two. This reduction would take place on the OUTCHOP of USS CORAL SEA in June 1975. The capability to surge deploy an additional carrier from Eastern or Middle Pacific sources, when required, would still be retained and would permit flexible response to contingencies in Northeast or Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Implementation of the two-plus concept would permit continued participation in national exercises as well as others, such as CENTO exercises MIDLINK and SHAHBAZ, the JCS continued. At this time, of course, the United States still was involved in Southeast Asia, and the JCS noted that although the on-going situation in the Western Pacific might not be conducive to a reduction of routine forward carrier deployments, the Chief of Naval Operations believed that current carrier commitments had to be brought into balance with existing and future fleet assets. <sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC provided his thoughts on the subject on 22 March. He said he recognized and understood the underlying reasons and factors requiring the decision to reduce forward carrier deployments, and he concurred, "with these constraints in mind and as the better of poor alternatives." He visualized an average of two forward deployed and Indian Ocean deployments continued on an irregular basis. JCS tasking should be modified accordingly, he noted. There remained, he continued, a strong requirement for three WESTPAC deployed carriers, as there were in effect three widely separated areas, Northeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, each of which required a credible naval and air presence. With only an average of two carriers deployed, "real or implied restrictions placed on MIDWAY's operational flexibility would be extremely onerous."

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC continued:

...Continued erosion [of] Pacific Command forces, especially CV/CVAs, will have significant adverse impact on PACOM capability to support commitments and overall strategy

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1. JCS 8090/120015Z Mar 75.

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forward presence throughout Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Drawdowns in forward deployed carriers with accompanying reduction in supporting forces will mean reduction in real capability. This reduction in capability will be apparent to ally, friend, neutral or potential adversary. To allies and friends, such actions in concert with previous force and support reductions will increase doubts as to the strength of the U.S. commitment and the coincidence of interests. To neutrals this action will raise [the] issue of the stability of power in [the] area. To the potential adversary, and it is here that deterrence is most applicable, reduction in force could encourage more aggressive pursuit of objectives contrary to U.S. interests.

(S) CINCPAC concluded that, with the existing unsettled situation in Southeast Asia, he recommended a delay in the carrier drawdown to the end of FY 76. The Secretary of Defense approved the proposed delay.<sup>1</sup>

### Naval Operations

#### Indian Ocean Deployments

(S) In February the JCS provided guidance to all commanders concerned with Indian Ocean deployment planning for FY 76. The JCS anticipated that the tempo of operations there would remain substantially the same as had been experienced in FY 75, that was about one deployment per quarter and generally alternating carrier task groups with surface combatant task groups. They advised that consideration should be given to scheduling those deployments to coincide, as feasible, with planned military exercises in order to enhance the training and readiness of deployed forces. The result was a more formalized scheduling of a U.S. presence other than that provided by the Middle East Force, and subsequently resulted in CINCPAC's cancellation of CONPLAN FRIDAY GUEST, which also concerned these deployments.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The first of the 1975 visits occurred when a carrier task group (TG 77.7), led by USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65), entered the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca on 13 January. ENTERPRISE was accompanied by USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), USS BENJAMIN STODDERT (DDG-22), and USS RATHBURNE (DE-1057). The Mobile Logistic Force that supported the task group was comprised of USS CAMDEN (AOE-2), USS MARS (AFS-1), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107). Routine surface exercises and air operations were conducted in the central Indian

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1. CINCPAC 220530Z Mar 75; CINCPACFLT 020144Z Aug 75.
  2. JCS 9187/112225Z Feb 75; CINCPACFLT 280421Z Aug 75.

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Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and during transits. Additionally, LONG BEACH conducted fleet exercises with four units of the French Navy, led by FNS CLEMENCEAU, on 7 and 8 February.

~~(S)~~ During the cruise, ENTERPRISE, RATHBURN, and STODDERT visited Mombasa, Kenya, while LONG BEACH visited Port Victoria in the Seychelles Islands. CAMDEN had been scheduled to visit Port Louis, Mauritius, when a cyclone struck that island on 6 February. At the request of the Mauritius Government, CAMDEN arrived two days later and immediately began providing emergency disaster relief. ENTERPRISE and MARS were diverted to the island arriving 11 February to join the effort, and, working in close cooperation with the U.S. Embassy and the island's government, the three ships provided more than 10,000 man-hours of assistance during an 8-day period. LONG BEACH remained at sea in the vicinity of Mauritius from 11 to 15 February. While ENTERPRISE was providing disaster relief, CAMDEN, STODDERT, and RATHBURN commenced a transit eastward and entered the Strait of Malacca on 17 February. ENTERPRISE and LONG BEACH entered the Strait on 20 February.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ The second deployment of the year was that of Task Group 75.1, consisting of USS REEVES (CG-24), USS BADGET (FF-1071), USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF-1074), and USNS MISPILLION (TAO-105). It entered the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait on 18 July. Port visits were made at Port Louis, Mombasa, Karachi, Colombo, Port Victoria, and Bahrain. Prior to the visit the Secretary of State had advised everybody in the department in the whole area. The Embassy in Kuala Lumpur advised that they had already received and acted upon a request for diplomatic clearance for the visit of one ship to Penang, which had described the visit as "routine." The Secretary's message, however, had advised that the ship was part of a four-ship task force to be deployed in the Indian Ocean for about 50 days. Such deployments were not considered routine, but were allowed. He requested that future requests contain full and accurate information. While deployed, the task group conducted passing exercises with the French frigate BOURDAIS on 14 August. The group completed the deployment on 5 September.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ The next task group deployed from 27 October to 7 December. Task Group 77.4 departed in two units. The first consisted of USS WORDEN (CG-18), USS TURNER JOY (DD-951), and USNS MISPILLION (TAO-105). The second contained

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1. J313 HistSum Feb 75; JCS 7393/200100Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 200217Z Dec 74; CINCPACFLT 260057Z Dec 74 and 040027Z Feb 75; ADMIN COMIDEASTFOR 061107Z Feb 75; CINCPACFLT 212157Z Feb 75.
  2. J313 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 052333Z May 75; CINCPAC 092104Z May 75; JCS 2088/111836Z Jun 75; SECSTATE 161151/091858Z Jul 75; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 566/111001Z Jul 75.

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the principal ship in the group, USS MIDWAY (CV-41), which was homeported in Japan. Accompanying MIDWAY were USS FANNING (FF-1076) and USS SACRAMENTO (AOE-1). Public affairs guidance concerning the task group was provided, as usual, to the effect that announcement of such deployments was not to be made until the transit of the Strait of Malacca had been completed. After the ships had entered the Indian Ocean, routine hometown news releases were authorized, in accordance with existing guidance, but no releases should be made that would generate local publicity in Japan. The Task Group participated in CENTO Exercise MIDLINK-75 the last half of November 1975. During the period of deployment in the western Indian Ocean, the MIDWAY was trailed by Soviet Navy units. Port visits during the deployment included Colombo, Male, Karachi, Bandar Abbas, and Bahrain.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 11 December the JCS advised that Indian Ocean deployment planning for FY 77-78 was under consideration, and they requested CINCPAC's comments on such aspects as frequency and duration, notional composition of task groups, and impacts of Arabian Sea operations requirements. They requested also comment on recommended alternatives to an approved deployment plan and the impact of scheduling a single carrier task group to participate in SHAHBAZ 76 and the Australian Coral Sea celebration, if CENTO exercise dates could be so arranged. They noted that Australian port visits were not considered to fulfill Indian Ocean presence requirements.<sup>2</sup>

(S) When CINCPACFLT commented to CINCPAC, he stressed the minor training benefit to participating units under certain circumstances and the cost of fuel in such operations. He noted that participation of a PACFLT carrier task group in SHAHBAZ would require 7 ships with about 6,400 personnel to deploy over 4,000 miles for a minimum of 30 days in order to provide the requested 50 sorties per day for 3 days. Ship fuel costs for such participation would be about \$3.1 million. Such an excursion covering both SHAHBAZ and the Coral Sea celebration in Australia would take 47 days and involve ship fuel costs of about \$4.2 million. Also, constraints of time and distance in the long transit from the South China Sea area to the Arabian Sea limited the training that could be accomplished en route. Passing exercises that might possibly be arranged prior to or after SHAHBAZ were unsophisticated and of only moderate value to either side; by definition they were exercises of opportunity between forces in passage. Participation also used a significant part of the operating days available, which could be used to provide a better return in improved readiness when used in areas where better facilities and services (submarines, target ranges, etc.,) were available. He recommended that a PACFLT carrier task group not be included in SHAHBAZ 76.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J313 HistSum Dec 75; SECSTATE 253945/242201Z Oct 75.
  2. JCS 3174/112111Z Dec 75. SHAHBAZ was an annual CENTO air defense exercise.
  3. CINCPACFLT 132130Z Dec 75.

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(S) CINCPAC advised the JCS on 13 December that he had reviewed PACFLT deployments to the Indian Ocean in the light of the drawdown from three to two WESTPAC carriers. He recommended one deployment by a carrier task group and two deployments by surface combatant task groups, each of 45 to 60 days duration, annually. He recommended that the carrier task group be composed of 1 CV, 1 CG, 2 DD/FF, 1 AOE/R, and 1 AFS, as required. The surface task group composition should be 1 CG, 2 DD/FF, 1 AO, and 1 AFS, as required.

(S) The proposed revision, he noted, would reduce carrier presence, but the annual total PACFLT ship days in the Indian Ocean would remain essentially the same as before, with no impact on Arabian Sea operations. (As noted above, there had been four deployments planned each year, two with carriers, two with other surface task group ships). CINCPAC said he would review and make recommendations on PACFLT submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean. He expected the Middle East Force presence to remain at its existing level, and P-3 operations were to continue at 40 flights per month into the Indian Ocean for surveillance and task group support. He cautioned that Indian Ocean deployments must be irregular in both number of units and timing to avoid a predictable pattern. Also, they should not be regulated by CENTO exercise requirements, but rather by the need to maximize effective presence, advance training and tactical development, and provide familiarization with the area and its exigent problems. Deployments provided an opportunity to develop or increase antisubmarine warfare operational training, fleet readiness, and combined operations with the French Navy in that area. CINCPAC continued that the requirement to obtain data on the performance of U.S. and Soviet acoustic sensor systems remained a priority mission of Indian Ocean operations. He recommended "earliest" deployment of the SURTASS (Surface Tactical Area Surveillance System) prototype ship, the SEISMIC EXPLORER. Passive sonar collection efforts by TASS ships might also prove valuable to increase data collection. "I support provision of TASS capable ships operating in Indian Ocean deployments as part of their overall collection capability as well as continued emphasis on Indian Ocean P-3 acoustic collection program."

(S) CINCPAC concluded with a discussion of a scheduled deployment in the April-June 1976 period. He said that while SHAHBAZ was being planned to finish by 17 April, which would allow a carrier task group to participate in both that exercise and the Coral Sea celebration in Australia, he opposed participation of PACFLT forces in SHAHBAZ, because of the minimal training benefit and costs in fuel and operating days available as had been outlined by CINCPACFLT.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The SURTASS program, discussed above, was a surface program to complement the SOSUS (Sound Surveillance Underwater System). SURTASS was a

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1. CINCPAC 132159Z Dec 75.


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towed array of hydrophones. Although considered to be still in the research and development stage, it was considered that the technology already existed. The Navy had adapted the Advanced Research Projects Agency's LAMBDA experimental array. The Navy's Long Range Acoustic Propagation Project, however, that had originally scheduled an acoustic survey of the Indian Ocean in the summer of 1975 had been postponed more than once to at least autumn in 1976. CINCPAC staff people had proposed to the project manager that the SEISMIC EXPLORER go without other scientific ships, but the manager believed he had to wait to go into the Indian Ocean until he could take his entire flotilla and gather more comprehensive bathymetry and acoustic data.<sup>1</sup>

Sea of Okhotsk ~~(S)~~

~~(TS)~~ On 20 May CINCPACFLT forwarded a plan for a task unit of two ships to conduct operations in the Sea of Okhotsk. Surface units had last conducted operations there in November 1971. The proposed excursion would provide continued support for the position that the Sea of Okhotsk was an international body of water with a continuing right of the United States to navigate or overfly it. CINCPACFLT noted that he anticipated that the excursion would draw Soviet surveillance from surface and air units and thus provide an opportunity for intelligence collection. CINCPAC concurred and so advised the JCS, recommending early approval.<sup>2</sup>

  
(U) Task Unit 75.4.1, comprised of USS HORNE (CG-33) and USS LEONARD F. MASON (DD-852), supported by VP/VQ aircraft, entered via La Perouse Strait on 15 September, proceeded to a position at 49°50' North, 150° East, and then exited via Proliv (Strait) Bussol' on 17 September. A report of the operation was forwarded to CINCPAC from CINCPACFLT on 20 September.<sup>4</sup>

Sea of Japan

~~(S)~~ Task Force 77.7 deployed to the Sea of Japan during the period 27-31 October. Commander, Carrier Group 5 embarked on USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) commanding; also in the task force were USS REEVES (CG-24), USS PARSONS (CVA-63), and USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF-1074). The excursion provided an opportunity to

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1. J34 Point Papers, 7 May 75, Subj: Indian Ocean Undersea Surveillance (U) and 5 Aug 75, Subj: Acoustic Survey in Indian Ocean (U).
  2. CINCPACFLT 202205Z May 75; CINCPAC 221930Z May 75.
  3. JCS 4149/282205Z Aug 75.
  4. J313 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 200604Z Sep 75.

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observe Soviet air and surface activity at close hand. On 28 October a minimum of 30 Soviet TU-16 (BADGER) aircraft conducted probable air-to-surface missile strike simulations against KITTY HAWK. Incoming aircraft were intercepted by tactical aircraft from the carrier. On 30 October a combined USAF-USN-ROK Air Force air defense exercise was conducted. The task group, which had entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsugaru Strait, exited through the Tsushima Strait. The objective of providing a U.S. Navy presence in the Sea of Japan supporting freedom of the seas and the right of free passage was accomplished. A CINCPAC computer printout on the status-of-actions log was maintained on the excursion.<sup>1</sup>

#### Air Operations and Basing in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea

(S) Airborne surveillance of the Indian Ocean was conducted by Navy P-3 aircraft operating from Diego Garcia and Bandar Abbas with support from U-Tapao, Thailand and Cubi Point in the Philippines. The maximum operating range of the P-3 was approximately 1,800 nautical miles. The flights provided antisubmarine warfare support and Soviet naval ship position data for any U.S. Navy task group deployed in the Indian Ocean. They also provided accurate position and movement data for merchant shipping, including tanker activity. In the summer of 1975 they were also engaged in an acoustic survey of the Indian Ocean, with primary emphasis on the area north of the equator, in support of Naval Oceanographic Office requirements to locate and define acoustic provinces in the region. As discussed in the 1974 CINCPAC History, the Royal Thai Government had first requested a standdown of all reconnaissance conducted from Thailand. It was finally agreed that P-3s could resume logistics and administrative flights using bases in Thailand, but that reconnaissance operations in the Indian Ocean by P-3s that took off from Thai bases were prohibited until such flights had landed at a base outside of Thailand.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In mid-1975 P-3 flights were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- The Eastern Indian Ocean was covered by 10 flights per month, 9 from Diego Garcia and 1 from Cocos Island.
- The Western Indian Ocean was covered by 30 flights per month operating from Diego Garcia and Bandar Abbas.


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1. J313 HistSum Oct 75; CINCPACFLT 020217Z Nov 75.
  2. J314 Point Papers, 15 May and 23 Jun 75, Subj: Indian Ocean VP Operations; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 580-584.
  3. J314 Point Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Indian Ocean VP Operations.

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● In addition, 10-12 logistics and aircraft repositioning flights were flown monthly between U-Tapao, Bandar Abbas, and Diego Garcia.

~~(S)~~ Regarding basing at Bandar Abbas, it was necessary to change some arrangements in 1975. During the October War in 1973 the Shah of Iran had granted permission for P-3s to stage out of that base to support U.S. Indian Ocean operations, but it was not to be a U.S. base; CINCPACFLT had maintained an austere housekeeping detachment there (one officer, one communicator, one corpsman, and one cook). It had been believed that some presence was required on a continuing basis to maintain equipment, food stocks for meals, and potable water. (The Iranians had been hospitable, but recurring health problems had indicated a requirement for maintenance of a U.S. capability.)<sup>1</sup>



~~(S)~~ CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT of this JCS policy. CINCPACFLT advised that the support detachment had been disestablished on 20 September. He would advise CINCPAC when activity in the Western Indian Ocean warranted consideration of increased operational tempo from Bandar Abbas.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ The use of Masirah had come under study in 1974 when the results of a British Defense Review were announced. The United Kingdom planned to withdraw all forces east of Suez. CINCPAC expressed concern over the decision to abandon Gan and Masirah airfields, as lack of access to those assets would seriously impact on U.S. flexibility and capability to operate in the Indian Ocean.

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1. JCS 8991/100101Z Nov 73; J314(A) Point Paper, 16 Jun 75, Subj: P-3 Basing Options if Denied Use of Bandar Abbas ~~(S)~~.
  2. JCS 7134/091359Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC 160230Z Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 270831Z Sep 75.

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POINT TO POINT GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCES

INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Airfield, Country	ICAO* Code	Cocos Islands	Diego Garcia	Djibouti	Gan	Learmonth	Masirah	Plaisance	Seychelles	U-Tapao	Point Ash 22-30N, 78E	Pandar Abbas	Socotra
Bandaranaike Sri Lanka	VCCN	1540	978	2188 <sup>e</sup>	621	2675	1720 <sup>c</sup>	2112	1623	1414	1670 <sup>c</sup>	2092 <sup>c</sup>	1560
Cocos Islands Australia	ACCC	-	1473	3499 <sup>e</sup>	1569	1156	2982	2302	2490	1648 <sup>ad</sup>	2933 <sup>c</sup>	3355 <sup>c</sup>	2949
Diego Garcia	HVKY		-	2079 <sup>e</sup>	399	2568	1858	1163	1020	2122 <sup>d</sup>	1890	2313	1617
Djibouti Afars & Issas	HFFF			-	1932 <sup>e</sup>	4635 <sup>e</sup>	1058 <sup>e</sup>	2102 <sup>e</sup>	1221 <sup>e</sup>	3579 <sup>de</sup>	1263 <sup>e</sup>	1685 <sup>be</sup>	638
Gan Island Maldives	VRRR				-	2716	1532	1492	1083	1913 <sup>d</sup>	1537	1942	1388
Learmonth Australia	-					-	4131	3135	3553	2583 <sup>ad</sup>	4085 <sup>c</sup>	4507 <sup>c</sup>	4101
Masirah Oman	OOMA						-	2468	1534	3052 <sup>cd</sup>	204	846	566
Plaisance Mauritius	FZFP							-	954	3263	2588	3011 <sup>b</sup>	1988
Victoria Seychelles	FSSS								-	2992 <sup>d</sup>	1674	2097 <sup>b</sup>	1034
U-Tapao Thailand	VTBU									-	3002 <sup>c</sup>	3424 <sup>cd</sup>	3062

- a. Denotes via western Malacca Strait pivot point 06°N-095°E
- b. Denotes via Point Ash, 22°-30'N, 78°E
- c. Denotes via Indian Ocean pivot point 04°N-78°E
- d. Denotes via Phuket, Thailand
- e. Denotes overflies a third country

\* International Civil Aviation Organization

SOURCE: J314, 25 Feb 75

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CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the strongest representation be presented to the United Kingdom for continued presence in Gan and Masirah.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ The JCS indicated on 27 December that they shared CINCPAC's concern, and a reclama concerning withdrawal from Masirah was forwarded. In light of the relative proximity of Gan to Diego Garcia, the reclama did not include Gan.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Masirah Air Base facilities included an 8,200-foot asphalt runway, TACAN and GCA navigational aids, POL storage (an estimated capacity of 5 million gallons on-base and 31 million off-base), and billeting facilities for approximately 800 personnel.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ When Sultan Qaboos of Oman visited Washington in January 1975 the United States requested occasional access to Masirah. The Sultan agreed and asked the United States to work out details with the British. In response to British questions, CINCPAC provided his answers and comments on 22 January.

~~(S)~~ Regarding types of aircraft, CINCPAC indicated that initially the primary aircraft would be the P-3, but on the occasion of task group operations into the Arabian Sea it would be desirable to stage limited numbers of logistic aircraft (C-130/C-141) through Masirah. Missions would be P-3 maritime air patrol, logistic support flights, and emergency divert for carrier airwing aircraft when a task group was operating in the Arabian Sea. Regarding frequency of use, it was believed about two P-3 flights per week initially, with an increase to one or two a day when a task group was operating there would suffice. During such operations logistic support flights might be about one per week. Airwing aircraft on emergency divert would be infrequent, with normal duration of stay only a few hours. Ground support requirements would be limited.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ The United Kingdom appeared to be reevaluating its presence at Masirah and it was possible that the United States would be granted occasional access once the legal details were worked out.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J5141 HistSum Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 102339Z Dec 74 (EX).
  2. J5141 Point Paper, 7 Jul 75, Subj: Future and Capability of Gan/Masirah Air Bases.
  3. Ibid.; TACAN: Tactical Air Navigation; GCA: Ground Controlled Approach.
  4. CINCPAC 222324Z Jan 75; J5141 Point Paper, 7 Jul 75, Subj: Future and Capability of Gan/Masirah Air Bases.
  5. Ibid.

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BENCH LINE Program

(S) In May 1975 CINCPAC had directed development and implementation of an expansion of the existing Warning Advisory Service Program (WASP), with the objective of minimizing the possibility of serious incidents such as forcedown/shutdown/harassment of U.S. military aircraft (including Military Airlift Command contract aircraft) that were transiting the PACOM periphery of non-friendly nations on normal flight plans (those in accordance with procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization). The service would not be applicable to reconnaissance aircraft, which were covered by JCS-directed WHITE WOLF procedures, or to SAC aircraft subject to SAC advisory support procedures.

(S) As a result of a June conference held in Yokota, Japan, preliminary procedures were developed and identified by the acronym "EXWASP." Following coordination in the PACOM and further development, the concept and basic procedures were proposed by CINCPACAF, and approved by CINCPAC on 29 July. The procedures, assigned the nickname "BENCH LINE," were forwarded to the Defense Mapping Agency's Aerospace Center for promulgation with an effective date of 1 September.

Casualty Resolution and the Four Party Joint Military Team

(U) Attempts to resolve the status of Americans who were missing in action, and recover, if possible, the bodies of the dead still in Southeast Asia were the tasks of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF until 30 June, under CINCPAC directly after that time.

(U) As planned in 1974, the JCRC began deploying from Nakhon Phanom to the Camp Samae San/U-Tapao area on 6 January 1975. The commander and last staff members moved on 24 January.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 21 April the JCRC Saigon Liaison Office was relocated to JCRC headquarters in Thailand because of the turbulent military situation in Vietnam.<sup>3</sup>

(C) With the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam, CINCPAC reassessed the mission of the JCRC and requested that the JCS do so also. He provided his conclusions and recommendations on 5 June. CINCPAC assumed that U.S. military personnel would no longer be permitted to search for crash or grave sites in Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam; that a U.S.-sponsored Public Communications program soliciting

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1. J3142 HistSum Aug 75; CINCPAC 290055Z Jul 75 and 210135Z Aug 75.
  2. J318 HistSum Jan 75; CDR JCRC 110350Z Jan 75.
  3. CDR JCRC 230835Z Apr 75.

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support for U.S. efforts at casualty resolution would not be permitted; that any remains identification or recovery effort would be totally dependent on the cooperation of Southeast Asian governments; and that casualty resolution efforts that depended on the cooperation of other governments would be limited to diplomatic efforts and passive receipt of information or remains (but that U.S. representatives might be able to obtain information through civilian agencies, international organizations, and religious, commercial, or third country contacts). CINCPAC believed that the military role should be limited to collection of casualty resolution information from available sources, collation and analysis of information, Service review and determination of status changes, and retention of the capability to identify remains. He recommended that the State Department assume responsibility for contact and negotiations with the Southeast Asia governments; that the Defense Intelligence Agency assume responsibility for the collection, collation, and analysis of information and maintenance of the casualty resolution data base; and that the Army be tasked to maintain a capability to identify remains and provide technical support. Lastly, he recommended the deactivation of the JCRC and the establishment of a casualty resolution coordination committee within the Department of Defense (POW/MIA affairs) to provide the necessary coordination within the Department. He acknowledged that final resolution of the JCRC and the Four Party Joint Military Team would be at Departmental level, but he proposed that no further personnel be assigned pending such resolution.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 10 June the JCS requested that billets to be left vacant be identified on the Joint Manpower Program and that vacancy listings have supporting rationale; any personnel requirements would be considered on a case-by-case basis.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Regarding the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT), on 5 April the Commander USSAG had forwarded, recommending approval, a proposal by the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the FPJMT to relocate six officers, three enlisted, and one civilian to Camp Samae San, Thailand, with their length of stay dependent on the situation in Vietnam. The FPJMT was to be co-located with the JCRC. The Embassy in Saigon had concurred, provided a small element remained in Vietnam as long as feasible. CINCPAC approved the request.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ Upon receipt of approval from the Secretary of State, the Embassy in Bangkok replied that Thailand would not take kindly to the notion that elements of the U.S. Delegation to the FPJMT would continue to carry out their functions

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1. CINCPAC 050037Z Jun 75.
2. JCS 3691/101937Z Jun 75; CDR JCRC 140330Z Jun 75 outlined specific requirements in this regard, which CINCPAC retransmitted as CINCPAC 170010Z Jun 75.
3. USSAG 050745Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 051057Z Apr 75.

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in Thailand. "Even more problematical would be implication that move was precursor of larger thin-out (read: 'evacuation') of U.S. personnel from Saigon." The Embassy approved the request provided the status of the element was officially on "administrative leave" for at least 30 days to provide time for a clearer picture of the ultimate disposition of the organization.<sup>1</sup>

(S) While all concerned agencies in the PACOM urged an early decision, the JCS advised that this was one of a number of decisions pending at higher levels. CINCPAC would be kept informed.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 27 June the JCS advised that the JCRC would remain in its current location for the time being. A site assessment for potential relocation change would be completed by 15 November, but it was anticipated that no actual move would take place in 1975.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 19 September preliminary guidance was received from the Secretary of Defense as a result of a planning conference held 21-28 August among representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the JCS, the JCRC, and CINCPAC. While it was noted that the probability of renewed negotiations concerning U.S. dead and missing was remote at that time, it was essential that the residual FPJMT element be prepared to enter such negotiations without delay when and if required. With this objective in mind, continued and intensified planning for the organization and conduct of negotiations was recommended. It was also suggested that careful study be given to past operations of the FPJMT, the negotiating strategy, tactics, and philosophy of prospective Southeast Asian delegations, and the pitfalls inherent in dealing with those delegations. Should conditions make it necessary for the JCRC to participate in the negotiations, detailed preparations by the JCRC would be necessary to achieve U.S. casualty resolution objectives. Negotiations at the JCRC-residual FPJMT level should initially be conducted on the basis of Article 8B of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam. (Article 8B is quoted:

...The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.)

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 5928/081052Z Apr 75, which cited SECSTATE 78945.
  2. JCS 4672/162103Z May 75.
  3. JCS 8446/272143Z Jun 75.

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Initiatives, the Secretary continued, should exploit areas in which available information would increase the probabilities of successful casualty resolution. Specific negotiating policy, guidance, and instructions to the Commander of the JCRC would be provided by designated representatives of the Department of State. Because of the proximity of areas in which the majority of recovery/resolution operations were anticipated, Thailand continued to be the most desirable location for the JCRC at the time. The JCRC, however, was to continue to assess sites for possible relocation should changes in the environment dictate. The Commander of the JCRC should be prepared to negotiate anywhere within Southeast Asia and continue to stress collection, collation, and compilation of data on all U.S. personnel for whom accountability had not been established. Accordingly, the on-going case folder program of the JCRC was to be accelerated, completing 200 files in 45 days and all remaining files within 6 months, in the negotiating format.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 2 October CINCPAC requested that the JCS clarify instructions from the Secretary concerning JCRC assumption of FPJMT residual negotiating responsibilities. Additionally, he recommended that a former FPJMT negotiator be assigned to the JCRC if conditions dictated JCRC participation in negotiations. The JCS replied that no additional guidance was available; an experienced negotiator would be made available to augment the JCRC if active negotiations were resumed.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC had directed the JCRC to conduct an assessment of potential sites should relocation out of Thailand be directed. The JCRC selected the Philippines as it was within a one-day flight of other Southeast Asian countries. Refurbishing facilities would require a minimum of \$25,000 and require 60 to 90 days. CINCPAC, however, recommended to the JCS that the JCRC be relocated to the Continental United States and if this was not feasible to Hawaii. The Ambassador in Bangkok had recommended that consideration be given to moving the JCRC and the Central Identification Laboratory to Bangkok to reduce the visibility of the U.S. presence in the U-Tapao area. On 27 November the Secretary of State advised the Ambassador that he didn't want the JCRC moved for at least a year. The question of missing in action was still under intensive review in the U.S. Congress and this work was scheduled to continue until October 1976. The House Select Committee had taken serious interest in the work of the JCRC; the Secretary would be "most reluctant" to have the JCRC moved out of Thailand at that time.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J318 HistSum Sep 75; SECDEF 8452/191844Z Sep 75. The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam was quoted in DOD Commanders Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 5.
  2. CINCPAC 021744Z Oct 75; JCS 3405/071952Z Oct 75.
  3. CDR JCRC 010132Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 120146Z Nov 75; MACTHAI 131112Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 150135Z Nov 75; AMEMB Bangkok 24322/190724Z Nov 75; SECSTATE 280901/270046Z Nov 75.

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(C) In Laos, the Embassy in Vientiane on 19 June requested that the Secretary of State suspend JCRC functions in Laos because of the necessity to reduce the number of U.S. personnel there. It was requested that the JCRC liaison officer be transferred elsewhere. The Department recommended the transfer to Udorn for operation from that location; his responsibilities were to be shared by a member of the Embassy staff in Vientiane. The Embassy concurred.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In the matter of aircraft support for the JCRC, on 17 January COMUSMACTHAI had directed his staff to examine the feasibility of consolidating the flight section supporting the JCRC at U-Tapao with its parent unit, the 70th Aviation Battalion at Don Muang. On 19 February CINCPAC postponed any consolidation because of the changing and worsening situation in Vietnam that required timely JCRC response. When CINCPAC recommended deactivation of the JCRC, COMUSMACTHAI requested that the U-21 detachment be consolidated, as had been proposed, and CINCPAC approved the request on 10 June.<sup>2</sup>

(C) With the evacuation of refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam, the JCRC Commander requested that evacuees be screened for possible missing in action personnel. Questioning other evacuees might also possibly furnish information. CINCPAC advised those concerned with refugee processing to consider these possibilities and also advised of a JCRC offer of personnel assistance in this regard.<sup>3</sup>

(C) While the offer of assistance was not accepted at other centers, JCRC personnel had provided support to the U-Tapao refugee camp. With reassignment of some personnel in July, CINCPAC recommended that the JCRC continue to support the camp but without degrading the data collation effort. COMUSMACTHAI was to furnish more support personnel to the camp, and it was not expected to remain open too long.<sup>4</sup>

(C) The camp did continue operation throughout the year, however, and a number of personnel actions were necessary to keep the camp staffed properly.<sup>5</sup>

(C) In the matter of actual recovering of remains of the dead, several instances occurred in 1975. On 2 April remains that had been disinterred by

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 4374/191950Z Jun 75; SECSTATE 146226/202327Z Jun 75; AMEMB Vientiane 4473/230925Z Jun 75.
  2. CDR JCRC 110350Z Jan 75; COMUSMACTHAI 300300Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 191956Z Feb 75; COMUSMACTHAI 090907Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 102043Z Jun 75.
  3. CDR JCRC 020814Z May 75; CINCPAC 030250Z May 75.
  4. USMACTHAI 060225Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 070319Z Jun 75; CDR JCRC 119014Z Jun 75.
  5. J3181 HistSums Aug, Sep 75; CDR JCRC 300622Z Sep 75.

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a district chief in Binh Doung Province, Vietnam and some personal effects were forwarded to Thailand for possible identification. On 15 December two sets of cremated remains plus facsimile identification cards were turned over to the United States at Hong Kong from the People's Republic of China. These were also sent to the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) for study. In the last instance, three sets of remains were returned to a U.S. Congressional delegation (accompanied by JCRC personnel) in Hanoi on 24 December; again they were forwarded for further study to the CIL.<sup>1</sup>

#### Unconventional Warfare Conference

(C) Representatives of CINCPAC and his component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group attended the third annual Unconventional Warfare conference sponsored by the CINC of the Readiness Command at MacDill AFB, Florida, 22-25 July.<sup>2</sup>

#### BONUS PRIZE

(S) BONUS PRIZE was a program concerned with the mutual support capabilities of tactical and strategic aircraft and missiles and unconventional warfare forces. In 1974 USCINCREC had requested that CINCPAC nominate specific items of hardware or techniques to enhance those mutual support capabilities, and CINCPAC's input had been forwarded on 1 May of that year. In 1975 CINCPAC continued to provide comments on BONUS PRIZE systems. At the third Unconventional Warfare conference a BONUS PRIZE workshop was also held. During that workshop, a CINCPACAF representative presented a briefing on a Covert Identification System in a night search and rescue role, and a CINCPACFLT representative's briefing concerned the MK-100 Radio Firing Device.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The JCS had assigned to USCINCREC, in coordination with other unified commanders, the task of recommending techniques to the JCS for the use of existing technology for BONUS PRIZE. On 27 August that commander requested CINCPAC's concurrence on three such proposed techniques:<sup>4</sup>

- Aerial infiltration/resupply of unconventional warfare teams by COMBAT TALON aircraft in conjunction with a radar beacon transponder (GAR-1) emplaced by unconventional

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1. CDR JCRC 100700Z Apr 75; CDR JCRC 170930Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 180344Z Dec 75; CDR JCRC 240700Z Dec 75.
  2. J318 HistSum Jul 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 266-267; CINCPAC 200041Z May 75; CINCPAC 140214Z Jun 75.
  4. USCINCREC 272035Z Aug 75; J318 HistSum Aug 75.

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warfare teams for terminal guidance of aircraft.

- Use of ground beacons (TEMIG I, III; and SST-181XE) employed by unconventional warfare teams to designate targets for strikes by AC-130H SPECTRE gunships.

- Resupply of unconventional warfare teams by high performance aircraft (F-4) dropping high-speed aerial delivery containers (CTU-1/A) on a drop zone marked by a radar beacon transponder (SST-181XE).

(S) On 22 September CINCPAC concurred with USCINCREC's recommendations and recommended that they be submitted to the JCS.<sup>1</sup>

(S) A review of the FY 75 BONUS PRIZE exercise program, new concepts, and nominated hardware were considered in the preparation of the FY 76 exercise plan. The PACOM projects, which were to be employed and evaluated in the field training exercise FOAL EAGLE in Korea, were as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- SPECTRE gunship/CH-3 helicopter employment on covert search and rescue mission.

- Unconventional warfare teams locating air interdiction targets and employing KU band beacons for terminal guidance of offset beacon bombing by F-111 or A-7 aircraft (provided such aircraft were available).

(U) CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF, in coordination with COMUS Korea, to initiate required action to include these projects in FOAL EAGLE and provide documentation after completion of the exercise. The U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and CINCPACFLT were to provide assistance or support as necessary.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group made several recommendations to CINCPAC for BONUS PRIZE. These concerned, in a September recommendation, unconventional warfare applications and employability of closed-cycle chemical laser target designators, expanding development of a maxi decoy, and a popout glider launched from high performance aircraft. A similar carrier, with ground-controlled terminal guidance, could be used as a supply delivery system reducing aircraft hazard and increasing security of unconventional warfare recipients. He also recommended some antitank weapons

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1. CINCPAC 222105Z Sep 75; J318 HistSum Sep 75.
  2. USCINCREC 122000Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC 142224Z Aug 75.

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that had conventional as well as unconventional warfare applications. Subsequently, in December, he recommended that the concept of a standoff rocket attack of enemy installations be tested, evaluated, and incorporated in U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine. U.S. inventory weapons recommended for evaluation included the Navy 5" rocket, and the Army 115mm and 2.75" rocket.<sup>1</sup>

### Training Areas

(U) On 14 February the JCS noted that training area utilization was experiencing constraints imposed by funding, environmental considerations, and actions by other nations. The Joint Staff, therefore, was conducting a study of training area requirements worldwide, as well as associated problems and alternative solutions to those problems. CINCPAC requested data from all of his component or subordinate commanders throughout his command. The requested data concerned all joint exercise or training areas, including international waters and airspace and foreign territories. Specifics included the area name and location, controlling agency, use, major users, size, limitations, relative importance, problems, and recommendations for action required to fulfill needs both at the time and in the 1975-85 time frame. CINCPAC's consolidated report was mailed to the JCS early in May.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Upon receipt of replies from commanders in the PACOM, it was noted that PACOM air and naval training areas were generally adequate as then available, but maneuver areas for brigade and larger size units and/or major amphibious assault training were not available in the central or western Pacific. Problems universally encountered included civilian and political encroachment, increasing governmental controls, and trespasser/scavenger security problems.<sup>3</sup>

### Electronic Warfare

(S) One briefing and one conference highlighted electronic warfare activities in 1975. In December 1974 CINCPAC had requested that the Air Force Special Communications Center in Texas present an electronic warfare update briefing to CINCPAC and his staff similar to briefings given to CINCPAC at Kelly Air Force base in Texas in October 1974. Suggested topics were COMFY COAT (reconnaissance) evaluations, exploitation programs, Service research and development projects and programs undergoing testing, MIJI (meaconing,

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1. J318 HistSums Sep, Dec 75.
  2. JCS 3153/141740Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 252235Z Feb 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser C249, 2 May 75, Subj: Worldwide Training Areas; information concerning.
  3. J3182 HistSum Apr 75.

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interference, jamming and intrusion), and other subjects that might be of interest. The Special Communications Center advised that those topics would be included. The USAF Security Service had other mission areas, however, such as signal intelligence and communications security that afforded excellent and interesting briefing topics. They recommended that the briefing be presented in April 1975. Because of limited temporary duty funds, the briefing was postponed in March. At that time they advised of specific briefing topics to be addressed, including the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center's reorganization and mission, the Airborne Warning and Control System, the electronic warfare joint test, and several Navy developments. The briefing was presented to CINCPAC on 15 July and to his staff the following day.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The joint electronic warfare conference was hosted by the CINC of the Readiness Command on 6-8 August, having been postponed because of temporary duty funding constraints. The purpose of the working conference was to exchange views, consider selected electronic warfare problems, and explore procedures and techniques for employment of electronic warfare in a joint environment. The following agenda items were proposed by CINCPAC:<sup>2</sup>

- Tactics to counter enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM) against communications and weapons delivery systems.
- Friendly ECM tactics and capabilities against enemy low, high, very high, and ultra high frequency band communications signals.
- Joint coordination and integration of theater EW efforts to optimize detection, early warning, and threat countermeasures.
- Anti-radiation missile threats and countermeasures.
- Electronic Support Measures and ECM against counter-mortar, battlefield surveillance, guidance, and proximity fuze radars.
- Service EW developments and current support capabilities and tactics (drones, chaff, jamming) in joint environment.

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1. J315 HistSums Feb, Dec 75; CINCPAC 140250Z Dec 74; USAFSS Kelly AFB 182030Z Dec 74; AFSPCOMMCEN/CC 041910Z Mar 75.
  2. CINCPAC 162235Z Dec 74.

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- Emission control planning and execution in joint task group exercises and operations.
- Increased joint Service use of intelligence information, equipment, R&D, operational test and evaluation, simulators, and other training devices.
- Intelligence support to EW including status of operational electronic intelligence requirement procedures.
- Results, as available, of electronic warfare joint test.
- Problems with frequency clearance procedures in coordinating and conducting ECM training.
- Communications links required for coordination of EW during exercises and operations.

#### Search and Rescue

~~(S)~~ On 6 September the Military Airlift Command promulgated a Program Action Directive relocating the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) from Nakhon Phanom and subsequent inactivation of the 56th ARRS at Korat.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ With other Thailand withdrawal actions the matter of crash and rescue capability was addressed. In December CINCSAC requested an assessment of the feasibility of retaining a U.S. search and rescue capability in Thailand or negotiating for host country support. The JCS advised that no such capability could be retained in Thailand after 15 January 1976, but that a request for negotiations with Thailand was being initiated. It was stated that mission requirements for the U.S. capability did not justify the cost. Appropriate crash and rescue support was to be retained at U-Tapao in the post-March 1976 time frame, however.<sup>2</sup>

#### Operations Security

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC operations security teams continued to conduct studies throughout the PACOM to identify for elimination possible sources of foreknowledge that hostile powers could exploit to degrade the effectiveness of operations.

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1. MAC 061440Z Sep 75.
2. JCS 4819/242251Z Dec 75; J311 HistSum Dec 75.

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Such a survey was conducted from 29 March through 18 April concerning reconnaissance operations in Southeast Asia, including GIANT SCALE, BUFFALO HUNTER, OLYMPIC TORCH, and OLYMPIC MEET. The survey was forwarded to the Strategic Air Command on 16 June.<sup>1</sup>

(U) An OPSEC survey of Exercise IVORY HUNTER (see Exercises, elsewhere in this chapter) was conducted 8-12 September. The objectives were to identify OPSEC weaknesses associated with joint crisis action management, to identify areas where security emphasis should be increased or reoriented, and to determine appropriate action to be taken by participating agencies in relation to OPSEC findings.<sup>2</sup>

(U) OPSEC support was provided from 5 to 14 November to the joint U.S.-Republic of Korea evaluation team formed at Youngsan, Korea to appraise the CINCUNC-directed command post exercise FOCUS LENS 76. Experience gained during this effort substantiated the premise that the application of OPSEC survey techniques to command post exercises was inappropriate as there was no actual movement of combat or support resources on which to base OPSEC findings and recommendations. The OPSEC survey for this exercise focused primarily on physical and communications security, which, in most cases, duplicated the communications security support provided by the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and the U.S. Army Security Agency communications security detachment based in Korea.<sup>3</sup>

#### Operational Reporting

(U) Reporting for the Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) was terminated by the JCS effective 30 June. They so advised on 9 June. In addition, all operational reporting requirements used to provide data to the SEADAB were terminated as of that date. This effectively ended all Southeast Asia Operational Reporting except for OPREP-3 and Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program reports. Software for the SEADAB system was to be sent to the JCS for storage and disposition.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In the matter of Residual Capabilities Assessment (RECA) reporting, publication on 5 February of CINCPAC Instruction 3401.5 established a single reporting system, based on the automated Joint Resource Data Base. The system entailed the submission of card changes resulting from resource degradation because of nuclear war or other disaster. A CINCPAC continuation card

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1. J319 HistSums Apr, Jun 75; CINCPAC 202112Z Mar 75.
  2. J319 HistSum Sep 75.
  3. J3193 HistSum Nov 75.
  4. J3 WEB 16 Jun 75, which cited JCS 092122Z Jun 75.

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on resource degradation provided expanded information over that required by the JCS system.<sup>1</sup>

Military Activities During Visits by Dignitaries

(S) Planned military activities in the PACOM were affected in the last quarter of 1975 because of visits by the President and the Secretary of State to the People's Republic of China. On 7 October the JCS advised that any military activity that might become a source of embarrassment to either party or that might produce an adverse reaction by China "must be assiduously avoided." Of primary concern were those activities that were overt demonstrations of continued U.S. support of the Republic of China, such as combined military exercises, port calls on Taiwan of U.S. Naval vessels, and visits by ranking U.S. military and civilian personnel. Of secondary concern were military activities in the peripheral areas such as Korea, Japan, and the Philippines that could be construed as contrary to Chinese interest.

(S) Certain actions were directed by the JCS as follows. Cancellation of Exercise BLUE SKY during the entire quarter, and cancellation or rescheduling of all other exercises on Taiwan during the periods 12 October-2 November and 20 November-15 December. Cancellation of the port call of USS OKLAHOMA CITY to Taiwan 4-7 November, although Commander Seventh Fleet could visit as scheduled if he traveled by air; if travel was to be at a time other than scheduled, he should re-clear it with the Embassy in Taipei. Cancellation of port calls of USS NEW ORLEANS and USS FORT FISHER to Taiwan 28 November-2 December. Cancellation of visit to Taiwan by Commander, Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet aboard his flagship, 9-13 October. Cancellation of all ship port calls in Taiwan during period 18-24 October. Cancellation of port call in Taiwan of any other ships that were carrying a large contingent of Marines or that might attract unusual attention, such as carriers. The JCS also directed increased attention to all other activities in WESTPAC to prevent development of a situation that might prove embarrassing to the President or the Secretary of State. They advised that further effort would be made to reduce the restrictions on PACOM activities. They noted that although they had the PACOM annual exercise schedule and schedule of naval vessel port calls to Taiwan during that period, they requested to be advised soonest of any other events or activities that could impact adversely on the visits.<sup>2</sup>

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1. J334 HistSum Feb 75.
  2. JCS 3570/072204Z Oct 75.

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### Sortie and Surge Requirements in Southeast Asia

(S) On 17 May the JCS advised that the sortie and surge requirements and carrier readiness posture outlined by the FY 74-80 planning guidance for Southeast Asia force and activity levels was rescinded. The sortie and surge requirement tasking had been promulgated in February 1974. In addition, the Continental United States-based F-105G WILD WEASEL Squadron was released from five-day response to Southeast Asia, as tasked in September 1974, and could be used for worldwide response commitment. F-4C WILD WEASEL on Okinawa was released from 48-hour availability for movement to Thailand. The relaxation of force response requirements to Southeast Asia was in recognition of the changed situation in Indochina, the JCS advised, but nothing in the message was to be construed to authorize deployment of forces from Thailand. There were to be no deployments from Thailand without specific directive from the JCS (see also Chapter I of this history).<sup>1</sup>

### Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface

(S) In November 1973 CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that the existing Southeast Asia Tactical Data System (TDS) interface contingency equipment (in storage) be replaced with operational USAF-USMC equipment using computer programs being developed by the Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System (TACS/TADS) program. In August 1974 the JCS had disapproved release of the stored equipment (except for the IRON HORSE intelligence processing system) because of the limited traffic handling capacity of the interim TACS/TADS program, and because of the lack of a secure data link between Service equipments. In addition, the JCS had reaffirmed the requirement to maintain a contingency interface capability.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 31 May 1975 CINCPAC again requested that the JCS review the requirement to maintain the Southeast Asia TDS interface in view of the loss of Cambodia and Vietnam. On 25 July the JCS cancelled the interface requirement and directed disposition of equipment according to Service directives. CINCPAC then authorized CINCPACAF to terminate the requirement to maintain the interface equipment in storage; this was accomplished by 16 August.<sup>3</sup>


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1. JCS 4960/170148Z May 75, which cited JCS 4024/131453Z Feb 74, 1411/121923Z Apr 74, and 2683/290216Z Sep 74.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 217-218.
  3. CINCPAC 310215Z May 75; JCS 5093/251855Z Jul 75; CINCPACAF 160300Z Aug 75.

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COMBAT SKYSPOT Deployment

(C) CINCSAC proposed deployment of a COMBAT SKYSPOT System (AN/TSQ-96) from Udorn to the Republic of Korea. No precise location had been determined, but it appeared that the northwest sector would provide the most desirable coverage for ground-directed bombing/radar bomb scoring. The system could be used for strategic, tactical, and allied aircraft. Although training for B-52 aircrews would be somewhat restricted, periodic scheduling against that site would allow the aircraft to be observed in that politically sensitive area. CINCSAC requested CINCPAC's concurrence and assistance. CINCPAC concurred and asked CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea to provide the necessary assistance.


Sensor Surveillance



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1. CINCSAC 041348Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 050320Z Sep 75.
2. JCS 6973/282200Z Jul 75.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, p. 251; J3221 HistSum May 75.
4. J3221 HistSum Oct 75.



Control of Lava Flow

(U) A major summit eruption of the volcano Mauna Loa on the Island of Hawaii took place in July 1975. Historically, summit eruptions had been followed by flank eruptions two or three years later. Seismic activity indicated that such a flank eruption could be expected, and lava flow from such an eruption could endanger the city of Hilo. State of Hawaii civil defense officials asked CINCPAC for possible use of military resources if necessary to alleviate the danger.

(U) CINCPAC tasked the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to determine the feasibility of using hand-emplaced explosives or artillery to divert lava flow. He advised that the use of military bombing in the 1935 and 1942 eruptions had been discussed and it was concluded bombing was undesirable because of problems of extreme air turbulence, dense smoke, cloud cover, and probable unfavorable local public reaction.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J320 HistSum Jan 73; COMUS Korea 110932Z Feb 75; JCS 9652/182046Z Jun 75; CINCPACFLT 250905Z Jul 75; CINCPACAF 301730Z Jul 75; also see Ch IX, Sec II.
  2. J3221 HistSum Mar 75.
  3. J3221 HistSum Aug 75; also see Ch IX, Sec II.
  4. CINCPAC 140135Z Aug 75; J3182 HistSum Aug 75.

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(U) CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT were also asked to notify the USACSG if they had any expertise in this area. CINCPACFLT advised that any Navy expertise was concentrated at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. They noted that experience in an Iceland eruption had indicated that cooling of lava with water was an effective control measure.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 11 November experts from the Army and Department of Interior met with representatives of State Civil Defense, the Service components, and CINCPAC. As a result of this and a follow-on meeting at CINCPAC headquarters, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to confirm the feasibility and generally outline the ability to use explosives to break down vent cone walls, breach walls of lava levee channels, and breach and clog lava tubes. Any one of these alternatives, if successfully accomplished, could disrupt lava supply, halt or slow the face of the lava flow, or cause new channels to be created. CINCPAC requested notification of any additional testing to develop these concepts.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 15 December CINCPAC advised the JCS of the situation to date. He noted that lack of detailed data on past experiences and the inability to conduct tests under realistic conditions precluded the certainty of results. (The first 10-bomb tests had been completed by CINCPACAF on 1 December using MK82 500-pound delayed-action bombs, but the tests had been inconclusive.) On 30 December the CINCPAC Support Group notified CINCPAC that Army testing would cost approximately \$6,000 and that testing would commence within a couple of weeks after notification of availability of State of Hawaii funds (which were being requested from the Federal Government).<sup>3</sup>

### Disaster Relief

(U) The two principal disasters in which PACOM forces provided assistance in 1975 were a flood in southern Thailand in January and cyclone relief on the island of Mauritius in February.

(U) The United States provided disaster relief assistance to flood victims in southern Thailand between 13 and 25 January. Airlift support totaled 699,000 pounds of rice, clothing, and medical supplies costing \$124,724.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPACFLT 302228Z Sep 75.
  2. J3182 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC 200234Z Nov 75; J021/Memo/316-75, 21 Nov 75, Subj: J021 WEB of 10-14 Nov 75.
  3. CINCPAC 151924Z Dec 75; CDRUSACSG 302020Z Dec 75; J021 HistSum Dec 75.
  4. J3182 HistSum Jan 75; COMUSMACTHAI 260435Z Jan 75.

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(U) As requested by the JCS, a final report on the relief effort was submitted by CINCPAC in coordination with COMUSSAG/7AF and COMUSMACTHAI. A summary follows:<sup>1</sup>

Due to the absolute necessity of establishing and maintaining a proper balance between monetary constraints and available resources, the initial assessment of disaster relief mission objectives must be as definitive as possible. In an expanded operation of that nature the use of airlift and aerial port expertise to marry available resources to requirements would alleviate many problems and provide a more cost-effective performance. The speed with which this operation was put into effect inhibited the coordination and planning required to optimize all aspects. One result was that C-130 loads were less than the allowable cabin load. Command/control elements must astutely assess the requirements of the emergency operation to determine the tradeoff between responsiveness and reduced efficiency.

On several occasions C-130 cargo loads were dispatched by the Royal Thai Air Force Airlift Control Center and delivered down country without the recipient being designated on the load nor informed of the scheduled arrival. This problem was finally resolved by having a Thai Air Force liaison officer on board each aircraft.

Additionally, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS insure that the State Department/ Agency for International Development be provided with current flying hour cost data at the initial planning stages of an operation so that their requests for specific military airlift support could be considered in that light.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Deployment of a carrier task group to the Indian Ocean area in January is addressed elsewhere in this chapter. While on that deployment, the ships provided major assistance to Mauritius, an island nation of 900,000 located 500 miles east of the Malagasy Republic. Cyclone GERVAISE, the worst disaster there since 1960, left nine dead, thousands of homes and buildings destroyed, and power, communications, and water systems severely damaged. On 8 February USS CAMDEN (AOE-2), which had been scheduled to make a rest and recreation call at Port Louis, provided emergency assistance instead. Personnel assisted in restoration of electrical power and the repair of communications systems

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1. J318 HistSum Mar 75.

2. USSAG/7AF 030235Z Mar 75; COMUSMACTHAI 060619Z Mar 75; CINCPAC 180004Z Mar 75.

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and airfield navigational equipment. CAMDEN personnel helped with reconstruction of the children's ward of the hospital, donated blood, and delivered bread and milk.

(U) USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) was diverted on 9 February, and men of that ship joined CAMDEN personnel in clearing roads, repairs to the police radio net, repairs to water lines, etc. USS MARS (AFS-1) also participated in operations.

(U) At the request of the Secretary of State, the JCS directed the Air Force to provide, and CINCPAC to coordinate, the airlift of disaster relief items from the Agency for International Development's stockpile on Guam. The C-141 flight emphasized the humanitarian aspects of the U.S. Indian Ocean presence when it made a refueling stop in U-Tapao. The Prime Minister of Mauritius thanked the United States for "generosity and magnanimity" and expressed confidence that, "the relations between our two countries will go from strength in the years to come."<sup>1</sup>

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1. J3182 HistSum Feb 75; CTG 77.7 171530Z Feb 75; JCS 9436/120422Z Feb 75; NSD Guam 130605Z Feb 75; AMEMB Port Louis 200647Z Feb 75.

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## CHAPTER V

### LOGISTICS

#### SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

##### JOPS Interim Software Program

(U) Efforts continued to upgrade the logistics portions of the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) and Interim Software (JIS) Program.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 30 January CINCPAC delivered the certifiable version of the PACOM Movement Requirements Generator (MRG) to the National Military Command System Support Center (NMCSSC). This was the MRG to be distributed as part of the baseline system, the JOPS III, which was ultimately released by the JCS to the developing commands (PACOM, EUCOM, LANTCOM, REDCOM) on 30 April 1975.<sup>2</sup>

(U) During July and August LANTCOM representatives installed and trained personnel in the latest version of the T54 Base Development Plan (BDP) module and the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE) module, the last module of the JOPS III to be installed in CINCPAC.<sup>3</sup>

(U) A successful simulation of the TFE was completed using Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5025 data, but an attempted run of OPLAN 5027 was unsuccessful because the volume of movement data exceeded software.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The remainder of the year was spent in acquiring operative experience with the system. A JOPS Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Support Conference was held during the period 3-7 November at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, in which using commands emphasized the need for actual planners' involvement; limitations of present documentation; difficulties encountered due to system complexity with related processing problems; the need for continuous training; and the requirement to provide responsive reports in forms which could directly assist the accomplishment of planning and planner functions.<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 271-272.
  2. J4126 HistSums Jan and May 1975.
  3. J441 HistSum Jul 75; J414 HistSum Jul 75.
  4. J4 WEB 4-10 Aug 75.
  5. J4126 HistSum Oct 75.

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RVNAF Logistic Support

(S) On 1 February 1975 CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS further refinements on costing and operations plan data for Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Contingency Logistics Plan II, which had been revised on 19 December 1974. On 21 March the JCS provided comments on the plan and guidance for its further development. CINCPAC was to submit a revised plan based on this guidance within 30 days. The JCS recommended the "...revised plan be in hard copy rather than message format...."<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 20 March 1975 U.S. Defense Attache' Office (USDAO), Saigon, commented on attempting to update the RVNAF support plan at that time.<sup>2</sup>

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...Update not feasible at this time. Situation fluid. Recent losses significant but not yet quantified. RVNAF strategy changing but not clear. Recommend delay update until situation stabilizes....

(S) Based on the USDAO appraisal, CINCPAC requested and was granted relief from the update requirement until the situation stabilized.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The CINCPAC Logistics Directorate was continuing to develop a revised logistics support plan for the Republic of Vietnam in case of an all-out attack by North Vietnam when the JCS directed suspension of planning on 16 April 1975. Vietnam officially fell on 30 April.

Long-term Logistics Support Planning - Thailand

(C) On 16 May 1975 CINCPAC received JCS comments and concurrence on the long-term logistics support plan for Thailand. Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) requested relief from executing certain provisions of the JCS approval and implementing message, primarily where it involved a transition to Navy funding and procedures for jointly staffed organizations. CINCPAC acceded to minor modifications such as the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 272-273; CINCPAC 010439Z Feb 75; JCS 7482/212239Z Mar 75.
  2. USDAO Saigon 201101Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC 030046Z Apr 75; JCS 8689/031923Z Apr 75.

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1 September target date for establishment of a Navy-run disbursing office after assignment of necessary personnel assets, but directed overall implementation to proceed according to schedule.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 6 November 1975 CINCPAC provided details of an alternate command and support arrangement to meet long term requirements in Thailand. Under this arrangement, the Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) and MACTHAI Support Group would be disestablished. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand would remain under direct CINCPAC operational command (OPCOM). U.S. Support Agency, Thailand (USSAT) would be formed under direct CINCPAC OPCOM with Chief, JUSMAGTHAI dual-hatted as Commander, USSAT. Commander USSAT would also serve as the U.S. Defense Representative in Thailand and CINCPAC Representative in Thailand. In general, common-user requirements would be handled by USSAT, while Air Force and Army would retain control over specific activities immediately related to their respective bases. This arrangement also envisioned maximum civilianization, use of Interservice Support Agreements, local hire and Thai contractors to maintain a low U.S. military profile. Planning toward this reorganization was underway as the year ended.<sup>2</sup>

#### Interservice Support

##### Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program

(U) On 23 January, in support of its implementation of the Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program, the CINCPAC Logistics Directorate forwarded a letter to all PACOM Sub-Zone Groups (SZG) citing Pallet Procurement as a successful example of consolidation of support functions in Hawaii, which resulted in an estimated yearly savings of \$58,834.00.<sup>3</sup>

(C) At the same time, a General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report on the reduction of costly military support functions in the Pacific was forwarded to CINCPAC for review and reply. This report was based on visits to Hawaii, Japan-Okinawa, Korea and Taiwan from January through June 1974. It concluded that actions taken had still not eliminated duplicative support functions and it recommended consolidation of these selected functions:<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. 1, p. 274; JCS 4783/162308Z May 75; USMACTHAI 300553Z May 75; CINCPAC 092329Z Jun 75.
  2. CINCPAC 062316Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 220541Z Nov 75; J412 Point Paper, 5 Dec 75, Subj: Long Term Support Plan for Thailand.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. 1, pp. 274-279; J43 HistSum Jan 75; HSZG ltr Ser 114-74 of 1 Oct 74; CINCPAC 43 ltr of 23 Jan 75, Subj: Pallet Procurement.
  4. J43 HistSum Feb 75; GAO Draft Report of 23 Jan 75, Subj: Ways to Reduce Costly Military Support Functions in the Pacific.

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Procurement Offices  
Maintenance of Real Property in Hawaii and Okinawa  
Civilian Personnel Offices  
General Cargo Ports in Japan  
Equipment Calibration  
Administrative Aircraft Support in Japan  
AUTODIN Terminals in Hawaii  
Industrial Gas Production in Okinawa  
On-base Housing and Household Furnishings  
Management in Okinawa

(U) After submitting an initial reply to the draft report on 1 March 1975, CINCPAC provided a report on 4 September which summarized the status of consolidation studies relevant to GAO recommendations:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Consolidation Study</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Status</u>
Procurement Offices	Hawaii	Study submitted 2 Sep 75 with no anticipated savings. Returned for further study and completion projected Aug 76.
	Japan/ Okinawa	Completed with no further consolidation beyond departmental planned Army/Air Force merger recommended.
Maintenance of Real Property	Hawaii	Projected completion Jan-Feb 76.
	Okinawa	Delayed pending Army WESTPAC II actions.
Civilian Personnel Offices	Hawaii	Completed 1 May 75. Recommended no consolidation without establishment of single DOD Civilian Personnel Agency.
	Okinawa/ Japan	Completed 31 Dec 74. Same as recommendations for Hawaii.
General Cargo Ports	Japan	Delayed pending Army WESTPAC II actions.

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1. J42 HistSum Aug 75; CINCPAC 041915Z Sep 75.

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<u>Consolidation Study</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Status</u>
Equipment Calibration	Hawaii	Completed Aug 73. Evaluation transferred to Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Metrology and Calibration. Forwarded to components for implementation by Sep 76.
	Okinawa	Delayed pending Army WESTPAC II actions.
Administrative Aircraft Support	Japan	Study, due Nov 75, not completed as of 1 Jan 76. No estimate of anticipated savings. Study hindered by fact that Air Force/Army both claim organic admin aircraft requirement in missions.
AUTODIN Terminals	Hawaii	Schofield Barracks and Wheeler AFB terminals consolidated May 75. Kunia facility to remain separate based on mission requirement.
Industrial Gas Production	Okinawa	Air Force agreed to assume responsibility 30 May 75. Personnel spaces in process of being transferred.
On-base Housing and Household Furnishings Management	Okinawa	Delayed pending Army WESTPAC II actions.

(C) Studies and actions to consolidate maintenance of real property, equipment calibration, on-base housing and household furnishings management on Okinawa and cargo ports in Japan were delayed as a result of Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decision (PBD) 280 "Pacific Manpower," issued in December 1974. This PBD caused the Army in the Pacific, especially in Japan, to review its support efforts in view of expected 90 percent military and 60 percent civilian strength reductions during FY 76-77.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J43 Point Paper of 22 May 1975, Subj: Interservice Support Ramifications of PBD 280 CR (C).

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(U) U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) response to PBD 280 was the submission of a WESTPAC II concept plan which was approved by DA on 1 April 1975; however, on 7 May the Secretary of Defense imposed a moratorium on implementation of the plan as a result of broader problems in Southeast Asia at the time. On 2 December the Secretary of Defense published PBD 253 which required further adjustment of support functions in the Pacific. Army was made the lead agency under this PBD and at year's end Service reviews and reclamaes were still in progress.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 25 November 1975 CINCPAC J4, in his role as Director of DRIS activities, distributed the PACOM DRIS Study Digest to all Sub-Zone Groups. This digest provided a summary of PACOM DRIS study accomplishments and efforts beginning in FY 75 through the date of publication. This publication was to be updated semi-annually, supported by inputs from Sub-Zone Group Chairmen, on 31 March and 30 September of each calendar year.

### Environmental Protection

(U) On 23 September 1975 Lieutenant General Johnson, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), personally notified Admiral Gayler of the current status of a DNA project to clean up noncontaminated and radiologically contaminated earth, debris, and material at Eniwetok Atoll so that the original inhabitants might return. DNA Honolulu Field Office briefed J44 action officers on the project scope and planned execution, which it was hoped could begin sometime after 1 July 1976.<sup>2</sup>

(U) DNA had initially requested almost \$40 million to accomplish the project by contract services; however, Senate-House Military Construction (MILCON) committee conferees agreed to a one-time authorization of \$20 million under the assumption that the work would be done by U.S. military engineers.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 12 November 1975 the Eniwetok clean up project was dropped from the Fiscal Year 1976 MILCON Appropriations Bill by joint House-Senate committee action, and funding was deferred pending further evaluation.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J421 Background Paper of 4 Feb 76, Subj: Trace of PBD 380/WESTPAC PBD 253.
  2. DNA 231707Z Sep 75; J441 HistSum Sep 75.
  3. Ibid.
  4. J44 HistSum Nov 75.

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Management of Wholesale Subsistence Stocks

(U) The year 1975 saw further implementation of the Worldwide Integrated Management of Subsistence (WIMS).<sup>1</sup>

(U) Service stocks were decapitalized and brought under the Defense Subsistence Stock Fund according to a time-phased plan in which Service supply organizations became agents for the Defense Supply Agency (DSA). In Hawaii, the Defense Subsistence Office, Hawaii, DSA, was activated on 14 January 1975 to provide management services to the new system. The schedule and value of stocks decapitalized and brought under the Defense Subsistence Stock Fund are shown by activity as follows:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Type*</u>	<u>Date of Decap</u>	<u>No. of Line Items</u>	<u>\$ Value of Decap</u>
Navy Supply Center, Pearl Harbor	NP	1 Feb 74	573	641,273
	P (Freeze & Chill)	14 Jan 75	174	1,520,084
	FF&V	14 Jan 75	20	38,065
Navy Supply Depot, Guam	NP	4 Feb 75	411	536,555
	P	4 Feb 75	134	576,172
Navy Supply Depot, Subic	NP	6 Jun 75	295	1,820,289
	P	6 Jun 75	147	2,646,037
MACTHAI Spt Gp Samae San, Thailand	NP	17 Jun 75	207	908,221
	P	17 Jun 75	103	597,431
USA Inventory Mgmt Center Taegu, Korea	NP	29 Oct 75	303	4,263,614
	P	29 Oct 75	135	906,815
Totals to Date	NP		1,789	8,169,952
	P		693	6,246,539
	FF&V		20	38,065

\*NP-non perishable; P-perishable; FF&V-Fresh Fruits & Vegetables

(U) Implementation of WIMS in Japan (including Okinawa) remained in abeyance at year's end because of unsettled questions arising from PBD 253. These included warehousing responsibilities, ADP programs, and lack of an approved

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. 1, pp. 280-282.

2. J46 HistSum Jan 75; Working Paper, DSA Def Sub Region, Pac, 9 Feb 76.

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execution plan.<sup>1</sup>

Procurement Actions/Policies

U.S. Invited Contractors in Thailand

(C) The Royal Thai Government (RTG) continued to demand that the U.S. Government (USG) deal only with taxed local firms when placing major service contracts held by U.S. invited contractors (AMPAC, Trans-Asia and FEC). On 18 January the State Department instructed the Embassy in Bangkok to request officially by letter that all contractors holding USG contracts in Thailand be granted tax relief. This letter, together with a proposed tax agreement, was delivered to the RTG on 22 January 1975.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 7 February, after the RTG formally acknowledged receipt of the Ambassador's letter, the Embassy proposed the fall-back position of offering the contract with the RTG for facility maintenance services so as to avoid taxation.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 2 May the Secretary of State approved a further American Embassy, Bangkok request to convert the three major service contracts to in-house operations. Based upon this decision, responsible commands implemented plans to assume base maintenance functions on 1 July 1975, and communications operation and maintenance functions by 1 September 1975.<sup>4</sup>

Thai-Am Aircraft Maintenance Contracts

(C) In view of continuing support requirements in Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement between the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI); Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI); and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) was signed on 14 February which proposed to consummate the Thai-Am Udorn Fiscal Year 1976 contract with the facility furnished rent-free and Thai-Am defraying operations and maintenance costs normally allocable to U.S. Government contracts.<sup>5</sup>

(C) CINCPAC supported the Memorandum of Agreement proposal and requested concurrence, which was given by the Secretary of Defense on 24 April 1975.<sup>6</sup>

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1. CNO Ltr, Ser 412C/6719 of 29 Nov 74, Subj: World-wide Integrated Management of Subsistence (WIMS) Implementation - Guam.
  2. STATE 012168/180053Z Jan 75; AMEMB Bangkok 1244/230526Z Jan 75.
  3. J45 HistSum Feb 75, which referenced AMEMB Bangkok 2194/070348Z Feb 75.
  4. STATE 102659/021532Z May 75.
  5. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 287.
  6. CINCPAC 130511Z Mar 75; SECDEF 2301/242210Z Apr 75.

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(X) In preparing the Memorandum of Agreement in February, the conferees had identified 260,000 manhours of potential input to the Udorn facility for FY 76; however, with the fall of Cambodia on 17 April and Vietnam on 30 April, the potential workload had dropped to approximately 10 percent of plant capacity. On 13 May security assistance for Laos was suspended and Royal Laotian Air Force assets at the Udorn facility were subsequently frozen, thus further reducing the workload. CINCPAC now concurred with COMUSMACTHAI's recommendation to disestablish the facility after 30 June 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A conference attended by representatives of CINCPAC, CSAF, MACTHAI, CINCPACAF, AFLC, Air Force Contract Maintenance Center, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and the Sacramento Area Logistical Command was held at Udorn from 25-27 June 1975 to plan the disestablishment of the Udorn facility by 31 October 1975. A total of 116 Military Assistance Program (MAP) aircraft recovered from Laos and Cambodia were located at Udorn, and minimum maintenance for these was contracted for 90 days through 30 September 1975. By 22 October 1975 MACTHAI confirmed receipt of funds to date to close the facility.<sup>2</sup>

<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Funds Received</u>
● Disestablishment, complete FY 75 contracts, and maintain Laos stockpile and aircraft.	\$626,000
● Maintain Khmer/Vietnamese aircraft in storage.	41,000
● Demilitarize 12 EC-47s	<u>49,000</u>
TOTAL	\$716,000

(X) This amount would allow disestablishment and maintenance of aircraft through 31 December 1975. As the 31 October close-out date neared, the conflict between the requirement to disestablish the Udorn facility and to provide caretaking for recovered aircraft became acute. The Secretary of Defense advised that a State Department decision on final allocation of recovered MAP aircraft was not expected until after October; therefore, CINCPAC recommended that MACTHAI continue caretaker and maintenance service until 31 December. The Secretary of Defense further granted approval to reprogram Laos MAP funds in an amount sufficient to continue the Thai-Am Udorn contract through 31 March 1976, if necessary. On 19 December 1975 CINCPAC set

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1. J45 HistSum Feb 75; USMACTHAI 130935Z May 75; CINCPAC 192229Z May 75; STATE 111653/132310Z May 75; USDAO Vientiane 170756Z May 75.
  2. J45 HistSum Jun 75; USMACTHAI 220500Z Oct 75.

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a new disestablishment date of 29 February 1976. MACTHAI estimated the delay in disestablishment as costing approximately \$100,000 per month.<sup>1</sup>

PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)

(U) On 31 January 1975 the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) assumed responsibility for operation of the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA). The purpose of this action was to unite overseas materiel utilization screening under one agency, with the ultimate goal of integrating the functions of the Materiel Asset Redistribution Center Europe (MARCE) with PURA at a later date, using an advanced system design to be developed by DSA. PURA operations were initially assigned to the Defense Automatic Addressing System Office (DAASO), Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio. CINCPAC concurred with DSA assumption of PURA responsibilities with the understanding that:<sup>2</sup>

- CINCPAC would be provided data to evaluate PURA effectiveness in meeting PACOM logistics requirements.
- PURA would remain responsive to priority offline requests of CINCPAC and PACOM Component Commands.

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1. CINCPAC 180503Z Oct 75; J4 WEBS, 4-10 Oct 75, 29 Nov-5 Dec 75, 15-21 Dec 75; USMACTHAI 220500Z Oct 75.
  2. J46 HistSum Jan 75; CINCPAC J4 ltr Ser 820-74, Subj: DSA Assumption of PACOM Overseas Materiel Utilization Screening Responsibilities.

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SECTION II

PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS (POL)

PACOM POL Management

Bulk Petroleum - PWRR/PWRS

(S) On 7 August 1975 CINCPAC recommended that the JCS, in conjunction with the Military Departments, review bulk POL Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirement (PWRMR) planning factors in view of changes in supply, transportation, and consumption patterns.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Based on this recommendation, CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to review and evaluate, in coordination with Service components, in-theater Service-prescribed war reserve requirements for prepositioned bulk petroleum.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC response to JCS tasking revealed that, except for aviation gas (AVGAS) and marine diesel fuel (DFM), little correlation existed between the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) Inventory Management Plan (IMP) and PACOM POL operation plan requirements for any given product. This was partially explained by the fact that operation plan requirements were determined from the prime support area whereas DFSC IMP represented entire PACOM theater requirement.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The most significant deficit was 4.3 million barrels of JP-4 required by the Air Force. It was noted that this deficit might not justify military construction or bulk procurement, especially in view of the post-Southeast Asia situation; however, CINCPAC did suggest that other Services might make limited reductions in terminal Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS) storage of other products to release tankage to store JP-4, after all Services validated their requirements. Also, JP-5 appeared to offer some potential in that DFSC IMP JP-5 PWRR requirement appeared to be high in comparison with the most demanding requirements in Operation Plans 5001 and 5027.<sup>4</sup>

Bulk POL Prices

(U) Prices of major POL products increased 14.3 percent between 1 November 1974 and 1 July 1975; however, a 10 percent increase expected in late 1975 did

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1. CINCPAC 072100Z Aug 75.
  2. JCS 4760/122110Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC 300430Z Sep 75.
  4. Ibid.

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not occur because of reduced world consumption and increased product availability. In fact, DFSC price lists released in December 1975, effective 1 January 1976, reflected a 13 percent decrease in standard prices from those in effect through 31 December 1975.<sup>1</sup>

<u>Product</u>	<u>Unit of Issue</u>	<u>1 Nov 74</u>	<u>1 Jul 75</u>	<u>1 Jan 76</u>
MOGAS 1	GAL	.381	.438	.381
AVGAS	GAL	.437	.490	.427
JP-4	GAL	.373	.423	.368
JP-5	GAL	.355	.408	.355
DFM	GAL	.339	.390	.339
NSF	BBL	13.166	15.162	13.166
NDF	BBL	14.238	16.380	14.238

#### Navy Multi-Purpose Surface Fuel Program

(C) As part of the Chief of Naval Operations-directed transition to diesel fuel marine (DFM) as the single multi-purpose surface fuel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet established milestone dates by which Navy special fuel oil (NSFO) would be removed from the fleet oilers and replaced by distillate fuels. This phased elimination of NSFO by Pacific Fleet oilers was based on the requirement to support the USS HANCOCK during her scheduled deployment March-October 1975. By February 1975 the ashore portion of the program had already succeeded in eliminating residual fuels at all WESTPAC Navy terminals except Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay. Adequate stocks of NSFO to meet Military Sealift Command Prepositioned War Reserve Stock and Peacetime Operating Stock requirements would be retained at Subic, Japan, Guam, and Pearl Harbor.<sup>2</sup>

#### Defense Supply Agency (DSA)-Owned Fuel Inventory Reduction

(U) In May 1975 the DFSC was directed to reduce world-wide DSA-owned in-place bulk petroleum inventories because of a stock fund cash shortage. To meet its desired 30 June inventory objective of 17,712,000 barrels, CINCPAC directed a 500,000 barrel PACOM-wide stock reduction.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 18 June 1975 DFSC notified CINCPAC that attainment of its target inventory objective by 30 June was not critical because the worldwide target would be met even with excess in CINCPAC.<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. 1, p. 300; J4 WEB, 30 Jun-6 Jul 75; J42 HistSum Dec 75.
  2. CINCPACFLT 102137Z Feb 75; NAVPETOFF 122052Z Feb 75.
  3. DFSC 011920Z May 75; CINCPAC 080100Z May 75.
  4. DFSC 181508Z Jun 75.

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(S) In July 1975 DFSC was authorized to permanently increase worldwide bulk POL inventories by 4.5 million barrels, and the CINCPAC target inventory for PACOM by 30 September was raised to 18,336,000 barrels. In October this was further raised to a target of 19,357,000 barrels by 31 December 1975. By the end of the year CINCPAC had attained an inventory of 18,493,000 barrels.<sup>1</sup>

POL in Southeast Asia

Republic of Vietnam POL Losses

(C) As the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces withdrew from up-country locations in early 1975, large amounts of POL products were left behind intact in spite of contingency plans for their removal or destruction. Between 1 January 1975 and the fall of Saigon on 29 April, an estimated 879,300 barrels of POL products worth \$13,605,900 were lost:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Value</u>
Military Regions I and II	293,100 barrels	\$4,812,900
Military Regions III and IV	586,200 barrels	\$8,793,000

Cambodia POL Losses

(C) After enemy interdiction of Mekong River and land routes to Phnom Penh in February 1975, a total of 3,099,516 gallons of POL products was airlifted to Cambodia between 27 February and 17 April.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
MAP	1,722,168 gallons
AID	1,377,348 gallons


(C) On hand and lost with the fall of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 were approximately 805,686 gallons of POL products worth about \$287,745.<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. J42 HistSum Jul 75; DFSC 162101Z Oct 75; Bulk Petroleum Msg Report, RCS: DSA(W) 1884 (DFSC), 2 Jan 76.
  2. DAO RVNAF Final Assessment, Jan thru Apr FY 75, p. 5-51; J4 WEB, 24-30 Mar 75; J44/J00 Discussion Topic, 21 Apr 75, Subj: POL Status.
  3. J422 Work Sheet, undated, Subj: Phnom Penh POL Status.

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# PACOM POL CONSUMPTION (IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)




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# BULK POL DATA, PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1975

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1975 POL CONSUMPTION

(in thousands of barrels)

BY PRODUCT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
AVGAS	15.6	50.5	39.5	47.4	31.2	53.0	28.5	38.9	57.1	14.5	19.4	16.0	411.6
JP-4	1,408.1	1,267.1	1,577.5	1,612.0	1,703.2	1,474.8	1,160.5	943.4	1,183.8	1,009.2	1,074.8	1,124.9	15,539.3
JP-5	411.4	382.8	444.7	537.3	608.5	348.5	353.3	353.5	309.8	503.5	231.3	286.0	4,770.6
MOGAS	93.8	90.3	121.3	100.1	91.8	89.6	87.3	78.0	77.6	82.8	141.5	85.8	1,139.9
DIESEL	792.5	948.0	921.2	955.2	503.9	801.2	729.0	698.7	700.1	1008.0	658.2	997.6	9,713.6
NSFO	289.0	282.2	291.3	229.4	495.6	242.5	168.6	110.8	117.5	237.3	98.9	130.9	2,695.0
Total	3,010.4	3,020.9	3,395.5	3,481.4	3,435.2	3,069.6	2,527.2	2,223.3	2,445.9	2,855.3	2,224.1	2,641.2	34,270.0

BY AREA

GUAM	602.5	173.2	400.0	318.1	478.2	299.8	362.2	220.5	291.9	206.6	126.6	189.0	3,632.6
HAWAII	667.2	588.0	764.7	654.7	1,053.9	610.3	674.2	416.6	429.7	585.4	673.3	553.3	7,671.3
JAPAN	662.0	683.9	661.6	748.2	613.1	602.3	629.9	675.4	649.5	631.7	549.5	630.1	7,737.2
KOREA	303.1	351.5	330.5	200.4	148.4	269.2	150.2	104.2	175.6	198.9	219.9	286.8	2,738.7
PHILIPPINES	577.9	794.2	733.4	1,117.7	550.4	848.3	579.9	542.9	666.1	786.6	420.2	814.2	8,431.8
TAIWAN	67.6	19.5	47.5	35.9	215.8	35.9	12.1	14.0	14.0	207.7	10.3	10.3	690.6
THAILAND	130.1	410.6	457.8	406.4	375.4	343.8	154.7	249.7	219.1	238.4	224.3	157.5	3,367.8
Total	3,010.4	3,020.9	3,395.5	3,481.4	3,435.2	3,009.6	2,527.2	2,223.3	2,445.9	2,855.3	2,224.1	2,641.2	34,270.0

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## SECTION III-MUNITIONS

### PACOM Munitions Posture

(S) By June 1975 Service munitions requirements in PACOM had been reassessed and redistribution had been directed in response to the changing political situation following the end of conflict in Southeast Asia. The major change in requirements was the phaseout of DOD-directed Southeast Asia surge air munitions stocks for the Air Force in Thailand and Navy in the Philippines, and the end of Army support to Cambodia and Vietnam as well as reductions in Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

### Munitions for Southeast Asia

(S) Munitions support for Southeast Asia, directed primarily toward resupply of Vietnam and Cambodia, continued to be an item of major concern at the beginning of 1975. The situation was complicated by numerous factors including reduced funding from Congress, increased costs of ammunition, increased expenditure rates resulting from increasing intensity of enemy activity, and, in the case of Cambodia, interdiction of supply lines.<sup>2</sup>

### Ammunition Highlights in Vietnam

(S) The Fiscal Year 1975 Vietnam Ammunition Program had been pared from \$469 million to \$268 million to accommodate an overall congressional cut, and total funding was considered inadequate at the current expenditure rate, especially for ground munitions. The average daily expenditure rate for ground munitions for FY 75 from July 1974 through January 1975 was 630 short tons. Total funding for FY 75 allowed for only 451 short tons per day, or a shortfall of 179 short tons per day. By the end of February, the actual rate of expenditure had climbed to an average of 642 short tons daily, and to 644 short tons in March, with a projected usage rate of 1,000 short tons per day based on the current situation in March. As of 9 March ground munitions assets were projected to be at 37,725 short tons or 38 days of supply (DOS) by the end of FY 75 as opposed to the objective of 60 DOS at the intensive combat rate.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J4622 Point Paper, 20 Jun 75, Subj: PACOM Munitions Posture.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 307-308. See Also Mekong Convoy Security, SCOOT and SCOOT(T), and Cambodia Airlift Support.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 310-312; J4621 Point Papers, 10 Feb 75 and 4 Mar 75, Subj: FY 75 Vietnam Ammo Planning and End of Year Position; J4621 Point Paper, 18 Mar 75, Subj: Vietnam Ammunition Drawdown.

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PACOM MUNITIONS POSTURE  
(Short Tons)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Previous Requirement</u>	<u>Current Requirement</u>	<u>Current On Hand Assets</u>	<u>Planned Redistribution Actions</u>
Air Force	Hawaii	238	135	1,219	+ 31
	Korea	22,253	21,160	19,600	+ 3,486
	Okinawa	44,174	50,220	34,500	+ 4,318
	Philippines	9,533	11,180	2,450	+ 3,149
	Taiwan	11,532	10,500	2,200	+ 3,856
	Thailand	<u>95,411</u>	<u>54,010</u>	<u>34,200</u>	- <u>30,210</u>
Subtotal		183,141	147,205	136,819	
Navy/Marine	Afloat	34,233	28,757	23,206	+ 5,551
	Guam	27,984	27,984	25,518	+ 2,466
	Hawaii	34,564	34,564	29,245	+ 19,425
	Japan	48,875	48,875	44,933	+ 3,942
	Okinawa	4,545	4,545	4,442	+ 123
	Philippines	<u>72,334</u>	<u>42,303</u>	<u>73,810</u>	- <u>31,507</u>
Subtotal		222,535	187,028	201,134	
Army	Hawaii	370	372	403	+ 1,897
	Japan	153,205	153,205	81,651	
	Okinawa	46,299	46,299	77,090	
	Korea	38,238	38,239	127,301	+ 28,887
	Thailand	<u>34,148</u>	<u>20,000*</u>	<u>42,000</u>	- <u>22,000</u>
Subtotal		<u>272,260</u>	<u>258,115</u>	<u>328,445</u>	
GRAND TOTAL		677,936	592,348	666,398	

\*Ammunition Left in Thailand (AIT) 47-day reserve for Korat.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES  
(SHORT TONS)  
January 1968 thru April 1975

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1968	95,736	103,000	123,674	124,660	127,942	125,004	128,407	126,379	117,569	122,232	114,925	127,672
1969	129,684	115,759	130,141	125,090	128,312	121,794	122,794	111,046	102,163	99,908	100,509	100,158
1970	117,675	100,639	100,358	97,323	97,323	80,683	79,582	70,867	59,538	54,538	58,134	60,463
1971	70,792	66,510	92,191	85,000	76,463	60,863	49,196	51,277	51,309	47,317	50,649	67,838
1972	56,800	64,963	62,059	91,678	107,378	80,852	99,077	97,849	90,413	94,359	100,693	95,485
1973	101,390	69,976	39,538	54,727	53,765	47,480	49,885	31,648	1,640	5,593	5,274	6,313
1974	7,473	7,867	6,504	6,549	7,550	11,747	4,745	9,304	6,426	3,347	4,994	4,346
1975	5,935	6,896	8,528	4,082								

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SOURCE: J42

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(C) Continued stress was placed on conservation. The U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO), Saigon, also attempted to accommodate ground requirements by reducing Air and Naval stockage objectives from 120 DOS to 30 DOS based on constrained funding; however, CINCPAC did not support this approach. Instead, an attempt was made to submit a supplemental request for \$198 million which was expected to bring the end of year position to 72 DOS; however, this was never approved.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 30 April 1975 Vietnam fell, leaving remaining ammunition stocks to the enemy. Of particular significance were ground munition stocks lost:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

During the NVA offensive, considerable ground ammunition was lost. Depot losses through 29 April 1975 totaled 95,104 short tons worth approximately \$246,016,553. No efforts by ground troops to destroy depots before withdrawal were reported...it must be assumed that the large majority of the ammunition was captured intact by the Communists.

(U) Also reported lost were \$19,314,763 worth of Navy munitions.<sup>3</sup>

#### Ammunition Highlights in Cambodia

(S) The ammunition situation in Cambodia at the beginning of 1975 was particularly desperate. As of 17 January 1975 Kantauk Ammunition Depot contained 12,400 short tons (S/T) of ammunition. The daily expenditure rate was reported at 571 S/T per day, resupply was limited to 90 S/T per day airland, and the Mekong River was closed; therefore, even with a reduced daily drawdown expenditure of 481 S/T, Kantauk was projected to run out of ammunition about 11 February 1975.<sup>4</sup>

(C) On 10 February 1975 the run-out date was projected to 1 March at current expenditure rate or 20 March assuming strict rationing. Action was taken to increase Bird Air contract airlift support in February.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J4621 Point Paper, 18 Mar 75, Subj: Vietnam Ammunition Drawdown.
  2. DAO RVNAF Final Assessment, Jan thru Apr FY 75, pp. 5-27.
  3. Ibid.
  4. J4 WEB, 13-19 Jan 75.
  5. J4624 Point Paper, 10 Feb 75, Subj: Cambodia Ammunition Status-Mekong Closed; see also Cambodia Airlift Support.

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(S) By 26 March the run-out date was projected to 29 April at a current daily expenditure rate of 430 S/T. At this point, additional funds were required to stretch ammunition deliveries further.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By 6 April 1975 the projected run out of all ammunition assets was 22 April; then, on 17 April, Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge.<sup>2</sup>

#### U.S. Ammunition Left in Thailand

(S) The end of hostilities in Vietnam and Cambodia left excess ammunition in Thailand and in transit. In-transit ammunition was diverted to Korea or returned to CONUS, while the JCS directed that stocks located in Thailand not required for missions or contingency plans be speedily retrograded.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The American Embassy, Bangkok, and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) pointed out that precipitous retrograde of U.S. materiel would be taken as a signal of U.S. intent to abandon Thailand so they requested that a 47-day ammunition reserve be retained for Thailand. This request was supported by CINCPAC and approved by the JCS and Secretary of State under the condition that the reserve remain U.S. Government-titled and with the allowance that it could be placed under the security and maintenance of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). It was thought that this gesture would facilitate removal of other ammunition and materiel.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The 47-day ammunition reserve became known as the U.S. Ammunition Left in Thailand Program and consisted of a total of \$54.4 million worth of munitions for storage at Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. (Figures in short tons as of 4 December 1975):<sup>5</sup>

<u>Type Ammo</u>	<u>At Korat</u>	<u>Enroute</u>	<u>Total</u>
Air	1,574	831	2,405
Ground	21,000	-	21,000
Navy	<u>49</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>49</u>
Total	22,623	831	23,454

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1. J4623 Point Paper, 26 Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Ammunition.
  2. J4 WEB, 24-30 Mar 75.
  3. J4621 Talking Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Disposition of Ammunition in Thailand.
  4. J4236 Point Paper, 7 Oct 75, Subj: Disposition of Ammunition in Thailand; CINCPAC 310045Z Oct 75 (EX); J4236 Point Paper, 4 Nov 75, Subj: Ammunition in Thailand (AIT); JCS 1553/101738Z Nov 75 (EX).
  5. J4236 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: Ammunition in Thailand (AIT).

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(S) With the March 1976 deadline for U.S. withdrawal from military bases in Thailand rapidly approaching, COMUSMACTHAI drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to obtain RTG agreement to store, secure, and maintain U.S. Ammunition Left in Thailand Program stocks. This MOU was sent to CINCPAC for approval; however, its presentation was delayed as a result of objections raised by Mr. Eisenhour, Senior Examiner for Security Assistance, Office of Management and Budget, who heard of the MOU while in Bangkok in October 1975. In view of the possible legal problems of retaining U.S. Government-titled stocks under Thai control, the Secretary of State directed CINCPAC not to proceed with the MOU until he received joint State/DOD approval.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC supported the American Embassy, Bangkok, in suggesting that the political significance of the U.S. Ammunition Left in Thailand Program made necessary a solution which would permit its continuance indefinitely.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Based on the restrictions of Section 514, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the fact that there were no current DOD contingency plans for employment of U.S. Forces in Thailand, the Chairman, JCS recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ASD(ISA), inform the Department of State that the decision for indefinite retention of ammunition for the U.S. Ammunition Left in Thailand Program must be based on political necessity rather than U.S. military requirements. Policy guidance on retention beyond March 1976 was also requested.<sup>3</sup>

(S) At year's end plans were underway to man the Korat facility to insure security and maintenance with or without an MOU.

#### War Reserve Munitions (WRM) at U-Tapao

(S) The question of storing WRM at U-Tapao arose in November 1975 when the State Department was refining negotiating instructions for the American Embassy, Bangkok, in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces by March 1976. The opinion of American Embassy, Bangkok, was that continued storage would be politically infeasible.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The CINCPAC Thailand withdrawal plan had recognized the need for storage of an estimated 41,000 short tons of ammunition at U-Tapao, which was an excellent site, well situated to meet overall PACOM objectives and contingencies.

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1. Ibid.
  2. CINCPAC 310045Z Oct 75 (EX).
  3. JCS 1553/101738Z Nov 75 (EX).
  4. AMEMB Bangkok 195/101238Z Nov 75 (EX).

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The nearest alternate location was Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines which had only a 10,000 short ton capacity. Furthermore, relocation was an expensive proposition, especially in view of the scarcity of new construction funds for such a requirement. Therefore, CINCPAC confirmed the need to retain WRM, for an indefinite period if possible, at U-Tapao to support U.S. security policy in PACOM.<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 111815Z Nov 75 (EX); CINCPAC 140421Z Nov 75 (EX).

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SECTION IV-TRANSPORTATION

Common User Airlift-PACOM

(U) On 31 March 1975 Military Airlift Command (MAC)/Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Proposal 74-32, as approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), implemented the consolidation of Pacific theater airlift forces under MAC. Phase II of the consolidation plan, implemented in August 1975, brought Air Force tactical airlift forces under MAC with the Pacific Theater Airlift Manager (TAM) also serving as the 374th Tactical Air Wing Commander. Under this concept, CINCPAC retained operational command, while PACAF exercised operational control of airlift assets for CINCPAC through the TAM.<sup>1</sup>

(U) This organizational consolidation was complemented, on 20 August 1975, by a Secretary of Defense Amended Program Decision Memorandum directing the Air Force to consolidate all airlift operations, including C-130 missions, into the MAC Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF) management system beginning 1 October 1976. Under this system the Services would budget for airlift requirements, funds would be allocated to Service accounts, and MAC would be reimbursed after the fact.<sup>2</sup>

(U) CINCPAC directed components to gather Fiscal Year 1977 data and forward it to CINCPACAF Director of Transportation, Pacific Airlift Management Office (PAMO) for compilation to meet CSAF suspense of 17 September 1975. The initial PACOM submission contained requirements for 26,322 flying hours, 3,282 hours more than programmed capability; however, MAC indicated that Readiness Command (REDCOM) C-130s might satisfy the extra requirement. CINCPAC submitted Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) intra-CONUS and intertheater requirements, as well as those for three CINCPAC-directed no-notice exercises, separately.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 17 December 1975 MAC provided more definitive guidance on requirement submissions under the ASIF management system and requested revision and revalidation of FY 77 C-130 airlift forecasts by 1 February 1976. CINCPAC would review submissions to lend support. MAC further clarified the fact that it would apply the type of aircraft (C-130, C-141, C-5, or commercial air) that could most effectively and economically do the job.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 317; Agreement between HQ PACAF and HQ MAC for OPCOM, Control and Mgt of PACOM Theater Airlift, Aug 75, p. 1.
  2. J4314 HistSum Sep 75; CSAF 272109Z Aug 75.
  3. J4314 HistSum Sep 75.
  4. J4313 HistSum Dec 75; MAC 172305Z Dec 75.

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### Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)

#### MTMC - Field Office Pacific (FOP)

(U) On 1 August 1975, at CINCPAC request, the Commander, MTMC, established the MTMC-Field Office Pacific to manage DOD personal property shipping functions formerly performed by CINCPAC. In addition, the MTMC-FOP was to perform MTMC Liaison Office traffic management functions to include monitoring PACOM and CONUS inland and terminal responsibilities.<sup>1</sup>

#### MTMC Charter Revision

(U) As a result of an Army Western Pacific ports study concurred in by CINCPAC on 5 December 1974, the JCS on 9 July 1975 requested concurrence to a proposed revision to the Military Traffic Management Command charter.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In August 1975 CINCPAC concurred with the JCS plan to revise the MTMC charter to operate PACOM common user terminals and manage container operations with the provision that:<sup>3</sup>

- CINCPAC retain final authority for port operations.
- MTMC be capable of rapid expansion of terminal operations and over-the-beach operations for contingencies.
- Korea terminals (Pusan/Inchon) be excepted from MTMC operation until feasibility determined.
- Navy-operated fleet support activities (Pearl Harbor, Guam, Yokosuka, Subic Bay) remain under Navy operation.
- Worldwide container control system be built around existing transportation industry data base.

(U) Program Budget Decision 253, 3 December 1975, directed Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and MTMC to survey Naha Port, Okinawa for possible transfer to MTMC. Other port surveys were to follow. The final decision for MTMC charter revision had not been made by year's end.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 211927Z Jun 75; CDR MTMC 132100Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 320.
  3. CINCPAC 280322Z Aug 75.
  4. Program Budget Decision 253, 3 Dec 75.

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Cambodia Airlift Support

(D) The five Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) C-130 aircraft operated under Bird Air contract continued to provide airlift support to Cambodia between U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base (RTNB) and Pochentong Airfield during January 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(D) Resupply of Cambodia via Mekong River convoy became increasingly difficult and necessary action was taken to increase C-130 airlift support to 30 aircraft sorties per day. The Bird Air contract was increased by \$1.9 million and by 28 February crews had increased from 5 to 12. This number reached 15 by the middle of March. Twenty C-130 aircraft were assigned to a Thailand Forward Operating Location. During the critical period required for crew procurement and training to attain 30 sorties per day, MAC contracted for commercial DC-8 support for 12 days (15-26 February) at a cost of \$1.2 million. On 4 March 1975 General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the JCS, personally expressed appreciation for the combined efforts of the Departments of State and Defense, the Services, the unified commands, and country teams which resulted in successful culmination of this operation.<sup>2</sup>

(S) With the interdiction of Mekong River support, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to develop a contingency plan for airlifting minimum daily U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) items by DC-8 commercial airlift from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, to Pochentong Air Base, Khmer Republic. The Logistics Directorate, Plans and Policy Division developed a plan for five DC-8s, four moving USAID cargo from Tan Son Nhut and one moving Military Assistance Program (MAP) cargo from U-Tapao RTNB. The latter aircraft was to be offset by two Bird Air contract C-130 aircraft tasked to haul USAID POL products in bulk airborne fuel tanks. On 22 February JCS approved the plan as Operation Plan 5136. It was implemented with flights beginning on 27 February.<sup>3</sup>

(C) A summary of all airlift support for Cambodia during 1975, through the collapse on 17 April, is provided in the following chart. Effective 17 April all support to Cambodia was terminated with the fall of the Government of the Khmer Republic. This included termination of the Bird Air C-130 airlift contract and DC-8 commercial carrier USAID airlift contract as well as the Khmer Air Force Airlift Self-Sufficiency Program.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 321-324.
  2. J4718 Point Paper, 19 Mar 75, Subj: Continued Expansion Bird Air Contract; J4716 Point Paper, 4 Mar 75, Subj: Airlift Support for Cambodia; J471 HistSum Feb 75; JCS 9968/042004Z Mar 75.
  3. J41 HistSum Feb 75; JCS 4160/151649Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 210415Z Feb 75; JCS 9069/221556Z Feb 75.
  4. J4115 HistSum Apr 75.

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CAMBODIA AIRLIFT SUPPORT

JANUARY - APRIL 1975

AIRUROP	JANUARY		FEBRUARY		MARCH		APRIL		TOTALS	
	SORTIES	S/T	SORTIES	S/T	SORTIES	S/T	SORTIES	S/T	SORTIES	S/T
Ammunition	29	381.3	22	353.4	165	2380.2			216	3114.9
Rice	11	141.1	-	-	38	594.3			49	735.7
Subtotal	40	522.7	22	353.4	203	2974.5			265	3850.6
AIRLAND										
Ammunition	138	2138.2	418*	11384.1*	277**	8309.6**			833	21831.9
POL	27	449.2	47	863.5	382**	7775.9**			456	9088.6
General Cargo	235	1047.2	64*	1469.0*	484**	20213.1**			783	22729.3
Subtotal	400	3634.6	529*	13716.6*	1143	36298.6**			2092	53649.8
GRAND TOTAL	440	4157.3	551*	14070.0*	1346**	39273.1**	631***	17739.7***	2968	75240.1

All support by BIRDAIR contract using C-130 Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) except where otherwise noted.

\*February figures include additional MAC contract DC-8 support for 12 days with 111 airland sorties delivering 5222.2 S/T ammo and 2.0 S/T general cargo. Figures also include MAC contract DC-8 support for delivery of AID rice and POL from Saigon on 27-28 February with 20 sorties delivering 857.9 S/T of rice.

\*\*March figures include MAC contract DC-8 support for 18 days with 57 sorties delivering 2714.8 S/T ammo and 10.0 S/T gen cargo. Figures also include MAC contract DC-8 support out of Saigon with 18568.3 S/T rice delivered in 389 sorties; 596.1 S/T POL in 13 sorties; and 220 S/T gen cargo in one sortie.

\*\*\*April figures are total of all sorties delivering ammo, POL, gen cargo and rice from U-Tapao and Saigon through termination of support on 17 April.

SOURCE: J471 HistSums Jan-Mar 75; J471 WEBs Apr 75.

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(U) On 23 April 1975 the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, which had been delegated the responsibility to monitor and control airlift operations into Cambodia by CINCPAC, provided an overall summary of the entire operation from 11 April 1973 to 17 April 1975. The USSAG summary, which highlights important events and statistics, is quoted here:<sup>1</sup>

...Joint Chiefs of Staff message 171325Z April 1975 suspended all aircraft support to Cambodia. Khmer airlift effort was terminated 17 April 1975 with rice airdrop to Kampong Chhnang at 1520 hours local time.

...The U.S. airlift operation in the Khmer Republic from 11 April 1973 to 17 April 1975 stands out as the largest sustained airlift operation since the Berlin airlift. The survival of Phnom Penh and several important isolated provincial enclaves became completely dependent on U.S. airlift to provide life-sustaining rice, ammo, POL, and general cargo. USAF C-130s (including those crewed by Bird Air, a civilian contractor) and contracted DC-8s flew 5,413 airland missions to deliver 123,631 S/T in the two year sustained operation.

...The continuous Khmer airdrop support to approximately 25 different enclaves, such as Kampong Seila and Neak Luong, was the largest sustained airdrop effort in USAF history. USAF C-130s flew more than 3,000 airdrop missions to deliver 38,893 S/T of ammo and rice, more than three times the tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh in 1968. The airdrops were highly successful using the AWADS/SKE high altitude, high velocity drop system in a combat environment. Approximately 98 percent of total bundles dropped were reported recoverable even though some of the drop zones had less than a 500 meter radius of security.

...To reduce U.S. military presence in the Khmer, USAF contracted with Bird Air for civilian aircrews. After 7 October 1974 all flights into the Khmer other than a small number of USAF-crewed administrative support flights, were crewed by civilian aircrews. As airlift requirements increased, the contract was expanded to 15 aircrews as of

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 289-290; USSAG/7AF 230530Z Apr 75.

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10 March 1975. Best record was on 17 March 1975 when 34 missions were flown (26 airland and 8 airdrop) delivering 654.1 S/T to Phnom Penh and Neak Luong.

...During February 1975 the MAP-CB airlift was supplemented with three MAC-contracted DC-8s to provide ammo airlift from U-Tapao to Pochentong. World Airways and Airlift International flew 111 missions from 15 to 26 February 1975 delivering 5,222 S/T. Best results were recorded 23 February 1975 when 11 missions delivered 523.3 S/T.

...At the completion of MAP-CB augmentation on 27 February 1975, the Airlift International and World Airways DC-8 operation moved to Saigon and, joined by Transinternational (TIA), Flying Tiger (FTL) and Seaboard World (SAW), began to provide airlift of USAID rice and kerosene to Pochentong. The DC-8s delivered 27,480 S/T rice and 873 S/T kerosene to Pochentong in 617 missions. A TIA DC-8 also flew 58 missions to airlift 2,763 S/T ammo from U-Tapao 4-21 March 1975 as trade-off for C-130 bladder birds transporting USAID fuel. On 18 March 1975 a record total 1,133.9 S/T rice, ammo, and kerosene was delivered to Pochentong; the largest single day rice delivery was 1085.6 S/T on 31 March 1975.

...In summary this huge airlift was conducted under difficult and hostile conditions. From 1 January 1975 until 17 April 1975 over 2,500 artillery and rocket rounds impacted on or near Pochentong Airfield. Impact patterns were monitored continually and every conceivable step was taken to minimize the probability of losses. These included changes in operating patterns, movement of the off-load activities to areas of least impacts, and, when prudent, suspension of operations for variable periods of time until favorable changes in the impact pattern could be discerned. These steps, plus a large measure of good fortune, resulted in completion of the airlift with no losses of aircraft nor American lives. There were eight instances of aircraft receiving minor to moderate shrapnel damage and, unfortunately, nine members of the Cambodian military and civilian off-load crews were killed and approximately forty were wounded.

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...The performance of all in the most demanding and hostile environment at Phnom Penh and under relatively primitive operating conditions was outstanding. There were numerous instances of individual performances in the sustained Khmer airlift which reflected dedication and heroism. The entire operation attests to the professionalism of all concerned....

SCOOT and SCOOT(T)

(S) By 1 January 1975 Support of Cambodia out of Thailand (transshipment) SCOOT(T) from deep draft ships to barges out of Vung Tau had become the primary means of supplying Phnom Penh with MAP material (ammunition/general cargo); however, Mekong River convoy operations were coming under an ever-increasing threat of interdiction.<sup>1</sup>

(S) By 9 January 1975 convoy operations had become untenable and intensive efforts were under way to increase airlift support to Cambodia. (See also, Cambodia Airlift Support.)

(S) As of 10 February the status of Mekong River convoy assets was as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Type	Lost	Remaining Available	Additional Located/Contracted	Total Avail/Located/Contracted
SCOOT tugs	4*	7	1	8
SCOOT barges	-	12	4	16
Shield barges	17	7	11	18
USAID tugs	2	2	-	2**
USAID barges	3	4	-	4**
Rice ships	2	-	-	-
POL ships	2	-	-	-
Total Assets	30	32	16	48

\*Insured value of \$1.85 million.

\*\*USAID was attempting to charter 7 tugs/8 barges in addition to those shown.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 328-329; J4712 Point Paper, 24 Feb 75; Subj: SCOOT.
  2. J4712 Point Paper, 10 Feb 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Assets.

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(D) The gravity of the situation was emphasized by the fact that one of the SCOOT tugs had been sunk at Vung Tau by sapper attacks on 17 January 1975, raised and sunk again on 1 February.<sup>1</sup>

(C) As a preventive measure, U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), with CINCPAC approval, initiated action for five tugs to tow six SCOOT barges loaded with Military Department-owned ammunition from Vung Tau to Vayama. On 10 March 6,000 short tons of ammunition departed Vung Tau in an effort to reduce the number of loaded barges in Vietnam vulnerable to sapper attack.<sup>2</sup>

(D) Although the prospects for continued Mekong convoy operations appeared grim, it was noted on 19 March that funds allocated by the Secretary of Defense (Defense Security Assistance Agency) for Fiscal Year 1975 (\$19.5 million) would allow contracts to be continued through 30 June 1975. Expenditures from 1 July 1974 through 8 March 1975 amounted to \$14,820,241.<sup>3</sup>

#### Mekong Convoy Security

(C) In January 1975 the rapidly deteriorating security situation along the lower Mekong River stood in sharp contrast to the optimistic report submitted by the USSAG as late as 22 November 1974.<sup>4</sup>


(C) The Khmer Communists were vigorously prosecuting their dry season offensive in an effort to strangle the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) by preventing essential commodities from reaching the capital.<sup>5</sup>

(S) By 9 January 1975 a temporary halt had been placed on all river movements to Phnom Penh as a result of enemy control of both sides of the Mekong north of Neak Luong for a stretch of 20 kilometers and south of Neak Luong at the narrows near Peam Chor and Peam Reang. The Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK) were forced more and more to concentrate on the defense of Phnom Penh while support to Cambodia shifted to the air.<sup>6</sup> (See also, Cambodia Airlift Support.)

(S) On 18 January 1975 CINCPAC requested JCS authority to provide cluster bomb units (CBU-55) to the Khmer Air Force to aid in opening the vital Mekong

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1. J4712 Point Paper, 24 Feb 75, Subj: SCOOT.
  2. J42 WEB, 17-23 Mar 75.
  3. J4712 Point Paper, 19 Mar 75, Subj: Mekong Convoy Capability; J4712 WEB, 17-23 Mar 75.
  4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 330.
  5. AMEMB Phnom Penh 1028/180507Z Jan 75.
  6. USSAG 091032Z Jan 75; USSAG 071245Z Jan 75; AMEMB Phnom Penh 1028/180507Z Jan 75.

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Mekong Convoy Shield Barges

supply route. The JCS approved use of CBU-55 on targets in unpopulated areas along the banks of the Mekong. This authority was later expanded by JCS to include other critical targets appropriate for CBU-55 employment where there was low or no probability of collateral damage; however, CINCPAC retained approval authority on a case-by-case basis for CBU-55 employment against these targets.<sup>1</sup>

(G) Planning continued into March 1975 in hopes that the security situation would improve and convoy operations could resume; however, riverine craft losses had also rapidly accelerated. Between 1 January 1975 and 3 March 1975, 25 craft had been lost as compared to a total of 28 losses during the period 1972 through 1974. By 18 March 1975, 38 craft had been lost:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Type Craft</u>	<u>Losses</u>		<u>On-Hand</u>	<u>Operational</u>
	<u>1 Jan</u>	<u>-18 Mar</u>		
River Patrol Boat (PBR)	13		44	35
Armored Troop Carrier (ATC)	8		11	6
Monitor or Armored Craft (MON)(AC)	2		8	6
Landing Craft, Mech-6 (LCM-6)	10		10	1
Landing Craft, Mech-8 (LCM-8)	1		2	0
Minesweeper, Patrol (MSR)	2		1	1
Minesweeper, River (MSM)	0		2	2
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)	2		0	0
Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB)	0		6	6
Landing Craft, Utility (LCU)	0		2	2
<b>TOTALS</b>	<u>38</u>		<u>86</u>	<u>59</u>

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1. CINCPAC 182342Z Jan 75; JCS 7884/200210Z Jan 75; JCS 6812/021510Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 040430Z Feb 75.
  2. J44/J00 Discussion Topic, Subj: Cambodia Riverine Craft Status, 4 Mar 75; J4714 Point Paper, 19 Mar 75, Subj: Cambodia Riverine Craft Status.

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(S) In the meantime, on 15 February 1975 CINCPAC supported a Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) requirement for more monitors to assist in minesweeping under fire to reopen the Mekong River supply route. Arrangement was to be made for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to lend four monitors to the Government of the Khmer Republic. On 21 March the text of the loan agreement was approved.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Passive protective measures continued to be taken to prepare riverine craft for resumption of convoy operations. These measures included filling riverine craft hulls with polyurethane styrofoam flotation material and attachment of foam-filled steel plate "blisters," welded together in series to form flotation collars around the hulls to reduce vulnerability to mine damage.<sup>2</sup>

### Military Transportation in Thailand

#### Military Airlift Command (MAC) Channels, Nakhon Phanom (NKP)

(S) On 3 September 1975, as part of the Thailand drawdown, the JCS directed closure of NKP Air Base. After coordination with the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, CINCPAC recommended, and the Air Force Chief of Staff granted, approval for suspension of all channels to and from NKP Air Base effective 1 November 1975. The channels were closed according to schedule.<sup>3</sup>

#### Reduction of Services at Don Muang Air Terminal

(U) As part of the drawdown in Thailand, Thirteenth Air Force directed termination of passenger and contractual service at Don Muang Air Terminal effective 30 June 1975. CSAF proposed that reduced services (12-hour day) be continued through 30 September 1976. After CINCPAC coordination to determine component command requirements, Military Airlift Command gave final approval to termination of terminal services and maintenance contracts effective 31 December 1975. A residual force (seven Air Force enlisted personnel) would remain to provide minimum service from 0800-2000 hours daily, providing for landings twice daily until closure of up-country bases was complete.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 150850Z Feb 75; STATE 064439/211947Z Mar 75; also see Security Assistance Chapter for problem involved in transfer of assets from GVN to GKR.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 330; CINCPAC 051710Z Feb 75.
  3. JCS 7213/032222Z Sep 75; MAC 302125Z Sep 75; PACAF 022215Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 040614Z Oct 75; MACTHAI 090600Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 160234Z Oct 75; CSAF 312032Z Oct 75.
  4. J4315 HistSum Nov 75; CSAF 291709Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 310335Z May 75; PACAF 071930Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 180506Z Oct 75; MAC 171515Z Nov 75.

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Trial Movement of Household Goods

(U) Effective 1 January 1975 the Department of Defense began conducting a one-year trial to evaluate the overall effectiveness of a competitive (no me-too) rate filing system for movement of household goods between the Continental United States and Okinawa. Based on the rates submitted by participating carriers, the cost avoidance for the first six months of the trial was \$956,300. The trial, monitored by the Mobility Operations Division of the Logistics Directorate, progressed satisfactorily during the first six months. On 1 August 1975 responsibility for monitoring the trial was transferred, along with all personal property shipping functions, to the Military Traffic Management Command-Field Office Pacific (MTMC-FOP).<sup>1</sup> (Also, see MTMC-Field Office Pacific.)

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1. J472 HistSums Jan-Apr 75; J43 HistSum Aug 75.

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SECTION V

FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

Facilities on Oahu

IPAC Facility - Joint Command Sponsored Military Construction Projects

(S) After having funds denied for rehabilitation of the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) during Fiscal Year 1975, CINCPAC reviewed and rejected alternatives and submitted a revalidation, requesting insertion of the project at \$3.78 million in the FY 76 U.S. Navy Military Construction (MILCON) program.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The status of this project, and the \$4.3 million project to upgrade the CINCPAC Command Center during FY 78, fluctuated during the year because of the requirement to compete for funds with other Navy projects such as CINCPACFLT Command Center Project P-185. On 19 July 1975 Admiral Gayler discussed the problems encountered in processing joint command sponsored military construction projects in a message to Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In his message Admiral Gayler noted that, "...Although 09BF [Navy] officially has the role of advocate for CINCPAC-sponsored projects within the system, he has an easily understandable problem of my elephant trampling his mice, but I don't like the solution of murdering the elephant...." He further suggested that, "Maybe joint projects ought to be funded out of Defense section of MILCON Bill," rather than out of the Service section. By December 1975 both the IPAC and CINCPAC Command Center projects had been restored for FY 77 and FY 78 at \$4.3 million and \$4.7 million respectively; however, a Program Budget Decision (PBD) on the General Defense Intelligence Plan (GDIP) had recommended deferral of the IPAC project until FY 78. The CINCPACFLT Command Center project had been restored in full at \$7.1 million for FY 76.<sup>2</sup>

Project FRESH (Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii)

(U) The objectives of Project FRESH, originally initiated in August 1971 as a result of Department of Defense direction and updated in July 1973 and August 1974, were to determine real property holdings which could be released by the DOD under the guidelines established by Executive Order 11508

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 331; CINCPAC 301625Z Jan 75.
  2. CINCPAC 190318Z Jul 75; J442 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: IPAC/Command Centers.

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(as superseded by Executive Order 11724) and to develop a land requirements document in support of the long-range military presence in Hawaii. The executive agent for this study was Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The Project FRESH study, as updated, revealed that DOD had land holdings in Hawaii of about 7 percent, with about 25 percent on the Island of Oahu. The study concluded that this land, amounting to 285,000 acres, could be reduced by 7,600 acres, or about 2.7 percent.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the study and, in GAO Report B-164217, 20 February 1975, recommended that it not be presented to the public as a valid statement of DOD long-range land needs in Hawaii based on the following conclusions:<sup>3</sup>

- Lack of specific DOD guidelines for converting force levels into land area requirements.
- Lack of supporting data.
- Failure of Services to apply land use conversion factors.
- Inconsistencies in determining requirements for similar land.

(U) To counter the GAO report, CINCPAC recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct continuation of the joint planning effort started under Project FRESH with Naval Facilities Engineering Command as the technical nucleus and a professional staff composed of representatives from CINCPAC, the component commands, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 18 April 1975 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) replied to the Comptroller General of the United States on the GAO final report, noting that:<sup>5</sup>

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1. J441 Point Paper, 17 Dec 75, Subj: Project FRESH; ASD(I&L) ltr of 18 Apr 75.
  2. J42 Point Paper, 10 Mar 75, Subj: GAO Report to SECDEF on Questionable Aspects of the Military's Study of Land Needs in Hawaii.
  3. Ibid.
  4. CINCPAC 190242Z Mar 75.
  5. ASD(I&L) ltr of 18 Apr 75.

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- Project FRESH study did meet its objective.
- Factors used in basic study were adequate and appropriate and remained valid for continued use.
- A document such as Project FRESH is a necessary part of the planning and coordination process between Federal, State, and local planning agencies.
- The Secretary of Defense planned to continue relying on Project FRESH data base as refined to reflect current and future planning.

### Bikeway Systems on Military Installations

(U) Admiral Gayler continued to lend strong personal support to cooperation between the civilian and military communities for construction of a bikeway system for Honolulu. On 22 January 1975 Commander, Fourteenth Naval District, RADM Paddock, and Honolulu City Managing Director Paul Devens officially opened the Pearl City-CINCPACFLT boathouse gate, city-built bike path. On 27 January Honolulu Mayor Frank F. Fasi expressed his appreciation to Admiral Gayler for his interest and assistance.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 24 January 1975 Admiral Gayler requested assistance from the Director, State Department of Transportation to expedite completion of the bikeway on Kamehameha Highway between the Halawa and Makalapa Gates of Pearl Harbor Naval Base. A request was also forwarded to CINCPACFLT requesting consideration for improving the Navy interconnect at Makalapa Gate.<sup>2</sup>

(U) By December 1975 the State design of the Makalapa to Halawa Gates section of the bikeway was nearing completion. This project was expected to eliminate the after-duty-hours restriction caused by the locked Halawa Gate by putting the bikeway along the Kamehameha Highway sidewalk rather than inside the Navy base.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 331; J425 HistSum Feb 75; Ltr Mayor Fasi to Admiral Gayler, 27 Jan 75.
  2. Ltr Admiral Gayler to RADM Wright (USN(R)), 24 Jan 75; J42 ltr Ser 263 of 3 Feb 75, Subj: Bikeways.
  3. J441 HistSum Dec 75.

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Ft DeRussy Guest Cottages

(U) On 30 August 1975 Admiral Gayler personally recommended to General Weyand, Chief of Staff of the Army, that the Ft DeRussy guest cottages scheduled to be razed in mid-September be saved; however, General Kerwin, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, responding in General Weyand's absence, reconfirmed the decision to demolish the cottages. This position had been confirmed by the Under Secretary of the Army in correspondence to the Federal Property Review Board and the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and was included in the Army environmental impact statement filed with the Council on Environmental Quality.<sup>1</sup>

Draft DOD-OMB Military Housing Study

(U) CINCPAC became aware of a draft Defense Department-Office of Manpower and Budget (DOD-OMB) Military Housing Study through a 14 November 1975 Department of the Army news release titled "Fair Market Rental." The release indicated that "...soldiers may have to begin paying the fair market rental (FMR) value of their government quarters and for the utilities they consume should a DOD proposal be implemented."<sup>2</sup>

(U) While component commanders had not been tasked through their respective Service channels to provide comments on this proposal, Admiral Gayler felt that its far-reaching impact on morale and operational readiness made timely comment imperative. Component commanders' views were requested and incorporated in CINCPAC's comment to DOD. After enumerating such problems as lowered morale, degradation of mobilization capability, adverse impact on civilian communities, increased energy consumption, and initial increased personnel costs, CINCPAC recommended the study not be adopted. If political pressures or other reasons required adoption of a fair market rental policy, he recommended in-depth analyses using simulated modeling techniques of the impact on individuals, the Services, and civilian communities.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 301520Z Aug 75 (BOM); Msg Gen Kerwin to Admiral Gayler, 13949/042225Z Sep 75 (BOM).
  2. DA 141330Z Nov 75.
  3. J44 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC 090513Z Dec 75; CINCPACFLT 050614Z Dec 75; CINCPACAF 272010Z Nov 75; COMMARCORBASESPAC 04232Z Dec 75; CDRUSASCH 050121Z Dec 75.

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### MILCON in Cambodia and Vietnam

(U) On 18 April 1975 CINCPAC recommended early completion of negotiations for final settlement of all contracts terminated by the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia and U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Saigon to allow for deobligation and reprogramming of funds as required.<sup>1</sup>

(U) By January 1975 the number of contracts being administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON), Republic of Vietnam was down from 88 at the beginning of the Fiscal Year to 67, with a value of approximately \$12 million. This included construction or repair of roads; utilities; dependent shelters; airfields; and port, operational, and training facilities at 28 different locations throughout Vietnam. Major emphasis during the third quarter FY 75 included three major construction projects:<sup>2</sup>

- Industrial pier, Saigon shipyard.
- 450 bed hospital, Phy Tho.
- Army arsenal upgrade phase II, Go Vap.

(U) By the end of March a parallel DIRCON office was established in Bangkok, and vital records were transferred to this office. By 29 April stop work orders had been issued on all incompletd contracts and closeout negotiations had been completed on all but six contracts. Continued negotiations to close out remaining contracts, settlement of claims, and payment of final invoices were then accomplished by the residual staff located at Bangkok.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Most construction underway in Cambodia prior to the fall on 17 April 1975 was to improve Pochentong, Battambang, and Ream airfields, and naval facilities at Ream. The responsibility for close out of contracts remained with the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC), Thailand. As of 14 May 1975 final close out actions were being taken on contracts involving approximately \$60,000.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 180501Z Apr 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 332-333; OICC Thailand 220409Z May 75.
  3. OICC Thailand 220409Z May 75.
  4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol I, p. 333; OICC Thailand Ltr Ser 1228 of 14 May 75, Subj: Status Report of Khmer Republic Contracts.

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Facilities/Construction in Thailand

(C) On 15 August 1975 CINCPAC recommended that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance to Services on construction projects in Thailand in view of projected U.S. withdrawal by March 1976. The current CINCPAC operations plan (Thailand Planning) proposed a freeze on all new construction and major repair work, and phasing of completion of those projects already underway with planned U.S. withdrawal.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 19 August 1975 the Secretary of Defense issued guidance for U.S. military contract construction in Thailand:<sup>2</sup>

- No new military construction (MILCON) or non-appropriated funded contracts were to be awarded pending further guidance.

- No repair and improvement projects were to be initiated except when essential for health, safety or immediate operational necessity.

(C) The status of all projects then under contract using U.S. funds as well as those using joint U.S.-Thai funds was to be reported by 1 September 1975 to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 18 September 1975 the Secretary of Defense provided further guidance on construction in Thailand which required termination of one project at Vayama and all but two projects at U-Tapao. Work was to continue on projects at Ramasun Station and on those projects where termination would generate no dollar savings. Work on joint U.S.-Thai funded construction (PEACE RIDE II) was to continue to completion.<sup>4</sup>

Thailand Regional Exchange (TRE)

(U) Periodic Thai complaints involving U.S. import of duty-free goods and black marketing of U.S. merchandise caused the American Embassy to urge the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) to assist in lowering the U.S. presence in Bangkok by relocating the TRE to the Samae San-U-Tapao area. COMUSMACTHAI had originally hoped to solve the problem by new construction, but on 2 February 1975 CINCPAC advised that new construction would

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1. CINCPAC 152151Z Aug 75.
  2. SECDEF 9790/191410Z Aug 75.
  3. Ibid.
  4. SECDEF 8734/182120Z Sep 75.

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be difficult to support in view of phaseout plans. COMUSMACTHAI was further advised that the balance between the pressure to relocate, availability of facilities, and goods and services provided could be determined in country by the major recipients of TRE benefits, both American Embassy and military beneficiaries.<sup>1</sup>

MILCON on Diego Garcia

(C) The Fiscal Year 1975 MILCON authorization bill, passed by Congress and signed by President Ford at the end of 1974, included projects for further increase in petroleum storage (320,000 barrels for Navy and 160,000 barrels for Air Force) at Diego Garcia.

(U) The FY 76 MILCON program included POL storage for 160,000 more barrels within the scope of work of the Navy authorization of \$13.8 million for Diego Garcia.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The entire program was expected to be completed by early 1979; however, it was recognized that the Culver Amendment to the FY 76 MILCON bill, delaying use of funds until 1 July 1976, could delay completion for six to seven months.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Availability of added POL storage was expected to greatly increase flexibility and options available in the Indian Ocean area:<sup>4</sup>

- Attack Aircraft Carrier (CVA) Task Force could operate for 38 days at a range of 685 nautical miles from Diego Garcia using fleet oiler shuttle.

- CVA Task Force could be extended to 118 days and 2,200 nautical miles (entire Indian Ocean) with two fleet oilers shuttling between Force and Diego Garcia and two Military Sealift Command tankers resupplying Diego Garcia.

(S) Increased POL storage capability was also expected to enhance Air Force tactical, bombardment, aerial mining, reconnaissance, and airlift operational concepts.<sup>5</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 334-335; CINCPAC 020610Z Feb 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 569; J422 Point Paper, 11 Nov 75, Subj: Diego Garcia-Scope of FY 75 & 76 MILCON Programs.
  3. Ibid.
  4. J4223 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: POL Storage-Diego Garcia.
  5. Ibid.

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MILCON in the Republic of the Philippines

(U) In the middle of June 1975 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in response to Congressional action deleting the total FY 76 MILCON program for the Republic of the Philippines, placed an indefinite hold on the award of all military construction projects not previously awarded, both non-appropriated and appropriated fund, for installations in the Republic of the Philippines. This hold affected unobligated FY 75 and earlier funds.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 24 July CINCPAC requested impact statements from CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT on the effects of the indefinite hold on such key projects as:<sup>2</sup>

Air Force

- Alteration of airman dormitories, Clark Air Base.
- 250 new family housing units, Clark Air Base.

Navy

- Dependent school expansion and gymnasium, Subic.
- Improvement of 130 family housing units, Subic.
- NAF, Navy exchange cold storage warehouse, Subic.
- NAF, special services comfort facility, Subic.

(U) CINCPACFLT response to CINCPAC request listed the following impact caused by the hold on construction:<sup>3</sup>

- Jeopardized dependent school accreditation.
- Imposed unequal BAQ forfeiture and morale problem for occupants of unimproved housing.
- Spectators and contestants inconvenienced by inadequate comfort facilities.

(C) CINCPACAF also responded to the hold:<sup>4</sup>

- Imposed bad living conditions on airmen in dorms without airconditioning.
- Forced 250 families to live in substandard, expensive off-base quarters.

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1. DASD(I&H) Memorandum, 24 Jun 75, Subj: Military Construction in the Republic of the Philippines.
  2. CINCPAC 240336Z Jul 75.
  3. CINCPACFLT 310043Z Jul 75.
  4. CINCPACAF 252315Z Jul 75.

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(U) In addition, CINCPACAF pointed out another requirement to upgrade 234 NCO family housing units which were currently forcing occupants to forfeit BAQ on an unequal basis.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 15 August 1975 following a visit to the Philippines by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing)(DASD(I&H)) Fliakas, Ambassador Sullivan emphasized the need to unfreeze FY 75 monies and for DOD to submit proposals for additional construction in spite of Congressional action on the 1976 request:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...My justification for this suggestion is my strong feeling that it should be a priority DOD program to establish adequate on-base housing soonest so that all repeat all U.S. personnel assigned to Clark and Subic can actually live on base. It is my feeling that most of our problems in black-marketing, community relations friction and other issues arising from economic differences between U.S. Service families and Filipinos could be eliminated if off-base housing could be discontinued.

(U) CINCPAC concurred with Ambassador Sullivan's views in a message to the JCS.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 24 September 1975 DASD(I&H) Fliakas notified the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force (Installations & Logistics) of approval to proceed with construction on three specific projects:<sup>4</sup>

<u>Service</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Program Amount</u>
Navy	Dependent school expansion, Subic.	\$1,775,000
Navy	Minor construction, Cold Iron Facility, Leyte Wharf, Cubi Point	\$ 275,000
Air Force	Improvement 234 family housing units, Clark.	\$2,470,000

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Manila 11348/150845Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC 182039Z Aug 75.
  4. DASD(I&H) Memorandum, 24 Sep 75, Subj: Military Construction in the Republic of the Philippines.

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(U) All other construction projects in the Philippines were held in abeyance for the remainder of 1975.

#### Road Construction in American Samoa

(U) In August 1974 the Governor of American Samoa requested assistance from CINCPAC to construct an access road to a television transmitter facility atop Mt. Alava on the island of Tutuila. CINCPAC forwarded the request in a personal letter to the Secretary of Defense, recommending coordination with the Department of the Interior as required by P.L. 48, U.S. Code 1666. The project was coordinated and assigned to the Department of the Army, with action to Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific by November 1974.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In January 1975 the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group advised that fund limitations prevented further Army participation in the project; however, a CINCPAC query to the Governor obtained agreement from the Government of American Samoa to assume the cost for a two-man Army engineer reconnaissance team to travel to American Samoa and evaluate the project.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Army estimated that the project would require a reinforced engineer platoon (1 officer and 62 enlisted men) deployed for 120 days to complete.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The estimated transportation cost of personnel and equipment for the project was \$200,000, and, since the equipment was excessive for air transport and the Navy was unable to provide shipping, CINCPAC again queried the Governor for the necessary funds. By October 1975 the Government of American Samoa advised that funds were available and that it also desired the scope of the project be revised to add a second "Top Mile" road which would require over double the time of the original estimate to complete. Army reaction to this addition was initially cool, but coordination was still in progress at year's end.<sup>4</sup>

#### U.S. Naval Use of Singapore Facilities

~~(S)~~ Among other actions resulting from an early 1975 United Kingdom (U.K.) defense review on Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf support facilities was the decision to remove all support forces from Singapore by 1976. The U.S. Pacific

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1. J441 Point Paper, 17 Dec 75, Subj: American Samoa Road Project.
  2. CDRUSACSG 241850Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 310432Z Jan 75.
  3. J441 Point Paper, 17 Dec 75, Subj: American Samoa Road Project.
  4. Ibid.

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Fleet had been using the Singapore facilities to repair and bunker (fuel) ships, and the U.K. withdrawal would jeopardize U.S. access to these facilities.<sup>1</sup>

(C) After failure of an attempt to have New Zealand retain the stores and fuel with the U.S. underwriting portions of the cost, the U.S. proposed U.K. control and retention of certain parts of the Senoko Oil Fuel Depot. The following were key provisions of this proposal:<sup>2</sup>

- The U.K. would continue to retain and control those parts of the Senoko Fuel Depot currently allocated to the U.K.
- The U.K. would retain two civilian managers of facilities.
- The U.S. would be guaranteed reasonable access to berths 6 and 7 (72-hour advance notice).
- The U.S. would deal with U.K. and not Government of Singapore.

(S) By the end of 1975 it appeared that the Government of Singapore was favorably disposed, and the outlook for continued U.K. management of the facilities was optimistic.<sup>3</sup>

#### Mid-Range Plans for Guam

(S) On 23 December 1974 the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force to study real property needs on Guam and Tinian. Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command was designated executive agent and the study format was to resemble that of Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii (Project FRESH). The completion date for the study was set for October 1975.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The study was to have two major objectives:<sup>5</sup>

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1. J4114 Point Paper, 10 Mar 75, Subj: Impact of U.K. Defense Review on Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf Support Facilities.
  2. J422 Point Paper, 8 Oct 75, Subj: USN Interests re UK Senoko POL Storage Facility-Singapore.
  3. J42 HistSum Oct 75.
  4. J425 Point Paper, 12 May 75, Subj: Mid-Range Plans.
  5. Ibid.

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- Develop a mid-range land use plan for Defense requirements on Guam and Tinian which consolidated functions and facilities.

- Develop rationale for long-range land use requirements on Guam and Tinian based on continued strong U.S. military presence in Pacific with composition of force remaining the same.

(S) As a result of the study, 1,600 acres were proposed for acquisition to support consolidation. Also identified for possible release, lease, or joint use were 3,200 acres in the mid-range and 2,800 acres in the long-range. The study was to be reviewed annually and updated every three years.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 23 October 1975 CINCPAC's concurrence and comments on the study were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further action or comment by the Secretary of Defense was awaited at year's end.<sup>2</sup>

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1. ENGCOC Ltr Ser S-22, 23 Sep 75, Subj: Guam Land Use Study; forwarding of (S).
  2. CINCPAC 231420Z Oct 75.

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CHAPTER VI--COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I--PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Status of PACOM Communications

(S) A review of PACOM communications systems as of 21 August 1975 revealed the following:<sup>1</sup>

- Fleet Communications System - This system was primarily a high frequency single side band (HFSSB) system with poor reliability, low capacity, poor long haul secure voice capability, and heavy message backlogs during crises.

- Defense Communications System (DCS) - This system was a mixture of cable and satellite systems (37 percent military satellites, 28 percent leased satellites, 30 percent leased cable and 5 percent tropospheric networks). It was limited by cable vulnerability, inflexibility, and long installation leadtimes. There was also poor interface with tactical systems to include variation between tactical and DCS satellite terminal hardware data rates, inability to link certain tactical secure voice capabilities with DCS automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) equipment, and the fixed nature of DCS automatic voice network (AUTOVON) and automatic digital network (AUTODIN) as opposed to mobile tactical requirements.

(S) Satellite communications were vital for flexibility and mobility, wide-band capability, and access to remote areas such as Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean. There were three main satellite systems in operation which were monitored by 12 super high frequency (SHF) earth terminals, 10 land based (including 3 transportable), and 2 shipboard:<sup>2</sup>

- Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II in the West Pacific.

- SKYNET II (British), with two channels and low capacity, over the Indian Ocean.

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1. J6122 Point Paper, 21 Aug 75, Subj: PACOM Communications.
  2. Ibid.

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- NATO IIB which supported wideband secure voice between Hawaii and Washington, D.C. This system was due to be replaced.

(S) Satellite limitation included lack of redundancy, too few terminals, negligible access to ships, and sparse Indian Ocean capacity which would not support major contingencies (no broadband capability there).<sup>1</sup>

(S) Secure voice capabilities were unsatisfactory to fleet units, and were generally narrowband with few wideband links which were essential for effective conferencing. Key wideband links included the one between Hawaii and Washington, D.C., and Thailand (Nakhon Phanom) equipment which was moved to Korea beginning 31 August 1975.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Key improvement programs developed for implementation included the following:<sup>3</sup>

- Gapfiller Satellite (GAPSAT) - This was a narrowband, ultrahigh frequency (UHF) system for fleet access, programmed as an interim system (CY 76) to provide coverage for the West Pacific and Atlantic areas, but not the Indian Ocean. It included a leased UHF transponder in the Marine Satellite (MARISAT) system and represented an important improvement over the current fleet HFSSB system. This satellite was originally scheduled to be operational by 3 July 1975, but continued problems throughout the year delayed its activation until mid-1976.

- FLEETSAT - This was a narrowband, secure voice UHF system designed for worldwide coverage with activation in late 1977. It was considered vital for fleet access.

- DSCS II - This was a SHF satellite scheduled for its next launch in March 1977, and needed to replace the NATO IIB system over the East Pacific and for Indian Ocean coverage.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.; J6 WEBS 3-9 Feb 75, 17-23 Mar 75, 12-18 May 75, 14-18 Jul 75, 11-15 Aug 75, 17-21 Nov 75 and 29 Dec 75-2 Jan 76.

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(S) In addition to the above satellite systems, 74 more terminals were programmed worldwide for the period CY 76-79 (26 shipboard, 7 airborne, 13 tactical/transportable, and 18 fixed).<sup>1</sup>

(S) Overall PACOM communications requirements were viewed as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- Full satellite communications coverage.
- Expedited availability of terminals and terminal hardware to include modular, mobile terminals, both shipboard and land based.
- Conferenceable secure voice down to tactical units (including airborne and ship subscribers) with parallel interactive message network.
- Secure tactical and strategic systems for all voice and data.
- Early test beds for conferenced secure voice (including ships and tactical units) and command center message handling.

Criticality of Clark Air Base/Dau Communications Facilities

(U) The key role of Clark AB and the adjacent Dau site facility in PACOM communications was highlighted in 1975 as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- Strategic Communications - Clark AB/Dau comprised the only strategic communications facility in the southwest Pacific. It provided major DCS paths to Taiwan, Okinawa, and Thailand. It also provided the southwest Pacific transmit/receive geographical position for satellite link with Diego Garcia, and its HF/UHF ground entry stations extended communications into the southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.

- Gateway Communications switching and transmission - The Clark/Dau complex housed the area primary AUTOVON and

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. J6128 Point Paper, 9 Jun 75, Subj: Clark AB (Including Adjacent Dau Site) Extremely Critical Communications Hub.

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AUTODIN switch facilities (its importance would increase with planned closure of the Taiwan AUTOVON switch and the Thailand AUTODIN switch). This complex also housed the area primary technical control facility.

- Other communications facilities - The Clark/Dau complex also housed a military satellite terminal, an area primary secure voice manual switch, a diplomatic telecommunications system regional relay facility (HF radio teletype connecting embassies in the Indian Ocean and West Pacific), and Philippine commercial communications mode (Dau).

- Other communications hub - The Clark/Dau complex served as the hub for other facilities to include the Navy communications station, communications satellite (COMSAT) terminal, the cablehead for undersea cable to Guam, Japan, and Hawaii, and military and civilian tropospheric links to Taiwan (connecting to Okinawa and Japan).

#### Integrated Communications System (ICS) in Thailand

~~(S)~~ During 1975 the disposition of the 17-site military-operated ICS developed as an issue related to the overall drawdown of U.S. Forces in Thailand. On 20 February 1975 the American Embassy, Bangkok sought authority from the State Department to initiate discussions concerning turnover of the Ubon ICS station to the Thai, which could lead to joint manning of the station to the benefit of the Thai military communications system and residual U.S. users in the area. On 30 June 1975 General Kriangsak Chamanan, Chief of Staff, Thai Supreme Command sent a letter to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand requesting that the U.S. Government turn over, in an operational status, and on a phased basis, the ICS and its facilities, including test and maintenance equipment when they were no longer required to support U.S. Forces. He noted that the Royal Thai Armed Forces would arrange to fulfill remaining U.S. communications requirements along with their own after turnover of the system. During the first part of July the American Embassy received State Department authorization to begin discussions looking toward ICS turnover. By November 1975 the American Embassy, Bangkok had prepared a draft turnover agreement, and on 4 December had requested authorization to tell the Thai that the United States would turn over the ICS.<sup>1</sup>

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 2883/200538Z Feb 75, 13364/080929Z Jul 75 and 25470/041044Z Dec 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 345-347.

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(S) In the meantime the CINCPAC Director for Communications-Data Processing coordinated with the Staff Judge Advocate on possible problems related to the turnover. These problems involved continued operations and maintenance (O&M) funding until the Thai could assume that responsibility, and funding of the actual turnover itself. As for operations and maintenance funding, the Staff Judge Advocate advised that the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, permitted utilization of MAP grant aid to fund, maintain, and operate ICS sites of third countries such as Thailand. Although not legally prohibited, there was a Department of Defense/State policy against using MAP grant aid for third country O&M funding. There was no authority to use U.S. O&M funds to operate or maintain ICS sites when there was no U.S. military connection, but since there was a U.S. residual presence it became an issue of fact as to whether U.S. Forces were being supported by the ICS sites.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In reviewing the proposed agreement between Thailand and the United States for turnover of ICS facilities, on 5 December 1975 the Staff Judge Advocate noted that Section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, stipulated that, after 30 June 1972, no military assistance could be furnished by the United States to Thailand directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance was authorized under the FAA or the Foreign Military Sales Act. The proposed agreement did not mention whether the turnover would be funded as MAP grant aid under the FAA, or as a Foreign Military Sale with or without guaranty provisions. In the former, but not the latter instance, Section 505 of the FAA required certain assurances from the recipient country as to, inter alia, utilization, and disposition of the grant articles. A final decision on funding the turnover was still pending at year's end.<sup>2</sup>

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)  
Communications-Electronics (C-E) Study

(C) On 3 December 1974 CINCPAC forwarded a CINCPAC/U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) Saigon study to the JCS on RVNAF C-E requirements in relation to the RVNAF force structure and Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV) funding (also, see the Security Assistance chapter). The study made recommendations on three main areas where action could be taken to relieve pressure on the DAV budget.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J73/Memo/S404-75 of 24 Nov 75, Subj: Legal Aspects of Drawdown of Thailand ICS Sites.
  2. J73/Memo/414-75 of 5 Dec 75, Subj: Legal Review of Proposed ICS Turnover Agreement.
  3. J620 Point Paper, 26 Feb 75, Subj: CINCPAC/DAO Study, Communications-Electronics (C-E) on RVNAF Force Level.

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- Civilianization of certain RVNAF and DAO-operated C-E systems.
- Deactivation of excess assets.
- Development of in-country C-E support material manufacturing capability.

(C) Facilities which could be civilianized were tentatively identified and early support for local battery manufacturing (AN/PRC-25 batteries were a multi-million dollar DAV budget item) was recommended, as was deactivation of the tropospheric systems (AN/PRC-85). These proposals were still being reviewed at the State Department as of 26 February 1975 and were not implemented prior to the fall of Vietnam on 30 April 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(C) This study also identified U.S.-owned equipment worth approximately \$2,750,000, mostly non-recoverable, which had been installed in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 (current value was estimated to be one-half to one-third original costs).<sup>2</sup>

TSC-54 Satellite Terminal at Clark AB

(C) The TSC-54 satellite terminal at Clark AB, Philippines, had been inoperative, except for short periods of time, from 13 September through 21 November 1975. The inability of maintenance personnel on-site to repair the terminal resulted in CINCPAC staff action to obtain assistance. The assistance team was unable to do more than assist in the repair of a sequence of problems. As soon as one trouble was repaired another would appear. On 16 October CINCPAC requested that the JCS contingency TSC-54 at Helemano be sent to Clark to support the deployment of the USS MIDWAY to the Indian Ocean. The contingency TSC-54 arrived at Clark on 23 October and became operational on 25 October.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The Clark terminal was returned to operational status on 21 November 1975 and the contingency terminal was relieved of its back-up mission on 6 December and was returned to Hawaii on 10 December.<sup>4</sup>

(C) It appeared that the sequence of problems which occurred at Clark terminal might have been indicative that O&M personnel were not properly

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. J622 Point Paper, 14 Nov 75, Subj: TSC-54 Satellite Terminal at Clark AB.

4. J6 WEBS, 17-21 Nov 75 and 8-12 Dec 75.

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qualified to maintain and repair the terminal. The training received from the assistance team in repair and evaluation of the terminal was expected to alleviate any shortcoming in training by the on-site O&M personnel.<sup>1</sup>

#### High Value Communications Equipment in Vietnam

(S) On 5 April 1975 CINCPAC queried the USDAO Saigon on saving high value communications equipment in Vietnam, specifically the TSC-54 earth terminal/MRC-108 communications equipment deployed to Saigon on 30 March and 2 April, respectively; however, the TSC-54 was ultimately destroyed upon completion of the evacuation at the end of April. As a result, CINCPAC requested and the JCS approved, deploying the Aviano, Italy AN/TSC-54 terminal to Hawaii for contingency requirements. The terminal arrived on site on 24 June 1975 (also, see TSC-54 Satellite Terminal at Clark AB in this chapter for contingency use of TSC-54 terminal).<sup>2</sup>

#### Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu (COTCO)


(U) On 13 March 1975 a Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems (DTACCS) memorandum to the JCS approved implementation of near-term Phase I (18 months) COTCO, which would consolidate Navy-sponsored communications centers on Oahu at the two Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) facilities (Makalapa and Camp Smith). On 26 June DTACCS directed the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to assume the responsibility for further telecommunications automation/consolidation on Oahu through AUTODIN system planning and system engineering (see chart on next page for comparison of existing facilities with COTCO Phase I consolidation).<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. J622 Point Paper, 14 Nov 75, Subj: TSC-54 Satellite Terminal at Clark AB.
  2. CINCPAC 050031Z Apr 75 and 0202145Z May 75; J6232 HistSum Jun 75; J6 WEB 31 Mar-6 Apr 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 350-351; J6 WEB 31 Mar-6 Apr 75, and 7-11 Jul 75.


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**CONSOLIDATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTERS ON OAHU**



\* Manual communications with manual routing; retype each message.  
 \*\* Manual teletype relay.




\* Terminals to be added to extend automated service under Phase I (38 manual centers not included in Phase I consolidation).  
 Potential additions indicated by broken line (---)

Source: J6126 Point Paper, 22 Jan 75. Subj: Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu.

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Cancellation of PACOM AKAC-275 (CIRCE) System

(S) On 17 October 1974 CINCPAC queried PACOM holders of AKAC-275 (CIRCE) on how it was being used, whether or not it was being issued to allied countries, and what the impact would be if it were replaced by one or more of the DRYAD systems, which were much more secure. Only a few users held CIRCE for contingency purposes and while the CIRCE wheel was easier to use and read, its relative short time security counterbalanced this advantage. On 28 January 1975, based upon the responses to his query, CINCPAC announced that the AKAC-275 would be cancelled and replaced by the AKAC-1519 (DRYAD) system effective 1 April 1975.<sup>2</sup>

Changing Callsign Implementation

(C) In efforts to improve force COMSEC posture, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps had pursued actions to develop changing callsign and frequency systems. Following were actions by the Services to implement individual systems. CINCPAC endorsed these efforts and specific PACOM and joint command progress toward implementation are included:<sup>3</sup>

- Army - Individual tactical units were being brought into the daily changing callsign, suffix, and frequency system as rapidly as they could be accommodated by NSA production facilities. The projected goal for implementation by all active tactical units was 1 July 1976. Priority of implementation was established by CONUS, Europe, and Pacific, respectively. Preliminary briefings were provided to Pacific tactical units in October 1974, and data collection was projected for Pacific units during the third quarter CY 75.

- Navy - The Navy implemented the worldwide daily changing callsign system for surface forces on 1 December

- 
1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 360-361; COMUS Korea Ltr SJ-0, 9 May 75, Subj: Requirement for COMSEC Equipment; J6131 HistSum Jul 75; JCS 7937/172209Z Dec 75; J6 WEB 16-19 Dec 75.
  2. CINCPAC 160201Z Oct 74 and 282221Z Jan 75; DIRNSA FT MEADE MD 232128Z Jan 75.
  3. JCS 012108Z Jul 75; CNO 232054Z Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 190527Z Sep 75 and 112337Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 090333Z Aug 75 and 242111Z Oct 75; DIRNSA FT MEADE MD 062219Z Nov 75.

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1974. Air tests were scheduled for third quarter CY 75, and progress had been made in test and development of a changing VHF/UHF system. The CNO called for expanded use of the Navy changing callsign system to include teletype relay, voice, and continuous wave for surface forces, shore stations and shore based aircraft. Based on CNO guidance CINCPACFLT, on 11 October 1975, announced a forthcoming change to PACFLT Communications-Electronics Instructions to reflect requirements for expanded implementation of changing callsigns.

- Air Force - The Air Force implemented the changing callsign system in 1957. The system had evolved to the point where it provided the capability to change aircraft callsigns daily and staff positions and facilities every three days. It also provided static callsigns for local flights if it were determined that callsigns jeopardized training, safety or control of aircraft. CINCSAC, TACAMO, WWABNCP, USAFSS and AFCS had implemented the maximum callsign change capability. Consideration was being given to a changing voice callsign system by 1 January 1976. PACAF operational facilities began using changing callsigns every 3-4 days on 1 September 1975. Commando Escort net subscribers were included in the PACAF system.

- Marine Corps - In conjunction with NSA, the Marine Corps, in June 1972, began testing a changing callsign and frequency system similar to the Army system. Air units began testing in November 1974 and Amphibious Forces commenced tests in mid-1975 with anticipated completion date the end of CY 75. FMFPAC was formulating plans to implement changing callsign and frequency system. FMFPAC/NSA data collection for development of unit C-E operating instructions was scheduled for the end of 1975.

- Joint Command - A developmental daily changing callsign system for all participating Services was scheduled for Exercise Solid Shield 76. Commando Escort net subscribers were included in the PACAF daily changing callsign system on 1 September 1975. PACFLT proposed that joint commands use the Navy changing callsign system for specific reporting that used Navy nets. CINCPAC was assessing the impact on joint commands of the PACFLT intention to expand use of daily changing callsigns.

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(U) Joint callsign and frequency implementation was a continuing PACOM action at year's end.

Monitoring Emergency Action Message Traffic (Project JACKSHAFT)

~~(S)~~ The results of Emergency Action Message (EAM) monitoring concluded 30 October 1974 were received according to schedule from CINCPACFLT in early 1975. CINCPAC forwarded the report to the Director, National Security Agency (NSA), concluding that the new EAM procedures were effective although weaknesses did exist. Project JACKSHAFT was considered to have accomplished its purpose.

~~(S)~~ The NSA concluded in its report dated 24 July 1975 that PACOM EAMs were very good and that operator personnel generally showed good COMSEC awareness. Excessive operator chatter was the only shortcoming. The NSA recommended that code tables be assigned by randomly chosen digraph indicators rather than true table numbers; CINCPAC had adopted this procedure in June 1975. The NSA also recommended that traffic from unobserved EAM codes be obtained and analyzed for poor COMSEC practices, and CINCPAC implemented this in November 1975.<sup>1</sup>

CINCPAC Message Traffic


(U) CINCPAC's message traffic was handled with that of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific by the consolidated Camp Smith Message Center under the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu. The tabulation below was prepared using the Center's statistical records for messages received and dispatched and the percentage of each attributable to the CINCPAC headquarters.

	<u>Messages Sent</u>	<u>Messages Received</u>
January	4,562	23,471
February	4,621	22,561
March	5,820	26,480
April	4,980	23,224
May	5,610	20,583
June	5,151	19,173
July	4,583	18,941
August	4,323	19,104
September	4,453	18,461
October	4,531	17,385
November	3,969	16,870
December	<u>3,228</u>	<u>14,561</u>
Monthly Average	4,652	20,068

1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 340-341; J6251 HistSum Apr 75.

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END OF VOLUME I




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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME II

1975

Prepared by the Command History Branch  
Office of the Joint Secretary  
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII

1976

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## CHAPTER VII

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE

#### SECTION I--A REVIEW

##### Fiscal Year 1975

(U) While the FY 75 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was passed in December 1974, the FY 75 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill was not passed until March 1975, and final allocation of funds was not made until April 1975, pending final action by Congress on the President's request for an additional \$222 million for Cambodia. These additional funds for Cambodia had been requested on 28 January 1975 at the same time the President had requested a supplemental appropriation of \$300 million for military assistance for South Vietnam. The \$300 million for South Vietnam represented the difference between the \$1 billion authorized for FY 75 and the \$700 million actually appropriated but considered inadequate.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The following chart provides a summary of funding for the FY 75 PACOM Security Assistance Program. (Note that the term Military Assistance Program (MAP), where used throughout this chapter, denotes grant aid (GA) unless otherwise stated.)

(U) A provision was included in the FY 75 appropriations bill, passed in March 1975, which limited to twenty the number of flag and general officers assigned primarily to security assistance-related duties after 1 May 1975. In response, the CINCPAC merger of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorates allowed for deletion of one Army general officer (O8) security assistance position. (See also Chapter 1.)<sup>2</sup>

##### Fiscal Year 1976

(U) Effective 1 July 1975, Public Law 94-41 provided Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) for FY 76 MAP funding limited to:<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. SECDEF 2017/261525Z Mar 75; Dept of State Bulletin, "President Ford Requests Additional Funds for Assistance to Vietnam and Cambodia," 17 Feb 75, pp. 229-231; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 371.
  2. SECDEF 2017/261525Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC ALPHA 156/010155Z Jul 75.

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FY 75 PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
(in \$ millions)

COUNTRY	MAP (GA) PROPOSED <sup>1</sup>	ACTUAL <sup>1</sup>	TRAINING (GA) ACTUAL <sup>2/6</sup>	FMSCR ACTUAL <sup>2</sup>	EDA AT ACQUISITION VALUE <sup>2/7</sup>
AFGHANISTAN <sup>4</sup>	.200	.212	.212	-	-
CAMBODIA <sup>3</sup>	362.500	254.525	3.220	-	1.479
CHINA	.400	2.712	.412	80.000	-
INDIA <sup>4</sup>	.100	.054	.054	-	-
INDONESIA	22.700	15.850	2.784	5.000	.128
KOREA	161.500	82.600	1.407	59.000	3.120
LAOS	85.200	19.743	1.321	-	.208
MALAYSIA <sup>4</sup>	.285	.283	.283	4.700	-
NEPAL <sup>4</sup>	.035	.032	.032	-	-
PAKISTAN <sup>4</sup>	.280	.277	.277	-	-
PHILIPPINES	17.900	21.010	.471	14.000	1.332
SRI LANKA <sup>4</sup>	.015	-	-	-	-
THAILAND	56.000	30.126	1.801	8.000	1.400
VIETNAM <sup>5</sup>	-	-	-	-	4.067
REGIONAL COSTS	.365	.364	.364	-	-
TOTAL PACOM	707.480	427.788	12.638	170.700	14.734

1. Source: FY 77 Congressional Presentation Document, March 8, 1976.

2. Source: FY 76-77 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD):

3. Includes \$180.210 million in MAP and \$74.315 million in drawdown stocks.

4. CONUS training only.

5. \$700 million in grant aid to Vietnam authorized separately under Defense Assistance to Vietnam. Not included in MAP totals.

6. Training included in MAP total. Shown here for purposes of comparability.

7. See CINGPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 377 for basic rules governing EDA.

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- Administrative and supply costs.
- Training scheduled to commence prior to 31 Dec 75.
- Technical Assistance Representatives in country.
- Limited funds to prevent disruption of essential on-going activities.
- No expenditure of FY 76 funds originally authorized for Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.

(C) In August 1975 the FY 76 MAP and Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) funding levels were agreed upon by the Departments of State and Defense. Proposed MAP levels exceeded original Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission levels; however, with the President's transmittal to Congress on 30 October 1975, MAP levels reverted to those of the POM submission, while FMSCR increased significantly for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.<sup>1</sup> (See Chart on Page 367.)

(U) President Ford noted, in his 30 October message to the Congress transmitting the administration's FY 76, FY 77, and FY 78 Security Assistance Program proposals, that "...For the first time, military sales credits exceed grants in our proposals for security assistance to Asian countries..." This funding pattern reflected the improved economic circumstances of several of our allies, their decreasing dependence on grant aid, and a greater ability to pay for defense purchases on a deferred basis.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Effective with transmittal of the FY 76 Security Assistance Program, the President recommended the establishment of a separate Foreign Military Training Program for FY 76 and subsequent fiscal years. Funds required to support the program were not included in the MAP budget estimate, but were requested separately under the authority of a proposed new Chapter 7 of the FAA. Also, the FY 76 and 77 CPD broke out MAP supply operations on a country-by-country basis as opposed to the previous regional consolidation under general costs.<sup>3</sup>

(U) All FY 76 training programs implemented Section 660, a 1974 FAA amendment to the FAA of 1961, which prohibited the use of foreign assistance funds

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 010/260240Z Aug 75.
  2. Dept of State Bulletin, 24 Nov 75, "Security Assistance Program Transmitted to the Congress," pp. 740-741.
  3. CPD FY 76 and 77, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75, p. 1.

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to assist police activities, including police training in the United States on and after 1 July 1975. Civilian police-related instruction was deleted from military courses and CINCPAC tasked Pacific Command Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions to comply with the provisions of Section 660 by 31 March 1975.<sup>1</sup>

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1. SECDEF 9026/112006Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 112100Z Mar 75.

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FY 76  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
(In \$ millions)

COUNTRY	MAP (GA)		FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM (GA)			FMSCR		
	POM3 SUBMISSION	DOD/STATE3 PROPOSED	CPD2	POM3 SUBMISSION	DOD/STATE3 PROPOSED	CPD2	POM AND DOD/STATE PROPOSED 1/3	CPD2
Afghanistan				0.2	0.2	0.2		
China			0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	80.0	80.0
India				0.2	0.2	0.2		
Indonesia	19.4	27.6	19.4	2.0	3.1	2.0	12.5	23.1
Korea	74.0	81.1	74.0	1.0	2.7	2.7	100.0	126.0
Malaysia				0.3	0.3	0.3		15.0 <sup>4</sup>
Nepal				.035	.035	.035		
Pakistan				.35	.35	.35		
Philippines	19.6	22.3	19.6	0.4	0.75	0.75	7.0	17.4
Sri Lanka				.015	.015	.015		
Thailand	28.3	44.4	28.3	1.70	1.75	1.75	15.0	36.7
TOTAL	141.3	175.4	142.2	6.700	9.900	8.800	214.5	298.2

1. Proposed FMS credit levels and POM submissions agreed.
2. Source: CPD FY 76-7T, 5 Nov 75.
3. Source: CINCPAC ALPHA 010/260240Z Aug 75.
4. To support offers made as a result of RADM Crowe's visit to Singapore and Malaysia, 20-30 Jul 75. (See Also, Section III, Singapore and Malaysia.)

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PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
 FY 76 AND FY 77  
 (In \$ millions)

COUNTRY	FISCAL YEAR 1976				FISCAL YEAR 1977				
	MAP MATERIEL	TRAINING	TOTAL GRANT AID	FMSCR PROGRAM	MAP MATERIEL	TRAINING	TOTAL GRANT AID	FMSCR PROGRAM	TOTAL PROGRAM
Afghanistan		.2	.2	.2		.05	.05		.05
China	.9	.5	1.4	80.0	.1	.1	.2	8.0	8.2
India		.2	.2	.2		.03	.03		.03
Indonesia	19.4	2.0	21.4	23.1	.4	.7	1.1	1.5	1.1
Korea	74.0	2.7	76.7	126.0	1.4	.5	1.9	1.5	3.4
Malaysia		.3	.3	15.0		.1	.1		.1
Nepal		.035	.035	.035		.01	.01		.01
Pakistan		.35	.35	.35		.08	.08		.08
Philippines	19.6	.75	20.35	17.4	.6	.2	.8		.8
Sri Lanka		.015	.015	.015		.005	.005		.005
Thailand	28.3	1.75	30.05	36.7	1.0	.5	1.5		1.5
TOTAL PACOM	142.2	8.8	151.0	298.2	3.5	2.275	5.775	9.5	15.275

Source: FY 76 & 77 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), 5 November 1975.

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
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PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
FY 77 - FY 81  
(In \$ millions)

COUNTRY	FY 77			FY 78			FY 79			FY 80			FY 81		
	MAP	TNG	FMSCR	MAP	TNG	FMSCR	MAP	TNG	FMSCR	MAP	TNG	FMSCR	MAP	TNG	FMSCR
Afghanistan		.19			.15			.15			.15			.15	
China		.5	40.0		.5	30.0		.5	20.0		.5	15.0		.5	10.0
India		.19			.15			.15			.15			.15	
Indonesia	17.5	1.9	12.8	16.0	1.4	11.0	14.3	1.0	12.0	12.7	1.0	13.0	11.3	1.0	15.0
Korea	47.3	2.7	150.0	17.6	2.0	179.0	12.4	2.0	150.0	10.9	2.0	120.0	10.1	2.0	100.0
Malaysia		.3			.3			.3			.3			.3	
Nepal		.035			.035			.035			.035			.035	
Pakistan		.35			.25			.25			.25			.25	
Philippines	24.9	.4	19.3	24.1	.4	19.8	24.0	.4	20.6	24.4	.4	20.6	24.4	.4	21.0
Sri Lanka		.015			.015			.015			.015			.015	
Thailand	23.2	1.8	20.0	27.7	1.8	25.0	21.9	1.8	25.0	11.1	1.8	25.0	10.4	1.8	25.0
TOTAL PACOM	112.9	8.38	242.1	85.4	7.0	264.8	72.6	6.6	227.6	59.1	6.6	193.6	56.2	6.6	171.0

Source: Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Military Security Assistance FY 1977-1981, May 1975.

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## SECTION II--PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

### Policy on Military Sales

(U) Thomas Stern, Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, provided valuable insight on military sales policy in a statement made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 18 June 1975. In this statement he noted that, depending on the type of case, the procedures varied somewhat for cash sales through government channels or commercial sales; however, all cases were processed within policy guidelines established by the State Department and all major cases had to be approved by senior State Department officials. Of particular interest was his explanation of the role of the Defense Department.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Although the views of Defense Department officials are fully taken into account in the decision making process; it should be emphasized that the Defense Department does not make policy with respect to military sales or transfers. The prime responsibility of the Defense Department is to implement national policy. This is clearly understood within the executive branch but may not be so clearly understood elsewhere.

(U) Mr. Stern went on to enumerate the political, economic, and military factors affecting policy decisions to sell or otherwise transfer military articles and services. These factors are summarized in the chart on the next page.<sup>2</sup>

### Coordination Between Sales and Planning

(U) On 28 January 1975 CINCPAC noted that, although existing planning documents provided adequate data on FMSCR and grant aid arms and equipment transfers, satisfactory information was not available on FMS cash and U.S. commercial transactions or on purchases from non-U.S. sources.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Dept of State Bulletin, 21 Jul 75, "Department Discusses Policy on the Sale of U.S. Military Articles and Services," pp. 99-101.
  2. Ibid.
  3. CINCPAC 282300Z Jan 75.

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Factors Affecting Transfer Decisions  
on U.S. Military Articles and Services

Political Factors	Economic Factors	Military Factors
1. The country's role in its surroundings and its interests in common and divergent with those of the United States.	1. The consistency of the sale with the country's development goals or our economic assistance program, if there is one.	1. The threat to be countered or deterred by the sale, as perceived by the recipient and ourselves and how it relates to our own security.
2. The comparative value of sales to other economic and political measures in furthering U.S. objectives.	2. The possible strain on present and future budgets of the recipient.	2. The effect of the sale on the regional military balance, regional military tensions, or the military buildup plans of another country.
3. The position of influence as well as potential restraint that sales might help support.	3. The economic benefits to the United States, which might be significant, but only of secondary importance in making a final decision.	3. The ability of the recipient to absorb and use the arms effectively.
4. The possible precedent set by a particular sale which could open the door to further requests from the recipient and other countries.		4. The impact of sales on the readiness posture of our own forces.
5. The current internal stability, capacity to maintain stability, and attitude toward human rights of the recipient country.		5. Other military interests supported, such as overflight rights or access to facilities.
6. The effect on good relations of not selling.		6. The possibility of better controlling conflict where a substantial dependence on U.S. sources of supply exists.
7. The options available to the recipient to include alternate sources and the resulting political, military and economic implications.		7. The policy not to sell or otherwise transfer, except in special circumstances, certain sensitive items such as hand-transportable surface-to-air missiles and weapons primarily designed for use against crowds.

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(S) The JCS recognized and appreciated the need for unified commands to correlate security assistance plans and programs with U.S. military plans, and agreed that they should be aware of FMS transactions within their respective geographic areas of responsibility and provide appropriate military advice; however, the JCS also noted that, in maintaining traditional government-to-government relationships, Washington representatives of foreign governments should be free to discuss sales either through diplomatic channels or directly with DOD.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In referring to the proliferation of high technology, CINCPAC had pointed out the problem caused by this direct approach to military sales (also, see Proliferation of High Technology).

(S) In working out the simplified security assistance procedures for PACOM countries in December 1975 CINCPAC was careful to insure that the provisions included notification of all known FMS queries; however, even this provision could not guarantee timely and accurate information on all U.S. commercial transactions, much less on purchases from non-U.S. sources; (also, see Simplification of Security Assistance Operations for PACOM Countries).

Recipient Country Sales of U.S. Origin Defense Items to Third Countries

(S) As part of the United States effort to develop a degree of self-sufficiency among PACOM nations benefiting from U.S. military assistance, technical data was provided and licensed contracts were arranged to allow these countries to produce certain basic defense articles within their capabilities. While this policy had its benefits, it also contained the seeds of conflict between the desire to encourage self-sufficiency and maintain amicable relations on one hand, and to protect U.S. commercial interests on the other. The Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) consummating these programs included provisions restricting disposition of U.S. origin defense items and the general policy was to discourage sales to third countries, but exceptions were made on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, MOU restrictions were not always easy to enforce. Some of the more significant cases follow.

Singapore Sales to Third Countries

(S) The Government of Singapore (GOS) produced the M-16 rifle, AN/PRC-77 radio and various small arms and crew-served ammunition. Singapore was interested in generating third country sales of these licensed items, but the U.S. position was to discourage such sales.<sup>2</sup>

(S) During 1974 the GOS had sold 10,000 M-16 rifles to the Philippines without seeking U.S. Government concurrence and had failed to pay royalties to

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1. JCS 4971/212155Z Oct 75.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 453.

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Colt Industries, which owned proprietary rights over overseas sales of M-16. Then, on 31 October 1974, the GOS, while apologizing for this action, notified the American Embassy of another request for sale of 25,000 M-16 rifles to the Royal Thai Police. In view of its royalty problem over the Philippine sale, Colt was reluctant to approve the proposed sale at first. The U.S. Government, in turn, would not act on the request without a formal request from Colt and Thai assurance that the rifles would not be transferred to another third country.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 13 May 1975 the Singapore Ministry of Defense notified the American Embassy of a request from General Kriangsak, Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army, for immediate delivery of 50,000 M-16 rifles. By June this requirement had increased to 60,000 with a need for immediate delivery of 30,000. Also, by this time, the GOS had paid Colt Industries \$638,170 due for back royalties.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Consultation at the end of June between Mr. Ong Kah Kok, Director of Military Industries, Singapore Ministry of Defense; Colt's President Eaton, and Vice President Fiddler revealed that Colt now desired to make a direct sale to Thailand. This elicited Mr. Ong's warning of a possible anti-Colt campaign in Southeast Asia. The outcome was a compromise. Colt agreed to the Thai purchase of 30,000 M-16 rifles from the GOS. The balance of the 30,000 was to be procured directly from Colt.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 18 August 1975 the Secretary of Defense requested, and on 20 August received, confirmation from the U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Singapore that the Thai had departed Singapore in a Thai Navy vessel about 3 August with a load of M-16 rifles. The U.S. Government had not approved the GOS-Colt contract, nor had it received written assurance from Thailand that the rifles would not be transferred to another third country. The GOS claimed that the agreement was made only after extreme political pressure from the Government of Thailand (GOT) and that an understanding existed between the GOS and GOT that rifles were to be returned to Singapore at GOS expense in the event that the U.S. Government did not approve the sale.<sup>4</sup>

(S) In another case, on 15 January 1975 the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO), Singapore requested support from the Secretary of Defense to permit the GOS to sell 163 locally produced AN/PRC-77 radio sets to the Government of New Zealand. It was estimated that approximately 70 percent of the components

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1. AMEMB Singapore 4396/010310Z Nov 74; STATE 246198/080119Z Nov 74 and 249239/221933Z Nov 74.
  2. AMEMB Singapore 2041/140957Z May 75 and 2361/020800Z Jun 75.
  3. AMEMB Singapore 2797/280515Z Jun 75; USDAO Singapore 1129/090504Z Jul 75; AMEMB Bangkok 13718/111004Z Jul 75.
  4. SECDEF 8726/181302Z Aug 75; USDAO Singapore 1444/200802Z Aug 75.

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were imported from the United States. The USDAO Singapore emphasized the role of this sale in maintaining military cooperation between the Governments of Singapore and New Zealand.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 3 March 1975, after having informed Congress, the Secretary of State notified the American Embassy, Singapore of final approval to sell, contingent upon payment of a royalty fee of \$12,225 (\$75 per set).<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Secretary of State emphasized that U.S. Government permission for this transaction was based on unique circumstances, in this case the special defense relationship between the GOS and New Zealand, and that it should not be construed as a precedent for other third party transfers of AN/PRC-77 radios.<sup>3</sup>

#### Republic of China Sales to Third Countries

(C) On 18 April 1975 the State Department disapproved a seven month old standing request from the Republic of China (ROC) to export 3,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition to the Philippines and 50 rounds of 155mm ammunition to Singapore, but approved a ROC request to export 20 metric tons of small arms powder to the Philippines.<sup>4</sup>

(C) When the ROC ammunition sales case first arose in August 1974, CINCPAC had stated that, "This headquarters supports sale of defense articles between PACOM countries when mutually beneficial to both parties...."<sup>5</sup>

(C) The final State Department decision expressed general disapproval of the export of U.S. origin defense articles to third countries:<sup>6</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...We have attempted to be consistent in not permitting other nations in the region to export U.S. origin defense articles to third countries. In the case of the 105 and 155mm ammo requests, these items were produced by the ROC on basis of U.S. technical data provided for the purpose of ROC self-sufficiency and we have so informed the Congress. It clearly was not the intent of Congress to assist any other of our

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1. USDAO Singapore 150452Z Jan 75; STATE 020399/290004Z Jan 75.
  2. STATE 046739/031331Z Mar 75.
  3. STATE 020399/290004Z Jan 75.
  4. STATE 08916/181651Z Apr 75.
  5. CINCPAC 310049Z Aug 74.
  6. STATE 089161/181651Z Apr 75.

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aid recipients in setting up an export industry of U.S. origin defense items....

(C) The State Department, however, approved the sale of small arms powder to the Philippines based on the fact that the United States was no longer producing this commodity.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In conclusion, the State Department agreed that reiteration of the general policy guidelines regarding third country sales of defense items was needed, and that CINCPAC's suggestions would be considered in the preparation of policy guidelines to be disseminated to all concerned. These guidelines had not, however, been disseminated by year's end.<sup>2</sup>

#### Republic of Korea (ROK) Sales to Third Countries

(C) On 23 September 1975 the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAGK) notified the Secretary of Defense of a ROK request to sell 245,000 M-67 grenades to the Government of Malaysia (GOM). JUSMAGK recommended approval, citing a previous example involving the sale of 81mm mortars to Cameroon. The Secretary of Defense disapproved this request on 24 October, advising that the M-67 hand grenade was a standard U.S. Army item in a long supply position due to the high level of production at the termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia. The Secretary of Defense further pointed out that the GOM had already allowed five U.S. Government letters of offer on the same quantity of M-67 grenades to expire during the past three years.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In another case involving the ROK sale of 100 SB-22 field switchboards to the GOM, the Secretary of Defense approved the sale without royalty charge based on the fact that the SB-22 was no longer being manufactured in the United States and was not available from United States inventory stocks.<sup>4</sup>

#### Proliferation of High Technology

(C) On 16 September 1975 Department of the Army informed Chief, MAAG Taipei of efforts by the Chinese Procurement and Service Mission in Washington, D. C. to obtain price and availability data on the secret-classified Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) system. Chief, MAAG Taipei opposed the release of information on FAAR, commenting that this effort was related to ROC Army efforts to obtain CHAPARRAL, which was not in concert with United States recommendations.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. CJUSMAGK Seoul 230711Z Sep 75; SECDEF 8598/211949Z Oct 75.

4. CJUSMAGK 050816Z Sep 75; SECDEF 9788/221404Z Sep 75 and 7270/231545Z Oct 75.

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Furthermore, Chief, MAAG Taipei noted that the ROC direct approach consisting of discussions with contractors and inquiries by their Washington-level representatives was often counterproductive to ongoing efforts. CINCPAC concurred with the Chief, MAAG Taipei position.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 1 October 1975 Chief, JUSMAGK Seoul requested confidential data on the Improved CHAPARRAL for release to the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. [REDACTED]

(S) On 15 November 1975 the American Embassy, Seoul reported that the ROK Government was in the final stage of decision on whether to purchase the Improved CHAPARRAL or the United Kingdom-produced RAPIER Missile, and suggested that briefing information was required to allow the United States to compete. Action was still pending at year's end.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In the meantime, on 1 October 1975, CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS, expressed concern with the increased sale of sophisticated systems and export of high technology to countries in the Pacific Command. It was noted that current DOD directives permitted countries and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) to bypass CINCPAC and communicate directly with the Secretary of Defense or work through the host countries' Washington agencies. The procedures needed revision, in view of the reversed trend toward increased FMS and decreased grant aid, to permit unified command review and evaluation of proposed sales at an early stage. CINCPAC further requested that the Services be tasked to provide the unified commander information on all requests for new weapons systems or technical data packages which provided new or increased capability.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The JCS recognized and shared CINCPAC concern regarding proliferation of high technology. They conceded that "...While DOD views are systematically provided to the State Department for use by the International Coordinating Committee (COCOM) and in deliberations on U.S. export control and technology transfer policy, this is clearly an area of increasing importance and one to which we need pay closer attention...."<sup>5</sup>

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1. DA 162016Z Sep 75; CMAAG Taipei 200801Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 042021Z Nov 75.
  2. CJUSMAGK Seoul 010809Z Oct 75, 060617Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 122100Z Oct 75.
  3. AMEMB Seoul 8819/150333Z Nov 75.
  4. CINCPAC 010146Z Oct 75.
  5. JCS 6352/142209Z Nov 75.

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(S) The JCS further recommended that CINCPAC concerns and suggestions involving proliferation of high technology be amplified at the forthcoming MAAG Chiefs' Conference.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Proliferation of high technology was also a subject of discussion by Admiral Gayler during his trip to Washington 8-15 December 1975. The general attitude was that advanced technology should only be exported when benefits clearly outweighed the risks in view of our need to maintain qualitative superiority in opposition to Soviet quantitative superiority. Disadvantages of technological proliferation were seen as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- No certainty as to end use with possibility of shifting alliances, capture, or capitulation.
- Increased risk of compromise based on similarities of systems [REDACTED]
- Reduced our lead and relative capability while permitting quantum jumps in foreign development.
- Allowed for possible development of countermeasures against our systems.
- Burdened some allies with expensive, impractical equipment.
- Triggered Soviet technological escalation such as provision of F-4s to South Korea influencing stepped-up Soviet MIG-21 deliveries to North Korea.

(S) On the other hand, it was realized that withholding technology could also result in disadvantages:

- Hindered achievement of complementarity with allies, possibly forcing them toward third country sales.
- Increased unit costs of U.S. Services.
- Reduced U.S. sales.


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1. Ibid.

2. Joint J021/J455 Point Paper, 5 Dec 75, Subj: Proliferation of Technology.

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
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1. Letter from Admiral Gayler to Asst SECSTATE Habib, 18 Dec 75.


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Simplification of Security Assistance Operations for PACOM Countries

(U) On 10 October 1975 the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC of proposed simplified procedures for processing security assistance actions for PACOM countries. These procedures were designed to reduce CINCPAC involvement in the day-to-day handling of routine MAP/FMS transactions without affecting the CINC's ability to keep informed of significant security assistance actions or to intervene when deemed necessary. Essentially, the simplified procedures involved amending the channels of communication to provide direct access between MAAGs and military groups and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs or military departments as appropriate.<sup>1</sup>

~~(C)~~ The initial reaction of CINCPAC and CINCEUR to the proposed simplified procedures was to note that they appeared to by-pass the unified commands in the conduct of extremely important security assistance policy and planning actions. CINCPAC, therefore, requested that the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) send their team to review the proposed procedures.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Consultations between DSAA representatives and the CINCPAC staff on 2-3 December 1975 resulted in CINCPAC concurrence with the simplified procedures, as modified, to become effective 1 February 1976. The two-fold goal of these procedures was as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- Reduce CINCPAC role in detailed program administration by eliminating CINCPAC security assistance data base.
- Retain CINCPAC program visibility and ability to apply military judgment by provision of information copies of all security assistance actions plus notification of all FMS queries at country (MAAG) or Washington (DSAA) level.

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1. SECDEF 6701/102051Z Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC 220440Z Oct 75; CINCEUR 291525Z Oct 75.
  3. CINCPAC 090415Z Dec 75; SECDEF 8181/180159Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 240326Z Dec 75.

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## Training

### Grant-Aid Training Funding

(U) On 25 March 1975 CINCPAC queried the Secretary of Defense on status of grant-aid training as a separate funding appropriation in FY 76. The Secretary of Defense replied that the FY 76 Congressional Presentation Document would reflect training as a separate program:<sup>1</sup>

- Starting 1 July 1975, and pending enactment of separate grant training authorization legislation, foreign military training would be managed, processed, and implemented on a country-by-country basis as a program separate from other grant-aid programs.

- Training would be governed by current Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM) procedures.

### Country Cost-Sharing Program

(U) The status of PACOM country cost sharing programs was updated at the PACOM Tri-Service Planning Conference conducted 17-28 February 1975. The following programs were in effect or planned at that time:

- Republic of China - Paid student travel to CONUS port of entry and return.

Would pay all transportation costs plus per diem in FY 77.

- Pakistan - Would begin payment of student transportation cost from country to port of entry on 15 April 1975.

- Korea - Paid transportation costs from country to CONUS.

Would pay all transportation costs beginning FY 76.

Would also pay per diem beginning FY 77.

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1. CINCPAC 242015Z Mar 75; SECDEF 5900/312121Z Mar 75.

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• Thailand

- Would pay transocean transportation costs beginning FY 76.

Would pay intra-CONUS transportation costs beginning FY 77.

Would pay 50 percent of per diem beginning FY 78.

Would pay total per diem beginning FY 79.

(U) All MAAGs and Missions were encouraged to support partial assumption of training costs by host countries to increase the grant-aid funds available for tuition expenses.<sup>1</sup>

Training Status of PACOM Countries

(U) The following chart depicts the training status of PACOM countries during 1975:<sup>2</sup>

~~(C)~~ In June 1975 CINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense a change in the type of grant aid received by Pakistan, Malaysia, and India from CONUS training only to training only. This new status would authorize receipt of U.S. training literature, films, and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and was designed to give greater opportunity to exert U.S. influence at no increase in planned FY 76 security assistance funds. The recommendation was not accepted.<sup>3</sup>

PACOM Tri-Service Planning Conference

(U) The first PACOM Tri-Service Planning Conference was held 17-18 February 1975 in Taipei, Taiwan. The conference, which provided a detailed review of FY 76-77 PACOM country training programs, was attended by representatives from SECDEF, MILDEPS, HQ PACOM, PACOM military components, country MAAG/DAOs and CONUS training commands. The conference served as an efficient way to cost total country training programs, make necessary on-the-spot Service program adjustments and coordinate inter-Service training requirements.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 252037Z Mar 75.

2. STATE 017013/1/230319Z Jan 76; J452 Worksheet, undated, Subj: Training.

3. J8 WEB 16-22 Jun 75.

4. J8 HistSum Feb 75.

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TRAINING STATUS OF PACOM COUNTRIES  
DURING 1975

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MAP</u>		<u>FMS</u>
	<u>Training &amp; Materiel</u>	<u>CONUS Training Only</u>	
Australia			X
Burma			X
China*		X	
Korea	X		
Indonesia	X		
Philippines	X		
Afghanistan		X	
India		X	
Japan			X
Malaysia		X	
Nepal		X	
New Zealand			X
Pakistan		X	
Singapore			X
Sri Lanka		X	
Thailand	X		

\*Status changed from training only to CONUS training only on  
26 August 1975 (See also, Section III, Republic of China).

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### Training Functions Assumed by CINCPAC

(U) On 27 June 1975 CINCPAC, based on a request by CINCPACAF and after having coordinated with CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and CDRUSACSG, announced its assumption of specific security assistance-related training functions effective 1 July 1975. Some of these functions had been delegated to the component commands since 1 August 1969:<sup>1</sup>

- Plan and conduct annual Tri-Service Planning Conference involving preparation, submission, and review of yearly refinement of country requirements for budget.

- Conduct pre-planning conference training assistance visits accompanied by military department representatives and component commands/CSG as appropriate.

- Approve, disapprove and/or further process all Security Assistance Training Program actions of all Services pertinent to current year programs to include third country training, except that furnished from component/CSG resources.

(U) Specific training functions to be retained by component commands/CSG were:<sup>2</sup>

- Coordinate and monitor in-country on-the-job training (OJT) conducted by U.S. personnel.

- Coordinate and monitor intra-theater uni-service mobile training teams (MTT).

### Tri-Service Training Regulations and MTT Support

(U) On 24 March 1975 CINCPAC queried the Secretary of Defense concerning the status of developing tri-Service training regulations. The Secretary of Defense replied on 31 March that there were still differences to be reconciled, but that every effort would be made to release a tri-Service regulation as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. CINCPACAF Ltr, XO, undated, Subj: Transfer of Training Functions; CINCPAC 080446Z May 75; CINCPACFLT 222157Z May 75; CDRUSACSG 170028Z May 75; CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. II, pp. 40, 42.
  2. CINCPAC 260257Z Jun 75 and 280151Z Jun 75.
  3. CINCPAC 242015Z Mar 75; SECDEF 5900/312121Z Mar 75.

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(U) On 19 July 1975 CINCPAC recommended that the Secretary of Defense renew efforts to eliminate Service differences and standardize MTT administration to improve MTT effectiveness. Problems noted due to lack of standardized procedures included the following:<sup>1</sup>

- Lack of adequate preparation on the part of MTTs and the MAAGs/Missions requesting them.
- Lack of a standardized, comprehensive reporting system which would allow for early corrective action and needed follow-up.

(U) On 24 July 1975 the Secretary of Defense replied that CINCPAC's recommendations would be considered when a joint MTT regulation was established and that CINCPAC would be further advised in that regard.<sup>2</sup>

### Training of U.S. Personnel

(U) Phase IV training of U.S. personnel assigned to security assistance duties in the PACOM was conducted during the period 5-19 September 1975 in Bangkok, Thailand with administrative support provided by COMUSMACTHAI. Seventy-four students from twelve PACOM MAAG/Mission posts attended. An increase was noted in the number of students who had completed Phase II training at Fort Bragg or Eglin Air Force Base. Fifty-nine percent of the attendees for this session had attended Phase II training as compared to 41 percent for the last session held in October 1974. CINCPAC noted that a continued effort was needed to annotate JTD positions requiring Phase II courses and include these requirements in personnel requisitions.<sup>3</sup>

### Computerized FMS Training Data

(U) In June 1974 CINCPAC had requested the Secretary of Defense to assist in creating a computerized PACOM FMS training file to permit monitoring the total training program with manageable summary documents. Secretary of Defense follow up to this proposal came on 15 July 1975 with direction to the CNO and DA to incorporate FY 76 FMS data in the DSAA computer system. The Air Force had established an FMS training data bank during FY 70.<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. CINCPAC 190409Z Jul 75.
  2. SECDEF 4284/242244Z Jul 75.
  3. CINCPAC MAAB No. 19, 15 Oct 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 380.
  4. J48 HistSum Aug 75; SECDEF 7367/151955Z Jul 75.

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CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Evaluations During CY 75

(U) During CY 75 the CINCPAC PEG evaluated PACOM U.S. Security Assistance Program activities as follows:<sup>1</sup>

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>PERIOD COVERED</u>	<u>DATE OF EVALUATION</u>
Republic of China	FY 75	2-15 Jun 75
Japan	FY 75	16-19 Jun 75
Republic of Korea	FY 76	22 Oct - 1 Nov 75
Thailand	FY 76	8-9 Dec 75

PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

(U) The PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, originally scheduled for 18-20 November 1975, was cancelled and rescheduled for 3-5 February 1976 due to unanticipated appearance before Congressional committees by numerous Washington participants.<sup>2</sup>

Captured U.S. Military Equipment

(S) On 29 July 1975 CINCPAC reported intelligence indications that Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were contemplating the purchase of U.S.-made military equipment captured by the Vietnamese Communists. Their aims appeared to be twofold, to preempt funneling of this equipment to insurgents and to augment their own arsenals. Although it was not clear whether or not Hanoi would offer anything for sale, CINCPAC felt that the U.S. position, if asked, should be as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- U.S. did not lay claim to captured equipment.
- U.S. provision of follow-on support under grant aid or FMS to purchasing countries should be contingent on their assessed need for the equipment.

- 
1. CINCPAC PEG Reports, Republic of China FY 75, 2 Dec 75; Japan, FY 75, 10 Dec 75; Republic of Korea, FY 76, 9 Feb 76; Thailand, FY 76, 6 Feb 76.
  2. CINCPAC 150416Z Nov 75.
  3. CINCPAC 290331Z Jul 75.

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- U.S. permission should be required to redistribute this equipment to third countries if grant aid follow-on support were provided.

### Recovered Southeast Asia MAP Equipment

(S) Significant amounts of U.S. grant aid military equipment, especially aircraft and ships, were recovered in the wake of the collapse of Cambodia and Vietnam in April 1975, and the Communist Pathet Lao takeover in Laos in August. After most of these assets reverted to U.S. control (approximately 96 percent), the State Department allocated those items not retained by the United States for redistribution between Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, and Indonesia.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Approximately 67 percent of the equipment was recovered in Thailand. The political complications involved with evacuating equipment out of Thailand became readily apparent immediately after the collapse of Cambodia on 17 April (the details of those complications are discussed in Section III, Thailand). One result of these complications was a lengthy and expensive delay in closing down the Thai-Am Udorn aircraft maintenance facility (Also see Chapter V, Section I). Major equipment recovered from Cambodia included 103 aircraft, 10 ships, 4 105mm howitzers and 6 armored personnel carriers (APCs).

(S) During the interim between the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam, CINCPAC issued instructions to PACOM agencies on the recovery of Vietnamese aircraft and vessels which might seek safe haven at U.S. military locations in neighboring countries. While the State Department had originally suggested early movement of some Vietnamese aircraft and excess aircraft engines outside the RVN by U.S. airlift, CINCPAC recommended dropping this idea on 22 April and giving top priority to planning for personnel evacuation and safe havens. This was based on the expectation that aircraft would be flown out of country by RVNAF crews as an escape measure. The same was expected for ships and other craft.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 23 April 1975 CINCPAC instructed the component commands to place under USG control and report all RVNAF aircraft and vessels seeking safe haven at U.S. military locations under their jurisdiction.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Major equipment recovered from Vietnam included 248 aircraft and 38 ships (33 at Subic Bay, 3 at Sattahip and 2 at Guam). Of the total 248 Vietnamese aircraft reported recovered, approximately 57 percent (142) were evacuated on the aircraft carrier MIDWAY (101) or by other Seventh Fleet

- 
1. STATE 181057/1/312102Z Jul 75; 200194/2/221711Z Aug 75.
  2. CINCPAC 221957Z Apr 75.
  3. CINCPAC 230255Z Apr 75.

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units (41). The following is the breakout of aircraft evacuated aboard the MIDWAY, which comprised all but two of the total F-5 aircraft recovered (one F-5B transferred to the Royal Thai Government and one F-5E lost at sea) and all but one of the recovered A-37s (one transferred to the Royal Thai Government). (For details of the MIDWAY evacuation, see Section III, Thailand.):<sup>1</sup>

<u>F-5E</u>	<u>A-37</u>	<u>UH-1</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>O-1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
25	27	45	3	1	101

(C) With the communist takeover in Laos, 45 more aircraft were recovered. These aircraft became involved in political problems and added further to the delay in closing the Thai-Am Udorn aircraft maintenance facility (also see Chapter V, Section I; and this Chapter, Section III, Thailand and Republic of the Philippines).

(C) The following is a summary of major items of equipment reported as recovered from Southeast Asia between April and July 1975:

ORIGIN	RECOVERED				SCUTTLED/LOST AT SEA	
	AIRCRAFT	SHIPS	105mm HOW	APCs	AIRCRAFT	SHIPS
Cambodia	103 <sup>1</sup>	10 <sup>1</sup>	4 <sup>1</sup>	6 <sup>2</sup>		
Vietnam	248 <sup>1</sup>	38 <sup>1</sup>			68 <sup>1</sup>	5 <sup>1</sup>
Laos	45 <sup>3</sup>					
TOTALS	396	48 <sup>4</sup>	4	6	68	5

- SOURCE:
1. CINCPAC J8 Report, Subj: Cambodia/Vietnam Evacuated Equipment as of 26 Jun 75.
  2. J816 Point Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Status of Recovered Ex-Cambodian/Vietnam Equipment.
  3. CINCPAC J8 Report, Subj: Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam Evacuated Equipment as of 23 Jul 75.
  4. Total includes 6 located at Sattahip of which two were LCM-8s which remained in U.S. inventory; 38 located at Subic Bay; and 2 located at Guam. (Per source 2 above.)

- 
1. J816 Point Paper, 23 Jun 75, Subj: Status of Recovered Ex-Cambodian/Vietnam Equipment; MACTHAI Fact Sheet, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: Recovered Aircraft from Cambodia and Vietnam; CINCPAC 080226Z May 75.

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(C) The following is a breakout of the disposition of major items of equipment recovered from Southeast Asia (Cambodia/Vietnam/Laos), not retained by the United States, based on information available to the CINCPAC staff at year's end. (See Section III, Thailand, Philippines, and Korea for details.)

TRANSFeree	AIRCRAFT	SHIPS	105mm HOW	APCs
Thailand	117 <sup>1</sup>	6 <sup>2</sup>	4 <sup>2</sup>	6 <sup>2</sup>
Philippines	67 <sup>3</sup>	19 <sup>4</sup>		
Korea	41 <sup>5</sup>			
Indonesia <sup>6</sup>				
Honduras	1 <sup>1</sup>			
Totals	226	25	4	6

- SOURCE: 1. MACTHAI Fact Sheets, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: Recovered Aircraft from Cambodia and Vietnam, and MAP Laos Aircraft. (One T-41 to Honduras had been diverted prior to delivery.)
2. STATE 200194/1/221711Z Aug 75.
3. STATE 200194/1/221711Z Aug 75, 22029/1/201510Z Sep 75.
4. JUSMAG Philippines Letter, 4 Dec 75, Subj: Transfer of Ships.
5. US-ROK SCM Background Papers, 26 Aug 75, Subj: ROK Fighter/Attack Aircraft Programs; CHJUSMAG-K 020830Z Feb 76.
6. AMEMB Jakarta 14430/240913Z Nov 75. Indonesia did not accept offer to ex-Vietnamese ships at Subic. They were then offered to, and accepted by the Philippines.

Cambodia/Vietnam Trainees in CONUS and U.S. Possessions

(C) On 5 April 1975, with the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam impending, the Secretary of Defense provided policy guidance on the disposition of MAP students from those two countries undergoing training in the United States and U.S. possessions:<sup>1</sup>

- 
1. SECDEF 1915/051630Z Apr 75.

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- Mass movement to return to country was not encouraged.

- Individual requests for return to country were to be honored and expedited.

- Requests to remain in the United States were generally to be honored until completion of scheduled training beyond which consideration would be given for those desiring to remain on a case-by-case basis within country dollar limitations. This was to allow for delay until home country situations were clarified.

(S) On 24 April the Secretary of Defense amplified the above policy:<sup>1</sup>

- Due to Khmer government surrender on 17 April, it was temporarily no longer possible for Cambodian students to travel there.

- Students completing or having completed training could be placed in an OJT status with living allowance for 30 days subsequent to 24 April to allow for contact with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices and voluntary agencies to obtain sponsorship.

(U) On 22 May the Secretary of Defense deleted the time limitation on students in an OJT status after 24 April and, on 28 May, directed the immediate release of all Cambodian and Vietnamese trainees in training or OJT status who wanted to remain in the United States, had sponsors and jobs, and who had met all INS requirements.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 2 June the Secretary of Defense announced further that students with sponsors could be processed for release as soon as possible and those without sponsors would await further instructions. By 30 June all trainees would either be released to sponsors or transferred to a refugee reception center (Eglin AFB, Florida; Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas; Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; or Camp Pendleton, California). DOD sponsorship was to terminate when trainees:<sup>3</sup>

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1. SECDEF 2221/242118Z Apr 75.
  2. SECDEF 8904/221917Z May 75; 3865/281348Z May 75.
  3. SECDEF 1840/022007Z Jun 75.

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- Were released to sponsors.
- Departed training station for home or third country.
- Were transferred to reception stations.

(U) On 22 June CINCPAC urged that consideration be given to U.S. Armed Forces recruitment of Cambodian and Vietnamese military trainees. On 23 June the Secretary of Defense announced that the Services had been authorized to give enlistment preference to qualified Cambodian and Vietnamese evacuees who had been previously trained by our armed forces as well as those in training in the United States when their government fell. The Interagency Indochina Task Force estimated that there were from 17,000 to 20,000 males of enlistment age among the evacuees and that between 6,000 and 8,000 were potentially qualified.<sup>1</sup>

#### Cambodia Trainees in Thailand

(C) On 24 April 1975 CINCPAC directed termination of all Cambodia MAP training in Thailand and on 25 April COMUSMACTHAI was tasked to establish a facility at Udorn to accommodate all Cambodian students in Thailand.<sup>2</sup>

(U) During the month immediately following the fall of Cambodia there were, according to the American Embassy, Bangkok, approximately 900 Cambodian military and their dependents located in Thailand at U-Tapao (400) and the Training and Logistics Detachment facility at Udorn (500). On 17 May the Embassy, Bangkok reported that antagonistic factions had been formed in both camps between those refugees desiring to return to Cambodia and those desiring to go to the United States. Prompt movement of the latter group to the United States was urged. According to USMACTHAI, as of 19 May 1975, 466 Cambodians located at Udorn were DOD-sponsored Cambodian MAP trainees and dependents, 251 of whom had petitioned to return to Cambodia and the remaining 215 of whom had completed processing for parole in the United States. MACTHAI requested transfer of the 215 from Udorn to Subic Bay, Philippines. The Secretary of State, noting that there was already a group of about 300 Cambodian refugees located at Subic Bay, requested that the JCS immediately move the 215 from Udorn directly to Camp Pendleton. The JCS completed this action on 21 May. In the meantime, CINCPAC, responding to a COMUSMACTHAI request, granted authority to continue \$4.00 per

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1. CINCPAC 190301Z Jun 75; SECDEF 4349/232044Z Jun 75.

2. CINCPAC 240322Z Apr 75. 250315Z Apr 75.

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day subsistence payments on a weekly basis for the remaining Udorn students pending their relocation to the U-Tapao refugee center or return to Cambodia.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As of 31 May MACTHAI reported that the Khmer population at Udorn was zero. On 29 May one Cambodian officer with five dependents departed for the U-Tapao refugee camp, and, on 31 May, 256 Khmer personnel were released at the Thai-Cambodian border. Informal information indicated that nine of the 256 changed their minds and went to the refugee camp.<sup>2</sup>


Cambodian Equipment Losses

(S) On 26 April 1975 Chief MEDTC reported major equipment losses with the fall of Cambodia as follows (also, see Cambodia):<sup>3</sup>

- Vehicles (Wheeled & Tracked): 6,535
- Small Arms (Individual & Crew Served) (.30 cal to 60mm): 303,892
- Artillery (81mm to 155mm): 1,207
- Communications Equipment: 21,189
- Aircraft: 97
- Ships: 114

- 
1. AMEMB Bangkok 8996/171046Z May 75; USMACTHAI 190950Z May 75, 191115Z May 75, 230808Z May 75; STATE 11604/191546Z May 75; JCS 1640/192037Z May 75; CINCPAC 240416Z May 75.
  2. USMACTHAI 020906Z Jun 75.
  3. Chief MEDTC 260950Z Apr 75 (EX). Contains itemized list of lost equipment.

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SECTION III--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Afghanistan

(S) Afghanistan received grant aid Foreign Military Training Program funds, but had purchased no arms or military equipment from U.S. sources. A total of 359 Afghani students had been trained under the MAP during the period FY 70 to FY 75. Funds actually expended for training in FY 75 totaled \$212,000, and \$200,000 was proposed for FY 76.<sup>1</sup>

Australia

Review

(S) Australia, having made cash purchases of over \$1.0 billion between FY 50 and FY 74, ranked first in FMS among PACOM countries; however, during the past few years she had fallen behind China (Taiwan), Korea and Japan. During 1974 potential purchases included M-60 tanks, patrol frigates, P-3 reconnaissance aircraft and an air superiority fighter aircraft, but this potential had to be balanced by weighing internal political factors. During 1975 it also became increasingly clear that future sales to Australia might be in jeopardy unless consideration were given to Australian Industrial Participation (AIP).<sup>2</sup>

Failure to Purchase M-60 Tanks


(S) One potential purchase was for M-60 tanks; however, on 23 December 1974, the Government of Australia (GOA) decided against the M-60 in favor of the German-built Leopard tank.

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1.5  
(5)

1. CPD FY 76 & 77 Security Assistance Program, FMS and MAP, 5 Nov 75; Comptroller DSAA, FMS and Military Assistance Facts Nov 75; USDAO Kabul 040515Z Feb 75.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 449; J464 Point Paper, 18 Jul 75, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Australia.
3. J825 HistSum Feb 75; USDAO Canberra 0025/090513Z Jan 75.

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# AFGHANISTAN

<p><b>AFGHANISTAN BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 290,000 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 19,142,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 2.3 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 8 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 40 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . 1.8 ACRES          1965 NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . 270 MILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . BELOW \$100          BUDGET DEFICIT . . . . . \$34 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 17</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>3 Corps, 10 Infantry Divisions, 3 Armored Divisions, 7 Independent Regiments, 1 Airborne Battalion.          Strength: 98,500</p> <p>Incapable of resisting outside aggression. Can maintain internal security jointly with paramilitary forces, except during widespread tribal unrest. Marginal logistics; reliant on USSR for material.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>3 Fighter Wings (MiG-21, MiG-17), 1 Light Bomber Wing (Su-7), 1 Transport Wing, 1 Training Wing.          Strength: 8,100 men and 267 aircraft</p> <p>Incapable of defending the nation's airspace. Can provide limited support to internal security operations. Poor logistics; complete dependence on USSR for material support.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>None</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AREA CHARGOR . . . . . IAN THOMPSON, JR.          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . VINCENT W. BROWN          USDAO . . . . . COL WILLIAM P. SEARL, USA</p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>-- DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS</li> <li>-- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE</li> </ul>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIAL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO DETERR OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.</p> <p>ASSIST IN THE ACHIEVING OF UNRESTRICTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.</p> <p>ASSIST IN THE ACHIEVING AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>	
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AREA CHARGOR . . . . . IAN THOMPSON, JR.          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . VINCENT W. BROWN          USDAO . . . . . COL WILLIAM P. SEARL, USA</p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>-- DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS</li> <li>-- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE</li> </ul>		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 69.

# AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIA BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	2,970,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	13,574,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	98.5 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	71 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	8.4 ACRES
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	\$78.9 BILLION
PER CAPITA	\$5,900
DEFENSE BUDGET	\$2 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	3
GOVERNOR GENERAL	SIR JOHN ROBERT KERR
PRIME MINISTER	JOHN MALCOLM FRASER
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER	JOHN DOUGLAS ALTHOFF
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	BONIS JAMES KILLEN
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS	ANDREW S. PEACOCK
CHAIRMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF COMMITTEE, AUSTRALIAN ARMED FORCES	GEN FRANCIS G. HASSETT
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, DHD (ARMY OFFICE)	LT GEN ARTHUR L. MCINNALD
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, DOD (NAVY OFFICE)	VADM IVOUGH D. STEVENSON
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, DOD (AIR FORCE OFFICE)	AVR JAMES A. ROWLAND
CHARG. E. AFFAIRS	MR. LEROY F. PERCIVAL, JR.
USDAO	COL ROGER P. NUNEMATER, USAF
CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA	COL JACK T. BETOUR, USAF
<b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b>	
CHARG. E. AFFAIRS: MR. LEROY F. PERCIVAL, JR.	
USDAO: COL ROGER P. NUNEMATER, USAF	
CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA: COL JACK T. BETOUR, USAF	
<b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>	
MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY OF OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT TO AUSTRALIA;	
MAINTAIN AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT OF U.S. ACTIVITIES AND ANZUS RELATIONSHIP;	
MINIMIZE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING U.S. INSTALLATIONS;	
MILITARY EXERCISES. ] CONDUCT PERIODIC COMBINED	

### MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

#### ARMY

8 Infantry Battalions, 1 Special Air Service Regiment, 4 Artillery Regiments, 1 Armored Regiment, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 1 Cavalry Regiment, 77 non-jet air craft in Army Aviation. Strength: 30,200

Capable of effective battalion and brigade-level operations; limited by obsolescent equipment.

#### NAVY


1 Carrier, 12 Destroyer Types, 5 Submarines, 13 Coastal types, 5 Amphibious Types, 4 Mine Warfare types, 8 Auxiliary types, 73 Service Craft, and 64 Naval aircraft. Strength: 16,000, which includes 1,600 Naval Air personnel.

Limited capability to conduct offshore patrol operations because of small number of ships, obsolescence of equipment, and low state of readiness of air arm.

#### AIR FORCE

427 aircraft, of which 231 are jet. Strength: 21,000

Capable of effective air defense of east coast region, but vastness of country precludes capability for extensive area defense.



### MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIAL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO INTER OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.

ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.

ASSIST IN RETENTION OF UNHINDERED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.

ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 70.

(b)(1)  
 Dec 1, 3 (c)(5)

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(S) Other relevant factors militating against the M-60 compared with the Leopard included the following:<sup>1</sup>

- Higher life cycle cost based on anticipated consumption of spares over a 15 year period and assumed higher levels of inflation in the United States.
- Willingness of Leopard manufacturer, Krauss-Maffei, to offer a definitive escalation clause as opposed to less committal U.S. approach.

(S) In spite of the above factors, the original intent to buy M-60s was apparently based on the following considerations:<sup>2</sup>

- Logistics support
- Long term availability.
- Lower immediate capital equipment costs.

(S) The letter of agreement for Leopard tanks was signed on 30 January 1975 and was for 42 tanks at approximately \$848,000 per tank plus the cost for a fire control system.<sup>3</sup>

#### Sale of P-3C Aircraft

(U) On 29 May 1975 the Chief FMS, Canberra notified CINCPAC of the Australian announcement to purchase eight U.S. P-3C Orion aircraft for an estimated \$200 million. The Australian Minister of Defense, Mr. Barnard, stated his reasons for the purchase as follows:

I have decided in favour of the Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft because overall it meets more closely Australia's

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1. USDAO Canberra 0025/090513Z Jan 75.
  2. USDAO Canberra 0145/110310Z Feb 75.
  3. J825 HistSum Jun 75; USDAO Canberra 0145/110310Z Feb 75.

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requirements for a long range maritime patrol aircraft in performing the roles and tasks of anti-submarine warfare, surveillance and search and rescue and it provides the more cost effective solution. The ability of the P-3C to remain on task for extended periods at substantial distances from base and its highly integrated electronic system were particular factors in its selection.

(U) One very important consideration in this purchase was the provision for AIP through incorporating the Australian Barra sonics system.<sup>1</sup>

### Burma

(U) On 25 April 1975 the American Embassy, Rangoon recommended that a formal letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) be issued to the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) for a U.S. Air Force instructor pilot training course for the period April 1976 through March 1977. On 21 August 1975 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force advised that an LOA for one FMS instructor pilot/T-37 space was being forwarded. In the meantime, on 30 July, the USDAO Rangoon advised that the Burmese Director of Defense Services, Intelligence, had requested information on availability of flight surgeon courses. These initiatives represented the first interest in U.S. military training shown by the GUB in five years and raised questions as to whether or not increased security assistance activity could be expected in the near future. In expectation of this possibility, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the USDAO Rangoon were revised to include security assistance responsibilities; however, no further actions were reported during the remainder of the year (also, see Chapter 1, Command and Control).<sup>2</sup>

### Cambodia

#### Funding

(U) The original CPD dollar guidelines for the FY 75 Cambodian MAP were for \$362.5 million, of which \$297.0 million was programmed to meet minimum necessary ammunition requirements. The program subsisted on CRA funding until December 1974 when the FAA authorization bill was passed. This bill placed a \$200 million ceiling on MAP for Cambodia, including purchasing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T). In addition Congress authorized a \$75

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1. CHFMS Canberra 0683/290019Z May 75.
  2. J481 Point Paper, 10 Sep 75, Subj: Burmese Express Interest in USAF Training; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 314-315.

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million drawdown of DOD stocks. By the end of 1974 only \$22 million of the authorized \$200 million remained and, even using authorized drawdown of stocks, ammunition expenditures alone were expected to exhaust all available funds well before the end of FY 75.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 28 January 1975 President Ford, in a message to Congress, proposed legislation to authorize and budget for the appropriation of an additional \$222 million in military assistance for Cambodia. In the meantime the MAP became primarily an ammunition, fuel and food supply mission (also see the Logistics Chapter).<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 17 March 1975, exactly one month prior to the fall of Cambodia, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 9 to 7 for a compromise \$82.5 million in additional military aid, tied to a cutoff of all military aid to Cambodia by 30 June, but President Ford was reported as not willing to accept such a compromise; thus no new funds were authorized prior to the fall. The President did point out, however, that officials had discovered \$21.5 million in unspent FY 74 funds that were now being made available. He noted that this error appeared to be the result of "very sloppy bookkeeping in the Department of Defense." At a DOD morning news briefing on 18 March, it was revealed that CINCPAC had, in the summer of 1974, posed a doubt that the accounting was being handled accurately, and that this suspicion had proved correct. At the DOD morning news briefing on 19 March the question was posed as to how CINCPAC got involved and the reply was that "they monitor everything that goes on over there. You know they're the responsible command for the Pacific area. They don't have any actual control in the sense, they just monitor."<sup>3</sup>

(U) After the fall on 17 April the Secretary of Defense reported that \$1.264 billion had been spent on military assistance to Cambodia during the period FY 70 to FY 75. Of this amount \$1.258 billion had been delivered and \$6 million remained for redistribution.<sup>4</sup>

(C) Brig. Gen. William W. Palmer, Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) from February 1974 to April 1975 concluded that Cambodian military "...failure to redress considerable and repeatedly identified deficiencies coupled with inadequate, uncertain and untimely MAP-CB funding caused

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 371, 387-388.
  2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 Feb 75, "President Ford Requests Additional Funds for Assistance to Vietnam and Cambodia," p. 231.
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 Mar 75, "Additional Aid Ruled Out"; SECDEF 4218/182259Z Mar 75, 5342/200008Z Mar 75.
  4. SECDEF 5639/182301Z Apr 75.

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its defeat and the failure of the U.S. to achieve its stated Security Assistance Objectives." He felt that the MAP planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) was neither sufficiently flexible nor responsive to meet fully the needs of a supported nation in active warfare.<sup>1</sup>

### Congressional Restrictions

(S) In addition to budgetary restrictions noted under Funding, the Cooper-Church Amendment of January 1971 specifically prohibited "advisors" in Cambodia, and the Symington-Case Amendment of February 1972 limited the total number of U.S. personnel in Cambodia to 200. According to General Palmer, Chief, MEDTC up to the fall on 17 April, the:<sup>2</sup>

...cumulative effect of these restrictions was to severely limit any MEDTC ability to ensure that millions of dollars in MAP funds were being well spent. FANK was provided modern equipment but was denied the overall training, technical know-how, and military professionalism desperately needed to modernize it in the areas of tactical leadership, staff planning and coordination, personnel and financial management or logistics operations. Proper management and effective use of the equipment provided was apparently to be learned by a trial and error, do-it-yourself process which time would not permit.

### Khmer Air Force (KAF) Airlift Self-Sufficiency

(U) On 5 August 1974 CINCPAC had initiated a plan for KAF self-sufficiency which included augmenting the KAF with C-123K aircraft and training 10 additional aircrews and 196 maintenance personnel. This training was provided by a U.S. Air Force Mobile Training Team (MTT) in Thailand, augmented by MACTHAI Training and Logistics Detachment personnel. The first of two planned 12-week aircrew classes graduated on 25 March 1975. A total of 366.1 flight hours and 96 sorties were required for this class which included six first pilots, four co-pilots, five flight mechanics, five loadmasters, four navigators, and one instructor navigator (total of 25 crew members). The second class of five aircrews had begun on 24 March. In the meantime, Cambodia was being supplied by contract airlift (also see Logistics Chapter) which continued until the fall on 17 April.<sup>3</sup>

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1. End of Tour Rpt, Brig. Gen. William W. Palmer, Chief MEDTC, 30 Apr 75, pp. 14-15, hereafter cited as Palmer Rpt.
  2. Ibid.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 443-444; USMACTHAI 250900Z Mar 75.

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FY 75 Khmer Army Training Program in Thailand

(S) On 27 March 1975, less than a month before the fall of Cambodia, CHMEDTC published a list of courses for Khmer Army third country training in Thailand. According to this list, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was to train a total of 335 students in 13 different short duration courses (3-6 days) between 1 April and 10 August 1975.<sup>1</sup>

M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)

(S) The last major equipment delivery to Cambodia consisted of M113 APCs. On 26 February 1975 CHMEDTC reported an urgent requirement to replace FANK combat losses sustained during the Khmer Rouge Winter Offensive (about 12 losses to date during FY 75). Department of the Army had identified 16 APC programmed in the Cambodia MAP, but noted that the price per APC was \$90,000 as opposed to the funded \$27,185 per APC; therefore, CHMEDTC offered to accept five. CINCPAC requested JCS assistance in exploring all possible sources at the lowest possible unit prices, preferably in-theater assets. As a result, the Secretary of Defense initially approved requisitioning 20 from any DOD source. By 16 March, 50 M113A1s had been located and shipped from Yokohama to Sattahip, Thailand. Two to five APCs were to be airlifted to Cambodia daily beginning about 26 March. Of the 50 shipped, 45 were delivered prior to the cessation of Cambodia airlift operations. The remaining five were diverted to U.S. Forces Korea.<sup>2</sup>

Termination of the Cambodia MAP

(S) In early April 1975 it became clear that the fall of the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) was imminent. On 12 April the Secretary of Defense suspended MAP support to the GKR except for airdrop of articles already in Thailand, and by mid-April all MEDTC and Embassy personnel had been evacuated. Phnom Penh fell on 17 April and the Secretary of Defense announced the termination of the Cambodia MAP on 19 April 1975.<sup>3</sup>

Disestablishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team - Cambodia (MEDTC)

(S) On 26 April 1975 the Secretary of Defense granted authority to disestablish the MEDTC and Training and Logistics Detachment (TLD), Udorn,

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1. CHMEDTC 270845Z Mar 75.
  2. CHMEDTC 260344Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 270232Z Feb 75; J8 WEBS 24 Feb - 2 Mar 75, 17-23 Mar 75, 21-27 Apr 75.
  3. SECDEF 8129/120710Z Apr 75, 8558/122150Z Apr 75, 6377/191631Z Apr 75.

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Thailand, in accordance with CINCPAC instructions. CINCPAC directed disestablishment of MEDTC effective 15 May 1975, and of the USMACTHAI TLD effective 30 June 1975. Residual functions of the MEDTC were absorbed by a Joint Liaison Office at Camp Samae San, attached to COMUSMACTHAI.<sup>1</sup>

Republic of China

FMS Credit

(S) On 9 May 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei requested additional FY 75 FMS credit above the current \$72.2 million ceiling to the original POM level of \$80 million to support the upgrade of the ROC air defense system. In requesting this additional credit, Chief MAAG Taipei noted that \$65.2 million was already committed to F-5E co-production, leaving very little for remaining priority projects. The Secretary of Defense advised that the ROC ranked fourth among 33 countries receiving credit already, but that an effort would be made to divert unused credit to the ROC if available. Ultimately, the ROC received the \$80 million requested.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 11 December 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei advised that the current worldwide economic recession had set back the ROC transition schedule from FMSCR to cash, and that it needed additional FY 77 and FY 78 FMS credit to achieve the U.S. recommended air and naval modernization. Chief MAAG requested, and CINCPAC supported, an increase of \$25 million in FY 77 and \$20 million in FY 78 above the latest POM figure for a total of \$65 million and \$50 million respectively. Action was pending at the end of the year.<sup>3</sup>

Change in Training Status

(U) On 26 August 1975 the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC of a change in Foreign Assistance status of the Republic of China (ROC), from a training-only to a CONUS-training-only country. The immediate impact of this action was cancellation of grant aid funds for a previously planned Resources Management MTT course. The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) had already expended over \$27,000 of its own funds in preparation for the course, so Chief MAAG China requested reconsideration. CINCPAC supported Chief MAAG's request, noting the possible adverse effects this untimely disruption of plans might have on future MAAG-MND relations. On 3 October 1975 the Secretary of Defense

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1. CHMEDTC/JLO Cp Samae San 150936Z Apr 75; SECDEF 3613/260027Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 020220Z May 75.
  2. CMAAG Taipei 090807Z May 75; SECDEF 4207/161316Z May 75; J8 WEB 23-29 Jun 75.
  3. CMAAG Taipei 110803Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 180317Z Dec 75.

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replied that the ROC could not be reinstated as eligible for MAP training overseas, but that this training could be financed through FMS or CONUS training at the Defense Resources Management Education Center at the next available course.<sup>1</sup>

Improved HAWK Battalion for Southern Taiwan

(S) On 15 April 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei requested assistance in obtaining clearance for a second Improved HAWK battalion for southern Taiwan.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC had supported the JSOP midrange (FY 77-84) objective of three Improved HAWK battalions for the air defense of Taiwan, and clearance had been granted in July 1974 to convert the one basic HAWK battalion, already located in northern Taiwan, to the improved configuration.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 18 April 1975 CINCPAC recommended approval in principle of the sale of the Improved HAWKS to the ROC subject to ROC availability of funds.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 21 November 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei, having received no response to the 15 April inquiry, again sought clearance for a second HAWK battalion. This request was supported by the American Embassy Taipei, which noted that failure to approve the sale might cause the Chinese to turn to the French Roland. CINCPAC again recommended approval on 29 November 1975. Final decision by the National Security Council was pending at year's end.<sup>5</sup>

Semi-Automated Air Defense Program

(S) On 18 September 1975 the Chinese Air Force signed a contract with Hughes Aircraft Corporation to devise a set of system specifications and costs which were to result in an implementing contract for a semi-automated air defense system effective January 1976 at an estimated cost of \$35 million. (b)(1) x 1.3

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1. SECDEF 6479/262015Z Aug 75; CHMAAG Taipei 230806Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 270347Z Sep 75; SECDEF 9721/030908Z Oct 75.
  2. CHMAAG Taipei 150850Z Apr 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 452; CINCPAC 180241Z Apr 75.
  4. CINCPAC 180241Z Apr 75.
  5. CHMAAG Taipei 210801Z Nov 75; AMEMB Taipei 7613/261100Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 290011Z Nov 75; DA 171448Z Dec 75; STATE 295335/162253Z Dec 75.

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30 December 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei advised that political, security, operational employment consideration and uncertainties regarding funding sources for the required hardware and software had restricted detailed planning for ROC system interface with external systems.<sup>1</sup>

Co-production/Co-assembly of F-5Es

(S) In January 1975 production of the first of 100 F-5E aircraft was begun according to the Northrop Aviation/Chinese Air Force (CAF) co-production program schedule. By 27 May, aircraft number 7 was delivered to the CAF 1st Wing.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In the meantime, on 7 February 1975, the Government of the Republic of China had submitted a letter of intent and commitment to Northrop Corporation for co-production follow-on of an additional 20 F-5E aircraft to be completed in Fiscal Year 1978. U.S. Government approval was granted on 1 June 1975. Chief MAAG Taipei recommended approval of this program in view of the aging ROC aircraft inventory and need to fill ROC shortfall of 2 squadrons under the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) midrange objective of 14 squadrons.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 18 December 1975 the American Embassy, Taipei requested approval for ROC co-production of 80 additional F-5Es for a total of 200. This request was based on ROC concern to maintain the quality of their air defense system in view of recent sales of British Rolls-Royce jet engines to the People's Republic of China and speculation of sales of French MIRAGE fighters. Further co-production of F-5Es would help maintain a balance to attrition and assist in achieving the JSOP goal of 16 ROC fighter squadrons with about 300 aircraft by 1980. CINCPAC reaction to this request was favorable and indorsement was pending at year's end.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CMAAG Taipei 200901Z Sep 75, 300330Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 270142Z Sep 75; CINCPACAF 182045Z Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 451; CINCPAC PEG REPORT on US MAP FY 75, pp. 17-18.
  3. CMAAG Taipei 180801Z Feb 75; STATE 127914/022016Z Jun 75.
  4. AMEMB Taipei 8069/180940Z Dec 75.

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### T-38 Bailment Aircraft

(S) On 11 April 1975 CHMAAG Taipei requested, CINCPAC supported, and the Secretary of Defense approved an extension of the 1972 bailment agreement for 22 T-38 aircraft which allowed the ROC maintenance of operational and training capability through the critical period of its F-5E conversion program. Bailment was to be extended from 30 April to 31 December, but on 29 May CHMAAG reported that the additional costs associated with accelerated F-5E conversion, reduction in planned FY 75 FMSCR, and anticipated costs of increased F-5E co-production imposed fiscal limitations which precluded retention of the T-38s beyond 31 May.<sup>1</sup>

### Sale of F-104D and T-33 Aircraft

(S) On 17 January 1975 the Secretary of State announced the approval for sale of six F-104D and twenty-five T-33 aircraft to the ROC. The ROC accepted the LOA at \$550,000 for the F-104Ds and \$1.0 million for the T-38s.<sup>2</sup>

### F-16 Price and Availability

(S) On 23 April 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei noted that the ROC Air Force was evaluating their overall Five Year Plan with particular emphasis on continuing fighter aircraft modernization during the period 1979-81. The ROC viewed the 1980's with a need to acquire two fighter squadrons with increased performance and some all-weather radar missile firing capability to maintain a credible deterrent; therefore, they requested price and availability data on the F-16. CINCPAC supported this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 April. On 18 December the American Embassy, Taipei expressed support for replacing F-104s with the F-16 in the 1982-83 timeframe. On 30 December, CINCPAC agreed to the need for replacement, noting that the F-16 was also the selected NATO replacement fighter.<sup>3</sup>

### Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on M-48 Tanks

(S) On 11 July 1975 Chief MAAG Taipei notified CINCPAC of ROC request to modify the terms of the 16 May 1974 MOU to allow for turn-in of M7/M8 howitzers in lieu of M18/M24 tanks for 100 M-48 tanks. Chief MAAG Taipei was opposed to

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 418-419; CHMAAG Taipei 110807Z Apr 75, 290811Z May 75; CINCPAC 160236Z Apr 75; SECDEF 5580/182232Z Apr 75.
  2. STATE 011631/171633Z Jan 75.
  3. CMAAG Taipei 230813Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 260313Z Apr 75; AMEMB Taipei 8069/180940Z Dec 75; J4/Memo/00123-75, 30 Dec 75.

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this substitution based on ROC excess inventories of tanks and the drain on operation and maintenance funds required for the upkeep of M18/M24 tanks. CINCPAC supported the position of Chief MAAG Taipei.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 22 September 1975 the Secretary of Defense, with State Department concurrence, proposed changing the MOU to satisfy the ROC request. Chief MAAG Taipei, noting that neither its message of 11 July nor CINCPAC's supporting message were referenced in the Secretary of Defense's proposal, suggested that the military and political factors involved may not have been fully considered, whereupon the Secretary of Defense requested the matter be held in abeyance for discussion during the CINCPAC MAAG Chiefs' Conference. On 4 December CINCPAC again supported the Chief MAAG Taipei stand requiring adherence to the original MOU.<sup>2</sup>

#### Howitzer Production

(S) On 16 April 1975 CHMAAG and the Country Teams supported a ROC request for authorization to produce two-four prototypes of 105mm (M102) and 155mm (M114A1) towed howitzers. (DA had previously advised that only production of components was authorized.) On 18 April CINCPAC supported this request to the Secretary of Defense. On 25 September the expected production, and other topics of interest, was discussed by the visiting ROC Combined Service Forces (CSF) Commander, General Lo Yu-Lun, with the CINCPAC Director of Logistics and Security Assistance, RADM Hugh A. Benton. Action was still pending on this request at year's end.<sup>3</sup>

#### Laser Guided Bomb Requirements

(S) On 8 May 1975 the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) emphasized that an urgent requirement existed in the ROC inventory for laser target designator/laser guided bombs to serve as a credible deterrent and available countermeasure to People's Republic of China (PRC) STYX missile-armed naval craft and the amphibious threat. According to COMUSTDC the natural barrier provided by the Taiwan Strait actually served as a salient for the PRC into the ROC with the present imbalance of naval craft and weapon systems. No further action was taken on this subject during 1975.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CMAAG Taipei 110550Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 251830Z Jul 75.


2. SECDEF 1789/221405Z Sep 75, 5224/132230Z Nov 75; CINCPAC 040143Z Dec 75.

3. CHMAAG Taipei 160401Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 180242Z Apr 75; J465 HistSum Oct 75.

4. COMUSTDC 080745Z May 75.

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**INDIA**

<p><b>INDIA BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>POPULATION: 1,111,000,000</p> <p>AREA: 2,973,147 SQ. KM.</p> <p>OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: HINDI</p> <p>RELIGION: About 80% HINDUISM, 17% ISLAM, 3% CHRISTIANITY, 2% OTHER</p> <p>GOVERNMENT: PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY</p> <p>HEAD OF STATE: YASHWANTH PRASAD</p> <p>PRIME MINISTER: INDIRA GANDHI</p> <p>CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF: GEN. SURESH K. MEHRA</p> <p>CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF: ADM. SURENDRA NATH KHILJI</p> <p>CHIEF OF AIR STAFF: AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DR. PRABHAKH BEHRA</p>	 <p>NEW DELHI</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>7 Corps, 15 Infantry Divisions, 10 Mountain Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions.</p> <p>Strength: 1,100,000 (Paramilitary Strength: 433,000)</p> <p>Excellent capability to maintain internal security and good capability to resist external aggression. Limited airborne capability. Dependent on foreign sources for sophisticated weaponry.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>1 Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier, 2 Light Cruisers, 1 Destroyer, 19 Frigates, 8 Submarines, 8 Patrol Craft (guided missile), 12 Coastal Patrol Ships/Craft, 8 Mine Warfare Ships, 4 Amphibious Warfare Ships.</p> <p>Strength: 3R,000</p> <p>Moderate capability to defend coastline. Limited long-range (offensive), antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious capabilities.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>3 Light Bomber Squadrons (B(1)58), 10 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons (SU-7, HF-24, MIG-21M), 17 Fighter Squadrons (GRAT, MIG-21FL), 2 Reconnaissance Squadrons (PR-57, C-121), 10 Transport Squadrons (miscellaneous).</p> <p>Strength: 105,000</p> <p>Moderate interceptor and close air support capabilities. Limited airborne capability.</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR: HON. WILLIAM B. SMITH</p> <p>USDAO: COL Lewis H. GARD, USA</p> <p>USCIB: COL Harry J. BROCKMAN, USA</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>ASSIST IN DEVELOPING EXPERTISE AND SYSTEMS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ITS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.</p> <p>PROVIDE U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA.</p> <p>ASSIST IN MAINTAINING ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITY BY PROVISION, ON REQUEST, OF SPARE PARTS AND RELATED ITEMS FOR PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED U.S. EQUIPMENT.</p> <p>PROVIDE, IF REQUESTED AND APPROVED, DEFENSE ITEMS TO SECURE ARMED FORCES MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY.</p>	<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS</li> <li>CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL PEACE</li> </ul>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 72.

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ROC Navy (ROCN) MAP Vessel Sinks

~~(C)~~ On 17 November 1975 CHMAAG Taipei reported the sinking of the ROCN minesweeper, coastal, RCS YUNG PING, MSC 155 (ex. U.S. MSC 40). The RCS YUNG PING ran aground in the Taiwan Strait near central Taiwan on 24 October 1975 and then sank in about 40 meters of water near Makung, while under tow to the ROCN Second Naval Shipyard, Penghus (Pescadores). The ROCN did not intend to salvage the ship which was transferred to the ROC under MAP in June 1955.<sup>1</sup>

Fiji

(U) On 5 August 1975 the Presidential determination on FMS was signed for two coastal minesweepers (MSC) to Fiji, and the transfer took place on 14 October 1975. The two minesweepers were sold on an FMS cash basis for \$40,800 with another \$60,920 for a mobile training team to provide crew transition training. Fiji was not a regular recipient of FMS and this was a one-time case. Its significance lay in the potential for cooperative search and rescue efforts in the South Pacific.<sup>2</sup>

India

(U) India received Grant Aid Foreign Military Training Program funds totaling \$54,000 in FY 75 with \$200,000 proposed for FY 76. A total of 572 Indian students had been trained under the MAP during the period FY 50 through FY 75. India had also received a total of \$62.5 million in FMS deliveries during the period FY 50 through FY 75, almost \$48 million of which had been received during the period FY 50 through FY 65. On 24 February 1975 the State Department announced an end to its embargo on exports of military equipment to India (also see Pakistan).<sup>3</sup>

Indonesia

Framework

~~(C)~~ Prior to the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam in April 1975 the Government of Indonesia (GOT) had assumed a strong U.S. military presence in Southeast

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1. CMAAG Taipei 9940/070814Z Nov 75.
  2. STATE 187056/072207Z Aug 75; CNO 102325Z Oct 75; J482 Point Paper, 9 Oct 75, Subj: Crew Training for Fiji; USDOD Offer & Acceptance, 3 Oct 75, 633D/174080; Amendment to Offer & Acceptance, 24 Dec 75, 633E/175949.
  3. CPD FY 76 & 7T, Security Assistance Program, FMS and MAP, 5 Nov 75, p. 5; Comptroller DSAA FMS and Military Assistance Facts, Nov 75, p. 16.

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# INDONESIA

**MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY**

**ARMY**

13 Infantry Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades, 1 Paratroop/Commando Regiment, 1 Cavalry Brigade, 4 Field Artillery Regiments, 4 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments, 44 Infantry Battalions (Separate), 7 Cavalry Battalions (Separate), 5 Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Combat Engineer Battalions, 5 Airborne Infantry Battalions, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Separate), 3 Signal Battalions, 1 Air Defense Radar Battalion, 2 Quartermaster Battalions, 6 Transportation Battalions, 2 Military Police Battalions

Strength: 100,000

Maintain internal security and effectively repel minor incursions but not a major attack. Limited offensive capability. Overall readiness retarded by long lines of communication and logistical problems.

**NAVY**

7 Destroyer Escorts, 2 Submarines, 22 Patrol Craft, 13 Coastal Minesweepers, 9 Tank Landing Ships, 16 Auxiliary Craft, 6 Transports, 3 Trainers, 1 Helicopter.

Strength: 26,000 Navy; 12,000 Marines

Partially suppress smuggling and provide limited support for amphibious operations. Conduct only token submarine interdiction and antiair warfare operations. Marines are capable of providing a regimental size landing force for amphibious assaults.

**AIR FORCE**

11 C-130s, 16 C-47s, 7 F-51s, 2 B-26s, 35 Miscellaneous Helicopters, 15 Mi-32s, 16 T-33s, 20 Miscellaneous Light/Medium W/P Cargo Transports, 46 Training Aircraft.

Strength: 28,000

Forces in being can provide only limited tactical air support and air defense. Transport capability is growing but still can support only minor ground operations. Early warning radar and antiaircraft artillery defense systems extremely weak.



**MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INDOONESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND SELF-DEFENSE.

PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. SUPPORT TO INDOONESIAN GOVERNMENT AMENABLE TO U.S. INTEREST

CONTRIBUTE TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS AND THE UNITED STATES.

HELP MAINTAIN U.S. ACCESS TO INDOONESIAN RAW MATERIALS AND AIR AND SEA LINES COMMUNICATION.

PREVENT DISRUPT COMMERCIALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY.

**INDONESIA BASIC INFORMATION**

AREA . . . . . 775,000 sq. mi.

POPULATION . . . . . 111,000,000

ADDITIONAL POPULATION . . . . . 15,000,000

PER CAPITA GNP . . . . . \$60 PER YEAR

LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 38 YEARS

ADDITIONAL PER CAPITA . . . . . \$20 BILION

PER CAPITA . . . . . \$100

DEFENSE BUDGET (Self-Financed) . . . . . 2% OF GNP

AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 4.1

PRESIDENT . . . . . GEN SUHARDO

MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY . . . . . GEN PANGGABEAN

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . Adam Malik

ARMED FORCES CHIEF . . . . . GEN PANGGABEAN

ARMED FORCES VICE CHIEF . . . . . GEN SURONO

ARMY COMMANDER . . . . . LT GEN MARYOTO

NAVY COMMANDER . . . . . ADM SUHYARTO

AIR FORCE COMMANDER . . . . . AIR MARSHAL Saleh HESARU

COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS . . . . . MAJ GEN ANWAR

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**

U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . MR. David B. HEWSON

CONSUL REPRESENTATIVE . . . . . MR. Richard M. CASHIN

ATTACHE . . . . . COL Angelo GRILLI, USA

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**

MAINTAIN AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 77.

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Asia and had, therefore, emphasized economic development over military preparedness. The fall of Indochina caused the GOI to reassess the threat, however, and it became seriously concerned with the possibilities of Communist infiltration and subversion, especially across the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ Between 15 and 19 September 1975 CINCPAC was represented at a series of formal meetings and discussions in Washington, D. C. on Indonesian military requirements. Indonesian representatives submitted a considerable "shopping list" which was ultimately reduced so that most of the items could be funded under proposed FY 76 MAP (\$30 million) and FMS (\$12.5 million) levels. Major items of equipment included five ships (2 LPR, 2 PSMM, 1 WHEC), 19 helicopters (16 UH-1, 3 S-61), 200 1 1/4 ton trucks, 100 landing boats, and assorted communications and surveillance equipment. It was agreed that no decision would be made on the communications and surveillance equipment until a DOD survey team reviewed actual requirements.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ An anti-infiltration surveillance study of the South China Sea approaches to Indonesia was conducted by a 9-member DOD team during the period 17 November to 10 December 1975. Based on considerations of reasonable attainability, cost effectiveness, and near-term implementation, the team recommended upgrading existing capabilities by improving communications, expanding human intelligence (HUMINT) networks and adapting existing equipment for surveillance missions, as opposed to an expensive radar program.<sup>4</sup>

#### Funding

~~(S)~~ The Security Assistance Program for Indonesia was subject to various conflicting pressures throughout CY 75. There was a feeling in some segments of Congress that growing Indonesian oil revenues should permit a phaseout of

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1. J472 Point Paper, 16 Dec 75, Subj: DOD Surveillance Survey Team - Indonesia.
  2. STATE 161472/092302Z Jul 75.
  3. J472 Memo, 26 Sep 75, Subj: Trip Report 15-23 Sep 75, Washington, D.C.; STATE 225053/201814Z Sep 75 (EX).
  4. J743 Point Paper, 9 Feb 76, Subj: Anti-Infiltration Surveillance Study of South China Sea Approaches to Indonesia, Dec 75.

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grant military aid. On the other hand, Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil company, had run into financial difficulty in paying back accumulated short-term debts, also, the conflict of approximately 50,000 political prisoners with Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act lay just beneath the surface. Based on comments of a visiting House International Relations Committee Staff Delegation (STAFFDEL) (Messrs. John Brady and Gerald Pithford) during the period 9 to 12 June 1975, the American Embassy, Jakarta anticipated that they might recommend termination of grant aid military equipment (MAP) at the end of FY 77 or 78. Finally, the Indonesian invasion of Timor in December 1975 was to become a matter of concern; however, on 6 December 1975, one day prior to the invasion, Presidents Ford and Suharto issued a Joint Communique' in which the former reaffirmed the United States intention to continue to provide "substantial aid" to Indonesia.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The actual FY 75 funded Indonesian Security Assistance Program was as follows (in \$ millions):<sup>2</sup>

<u>MAP (GA)</u>	<u>FMSCR</u>
15.85*	5.00

\*Includes \$2.80 million for training.

(C) The proposed FY 76 program fluctuated as follows, with FMSCR increasing significantly (in \$ millions):

	<u>POM<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>PROPOSED<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>CPD<sup>2</sup></u>
MAP (GA)	19.4	27.6	19.4
Training (GA)	2.0	3.1	2.0
FMSCR	12.5	12.5	23.1

SOURCE: 1. CINCPAC ALPHA 010/260240Z Aug 75.  
2. CPD FY 76-7T, 5 Nov 75.

(C) Except for the surveillance radar not recommended by the DOD Survey Team, FY 76 program funding was tailored to meet the modified requirements

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1. SECDEF 9926/142031Z Mar 75; Sunday Cape Cod Times, 7 Dec 75, dateline Jakarta, Indonesia (N.Y. Times News Service); CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 381; AMEMB Jakarta 7386/190543Z Jun 75; Dept. of State Bulletin, "Joint Communique' Issued at Jakarta, Dec 6," 29 Dec 75, p. 922.
  2. CPD FY 76 & 7T Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75, pp. 18-19.

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list submitted in Washington, D.C. in September 1975. As of 31 December 1975 major funding was concentrated as follows (figures do not include MAP overhead, PCH&T or training) (in \$ millions):<sup>1</sup>

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>COMMUNICATIONS/ ELECTRONICS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MAP (GA)	1.78	4.5	5.62	11.90
FMSCR	17.1*	6.0		23.1
CASH		.17		.17
TOTAL	18.88	10.67	5.62	35.17

\*Helicopters (16 UH-1, 3 S-61)

Training

(C) As of 31 December 1975 the Indonesian training program (\$2.0 million) involved 232 students. The single most important project being developed was for 16 OV-10 aircraft for the air force (TNI-AU) scheduled for late 1976 delivery. A planning conference had been held at Eglin AFB, 30 July to 1 August 1975, and training was scheduled to be a combination of grant-aid (10 pilots) and FMS (24 ground maintenance technicians). Beyond new equipment requirements, training emphasis was on resources management (intermediate and senior levels), professional training, and English language. On 11 November CSAF advised that the grant aid portion of training costs had increased from \$24,040 per student to \$35,180 or a total of \$141,400. This increase involved material and personnel services costs, increased flying hours (training site moved from Hurlburt Field to Patrick AFB, Florida), and identification of CH-3 support requirements.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 7 November 1975 the Chief, US Defense Liaison Group (CHUSDLG) Jakarta, advised that the Indonesian Army would form an aviation unit in the near future to include 16 UH-1H helicopters, and that CONUS training valued at approximately \$130,000 would be requested to begin in January 1976. The program was to be funded by deleting lower priority FY 76 training.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J473 Point Paper, 31 Dec 75, Subj: Indonesian FY 76 Security Assistance Program.
  2. J483 Point Papers, 18 Nov 75, Subj: Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) for Indonesia, and 31 Dec 75, Subj: Indonesian FY 76 Security Assistance Program; CSAF 112200Z Nov 75, 242253Z Nov 75.
  3. CHUSDLG Jakarta 070337Z Nov 75.

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V-150 Armored Cars

(C) In May 1975 the GOI signed a LOA for 45 V-150 Cadillac Gage armored cars. Thirteen of these vehicles had already been programmed under the FY 74 MAP, and the initial shipments of this order were received in December 1975. This was a priority project for the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD), but, in August 1975, the U.S. Army Logistics Assistance Office-Hawaii (LAO-H) reported misgivings with the Indonesian lack of organizational maintenance support facilities. The Defense Liaison Office replied that efforts would be made to develop an in-country maintenance capability without outside assistance.<sup>1</sup>

Ship Procurement

(C) Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) interest in acquiring four anti-submarine frigates, three or four GEARING class destroyers, and one or two BARBEL class submarines continued into 1975. Between 18 and 22 February a GOI ship procurement mission visited Washington, D.C. to discuss design, costs and procedures to acquire these ships. Based upon this visit, the mission noted that the price for building the new frigates would not allow them to buy the number desired and that the 65-month lead time appeared questionable. On 5 June 1975 the Secretary of Defense reported that McMullen Associates, Inc., of Avondale Shipyards, New Orleans, would build three multi-purpose frigates if given 60-70 days to draw up the specifications. On 6 June CHUSDLG replied that the GOI had established a 1 June deadline for selection of ships to be purchased and, on 30 June, they advised that the GOI had decided to purchase four Corvette-type ships through NEVESBU Shipyard, Netherlands.<sup>2</sup>

Allocation of Recovered Southeast Asia Equipment

(S) On 22 August 1975 the State Department proposed allocating the following recovered Southeast Asia equipment to Indonesia:<sup>3</sup>

<u>SHIPS</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
1 PGM	7 C-47
1 PC	4 C-123B
<u>4</u> WHEC	<u>1</u> O-1
6	12

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1. J4 WEB, 11-17 Aug 75; J475 HistSum, 8 Sep 75; J472 Point Paper, 13 Feb 76, Subj: V-150 Armored Cars; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 395, 396.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 394-395; J823 HistSum, 10 Mar 75; CHUSDLG Jakarta 170910Z Apr 75, 060421Z Jun 75, 300915Z Jun 75; SECDEF 1028/051504Z Jun 75.
  3. STATE 200194/2/221711Z Aug 75.



(S) On 13 November 1975 the American Embassy, Jakarta reported that, although Indonesian officials had not submitted a definitive written reply, they had orally replied that they did not intend to accept any of these ships or aircraft. On 24 November the American Embassy withdrew the offer of ships to Indonesia, thus making them available to the Philippines (also see Philippines). Indonesia did not accept any of the aircraft either.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 6 December 1975 the State Department authorized allocation of five ex-Laotian UH-34D helicopters to Indonesia, but these aircraft were finally offered to Thailand to obtain release of modified T-28s to the Philippines (see also Philippines and Thailand).<sup>2</sup>

Third Country Military Assistance

(C) During the period FY 70 through FY 75 Indonesia had been provided military equipment by several countries other than the United States to include the following:<sup>3</sup>



<u>SALES</u>	<u>GRANT AID</u>
United Kingdom	Australia
Japan	New Zealand
Malaysia	
Sweden	
France	
Netherlands	
Italy	

(S) The Indonesians appeared to show a preference for U.S. products, but insufficient aid, slow delivery schedules or high prices sometimes influenced decisions to procure from third countries, as was the case with the frigates mentioned earlier.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Australia had a Security Assistance Program for Indonesia covering the period 1972 to 1975 at a total cost of approximately U.S. \$24 million. The program included training as well as provision of the following equipment and support:<sup>5</sup>

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 13896/130200Z Nov 75, 14430/240913Z Nov 75.
  2. STATE 288574/061732Z Dec 75.
  3. J823 Point Paper, 14 May 75, Subj: Third Country Military Assistance to Indonesia.
  4. Ibid.
  5. J823 Point Paper, 9 Apr 75, Subj: Australian Security Assistance to Indonesia.

**JAPAN**

<p><b>JAPAN BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 143,000 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 111,000,000          CAPITAL . . . . . TOKYO          OFFICIAL LANGUAGE . . . . . JAPANESE          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 73.5 YEARS          AREA UNDER CULTIVATION . . . . . 8,100,000 ACRES          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$450 BILLION          GNP PER CAPITA . . . . . \$5,000          MILITARY BUDGET . . . . . \$1.3 BILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 10%</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>17 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Division, 1 Airborne Brigade, 1 Tank Brigade, 1 Combined Brigade, 2 Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades (AAA), 13 non-divisional Artillery Battalions, 1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (75mm), 1 Helicopter Brigade</p> <p>Strength: 156,000</p> <p>Can maintain internal security, but requires U.S. support to repel aggression by a major power. Good discipline, morale, leadership, training, and equipment. Stock levels to support an expanded force are inadequate for sustained operations. Combat units are understrength</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>47 Destroyer types, 16 Submarine, 26 Coastal patrol types, 9 River Patrol types, 47 Mine Warfare types, 5 Amphibious types, 13 Auxiliary types, 191 Service craft</p> <p>Strength: 40,000</p> <p>Incapable of operations beyond coastal waters except in conjunction with U.S. forces. Lack adequate air defense, anti-air, marine warfare, and logistic support forces. Ship are well maintained; personnel highly motivated and well trained.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>900 Aircraft, including: 8 Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (F4U F-104/D4U, 55 F-4U), 3 Fighter Bomber Squadrons (F4U F-84F), 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-104), 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (6 R-106F, 14 R-4C), 2 Transport Squadrons (20 C-46, 11 YS-11), 2 Training Squadrons (70 F-105), 3 B-1H1 A10F groups (162 launchers, 452 missiles)</p> <p>Strength: 41,000</p> <p>Marginal capability to defend Japanese air space. However, lacks capability to defend against a more conventional bomber threat by either the F-4 or B-52.</p>
<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>EMERGENCY QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN ANTI-SUBSIEPHER WARFARE AND AIR DEFENSE, WILL ASSIST THE U.S. IN PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE EFFECTIVE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>AMBASSADOR . . . . . MR. ROBERT B. ROBINSON          VICE AMBASSADOR . . . . . LT GEN MATHIAS T. GALLAGHER, USAF          CHIEF OF MISSION . . . . . CAPT HAROLD L. DORE, USAF          CHIEF OF STAFF . . . . . CAPT CHARLES W. COLE, USAF</p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>PROVIDING JAPAN TO HAVE A LARGER ROLE IN REGIONAL DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF AIR DEFENSE AND ANTI-SUBSIEPHER WARFARE, THROUGH STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT AND COMBAT CAPABILITY OF FORCES.</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>EMERGENCY QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN ANTI-SUBSIEPHER WARFARE AND AIR DEFENSE, WILL ASSIST THE U.S. IN PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE EFFECTIVE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE.</p>
<p><b>JAPAN BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 143,000 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 111,000,000          CAPITAL . . . . . TOKYO          OFFICIAL LANGUAGE . . . . . JAPANESE          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 73.5 YEARS          AREA UNDER CULTIVATION . . . . . 8,100,000 ACRES          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$450 BILLION          GNP PER CAPITA . . . . . \$5,000          MILITARY BUDGET . . . . . \$1.3 BILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 10%</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>17 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Division, 1 Airborne Brigade, 1 Tank Brigade, 1 Combined Brigade, 2 Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades (AAA), 13 non-divisional Artillery Battalions, 1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (75mm), 1 Helicopter Brigade</p> <p>Strength: 156,000</p> <p>Can maintain internal security, but requires U.S. support to repel aggression by a major power. Good discipline, morale, leadership, training, and equipment. Stock levels to support an expanded force are inadequate for sustained operations. Combat units are understrength</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>47 Destroyer types, 16 Submarine, 26 Coastal patrol types, 9 River Patrol types, 47 Mine Warfare types, 5 Amphibious types, 13 Auxiliary types, 191 Service craft</p> <p>Strength: 40,000</p> <p>Incapable of operations beyond coastal waters except in conjunction with U.S. forces. Lack adequate air defense, anti-air, marine warfare, and logistic support forces. Ship are well maintained; personnel highly motivated and well trained.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>900 Aircraft, including: 8 Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (F4U F-104/D4U, 55 F-4U), 3 Fighter Bomber Squadrons (F4U F-84F), 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-104), 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (6 R-106F, 14 R-4C), 2 Transport Squadrons (20 C-46, 11 YS-11), 2 Training Squadrons (70 F-105), 3 B-1H1 A10F groups (162 launchers, 452 missiles)</p> <p>Strength: 41,000</p> <p>Marginal capability to defend Japanese air space. However, lacks capability to defend against a more conventional bomber threat by either the F-4 or B-52.</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 74.

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AIRCRAFT

SHIPS

SUPPORT

16 SABRE Jets

2 107' Attack Class  
Patrol Boats

Armored Car Rehab

6 NOMAD Aircraft

6 51' Patrol Boats

4 Dart Ranges

Japan

Review

(U) Security assistance to Japan consisted of FMS cash only. Japan ranked third in the PACOM in FMS, having purchased over \$450 million in goods and services through FY 75. FMS orders for FY 75 totaled \$29.7 million with \$50 million proposed for FY 76.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 10 January 1975 the new Liberal Democratic Party cabinet approved the Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 75 National Budget request for submission to the Diet. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) portion was U.S. \$4.05 billion out of a total of U.S. \$70.2 billion, and was up 21.4 percent from JFY 74; however, the general trend was to reduce annual quantitative procurement and postpone new acquisitions in the face of escalating costs.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As of 17 November 1975 potential sales to Japan included P-3C aircraft, future fighter (FX) aircraft to replace the F-104, E-2C aircraft, Improved HAWK, and armed helicopters with TOW and M-97 20mm Gatling guns.<sup>3</sup>

Training

(U) Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) training was considered excellent in nearly all basic areas, and was supplemented by CONUS training, which since 1967 had been purchased through FMS. Sixty-five individuals were programmed to attend CONUS formal courses in FY 76. CONUS-trained personnel were used:<sup>4</sup>

- For instructor training for new equipment and systems.
- To provide graduate level academic training.
- To provide instructors for established courses.

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1. CPD FY 76 & 77, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75, p. 108.
  2. CMDAO Tokyo 7005/230025Z Jan 75.
  3. J462 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Security Assistance - Japan.
  4. J482 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) Training.

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- To provide highly honored U.S. training for mobilization, orientation, and retention purposes.

- To fulfill training requirements for which it is economically infeasible to establish in-country courses.

(U) Major training deficiencies were viewed as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- Japanese civilian universities did not accept uniformed personnel into graduate and specialized courses.

- There was no range capability for NIKE and HAWK missile systems, so annual service practice was conducted on U.S. ranges.

- Technical and specialized in-country training on sophisticated U.S. equipment was lacking because the number of students to be trained was so few as to render it uneconomical to establish training courses in Japan.

Role of the Military Defense Assistance Office-Japan (MDAO-J)

(C) During the period 25 to 27 June a U.S. House International Relations Committee Staff Delegation (STAFFDEL) visited the American Embassy, Tokyo. They questioned the need to continue the Military Defense Assistance Office-Japan (MDAO-J) in Tokyo and suggested establishing a Japanese purchasing office in Washington instead. They were advised of the continuing valid role of the MDAO-J as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- MDAO satisfied industrial security requirements and Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) 1954 requirements for release of classified information to JDA on Government-to-Government basis.

- MDAO monitored end item utilization of \$800 million worth of on-hand MAP equipment to include excessing and turn-in.

- MDAO analyzed JDA research and development efforts through a data exchange program.


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1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Tokyo 8929/030804Z Jul 75.

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**KOREA**

<p><b>KOREA BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 38,000 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 35,800,000          GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT . . . . . 2.0 PER CENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 71 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 60 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . 2 ACRE          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1975 (EST) . . . . . \$18.2 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$531          BUDGET DEFICIT (As a % of GDP) 1975 (EST) . . . . . 11.0 PERCENT          AS PERCENT OF GDP . . . . . 5.3</p>	 <p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>ASSIST ROK IN ACHIEVING MODERNIZED FORCES CAPABLE OF DETERRENCE/DEFENDING WITH U.S. MATERIAL SUPPORT AGAINST NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION.</p> <p>ASSIST ROK IN DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE COMBAT-PIERCEMENT CAPABILITY.</p> <p>ASSIST IN OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE ROK TO REDUCE HUNG/COMBATANT, OVERHEAD MANPOWER AND EMPHASIZE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ALL MILITARY RESOURCES.</p> <p>PROMOTE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES.</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>17 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Infantry Division, 2 Armored Divisions, 7 Land Battalions, 5 Special Forces Brigades, 12 Counterintelligence Battalions, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 29 Artillery Battalions, 2 Air Defense Artillery Brigades.</p> <p>Strength: 527,844*</p> <p>Maintain internal security and effectively repel aggression from North Korea, assuming adequate logistic, air and naval support is provided from outside sources. Combat readiness is degraded by equipment shortages.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>7 Destroyer Types, 44 Coastal Patrol Types, 11 River Patrol Types, 9 Mine Warfare Types, 94 Amphibious Types, 119 Auxiliary Types, 1 Marine Division.</p> <p>Strength: 44,700, which includes 24,300 Marines*</p> <p>Adequate capability of patrolling coastal waters, antisubmarine warfare, and amphibious operations. Limited minesweeping capability.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>12 Tactical Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (10 F-86, F-6, F-4), 1 Helicopter Squadron (UH-1H), 3 Transport Squadrons (2 C-46, 1 C-54), 1 Ocean Surveillance Squadron (S-2), 1 Tactical Air Support Squadron (O-1), 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (PR-5).</p> <p>Strength: 27,700*</p> <p>Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VIP air and limited all-weather defense missions.</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . Gen. Richard E. SHELDON          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . MR. MICHAEL H. B. ADLER          COMUS KOREA . . . . . GEN RICHARD G. STELWELL, USA          CHIEF, JUSMAG-K . . . . . MAJ GEN OLIVER D. STREIT, III, USA</p>	<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST REINFORCED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN COERCIVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p>Strength: 27,700*</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 75.

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- MDAO analyzed Japanese defense budget trends.
- MDAO served to effect JSDF complementarity.
- Japanese funded 88 percent of the MDAO eligible costs.

The STAFFDEL was further advised that a Japanese purchasing office in Washington could not hope to replace the working relationship facilitated by the MDAO. It was further pointed out that the MDAO-Japan might serve as a model for MAAGs in other host countries evolving from full grant aid to financial self-sufficiency.<sup>1</sup>

Republic of Korea

Framework for Security Assistance

(S) Since FY 71 security assistance to the ROK had been provided within the guidelines of the Five-Year Modernization Plan (MOD Plan) which originally provided for \$1.5 billion total obligation authority (TOA) over the FY 71-75 period. Of this total, \$1.25 billion was to be new obligation authority (NOA) and \$250 million in Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The primary purpose of the MOD Plan was to effect both a quantitative and qualitative improvement and modernization of the ROK forces in order to deter or contain an attack by North Korea, augmented only by U.S. tactical air, naval and materiel support. Drastic reductions in MAP grant aid, especially in FY 74, as well as a 1974 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and PL 93-594 which raised costs considerably for overseas and CONUS-generated EDA, slowed down achievement of MOD Plan goals. By the end of FY 75 there was a shortfall against fiscal targets of about \$350 million in NOA (MAP materiel and training assistance plus FMS Credit), and about \$110 million in EDA. As of August 1975 it was estimated that, if projected grant aid and FMS Credit programs materialized, the MOD Plan NOA target would be realized in FY 77, while the EDA target would probably never be achieved unless Congress relaxed current legislative provisions on EDA for Korea.<sup>2</sup>

(S) President Park, convinced that the United States would ultimately withdraw its support and that the ROK must become increasingly self-reliant in its defense, ordered preparation of a new Five-Year (FY 76-80) ROK Force Improvement Plan (FIP) which was developed unilaterally by the ROK without initial consultation with U.S. counterparts. This plan, unveiled at the 8th Annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), 26-27 August 1975, contained a

1. Ibid.

2. Two ROK-US SCM Background Papers, 26 Aug 75, Subjs: Status of Five-Year MOD Plan (FY 71-75), EDA Program; CINCPAC Command History 1974. Vol. II, p. 377.

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newly developed project list estimated at over \$4.0 billion. It emphasized improvements in air, sea, and land power required for a self-reliant force capable of defending against North Korea without relying on U.S. forces. To finance the plan the ROK National Assembly enacted a new defense tax in July with the basic objective of providing \$3.0 billion in the next five years. The Koreans requested U.S. support as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- Continued U.S. troop presence.
- Complete MOD Plan by end FY 77.
- Provide follow-on FMS Credit for FIP.
- Provide technical data assistance and support for ROK defense industry.

(S) The Country Team made a detailed military and economic analysis of the ROK FIP, arriving at the following conclusions:<sup>2</sup>

- The FIP was both feasible and justified in military terms.
- The Korean economy could afford the FIP in terms of overall resources, but there would be considerable strain on ability to secure and service additional debt.
- The United States should support a modified FIP, with an extended time schedule and adjustment in priorities, by providing annual support of a target amount of \$300 million in FMS guaranteed commercial credit.

(S) By 24 November 1975 ROK/US Standing Action Officers' Committee (SAOC) meetings to evaluate ROK forces weapon systems and materiel requirements, as well as discussions between the Chief, JUSMAG-K and LT GEN Lew, Byung Hion, Director, Joint Staff, JCS, had resulted in accommodations toward the U.S. position, reducing the new investment target figure from \$4.1 billion to \$3.7 billion. Major agreements reached included:<sup>3</sup>

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1. ROK-US SCM Background Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: ROK Force Improvement Plan; AMEMB Seoul 6763/300407Z Aug 75.
  2. AMEMB Seoul 8760/140149Z Nov 75, 8802/140822Z Nov 75, 8814/140907Z Nov 75.
  3. AMEMB Seoul 9047/240902Z Nov 75.

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- Convert all three basic HAWK battalions to Improved HAWK.
- Reduce obsolete equipment replacement by approximately \$223.1 million.
- Make up shortages for one marine and 18 army divisions in lieu of equipping a fourth battalion in each regiment of 17 infantry, four ready reserve and six rear security divisions.
- Delete \$76.7 million project to equip and provide facilities for 748 Homeland Defense Reserve Force companies.
- Defer acquisition of two submarines, which would have cost approximately \$104.5 million, until after 1980.

(S) In addition to the above, final decisions were pending at the end of the year on the following projects:<sup>1</sup>

- Upgrade the M-48 tank vice M-60 co-production.
- Provide six rear area security divisions with fire-power equipment only vice full TO&E authorizations.

(S) With reference to the extended time schedule, the ROK remained adamant that the FIP be considered a five-year program, regardless of phased funding of some projects beyond 1980.<sup>2</sup>

#### FY 75 Security Assistance Program

(S) The original FY 75 Korea MAP proposal was for \$161.5 million, while FMS Credit was set at \$52 million. In December 1974 the FY 75 FAA established the total country ceiling at \$145 million. An additional \$20 million could be provided if the President of the United States would certify that Korea had made progress in the area of human rights. In view of the obvious impact this would have on planning and programming, CINCPAC requested clarification of the provisions of this legislation and CHJUSMAG-K requested a dollar breakout of charges by category against the FY 75 ceiling to date for planning purposes. The Secretary of Defense confirmed CINCPAC's understanding that there was little likelihood of increasing the ROK ceiling to the maximum of \$165 million indicated.

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1. Ibid.
  2. Ibid.

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The breakout of charges provided CHJUSMAG-K as of 30 January 1975 revealed that only \$57.6 million remained available out of a total of \$85.6 million for FY 75 MAP materiel and training:<sup>1</sup>

Breakout (\$ millions)

MAP Materiel & Training	85.6
P&T (MAP)*	(28.0)
Remaining (MAP)	(57.6)
FMS Credit	(52.0)
EDA	<u>( 7.4)</u>
 FY 75 Ceiling (MAP & FMSCP)	 (145.0)

\*EDA PCH&T costs of items originated overseas borne by receiving country per Sec 25, FAA of 1974 (PL 93-559).

(C) In April 1975 the Secretary of Defense established the final FY 75 MAP level for Korea at \$82.6 million and directed programming to eliminate everything except the following (in \$ millions):<sup>2</sup>

27 F-5E	62.4
PCH&T	24.0
Training	<u>1.4</u>
 TOTAL	 87.8

(C) The Secretary of Defense noted that this would result in overprogramming of approximately \$5.5 million. This was subsequently resolved by CINCPAC reprogramming to defer \$5.5 million of the F-5E requirement until early FY 76 under continuing resolution authority. CINCPAC reprogramming resulted in an FY 75 total of \$82,599,487.<sup>3</sup>

FY 76 Security Assistance Program

(C) The FY 76 ROK Security Assistance Program funding level fluctuated as follows between 27 December 1974 and President Ford's transmittal to Congress on 30 October 1975.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 405; CINCPAC 090345Z Jan 75, CJUSMAG-K 230817Z Jan 75; SECDEF 5596/301636Z Jan 75.
  2. J4 WEB 14-20 Apr 75; SECDEF 5450/182109Z Apr 75.
  3. Ibid.; SECDEF 8845/222129Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 240204Z Apr 75.
  4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 406; SECDEF 4074/230009Z Aug 75; STATE 258224/1/310125Z Oct 75; CPD FY 76&7T, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>MAP (GA)</u>	<u>TRAINING (GA)</u>	<u>FMSCR</u>
27 Dec 74	48.6	*	100.0
23 Aug 75	100.0	2.7	100.0
30 Oct 75	74.0	2.5**	126.0

\*Combined with MAP.

\*\*Final total in FY 76-7T CPD was \$2.7 million.

(C) The FY 76 ROK Security Assistance Program established the milestone at which point FMS Credit exceeded grant aid.

(C) By 21 November 1975 the FY 76 ROK Security Assistance Program priorities, based on the levels in the President's congressional submission, stood as follows (in \$ millions):<sup>1</sup>

MAP (GA)

5.6 F-5E CSP & AGE  
.3 UN Forces Support  
12.0 F-5B Fighter Aircraft  
4.3 War Reserve Munitions  
13.6 CPIC  
19.2 Mobile Radar  
.1 NIKE Transfer Support  
18.9 Supply Opns (PCH&T)  
74.0

FMSCR

5.5 M-16 Rifle Plant  
3.6 Arsenal Expansion  
4.5 AIM-9 Conversion  
2.5 TOW Missile System  
3.7 F-5B  
24.8 Improved HAWK  
3.3 Missile Maintenance Depot  
16.4 Radio Co-production (follow-on)  
5.5 PSMM Armament  
13.4 HARPOON  
42.8 F-5E Aircraft  
126.0

Training (GA)

\*2.5

Total (GA)

76.5

Total Program (Minus cash sales)

202.5

\*Planning based on \$2.5 million; final CPD level was \$2.7 million.

i. J463 Point Paper, 21 Nov 75, Subj: Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK)

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FY 76 Training Program

(S) The FY 76 ROK Foreign Military Training Program as originally submitted to Congress was \$2.5 million (the final CPD figure was \$2.7 million). Much of this (\$1.6 million) was for training to support ROK Army takeover of the six NIKE-HERCULES batteries by April 1977. Identified training deficiencies and FY 76 priorities were as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Deficiencies

- Higher level managerial and technical skills.
- Maintenance capability for highly technical weapons systems.

Priorities

- Air defense maintenance (Army).
- Resource management (all Services).
- Upgrading tactical and technical courses (all Services).

(U) By the end of December 1975 the ROK had reached the FY 75 funding level authorized by CRA, but Congress was expected to provide partial relief from this restriction by the end of January 1976.<sup>2</sup>

Request for Relief from Restrictions Governing EDA in FAA 1974

(S) On 9 October 1975 CHJUSMAG-K reported receiving a letter from the ROK MND Director, Logistics Bureau requesting help to remove the FAA 1974 provision requiring the ROK to be charged against their legislative program ceiling at full acquisition value of overseas generated EDA provided them. CHJUSMAG-K noted that the ROK was the only PACOM country so restricted, and requested CINCPAC support to remove this restriction. CINCPAC supported the CHJUSMAG-K position in a message to the Secretary of Defense noting that EDA constraints frustrated attainment of MAP objectives, and requesting strong actions by OSD

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1. J482 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Republic of Korea Security Assistance Training Program (SATP); CPD FY 76&7T, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75.
  2. J4 WEB 27 Dec 75 - 2 Jan 76.

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and the Department of State to portray the impact of the FAA 1974 to Congress. There were no results.<sup>1</sup>

#### Transfer of MAP Equipment to ROK Homeland Reserve Forces

(C) On 3 June 1975 CHJUSMAG-K supported a ROK request for authority to transfer excess small arms, ammunition, and radios from MAP-supported ROK forces to the ROK Homeland Reserve Forces (HRF) which were not MAP supported. The transfer would involve 648,000 small arms, 10,000 machine guns, .30 caliber ammunition, and 180 radios. CINCPAC, after requesting and receiving a more detailed explanation of ROK plans for use, maintenance, and security of this equipment, concurred in the request. On 14 November 1975 the Secretary of Defense approved the transfer as an exception to policy (in accordance with Para 3G, Chap K, Part II of the MASM), and required an annual report on quantities of items transferred according to phased schedule. CINCPAC requested a copy of this report.<sup>2</sup>

#### Authority to Produce Major End Items

(C) On 29 May 1975 CHJUSMAG-K reported a ROK request for authority to produce U.S.-origin weapons, equipment, and munitions end items for calendar years 1975 through 1977. All items to be produced were for ROK indigenous use only and no U.S. Government financing, either GA or FMSCR, was involved. A major consideration was production of 155mm howitzers to supply battalions to support each of six rear area security divisions and six corps artillery battalions, the latter recognized as shortfall items in the JSOP 77-84. The remaining items were to be stocked for equipping up to 20 Homeland Defense Divisions. The Secretary of Defense, on 18 July 1975, approved this production for indigenous use only, without levying royalty fees.<sup>3</sup>

#### Third Country Purchases

(C) With the decline in MAP grant aid levels beginning in 1974 the ROK began to exhibit increasing independence in making its own determination on force structure and procurement of equipment. This independence was demonstrated by the initial unilateral preparation of the ROK FIP and several initiatives, beginning as early as mid-1974, to procure military equipment from third country sources. These initiatives resulted in contracts for Swiss Oerlikon 35mm guns,

1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 377; CJUSMAG-K 090823Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 240304Z Oct 75.
2. CJUSMAG-K 030510Z Jun 75, 260855Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 100306Z Jun 75, 180254Z Nov 75; SECDEF 5868/141504Z Nov 75.
3. CJUSMAG-K 290601Z May 75; SECDEF 1209/181603Z Jul 75.

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French EXOCET missiles, and Italian Oto Melara naval guns, and included discussions with United Kingdom sources for anti-submarine warfare items including submarines.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The issue of ROK purchase of third country materiel was discussed during the 7th SCM in September 1974 with the following points raised by the United States:<sup>2</sup>

- Korean modernization was a joint effort and the United States would be disappointed to learn that the ROK was seriously negotiating with third countries without prior consultation with the United States.

- All materiel acquisition should be in keeping with the jointly developed requirements/priorities list.

- Significant third country procurement would evoke questions with Congress about the necessity of continuing military assistance and maintaining U.S. military presence in Korea.

(S) The current policy on third country purchases as of the 8th SCM in August 1975 was that third country purchases were acceptable if:<sup>3</sup>

- The item was a jointly recognized modernization requirement/priority.

- There was no suitable weapon available from the United States.

- The costs were acceptable in light of critical foreign exchange availability.

#### Sophisticated Weapons

(S) On 25 April 1974 the Joint U.S.-ROK Ad Hoc Committee on ROK Forces Modernization proposed Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) and SHRIKE missiles for ROKAF modernization. On 6 November 1974 CHJUSMAG-K requested and CINCPAC supported the request for briefings on these weapons to the ROKG. The Secretary of

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1. US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 5 Aug 75, Subj: Third Country Purchases; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 401-402.

2. US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 5 Aug 75, Subj: Third Country Purchases.

3. Ibid.

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Defense reported on 20 December 1974 that the Secretary of State had disapproved this request because of the sophisticated technology it would give the ROK which it did not currently have nor need in the future. CINCPAC immediately requested reconsideration, and on 13 February 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested information on which to submit a reclama. CINCPACAF provided required technical information. The final CINCPAC stand on this issue on 11 April 1975 was to remain firm in supporting the briefing to ROK on LGB capabilities without indiscriminately disclosing highly advanced technology, but to defer consideration of system acquisition until the FY 78-82 POM cycle. CINCPAC did not support offering SHRIKE to the ROKAF.<sup>1</sup> (See also Section II for general discussion on release of technology.)

### ROK Air Force

#### ROK Fighter/Attack Aircraft Programs

(S) In 1975 there was general agreement that additional high performance aircraft were required to enable the ROK to defend against North Korean attack without U.S. tactical aircraft augmentation. The original ROK MOD Plan included 72 F-5E aircraft to replace the F-86s in the ROKAF inventory. The new ROK FIP included the purchase of 60 F-X (probably the F-16), 18 A-X aircraft (probably the A-10), and 24 F-5E aircraft. The U.S. agreed to sell to the ROK the F-4D squadron (18 aircraft) originally bailed to them to replace 36 F-5As loaned to South Vietnam under ENHANCE PLUS. By the time of the 8th Annual SCM, 26-27 August, the ROK had requested an LOA to purchase a squadron of F-4E (19) aircraft and had expressed intent to buy 60 F-5E/F aircraft. At the 8th Annual SCM the United States decided to offer the ROK a squadron of A-37s (27), one RF-5A, and two F-5A aircraft retrograded from Vietnam. Also, 9 O-1 Vietnam retrograde aircraft were to be transferred to the ROK at no cost. (As of 2 Feb 76, 2 O1-D and 9 O-1F Lao retrograde were actually transferred.) As of 1 August ROK fighter aircraft status was as follows:<sup>2</sup>

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1. J536 HistSum Apr 75; CJUSMAG-K 060253Z Nov 74; 130134Z Mar 75; SECDEF 8167/202141Z Dec 74; JCS 2459/132326Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 120246Z Nov 74, 110326Z Apr 75; CINCPACAF 051850Z Mar 75.
  2. US-ROK SCM Background Papers, 26 Aug 75, Subjs: ROK Fighter/Attack Aircraft Programs; F-86 Aircraft Washout Schedule; CJUSMAG-K 150701Z Nov 75; CSAF 301950Z Dec 75; SECDEF 7569/212141Z Apr 75; J463 HistSum Nov 75; J463 Point Paper, 21 Nov 75, Subj: Major Issues/Projects in ROK; CJUSMAG-K 020830Z Feb 76.

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u> <u>1 Aug 75</u>	<u>FUNDED, NOT</u> <u>DELIVERED</u>	<u>POTENTIAL</u> <u>ACQUISITIONS</u>	<u>PROJECTED</u> <u>TOTALS</u>
F-86	90 <sup>8</sup>	0	0	18 <sup>8</sup>
F-5A	71	0	2 <sup>1</sup>	73
F-5B	18	16 <sup>2</sup>	0	34
F-5E	19	53 <sup>3</sup>	54 <sup>4</sup>	126
F-5F	0	0	32 <sup>5</sup>	32
F-4D	34 <sup>9</sup>	0	0	34
F-4E	0	0	19 <sup>6</sup>	19
F-X (F-16)	0	0	60 <sup>7</sup>	60
A-X (A-10)	0	0	18 <sup>7</sup>	18
A-37	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>27<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>27</u>
TOTAL	232	69	212	495

Notes:

1. Vietnam retrograde.
2. 3 in FY 74 MAP; 13 FMS.
3. FY 73, 74, 75 MAP; includes 21 ROC ENHANCE PLUS reconditioned payback aircraft.
4. FMS Peace Freedom LOA signed 14 Nov 75 for \$208 million (includes 6 F-5Fs).
5. Presumably all FMS; Peace Freedom LOA signed for six aircraft 14 Nov 75.
6. LOA accepted 30 Dec 75 at cost of \$150 million.
7. ROK FIP; presumably all FMS.
8. To be replaced by F-5Es; all but 18 to be washed out by 1981.
9. One squadron (18 aircraft) originally bailed to ROK under ENHANCE PLUS; LOA signed 6 Oct 75 at cost of \$46 million.

(C) The CINCPAC representative at the F-5E Conference held in the ROK during the period 20-23 May 1975 noted that the ROKAF appeared to be experiencing

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great success with their F-5E program. Northrop data cited the following performance record:<sup>1</sup>

	<u>Worldwide</u>	<u>USAF Standards</u>	<u>ROKAF</u>
Operationally Ready Rate (%)	80.3	71	84.7
Flight Hours Per Month (Actual use)	18.7	20	32

(S) The ROK interest in co-producing F-5E aircraft which had surfaced in October 1974 had subsided by August 1975. The ROK had apparently concluded that the best way to develop a production capability would be to establish a depot level maintenance facility.<sup>2</sup>

#### AN/ALR-46 Radar Warning System

(S) In October 1975 the Koreans requested that their F-5E/F (Peace Freedom) aircraft be equipped with a Radar Homing and Warning System (RHAW). CSAF recommended ALR-46(V)-2 system. CINCPAC concurred with release of this system and with request to process exception to national disclosure policy. The ROK requested an LOA on this system on 24 October. As significant retrofit was necessary for aircraft already in ROKAF fleet, a Modification Proposal and Analysis (MPA) had to be prepared. On 31 December 1975 the CSAF reported that the MPA would cost \$513,000 and installation on 205 ROKAF tactical fighters would cost about \$180.2 million.<sup>3</sup>

#### T-37C and EC-47 Aircraft

(U) On 17 December 1975 the final seven T-37C aircraft provided by grant aid arrived at Pusan, giving the ROKAF a total of 25 T-37C aircraft.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 28 June 1975 two EC-47 aircraft arrived in Korea. The third arrived about a month later. These had been included in the US-ROK Ad Hoc Priority List of 10 April 1974, as modified by the Joint Standing Action Officers' Committee, 24 July 1974.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J822 Memo, 27 May 75, Subj: F-5E Conference Visit to Republic of Korea.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 409; US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: F-5E/F Aircraft.
  3. CSAF 202001Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 250102Z Oct 75; CSAF 171245Z Dec 75, 172204Z Dec 75, 312130Z Dec 75.
  4. J463 HistSum Jan 76.
  5. CJUSMAG-K 200043Z Jan 75 (BOM); JUSMAG-K Activities Update 27 Jan - 10 Jul 75, 11 Jul 75, p. 2.

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Missile Programs

NIKE-HERCULES

(S) On 13 January 1975 COMUS Korea submitted a phased plan for ROK take-over of the U.S. NIKE-HERCULES battalion in Korea based on training leadtime of 24 months from the date of U.S.-ROK agreement on the transfer. On 14 January confirmation was received from ROK Defense Minister Suh of the ROKG desire to take over the battalion, consisting of six batteries, with a leadtime of three years. The position of OASD(ISA) had been to speed up completion of the transfer to the end of CY 75, but CINCPAC and the JCS supported the COMUS Korea position, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 19 March 1975, for transfer during FY 77.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Funding issues related to the transfer were still being worked out at the end of the year. Training (\$1.6 million) was funded out of the FY 76 Foreign Military Training Program (See also Training, this section).<sup>2</sup>

(S) Also related to the NIKE-HERCULES program was a ROK initiative, reported by the State Department on 12 March 1975, to upgrade the surface-to-surface capabilities of the system. McDonnell-Douglas representatives had completed the feasibility phase of the plan by February 1975 and were finalizing the design phase for State Department approval. On 14 March 1975 the Secretary of Defense, in explaining the administrative procedure for transferring the six NIKE-HERCULES batteries to the ROK, emphasized that neither DOD nor State supported the McDonnell-Douglas proposal to improve the surface-to-surface capabilities of the NIKE-HERCULES system. The system was not considered cost effective in a surface-to-surface conventional role, and there was reluctance to support increased ROK self-sufficiency in intermediate range missiles. The Secretary of Defense further emphasized that, if ROK interest in the six NIKE-HERCULES batteries was based on expectations of U.S. industry technical support of a surface-to-surface improvement program, the U.S. position should be made clear.<sup>3</sup>

(S) McDonnell-Douglas decided not to proceed with the surface-to-surface improvement program. Data compiled was given to the ROK Agency for Defense Development which had already paid \$75,000 for the project feasibility phase.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 412-413; J536 HistSum 10 Apr 75; COMUSK 130725Z Jan 75, 142342Z Jan 75; JCS 5045/191922Z Mar 75.
  2. J822 HistSum 10 Jul 75; J482 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Republic of Korea Security Assistance Training Program (SATP).
  3. STATE 055790/122248Z Mar 75; SECDEF 9621/141450Z Mar 75.
  4. STATE 055790/122248Z Mar 75.

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(S) The question of a surface-to-surface mission for the NIKE-HERCULES arose again on 18 June and 2 December 1975, when CHJUSMAG-K requested clarification of Department of the Army denial of NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface kits to the ROK and U.S. Army Missile Command cancellation of a ROK requisition for these lists. The ROK desired to fire the NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface during a May-June 1976 Annual Service Practice. A joint State-Defense reply on this matter was expected about 15 January 1976.<sup>1</sup>

#### TOW Anti-Tank Missile Systems

(S) In June 1974 the ROK signed two FMS cases for six companies (18 launchers per company) of TOW anti-tank missile systems. Delivery was scheduled over a two-year period to begin in August 1976, but, because of the extended delivery schedule in relation to the existing armor threat from North Korea and conversion of the U.S. 1/73d Armor Battalion to the 2/9th Infantry Battalion with resulting loss of tanks, COMUS Korea recommended speedy delivery of at least two companies by diverting the equipment from U.S. Army stocks. This action was completed on 8 October 1975 with \$4.4 million in unused FY 74 HARPOON credit being transferred to FY 75 TOW credit.<sup>2</sup>

#### HARPOON Missiles

(S) The ROK had requested HARPOON Missiles as far back as December 1973 under a pilot production program. Action was delayed through 1974. On 23 January 1975 CHJUSMAG-K requested that a letter of offer be prepared for a 12 launcher/120 missile HARPOON Missile system for the ROK. On 9 August 1975 President Park expressed his disappointment over delays in HARPOON availability to a visiting congressional delegation, and noted that these delays had forced the ROKG to consider other solutions. (This was probably a reference to Korean interest in purchase of French Exocet missiles during January and February 1975, which was a matter of considerable State Department concern at the time.) On 20 November the Chief of Naval Operations provided a LOA to the ROK Defense Attaché in Washington for a 12 launcher system costing \$91 million. The expiration date of the LOA was extended, at ROK request, to 15 January 1976.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CJUSMAG-K 020846Z Dec 75; J461 HistSum 9 Jan 76.
  2. COMUSK 210617Z Jul 75; SECDEF 4478/041629Z Sep 75; J461 HistSum Jan 76.
  3. US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: Harpoon Missiles; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 401-402, 414; CJUSMAG-K 230329Z Jan 75; AMEMB Seoul 6150/120920Z Aug 75; CNO 202339Z Nov 75, 242014Z Nov 75, 031619Z Dec 75; AMEMB Seoul 0002/030915Z Jan 75, 884/110056Z Feb 75; STATE 001812/040035Z Jan 75 (EX), 007320/121703Z Jan 75 (EX), 011535/170909Z Jan 75 (EX).

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Lockheed Rocket Propellant Plant

(S) On 6 May 1975 the American Embassy, Seoul reported Korean interest in expediting establishment of an in-country Lockheed Rocket Propellant Plant to round out their missile maintenance capability. The cost of the plant was estimated at \$5 million. By November 1975 the plant was being dismantled for shipment to Korea with installation completion due in October 1976. This plant, combined with follow-on technical assistance, would allow the ROK to reload HAWK and NIKE-HERCULES rocket motors by CY 77.<sup>1</sup>

Naval Programs

Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft (CPIC)

(S) The CPIC program, begun in 1971 to provide fast boats to counter North Korea agent boats, was still in the prototype test and evaluation stage through the first half of 1975. On 12 June 1975 the prototype arrived in Korea without 30mm service ammunition required to conduct advanced training, crew checkout, and weapon system performance evaluation. CHJUSMAG-K requested and CINCPAC supported the request to obtain a minimum of 2,000 rounds for testing and training. The Chief of Navy Materiel granted approval to procure the ammunition from the Federal Republic of Germany at a cost of \$40,000. On 6 November 1975 CHJUSMAG-K reported that the ROKN had decided to construct eight CPIC in-country using water jet propulsion rather than Volvo outdrive engines.<sup>2</sup>

Multi Mission Patrol Ship (PSMM)

(S) In December 1974 the ROK had begun construction of five PSMMs as follow-on to their existing program supported with FMSCR. Three of the craft were to be built in Korea and two in the United States in an approved joint venture between Tacoma Boat Company, Seattle, Washington, and the ROK. The scheduled completion date was mid-1977. These boats were required to counter North Korean OSA/KOMAR STYX missile-equipped high speed patrol boats and were planned to be equipped with U.S. HARPOON missiles. Twenty Missile Patrol Gunboat (PGM)/PSMM class gunboats were recommended in the FY 76-83 JSOP as a mid-range objective for FY 80-83. The primary weapon for these gunboats was to be the Italian Oto Melara 76mm gun with the Emerson Electric 30mm gun and

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1. STATE 165062/1/061311Z May 75 (EX); J463 Point Paper, 21 Nov 75, Subj: Major Issues/Projects in ROK.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 415; CJUSMAG-K 270915Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 280334Z Jun 75; CNAVMAT Wash DC 281912Z Aug 75; CJUSMAG-K 060556Z Nov 75.

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Honeywell H-93 fire control system for the secondary armament and fire control system.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Craft construction was being financed from the Korean budget at about \$48 million, but, according to CHJUSMAG-K, diversion of unused FY 74 credit was needed to fund the secondary armament fire control system. Both CHJUSMAG-K and the American Embassy, Seoul noted an apparent Washington level reluctance to divert the necessary credit for fear that it would go into the foreign part of the weapons package. The American Embassy explained that the foreign components were being separately funded and, on 30 May, one day prior to the contract deadline, verbal approval was given to divert \$3 million in FY 74 Improved HAWK FMSCR to support PSMM armament.<sup>2</sup>

#### Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Program

(S) The ROK desired to develop an ASW capability to counteract the North Korean submarine threat. This desire included an interest in purchasing submarines as well as developing a shipborne helicopter ASW surveillance system.

[REDACTED] During January 1975 the ROK was considering buying two British submarines, but the high price (\$54 million each) and stiff financial terms caused the ROK instead to consider bailment of two diesel submarines from the United States by February. By 24 November the ROK agreed to defer plans to purchase submarines until 1980 in the interest of realizing their primary FIP goals.<sup>3</sup>

(S) At the 8th Annual SCM in August 1975 the possibility of sending an ASW study team to develop an overall surveillance program for the ROK Navy was discussed in relation to the ROK preference for a shipborne helicopter ASW surveillance system. On 18 December the American Embassy, Seoul urged early dispatch of the ASW study team in view of continued ROK interest in a shipborne capability and mention of the French Alouette helicopter. CINCPAC did not support shipborne helicopters for ROK Navy ASW requirements in view of the high costs and marginal utility of a small number of new helicopters working off over-age ships. CINCPAC further requested that the study team stop at CINCPAC headquarters on their way to Korea.<sup>4</sup>

1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 415-416; CJUSMAG 050725Z Mar 75.
2. CJUSMAG-K 050725Z Mar 75, 220557Z May 75; AMEMB Seoul 3785/290537Z May 75; STATE 127579/021348Z Jun 75; J822 HistSum Jul 75.
3. US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 8 Aug 75, Subj: ASW Program; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 383-384, 402; STATE 011535/170909Z Jan 75 (EX); AMEMB Seoul 884/110056Z Feb 75, 9047/240902Z Nov 75.
4. AMEMB Seoul 9731/180713Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 232036Z Dec 75.

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### M-60 Tank Co-Production

(C) Since mid-1974 the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) had shown an interest in co-producing M-60 series tanks. The MND designated Hankuk Machinery Company to handle in-country assembly. Chrysler Corporation, which had co-produced M-60 tanks with Italy, was interested in a Korean program. The program was included in the FY 77-81 POM with first FMSCR due in FY 78 and deliveries to start in CY 80.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 10 September 1975 the American Embassy, Seoul reported the ROK decision not to upgrade M-48 tanks, but to try to replace them with co-produced M-60s. Hyundai Shipbuilding Company had replaced Hankuk Machinery Company as prime contractor, and Samsung Business Group was also being considered for the task. Representatives from the latter company planned to visit Chrysler in the United States in late September. Ambassador Sneider noted Department of the Army's reluctance to discuss M-60 co-production but recommended accommodating the Koreans without making a commitment because he believed they were also considering third country purchase of West German Leopard tanks.<sup>2</sup>

(S) By 24 November 1975, as a result of overall planning for their five-year FIP, the Koreans were reconsidering upgrade of M-48s in lieu of co-production. (See also, Framework for Security Assistance.)

(C) Also related to M-60 tank co-production was a ROK proposal to produce M-60 hull and turret armor castings. CHJUSMAG-K reported on 12 May 1975 that the Koreans were aware of a Department of the Army move to increase production of these components. They saw in this an opportunity to support their own M-60 tank co-production as well as increase their technical and industrial capability; however, Department of the Army replied on 29 May 1975 that, while ROK interest was appreciated, it was too late to consider another source at that time.<sup>3</sup>

### M-16 Rifle Production

(S) By mid-1975 the ROK-Colt Industries M-16 Rifle Plant, established to produce approximately 600,000 rifles by 1979, had produced about 150,000 rifles. The program now required an additional \$10 million in foreign exchange above the original \$42 million estimate because of inflation. Also, the ROK desired to speed up production for completion by September 1977 vice April 1979. On 13 November 1975 the Secretary of Defense approved an amendment to the M-16

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1. US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: M-60 Tank Matters.
  2. AMEMB Seoul 7076/100920Z Sep 75.
  3. CJUSMAG-K 120202Z May 75; DA 291916Z May 75.

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Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC:

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plant MOU which increased the FMSCR level by \$10 million and authorized accelerated production according to ROK desires.<sup>1</sup>

### Laos

#### Funding

(S) Security assistance grant aid funding for Laos had been changed from Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) to MAP effective 1 July 1974. The FY 75 Laos MAP CPD level, established on 4 February 1974, was \$85.2 million, exclusive of \$4.8 million for supply operations, but the program was subsequently reduced to a final funded \$20.704 million, including supply operations and \$1.321 million for training.<sup>2</sup>

#### Program Phaseout

(S) On 13 June 1974 an MOU was signed by the U.S. Charge and Lao Minister of Defense to defray the costs of phasing out the Lao Irregular Force (LIF) and reduction of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) armed forces from 60,000 to 50,000 by 30 June 1975. In conjunction with this reduction was action initiated by the DSAA in July 1974 to redistribute/dispose of excess Laos MAP/MASF materiel including munitions. By October 1974, \$24.3 million in munitions had been authorized for transfer to Vietnam and offers for \$410,876 and \$296,699 in miscellaneous equipment had been accepted by the Chief, MEDTC, and USDAO Saigon respectively.<sup>3</sup>

(S) By 31 March 1975 Laos assets totalling approximately \$100 million, [REDACTED] had been processed for redistribution, relocation, or disposal. As of 10 April approximately \$500,000 in assets [REDACTED] were awaiting program approval and transfer.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Security assistance had been provided to the right wing Forces Armees Royale (FAR), with some reaching the neutralists; however, on 15 February 1975 the American Embassy, Vientiane reported that the Pathet Lao Secretary of State for Defense, Khommouane Boupha, had requested the United States to provide all military aid directly to the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU). He was told by the Defense Attaché that the two sides in the government would

1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 419; US-ROK SCM Background Paper, 26 Aug 75, Subj: M-16 Rifle Production; SECDEF 497/131816Z Nov 75.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 417, 419; Comptroller DSAA booklet, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Nov 75, pp. 6-7.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 419-421.
4. J835 ListSum Apr 75.

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have to get together before we would consider changing our arrangements for military support.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 11 May 1975 the USDAO Vientiane reported that the on-going disintegration of the Vientiane leadership was expected to result in a PGNU dominated by communist elements with only minimal or, at best, ineffective right wing presence. Faced with this situation, the USDAO, with the concurrence of the Country Team, acted to delay the shipment of purely military supplies such as ammunition and weapons without stopping the flow of commercial consumables such as rice, fuel, and medicine. On 15 May the Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Udorn, in compliance with a joint State/Defense directive of 13 May 1975, reported that requisitions had been suspended for all MAP equipment and supplies except POL, subsistence, and medical supplies. Furthermore, action had been taken to intercept and hold parcel post and MAC air shipment of Laos MAP equipment.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 20 May 1975 the USDAO Vientiane proposed the following actions:<sup>3</sup>

- Seek no FY 76 security assistance funds for Laos except for some training.
- Supply rice for the remaining army until FY 75 funds were exhausted (projected between Dec 75 and Mar 76).
- Cease all other military assistance, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
- Offer the PGNU possession of all "Nation Building" air assets in-country (H-34, C-47, C-123) which might be maintained by Royal Air Lao without USG contract support.
- Excess all air spares located in Thailand.
- Attrit U.S. military presence to three accredited Service attaches and clerical support.

(S) On 1 June 1975 the Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand, submitted, and CINCPAC indorsed, a plan to terminate security assistance to Laos by 30 June 1975. The Secretary of Defense approved this plan on 26 June and ordered it implemented with the following modifications:<sup>4</sup>

1. AMEMB Vientiane 1084/150218Z Feb 75.
2. USDAO Vientiane 6009/D/110639Z May 75; DEPCJUSMAG Udorn 140945Z May 75; STATE 111653/132310Z May 75.
3. USDAO Vientiane 6015-75/D/200406Z May 75.
4. DEPCJUSMAG Udorn 010800Z Jun 75; SECDEF 7426/262204Z Jun 75.

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- Laos titled assets were not to be relocated without DSAA instructions.

- No additional MAP funds were to be obligated for the support of Laos after 30 June 1975.

- No FY 76 CRA funds would be reserved/obligated for Laos training support after 30 June 1975.

- Care of Laos MAP stocks located outside Laos was to be charged to budget project L40.

(S) On 9 July 1975 the Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand proposed, and CINCPAC supported, termination of all Laos [REDACTED] MAP training on 1 August 1975. <sup>4e AF</sup> The Country Team further urged asylum in the United States for all students seeking it. The Secretary of Defense concurred on 14 July.<sup>1</sup> As of 11 July there were 79 students and one dependent in CONUS; 10 subsequently returned to their homeland.

(S) Effective 1 August 1975 Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand assumed a caretaker status for the Laos security assistance program, with disestablishment scheduled for 15 August. On 4 August COMUSMAGTHAI assumed the responsibility for Laos MAP logistic functions and distribution of Laos MAP assets.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 23 August 1975 Vientiane radio proclaimed the complete takeover of the country by the communist-led Pathet Lao.<sup>3</sup>

#### UH-34D Helicopter Loss

(S) On 22 January 1975 a RLAF UH-34D helicopter (S/N 156596) crashed and burned at Long Tieng, Laos. The engine failed on a routine cargo/passenger mission. Casualties included two passengers killed, pilot seriously injured, and four passengers and two crew members with minor injuries. The aircraft was dropped from the inventory, leaving 37 active out of 40 authorized.<sup>4</sup>

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1. DEPCJUSMAG Udorn 090925Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 100501Z Jul 75; SECDEF 6229/141659Z Jul 75, 3800/241409Z Jul 75; J4 WEB 14-20 Jul 75.
  2. USMAGTHAI Bangkok 040737Z Aug 75.
  3. Current History, Oct 75, p. 157.
  4. DEPCJUSMAGT Udorn 270933Z Jan 75.

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Malaysia and Singapore

The Increased Prominence of Malaysia and Singapore

(S) The increasing prominence of Malaysia and Singapore in United States security assistance considerations was apparent throughout 1975. This was a result of several factors among which the following were particularly noteworthy:<sup>1</sup>

- U.S. strategic concerns in the region required continued access to Singapore naval and air basing facilities.
- Continuing insurgent activities in Malaysia could adversely impact upon U.S. strategic concerns in the region.

(S) To protect its strategic interests in the region, the United States Government stressed the importance of continued trust and friendship between Malaysia and Singapore; therefore, the manner in which assistance to one would be perceived by the other was an important consideration. As Ambassador to Singapore, John H. Holdridge, put it:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The two divorced spouses are still residing in different rooms of the same burglar-infested house, and the safeguards adopted by the one inevitably impact upon the other.

\* \* \* \* \*

(S) On 6 May 1975 the State Department noted that Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia, in a 2 May discussion with Assistant Secretary of State Habib, stated that Malaysia hoped to look to the United States for training in modern counter-insurgency techniques and also for help in purchasing modern arms for counter-insurgency use. It appeared that Razak had in mind significant expansion of the present small (\$200,000 per year) MAP training program and periodic FMS cases, with the latter to include FMSCR.<sup>3</sup>

(S) During the period 20 to 30 July, RADM William J. Crowe, East Asia and Pacific Regional Director, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OASD(ISA)), visited Malaysia and Singapore

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1. STATE 240790/2/091557Z Oct 75 (EX).
  2. STATE 250585/1/212339Z Oct 75 (EX), 250585/2/212339Z Oct 75 (EX), and 240790/1/091557Z Oct 75 (EX).
  3. STATE 106062/062349Z May 75 (EX).

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(this was also referred to as the Interdepartmental Team visit) for consultations which, by October 1975, resulted in proposed programs of assistance for the two countries.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 18 September 1975, encouraged by the Interdepartmental Team visit, the American Embassy, Singapore requested that Singapore be included in the FY 77 and follow-on grant aid (training only) program at an approximate level of \$500,000 per year. The American Embassy further requested, "...a token amount not to exceed 50 thousand dollars..." be made available to offer additional training during the remainder of FY 76. The primary reason for this request was that "...budgetary constraints do exist and on occasion cause GOS to neglect some essential training decisions, regardless of DAO advice...."<sup>2</sup>

(C) CINCPAC concurred with the American Embassy proposal, but suggested consideration of the political effect of allocating more to Singapore than to Malaysia (then at \$300,000). On 6 October 1975 the State Department disapproved this request. It was noted that considerable Congressional criticism might result from recommending grant MAP funds for training to a country which was fully capable of purchasing required equipment and training from its own cash resources.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 1 November 1975 the American Embassy, Singapore commented that the GOS leadership was concerned over the mounting cost of military equipment purchases, and that they were interested in exploring the possibility of some sort of "offsetting" arrangement to reduce the financial burden such as increasing U.S. Navy ship repair work in Singapore. On 26 November Ambassador Holdridge, in a conversation with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, Dr. G. S. Lee, emphasized the already sizeable U.S. military expenditure in Singapore as well as expanding Singapore exports to the United States. He avoided a formal approach for an offset agreement, knowing Washington's probable reaction in view of Singapore's excellent financial position.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 3 December 1975 the U.S. Defense Attaché Office Singapore requested CINCPAC support for additional administrative assistance to handle what they considered significant growth in security assistance activity in the past six months. According to the USDAO, the current case load of open activities was running about 150, an increase of about 50 in the last three months.

1. AMEMB Singapore 4068/180800Z Sep 75; STATE 250586/1/012339Z Oct 75 (L); STATE 250586/212340Z Oct 75.

2. AMEMB Singapore 4068/180800Z Sep 75.


3. CINCPAC 0301277 Oct 75; STATE 237704/062051Z Oct 75.

4. STATE 259508/1/010716Z Nov 75 (EX), 279663/261113Z Dec 75 (L).

5. USDAO Singapore 2120/030100Z Dec 75.

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**MALAYSIA**

<p><b>MALAYSIA BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 29,400 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 11,967,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 2% (1961-11)          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 85.5 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 60 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . 64 ACRES          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$8.2 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$710          DEFENSE BUDGET . . . . . \$442.6 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 5%</p> <p>PARLIAMENTARY RULER . . . . . TUNJA PATERA HATI AL BARUHUN Sultan Ibrahim</p> <p>PRIME MINISTER . . . . . ABUJIL RAZAK bin Isakan Hussein</p> <p>MINISTER OF DEFENSE . . . . . ABUJIL RAZAK bin Isakan Hussein</p> <p>MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . ABUJIL RAZAK bin Isakan Hussein</p> <p>MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS . . . . . MOHAMMED GHUZALI bin Shafie</p> <p>CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF . . . . . IBRAHIM bin Ismail, GEN</p> <p>CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY . . . . . HAJI MOHAMMED SARI bin Abdul Ghaffar</p> <p>CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF . . . . . K. THAMARASINGAM, RADM</p> <p>CHIEF OF AIR STAFF . . . . . SULAIMAN SUJAK, AIR VICE MARSHAL</p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . HON. FRANCIS T. UNDERHILL, JR.</p> <p>USDAO . . . . . COL RICHARD C. EMAN, JR., USA</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>8 Brigades, 29 Infantry Battalions          (Police Field Service Strength: 14,800)          (Marine Police Strength: 2,000)          (Border Scouts Strength: 1,200)</p> <p>Essentially an infantry force trained and experienced in jungle operations. Fairly effective in internal security and counterinsurgency missions up to battalion level. Very slight capability at brigade level and incapable of resisting a significant external attack or engaging in operations outside Malaysia without considerable outside assistance.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>2 Destroyer Escort types, 32 Coastal Patrol types (7 non-operation), 6 Mine Warfare types, 1 Amphibious Warfare Ship, 20 Amphibious Warfare Craft, 4 Work Boats, 1 Survey Vessel, 1 Diving Tender.</p> <p>Strength: 5,000</p> <p>Offshore patrol, defense of sea lines of communication and territorial waters, as well as support of internal security operations. Limited by small size, maintenance problems, long coastline and geographic separation of the country into two portions.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>39 Jets, 8 Turboprops, 41 Propeller Aircraft, 51 Helicopters.</p> <p>Strength: 5,000</p> <p>Can provide relatively effective transport support to Army, Navy, and Police for internal security missions. Modest ground support capability with C-47G and F-5F aircraft.</p>		<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIEL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO ENTER OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.</p> <p>ASSIST IN RECEPTION OF INTERCEPTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.</p> <p>ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR A STABLE NON-COMMUNIST MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT. ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF FORCES CAPABLE OF ASSURING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND IN FACILITATING THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR A STABLE NON-COMMUNIST MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT. ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF FORCES CAPABLE OF ASSURING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND IN FACILITATING THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT.</p>		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 76.

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Malaysia

F-5 FMS Case

(C) The biggest issue in the Malaysian Security Assistance Program during 1975 involved a 1972 FMS purchase of 16 F-5 aircraft (two F-5Bs and 14 F-5Es). The \$4.7 million Malaysian FMSCR for FY 75 provided the fourth and final increment of funding for this case. Eight of these aircraft were delivered in May 1975 and the remaining eight in September. The first shipment was delivered late and received national attention. Also, according to the U.S. Defense Attaché, six of these first eight were inoperable at the time of the King's visit to the RMAF air base, Butterworth, on 1 August 1975. The problem was one of logistics and communications support for the logistic system. In his frustration, the U.S. Defense Attaché accused the U.S. Air Force of apathy toward the Security Assistance Program in Malaysia. CINCPAC offered to assist in reaching a solution, but noted that the acrimonious tone of the Defense Attaché's comments was contrary to the standards expected of DOD representatives, and was hardly conducive to harmonious relationships needed to resolve problems.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Beyond the problems associated with the initial delivery, the main issue was effective monitoring of the status of requisitions in the absence of adequate communications. All status was returned to foreign countries, such as Malaysia, without access to an AUTODIN data pattern terminal, via first class mail, not air mail. The Air Force Logistics Center (AFLC), Wright-Patterson AFB, suggested several alternatives, noting that the RMAF must agree to bear any costs above the standard first class mail service. In the interim, AFLC recommended use of the American Embassy circuit. On 21 August 1975 the U.S. Defense Attaché reported that the RMAF favored the AFLC alternative to use AUTODIN - Telex interface on a pro rata basis with other users. This system was expected to be operable in about a year and the cost was estimated at \$1,500 - \$2,000 a month.<sup>2</sup>

FMS Materiel and Training Recommended from RADM Crowe Visit

(S) As a result of RADM Crowe's visit to Malaysia and Singapore between 20 and 30 July 1975, the State Department, on 21 October 1975, notified the American Embassy, Kuala Lumpur that it was prepared to approve recommended equipment and seek Congressional approval for FMS guaranteed loans through FY 79, subject to GOM response.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J47 Point Paper, 9 Oct 75, Subj: Malaysia Security Assistance Program; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 1062/300720Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 022036Z Aug 75; AFLC 062145Z Aug 75.
  2. SECDEF 7295/211624Z Apr 75; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 1177/210715Z Aug 75.
  3. STATE 250585/1/212339Z Oct 75 (EX).

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<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Approx Lead Time</u>
101,800	M-16 Rifles	
41,000		by Jun 76
60,800		by Apr 77
6	S-61 Helicopters	8 months
20	UH-1H Helicopters	26 months
30,000,000	Rounds of 5.56mm ammo	6 months
400,000	V100/V150 Armored Car Grenades	12 months
12,400	M18A1 Claymore Mines	3-6 months
32	V150 Armored Cars	12-15 months
2	Tank Landing Ship (LST)(511 Class)	4-5 years (new)
12	105mm Howitzers (M102)	26 months

(S) It was the intent of the State Department to seek a level of financing substantial enough "...so that GOM will be able to devote resources to dual task of combating terrorists and social/economic development."

(S) The State Department was prepared to approve the following training to be funded on an FMS case basis:<sup>2</sup>

- UH-1H helicopter basic pilot and instructor pilot training.


- Two dog-handling teams trained to detect mines and booby traps were to be dispatched to Malaysia for 14 days to participate in Malaysian armed forces tests.

#### Disposition of U.S. Origin F-86 SABRE Jets

(S) On 11 December 1975 the American Embassy, Kuala Lumpur reported the desire to transfer 16 F-86 aircraft to the Indonesian Air Force as a gift. The IAF was phasing out the SABRES for F-5Es. These aircraft were surplus to US needs and were originally presented to the GOM by the Australian

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# SINGAPORE

<p><b>SINGAPORE BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>POPULATION: 1,000,000</p> <p>AREA: 700 sq. mi.</p> <p>OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: English</p> <p>RELIGION: 70% Buddhist, 10% Muslim, 10% Hindu, 10% Christian</p> <p>GDP: \$1.5 billion</p> <p>PER CAPITA: \$1,500</p> <p>DEFENSE BUDGET: \$175 million</p> <p>AS PERCENT OF GDP: 11.7%</p>	 <p>SINGAPORE CITY</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>4 Infantry Brigades, 1 Field Artillery Command, 1 Armored Brigade, 1 Commando Battalion, 2 Engineer Battalions, 1 Signal Battalion.</p> <p>Strength: 15,000 (Active Strength: 7,000)</p> <p>Capable of maintaining internal security, but would need outside assistance to resist external attack. Its operational capability above battalion level.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>13 Coastal Types (3 non-operational), 1 River/Boatland Patrol, 1 Amphibious Landing Ship, 4 Amphibious Landing Craft, 1 Exercise Type.</p> <p>Strength: 1,200</p> <p>Lack patrol capability in territorial waters. Incapable of deterring against a major naval attack.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>172 Aircraft, of which 90 are jets. This does not include 8 A-4s in the United States for training purposes.</p> <p>Strength: 1,400</p> <p>Potentially good ground support capability with A-4s aircraft. Limited in defense and transport rescue capability.</p>
<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>CONTINUED EFFECTIVE U.S. MILITARY ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES, PERMIT OF SWIFT USE OF THE SINGAPORE SHIPYARD AREA AND AIRFIELD, SWIFT USE OF SINGAPORE'S SHIP SHIP FACILITIES.</p> <p>CONTINUING TO SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT TO AND OVER THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE.</p> <p>CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF SINGAPORE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SECURITY.</p> <p>USE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT EQUIVALENT WITH U.S. SECURITY AND INTERNAL AS WELL AS COMBAT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS INTERESTS.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR: DR. JOHN H. HOWARD</p> <p>CHIEF OF CONSUL: LARRY JAMES W. GARDNER, USA</p>	<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY SUSTAINING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>-- PREVENT HOSTILE EXTERNAL IMPACT</li> <li>-- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL PEACE</li> </ul>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 81.

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Government in 1969 (10), 1971 (6), and 1975 (one to replace one lost in a crash). They were not flyable and were to be used to provide spare parts for the Indonesian's existing Australian-supplied SABRES. The American Embassy, Jakarta noted that the transaction should not be held up because of possible criticism related to the Government of Indonesia role in Timor, and that to do so might involve the United States in a dispute in which our declared policy was one of non-involvement. CINCPAC concurred in the proposed transfer which had not taken place at year's end.<sup>1</sup>

Singapore

FMS Materiel and Training Recommended from RADM Crowe's Visit

(S) As a result of RADM Crowe's visit to Malaysia and Singapore between 20 and 30 July 1975, the State Department, on 21 October 1975, notified the American Embassy, Singapore, that it was prepared to issue commercial licenses for cash sale of the following items from U.S. production on a normal leadtime basis:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Approx Lead Time</u>
20 or (6)	UH-1H helicopters (S-61 Sikorsky helicopters)	26 months (8 months)
75	M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers	49 months
10	Mini Armored Troop Carriers	30 months
18*	105mm Howitzers (M102)	26 months

\*Reduced from 60 to 18 on 13 November 1975 in meeting with USDAO Singapore (Also see Singapore Training Space).

(S) The U.S. Government recommended that funding of the program be accomplished through a combination of FMS cash and/or commercial cash purchases extended through FY 79.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The State Department also agreed to make a training seminar available by mid-February, tentatively at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for

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1. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 7244/110850Z Dec 75; AMEMB Jakarta 15488/180922Z Dec 75; CHUSDLG Jakarta 180920Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 232035Z Dec 75.
  2. STATE 250586/212340Z Oct 75 (EX).
  3. Ibid.; USDAO Singapore 2035/180440Z Nov 75.

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Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The program was to run three weeks for 20 to 40 senior officers. The Secretary of Defense tasking for the seminar noted that it should examine problems in leadership, command and control, and administration and logistical management which arise in domestic insurgent and terrorist situations, and that it should stress the interrelationship between national policy and the conduct of military operations. Singapore was reminded of the fact that, since the U.S. Government desired to promote joint cooperation, the seminar was equally available to Malaysia.<sup>1</sup>

Request for C-130s

(S) On 29 May 1975 the USDAO Singapore advised of a GOS request for 3 to 5 excess or in-service C-130 aircraft to enhance its Special Action Force airlift capability. CINCPAC supported this request. The Secretary of Defense responded that all C-130 aircraft retrograded from South Vietnam had been allocated to the U.S. Air National Guard and Reserve units from which they had originally been withdrawn to meet emergency Vietnam requirements; therefore, the request could not be approved.<sup>2</sup>

DA Review of Improved HAWK

(S) On 7 August 1975 the USDAO Singapore requested that Department of the Army provide its professional opinion on the command and control adequacy of the Raytheon Improved HAWK missile system proposed for sale to Singapore. Raytheon claimed that their proposal was adequate to do the job considering the fiscal constraints imposed by the GOS. Department of the Army noted that it did not normally get involved with commercial sales and that, while it could determine operability of the system, it would not address the cost or practicality of the system. USDAO claimed that, even though this was a commercial purchase, "...U.S. Army in the mind of the purchaser will still be responsible for assuring package reasonable...."<sup>3</sup> Further action on this matter was still pending at year's end.

Training Space

(S) In view of its small size, 227 square miles, Singapore was continually hard pressed to find adequate training space for its modern aircraft and other weapons. On 30 June 1975 General Lai Ming-Tang, Chief of the General

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1. STATE 250586/212340Z Oct 75 (EX): SECDEF 6895/222059Z Oct 75; USDAO Singapore 2035/180440Z Nov 75.
  2. USDAO Singapore 0885/290732Z May 75; CINCPAC 311920Z May 75; SECDEF 5163/091451Z Oct 75.
  3. USDAO Singapore 1357/070216Z Aug 75; DALO-ILP 201512Z Aug 75.

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Staff, Republic of China Armed Forces, told Chief, MAAG China that Singapore Army units would conduct battalion-size armor, artillery, and infantry combined arms training on Taiwan.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In 1973 the GOS had contracted with the U.S. Navy to train 48 A-4 pilots with completion of the program scheduled for August 1976; however, limited air space and firing ranges in Singapore placed severe constraints on low-level navigation, reconnaissance, and air-to-ground weapons delivery training. On 25 March 1975 the GOS issued a formal request to the American Ambassador to allow GOS to conduct necessary continuation training at Cubi Point U.S. Naval Air Station, Philippines. In view of the legal and political implications of third country forces being stationed on a U.S. base in the Philippines for training on a semi-permanent basis, it was felt necessary to insure that the GOS had first obtained formal Philippine Government (GOP) concurrence. On 14 August 1975 the American Embassy, Singapore stated that the GOS had sent a formal note requesting concurrence from the GOP, but no final determination had been made by the end of the year.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In the meantime, on 10 April 1975, CINCPAC had been requested by the American Embassy, Manila to task the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines, to make an appropriate contingency study of the relative capabilities of Cubi and Basa for proposed extended training. This was done for Cubi, showing less than ideal conditions, and comments on Basa were still pending at the end of the year.<sup>3</sup>


#### Jungle Warfare Training Center

(S) By August 1975 indications were that Singapore would seek establishment of a joint Singapore-Brunei jungle warfare training center; however, United Kingdom concurrence was required, and the final decision was not expected until March 1976. On 18 November the USDAO Singapore commented that the Singapore Director of the General Staff referred to adverse Malaysian press comment concerning existing GOS training in Brunei and expressed concern as to whether approval would be granted at all. This, in turn, would impact on training and build-up plans (also, see FMS to Singapore).<sup>4</sup>

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1. J483 Point Paper, 21 Jul 75, Subj: Singapore Army Units to be Trained in Taiwan.
  2. J483 Point Paper, 15 Aug 75, Sugg: Government of Singapore (GOS) - A-4 Training; AMEMB Singapore 1240/280221Z Mar 75, 1502/141040Z Apr 75; J483 Discussion Topic, 20 Nov 75, Subj: Singapore Interest in A-4 Training in Philippines.
  3. AMEMB Manila 4449/100757Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 190119Z Apr 75; J483 Point Paper, 15 Aug 75, Subj: Government of Singapore (GOS) - A-4 Training.
  4. USDAO Singapore 2035/180440Z Nov 75.

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**NEPAL**

<p><b>NEPAL BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 54,600 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 12,550,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 2.1 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 12 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 40 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . .8 ACRES          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$1,071 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . Less than \$100          DEFENSE BUDGET . . . . . \$9.7 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GDP . . . . . 9</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>12 Infantry Battalions, 1 Parachute Battalion, 1 Artillery Battalion, 1 Cavalry Squadron, 21 Militia Companies. The Army Aviation element has 4 light transports and three helicopters.</p> <p>Strength: 20,000</p> <p>Incapable of offensive or defensive operations against India or the PRC. Capable of maintaining internal security, unless widespread disturbance is supported by outside powers. Extremely poor logistics.</p> <p>None</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>None</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>None</p>
<p>KING, CHIEF ROYAL NEPAL ARMY . . . . . Bir Bikram Shah Deva BIRINDRA</p> <p>PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF PALACE AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF DEFENSE . . . . . Jasti GEPJ</p> <p>MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . Krishna Raj ARYAL</p> <p>CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF . . . . . GEN S. J. B. Rana GUNA, ARMY</p> <p>ROYAL NEPAL ARMY . . . . .</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIEL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO DETER OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.</p> <p>ASSIST IN RETENTION OF UNINTERRUPTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.</p> <p>ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . Wm. William I. CARO</p> <p>U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . Charles R. GRAKER</p> <p>USDAO . . . . . COL David A. OWENS, USA</p>
<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>-- DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS</li> <li>-- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE</li> </ul>		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 77.

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Allied Officer Hall of Fame

(U) Colonel Winston Choo Wee Leong, Director, General Staff, Singapore Ministry of Defense was selected for the Allied Officer Hall of Fame at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) in November 1975. This honor was reserved for foreign USACGSC graduates who later served as the highest ranking officer in the service component or armed forces of their countries.<sup>1</sup>

Nepal

FMS

(S) Nepal was a very small purchaser of items under FMS. Purchases for FY 74 were a little over \$2,000 with no projection for FY 76; however, in May 1975 the Nepalese had made an informal inquiry into the possibility of obtaining air defense equipment to defend against raids, highjackings, or other aerial attacks. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Defense Attache explained to General Arjun Rana, Director of Military Operations, Royal Nepalese Army, that the general agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and India was that Nepal's principal military association should be with India. After the Defense Attache advised that this capability should be obtained from India or through an official request to the U.S. Government, the whole issue seemed to dissolve.<sup>2</sup>

Training

(S) A small grant aid training line item was maintained with \$35,000 programmed for FY 76. Nepal had sent one officer a year to the Army Command and General Staff Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since 1965. In December 1975 the USDAO Kathmandu requested, on behalf of King Birendra, guidance on the possibility of obtaining an extra quota and costing data (FMS vs GA). Action on this request was still pending at year's end.<sup>3</sup>

New Zealand


(S) New Zealand received FMS on a cash basis only. By the end of 1975 total sales had amounted to over \$125 million, with the greatest volume in FY 65 at \$22.2 million and FY 69 at \$29.2 million. Included were purchases of

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1. J4 WEB 8-14 Nov 75.
  2. USDAO Kathmandu 057/200405Z Feb 75; AMEMB Kathmandu 4307/290828Z Sep 75.
  3. J4 WEB 22-28 Dec 75.

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# NEW ZEALAND

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<p><b>NEW ZEALAND BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 103,736 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 3,092,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 2.2 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 98 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 67 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . .64 ACRE          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$11.7 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$3,870          DEFENSE BUDGET . . . . . \$211.6 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 2</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b>          1 Infantry Battalion, 2 Infantry Brigades, 1 Special Air Service Squadron          Strength: 5,600          Capable of maintaining internal security but incapable of withstanding major attack.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b>          4 Destroyer Types, 10 Coastal Types, 4 Auxiliary Types          Strength: 2,000          Capable of conducting limited offshore patrol.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b>          116 Aircraft, of which 23 are Jets.          Strength: 4,700          Modest ground attack capability and limited air defense and airlift capabilities.</p>
<p>GOVERNOR GENERAL . . . . . Sir Denis Blundell          PRIME MINISTER . . . . . Robert U. Muldoon          FOREIGN MINISTER . . . . . Brian E. Talboys          MINISTER OF DEFENSE . . . . . Allan McKay          CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF . . . . . LT GEN/STAFF Richard James Holden Webb          CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF . . . . . MAJ GEN Robin H. F. Holloway          CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF . . . . . RADM J. F. McKenzie          CHIEF OF AIR STAFF . . . . . AVM Richard Bruce Bolt</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b>          PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIAL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO DETEL OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.          ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY STABILITY.          ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.          ASSIST IN RETENTION OF UNINTERRUPTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.          ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>	
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b>          U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . POW. Armistead I. SELDEN, JR.          USDAO . . . . . COL William W. LEESBURG, USAF</p>		
<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>          MAINTAIN CREDIBLE SECURITY GUARANTY UNDER AREAS, PROMOTE MILITARY COOPERATION, [REDACTED] SUPPORT OR MINIMIZE PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT COMPLICATE USE OF INSTALLATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND.</p>		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 78.

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(b)(1)  
 see 1.3(a)(5)

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training at \$27,000 from FY 71 through FY 75. Previous equipment sales had included A-4K and P-3B aircraft, UH-1H helicopters and PRC-77 radios. Most current FMS activity involved logistic support arrangements for spare parts. Training purchased from the United States was of a professional development type or courses for which it was economically infeasible to develop an in-country capability (e.g., Jet Accident Investigation, J52-P8A Engine Depot Level Maintenance). The FY 76 program consisted of a USMC Command and General Staff Course and Computer Orientation for Senior Executives (no cost) and miscellaneous Navy material courses for a total cost of \$3,000.<sup>1</sup>

Pakistan

Review

(U) Pakistan received Grant Aid Foreign Military Training Program funds totaling \$277,000 in FY 75 with \$350,000 proposed for FY 76. A total of 4,449 Pakistani students had been trained under the MAP during the period FY 50 through FY 75. Pakistan had also received a total of \$119.8 million in FMS deliveries during the period FY 50 through FY 75. Delivery high points were as follows (in \$ millions):<sup>2</sup>

<u>Period</u>	<u>Value</u>
FY 50 - 65	33.2
FY 69 - 70	33.9
FY 74 - 75	31.7


(U) On 24 February 1975 the State Department announced an end to its embargo on exports of military equipment to India and Pakistan. Equipment could be sold on a case-by-case cash-only basis, thus ending a decade-long embargo on all but sales of spare parts for equipment previously provided. Grant aid military support had been suspended in September 1965.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 23 September 1975 the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) projected approximately \$80 million in FMS purchases for FY 76 and over \$100 million for FY 77-78. In view of this projected increase in

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1. J461 Point Paper, 21 Nov 75, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to New Zealand; J482 Point Paper, 5 Dec 75, Subj: Security Assistance Training for New Zealand.
  2. CPD FY 76 & 77, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75, p. 5; Comptroller DSAA FMS and Military Assistance Facts, Nov 75, p. 17.
  3. State Department Bulletin, 17 Mar 75, pp. 331-332, "U.S. Modifies Policy on Exports of Arms to India and Pakistan."

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# PAKISTAN

<p><b>PAKISTAN BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 310,000 sq MI          POPULATION . . . . . 71,000,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 3.1 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 14 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . About 40 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . 1.1 ACRE          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$7.8 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$110          DEFENSE BUDGET . . . . . \$606.6 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . About 7 PERCENT</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b>          6 Corps, 15 Infantry Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions.          Strength: 408,000          (Paramilitary Strength: 73,000)          Moderate capability to maintain internal security and limited capability to resist external aggression. Dependent on foreign sources of supply for most war materiel.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b>          1 CLM, 4 IB, 1 FF, 3 SS, 13 PGH, 4 PIH, 7 MSI, 4 Auxiliaries.          Strength: 9,900          Incapable of defending coastline and has very limited antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare capability. No transport or amphibious capability.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b>          1 Light Bomber Squadron (B-57B), 4 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons (F-86), 8 Fighter Squadrons (MiG-19 and MiG-17), 2 Transport Squadrons (C-130).          Strength: 17,600          Moderate interceptor and limited close air support capability.</p>
<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b>          PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIEL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO DETER OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.          ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.          ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.          ASSIST IN RETENTION OF UNINTERRUPTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.          ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . HON. Henry A. BYRONDE          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . Joseph C. WHEELER          U.S. DRP . . . . . COL Richard F. GIBBS, USAF</p>	<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>          TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:          -- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY          -- DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS          -- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 79.

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equipment acquisition and concomitant increase in training requirements, continued pressure was expected from the ODRP and American Embassy, Islamabad to change Pakistan's training status from CONUS training only to training only (See also Section II, Training).<sup>1</sup>

#### Iranian Support of Pakistani Military Requirements

(C) The Government of Iran provided security assistance support to Pakistan and indicated a willingness to assist through provision of funds to Pakistan for purchases of equipment through FMS and transfer of equipment from Iranian stocks to Pakistan, whichever means proved agreeable to the United States Government. On 27 August 1975 the Iranian Vice Minister of War, General Taufanian, submitted an extensive list of arms proposed for transfer or sale to Pakistan. This list was forwarded to Washington for review. In September the question arose of how to handle Pakistani P&A data requests to be supported by Iran. The American Embassy, Tehran desired to submit this data directly to the Government of Iran, while the American Embassy, Islamabad preferred to submit the data to Pakistan, leaving the decision to notify Iran to the Pakistanis. The Secretary of State supported the latter approach on 30 October 1975.<sup>2</sup>

#### Request for 30 Surplus M-47 Tanks

(C) On 27 August 1975 the ODRP reported that the Government of Pakistan had submitted a formal request to establish an FMS case of 30 M-47 tanks located in Belgium at \$6,398 each to be used in a turretless configuration for bridge laying purposes. The first request for P&A data had been submitted in October 1974. By 1 December 1975 MG Ali Nawab, the Pakistan Army Project Officer, had expressed considerable dissatisfaction at delays in releasing the tanks. He had, unknown to ODRP, been keeping a ship in Karachi ready to sail for Brussels since mid-November at \$5,000 per day demurrage. He suggested moving the tanks to Iran no later than 1 March 1976 to demilitarize them and allow him to contract for the needed bridging equipment. At year's end the ODRP requested expeditious action to ship the tanks to Iran and eliminate this irritant to smooth Pakistan military-American Embassy relations.<sup>3</sup>


#### Tank Rebuild

(C) On 5 March 1975 the CARMISH MAAG Tehran advised that the Government of Iran had signed a contract to rebuild (primarily dieselize) 147 M-47 tanks

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1. J481 Point Paper, 23 Sep 75, Subj: Pakistan Security Assistance Training Program (SATP).
  2. CARMISH MAAG Tehran 271333Z Aug 75; AMEMB Islamabad 8750/220700Z Sep 75; AMEMB Tehran 9339/221303Z Sep 75; STATE 236179/031948Z Oct 75.
  3. ODRP Islamabad 271050Z Aug 75, 020710Z Dec 75.

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# PHILIPPINES

<p><b>PHILIPPINES BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 116,000 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 42,845,000          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 3.3 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 83 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 59 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . .52 ACRE          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FY 75 . . . . . \$14.0 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$340          DEFENSE BUDGET (Self Financed) 1975 . . . . . \$403 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 2.9</p>	 <p>QUEZON CITY</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>3 Infantry Divisions, 2 Infantry Brigades, 1 Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1 Airborne Battalion, 1 Artillery Group.          Strength: 45,000</p> <p>Constabulary: 4 Zone Commands (brigade), 11 Battalions, 1 Metrocom (brigade), 1 Presidential Guard Battalion.          Strength: 37,500</p> <p>In conjunction with the Constabulary, the Army can maintain internal security and perform counter-insurgency and civic action missions. Not capable of resisting a major external attack without considerable outside assistance. Budget limitations, understrength combat units, and lack of operational experience and training above battalion level retard combat readiness.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>1 Destroyer type, 55 Coastal Patrol types, 6 Mine Warfare types, 37 Amphibious types, 11 Auxiliary types, 1 Marine Brigade.          Strength: 21,500, which includes 5,000 Marines</p> <p>Conduct limited offshore patrol and minor amphibious and antisubmarine warfare operations.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>2 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (1 F-86, 1 F-5), 1 Air Commando Squadron (OH-1H), 1 Liaison Squadron (H-17), 1 Air Rescue Squadron (UH-1H, HH-16), 2 Transport Squadrons (C-47).          Strength: 15,000</p> <p>Limited capability to assist the Army in maintaining internal security and contributing to the defense against external attack.</p>
<p><b>PHILIPPINES BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>PRESIDENT . . . . . Ferdinand E. Marcos          SECRETARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . Carlos P. Romulo          SECRETARY NATIONAL DEFENSE . . . . . Juan P. Enrile          CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP . . . . . GEN Romeo Espino, Army          VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AFP . . . . . LGEN Rafael Illeto, AF          CG, ARMY . . . . . MGEN Rafael Zagala, Army          FOIC, NAVY . . . . . RAUM Hilario Ruiz, Navy          CG, AIR FORCE . . . . . MGEN Jose Ramcuro, AF          CHIEF CONSTABULARY . . . . . MGEN Fidel Ramis, PC</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>ASSIST IN OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS. PROMOTE THE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES. SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SMUGGLING CAPABILITIES.</p>	<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . Thomas C. Niebuck          CHIEF JUSMAG . . . . . BGJG Jack R. Sadler, USA</p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES, TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO, AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES.</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 80.



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and 123 M-48 tanks for Pakistan at no cost to the latter. The rebuild was to begin 15 months from contract signing (5 Feb 75) for M-47 tanks and 25 months for M-48 tanks. In a related action on 22 July 1975 the Secretary of State, with DOD concurrence, approved a Government of Pakistan request to upgun the 123 M-48 tanks to be rebuilt in Iran from 90mm to 105mm.<sup>1</sup>

TOW Missile Training

(C) On 7 October 1975 the Secretary of State announced that the U.S. Government was prepared to make available 24 TOW launchers, 450 missiles, 1 training set, and related mounting kits to the Government of Pakistan (GOP). By 31 October 1975 the GOP had signed the LOA for delivery within 120 days (April 1976). The items were to be used for training in advance of delivery of follow-on buy of 200 launchers and 3,000 missiles.<sup>2</sup>

Republic of the Philippines

Review

(C) The FY 76 Philippine Security Assistance Program showed a slight decrease in MAP materiel funding and an increase in grant aid training and FMSCR over actual FY 75 funds expended. Planning guidance fluctuated several times prior to submission of the CPD for FY 76 and 7T on 5 November 1975 (in \$ millions):<sup>3</sup>

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MAP (GA)</u>	<u>TRAINING (GA)</u>	<u>FMSCR</u>
--	FY 75 Actual	20.51*	.5*	14.0
--	FY 76 POM Submission	19.6	.4	7.0
26 Aug	FY 76 State/DOD Recommendation	22.3	.75	7.0
30 Aug	FY 76 Approved by President	19.6	.75	12.4
31 Oct	FY 76 Presidential Submission	19.6	.6	17.4
5 Nov	FY 76 & 7T CPD	19.6	.75	17.4

\*FY 75 Training broken out for comparison.

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1. CARMISH MAAG Tehran 051335Z Mar 75; STATE 172259/221857Z Jul 75.
  2. STATE 5772/072205Z Oct 75; J4 WEB 25-31 Oct 75.
  3. CPD FY 76 & 7T, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 010/260240Z Aug 75; SECDEF 4813/300412Z Aug 75; STATE 258724/1/310125Z Oct 75.

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~~(C)~~ Ambassador Sullivan advised that, while the Government of the Philippines (GOP) could accept the proposed FY 76 FMSCR level, amounts of FMSCR above that proposed could create a heavy burden on future year budgets.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ In FY 77 through FY 81 planning, an additional \$5 million grant aid and \$10 million FMSCR was included to support base rights negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ The major investment items in the FY 75 and FY 76 programs were:<sup>3</sup>

<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>
9 UH-1H helicopters (7 accelerated)	9 UH-1H helicopters
2 65 ft Patrol Boats	30 105mm Howitzers
7 Landing Craft (7 accelerated)	7 400KW Generators
93 Recoilless Rifles (53 accelerated)	3 65 ft Patrol Boats
16 T-28D Aircraft (airframes via excess, Rehab cost \$312,600)	3 Mini ATC Commo modernization

### Training

~~(C)~~ The Republic of the Philippines had demonstrated a desirable downward trend in grant aid training from over \$800,000 in FY 72 to less than \$500,000 in FY 75; however, the Muslim insurrection and pressure of base rights negotiations caused a recommended increase to \$750,000 for FY 76.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The training program emphasis was on resources management (intermediate and senior levels), logistics management, and courses to provide an instructor base.<sup>5</sup>

### Accelerated Delivery of Equipment

~~(S)~~ On 4 February 1975 Philippine Executive Secretary Melchor visited CINCPAC and requested accelerated delivery of equipment to outfit four additional infantry battalions. This was the third consecutive year the Philippines had

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1. J464 Point Paper, 14 Nov 75, Subj: Foreign Military Sales Credit, Philippines.
  2. J464 Point Paper, 14 Nov 75, Subj: Military Assistance Program for the Republic of the Philippines (ROP); J4 WEB 4-10 Aug 75.
  3. Ibid.
  4. J483 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Security Assistance Program (SATP) for the Republic of the Philippines; CPD FY 76 & 7T, Security Assistance Training Program, FMA & MAP, 5 Nov 75.
  5. J483 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) for the Republic of the Philippines.

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requested accelerated delivery. On 12 February CHJUSMAG Manila forwarded specific requirements to support this request. He noted that no substantive progress had been made in GOP attempts to mediate its differences with Muslim rebels in the Sulu-Mindanao area, and that the need for equipment to raise new forces and strengthen existing units was real and urgent.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC supported, and the Secretary of Defense approved, CHJUSMAG's request and tasked the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to accelerate delivery of the following equipment according to the schedule shown:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Required Delivery Date (RDD)</u>
90mm recoilless rifles	53	1 Apr 75
3.5 in. rockets	10,000 rounds	1 Apr 75
40mm grenades	60,000 rounds	1 Apr 75
105mm ammunition	12,000 rounds	1 Apr 75
50 cal. ammunition	3 million rounds	1 Apr 75
90mm ammunition	10,000 rounds	1 May 75
UH-1H helicopters	7	1 Jul 75
LCVP	5	31 Oct 75
LCM-5	2	31 Oct 75
LVTP-5	30	*

\*1 May 75 was RDD for 19 serviceable craft, remaining unserviceable craft not assigned RDD pending inspection by GOP representatives.

~~(C)~~ On 5 March 1975 the American Embassy, Manila relayed President Marcos' thanks to Washington for action taken to accelerate delivery of needed equipment.<sup>3</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 7 March 1975 CINCPAC expressed strong reservations concerning the purchase of LVTP-5s, noting that their attractive price might not outweigh their operational limitations and maintenance costs, and that, at best, they offered only a short range solution for Philippines Marine landing craft needs. These craft were purchased anyway.<sup>4</sup>

~~(C)~~ On 9 April 1975 the Secretary of Defense advised that the Navy could not meet the in-country delivery date for five LCVPs and two LCM-6s. After

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1. J824 HistSum Mar 75; CJUSMAG Manila 120614Z Feb 75.
  2. SECDEF 4391/271912Z Feb 75.
  3. AMEMB Manila 2806/050938Z Mar 75.
  4. SECDEF 3082/172038Z Mar 75; CINCPAC 070455Z Mar 75.

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obtaining CINCPAC's concurrence the Secretary of Defense directed substitution of seven LCM-8s from U.S. Army resources in Okinawa.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ By July 1975 all the accelerated items listed by the Secretary of Defense had been delivered.<sup>2</sup>

Ships Transferred to the GOP

~~(C)~~ On 3 September 1975 CHJUSMAG Manila forwarded a request to make 33 excess ships in Japan, including two Destroyer Escorts (DE), available to the Philippine Navy as EDA on an as-is-where-is basis.

~~(S)~~ On 11 September 1975 the following message, quoted in part, emanated from Ambassador Sullivan in Manila:<sup>3</sup>

...I was absolutely dumbfounded to read ref a, which blandly and blithely informs us that the two destroyer escorts in Japan which we have been seeking for the Philippine Navy have been sold for scrap....

\* \* \* \* \*

...These vessels have been intended to be major blue chips in our plan to secure best possible arrangements for U.S. military facilities during negotiations.... Therefore, my initial (and very Irish) reaction to this SNAFU was to suggest that we let GOP sell Subic to a "Republic of China commercial firm" and let the U.S. Navy lease it back....

\* \* \* \* \*

...In short, the prestige of the Secretaries of State and Defense and their good faith, have been engaged directly with the highest authorities of the Philippines. Moreover, our game plan for negotiations on Subic and Clark has been derailed by this action....

~~(S)~~ On 22 September the Secretary of State informed the American Embassy, Manila that a hold had been placed on the final sale of the two DEs and a freeze

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1. SECDEF 9307/141707Z Apr 75.
  2. CJUSMAG Manila 100102Z Jul 75, 100746Z Jul 75; J464 Point Paper, 18 Aug 75, Subj: Philippine Accelerated Delivery.
  3. AMEMB Manila 12803/110415Z Sep 75.

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had been placed on the other excess vessels in Japan, pending solution of the DE problem; however, the Secretary of State also expressed skepticism as to the blue chip value of the two DEs in base negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 23 October 1975 the Secretary of State indicated that the DE sale to the Chinese firm would continue to be processed and that, upon notification of Indonesian nonacceptance, the Philippines should be offered four WHECs, one PC, and one PGM from Southeast Asia at Subic Bay, plus some other specified vessels in lieu of the two DEs.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 17 November a total of 49 ships, 30 out of Japan and 19 from recovered Southeast Asia assets (one at Guam and 18 at Subic), were transferred to the GOP.<sup>3</sup>

#### T-28 Aircraft

(S) On 22 August and 20 September 1975 the State Department proposed the allocation of 67 recovered Cambodian and Laotian T-28 aircraft to the Philippines as follows:<sup>4</sup>

<u>Origin</u>	<u>T-28B</u>	<u>T-28C</u>	<u>T-28D</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Cambodia	15		27*	42
Laos	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>25</u>
	23	3	41	67


\*Included 3 for spare parts.

(S) The 14 Laotian T-28Ds were an improved version with wing modifications and Yankee seats desired by both Thailand and the Philippines, and their removal became an issue in December 1975. The Thai offered to agree with removal of the other aircraft if they could trade 14 of their T-28s for the 14 modified Laotian aircraft. On the other hand, the American Embassy, Manila emphasized the urgent need for these aircraft to go to the Philippines. CINCPAC supported the Philippine position. On 26 December the State Department proposed that five UH-34s, also from recovered Laotian assets, be offered the Thai instead. Negotiations continued through January 1976. Ultimately, the Philippines got the modified T-28Ds, and, on 5 March 1976, the last of the T-28s

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1. STATE 225252/221615Z Sep 75.
  2. STATE 251989/230204Z Oct 75.
  3. JUSMAG Philippines Letter, 4 Dec 75, Subj: Transfer of Ships.
  4. STATE 200194/2/221711Z Aug 75, 225029/1/201510Z Sep 75.

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# SRI LANKA

<p><b>SRI LANKA BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 25,300 SQ MI</p> <p>POPULATION . . . . . 13,763,000</p> <p>ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 1.9 PERCENT</p> <p>LITERACY RATE . . . . . 82 PERCENT</p> <p>LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 62 YEARS</p> <p>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . .3 ACRE</p> <p>GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$2.1 BILLION</p> <p>PER CAPITA . . . . . \$160</p> <p>INTERSE BUDGET . . . . . \$38 MILLION</p> <p>AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 1.5</p>	 <p>COLOMBO</p>	<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b></p> <p>3 Infantry Battalions, 1 Artillery Regiment (Battalion), 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (Battalion).</p> <p>Strength: 9,000</p> <p>Reserves (Volunteer Force): 9,000</p> <p>Incapable of repelling an invasion. In conjunction with police and other services, can maintain internal security, but has serious command and control deficiencies. Completely reliant on foreign sources for logistics support.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b></p> <p>1 Patrol Escort, 1 Fast Patrol Boat, 5 Motor Gunboats, 23 Patrol Craft.</p> <p>Strength: 2,600</p> <p>No capability against even minor enemy naval attack. Adequate in assisting internal security operations. Limited anti-smuggling capability.</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . HON. Christopher VAN HOLLEN</p> <p>U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . Ernest KAMRICH</p> <p>USDAO . . . . . COL PMAJ O. CUTCHEN, USN</p> <p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>TO SUPPORT THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY</li> <li>-- DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS</li> <li>-- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE</li> </ul>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIEL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO DETER OR DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSION.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.</p> <p>ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND SELF-RELIANCE.</p> <p>ASSIST IN RETENTION OF UNINTERRUPTED FREE WORLD ACCESS TO STRATEGIC RESOURCES.</p> <p>ASSIST IN THE ACQUISITION AND/OR RETENTION OF NECESSARY U.S. AND ALLIED RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS.</p>	<p><b>AIR FORCE</b></p> <p>1 Tactical Squadron (M16-17, I-51), 1 Transport Squadron (OH-114, C-1, Cessna 337, Convair 440), 2 Helicopter Squadrons (OH-13H, Bell 206A, RA-26), 1 Training Squadron (T-5), DHC-1, C-1, Cessna 150).</p> <p>Strength: 2,300</p> <p>Limited capability to provide close support to the Army and in day air defense. Adequate in assisting internal security and in anti-smuggling operations.</p>

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 82.

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were shipped to the Philippines. Of the 67 allocated, <sup>Seventy</sup> ~~eight~~ were declined because of poor condition.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 24 October 1975 CHJUSMAG Philippines advised that the Philippine Air Force had accepted the initial 42 Cambodian T-28s and required \$686,000 in CRA funds to rehabilitate the aircraft. CINCPAC supported this request, but, on 4 November 1975, the Secretary of Defense replied that the rehabilitation cost must be paid by the recipient country. CINCPAC requested reconsideration and, on 2 December, the Secretary of Defense granted an exception to policy to allow MAP funding. In approving this exception, the Secretary of Defense noted that both overseas generated EDA and MAP redistributable property under MAP or FMS was normally transferred on an as-is-where-is basis. The exception was made in consideration of the role of these aircraft in improving the U.S. base negotiations position.<sup>2</sup>

Sri Lanka


(S) A modest (\$30,000) grant aid line item had been maintained for Sri Lanka CONUS-only training since 1968. In 1970 a newly-elected leftist government declined to continue the CONUS training program. Subversion on the island in 1971 caused the government to move to a non-alignment position, and a one-time U.S. grant aid program of \$3 million was approved for helicopters, light aircraft, and communications equipment. Delivery of this material was completed in 1973; however, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) continued to decline the CONUS training.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Both the Embassy and the U.S. Defense Attaché in Colombo had consistently supported the retention of the training item in the MAP each year to counter the left-leaning tendencies of the GSL and potential Soviet influence. In FY 75 the authorized training grant was reduced to \$15,000 and this level was continued in FY 76. The FY 77 authorization was \$5,000.<sup>4</sup>

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1. STATE 200194/221711Z Aug 75, 22029/1/201510Z Sep 75, 9816/261653Z Dec 75; Bangkok 26081/151143Z Dec 75; Manila 17559/160808Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 200327Z Dec 75; J456 Point Papers, 5 Jan 76, Subj: Status of Excess Material Allocated to the Philippines, and 13 Apr 76, Subj: Summary of EDA and MAP Redistributions to Philippines.
  2. CJUSMAG Manila 240842Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 300612Z Oct 75, 182004Z Nov 75; SECDEF 5722/042112Z Nov 75, 440/021819Z Dec 75.
  3. J481 Point Paper, 16 Sep 75, Subj: Sri Lanka Security Assistance Training Program (SATP)(FY 76/FY 77); CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 528.
  4. Ibid.

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**THAILAND**

<p><b>THAILAND BASIC INFORMATION</b></p> <p>AREA . . . . . 198,500 SQ MI          POPULATION . . . . . 42.3 MILLION          ANNUAL GROWTH . . . . . 3.1 PERCENT          LITERACY RATE . . . . . 79 PERCENT          LIFE EXPECTANCY . . . . . 61 YEARS          ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA . . . . . .7 ACRE          GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT . . . . . \$12.2 BILLION          PER CAPITA . . . . . \$280          DEFENSE BUDGET (Proposed) FY 76 . . . . . \$483 MILLION          AS PERCENT OF GNP . . . . . 4</p> <p>DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY</p> <p>SLUG . . . . . Prathiphut Adornet          PRIME MINISTER . . . . . Kriangsak Pibool          SECURITY PRIME MINISTER . . . . . Prachya Adorn San          CHIEF ARMY . . . . . GIH BUKHICHAI Banrungphon          CHIEF NAVY . . . . . AUM SA-NGAD Chatoryoo          CHIEF AIR FORCE . . . . . AIR CHIEF MARSHAL KANOL Thejajunga</p>		<p><b>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</b></p> <p><b>ARMY</b>          7 Infantry Divisions, 1 Regimental Combat Team, 3 Special Forces Groups, 1 Airborne Battalion, 1 Field Artillery Battalion.          Strength: 137,000          Moderate capability to maintain internal security and limited resistance to external aggression. Lack of effective logistical system; too much dependence on foreign sources.</p> <p><b>NAVY</b>          2 Destroyer types, 44 Coastal Patrol types, 31 River Patrol types, 18 Mine Warfare types, 49 Amphibious types, 7 Auxiliary types. 1 Antisubmarine Warfare Squadron (S-2), 1 Utility Squadron (HU-16, U-17A, C-37), 1 Reconnaissance/Close Support Squadron (O-1). 1 Marine Brigade, 5 Marine Infantry Battalions, 3 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Artillery Battalion.          Strength: 25,758, which includes 8,892 Marines.          Limited ability to conduct coastal defense and patrol in Gulf of Thailand and internal waterways.          Limited antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious support.</p> <p><b>AIR FORCE</b>          4 Fighter/Reconnaissance Squadrons (1 F-5A/B, RI-5A; 1 F-33A/RI-33A, 2 OV-10); 3 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (2 F-100, 1 A-47); 2 Helicopter Squadrons (1 OH-34C/H, 1 OH-1H); 1 Utility Squadron (AU-23A); 2 Transport Squadrons (1 C-123, HS-74B, 3 C-47 D/VG/AC/RC); 1 Training Squadron (T-41); Forward Air Control Squadron (O-1A/O/C, U-10D).          Strength: 42,775          Limited airborne operations, close support of the Army, and day air defense.</p>
<p><b>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</b></p> <p>U.S. AMBASSADOR . . . . . HON. Charles S. WHITTHOUSE          U.S. AID DIRECTOR . . . . . TP. PETER ERNST          COMUSMACV &amp; CHIEF . . . . . BGEN Harry C. ADERHOLT, USAF          JUSMAGTHAI . . . . .</p>	<p><b>MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</b></p> <p>ASSIST IN MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. FORCES, AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.</p> <p>ASSIST IN DEVELOPING CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS INSURGENCY AND MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY.</p> <p>PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THAI MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND AGAINST LIMITED EXTERNAL MILITARY THREATS AND PROTECT VITAL TIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION.</p> <p>ENHANCE DEFENSE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY.</p>	
<p><b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b></p> <p>ASSIST THAILAND IN SUSTAINING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND RESISTING POSSIBLE OVERT AGGRESSION. PROMOTE REGIONALISM AND ASSURE U.S. BASE RIGHTS.</p>		

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 83.



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(S) In view of the negative GSL response to overtures by the Defense Attaché toward resumption of a modest training program, CINCPAC requested, during the annual program update, in August 1975, that the Sri Lanka training item be specifically defined. A new Defense Attaché requested more time for familiarization and on 30 August CINCPAC recommended to the Defense Department that the item be held in abeyance until January 1976, at which time the matter would be readdressed.<sup>1</sup>

Thailand

Review

(U) The end FY 75 figures for the Security Assistance Program for Thailand stood as follows (in \$ millions):<sup>2</sup>

<u>MAP Materiel (GA)</u>	<u>Training (GA)</u>	<u>FMSCR</u>
28.3*	1.8*	8.0

\*FY 75 training broken out for comparison.

(S) Operating costs accounted for \$14.8 million of the FY 75 MAP materiel total. The Military Assistance Command-Thailand (MACTHAI) goal was to phase out grant aid funds for operating support by the end of FY 77. The total Thai self-financed defense budget for FY 75 was \$381 million.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 30 June 1975, for the first time, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) signed an agreement to accept \$8 million in FMSCR for FY 75. The American Embassy, Bangkok noted that this action (agreed upon by the Thai Cabinet on 17 June), along with an upsurge of procurement activity, suggested that the Thai were indeed seriously concerned about the need to strengthen their armed forces, and accepted the fact that it was their primary responsibility to provide the resources. This reflected Thai concern over the heightened threat to Thailand resulting from developments in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The FY 76 Thailand Security Assistance Program fluctuated several times prior to submission of the FY 76 and 77 CPD on 5 November 1975 (in \$ millions):<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. CPD FY 76 & 77, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75.
  3. J475 Point Paper, 18 Aug 75, Security Assistance-Thailand; J471 Point Paper, 6 Oct 75, Subj: Security Assistance Program Thailand.
  4. J834 HistSum Jul 75; AMEMB Bangkok 11643/181135Z Jul 75.
  5. CPD FY 76 & 77, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 010/260240Z Aug 75; SECDEF 4813/300412Z Aug 75; STATE 258724/1/310125Z Oct 75.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MAP (GA)</u>	<u>TRAINING (GA)</u>	<u>FMSCR</u>
--	FY 76 POM Submission	28.3	1.70	15.0
26 Aug	FY 76 State/DOD Recommendation	44.4	1.75	15.0
30 Aug	FY 76 Approved by President	28.3	1.75	36.7
31 Oct	FY 76 Presidential Submission	28.3	1.70	36.7
5 Nov	FY 76 & 7T CPD	28.3	1.75	36.7

(C) There was a significant increase in FMSCR proposed for FY 76, but, while the Headquarters Supreme Command, Thailand indicated it would use the credit, no action had been taken by the RTG to approve acceptance of the credit at year's end, nor had it used any of the \$8 million FY 75 FMSCR which it had accepted in June.<sup>1</sup>

### Training

(U) Grant aid funds spent on security assistance training for Thailand dropped from \$3.8 million in FY 71 down to \$1.3 million in FY 73, up to \$1.8 million in FY 75, and \$1.75 million was proposed for FY 76.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As part of the PACOM effort to stretch grant aid training dollars, Thailand implemented a phased cost-sharing schedule according to which the Thai were to assume all transportation and living costs associated with training by FY 79 (also see Section II, Country Cost-Sharing Program). The original assumption upon which this program was based was that cost-sharing would free funds for training spaces; however, Thai budgetary limitations resulted in the opposite effect. As of 5 September 1975, \$192,364 of FY 76 training funds remained uncommitted and CINCPAC was considering the use of MTTs to expend these funds. At year's end, a request was still pending for MTT support to establish an Integrated Communications System (ICS).<sup>3</sup>

### Interest in F-5 Aircraft

(S) Originally, the FY 78-85 JSOP Force Objective for Thailand had indicated two F-5 squadrons; however, FY 78-81 POM guidance indicated that low priority should be assigned to further acquisition of sophisticated aircraft. In April 1975 the RTAF requested an LOA for 16 F-5E/F aircraft and COMUSMACTHAI forwarded it through channels to the State Department recommending approval.

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1. COMUSMACTHAI Bangkok 110253Z Nov 75.
  2. J4831 Point Paper, 4 Dec 75, Subj: Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) for Thailand; CPD FY 76 & 7T, Security Assistance Program, FMS & MAP, 5 Nov 75
  3. J4831 Point Paper, 5 Sep 75, Subj: Cost Sharing - Thailand.

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In May 1975 the RTG was negotiating with Northrop Corporation to purchase 15 F-5E and three F-5F aircraft for a total package cost of about \$67.8 million. As MACTHAI reported, this decision appeared to be influenced by the changed situation in neighboring countries. In June 1975 COMUSMACTHAI acted to reduce the FY 78-81 JSOP Force Objective from two to one F-5 squadron for Thailand, informing CINCPAC that he no longer supported Thai purchase of fighter-type aircraft, and CINCPAC instructed MACTHAI to take necessary action, short of overt nullification of the LOA, to discourage Thai purchase of F-5 aircraft. After being extended once, the LOA finally expired on 30 November 1975. According to the American Embassy, Bangkok, Thai hesitancy to accept the LOA appeared to be based on the lingering hope of obtaining the aircraft through grant aid.<sup>1</sup>

#### Training and Logistics Detachment (TLD)

(S) On 14 December 1974 CINCPAC had recommended a phasedown in manning of the TLD as part of the reductions in headquarters and support elements in Thailand. The JCS concurred with the CINCPAC recommendation in principle, but requested CINCPAC to consider possible disestablishment of the TLD by the end of FY 75. On 3 February CINCPAC submitted a detailed training program for Cambodian students within the reduced TLD manpower capability. The program envisioned phase-out at the end of FY 76. On 19 February the JCS approved the CINCPAC plan, including disestablishment of the TLD by the end of FY 76. As discussed in this chapter under Cambodian training, the surrender of Cambodia to the communists resulted in the disestablishment of the TLD on 30 June 1975.<sup>2</sup>

#### Cambodia/Vietnam Equipment Recovered in Thailand

(C) According to COMUSMACTHAI, approximately 241 aircraft arrived in Thailand in the wake of the collapse of Cambodia and Vietnam, 109 of which were ultimately transferred to the RTAF. Also included were some ships, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and other miscellaneous small arms and equipment.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J475 HistSum Nov 75; STATE 018838/272040Z Jan 75; J834 HistSum May 75; USMACTHAI 280830Z Aug 75; CINCPAC 042017Z Sep 75; AMEMB Bangkok 26893/291158Z Dec 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 439-442; J8 HistSum Jan 75; JCS 4631/010548Z Jan 75; J8 HistSum Feb 75; CINCPAC 032104Z Feb 75; JCS 6586/192303Z Feb 75; See Cambodia for TLD disestablishment authority.
  3. MACTHAI Fact Sheet, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: Recovered Aircraft from Cambodia and Vietnam.

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(S) Cambodia fell on 17 April 1975. On 21 April an Associated Press story datelined Bangkok appeared with the following lead:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The Thai Government will give Cambodia's new Communist Government all vehicles, aircraft, weapons, and ammunition brought into Thailand by fleeing Cambodian troops, Foreign Minister Chatchai Choonhavan said today.

[REDACTED] Then, when Vietnam fell on 30 April 1975, the question arose again when Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) used this issue to exploit Thai desire to improve relations with Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 2 May 1975 the American Embassy, Bangkok reported that the Thai had publicly acknowledged U.S. title to Vietnamese assets; however, the U.S. Charge, Masters, advised that major items of equipment should be moved out soonest before their presence became a political issue. He also submitted a list of 81 Cambodian and South Vietnamese aircraft, excess to U.S. requirements, that he urged be immediately turned over to the Thai at no charge to their MAP. On 3 May the Charge requested immediate removal from Thailand of all Cambodian and South Vietnamese MAP aircraft except those identified for turnover to the Thai. In the meantime, steps were under way to quickly move most items aboard the aircraft carrier MIDWAY.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 3 May 1975 the Secretary of Defense advised that steps were being taken to allocate the 81 aircraft to Thailand per the Charge's request (actual number was reduced to 78 after discovery of a duplicate reporting error).<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 4 May 1975 the Charge reported that 11 F-5s and a number of A-37s remained at U-Tapao, but that movement to the MIDWAY had been terminated because of the loss of two F-5Es to inadequate slings. Noting the increasing political pressure which could result in freezing remaining recovered equipment in Thailand, the Charge urged that loading operations be resumed and completed

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1. STATE 091714/220135Z Apr 75.
  2. COMUSMACTHAI 241110Z Apr 75; AMEMB Bangkok 8143/061100Z May 75; STATE 104072/051153Z May 75 (EX).
  3. AMEMB Bangkok 7976/021327Z May 75 (EX), 8015/040510Z May 75 (EX); COMUSMACTHAI 030350Z May 75.
  4. SECDEF 1742/031455Z May 75 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 10359/051003Z Jun 75.


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
within 48 hours if possible. On 5 May the Secretary of State advised CINCPAC that the Thai press would visit U-Tapao at 0900 local time on 6 May to report the departure of the first planeload of Cambodian refugees, and that there should be no visible movement or processing of aircraft being taken out of Thailand during this visit.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 6 May 1975 the Charge met with the Thai Foreign Minister who notified him that the Thai Cabinet had decided to order suspension of further removals of MAP and MASF equipment from Thailand. The Charge noted that, fortunately, the MIDWAY had sailed on the evening of the 5th with the bulk of the expensive equipment on board (101 aircraft). He also expressed his gratitude to all those involved in loading the MIDWAY under such difficult conditions.<sup>2</sup>

Laotian Aircraft Recovered in Thailand

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 8015/040510Z May 75 (EX); STATE 104072/051153Z May 75 (EX); CINCPACAF 040215Z May 75.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 8143/061100Z May 75; J8 WEB 5-11 May 75.
  3. USDAO Vientiane 6004-75/D/170756Z May 75, 6017-75/D/220745Z May 75; CINCPAC 191919Z May 75; STATE 224029/1/201510Z Sep 75; AMEMB Vientiane 5740/240803Z Sep 75; CINCPAC J8 Report, Subj: Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam Evacuated Equipment as of 23 Jul 75, p. 7.

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Total Cambodian/Vietnamese/Laotian Aircraft Transferred to Thailand

(C) As of 23 January 1976, COMUSMACTHAI accounted for a total of 117 Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Laotian aircraft transferred to the RTG:

Origin	A-37	C-47	C-123K	F-5B	O-1	T-28	T-41	U-17	UH-1H	UH-34	Total
Cambodia <sup>1</sup>		12	10		10	9	1		13		55
Vietnam <sup>1</sup>	1	17		1	12			14	9		54
Laos <sup>2</sup>		1	2							5	8
Totals	1	30	12	1	22	9	1	14	22	5	117

1. Source: MACTHAI Fact Sheet, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: Recovered Aircraft from Cambodia and Vietnam.
2. Source: MACTHAI Fact Sheet, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: MAP Laos Aircraft.

(C) Other equipment under Thai control and allocated to them by the State Department included the following major items:<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 5740/240803Z Sep 75; CINCPAC TANGO 33/271400Z Oct 75, 310057Z Oct 75; FBIS 260153Z Oct 75; AMEMB Bangkok 23273/051103Z Nov 75, 26001/131104Z Dec 75; STATE 272346/180008Z Nov 75; MACTHAI Fact Sheet, MACTJD-PRM, 23 Jan 76, Subj: MAP Laos Aircraft.
  2. STATE 200194/1/221711Z Aug 75.

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Origin	Ships			Other	
	LCM-8	PC	PCF	105mm HOW	M-113 APC
Cambodia		1	2	4	6
Vietnam	2	1	1	4	6
Total	2	1	3	4	6

Vietnam

Funding

(U) Public Law 93-365, H.R. 14592 of 5 August 1974 authorized the appropriation of \$1.0 billion for a DOD-controlled single account, separate from the regular MAP, called Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV); however, the Appropriations Bill of 8 October 1974 (PL 93-437) only appropriated \$700 million for the FY 75 DAV. This amount was recognized by CINCPAC, the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and the President as being inadequate to support RVN requirements under continuing high intensity combat.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 28 January 1975 President Ford, in a message to Congress, proposed a supplemental appropriation of \$300 million for military assistance to the RVN. This amount represented the difference between the \$1.0 billion originally authorized for FY 75 and the \$700 million actually appropriated. The President noted that this did not allow for replacement of equipment lost in combat, but was only the minimum needed to prevent serious reversals under the current level of North Vietnamese attacks. He noted further that the \$700 million had only allowed provision of essential consumable items such as ammunition, gasoline, spare parts, and medical supplies; and that even those supplies had not kept pace with minimally essential expenditures.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Added to the problem of inadequate overall funding was the issue of unprogrammed costs chargeable to the FY 75 DAV program, especially the accrual of PCH&T costs. On 18 February 1975 the USDAO Saigon requested the Defense Audit Agency to audit PCH&T funds of the MILDEPs to clarify these costs. CINCPAC concurred with this request. The Secretary of Defense replied that estimated PCH&T costs were \$74.0 million and that an audit had been requested although its scope and duration had yet to be determined.<sup>3</sup> This problem was not solved at the time of the fall of Vietnam on 30 April 1975.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 371, 432-437.
  2. Dept of State Bulletin, 17 Feb 75, "President Ford Requests Additional Funds for Assistance to Vietnam and Cambodia," p. 320.
  3. USDAO Saigon 180504Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 200319Z Feb 75; SECDEF 6031/28222Z Feb 75; Residual USDAO Saigon Personal Recollections, 15 Jul 75, pp. 62-64.

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(C) On 18 April 1975 CINCPAC directed the DAO Saigon to realign the FY 75 DAV program by purging it of all items not urgently needed for combat operations and cancelling requisitions not deliverable within 90 days. Ammunition was not to be programmed to exceed 30-day stock levels and all requisitions were to be coded to "fill or kill."<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 25 April CINCPAC notified the USDAO of the Secretary of Defense's authorization to release the remaining \$20 million of 4th and final quarter DAV funds (in \$ millions):<sup>2</sup>

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Air Force	PCH&T	10.7
Army	Transportation	3.5
Navy	DAO admin and Local National severance pay.	5.8
Total		20.0

(S) In his final assessment of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), MG Homer D. Smith, USA, the Defense Attaché, commented on the funding of the DAV:<sup>3</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...I think it only fair at this time to say that the funding constraints materially contributed to the total defeat of RVNAF and surrender of the Government of the South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese/Provisional Revolutionary Government.

\* \* \* \* \*

Property Disposal

(C) On 24 December 1974 the Secretary of Defense reported a Comptroller General ruling that proceeds from the sale of U.S. Government-titled scrap not designated for transfer to the Government of Vietnam prior to 1 July 1974 would be charged to the DAV appropriations ceiling of \$700 million at the actual value, or gross proceeds of the sale. The American Embassy, Saigon appealed this ruling to the Secretary of State in view of the 1972-1973 U.S. Government-

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1. CINCPAC 180420Z Apr 75.
  2. CINCPAC 251957Z Apr 75.
  3. DAO RVNAF Final Assessment Jan thru Apr FY 75, 15 Jun 75, Forward and Assessment.

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Republic of Vietnam government-to-government agreement in which the United States had promised to give all U.S. scrap to the Government of Vietnam. CINCPAC recommended that either no DAV offset be made with sales or that gross revenue from scrap sales be charged as offset to the DAV on a phaseout percentage basis as follows: FY 75, 15%; FY 76, 10%; FY 77, 5%; and no charge thereafter. On 12 March 1975 the Secretary of Defense advised that the guidance of 24 December 1974 only pertained to U.S. Government-titled scrap and that scrap or redistributable excess not accepted by the U.S. Government from the Government of Vietnam (non-U.S. titled) could be sold with no offset to the DAV program. The solution being considered prior to the fall of Vietnam was U.S. Government non-acceptance of title to all future scrap generations or redistributable excess once excess screening had been completed.<sup>1</sup>

### Training

(U) On 27 March 1975 the USDAO Saigon and the RVNAF cancelled all CONUS training under the FY 75 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) not already committed so the funds could be used to support higher priority requirements. Only those students already in the CONUS were to complete training.<sup>2</sup>

### Suspension of DAV Program

~~(S)~~ On 24 April 1975 CINCPAC recommended suspending supply action on all materiel in CONUS destined for support of the RVNAF. On 29 April the Secretary of Defense suspended all DAV support to include diversion of materiel enroute to Vietnam to appropriate military department of DSA storage facilities. (Also see Chapter I for discussion of the phaseout of the DAO Saigon.)<sup>3</sup>

### Materiel Losses During the Final Days

~~(S)~~ The situation in Vietnam rapidly deteriorated beginning with the withdrawal from Kontum and Pleiku on 15 March 1975. On 25 March 1975 MG Smith reported that every effort was being made to save as much materiel as possible, but that the refugee situation had complicated this effort. He was confident that the RVNAF would do their best to maintain control of materiel necessary for fighting, but not so confident that they would take time to destroy materiel which had to be abandoned. On 31 March he reported that the situation was desperate and that it could all be over in a short period of time if the enemy

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1. SECDEF 1218/242135Z Dec 74; AMEMB Saigon 0552/151230Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 210014Z Jan 75; J4612 Point Paper, 18 Mar 75, Subj: Property Disposal Vietnam.
  2. J4 HistSum Mar 75; USDAO Saigon 270355Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC 241712Z Apr 75; SECDEF 6290/291607Z Apr 75.

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followed through and the U.S. Government did not soon provide additional moral and materiel support. Four ARVN divisions had been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective and two other divisions had been only partially salvaged. To date, in the current offense, the RVNAF had lost materiel valued at about \$637.3 million (not including non-divisional support units or fixed facilities such as airfields, ports, and military installations) (in \$ millions):<sup>1</sup>

Ground Losses	407.1
Air Force Losses	222.6 (includes 268 aircraft)
Naval Losses	<u>7.6</u>
TOTAL LOSSES	637.3


(U) In May 1975 key staff officers assigned to the USDAO Saigon estimated the total value of materiel losses to the North Vietnamese with the fall of South Vietnam at nearly \$4 billion (See also Chapter V for specifics on POL and munitions losses):<sup>2</sup>

<u>Service</u>	<u>Value of Materiel Lost</u>
Army	\$1,233,339,000
Navy	*\$ 141,212,585 (includes over 1,500 craft)
Air Force	<u>\$2,465,200,000</u> (includes 1,428 aircraft)
Total	\$3,839,751,585

\*RVNAF Final Assessment Jan thru Apr 75 shows Navy losses to be \$121,595,583.

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1. DAS RVNAF Final Assessment Jan thru Apr FY 75, 15 Jun 75, p. 16-B-3; USDAO Saigon 251053Z Mar 75 (BOM), 311017Z Mar 75 (BOM).
  2. Residual USDAO Saigon Personal Recollections, 15 Jul 75, pp. 39, 42, 48; Defense Attaché Saigon RVNAF Final Assessment Jan thru Apr 75, 15 Jun 75, p. 7-1.

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CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Urinalysis Program

(U) On 7 January 1975 the Secretary of Defense directed all urinalysis testing under the Department of Defense Drug Abuse Testing Program to resume no later than 1 February 1975. The program had been suspended since 18 July 1974, pending a court decision on the Department of the Army's petition for a rehearing of the case, United States vs Ruiz. The revised Department of Defense exemption policy was enunciated as follows:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Evidence developed by, or as a direct or indirect result of urinalyses administered for the purpose of identifying drug users may not be used in any disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or as a basis for characterizing a member's discharge as other than an honorable discharge. Similarly, a military member may not be subject to disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or to administrative action leading to a discharge other than an honorable discharge for drug use solely because he has volunteered for treatment under the drug identification and treatment programs of the Department of Defense.

(U) Operational laboratories were established at Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii, and Camp Zama, Japan; however, the SEATO laboratory in Bangkok, Thailand was not activated. The Commander, U.S. Army Japan was designated by Department of the Army as coordinating agent for the drug abuse testing program in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC), and the Camp Zama laboratory became operational for acceptance of specimens on 26 February 1975.<sup>2</sup>

PACOM Military Customs/Drug Suppression Conference

(U) The PACOM Military Customs/Drug Suppression Conference scheduled for 22-24 January 1975 was cancelled due to budgetary constraints.<sup>3</sup>

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1. JCS 1641/102350Z Jan 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 462.
  2. J114 HistSum Feb 75; CDRUSARJ 060435Z Feb 75.
  3. CINCPAC 142300Z Jan 75.

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East Asia Narcotics Conference

(S) During the period 24-26 March 1975, CINCPAC was represented at the State Department-sponsored East Asia Narcotics Conference held in Bangkok. CINCPAC had participated in these regional conferences since 1971, and it was decided to combine this participation with a WESTPAC trip of the PACOM Military Customs program manager as more economical than holding a separate Military Customs conference. The CINCPAC representative prepared a presentation on PACOM drug suppression programs to include FRONTAL EDICT, COMMANDO PLUG, and STABLEBOY.<sup>1</sup>

Military Customs Staff Assistance Visit, WESTPAC

(U) Following the East Asia Narcotics Conference, during the period 27 March through 22 April 1975, the PACOM Military Customs program manager and a member of the U.S. Customs Service conducted staff assistance visits to coordinate military customs and narcotics/drugs activities in Thailand, Japan including Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Guam.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The following is a country-by-country summary of some of the findings revealed by the visit:<sup>3</sup>

Thailand - The drug threat continued to be high quality heroin (95 percent pure) which was cheap and readily available. Servicemen trafficked in heroin in every conceivable manner to include body carry, accompanied baggage, on aircraft, and by APO mail. A serious potential trafficking problem existed with accelerated unit drawdowns.


Japan - On the main islands the threat did not appear severe. Amphetamines and barbiturates were the preferred drugs. Heroin was scarce. Evidence pointed to drugs, especially LSD and marijuana, which were entering Japan through the mails from the CONUS. Currently, 94 of 158 U.S. personnel confined in Japanese prisons were narcotic offenders. On Okinawa the drug threat appeared to be almost of epidemic proportions, with the DOD and dependent population consuming heroin, amphetamines, LSD, marijuana, alcohol, and every other form of drug available. Drugs were entering

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 458-459; J1/Memo/C8-75, 4 Feb 75, Subj: FY 75 Travel Funds.
  2. CINCPAC 192310Z Mar 75.
  3. J112 HistSum May 75.

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from Thailand and the CONUS. Trafficking took place on Kadena Air Base, in Koza City, in the schools between teenagers and servicemen, and by resident retired personnel.



Korea - The primary threat was locally grown marijuana, but evidence suggested that LSD was arriving in the mails from CONUS. Amphetamines were produced in Korea and exported to Japan, where the profit was high (about \$129/gram). Pills were readily available across the counter in drug stores, which Korean authorities were trying to police.

Philippines - At Clark Air Base, the method of smuggling appeared to be shifting from passengers, crew members and accompanied baggage to the mail. Tactical aircraft and crew members arriving from Southeast Asia continued to be a secondary threat. COMMANDO PLUG had increased drug seizures by 50 percent and had a positive deterrent effect. At Subic Bay/Cubi Point, the primary drug threat was from USN ships visiting such ports as Karachi, Singapore, and Hong Kong. STABLEBOY operations were effectively deterring drug purchases by seamen visiting some of these ports.

Taiwan - The drug threat continued to be amphetamines and barbiturates sold without prescription in Chinese drug stores. The marijuana distribution system was fragmented. Glue-sniffing by pre-teenagers had surfaced again. Little or no cocaine or hashish was being found. With the down-island phasedown, the hard drug situation was expected to disappear.

Guam - Governor Bordallo actively solicited military assistance in drug suppression efforts and authority was given to the military customs advisor to advise and assist the Government of Guam Customs. Heroin use was leveling off. Heroin found was of 45 percent purity with a street cost of \$300/gram. Marijuana was the second choice and was coming in from the CONUS. Little or no cocaine, hashish or amphetamines had been discovered. LSD came in from the CONUS by the mails. At Andersen Air Base, the threat continued to be servicemen going on leave in Thailand.

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Mailing of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs via APO Mail

(U) On 13 January 1975 the Department of the Army (DA), executive agent for the DOD military customs program, directed all military customs and postal inspection activities at APO/FPOs to cease the intercepting and forwarding to U.S. Customs of suspect first class mail unless such mail was specifically addressed to points within the customs territory of the United States. CINCPAC opposed this decision, provided a summary of 1974 drug mailing incidents, and recommended two alternative solutions. There was a total of 131 incidents in 1974 including 15.98 ounces of heroin (street value estimated at \$391,000), approximately one pound of marijuana, pills and hashish. Alternative solutions recommended by CINCPAC included:

- Secure legislation allowing duly appointed military customs inspectors (MCI) or postal authorities in overseas MPOs to open suspect intra/intertheater first class mail based on probable cause (e.g., dog alert, flouroscope, etc.).

- Pouch suspect mail to one or more central locations (i.e., Bangkok and Kimpo Aerial Mail Terminals (AMTs)). Screen suspect mail at AMTs to determine probable cause and turn it over to Service investigative agencies for controlled delivery to addressee and subsequent opening pursuant to appropriate commander's orders.

FBI Office Established on Guam

(U) On 16 June 1973 CINCPAC, on behalf of CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI, requested that consideration be given to establishing a Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and FBI Office on Guam to insure a coordinated approach in counterintelligence and criminal investigations activities. The request was approved, and, on 18 February 1975, an FBI resident agent office was established.<sup>2</sup>

Bangkok Youth Treatment Center (YTC)

(U) On 15 January 1975 MAJ GEN Hixon, USA, COMUSMACTHAI, in a letter to Admiral Gayler, requested assistance to support the Bangkok YTC. In response, the Chief of Naval Operations provided \$85,000 as the DOD portion for operation of the Center.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J112 HistSum Feb 75; DA 131547Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 230032Z Jan 75.
  2. J111 HistSum Mar 75; J1 WEB 18 Feb 75.
  3. J4 WEB 3 Feb 75.

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### Significant Heroin Seizure


(U) On 17 October 1975 a U.S. Army military customs inspector made a large seizure of heroin during an off-base household goods inspection in Bangkok. Approximately 100 pounds were secreted in false panels of wooden furniture. Based on current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) statistics, the shipment cost \$237,600 and had a street value of \$49,104,000 (East Coast) or \$38,649,000 (West Coast). Thai police authorities confiscated the heroin and placed the subject, Army Specialist Five Myrick, in custody. At year's end, investigations were continuing to try to identify Thai Nationals involved in the shipment.<sup>1</sup>

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1. J4 WEBS 14-17 Oct 75, 3-7 Nov 75.

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SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Civilian Personnel Activities in PACOM Headquarters

Civilian Personnel Information Sessions

(U) On 12 February 1975 the CINCPAC Personnel Directorate announced a program of one-hour Civilian Personnel Information Sessions to inform supervisors and non-supervisors of civilian personnel management policies and procedures. Sessions were planned monthly, consistent with workload and availability of guest speakers. Among the subjects to be covered were the following:<sup>1</sup>

- Affirmative Action Plan
- Career Counseling
- Coping with Alcoholism
- Employment Information
- Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
- Management Affirmation of EEO
- Management by Objectives
- Merit Promotion Program
- Reduction in Force
- Secondary Skills Survey
- Training Opportunities/Schedules
- Upward Mobility Program

(U) By October 1975 five sessions had been held on subjects selected from the above listing.<sup>2</sup>

Outstanding Performance Ratings (OPRs) for Civilian Personnel

(U) The following were the results of OPRs, including Quality Salary Increases (QSI) and Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPA), for civilian employees of CINCPAC and the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) for the rating period 1 April 1974 to 31 March 1975:<sup>3</sup>

<u>Civilians Assigned</u>	<u>OPRs Recommended</u>	<u>OPRs Approved</u>	<u>Cash Awards Recommended</u>		<u>Cash Awards Approved</u>	
			<u>QSI</u>	<u>SSPA</u>	<u>QSI</u>	<u>SSPA</u>
193	104	41	48	14	8	1

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1. CINCPACINST 12713.3, 12 Feb 75, Subj: Civilian Personnel Information Sessions.  
 2. J1441 HistSum Oct 75.  
 3. J1441 HistSum Jul 75.

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Census of U.S. Civilians Associated with the Security Assistance Program

(U) In October 1975 CINCPAC, at Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) request, provided the Secretary of Defense with required information on all U.S. civilians assigned to PACOM MAAGs, Missions and Military Groups, and those performing security assistance functions at PACOM headquarters and in the subunified commands. The total was 96.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. Forces Labor Costs for Local Nationals Overseas

(U) U.S. Forces local national (LN) labor costs in the PACOM continued to rise while employment levels decreased. As of January 1975 PACOM LN labor costs were as follows:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Workforce (as of 30 Sep 74)</u>	<u>Average Annual Cost (as of Jan 75)</u>	<u>Total Annual Cost (projected)</u>
Japan	31,000	\$9,360	\$290,160,000
Korea	18,000	3,460	62,280,000
Philippines	21,000	2,100	44,100,000
Taiwan	4,000	2,800	11,200,000
Thailand	12,000	2,100	25,200,000
Vietnam	<u>4,000</u>	1,050	<u>4,200,000</u>
Totals	90,000	\$4,855	\$437,140,000

(U) Per employee costs in Japan had risen approximately 90 percent since 1970 in the wake of a rapidly expanding economy, attendant inflation, and a 20 percent increase in the value of the yen in relation to the U.S. dollar since December 1971. Vietnam was the sole exception to rising costs. There, despite rampant inflation, the average employee cost had decreased by 30 percent since 1970. The decrease was due primarily to an 83 percent devaluation of the piaster since April 1972.<sup>3</sup>

PACOM Third Country National (TCN) Employment

(U) On 2 January 1975 CINCPAC requested an update report from all PACOM country areas, identifying total TCNs employed by nationality, grade, and DOD organization. The purpose was to provide the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee

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1. J1 WEB 20-24 Oct 75.
  2. J121 HistSum Jan 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 465-466.
  3. J121 HistSum Jan 75.

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needed information for future personnel policy, wage schedules, and publication issuance actions.

(U) A total of 125 (103 appropriated fund; 22 nonappropriated fund) TCN employees was located in eight countries, representing 11 nationalities. The predominant strength by nationality was Filipino (51), Chinese (34), Korean (9), and Vietnamese (9). This contrasted to a high of 1,100 TCNs employed by DOD organizations in PACOM during 1970.<sup>1</sup>

### Civilian Personnel Activities in PACOM Countries

#### Japan and Okinawa

##### Labor Cost Sharing

*ju* (U) (S) In August 1973 a COMUS Japan proposal was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to have the Government of Japan (GOJ) pay or share U.S. Forces (USF) local national (LN) employee labor costs. In 1974 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) advised that this proposal was useful but not timely for raising with the GOJ.<sup>2</sup>

*ju* (U) (S) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested further thoughts from COMUS Japan after the subject was raised by Secretary Schlesinger with the Director General, GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency, during the latter's visit to Washington, D.C. in October 1974. COMUS Japan reported little likelihood that cost sharing could be accomplished by USF in-country initiatives and recommended that an agreement in principle be initiated at the highest levels of the GOJ and the U.S. Government.<sup>3</sup>

(U) CINCPAC supported the COMUS Japan position and recommended that, once raised, the issue be made a priority agenda subject for the next USG-GOJ Security Consultative Committee meeting.<sup>4</sup> No further action was taken on this subject during 1975.

##### Pay Increase for Local National Employees

(U) A 30.69 percent wage and benefit increase was approved in February 1975 by the Service components in Japan for some 31,000 Japanese employees of the USF, retroactive to 1 April 1974. By agreement with GOJ, the amount and

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1. CINCPAC 022046Z Jan 75; J12 HistSum Jan 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 574-575; J121 HistSum Jan 75.
  3. COMUSJ Ltr J5 of 18 Dec 74.
  4. CINCPAC Ltr 12 Ser C25 of 14 Jan 75.

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timing of USF pay adjustments paralleled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Personnel System (NPS) employees. A comparable NPS increase had received Diet approval in late 1974.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Fringe benefit increases included higher allowances for family members, housing, commuting, and summer and year-end bonuses.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The U.S.-GOJ agreement was the result of nearly six months of intensive negotiation on pay setting methodology and the amount of increase. Major gains achieved by the USF were:<sup>3</sup>

- Agreement to a joint U.S.-GOJ six month study on pay fixing methods to be used for specific nonappropriated fund job categories.

- Deletion of language allowance from the basis of computation of seasonal bonuses.

- Extension of waiting period for longevity step increases under certain conditions.

- Added management prerogatives in rehiring and pay of employees mandatorily terminated at age 62.

(U) The increase incorporated a 10 percent interim pay adjustment granted employees in October 1974 and made retroactive to 1 April 1974.<sup>4</sup>

### Labor Strikes

(U) U.S. Forces Japanese national employees in Okinawa Prefecture staged island-wide strikes of 24-hour duration each on the 27th day of January, February, and March 1975. The strikes centered on demands for cancellation of reduction-in-force notices and increases in pay and benefits. The 27 March strike was in support of an annual nationwide Spring Struggle of Japanese workers in all sectors, private and public, but USF LN employees on Honshu did not participate in this nationwide strike.<sup>5</sup>

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1. COMUSJ 100840Z Feb 75.
  2. USFJ and GOJ DFAA Confirmation of Agreement in Principle on Pay Adjustments for USFJ Employees, 8 Feb 75.
  3. Ibid.
  4. COMUSJ 210631Z Oct 74.
  5. USF Japan Ltr J51, undated, Subj: Zenchuro/Zengunro Strike Activities; CDRUSARJ 252340Z Mar 75.

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(U) On 9 May 1975 a 24-hour strike was conducted on Okinawa and a 2-hour strike on mainland Japan to support the All Japan Council of Trade Unions demands for pay increases in 1975. Okinawa strikes further protested USF announced reduction-in-force of 1,137 LN employees from May through July 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 3 December 1975 another 24-hour strike was conducted against all USF installations to demand early resolution of stalled 1975 general pay increase negotiations and to protest USF proposed lowering of the mandatory retirement age from 62 to 60.<sup>2</sup>

### Korea

#### Revised Wage Schedule for Local National Employees

(U) Revised schedules of wages for USF LN employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by the PACOM Service component commands in October 1975 under authorities delegated by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 114 private sector firms in four Korean urban areas from August through October 1975. Revised compensation benefits, effective 1 November 1975, resulted in an average increase of 31.1 percent for some 23,000 employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The increase was comprised of the following:<sup>4</sup>

- 19.6 percent to base pay.
- 9.8 percent to payment-in-kind allowance.
- 1.7 percent to raise the Spring bonus from 1/2 to 1 month of pay.

(U) The payment-in-kind allowance was established for the first time in the PACOM. It represented an amount equivalent to benefits received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, uniforms, and transportation. This amounted to 32 won (6 2/3 cents) an hour per employee. An equivalent amount previously was included in USF employee base pay. It was now identified and paid separately, thereby lowering base pay and making it more representative of private sector pay practices. This also served to

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1. J1 WEB 5-11 May 75.
  2. J1 WEB 1-7 Dec 75.
  3. ASD/M&RA Memo of 18 Jul 72; USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE of 31 Oct 75.
  4. HQ USFK Ltr EACP-K of 25 Oct 75; USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE of 31 Oct 75.

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lower overall USF labor costs because base pay was used as the basis to compute other items such as overtime, other premium pay, and severance allowance.

### Philippines

#### Revised Wage Schedules for Local National Employees

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 20,000 USF LN employees in the Philippines were jointly approved and issued by the PACOM Service component commands under authorities delegated by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 30 private sector employers in the greater Manila area during April and May 1975. The new wage rates, effective 1 July 1975, resulted in an increase of 5.6 percent for manual and 8 percent for nonmanual employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds.<sup>2</sup>

(U) A survey of private sector fringe benefits was conducted concurrently with the wage survey. Changes made to USF benefits, based on survey findings, included:<sup>3</sup>

- Payment of an emergency allowance of 50 pesos a month to all full-time employees, with a pro-rated allowance to part-time and intermittent employees. The emergency allowance, first authorized in 1974, had been previously paid to employees making less than 600 pesos a month and other select employees.

- Increases to rates paid for work in excess of 8 hours a day on Sundays and holidays. Rates were increased from 150 percent of base pay to a minimum of 160 percent on Sundays and a maximum of 250 percent on holidays.

#### Collective Bargaining

(U) Negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the U.S. Bases and the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations began on 24 June 1975. The Federation, under terms of the

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1. ASD(M&RA) Memo of 18 Jul 72; CINCPACFLT Ltr 12531 Ser 74/3681 of 13 Jun 75.
  2. CINCPACREPPHIL, Narrative Report, U.S. Agencies Wage Change/Fringe Benefit Survey, Republic of the Philippines 1975, undated.
  3. Ibid.

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U.S.-Republic of Philippines Bases Labor Agreement (BLA) of 1968, represented some 20,300 Filipino direct hire employees of the USF in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Groundwork for CBA negotiations was initiated early in 1975. The Federation submitted a large number of proposals to the U.S. Bases in April 1975 to change the Agreement. U.S. Bases' recommendations for change and positions to hold the line were developed by the Services in the Philippines, approved or modified jointly by the PACOM Service commands in Hawaii, and presented by the U.S. Bases chief negotiator to the Federation in May 1975. Other preparations included labor negotiations training for the U.S. Bases negotiating team, meetings in Hawaii with the U.S. Bases chief negotiator and PACOM Service commands' representatives, and, on 10 June 1975, preliminary meetings of both negotiating teams to gain clarification of both parties' proposals.<sup>2</sup>

*of (U) 10/10/75* Negotiations were active and heated throughout the remainder of 1975. Over 100 separate negotiating sessions were held. As the weeks and months passed, less controversial CBA provisions were approved and jointly signed. Other issues became major obstacles to agreement. At year's end, agreement could not be achieved on Federation positions as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- That fringe compensation items be negotiable.
- That final appeal on disciplinary and grievance cases be decided by binding arbitration (with the Federation exercising de facto veto power on who could serve as arbitrator).
- That intermittent employees be given the same benefits as all other employees.
- The U.S. Bases' staunch positions were that fringe compensation items continue to be based on prevailing locality practice and not be negotiable (per DOD policy).
- That discipline appeal procedure should be simplified with advisory arbitration as a final appeal mechanism.

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1. CINCPACFLT 120257Z Apr 75.
  2. J1 HistSum Dec 75.
  3. OCMM FD Pearl Harbor 090215Z Sep 75.

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- That supervisors, guards, and personnel workers be excluded from the bargaining unit.

*see (U) (S)* An early Federation demand, given strong informal support by the GOP Department of Labor, was for collection of union dues (or an equivalent amount) from all USF Filipino employees regardless of Federation membership. Some 48 percent belonged to the Federation in October 1975. American Embassy, Manila strongly supported this proposal and recommended to the State Department that the USG engage in an exchange of notes with the GOP to amend the 1968 BLA to accommodate this proposal. The Embassy stated that this action would be consistent with a new Philippines Labor Code calling for compulsory check-off of union dues for all employees of Philippines private sector firms. The CINCPAC Representative, Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) and in-country commands nonconcurred. CINCPAC and PACOM Service commands registered nonconcurrence to the Secretary of Defense citing the undesirable precedent to modify the BLA for this or any similar reason, and the need to retain the right of USF Filipino employees to voluntarily join or refrain from joining the union and paying dues as provided in the BLA. The State Department, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, concluded that amendment of the BLA was not necessary or desirable and cited U.S. law and policy as clearly not requiring check-off of union dues from a USG employee without his written authorization.<sup>1</sup>

*see (U) (S)* A later Federation proposal was to pay a bonus only to Federation members on successful conclusion and signing of a new Agreement. The CINCPACREPPHIL and in-country commands recommended such a signing bonus. PACOM Service commands concurred and agreed to an amount of 300 pesos (\$40.00) bonus to each Federation member for such a purpose. CINCPAC and HO Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Pacific, nonconcurred. Under specified Secretary of Defense guidelines, CINCPAC caused the issue to be elevated to the Secretary of Defense for decision, noting concern over paying a signing bonus only to Federation members as being contrary to the principle of employee equity and USF neutrality in union membership electives. The Services expressed the view that payment of a bonus to members only would not constitute interference or coercion and would minimize the possibility of negotiations breaking down with a resulting adverse impact on the forthcoming U.S.-ROP Military Bases Agreement negotiations. The Secretary of Defense, in October 1975, advised that a signing bonus to all employees might be worthwhile to offer, but that a bonus to Federation members only would be in conflict with the purpose and intent of the BLA. Two subsequent reclamation with divergent views restated resulted in the Secretary of

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1. AMEMB Manila 260336Z May 75; CINCPACREPPHIL 290813Z May 75; CINCPAC 072031Z Jun 75; STATE 182991/021530Z Aug 75.

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Defense, on 23 December 1975, going along with a bonus only to Federation members in the interest of bringing negotiations to an early conclusion.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 23 December 1975 the Federation spokesman declared the negotiations to have reached an impasse. The U.S.-ROP Joint Committee on Labor met informally on 24 December to try to get negotiations going again. Negotiators agreed to return to the bargaining table during the first week in January 1976.<sup>2</sup>

Revised Employment Benefits for Local National Employees

(U) PACOM Service commands, under authorities delegated by the Secretary of Defense, authorized improvements in benefits for USF LN employees in the areas of retirement, maternity leave, sick leave, and hospitalization health benefits. Improvements were based on a survey of private sector employment and fringe benefit practices in the greater Manila area conducted during April and May 1975. The CINCPACREPPHIL was authorized to implement revisions, except for health plan benefits, on or before 1 February 1976.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The retirement plan was increased to authorize one month's pay for each year of service to be paid at the basic rate of pay at the time of retirement. This superseded a plan authorizing a lesser benefit of 110 percent of one month's pay based on prior year, lower pay rates:<sup>4</sup>

(U) Maternity leave benefits were changed from an old practice of up to 16 weeks off for maternity purposes at 60 percent of basic pay to the prevailing practice of a maximum of 6 weeks leave (normally 2 before and 4 following delivery) at the full basic rate of pay.<sup>5</sup>

(U) Sick leave benefits were improved, to conform more closely to prevailing practice, to authorize a cash pay off at time of separation, except for cause, for significant amounts of unused accrued sick leave. Pay off formula was one month base pay for 2,000 or more hours of accumulated sick leave, 3 weeks pay for from 1,500 to 1,999 hours, 2 weeks pay for 1,000 to 1,499 hours, and 1 week pay for 500 to 999 hours. Previously there had been no pay off provision.

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1. ASD(M&RA) Memo of 18 Jul 72; CINCPACREPPHIL 160907Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 252344Z Oct 75, 070316Z Nov 75, and 181946Z Dec 75; SECDEF 1992/302212Z Oct 75, 6449/142326Z Nov 75, and 3418/231918Z Dec 75.
  2. CINCPACREPPHIL 310316Z Dec 75.
  3. ASD(M&RA) Memo of 18 Jul 72; CINCPACREPPHIL 030939Z Dec 75.
  4. CINCPACFLT 180047Z Dec 75 and 061914Z Jan 76.
  5. CINCPACFLT 180047Z Dec 75.

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(U) The CINCPACREPPHIL was given parameters and authority to develop and install an improved hospitalization/health plan for USF Filipino employees. The improved plan was to meet the minimum benefits of the old plan (employer paid, applicable to employees only) and provide at least limited coverage, on an employer/employee shared premium basis, for employee dependents. Implementation was authorized for the earliest practicable time a plan could be developed and arranged with an insurance firm or other carrier.<sup>1</sup>

### Thailand

#### MACTHAI Support Group Civilian Staffing

(U) On 4 February 1975 the JCS approved implementation of the FY 75 Joint Manpower Program for USMACTHAI Support Group and transfer from Army to Navy administration of 73 U.S. and 1,213 Thai National civilian billets. The Chief of Naval Operations advised that transfer of employees to Navy rolls could not be accomplished until 1 July 1975 due to strict congressional civilian personnel ceilings established for each military service. Pending the 1 July official personnel transfer actions, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to issue advance personnel action notices and use administrative means (detail of personnel) to implement the Support Group organization.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, the Defense Department approved CINCPAC's recommendation that Department of the Army civilians transferring to Support Group billets retain reemployment rights with Department of the Army. Also, individuals transferred would retain identity with, and continue coverage by, Army Career Program requirements. Further, those with Transportation Agreements would be permitted to serve under terms of existing agreements rather than be extended (a normal) twelve months on transfer to Navy.<sup>3</sup>

#### Civilian Employment Reduction Preparations

(U) In November 1975 Thailand was declared a major reduction-in-force (RIF) area for USF U.S. civilian employees. The action was taken in anticipation of selected base closures and significant staffing reductions during the remainder of FY 76. The declaration, initiated at COMUSMACTHAI request and approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASD(M&RA)), authorized eligible U.S. employees who were to be affected

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1. CINCPACFLT 240251Z Dec 75.
  2. JCS 3840/042326Z Feb 75; CNO 261256Z Feb 75; CINCPAC 070254Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC 211800Z Jan 75; SECDEF 4939/300047Z Jan 75.

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by RIF to register for priority placement in DOD job vacancies in the United States and other PACOM areas.<sup>1</sup>

(U) A special authority was granted by ASD(M&RA) for career and career conditional employees with return employment rights to a lower grade at an activity in the United States. Such employees, if they volunteered to remain at their Thailand activity until activity closure, might continue priority placement registration at their present higher grade level for a specified time period after leaving Thailand.

(U) Thailand was deleted from the DOD list of countries for which displaced employees in other PACOM country areas could register for priority placement to job vacancies.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In view of the planned drawdown, USMACTHAI Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) was relieved of non-mission oriented support. Arrangements were made for CPO services to out-of-country organizations; i.e., the Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia, and Office of the Defense Representative, India, to be transferred to the Naval Station, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.<sup>3</sup>

### Change of U.S. Civilian Tour Length

(U) A joint COMUSMACTHAI and Service request to shorten U.S. civilian tour length in Thailand was approved by the Secretary of Defense following CINCPAC and Service component commands' favorable endorsement. The tour length, formerly two years for all DOD civilians, was revised to a one-year unaccompanied tour except for selected continuing positions designated by in-country Service commanders for a two-year accompanied tour. Civilians serving on a two-year tour at the time of the policy change were to be continued under that arrangement.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The change reduced entry of dependents into Thailand at a time of anticipated large scale military and civilian reductions during FY 76.

(U) In anticipation of reductions, COMUSMACTHAI also indicated intent to authorize early return of dependents and household goods of U.S. civilian

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1. CINCPAC 201841Z Nov 75; SECDEF 6447/142325Z Nov 75; COMUSMACTHAI 050130Z Sep 75, 230747Z Sep 75.
  2. SECDEF 7652/182337Z Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC 270230Z Sep 75; CINCPACFLT 100401Z Oct 75; USMACTHAI 230511Z Oct 75.
  4. USMACTHAI 020208Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 040344Z Jul 75; SECDEF 8965/301731Z Jul 75, 5960/062122Z Jul 75.

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employees prior to sponsor's completion of tour. Concurrence was given provided the sponsor made such a request.<sup>1</sup>

#### Status of Local National Unions

(U) Recent Royal Thai Government (RTG) labor legislation permitted formation of labor unions. On 22 April 1975 COMUSMACTHAI requested authority to issue a memorandum to the American Embassy, Bangkok stating USF policy on recognition and relations with unions of USF Thai employees. The memorandum included a statement proposed for release to the RTG and to the USF work force. It also provided a rationale for the Ambassador's consideration. The PACOM Service components, working through the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee, provided guidance to COMUSMACTHAI for release of a Policy statement in a revised form.<sup>2</sup>

*per* (U) ~~(S)~~ The proposed USF policy established standards and criteria needed to form a union and gain recognition. Exclusive recognition would be granted a single union whose members comprised a majority of all direct hire USF Thai employees. Chapters could be established where employees had a common interest, such as employment by the USF at a given location, provided a majority of employees at each location agreed to join the union. Exclusive recognition granted the union authority to represent all USF Thai employees and negotiate with the USF in areas other than those of mission, policy, budget, security, organization and assignment of personnel, technology of performing work, schedules of compensation, and related matters of management discretion.<sup>3</sup>

*per* (U) ~~(S)~~ In the event exclusive recognition criteria were not met, organized groups comprising at least 20 percent of the direct hire work force of a USF activity or installation would be granted consultation rights on changes in personnel policies, practices, and working conditions within the authority of the installation commanding officer.<sup>4</sup>

#### Thai Security Guard Labor Dispute

(U) Starting 8 June 1975, almost 2,000 (of 4,000) Thai Security Guards (TSGs) left their duty stations at USF installations throughout Thailand to protest handlings of grievances against their Thai employer, the Thai Ministry of Defense (MOD). The TSGs were provided to protect U.S. property under terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed by representatives of MACTHAI.

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1. USMACTHAI 110630Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 120209Z Jul 75.
  2. USMACTHAI 220827Z Apr 75; CINCPACAF 240500Z May 75.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.

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and MOD, in which the United States reimbursed MOD for this protective service. Thai regular military and U.S. personnel provided interim protection during the strike.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Initial demands were for additional severance pay for guards dismissed in December 1974 and April 1975 and charges of MOD corruption and mishandling of TSG funds. Striking guards staged a protest encampment in Bangkok, first at an off-street open area, then blocking a major traffic artery, and finally, through the end of August, in front of Government House, the seat of RTG Executive Government.<sup>2</sup>

*of (U) let* On 1 July 1975 the strikers were separated for abandonment of positions. The Thai Prime Minister involved himself in an attempt to settle the dispute. On 30 July 1975 he asked the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), American Embassy, to meet and review striker demands. The majority of demands were rejected as unreasonable in view of Thai labor law and the MOD/MACTHAI MOU. However, due to the importance the Prime Minister attached to settling this labor/political exigency, the DCM committed the following, to which RTG officials concurred.<sup>3</sup>

- U.S. funding of severance pay up to limits set in the MOU, and not above the scale set in the law, for separated strikers even though not eligible under terms of the MOU or law.

- U.S. funds for payment of 75 percent of pay for strikers while on strike for which no previous authority existed.

- U.S. funding of a nominal payment (\$2 per month per man) from February 1975 for medical benefits previously agreed to but not activated by MOD.

*of (U) let* The Prime Minister subsequently held several meetings with TSG strike leaders, but his compromise positions were rejected and the encampment and demonstrations continued. In order to defuse the situation further, in consultation with the Prime Minister's office, MACTHAI officials agreed to advance the termination date of separated strikers from 1 July to 8 August for pay purposes. This was formalized by modification to the MOU on 23 August 1975, along with a statement that no additional U.S. DOD funds would be applied to

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 270953Z Aug 75.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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assist the RTG in settlement of current RTG labor difficulties. Another modification was that if a further TSG strike or work stoppage occurred, the RTG would terminate the TSG program within 72 hours after U.S. request and continue services by use of Thai regular military personnel.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The RTG, late in August, scheduled payment of all authorized amounts to terminated TSGs. Most accepted payment; some did not. The encampment, demonstrations, and local press interest diminished.<sup>2</sup>

*gm (U) 105* CINCPAC was concerned with the precedent set by the concessions authorizing severance pay to guards separated for cause and payments to guards for the period on strike. Both concessions were counter to USF labor policies and practices in the PACOM. These concessions were expected to impact in the direct hire area, where the United States employed around 10,000 Thais, in the wake of USF drawdown in Thailand.<sup>3</sup>

#### Conversion of Thai Facilities Maintenance

*gm (U) 105* On 12 June 1975 the JCS approved conversion of Thai Facilities Maintenance from contract to in-house operations. This resulted in increases of 34 U.S. civilian and 1,308 LN to the MACTHAI Support Group JTD.<sup>4</sup> (See also Logistics Chapter.)

#### Vietnam

##### Pay Increase

(U) Some 4,000 Vietnamese employees of DAO Saigon received pay increases averaging 37 percent on 6 January 1975. Increases were based on data obtained during a U.S. Mission survey of private sector pay practices conducted during September and October 1974 in the Saigon/Cholon metropolitan area.

(U) The increase reflected pay hikes granted by industry during the 14 months since the previous survey. The cost impact to DAO was lessened somewhat since employees were paid in the local currency (piasters) which had been devalued by 20 percent during that period.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 17695/230646Z Aug 75.
  3. J1 WEB 4-8 Aug 75.
  4. JCS 4721/121247Z Jun 75.
  5. DAO Saigon Ltr, AOSDP-P of 22 Jan 75.

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### Disposition of DAO Saigon U.S. Civilian Employees

(U) By the middle of April 1975 the U.S. Civil Service Commission had granted special authorities to move all non-essential U.S. civilian employees from Vietnam without regard to retention rights. These employees were ordered to the DOD-established processing point, Travis AFB, California. They were granted 60 days TDY at the activity nearest their homes of record in the United States prior to permanent assignment or separation.<sup>1</sup>

### Separation of DAO Saigon Vietnamese Employees

(U) The separation date for Vietnamese and Third Country National employees of all U.S. Government agencies in South Vietnam was established as 30 April 1975. The DAO Personnel Processing Center (Travis/Treasure Island) was responsible for separating these employees and the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, for paying them. Final pay included:<sup>2</sup>


- Four weeks pay in lieu of required advanced RIF notice.
- Severance pay (approximately one month for each year of service).
- Salary due through 30 April 1975.
- Lump sum annual leave remaining to employee's credit.
- Pro-rated Tet bonus.

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1. J1 WEBS 7-13 Apr, 14-20 Apr, and 28 Apr - 5 May 75.  
2. J1 WEB 12-18 May 75.

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## SECTION III--MORALE AND WELFARE

### Awards and Decorations

#### CINCPAC Awards Program

(U) During CY 75 CINCPAC processed a total of 844 awards as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Award	Forwarded for Appr/Disap	CINCPAC ACTION		
		Appr/ Recm Appr	Disap/ Recm Disap	Percentage Appr/Recm Appr
MOH	3	1	2	33
DSM	8	2	6**	25
LOM	107	68*	39	64
MSM	209	111	98	53
JSCM	409	301	108	74
PUC	3	3	0	100
Other	105	78	27	74
Totals	844	564	280	67

\*Includes one forwarded to DA for consideration.

\*\*Includes three downgraded to LOM.

#### Awards Policy Change

(U) On 21 November 1975 CINCPAC changed the awards policy to permit joint activity personnel to be recommended and awarded Service awards (ARCOM, AFCM, NCM, NAM) vice the Joint Service Commendation Medal (JSCM).. This policy was to apply only in rare instances where recognized acts were solely Service oriented.<sup>2</sup>

#### Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM)

(U) In September 1975 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the AFEM be awarded to units/personnel who participated in operations FREQUENT WIND, EAGLE PULL, and the rescue of the S.S. MAYAGUEZ. Final action on this request was still pending at year's end.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J115 Report, 31 Dec 75, Subj: Status Report, Awards and Decorations.
  2. J1 WEB 17-21 Nov 75.
  3. J1 WEB 2-5 Sep 75.

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### Meritorious Unit Commendation Recommended for MEDTC

(U) On 8 July 1975 CINCPAC forwarded a recommendation for award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Second Award) to the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) for the period 16 August 1973 to 12 April 1975. The recommendation was forwarded to the Commander, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia. Final determination was pending at year's end.<sup>1</sup>

### Leave and Liberty

#### Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) Program

(U) CINCPAC Instruction 1700.2D, Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) Program for the Pacific Command, was published on 29 May 1975. The instruction updated origination and destination sites. Iwakuni and Misawa, Japan were added as authorized origination sites. The most significant change was that Single Senior Military Representatives (SSMRs) were authorized to grant one-time exceptions for flights terminating in other than approved destinations.

(U) Although CINCPAC took no action during 1975, CINCPACFLT recommended the abolishment of the EML Program in the PACOM in November 1975. The rationale for this recommendation was that changing patterns of air logistics in the past three years had all but rendered the concept of EML invalid. Resources were not considered adequate to provide transportation for most personnel in isolated locations to areas of leave or recreation. The continued existence of the program without the ability to actually carry it out in many cases merely served as a personnel irritant.<sup>2</sup>

### Postal Affairs

#### Proposed Disestablishment of Military Post Offices in the PACOM

(U) On 15 October 1974 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics had published a memorandum that proposed disestablishment of 21 military post offices (MPOs) on Hawaii, Guam, Wake, Midway, Johnston Island, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), and the transfer of five additional MPOs to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). This reduction, as well as similar action for MPOs/MAOs (Mailing Address Only) in Alaska and Puerto Rico, was expected to reduce worldwide DOD mail

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1. J115 Ltr Ser S448, 8 Jul 75, Subj: Recommendation for Meritorious Unit Commendation (Second Award) for the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
  2. J113 HistSum May 75; CINCPACFLT 132140Z Nov 75.

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transportation costs by an excess of \$2 million annually. On 26 December 1974 CINCPAC tasked the components and other concerned PACOM commands for an evaluation and priority listing of MPOs/MAOs, as well as additional operational and cost information.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 31 January 1975, after further evaluation, CINCPAC restated his original position opposing closure of MPOs/MAOs under consideration. Additional rationale for retention included the facts that:<sup>2</sup>

- Military personnel and operating cost savings would be contractual arrangements already in effect between DOD and the USPS.

- Partial upgrade required to obtain priority rates for reasonable delivery times would actually increase costs by about \$628,044.

- Increased costs to servicemen, requiring possible offset by Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) increases, resulting from higher zone rate charges and loss of SAM/PAL privileges, were estimated at approximately \$3,244,060.

- It was doubtful whether the USPS would be able to staff the following MPOs/MAOs: 96556 (PTA, Hawaii); 96614 (Midway); 96617 (Kunia, Hawaii); and 96630 (NAVSTA Guam).

(U) Concurrently, a priority listing of MPOs/MAOs to be retained was prepared with the components' concurrence. Priority of retention was as follows:<sup>3</sup>

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
1	Midway	Navy	96614
2	Guam	Navy/Air Force	96630/96334
3	Johnston Island	Air Force	96305
4	Wake Island	Air Force	96501
5	TTPI	Air Force/Navy	96401/96555/96333
6	Hawaii	Army	96556/96341
7	All remaining Oahu MPOs/MAOs		(17 total)
	TOTAL		27 MPOs/MAOs

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 483-484.
  2. CINCPAC 310346Z Jan 75.
  3. J112 HistSum Feb 75.

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(U) The JCS acknowledged receipt of the above listing and advised that CINCPAC would be notified promptly when a decision had been reached. No decision was forthcoming at year's end.<sup>1</sup>

Military Post Office Privileges in Thailand

(C) On 20 November 1975 the American Embassy, Bangkok reported a letter received from the Chief of Staff, Thai Supreme Command, registering complaints about alleged postal abuses of U.S. military post offices in Thailand. The letter went on to present rules restricting future military post office operations to take effect 1 January 1976. These rules included:<sup>2</sup>

- Eligibility to use field post offices would be restricted to active U.S. military personnel and their dependents and DOD civilians and their dependents.

- Mailed items were not to exceed one kilogram in weight nor \$35 U.S. dollars in value.

- Sending parcel post and money orders through U.S. field post offices must be suspended in view of already existing agreements between the postal administrations of the United States and Thailand.

- The U.S. Military should establish a central field post office at Don Muang with a team of Thai Joint Customs Group Inspectors (TJCGI) assigned thereto.

(C) The American Embassy commented that, based on the unusual channel by which the letter was sent (Chief of Staff, Thai Supreme Command, directly to the American Ambassador), it appeared that this was a Royal Thai Government (RTG) low-level initiative subject to negotiation in connection with the U.S. residual presence in Thailand. The American Ambassador suggested resistance to all or most demands except possibly assignment of the TJCGI.<sup>3</sup>

Postal Service to Vietnam

(U) On 7 April 1975 the USDAO Saigon requested action to divert surface mail currently enroute to Saigon to other locations. It requested that all

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1. JCS 5011/052342Z Feb 75.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 24526/201049Z Nov 75.
  3. Ibid.

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but logistical mail be diverted and that the latter be broken down and sent via air to Saigon.<sup>1</sup>

(C) Saigon fell on 30 April 1975, and on 22 August, the U.S. Postal Service had received a cable from the Soviet Postal Administration stating that postal service between South Vietnam and the United States was not established and that South Vietnam refused to accept dispatches from the United States. This was presumed to be in retaliation for the USG veto of their UN application, but State Department noted that this stand was in violation of the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union. Action was on-going to clarify this situation at year's end.<sup>2</sup>

### Far East Scouting Programs

#### General

(U) An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs memorandum of 14 March 1974 encouraged reduction of nonappropriated fund (NAF) support to scouting programs. When queried by CINCPAC on a possible 30 percent reduction in NAF support, with eventual phase-out of all NAF support for Far East scouting programs, the Subunified Commands expressed strong support for these programs and were against reduction in NAF support. CINCPAC and the components endorsed the scouting program as an effective means for cultivating motivation, morale, and self-reliance. Maximum cooperation and command support was encouraged; however, it was agreed the exclusive support of the budget by NAF was unreasonable. As of July 1975 the FY 76 proposed budget for the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) Far East Council (FEC) was \$121,680. No budget figures for the Girl Scouts of America (GSA) Far East were forthcoming because of a complete administrative reorganization initiated in the face of rising costs. The FY 75 budget was to support the reorganization.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 4 November 1975 CINCPAC Instruction 5760.1A was published. This instruction consolidated CINCPAC policy concerning cooperation with BSA and Girl Scouts of the United States of America (GSUSA). The instruction included a provision authorizing space-required military airlift for professional scout leaders at the government tariff rate on a reimbursable basis. This instruction also encouraged the preparation of budgets with the goal of elimination of NAF support.<sup>4</sup>

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1. USDAO Saigon 070752Z Apr 75.
  2. STATE 203503/262349Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 485-487; J114 Point Paper, 8 Jul 75, Subj: Boy and Girl Scout Funding and Support for Far East Programs.
  4. CINCPACINST 5760.1A of 4 Nov 75, Subj: Scouting Activities.

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Boy Scouts

(U) On 4 July 1975 CINCPAC notified the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan), responsible for the WESTPAC scouting programs, that \$38,000 out of \$80,000 collected from the Overseas Combined Federal Campaign (OCFC) in the Far East and Europe for scouting programs had been released to National BSA Headquarters to date.<sup>1</sup>

Girl Scouts

(U) On 12 September 1975 COMUS Japan hosted a meeting on the reorganization of Girl Scout activities in the Far East. Representatives from Girl Scout National Headquarters, CINCPAC, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan attended. It was agreed that, upon disbandment of the USA Girl Scouts Far East on 31 October 1975 and departure of the professional Girl Scout leaders, USA Girl Scouts - Far East Coordinating Group would be the successor organization and would receive OCFC fund support to continue professional scout services to the Far East.<sup>2</sup>

Post-Secondary Civilian School Program

(U) On 27 June 1974 CINCPAC requested assistance from the JCS in obtaining concurrence in the concept of proportionate shares to provide FY 75 funds in support of the post-secondary civilian school program. The Service proportionate shares for FY 75 were based on travel costs for institutional faculty and staff advisors (\$128,000), salaries for three people working at the Far East Book Distribution Center, Fuchu Air Station, Japan (\$31,785), contractor costs (\$12,000), and one manpower position for a total of \$171,785 plus the one manpower position.<sup>3</sup>

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>SHARE</u>
Army	\$53,898
Navy	11,147
USMC	20,456
USAF	86,284 (+ one person)
	<u>\$171,785 (+ one person)</u>

(U) On 11 June 1975 the Department of the Air Force advised that the Departments of the Army and Navy had concurred in the proposal to establish a

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1. CINCPAC 040343Z Jul 75.
  2. J114 HistSum Oct 75; COMUSJ 090700Z Apr 75.
  3. CINCPAC J11 Ltr, Ser 1928, 27 Jun 74, Subj: Support for Post-Secondary Civilian School Program; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II., p. 487.

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cost sharing basis for the support of civilian colleges and universities in the Far East beginning with FY 77.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 12 September 1975 CINCPAC Instruction 1500.1A was published. The major provisions of this instruction were:<sup>2</sup>

- Designate CINCPACAF as headquarters of primary responsibility to coordinate designated PACOM education programs.
- Insure Service provision of a proportionate share of program expenses.

### CINCPAC Joint Retirement Ceremony

(U) On 29 August 1975 LT GEN William G. Moore, USAF, CINCPAC Chief of Staff, officiated at the Staff's first joint retirement ceremony honoring nine retirees from the Army, Navy and Air Force.<sup>3</sup>

### Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EO&T) Coordinating Committee

(U) The Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EO&T) Coordinating Committee, established by CINCPACINST 5350.2, published 8 December 1972, served its immediate purpose during a period of racial unrest and was cancelled 29 August 1975. Different Service philosophies and programs in Race Relations and Equal Opportunity precluded CINCPAC from direct involvement in Service matters unless a subordinate commander requested assistance. The JCS had advised CINCPAC on 20 December 1974 that operational command did not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.<sup>4</sup>

### Crime in Okinawa

(U) Initiatives by the USG and the Government of Japan had resulted in vastly improved relationships between the two governments, as evidenced by the Emperor's visit to the United States in October 1975. CINCPAC considered the U.S. personnel crime rate in Okinawa to be a potentially serious problem area which had to be closely monitored in order to preserve the improved relationship.

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1. Dept of the AF Ltr, DPPE, 11 Jun 75, Subj: Support for Post-Secondary Civilian School Programs.
  2. J114 HistSum Oct 75.
  3. J1 HistSum Sep 75.
  4. CINCPAC 291746Z Aug 75; JCS 8130/202052Z Dec 74.

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In October 1975 CINCPAC requested the components, USACSG, and COMUS Japan to provide an estimate of the situation on this problem to include:<sup>1</sup>

- Analysis of principal problems leading to Okinawa crime.
- Actions implemented or that would be taken to overcome the problem.
- Results and forecast of when further improvements could be expected.

(U) Overall criminal statistics had shown a downward trend during 1975, but then the military population had also decreased. The Army population had declined by approximately 30 percent during the first nine months of 1975 with a corresponding decrease in crimes.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Problem areas leading to crime in Okinawa included:<sup>3</sup>

- Lack of shore patrols/military police patrols in the civilian community which precluded effective use of curfew/off limits restrictions.
- Lack of appreciation and understanding of local ethnic and cultural differences.
- High cost of transportation to areas other than those densely populated by entertainment establishments.
- Large percentage of unaccompanied personnel, particularly Marines.
- High personnel turnover among Marines.

(U) Action programs to overcome these problems were as follows:<sup>4</sup>

- Discussions with local police chiefs of cities near bases were on-going with a view toward establishing off-base uniformed patrols.

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1. CINCPAC 170427Z Oct 75, 302119Z Oct 75.
  2. J111 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Okinawa Crime; CDRUSARJ 092245Z Nov 75; CINCPACFLT 110230Z Nov 75; COMUSJ 010100Z Oct 75.
  3. J111 Point Paper, 17 Nov 75, Subj: Okinawa Crime.
  4. Ibid.

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- Education and news media programs were presented to promote understanding of cultural/ethnic differences and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

- Priority was being given to improving and increasing on-base recreational facilities, the new USO at Camp Zukeran being an example.

- There was increased command attention at all levels.

(U) Although there were no specific forecasts, sustained interest and attention was expected to result in a continuing downward crime trend.<sup>1</sup>

### PACOM Professional Entertainment Program

(U) On 20 May 1975 the Chief, Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office and the PACOM Professional Entertainment Coordinator debriefed the Director of Personnel on their month-long tour of the PACOM entertainment circuit. The debriefing revealed that:<sup>2</sup>

- Commanders in the field considered the program worthwhile and needed.

- The PACOM circuit constituted 40 percent of the worldwide program.

- The PACOM circuit was the best organized and most responsive of all six national circuits.

- The troops in the field were responsive to the program.

### Contractor Privileges Withdrawn

(U) On 23 April 1975 COMUSMACTHAI advised that, effective 30 June 1975, all duty-free privileges to all U.S. invited contractor personnel in Thailand would be terminated. This included duty-free importation of privately owned vehicles and household goods, and commissary and exchange purchases. Also, personal parcel mail through the military postal system for contractor personnel would be terminated on 30 June 1975. According to COMUSMACTHAI the withdrawal

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1. Ibid.

2. J113 HistSum May 75.

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of contractor employee privileges was taken with great reluctance, and only after the Royal Thai Government adamantly demanded termination of this support.]

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 230105Z Apr 75.

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**SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES**

Joint Manpower Programs

Manpower Visit to Thailand

(U) The CINCPAC Manpower Management Team made a manpower assistance visit to Thailand from 2 to 19 December 1975, during which new JUSMAGTHAI and United States Support Agency, Thailand (USSAT) documents were prepared. Additionally, the team coordinated the overall effort to reduce military billets in Thailand to under 3,000 by 19 May 1976. Projected strengths, based on this effort were:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Overall Military Strength</u>	<u>JUSMAG</u>	<u>USSAT</u>
2,892	97	192

(U) The above figures were being reviewed at CINCPAC headquarters at year's end, as was the eventual residual organizational structure.<sup>2</sup>

Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) JTD

(U) On 10 October 1975 the JCS approved the JCRC FY 76 Joint Manpower Program with Change 1, for a total of 88 billets. Change 1 added the Negotiations Division, which was to perform the residual function of the disestablished U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Team.<sup>3</sup>

Bangkok/Don Muang Tour Length

(U) On 16 July 1975 COMUSMACTHAI requested that the accompanied tour in the Bangkok/Don Muang area be designated a 36-month tour and that the Bangkok/Don Muang "all others" tour remain at 18 months. This position was based on an April 1975 DOD Audit Team recommendation. CINCPAC supported the MACTHAI request and forwarded it to CINCPACAF for processing.<sup>4</sup>

The Privacy Act of 1974

(U) The Privacy Act, signed into law on 31 December 1974, became effective on 27 September 1975 (5 USC 522a, PL 93-579). One of the provisions of the Act required that an individual be informed as to the authority for gathering

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1. J1 WEB 15-21 Dec 75; J132 HistSum Dec 75.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J1 WEB 20-24 Oct 75.
  4. J1 WEB 28 Jul - 1 Aug 75.

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information on him, the principal purpose for which the information would be used, the routine uses of the information, whether submission of the information was voluntary or mandatory, and what the consequences were for not furnishing the information.

(U) DOD Directive 5400.11 directed that a separate statement meeting the notice requirements had to accompany each form subject to the provisions of the Act. CINCPAC encountered unreasonable costs, expenditure of manhours, and inconvenience in fulfilling this administrative requirement.

(U) On 29 November 1975 CINCPAC, noting that the informative requirements of the Act presented an administrative nightmare, proposed two alternative plans to alleviate this problem while complying with the letter and spirit of the Act:<sup>1</sup>

- Under the preferred plan, frequently used record systems would be consolidated by similarity of authority, purpose, use and whether voluntary or not, by paragraphs in a CINCPAC instruction. Letters and memoranda forwarding forms requesting personal data would direct the individual's attention to specific paragraphs of the instruction which would provide notice of the Privacy Act information that pertained.

- An alternative plan consolidated several Privacy Act statements with similar characteristics into one statement. Where possible, the statement was to be all-inclusive and when signed would constitute a one-time acknowledgement of an individual having been informed in accordance with the Act. A similar system was already being used for medical/dental records.

(U) The Defense Privacy Board was still considering the feasibility and acceptance of the two proposals at year's end.<sup>2</sup>

### The Freedom of Information Act

(U) On 11 February 1975 CINCPAC disseminated interim instructions, effective 19 February, applicable to HQ PACOM and all unified organizations subordinate to CINCPAC, to implement the Freedom of Information Act. In most

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1. J73 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC 290159Z Nov 75.
  2. J73/Memo/408-75 of 26 Nov 75.

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cases requests for records were to be granted or denied within 10 working days and the procedures established included those for:<sup>1</sup>

- Processing requests from the public for command records.
- Referring requests for other records to the appropriate organizations.
- Notifying the requestor of his right to appeal in case of a denial.

Travel in Southeast Asia

(U) On 18 March 1975 CINCPAC assumed control over all TDY requests for travel to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Laos, and Cambodia not specifically exempted. This action modified the then current procedure which stated that all TDY requests would be approved unless otherwise indicated by CINCPAC. This action was taken to control travel into the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia.<sup>2</sup>

Operation HOMECOMING Procedures

(C) On 13 June 1975 CINCPAC requested and on 8 July received concurrence from the JCS to modify planning and reaction requirements for HOMECOMING in view of doubtful release of additional Missing in Action (MIA) personnel without extensive diplomatic negotiations and advance information. The JCS directed that modified capabilities be retained to initiate HOMECOMING for U.S. civilians held in South Vietnam should they be returned to U.S. control.<sup>3</sup>

Filipino Recruitments in the U.S. Navy

(C) On 6 November 1975 RADM Kilcline, COMNAVFORPHIL, noted that the Navy Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) wanted to terminate enlistment of Filipino nationals and that the eventual cessation of the program seemed assured. He expressed hope that the program would be kept alive until the military base agreement negotiations were completed. On 24 December Ambassador Sullivan advised that the Government of the Philippines would not welcome termination of the program. In light of the approaching base negotiations, he strongly recommended that the Navy defer its plans to terminate the program until it was known more

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1. CINCPAC 110301Z Feb 75.
  2. J1311 HistSum Mar 75; CINCPAC 180100Z Mar 75.
  3. CINCPAC 130015Z Jun 75; JCS 3184/082039Z Jul 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 492-494.

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clearly how it might impact on broader United States interests in base negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

Combat Zone Tax Exemption (CZTE)

(U) Previously, Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provided for exclusion of combat pay for members of the U.S. Armed Forces serving in a designated combat zone during the induction/draft period which ended 30 June 1973. Then, Section 108 of Public Law 93-52 required all combat activities of the United States in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to be terminated as of 15 August 1973, thus also terminating the CZTE. Public Law 93-597, enacted 2 January 1975, indefinitely extended the CZTE from 30 June 1973 for personnel serving in a designated combat zone (Republic of Vietnam and coastal waters), but Cambodia was not designated. On 19 September 1973 the JCS strongly recommended an exception to cover personnel serving in Cambodia, but they were turned down by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The OSD decision was reaffirmed on 13 February 1975, and on 16 June 1975, the JCS advised that further attempts to obtain an exception for personnel assigned to the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) could be counterproductive.<sup>2</sup>

Overseas Combined Federal Campaign (OCFC)

(U) \* The 1974 fiscal year was the first "million dollar year" for PACOM participation in the OCFC. Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976 maintained a steady upward trend despite a decrease of potential contributors. PACOM military and DOD civilian contributions since FY 74 had been:<sup>3</sup>

FY 74	\$1,123,282.40*
FY 75	1,445,906.41
FY 76	1,500,848.01

\*Adjusted from \$1,122,479.40 as shown in CINCPAC Command History 1974.

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1. COMUSNAVPHIL 060901Z Nov 75; AMEMB Manila 17966/240149Z Dec 75.
  2. USDAO Saigon 070105Z Feb 75; DA 072146Z Feb 75; JCS 7443/161451Z Jun 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 497; J11 Ltr, Ser 440, 26 Feb 75, Subj: Overseas Combined Federal Campaign (OCFC); J114 Point Paper, 20 Jul 76, Subj: Overseas Combined Federal Campaign (OCFC).

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CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MANAGEMENT

(U) The evolution of the new intelligence management structure in the Pacific Command (PACOM) continued during 1975. The reorganization and consolidation of PACOM Intelligence activities initiated in 1973 culminated in the establishment of the Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) on 7 January 1974. IPAC became fully operational as a joint subordinate command of CINCPAC under the staff direction of the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2) on 12 August 1974.<sup>1</sup>

DIA Study Group on PACOM Intelligence Resources

(S) On 5 June 1975 the Director, DIA advised CINCPAC of the formation of a DIA study group to review the mission and resources of U.S. military intelligence activities in the PACOM in order to identify the residual intelligence resources needed to maintain U.S. combat readiness in the Pacific area. To attain the CINCPAC perspective, Admiral Gayler was requested to participate. Specifically, the DIA desired CINCPAC to identify areas where, from his perspective, intelligence activities and resources indigenous to the PACOM were not adequate to the tasks set forth in contingency plans for the PACOM area and other areas in which contingencies might arise. CINCPAC was also requested to evaluate the role national intelligence assets, in support of theater assets, might play where gaps might exist in support of contingency plans.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC replied by letter dated 6 August which included a complete list of military intelligence resources available in the PACOM for employment during contingencies. The list included aerial reconnaissance assets normally considered operational resources because each had a collection capability essential to the command.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Out of a total of 15,527 authorized billets in the theater, 4,454 (29 percent) were organic to the command. The remaining 10,803 billets (71 percent), although responsive to command intelligence requirements, were

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 34-40 and Vol. II, p. 499.
  2. DIA DD06157/0521342Z Jun 75 (BOM).
  3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S507 of 6 Aug 75, Subj: Defense Intelligence Agency Study Group, with encl: PACOM Intelligence Resources; all material which follows on this subject is from this source.

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under the command or management of such organizations as the Strategic Air Command, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), or other headquarters based in the Continental United States. The incremental arrival of additional intelligence assets in the theater was specified in existing contingency plans such as CINCPAC Operation Plans 5025 and 5027.

(S) CINCPAC's position was that PACOM organic intelligence resources were not adequate to meet major contingency plans; for example, the only available PACOM airborne SIGINT resources were 15 U.S. Navy P-3s and six U.S. Army RU-21s. Tactical reconnaissance was limited to 18 RF-4Cs assigned to the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. CINCPAC considered the total resources deployed in the PACOM to be marginally adequate to cope with the initial stages of a major contingency if all assets were immediately focused on the single area in question. However, a serious temporary degradation of intelligence capability elsewhere in the PACOM would result, and, with two or more major contingencies, theater intelligence capabilities would be totally overloaded.

(S) Contingencies aside, much of the PACOM area of responsibility lay beyond the envelope of current intelligence coverage. For example, the modest current intelligence reporting capabilities of the attaches and fleet resources --with their associated intelligence resources on board--provided the only near-real-time reporting on South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The factors of time, distance, and base rights militated against adequate intelligence support in the event of a contingency west of the Strait of Malacca. CINCPAC noted that further development of Diego Garcia and overhead capability would help to alleviate PACOM concern in these areas.

(S) CINCPAC stressed the need to retain the in-theater strategic reconnaissance aircraft, such as SR-71s, U2Rs, RC-135s, and drones to ensure immediate overflight capability, noting that overhead platforms would play a greater role in future theater contingency planning and operations.

(S) Both technology and economy pointed to the rerouting of SIGINT collection and reporting from CONUS. This trend, CINCPAC cautioned, appeared to cut the local commander out of the information flow or make him heavily dependent on vulnerable long-haul communication links with NSA/CSS. Regarding cryptologic resources, the PACOM needed the full spectrum of U2R collection platforms--mobile ground terminals for down links from drones, U2Rs and ELINT collectors, and more theater-oriented overhead collection and dissemination.

#### IPAC's Growing Pains

(D) Original planning and guidance had envisioned the collocation of all elements of the Center at a single site. On 22 January 1975 the CINCPAC J2

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and the Commander, IPAC met with Admiral Noel Gayler concerning a final facility for IPAC. Admiral Gayler expressed his desire that intelligence analysts and operational planning staffs should be located close together to facilitate daily coordination. To that end, he directed that one building at Camp Smith be acquired and rehabilitated to house IPAC under one roof. The conferees were aware that funds for the IPAC facility had already been denied by Congress as a contingency Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 request, but were hopeful that the project would be approved as part of the normal FY 76 military construction (MILCON) appropriation.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As the year passed, it was evident that IPAC would be forced to operate with existing facilities at five different locations on Oahu. In August the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) advised Admiral Gayler that the IPAC project had been deferred to the FY 77 MILCON budget for the Navy. Based on the obvious lead time from eventual approval of the IPAC project to occupancy, IPAC began a reorganization and relocation of various functions among Camp Smith, Hickam Air Force Base, Hospital Point, Kunia and the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) facilities. In December 1975 the CNO advised CINCPAC that FY 77 MILCON funds for IPAC were in jeopardy but that the Navy would try to "reinsert" the IPAC project into the FY 77 MILCON program during final realignment.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The effect on IPAC operations of the multi-site separation was summarized in a February 1975 paper:<sup>3</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

IPAC support was established on an austere basis with a support-to-analyst ratio of about 1:8. Designed for operations under a single site, support has been forced to function in several locations at a significant cost to efficiency.

The heart of IPAC is its Operations Center at CINCPAC. The Operations Center is responsible for the control of all substantive intelligence activities of IPAC and serves as a funnel through which all requirements are passed to the appropriate element and all reporting to consumers is audited.

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1. IPAC HistSum Jan 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 331.
  2. CNO 041924Z Aug 75; IPAC HistSums Sep, Oct 75; CNO 112055Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 122219Z Dec 75.
  3. IPAC Executive Rpt, "The First Six Months," 12 Aug 74 - 12 Feb 75, undated, CINCPAC microfilm file, hereafter cited as Executive Rpt.

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Although the tasking was not in the original concept, the IPAC Operations Center has absorbed the 24-hour, 7-day week I&W responsibilities for CINCPAC.

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The multi-site separation of IPAC has contributed to nagging problems which in some cases cannot be readily resolved.

The distribution of message traffic and administrative papers between operational sites has proven to be a monster which threatens organizational well-being as courier requirements continue to mount. The impact on the ability of the Center to meet consumer requirements was minimized because the Center immediately moved to a wartime footing of late hours, weekend duty, and other extraordinary measures to meet requirements. In effect, the Center has consumed much of its crisis reserve--but has been able to meet current requirements. If, however, the Center were required to deploy its ALFA teams to a forward crisis area, its base capability would be proportionally degraded.

Defense Analysis, which integrated both defense analysis functions and ELINT operations, has been particularly vulnerable to the shortcomings of multi-site operations. Fortunately, operations communication circuitry between the site at Hickam AFB and Hospital Point and the Operations Center, as well as collection facilities in the theater, has allowed the division's operations to continue with minimal degradation.

Intelligence Applications' current and estimative activities are collocated near the Operations Center in Building 80 at Camp Smith. They enjoy the benefits of integrity and the availability of IDHSC circuits.



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SSO/SAO functions also have been complicated by dispersed operations. Control of classified material is extremely difficult, but every effort has been made to ensure that publications are in the hands of those who need them.

\* \* \* \* \*

The operation of five ADP sites has been complex; however, the Center has made the best of an awkward situation. One advantage has been the opportunity to train each substantive analyst on the operation of the IDHSC system. Additionally, IPAC has been able to take advantage of the internetting of ADP sites by a quantum jump in IDHSC utilization. While many of the problems of five-site operations continue, and the original concept of advanced computer technology for the Center remains valid, there has been an opportunity to eliminate overlap and duplication between various applications. IPAC has been strengthened by being forced to make the IDHSC technique work. Nevertheless, the Center remains short on in-house programming capabilities because of five-site operations. Therefore, current IBM programming will have to remain in effect for an additional year instead of in-house programming at a single site. In the interim, IPAC programmers are learning about all of the processing procedures for the Center.

(U) Meanwhile, effective 1 July 1975, IPAC assumed the liaison function for civilian personnel administration from the CINCPAC Director for Personnel. A separate common-service agreement was executed between IPAC and the Consolidated Civilian Personnel Office (CCPO) at Pearl Harbor. After discussions among IPAC, CINCPAC, and Fleet Auxilliary Unit representatives, IPAC notified CINCPAC that, effective 1 November 1975, IPAC assumed Navy military personnel management functions formerly the responsibility of the CINCPAC Director for Personnel. Personnel management functions for Army and Air Force military personnel were to be assumed by IPAC by 1 February 1976.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The total costs for FY 75 IPAC operations were \$5.071 million. There were 18,378 man-hours of production, 70 percent scheduled. Of the unscheduled production, 35 percent was derived from CINCPAC, 23 percent from other PACOM commands, 21 percent from national users, 9 percent from other non-PACOM

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1. IPAC HistSums Jul, Oct 75.

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commands and 11 percent from internal IPAC requirements. The Indications and Warning Watch effort consumed 4,087 man-hours of unscheduled production.<sup>1</sup>

### Systems Architectural Group Activities

(U) The IPAC Systems Architectural Group (SAG) was activated on 1 October 1974 to examine IPAC as a total system, determine which functions could be improved through automation, and identify the necessary connections to external systems. The primary thrust of the SAG was toward the acquisition of an advanced technology computer capability for IPAC. In January 1975 the SAG consolidated a statement of functional requirements from IPAC, CINCPAC, and other commands. In order to assure that all Indications and Warning (I&W), current intelligence, and intelligence production analysts received the most timely and complete support possible from automated systems, the SAG developed a concept for inter-netting the various automated systems. All of these systems would be available to analysts at IPAC, the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) via cathode ray tube (CRT) displays. The concept was called PACOM Integrated Function for Intelligence and Command and Control (PACIFIC). Although the acronym PACIFIC was not widely adopted, most of the concept was embodied in planning for a PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC) later in the year.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Effective 1 October 1975, the functions of the IPAC SAG were transferred to CINCPAC J2, and SAG personnel were assigned to CINCPAC to form the basis for a PACOM SAG. The SAG chief, after his transfer, was also designated deputy program manager for the PDSC (q.v.), and the objective of the PACOM SAG continued to offset current and projected diminution of personnel resources.<sup>3</sup>

### PACOM Data Systems Center

(U) In July 1975 CINCPAC advised the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASDI) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the proposed concept for intelligence automated data processing (ADP) consolidation and requested approval to prepare a detailed plan. The concept included the PDSC as a separate command under CINCPAC, with one operating system on a 24-hour per day, seven day a week basis. If adopted, ADP from five locations using 1,000 programs in 10 program languages and three operating systems would be consolidated in the PDSC. A personnel reduction island-wide from 160 to 120 people would also be possible. Component commands would be served by

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1. IPAC HistSum Aug 75.
  2. IPAC HistSums Jan, Nov 75; Memo, CDR V.V. Harkins, Jr., to COMIPAC, 12 Nov 75, Subj: Transfer of SAG Functions to CINCPAC.
  3. J21 HistSum Oct 75; IPAC HistSum Oct 75.

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mini-computers with full access to the PDSC main frame. Savings over an eight year period were estimated at \$10 million.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 7 August DIA advised CINCPAC J2 that the PDSC concept was sound and in consonance with the original decision and guidance which had led to the establishment of IPAC. After approval of the concept by the Secretary of Defense, DIA proposed that a detailed implementation plan be a joint DIA/CINCPAC/Service effort governed by an appropriate DIA regulation.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, CINCPAC had begun to investigate site options for the PDSC. Among those considered were FICPAC, Hospital Point (Pearl Harbor) and sites at Hickam Air Force Base associated with 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) operations. In June CINCPAC had considered Hospital Point as a site, with the PDSC as a CINCPAC subordinate command. On 19 August CINCPACFLT recommended against a subordinate command because the location of PDSC hardware and operators at FICPAC would be more cost effective. In October Headquarters, PACAF offered space in the 548th RTG building and/or a wing of the headquarters building, with cost estimates the lowest of any site investigated.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In November CINCPACFLT provided cost estimates for locating the PDSC at FICPAC. The estimates were on the order of four times higher than for the Hickam site option and approximately twice that of the Hospital Point option. By December CINCPAC had tentatively chosen the Hickam site at an estimated cost of \$157,000, and CINCPACFLT had requested a personal briefing by Admiral Gayler's staff on the PDSC and the rationale for the Hickam site selection.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In November and December a representative of the Rome Air Development Center (RADC) and five RCA Corporation contractors provided assistance to the PACOM SAG in developing a specific "required operational capability (ROC)" for improving PDSC increments and in collecting data for PDSC analysis.<sup>5</sup>

#### PACOM Intelligence Watch Upgrade

(S) On 18 November 1974 the CINCPAC J2 realigned the Headquarters PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W) Center by establishing the PACOM Intelligence Watch. This action combined into a single operation those functions previously done by J2 I&W Center, IPAC, and the National Security Agency Operations Group. The Commander, IPAC was tasked to operate the Intelligence Watch under the

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1. J211 Talking Paper, 8 Aug 75, Subj: Intelligence ADP Consolidation on Oahu.
  2. DIA 6938/072016Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPACFLT 192357Z Aug 75; J21 HistSum Oct 75.
  4. J21 HistSums Nov, Dec 75; CINCPACFLT 190100Z Dec 75.
  5. J21 HistSums Nov, Dec 75.

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guidance and direction of J2. To carry out his responsibilities, the Commander, IPAC formed watch teams with highly qualified military intelligence personnel. Each team was comprised of a Duty Director for Intelligence, an Operations Officer, an Operations NCO, an Intelligence Support Specialist, and a Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Specialist provided by the National Security Agency. These teams produced real-time, all-source intelligence analysis, managed and coordinated real-time collection requirements, and operated situational displays.<sup>1</sup>

(S) During 1975 an improvement to the communications facilities available to the Watch was programmed in the amount of \$40,000. Personnel were trained in the proper use of the CRT for general service (GENSER) message spot report and free form message release from the Watch area. The consolidation of in-place and programmed capability constituted a significant upgrade in Watch message processing capability.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The innovation with perhaps the greatest potential for upgrade of Watch capability was a system called SHOWCASE manufactured by the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). The DIA had tentatively validated an IPAC need for an interim Dual DEC-10 SHOWCASE display consisting of a remote graphic terminal for geographic and other static data combined with on-going data collected from SIGINT sources. The terminal would be driven over a 50KB communications circuit by a dual DEC-10 computer located at NSA. As part of its response to the DIA I&W data call (Project 1955) to upgrade I&W capability, IPAC submitted a functional requirement for a "stand-alone" SHOWCASE system with an expanded display capability of as many as eight graphic and 42 alpha-numeric display terminals driven by a dual DEC-10 computer located at IPAC. All graphic and file data would then be resident on the IPAC computer and update of SIGINT activity data would require only a low-speed circuit from NSA.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In October CINCPAC J2, IPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, and NSA representatives conducted a SHOWCASE simulation of the capabilities inherent in an automated intelligence system. The objective was to determine whether such a system would be useful and needed by the PACOM. However, the pending establishment of the PDSC had raised some questions as to the cost effectiveness of a separate SHOWCASE capability within the PACOM Intelligence Watch area and no further action to acquire the dual DEC-10 had been taken by the end of the year.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 499-500.
  2. IPAC HistSum Jun 75.
  3. IPAC Point Paper, 5 Mar 75, Subj: Dual DEC-10 SHOWCASE Capability for IPAC; IPAC HistSum Feb 75.
  4. IPAC HistSums Sep, Nov 75; J21 HistSum Oct 75; Interview with Capt. E. Marek (J212), 12 Jul 76.

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(U) One improvement which was installed in the Watch Center involved two DACOM 412 secure facsimile terminals (one each at the Watch Center and the 548th RTG facility at Hickam). These terminals could exchange secure page copy information with a number of similar terminals installed at key Washington, D.C. and European intelligence agency offices. The terminals were provided by the Air Force Intelligence Service for one year at no cost to CINCPAC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized the use of AUTOVON for the secure facsimile service on 18 July 1975 and the required KG-36 cryptological and DACOM 412 terminal were installed in August 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In addition to these actual and tentative actions to upgrade the hardware within the PACOM Intelligence Watch working area, the CINCPAC J2 established a small study group, in March 1975, to assess the overall structure and capabilities of I&W Centers throughout the PACOM. This group was chaired by a J2 representative; other representatives were from IPAC and NSA/Central Security Service Pacific (NCPAC).<sup>2</sup>

(S) Initially, the group worked to construct a clear picture of the characteristics of each I&W Center in the PACOM. Seven commands operated recognized Department of Defense I&W Centers. As reported by the group, these were:

...CINCPACFLT at Makalapa, Oahu, Hawaii, operates the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC). This center provides continuous, all source, all threat ocean surveillance I&W capability covering the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This support is provided to Pacific Commands, other ocean surveillance elements, and national authorities. PACFLT operates extensive operational communications (OPSCOMMS) throughout the Pacific handling high frequency radio direction finding (HFDF), underwater sound surveillance, and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) information. Additionally, PACFLT operated the Tactical Exchange Automated System, called TEXAS, which is the Fleet's worldwide communications interfacing system with SIGINT sites and operating commands.

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1. J21 HistSum Jul 75.
  2. J21 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S709 of 24 Dec 75, Subj: PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W) Study - Final Report, with 1 encl: Final Report on PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W); all subsequent narrative under this heading is from this final report.

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...CINCPACAF at Hickam AFB, Hawaii is a source for near real time air related indications intelligence and is linked directly with NSA and SIGINT collection field stations in Thailand, Korea, and Okinawa. Additionally, the PACAF center is collocated with the PACAF Emergency Situation Room (ESR) which operates teletype circuits with two Command Advisory Functions (CAF) at 5AF in Yokota and 13AF at Clark as well as with Headquarters, USAF. PACAF, like PACFLT, is also tied into the DIA INDICOMM System and the CINCPAC All Source Information Center (ASIC) System.

...Both 5AF/U.S. Forces Japan (5AF/USFJ) and 13AF also operate DOD I&W Centers. These two centers are primarily air indications centers in the forward area responsible for supporting peripheral airborne reconnaissance in the Pacific. They each have ready access to Air Force operating commands, field SIGINT collection stations and forward naval elements.

...Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSK) and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) are subunified commands of CINCPAC operating DOD I&W Centers. As opposed to the component centers described thus far, these subunified commands focus more on geographic areas than functions. Each of these commands relies heavily on all source ground, air, and naval intelligence associated with their particular areas of interest. These two commands have communications with field SIGINT collection activities and naval, air, and ground commands.

...The CINCPAC I&W Center, called the PACOM Intelligence Watch, is operated on behalf of CINCPAC J2 by Commander, Intelligence Center Pacific (COMIPAC). This center monitors activities occurring throughout the Pacific and is tied in with Pacific I&W Centers through a combination of the DIA INDICOMM, Navy TEXAS, and CINCPAC ASIC communications systems.

(S) The basic ingredients for a reliable I&W system in the PACOM--well placed, professionally manned centers with reasonably satisfactory communications--were already in existence. Despite these assets, the group noted some significant shortfalls in the system:

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...Each center has developed widely varying perceptions of its I&W responsibilities. Each element is pre-occupied with what it perceives as its own, unique and immediate mission responsibilities, and gives little attention to sharing and exchanging information among the other centers.

...PACOM lacks a single center capable of receiving, assembling and fusing the wide variety of information and analytic inputs available to construct an accurate and timely situation. Additionally, PACOM commands cannot adequately nor rapidly merge intelligence data with friendly or "Blue Force" data.

...It was found that in some cases PACOM's analysts fail to recognize the seriousness or potential seriousness of activities occurring around them. On occasion analysts did not realize the potential consequences of certain situations and this affected how and to whom they reported. Additionally, oft times the PACOM I&W focus went directly to incident areas. It did not include adequate attention to related actions other nations might be undertaking.

...Psychologically and methodologically, PACOM commands are not approaching the I&W problem from the right end. The PACOM I&W effort is essentially one of reacting to events already occurring rather than anticipating events before they occur.

...Finally, no theater plans nor procedures exist for establishing, developing, and providing guidance to the I&W centers in the Pacific, and there is no focal point in the theater actively organizing and operating these elements into a theater system.

(S) Having assessed the pluses and minuses, the group addressed means to improve the way in which PACOM commands approached the business of I&W. An important first step was goal definition. An operational definition chosen by the group as helpful was to, "Provide timely expectations of courses of action another nation is likely to take, in terms of increasing or decreasing likelihood that a particular action will take place." The factors of increasing or decreasing likelihood were used so that PACOM I&W would render more realistic appraisals of target nation options, as contrasted with attempting to define a target nation's ultimate intentions. Given this working definition, the group postulated these functions for the PACOM I&W system:

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...Assess capabilities - assess what another nation can do.

...Estimate intentions - estimate what another nation wants to do.

...Determine indicators - determine what another nation is required to do should it decide to pursue a specific course of action.

...Detect indications - detect what another nation is in fact doing.

...Correlate information with "Blue Forces" Data.

...Provide forewarning/foreknowledge.

(S) The initial step to devise a PACOM I&W system to accomplish these functions was to establish proper configuration characteristics. The group noted that, while the characteristics listed below seemed to be basic, their absence was at the root of PACOM's I&W weaknesses:

...Interconnect all system elements so each element is coordinated and interdependent.

...Organize each element within the system to form a network in which all elements continuously act and interact.

...The system as a whole, regardless of prescribed focus, must be flexible enough to change and transition easily from the routine to the crisis. This requires that each element maintain not only knowledge of activity within its area of special responsibilities but also a broad overview of the situation as a whole.

...System element contributions must be fused.

...PACOM I&W system must have a controlling and coordinating authority.

(S) Accompanying these characteristics for greater interdependence and flexibility, the study group noted that Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) in the PACOM were vital to a well-rounded I&W capability because of their geographic locations and access to on-the-scene information. This was especially important

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in the areas of the PACOM where other forms of intelligence collection were sparse, such as South Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Indian Ocean littoral. The group recommended that the DIA be solicited to integrate the DAOs into the PACOM I&W structure.

(U) In describing other working relationships, the study group stipulated that CINCPAC J2 retain responsibility for overall PACOM I&W system management. The Commander, IPAC would actually operate the system as the PACOM I&W System Network Controller and the I&W focal point in the PACOM. Actions required to make the system work were concentrated in three specific areas, as reported by the study group:

...(U) OUR ATTITUDE: The concepts, ideas, and structural requirements contained in this plan require changes in attitudes toward I&W. PACOM I&W, as described in this report, transcends the simple requirement for quick reaction and quick response. PACOM I&W must anticipate. The processes required to produce the warning itself demand the cooperation of and coordination among existing analytic resources in PACOM. It is critical to the success of PACOM I&W that all elements work together to achieve goals.

...(U) TOP MANAGEMENT'S ROLE: It is essential that top management be active in the I&W process. This activity should take place in the following areas:

- Driving the I&W effort and forcing the pace of improvements in the I&W system in terms of equipment and personnel.
- Safeguarding against the pitfall of reinforcing consensus by forcing constant reviews of minority analytic opinion.
- Closing the gap between desk analyst and policy maker to insure that the policy maker understands the analytic position.
- Insuring that all pertinent information is available to the warning systems including relevant operational plans and movements.
- Interrogating the I&W system to insure that all necessary functions are being performed.

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...(S) COMPUTER ASSIST: It is recognized that tremendous efforts are being made at the national level to improve indications and warning. Much of this work involves the use of probabilities to describe intelligence uncertainties and probabilistic models worked on interactive computer terminals. PACOM should stay abreast of these new ideas and methodologies. The absolute necessity for computer driven I&W support systems is continuously underscored during crisis situations and their post mortems. Manual methods of intelligence handling continuously overwhelm our analysts. Real time I&W response simply cannot be provided without automated system support. It is important, however, to the PACOM I&W system as a whole and to each system element individually that automated support is planned in a coordinated and coherent fashion. It is especially important that the analysts are part of the automation planning process to assure that the computer support design reflects that which is most useful to the product user. As system manager, CINCPAC J2 will insure that PACOM planning and developments in this area are coordinated within theater and are consistent with national initiatives. Whenever possible, PACOM will take advantage of national level system developments.

#### PACOM IDHSC Network

(U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) network was designed to provide the intelligence community with Special Intelligence (SI) communications for on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using inter-netted IDHS computers. In November 1974 FICPAC completed a study of PACOM IDHSC switch saturation problems and recommended that the PACOM 360/30 switch (64K core) be upgraded with an additional 32K core costing about \$15,000. In January 1975 the CNO approved the acquisition of the 32K core for the PACOM switch at FICPAC.<sup>1</sup>

(U) By June 1975 work on the PACOM IDHSC-Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems (COINS) switch software was underway to establish a capability to inter-leave query/response and bulk data traffic. This effort was prompted by the replacement of the DIA IDHSC 360/30 IBM switch with a PDP 11/45. Testing for compatibility of the two systems and development of an inter-leaved bulk data transfer package was completed and an inter-leaved bulk data package was operating between the two switches by September. However, only all-source data

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 503; J21 HistSum Jan 75.

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could be inter-leaved. At the collateral security level, the two switches operated in a dedicated mode, which excluded analyst user queries.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Related to this effort was a Technical Development Plan for a Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) which incorporated the PACOM IDHSC network. For clarity, this intelligence communications structure in the PACOM was labeled the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network; it included PACOM access to COINS and the DIA On-Line System (DIAOLS). On 29 December CINCPAC supported a FICPAC package of IDHSC/WICS switch system operations and procedures designed to assist DIA in formulating a fully accredited system for inter-leaving all-source and collateral bulk data transferred between the DIA and PACOM switches. Accreditation of full bulk data inter-leaving operations was anticipated early in 1976.<sup>2</sup>

(U) When IPAC was established, the CINCPAC IDHSC terminal was moved from the third floor of Building 4 to the second floor of Building 80 to provide better support to both IPAC analysts and CINCPAC J2 users. Action to acquire multiplexors and a leased ASR-37 TTY for a second CINCPAC IDHSC began in late 1974. The second terminal became operational on 17 June 1975 in IPAC space on the first floor of Building 80.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In August 1974 PACAF submitted a telecommunications service request to DIA for validation of an IDHSC circuit which would also support host file and CRT operations. The PACAF ASR-MOD37 TTY terminal, located at the 548th RTG, and the IBM 360/50 computer became an operational host computer on the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network in May 1975. During October several new capabilities were developed to access the PACAF-hosted installations file (SPIFIN). By 20 October PACAF and IPAC CRT users at Hickam Air Force Base were able to retrieve data from COINS files at NSA. This capability was possible because of software changes which recognized the PACAF 360/50 computer as a valid host in the PACOM IDHSC network. CRT users from the PACAF computer attained IDHSC-COINS retrieval capabilities, and, in late October, Strategic Air Command (SAC) began to make on-line data retrievals directly from the PACAF IDHSC-hosted SPIFIN file. These SAC queries of a PACOM IDHSC-hosted file marked the first regular direct data retrievals from PACOM files by a user outside of the PACOM. The access mode used by SAC was via the "store and forward" route through the DIA and FICPAC network switches. Another access mode was developed when, on 7 November, DIA completed action to allow a DIAOLS interactive terminal user to access the PACAF SPIFIN file. Since most DIAOLS interactive terminals were in the Washington, D.C. area, this marked the beginning of Washington user access to PACOM-hosted IDHSC files.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J21 HistSums Jul, Aug, Oct 75.
  2. J21 HistSums Nov, Dec 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 502; J21 HistSum Jul 73.
  4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 503; J21 HistSums Oct, Dec 75.

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(U) The installation of the network's first WESTPAC terminal at U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) headquarters in Seoul, Korea was completed in May 1974. During the balance of the year, the Korea terminal was plagued with maintenance and transmission problems. On 27 January 1975 operations were resumed after repair of the ASR-MOD 37 teletype, which had not operated since 4 November 1974. By mid-year, performance of the USFK IDHSC circuit had improved, but problems persisted with garbled output. In August the garble problem was found to be a timing interface variance involving the FICPAC IBM communications control unit. This variance was eliminated by software modification of the FICPAC switch. In September the Korea circuit and terminal were down for parts repair and equipment relocation, but operational problems for the balance of 1975 were minimal.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In August 1974 plans were reactivated for establishment of an IDHSC terminal/circuit at U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) headquarters in Taipei. The first successful communications on this circuit were between USTDC and FICPAC on 16 July 1975. Upon installation of a missing frequency determining module (FDM), the USTDC IDHSC was accepted as fully operational on 22 August. By 8 September the original USTDC KSR-MOD 33 TTY (on loan from DIA) had been replaced with a Teletype Corporation ASR-MOD 37 TTY.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In November 1974 CINCPAC validated a functional requirements statement from U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)/Fifth Air Force (5AF) for an IDHSC terminal at Yokota Air Base in Japan. The following month CINCPAC validated the need for an IDHSC terminal at Thirteenth Air Force (13AF) Headquarters, Clark Air Base, Philippines. The functional requirement statement for the USFJ/5AF terminal was approved in February 1975 and that for 13AF in April. CINCPAC tasked PACAF to establish IDHSC/WICS terminals at both Air Force-supported sites, but operational status was dependent upon the acquisition and installation of an AN/GYQ-21(V) computer at Hickam Air Force Base, not expected until March 1976.<sup>3</sup>

(U) One other addition to the galaxy of IDHSC/WICS terminals had been tentatively approved by DIA in December 1975, with formal validation expected in January 1976. This was for a terminal at Fleet Air Intelligence Support Center (FAISC), Cubi Point, Philippines. When validated, CINCPAC would task PACFLT to take further action.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 502; J21 HistSums Jan, Jul, Aug, Oct 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 502; J21 HistSums Jul, Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 503; J21 HistSum Dec 75.
  4. J21 HistSum Dec 75.

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Delegated Production-DIOBS Control

(S) In 1974 DIA initiated a program to delegate production of intelligence data so as to utilize available resources to the maximum extent. In January 1975 DIA was advised by IPAC that the production of ground order of battle (GOB), both strength and disposition, of all PACOM countries except Russia could be assumed by IPAC. On 6 January DIA advised that the IPAC GOB data base on every unit in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam had been established in the Defense Intelligence Order of Battle System (DIOBS), thereby formalizing IPAC's enemy GOB as the national authority. DIA also requested that IPAC provide the friendly GOB data base on Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam for inclusion in the DIOBS. IPAC suggested to DIA that the existing production of naval order of battle (strength figures produced nationally, disposition produced by the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC) in Hawaii) be maintained. In the air order of battle, strength should be produced nationally, with IPAC assuming responsibility for aircraft disposition within the PACOM.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In February IPAC learned of the successful file maintenance run on the IPAC GOB at DIA using full record replacements and transaction cards generated by corrected IPAC software. Meanwhile, IPAC successfully converted nine GOB COBOL programs from the IBM 360-50 FICPAC computer to the IBM 360-40 computer at Hospital Point. DIA expressed keen interest in IPAC plans to convert all GOB software to COBOL.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In March the Commander, IPAC reviewed the accomplishments of a working level meeting between DIA and IPAC representatives in a message to the Director, DIA. Previously existing problems in regard to IPAC-DIA order of battle exchanges were resolved and a format was developed for the IPAC GOB to be placed on-line in the DIAOLS/COINS network by August 1975. During the meeting, IPAC provided DIA personnel with a strawman format for the standard GOB to be used in the delegated production system (DPS). The strawman made provision for all known national and PACOM requirements and included proposed input formats.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 31 March DIA informed CINCPAC, SAC, and the Continental Air Defense (CONAD) Command of an impending visit by the DIA working group charged with the preparation of the DPS program. The purpose of the visit was to discuss tentatively selected areas of delegation; e.g., ground OB, naval OB and ports, and responsibility for command geographic area of interest less Russia to the PACOM. Other tentative delegations included space OB to CONAD and SAM OB

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1. IPAC HistSum Jan 75; DIA 6762/061643Z Jan 75.
  2. IPAC HistSum Feb 75.
  3. IPAC HistSum Mar 75; SSO IPAC (CAPT Bowersox) to DIA (LT GEN Tighe), 280018Z Mar 75 (BOM).

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worldwide to SAC. These delegations would also include associated Automated Installation Intelligence Files (AIF).<sup>1</sup>

(S) The PACOM took the lead in the proposed DPS with a positive position that automated orders of battle could be produced at theater level in support of worldwide consumers without increasing personnel or sacrificing quality. IPAC dispatched consumer survey messages in March requesting comments on changing GOB distribution from hard copy computer printouts to microfiche. The objective was to economize printing, administration, security control, and handling costs and to improve the frequency and timeliness of distribution. On 8 April the first microfiche reports were distributed to users of the collateral IPAC GOB.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Another initiative was the development by IPAC of an on-line data entry system which permitted GOB analysts to input data on the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) terminals for storage in card image format. The analysts were able to input data, direct the data to be passed through a computer edit check, recall bad data for correction and finally, direct that the data be put out to cards or tape for subsequent GOB file updates.<sup>3</sup>

#### EOB/ELINT Data Processing

(S) In November 1974 the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) requested DIA to produce a consolidated Indian Ocean Electronic Order of Battle (IOEOB). The DIA concurred with the need for an IOEOB, but suggested that it be produced by the European Defense Analysis Center (EUDAC) because tactical data were available there. CINCPAC demurred, stating that IPAC should produce the IOEOB for PACFLT ships deploying to the Indian Ocean. In December 1974 DIA agreed that the parties should meet to resolve the details of responsibility. On 15 January 1975 IPAC and PACFLT representatives met to discuss the baseline IOEOB to be maintained by IPAC and EUDAC. The representatives agreed that the baseline should be updated by PACOM and EUCOM ships operating in the area, although, at that time, PACFLT ships were not tasked to provide EOB updates on non-Soviet emitters. Another potential problem was that the PACFLT electronic intelligence (ELINT) reporting procedures were not designed

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1. DIA 5228/311714Z Mar 75.
  2. IPAC/Memo/C28-75 of 8 Aug 75 to CINCPAC (J22), Subj: IPAC Input to Annual Report to President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with 1 encl: IPAC Input; IPAC HistSums Mar, Apr 75.
  3. IPAC HistSum Jul 75.

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to fulfill the EOB requirements in the format desired by the producers at IPAC and EUDAC.<sup>1</sup>

(S) During a 28 January 1975 conference at DIA, specific guidelines and responsibilities were agreed upon and formalized by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). The MOA assigned production responsibilities to EUDAC for the Middle East Force, the LANTCOM ELINT Center (LEC) for the Atlantic Fleet and IPAC for PACFLT. Under the MOA, the DIA worldwide EOB was to be the source for confirmed, probable and tenuous sites/equipments. There would be a monthly exchange of information between IPAC and EUDAC, with info to LEC, for "Z" status sites/equipments. The "Z" status information monthly exchange began on 21 May 1975.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 17 April CINCPAC J2 had validated the new IOEOB program, and on 18 April advised all concerned of a forthcoming computer printout of an inter-command validated EOB of Indian Ocean littoral countries produced by IPAC and EUDAC for their respective commands and forces.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In August some EUDAC/EOB holdings on PACOM areas were transferred to the IPAC file, including those for the Maldiv Islands. The first IOEOB was published by IPAC as of 1 October 1975, providing PACFLT units with a consolidated list of EOB sites from Malaysia to South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Many in-house improvements in the processing of ELINT/EOB data were undertaken in conjunction with the IPAC ELINT modernization plan. Early in the year work began on a major teleprocessing program (TPP) which would allow analysts to review and update the EOB in an on-line transaction mode using CRTs. The program would lend itself to development of a master transaction file containing all CRT updates to the EOB, thus providing audit capability and eliminating the previously used card-update system. By June 1975 this system had been tested and accepted.<sup>5</sup>

(S) EOB and ELINT analysis and processing was significantly improved when, on 13 March, the first bulk data transmission of a major source input arrived via IDHSC link at FICPAC. Previously, tapes of the data had been delivered by courier, with a built-in delay of three to six weeks in analysis, processing

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1. IPAC HistSum Jan 75; IPAC Point Paper, 17 Jun 75, Subj: Maintenance of Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) for the Indian Ocean Area.
  2. Ibid.; "Z" status was information still too nebulous even to be defined as tenuous.
  3. IPAC HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC 180203Z Apr 75.
  4. IPAC HistSums Aug, Oct 75.
  5. IPAC HistSums Jan, May 75.

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and assimilation. Also in March an IPAC-developed computer program began to convert data cards for the weekly multi-page EOB change message to an eight-level output paper tape. At least three man-hours of Communications Center time per week were reduced to 10 minutes of computer processing time.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In June IPAC disseminated the first Daily Defense Analysis Report which summarized military events developed through the exploitation of operational ELINT. In August the Far Eastern portion (over 700 sites and 2,900 sets) of the SAC EOB was placed on-line in the Hospital Point IBM 360-40 for EOB/ELINT analysis.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Within the PACOM, a study was undertaken to reduce the radius of accuracy (ROA) of radars with large ROAs. After query of IPAC data bases, the 548th RTG SPIFIN and NSAs SIGINT file, the ROAs of eight radars at six sites were reduced to five nautical miles. In March IPAC forwarded site orientation tables (SOTs) to Japanese ELINT collectors. Each SOT was an ADP list of all enemy radar emitters by bearing and type within 200 nautical miles of Japanese intercept sites. The purpose was to assist the Japanese in acquisition and identification and to provide a model for eventual full-file EOB operation from IPAC-supplied data.<sup>3</sup>

#### HUMINT ADP Management

(S) In September 1975 representatives from DIA visited the CINCPAC J2, IPAC, PACAF, FICPAC, and the 548th RTG to discuss ADP support to PACOM Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT) collection management. The DIA people provided background briefings regarding the uses of the Human Intelligence Management System (HIMS) files as management tools. As a result of the exchange of information, CINCPAC requested the following ADP support to PACOM HUMINT collection management effective 1 October 1975:<sup>4</sup>

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A. Monthly comprehensive collection opportunities requirements list (CORL) sorted by subject and ICR/CIR control number for all requirements assigned to this hq for info....

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1. IPAC HistSum Mar 75.
  2. IPAC HistSums Jun, Aug 75.
  3. IPAC HistSums Feb, Mar 75.
  4. J23 HistSum Sep 75; CINCPAC 0100502Z Oct 75 and 040144Z Oct 75.

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B. Monthly comprehensive report from defense source registry (DSR) file listing all sources with capability against PACOM area countries, sorted by subject, target country, collector, and project.

C. Monthly comprehensive management reports...from Intel Report Index Summary (IRISA) files on IRs containing information on PACOM area countries, responding to PACOM originated ICR/CIR, and/or originated by PACOM area based reporters.


Intelligence Exchange - Philippines

(U) On 3 November 1975 BGEN Ignacio I. Pax, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) co-signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering the exchange of intelligence between CINCPAC and AFP. The exchange was scheduled to take place at an annual conference held alternately in Hawaii and the Philippines. The MOU had previously been signed by the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence, BGEN Doyle E. Larson, USAF.<sup>1</sup>


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1. J22 HistSum Nov 75.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 508-510; for additional background, see CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 610-612.
2. DIA 1278/192127Z Nov 75.


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primarily to air defense analysis, with material from both used extensively. CINCPAC did not believe either unit should be favored in case-officer manpower spaces. Since two spaces were dedicated to counterintelligence, and one of the remaining 10 to USDAO political-military functions, CINCPAC suggested one (supervisory) O5 space, to be filled on an alternating basis by Army/Air Force; six case-officer slots (O3/O4), three each to be filled by Army/Air Force; and the remaining two spaces to be filled by noncommissioned intelligence operations specialists.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The day before CINCPAC's reply, on 2 December, the DIA agreed with the USDAO recommendation that the two Army spaces authorized for the counter-intelligence function would not impact on the split of the remaining 10 spaces. Noting the Service position that each should furnish the senior man, the DIA added that each Service had taken a strong position that operational control of the intelligence element be exercised by the Service. DIA concurred with the position on operational control provided that all activities of the element were fully coordinated with the USDAO.<sup>2</sup>


(S) In late December, in connection with residual manpower ceilings, USDAO advised CINCPAC that the intelligence liaison section of 10 spaces plus two for counterintelligence would be assigned to DAO replacing Detachment K, 500 MIG and Detachment 5, 7602 AIG. The MOU had not yet been completed, but the element was now expected to be a mix of civilians and military.<sup>3</sup>



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1. J23 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC 032111Z Dec 75.
  2. DIA 4261/021537Z Dec 75.
  3. DIA 4820/242252Z Dec 75, which quoted CINCPAC 240247Z Dec 75; USDAO/AMEMB Bangkok 1139/290723Z Dec 75.
  4. J23 HistSums May, Jul 75; CINCPAC 092013Z May 75 (RODCA); CINCPAC 040033Z Jul 75.

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
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
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1. J23 HistSum Dec 75; JCS 5999/141707Z Nov 75; DIA 2244/201857Z Nov 75 and 8531/281605Z Nov 75 (both RODCA); CINCPAC 092124Z Dec 75; for RODCA discussion, see CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 615.
  2. Ibid.

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


NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS  
SECURITY  
(IP. 792)  
STORAGE

1. J2/Memo/06-75 of 24 Feb 75, Subj: Hostile Intelligence Collection.
2. J23 HistSum Jul 75; DIA 1395/052133Z Jun 75.

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NOTE  
(p. 79)

1. J23 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 122150Z Jul 75.

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~~(S)~~ Initial feedback indicated that COMUS Japan J2 accepted the revision proposed by CINCPAC, and the Army and Navy CI units also agreed with the revised wording. At the end of the year, however, the Air Force CI unit had not yet agreed to the proposed coordination procedure.<sup>3</sup>

CI Screening of Indochina Evacuees

~~(S)~~ Illustrative of the CI problems consonant with the evacuation of Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals to safe havens under U.S. control was a State Department message dispatched on 14 April 1975. State cited previous instructions prohibiting the boarding of U.S. carriers by undocumented Vietnamese, but acknowledged that some U.S. aircraft would arrive at Asian ports of entry with unauthorized passengers. Specifically named were military bases such as Clark Air Base, Philippines, Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, and U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. State's solution was for consular officers to interview such passengers to determine whether the individual had a possible claim to documentation as an immigrant or as a refugee under the United Nations Convention or U.S. law. If not, these passengers were to be considered the responsibility of the host government. If the evacuee qualified as an immigrant, consular officers were to notify the principal in the United States and proceed with the documentation process.<sup>4</sup>

~~(S)~~ The potential for CI acquisition was recognized by the U.S. organizations at each port of entry. COMUS Japan submitted a contingency plan for

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1. J23 HistSum Nov 75; COMUSJ 030600Z Nov 75.
  2. J23 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC 290349Z Nov 75.
  3. J23 HistSum Nov 75; oral confirmation by CINCPAC J23.
  4. JCS 9890/150335Z Apr 75, which quoted STATE 140229Z Apr 75.

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CINCPAC review on 16 April, noting that among the evacuees could be communist agents and sympathizers, anti-U.S./Japan agitators, and unauthorized evacuees including deserters and draft-dodgers. Other CI screening, segregation, and processing plans were submitted by the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines and the CINCPAC Representative, Guam/TTPI. Each acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the numbers of evacuees involved and the politically sensitive nature of the CI screening process.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 26 April 1975 the State Department expressed concern over media reports from Saigon that some U.S. military deserters were among the American citizens who had been or would be evacuated. State acknowledged that deserters were entitled to evacuation, but could, "...pose special problems...." State advised the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) representatives at Guam and Clark Air Base to be alert to the possibility that unidentified deserters could be among the other American citizen evacuees. The U.S. Embassy in Saigon replied, on 28 April, that no known deserters had come to the attention of the Embassy or the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) during the evacuation. In the confusion of departure, however, the Embassy believed it to be "...virtually certain..." that some had slipped through, probably with stolen or altered passports.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Meanwhile, CINCPAC J2 had expressed concern to the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) and the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS) about a critical lack of information on Cambodian internal developments since the communist takeover on 17 April. A similar situation was expected in South Vietnam. CINCPAC listed essential elements of information (EEI) needed to satisfy theater intelligence objectives, and requested that a joint Army-Air Force intelligence collection activity be established to screen, debrief and/or interrogate Cambodian and South Vietnamese refugees and defectors. Thailand was to be the base of operation, with the 500th MIG as executive agent. The 7602d AIG would participate as an equal partner. The concept included bilateral efforts with Thai military intelligence and border control agencies, and coordination with Malaysia, Philippine, and Republic of China agencies in support of USDAOs for refugees and defectors bypassing Thailand.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 14 May CINCPAC was informed by the Commander, 500th MIG on the progress of the refugee/defector debriefing project. A debriefing effort of the scope desired by CINCPAC required the cooperation and consent of a Thai

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1. J23 HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC 240032Z Apr 75; COMUSJ 160716Z Apr 75; CINCPACREP Phil 261401Z Apr 75; CINCPACREP Guam/Marianas 280530Z Apr 75.
  2. STATE 097019/011105Z May 75 and 101384/011104Z May 75, which passed previous State and Saigon msgs to CINCPAC.
  3. J23 HistSum May 75; CINCPAC 022223Z May 75.

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Government agency. The Royal Thai Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) had expressed reluctance to mount a massive exploitation effort for fear of compromising the clandestine nature of its charter. Further, while the Special Reporting Facility (SRF) and U.S. Mission in Bangkok did not object to a U.S. screening and debriefing operation at U-Tapao, the proposal for a new bilateral exploitation effort raised, "...a host of objections...."<sup>1</sup>

(S) Although it appeared that the SRF objections had prevailed, higher level negotiations to which CINCPAC was not privy apparently resulted in approval of the project, but with a sharply reduced "low profile" role by U.S. military personnel. No U.S. military or civilian personnel were to be stationed at the forward interrogation sites, which would be manned by Thai personnel. On 30 September 1975 the Commanders of Detachment 5, 7602d AIG and Detachment K, 500th MIG signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting forth the terms of reference for the joint service/bilateral refugee exploitation project.<sup>2</sup>

#### Freedom of Information Actions

(U) CINCPAC responses to requests for material under the Freedom of Information Act were coordinated by the Human Intelligence Branch of the J2 Collection Management Division. During 1975, only two requests of note were processed--one generated by a Hawaiian source, the other received from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the first case, a resident of Hawaii requested Admiral Gayler to furnish all files concerning him and held by U.S. military organizations in Hawaii. In early 1972 this individual had been arrested, among others, after allegedly pouring human blood on files at Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) headquarters on Hickam Air Force Base. Later that year, on 5 October, he appeared near Admiral Gayler's office at PACOM headquarters in Camp Smith with "indictments" in the "Court of Humanity" against Admiral Gayler and another unidentified officer. He presented the papers, which purported to be a citizen's arrest, to a CINCPAC aide, after which he was led from the base with no struggle. He was presented with a persona-non-grata letter at that time.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CDR 500 MIG 140158Z May 75.
  2. J23 HistSums Jul, Sep 75; Memo, Spec Asst to Ambassador, 22 Sep 75, Subj: Coordination on Proposal for Establishment of AFIOC Cambodia Refugee Debriefing Centers; 7602 AIG 032020Z Sep 75; Ltr, HQ 500 MIG to CINCPAC, 2 Sep 75, Subj: Refugee/Defector Debriefing; MOU, 500 MIG and 7602 AIG, 30 Sep 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 52-53; J23 HistSum Nov 75; Ltr, Peace Education Project (James V. Albertini, Director) to Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC, 8 Aug 75, n.s.

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(U) CINCPAC advised the petitioner that his request had been referred to each of the Service component commanders, and provided copies held by CINCPAC of a memorandum for record of 5 October relating to the incident described and a response to query from United Press International. Responses from the Services included only a PACAF holding relating to the incident earlier in 1972, including a letter of debarment from Hickam Air Force Base dated 2 March 1972. The petitioner was instructed by CINCPAC to address any further questions to the commanders of the components.<sup>1</sup>


(U) In the second case, the CNO referred to CINCPAC for reply a request from a California resident to purchase, under the FIA, "The Mekong River, An Obstacle to Crosscountry Movement" from the PACOM Intelligence Digest of 17 January 1969. He also requested "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia," published by CINCPAC from July 1967 to July 1968. On 7 November 1975 CINCPAC advised the petitioner that access to the Intelligence Digest article was denied on the grounds that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. The requester was advised of his right to appeal through the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department. On 12 November the requester was advised that the Measurements of Progress were releasable upon payment of \$61.30 for search and reproduction costs.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In December CINCPAC was advised that the denial of the Intelligence Digest article had been appealed to the Navy Judge Advocate General, to whom the CINCPAC rationale for denial was sent. CINCPAC advised that the article in question had been condensed from various classified documents initially published by the DIA, SEATO, CIA, and other joint sources. In view of the numerous national agency and foreign intelligence documents used to write the Digest article, CINCPAC had requested and received DIA concurrence to deny the request.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J23 HistSum Nov 75; CINCPAC (J2) Ltr to James V. Albertini, 14 Aug 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2030 of 14 Aug 75, Subj: Request for Personal Files Under the Freedom of Information Act (FIA); CINCPACFLT 190034Z Aug 75; CDR USACSG 190122Z Aug 75; CG FMFPAC 200139Z Aug 75; CINCPACAF 212110Z Aug 75; CINCPAC (J2) Ltr to James V. Albertini, 23 Aug 75.
  2. J23 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2754 of 7 Nov 75 to T. Jeffery Hughes; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2786 of 12 Nov 75 to T. Jeffery Hughes.
  3. J23 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S688 of 12 Dec 75, Subj: Freedom of Information Act Appeal (Mr. T. Jeffery Hughes). This letter CONFIDENTIAL without Digest pages.

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● BUFFALO HUNTER: An additional CH-3 helicopter is en route from Osan AB Korea to Nakhon Phanom Aprt Thailand to support increased drone mid-air retrievals (for a total of 3 helicopters), and additional DC-130, aircrew, planning team


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1. J31 Point Paper, 10 Feb 75, Subj: U.S. Photo Reconnaissance Capability in Southeast Asia.
  2. J23 HistSums Mar-Apr 75.
  3. J23 HistSum Apr 75, with 16 CINCPAC msgs; CINCSAC 261915Z Apr 75.

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
positioned at U-Tapao, with an additional DC-130, 10 additional drones and associated support equipment and personnel being provided the week of 28 April.



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1. J23 HistSum May 75, with 12 attached msgs, the first of which was JCS 8223/121944Z May 75.


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1. DIA (DC-SC) 05216/122108Z May 75 (BOM).
  2. CINCPAC 130239Z May 75.
  3. USSAG/7AF 131253Z May 75, which cited several undated phonecons and USSAG/INCR 130755Z May 75.
  4. J23 HistSum May 75; CINCPAC 130241Z May 75, 142145Z May 75, 152333Z May 75, 161511Z May 75, 162226Z May 75, 200037Z May 75, and 210113Z May 75.

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(S) (C) (G)

1. J23 HistSum Oct 75; Det 5, 7602 AIG 290315Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 010112Z Oct 75; DIA 012016Z Oct 75 (BOM); CINCPAC 020450Z Oct 75 (BOM); DIA 032234Z Oct 75 (BOM).
2. J23 HistSum Jul 75; CINCPAC 150241Z Jul 75 (BOM); JCS 1322/312353Z Jul 75.
3. J23 HistSums Nov-Dec 75, as updated in Jul 76; CINCPAC 050201Z Nov 75; JCS 5233/132238Z Nov 75; SACRECONCEN 142306Z Nov 75; DIA DC-5C 5400/031704Z Dec 75; CINCPAC 090110Z Dec 75.

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
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CINCPAC (1975)

1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 625-626.
2. J23 HistSum Apr 75; DIA DC 03828/092315Z Apr 75 (BOM); SAC 141715Z Apr 75 (BOM).
3. J23 HistSum May 75; DIA DC 04767/302107Z Apr 75 (BOM); SAC 021615Z May 75 (BOM); CINCPAC 082330Z May 75.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 624-625.

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


1. J23 HistSums Oct-Dec 75 as updated in Jul 76; CSAF 032020Z Oct 75; CINCPACAF 082300Z Oct 75; DIA DD 11262/111545Z Oct 75 (BOM); JCS 1540/161345Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 230333Z Oct 75; CINCPACAF 300245Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 050556Z Nov 75 (BOM).
2. J23 HistSums Aug-Oct 75 as updated in Jul 76; CINCPAC 061957Z Aug 75 and 142331Z Aug 75; JCS 9034/182013Z Aug 75; CINCPAC 032343Z Sep 75; CJCS 171905Z Oct 75.

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(b)(1)




1. J23 HistSum Dec 75; CINCPAC 071024Z Dec 75 (BOM), which cited COMUSK 070339Z Dec 75 (BOM); 548 RTG 160950Z Dec 75; COMUSK KRA 4343/230913Z Dec 75 (BOM); CINCPAC 312137Z Dec 75 (BOM).
2. JCS 4225/082159Z Apr 75 (EX); USCINCEUR 7111/091555Z Apr 75.

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(b)(1) 15 (c)

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1. J23 HistSum Apr 75; CINCPAC 120237Z Apr 75; DIA DC 04741/301504Z Apr 75 (BOM).
  2. J23 HistSum Jun 75; JCS 6752/201607Z Jun 75; DIA 3298/210512Z Jun 75; CINCPAC 220211Z Jun 75 and 250604Z Jun 75.

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
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(b) (1) (5) (c)

1. DIA 7013/261336Z Jun 75.
2. J23 HistSum Jul 75; JCS 2969/021533Z Jul 75, which cited JCS 9171/281741Z Jun 75 (EX); JCS 2971/081757Z Jul 75; DIA 9437/172103Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 281806Z Jul 75.
3. J23 HistSums Sep-Dec 75 as updated in Jul 76; DIA 121329Z Sep 75, 291418Z Sep 75; CINCPAC 212127Z Nov 75, which cited CINCPAC 130600Z Sep 75; JCS 5897/152203Z Dec 75.

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Indian Ocean Conventional Target List (C)

(S) In late 1974 IPAC had begun the collection of necessary data for an Indian Ocean Conventional Target List (IOCTL) covering the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean. This was prompted by the regular deployment of Seventh Fleet units, under the operational control of CINCPACFLT, to the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean on both sides of the Unified Command Plan boundary for PACOM responsibility of 62.5 degrees east longitude. The IOCTL contained targets suitable to sustain United States access to and transit of the Indian Ocean, and to support offensive operations under CINCPAC Operations Plan (OPLAN) 5125.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 517.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 521-522.
  3. TLRG Minutes, 23 May 75; JCS 071905Z May 75; J22 HistSum Aug 75; JCS 242324Z Jul 75; TLRG Minutes, 26 Aug 75; Memo/CINCPAC J22/TS53-75 of 1 Aug 75.

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Option "C" of this OPLAN specified support of CINCEUR OPLAN 4224 -- "Defense of Israel," and Option "D" supported CINCEUR OPLAN 4274 -- "Defense of Iran."<sup>1</sup>

(S) In developing the IOCTL, the littoral countries were grouped by IPAC into five priorities: those of primary concern -- under the influence of Russia; those of secondary concern -- countries which could follow policies inimical to U.S. interests either by siding with Russia or by adopting an oil strangulation strategy; those of evacuation concern -- countries whose instability could require evacuation of U.S. or allied personnel; friendly countries; and lastly, those of no immediate interest or concern. IPAC selected, and CINCPAC J2 approved, interim target selection criteria which included installations which could provide Russia an offensive capability; those which could provide Russia logistic support or battle damage repair facilities; those with a potential defensive threat to strike forces; and, those lucrative industrial, power, or POL concentrations, damage to which could cause severe economic setbacks in the targeted country.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In April 1975 IPAC published and made initial distribution of the first IOCTL in accordance with CINCPAC J2 guidance. Seven countries of primary concern and four of secondary concern were included in the initial IOCTL.<sup>3</sup>

(S) During the TLRG meeting in May, the chairman advised that USCINCEUR had offered tactical target materials (TTM) support for the IOCTL country installations in the EUCOM area of TTM production and maintenance responsibility. The TTM requirements for the PACOM were determined and a reply requesting specific support was dispatched. Since the IOCTL countries of Somalia and Mauritius had not been assigned to a TTM producer, DIA was queried by CINCPAC as to the availability of TTM on IOCTL installations within those countries. Also discussed during the May meeting was the one IOCTL country within the PACOM area of responsibility -- Bangladesh. IPAC provided a list of 13 IOCTL active installations in Bangladesh not covered by existing TTMs and production of TTMs on the list was assigned.<sup>4</sup>

(S) The following month the TLRG reviewed the status of the 13 installations, noting that three were PACAF categories and 10 were PACFLT categories. For Somalia, it was determined that, of 20 active installations, three of twelve PACAF categories were available and five of the eight PACFLT categories were

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 520-521.
  2. IPAC HistSum Feb 75; IPAC Point Paper, n.d., Subj: Target Selection in the Indian Ocean Littoral States (C), with 1 encl: Indian Ocean Country List.
  3. J21 HistSum Apr 75; IPAC HistSum Jun 75; TLRG Minutes, 15 Apr 75; CINCPAC 180204Z Apr 75; Memo/J2/0004-75 of 20 Feb 75; Memo/J21/00192-75 of 4 Apr 75.
  4. TLRG Minutes, 23 May 75, and Encl 6, List of Bangladesh Installations.


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available. Automated Tactical Target Graphics (ATTG) were required for nine PACAF and three PACFLT categories.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In August both PACAF and PACFLT notified CINCPAC that the hard copy TTMs [REDACTED] were not of the quality specified in DIA Manual 57-23. Each recommended that CINCPAC request EUCOM to replace the TTMs with ATTGs utilizing the proper format. CINCPAC, on 1 October, requested EUCOM to replace the faulty TTMs; EUCOM responded by referring CINCPAC to the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) for duplicate aperture cards on the TTM furnished by EUCOM. CINCPAC was also informed that ATTG production by EUCOM was underway, and that continuous tone and line prints of the graphic and data page sections for each ATTG, suitable for miniaturization, would be provided to FICPAC.<sup>2</sup> (1)(c)

(C) In November IPAC published and distributed the second revision of the IOCTL. This revision contained 236 targets, with 21 additions and 3 changes of status.<sup>3</sup>



1. TLRG Minutes, 17 Jun 75.
2. TLRG Minutes, 26 Aug, 3 Oct, 12 Nov 75, Ltr, CINCPACFLT Ser 20P/C, 11 Aug 75, Subj: European Command, Indian Ocean Contingency Target List, Tactical Target Materials, review of (C); Ltr, CINCPACAF, 10 Aug 75, Subj: Target Materials Support for IOCTL; CINCPAC 010051Z Oct 75; USCINCEUR 17882/101737Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 170305Z Oct 75.
3. IPAC HistSum Nov 75; TLRG Minutes, 12 Nov 75.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 524-525.

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(S) The [redacted] was reviewed quarterly thereafter, and, during the May 1975 TLRG meeting, two deletions of targets were approved. The updated list was distributed to PACOM and national-level consumers in June and appropriate changes to the AIF were made to reflect the up-date.<sup>1</sup>

NKTTL

(S) In July 1973 CINCPAC formally discontinued a target list called the Korean Tactical Target List because the data were available in such publications as the AIF and ATTG file. In February 1974 the CINCPAC J2 directed that a North Korea Tactical Target List (NKTTL) be developed based primarily on experience gained during the LINEBACKER campaigns against North Vietnam. The NKTTL was to support the offensive air operations appendix to the operations annex of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027. Initial distribution of the NKTTL was made in March 1974, and the list was updated during the year.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In January 1975 the TLRG concurred in the addition of six targets and the deletion of two, and in April, IPAC began a comprehensive review of the 256 targets then on the list. In May the TLRG approved eight additions and three deletions and directed publication of the revised list. This was done in June, and, as with the SKCATL, inputs were made to the AIF and ATTG file.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In May 1975 PACAF requested IPAC to provide a special computer-developed overlay/listing of the NKTTL. The overlay was to be sent to PACAF operational units for use in mission planning and crew familiarization. The computer production of the list and plot was completed on 16 May, just one week before the revision discussed above was approved by the TLRG.<sup>4</sup>

(S) During the 17 June TLRG meeting, the senior PACAF member provided the Group a description of the mission folders, combat planning folders, and contingency target materials PACAF was required to maintain for various priority targets listed in different NKTTL appendices. PACAF requested some advance indication of future IPAC changes and periodic "purging" of the list to keep its size manageable. The chairman suggested, and the members concurred, that it would be beneficial for PACAF to present its informal briefing to IPAC target analysts. The analysts could see how the list was utilized to support operational units and be fully cognizant of production requirements resulting from proposed target changes. The IPAC and PACAF members reported in July that

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1. TLRG Minutes, 13 Feb and 23 May 75, with encl: IPAC 04 SKCATL Recommendations of 23 May 75; IPAC HistSum Jun 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 523-524.
  3. TLRG Minutes, 14 Jan, 23 May 75; IPAC HistSums Apr-Jun 75.
  4. IPAC HistSum May 75.

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mutually acceptable target change notification procedures had been derived during the informal session.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In August IPAC proposed the addition of Ground Control Intercept (GCI) sites in North Korea to the NKTTL, noting the dependency of the North Korean Air Force on GCI guidance in close air support and interdiction. Twelve GCI sites were listed in order of priority, with seven as primary and five as secondary. In October PACAF concurred in the addition of the GCI sites, and further recommended the addition of jet-capable airfields and selected surface-to-air (SAM) missile support facilities. The TLRG approved the NKTTL change to include GCI sites at the October meeting, and, after review by the members, the addition of airfields and SAM support facilities was approved in November. All three categories were subsequently approved by CINCPAC J2.<sup>2</sup>

CINCPAC CONPLAN 5020

(S) In December 1974 CINCPAC J2 and the TLRG initiated a review of CINCPAC Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5020, which provided several levels of offensive operations against North Korea. In January 1975 IPAC and PACAF submitted recommended changes in 5020 targeting to the TLRG, and the following month, additional changes and recommendations were offered. CINCPAC passed the proposed changes to COMUS Korea for comment, and, on 14 April, CINCPAC J2 recommended that the proposed changes be forwarded to the JCS for approval. No feed-back regarding further action was received by J2 during the year.<sup>3</sup>

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1. TLRG Minutes, 17 Jan and 26 Aug 75; Ltr, CINCPACAF, 16 Jun 76, Subj: Review of Conventional Target Recommendations.
  2. TLRG Minutes, 26 Aug, 3 Oct, and 12 Nov 75; Memo/IPAC/S311-75 of 22 Aug 75, Subj: North Korean GCI Targeting Concept (C); Ltr, CINCPACAF, 3 Oct 75, Subj: Business Items for TLRG Meeting 8-75.
  3. TLRG Minutes, 14 Jan, 13 Feb, and 15 Apr 75; J23 HistSum Apr 75; Memo/IPAC/S17-75 of 10 Jan 75, Subj: CINCPAC CONPLAN 5020 Targeting Support; Ltr, CINCPACAF, 10 Jan 75, Subj: PACOM Target List Review Group Meeting 10-74, 12 Dec 74; Memo/IPAC/S86-75 of 11 Feb 75, Subj: Review of CONPLAN 5020 Targets; Memo/IPAC/S87-75 of 11 Feb 75, Subj: Review of CONPLAN 5020 Targets; Memo/J2/0044-75 of 14 Apr 75, Subj: CINCPAC CONPLAN 5020 Recommended Target Changes.

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CINCPAC OPLAN 5025/TDCATL

(S) During the January 1975 TLRG meeting, the question was raised as to whether any efforts had ever been devoted to the development of a conventional

[REDACTED] The chairman reported that CINCPAC had recommended deletion of the nuclear option for that plan. Consequently, the members were asked to comment on the desirability and feasibility of generating a conventional targeting program for OPLAN 5025 [REDACTED]

(S) As background for the next meeting, PACAF and IPAC submitted comments pertaining to a conventional target list for OPLAN 5025. PACAF had made no previous effort to develop an NKTTL-type list for OPLAN 5025. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If development of a conventional target list was directed, PACAF recommended that it be limited to those naval and commercial

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 525.
  2. TLRG Minutes, 14 Jan and 13 Feb 75; IPAC HistSum Dec 75.
  3. TLRG Minutes, 14 Jan 75.

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ports expected to serve as points of embarkation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In summary, PACAF expressed major reservations regarding the need for a tactical target list similar to the NKTTL in support of OPLAN 5025.<sup>1</sup>

(S) IPAC also replied that there had been no previous effort to prepare a conventional target list for OPLAN 5025. The [REDACTED] CINCPAC Consolidated Target List (CCTL) was considered, with modifications to be feasible as a conventional target list. IPAC also noted that while Annex A of OPLAN 5025 acknowledged that the CCTL was adaptable to conventional targeting, commanders were authorized, "...to plan on the destruction of additional targets...." On that premise, IPAC recommended that an expanded target list be developed which included the CCTL targets appropriate for conventional weapon-  
eering plus additional targets as required. [REDACTED]

(S) During the February TLRG meeting for which the PACAF and IPAC comments were prepared, the chairman reported that the [REDACTED] had asked CINCPAC to develop and maintain an automated conventional target list to support OPLAN 5025. The list was needed to replace [REDACTED] Target Intelligence File (ATIF) which [REDACTED] was unable to maintain because of personnel reductions. The chairman also reported that CINCPAC had requested that the requirement for a [REDACTED] be deleted from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 4 April CINCPAC J2 instructed IPAC to continue preliminary research into a conventional target list for OPLAN 5025, taking into account the concept of operations and tasks assigned for the different levels of hostilities addressed in the OPLAN. Specifically, IPAC was to target those installations whose destruction would halt [REDACTED] aggression swiftly and decisively to avoid the broadening of hostilities into a general war. Research was to be limited,

1. Ltr, CINCPACAF, 10 Feb 75, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 Targeting Requirements.
2. Memo/IPAC/S92-75 of 13 Feb 75, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 Targeting Requirements, with 1 encl: Point Paper - CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 Targeting Requirements Review; COMUSTDC was the CINCPAC planning agent for the ROCHESTER Plan, the full title which was Ministry of National Defense - U.S. Taiwan Defense Command OPLAN ROCHESTER-74 - Mutual Defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.
3. TLRG Minutes, 13 Feb 75.

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excluding targets or target complexes calling for an enlarged air offensive or resources beyond PACOM capabilities and the fullest use was to be made of the CCTL and ROCHESTER target lists. The IPAC conclusions and recommendations were to be presented to an ad hoc TLRG working group which would include a PNP representative.<sup>1</sup>

(S) As a result of the ad hoc working group discussions, CINCPAC J2 concurred in the need for a conventional target list, supporting weaponing and production of TTM. [REDACTED]

(S) A study was completed by IPAC which included a concept paper, a SAC weaponing/penetration analysis of selected [REDACTED] weapon production installations, and an IPAC penetration analysis. A target list was circulated for review, and after revision, initial distribution was made. [REDACTED]

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1. TLRG Minutes, 18 Apr 75; Memo/J21/000190-75 of 4 Apr 75, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 Conventional Targeting Program.
  2. TLRG Minutes, 23 May 75.
  3. TLRG Minutes, 26 Aug 75; IPAC HistSum Jul 75; the mysterious alchemy which produced the new name for the target list was not explained.
  4. TLRG Minutes, 3 Oct 75 and 12 Nov 75; COMUSTDC 230705Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 260151Z Nov 75.

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
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(S) In the last action of 1975 related to the TDCATL, CINCPAC J2 and the TLRG approved the IPAC recommendation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IPAC recommendation was based on anticipated heavy reliance by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] installations would seriously deg

[REDACTED] Destruction of the designated EW/GCI capability to defend the airspace [REDACTED]




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1. TLRG Minutes, 9 Dec 75; Memo/IPAC/S63-75 of 17 Nov 75, Subj: Addition of PRC EW/GCI Sites to Taiwan Defense Conventional Air Target List (TDCATL)(C).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 526-531.
3. TLRG Minutes, 14 Jan 75 and 13 Feb 75; IPAC HistSums Feb, May, Jun, Dec 75.

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1. TLRG Minutes, 23 May 75; Ltr, CINCPACAF, 6 May 75, Subj: Discussion Item for Next TLRG Meeting.
  2. TLRG Minutes, 17 Jun 75 and 26 Aug 75.


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1. TLRG Minutes, 3 Oct 75; Ltr, CINCPACAF, 3 Oct 75, Subj: Business Items for TLRG Meeting 8-75.
2. TLRG Minutes, 23 May, 3 Oct and 9 Dec 75; Ltr, DIA, 11 Jul 75, Subj: Urban Population Distribution Analysis Program, which cited Ltr, CINCPAC Ser S-338 of 20 May 75, same subject; IPAC HistSum Dec 75.
3. IPAC HistSums Apr, May, Jun, Jul 75.

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1. IPAC HistSums May, Sep, Nov 75.

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## CHAPTER X

### POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

#### SECTION I--OVERVIEW

##### Selected Chronology 1975

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, and the various issues of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin:

- 31 Dec - The Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific was disestablished.
- 1 Jan - Communist-led Cambodian forces began a country-wide dry-season offensive.
- 2 Jan - In an interview published this date, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said he would not rule out the use of force against oil-producing nations "where there is some actual strangulation of the industrial world."
- 12 Jan - In an interview published this date in Time magazine, President Gerald Ford supported Kissinger's stand on the possible use of force in the Middle East.
- 26 Jan - Elections were held in Thailand for 269 seats in the House of Representatives, after which a premier would be elected by the House.
- 28 Jan - President Ford asked Congress for Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 supplemental funds amounting to \$300 million for South Vietnam and \$222 million for Cambodia.
- 3 Feb - Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger proposed a \$92.8 billion defense budget to Congress.
- 5 Feb - A congressional amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act appropriations bill stopping military aid to Turkey became effective.

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- 12 Feb - In a South Korea national referendum, the martial law policies of President Park Chung Hee won the support of 80 percent of the votes cast.
- 13 Feb - The recently elected Thailand National Assembly selected Seni Pramoj as Premier of the Royal Thai Government (RTG).
- 14 Feb - The New York Times reported a decision by the Sultanate of Oman to deploy ground-to-air missiles along the Strait of Hormuz.
- 24 Feb - The ten-year-old U.S. arms embargo against Pakistan was lifted; however, Pakistani purchases were limited to a cash basis.
- 27 Feb - In the Republic of Philippines, the martial law regime of President Ferdinand Marcos won overwhelming approval in a national referendum.
- 6 Mar - The coalition cabinet of Premier Seni Pramoj lost a vote of confidence in Thailand.
- 13 Mar - The Thai National Assembly elected Khukrit Pramoj, Seni's brother, as Premier.
- 17 Mar - In Geneva, delegates from 140 nations began an eight week session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS).
- 19 Mar - The South Korean National Assembly passed a bill amending the criminal code by forbidding Koreans to criticize the government to foreigners.
- 25 Mar - Saudi Arabian King Faisal was assassinated by his nephew. The Crown Prince, Kahlid, was proclaimed King.
- 29 Mar - President Ford announced that U.S. naval and contract ships had been directed to aid in evacuating refugees from coastal ports in South Vietnam.

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- 1 Apr - Cambodian President Lon Nol left the country after naming Sautham Khoy "interim president."
- 4 Apr - A U.S. Air Force C-5 transport aircraft crashed near Saigon with 243 Vietnamese orphans aboard.
- 6 Apr - Republic of China (Taiwan) President Chiang Kai-Shek died at 87. The vice president, C. K. Yen, was sworn in as president. The son of the deceased president, Chiang Ching-Kuo continued as premier and assumed the presidency of the Kuomintang.
- 8 Apr - Four Russian naval task forces (nearly 200 ships) were reported to be conducting a worldwide exercise covering all the world's oceans.
  - In South Korea, President Park Chung Hee proclaimed a state of emergency. Armed troops seized the University of Korea campus and closed all classes.
- 9 Apr - Eight men convicted by a military tribunal of being communist spies were hanged publicly outside of the Seoul, South Korea penitentiary.
- 10 Apr - Ex-President Lon Nol of Cambodia arrived in Honolulu, ostensibly for medical treatment.
- 12 Apr - The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia was evacuated by U.S. military operation EAGLE PULL. Acting President Khoy fled with the Ambassador.
- 17 Apr - The Khmer Rouge occupied Phnom Penh and accepted the surrender of the Cambodian Government.
- 18 Apr - The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recognized the new government in Cambodia by joint communique. The five ASEAN nations were Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines.
- 19 Apr - The Government of India announced the landing of its first space satellite from the Soviet Union, thus becoming the 11th nation to orbit a satellite.

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- 21 Apr - In South Vietnam, President Nguyen Van Thieu resigned. He was succeeded by Vice President Tran Van Huong.
- 25 Apr - The 24th Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty Council of Ministers meeting was held in Washington, D.C.
- 26 Apr - Former President Lon Nol of Cambodia moved into a \$100,000 home in the Hawaii Kai area of Honolulu. The United States withdrew its Secret Service protection.
- 29 Apr - The South Vietnam National Assembly approved the former Vietnamese General Duong Van Minh as president.
  - The final evacuation of U.S. military and civilian personnel from Saigon was carried out by U.S. military forces in Operation FREQUENT WIND.
  - In Athens, United States and Greek officials agreed to close the U.S. air base at Athens airport and to end the home-porting of the U.S. Sixth Fleet at Eleusis.
- 30 Apr - South Vietnam President Duong Van Minh announced the unconditional surrender of Saigon to the Viet Cong.
  - The evacuation of U.S. personnel was completed. More than 50,000 Vietnamese were evacuated by air from Saigon in the previous two weeks.
  - Communist troops of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam took over the government. All telephone and telegraph communication with Saigon ended.
  - A letter dated January 5, 1973, purportedly from former President Nixon to former President Thieu, was made public by a former Saigon cabinet member. In the letter, Nixon had promised to "take swift and severe retaliatory action" if North Vietnam violated the Paris peace accord.

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- 1 May - Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Phillip arrived in Honolulu for a two-day rest enroute to Japan.
- 6 May - The U.S. Civil Service Commission announced a reduction in the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) for Federal civilian employees in Hawaii from 15 percent to 12 1/2 percent.
- 9 May - The United Nations LOS Conference adjourned its second session in Geneva. A third session was tentatively scheduled for New York City in the spring of 1976. Little substantive progress was reported on key issues.
- 10 May - In South Korea, about 1.5 million people rallied in Seoul to show support for President Park's request for increased military preparedness against a possible North Korean attack.
- 12 May - At approximately 2115 hours (Eastern Daylight Time), the SS MAYAGUEZ, an unarmed commercial vessel, was fired upon and forcibly boarded by Cambodian gunboats. The vessel was some 52 nautical miles from the Cambodian coast, about seven miles from the Poulo Wai Islands. It was forced to anchor near Koh Tang Island, about 15 nautical miles off the Cambodian coast, and its 39-man crew was taken captive.
- 14 May - At approximately 2100 hours (Eastern Daylight Time), the MAYAGUEZ was re-taken by U.S. Forces. At about 2330 hours (EDT), the entire crew was taken aboard the USS WILSON.
  - The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) missions in Laos were attacked by anti-American student demonstrations.
- 15 May - The Thai Government accused the United States of a "breach of faith" because U.S. Marines in the MAYAGUEZ recovery operation had been staged from U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Base.

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- The foreign ministers of the five ASEAN nations meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia failed to agree on a treaty of amity and cooperation.
- 16 May - The Thai Premier, Khukrit Pramoj, announced that the Thai Ambassador to the United States would be recalled in protest against U.S. violation of Thai sovereignty in the MAYAGUEZ incident.
- 19 May - The Royal Thai Government accepted the apology of the United States Government concerning the MAYAGUEZ affair.
- 20 May - The U.S. House of Representatives voted 311 to 95 against U.S. military strength reductions overseas.
- 22 May - The U.S. AID headquarters in Vientiane, Laos was looted by students and Laotian employees of AID.
- 5 Jun - President Anwar Sadat of Egypt officially re-opened the Suez Canal to all except Israel-bound ships. The Canal had been closed since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.
- 7 Jun - The U.S. State Department announced the withdrawal of all combat aircraft from Taiwan; also, U.S. military personnel strength on Taiwan would be reduced to 2,800 by the end of June 1975.
- 9 Jun - Having arrived in Peking on 7 June, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines announced jointly with Premier Chou En-Lai of the People's Republic of China (PRC) the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
- 10 Jun - U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger charged that Russia was storing anti-ship missiles at Berbera, Somalia on the Gulf of Aden.
- 11 Jun - The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) refused to allow on-site searches for Americans missing-in-action until the United States agreed to provide post-war economic assistance.

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- 12 Jun - Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's charge that Russia was constructing a missile storage base in Somalia was denied by the Soviet Union.
- 17 Jun - The Turkish Government officially notified the United States that, unless the U.S. arms embargo was lifted within 30 days, there would be a "suspension of activities" at some U.S. bases.
- The people of the Northern Mariana Islands voted in favor of U.S. citizenship and commonwealth status. The plebiscite recorded 78.5 percent of the voting population of the Marianas in favor.
- 20 Jun - Secretary of Defense Schlesinger declared that the Soviet Union had deployed 60 intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry warheads in the past six months.
- 26 Jun - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India proclaimed a state of emergency and imposed strict news censorship. The Indian Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that Gandhi's election to Parliament in 1971 had been illegal.
- 1 Jul - Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was quoted that, if the United States faced defeat in a conventional war, it might use nuclear weapons, abandoning its no-first-use doctrine.
- Having arrived in Peking on 29 June, Prime Minister Khukrit Pramoj announced that the Royal Thai Government and the PRC had established diplomatic relations.
- 4 Jul - The Government of India ordered a ban on opposition political activities. Several thousand political opponents of Indira Gandhi were reported to have been arrested and the press continued to be strongly censored.

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- 9 Jul - After the Comoro Islands had declared independence from France on 6 July, France granted independence this date. One of the Comoros, Mayotte, elected to remain under French rule.
- The South Korea National Assembly approved three "wartime security" bills which provided for a civil defense corps; a "defense tax" to raise an additional \$400 million for defense; and, a "public security" measure which permitted government surveillance of persons once-convicted of violating the anti-communist and national security laws.
- 12 Jul - The Communist Party newspaper Pravda accused Secretary of Defense Schlesinger of "playing a dangerous game with his belligerent statements" to the U.S. Congress regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
- 15 Jul - A Russian SOYUZ spacecraft with two men aboard blasted off from the Soviet space center in Baikonur in Central Asia to rendezvous with three American astronauts in an APOLLO spaceship. The U.S. astronauts were launched from Cape Canaveral later that day.
- 17 Jul - The APOLLO/SOYUZ spacecrafts linked successfully and the crews exchanged visits between ships.
- 19 Jul - The APOLLO/SOYUZ craft separated after two days of historic first international meeting above the surface of the earth.
- 21 Jul - Soviet cosmonauts aboard the SOYUZ descent vehicle landed safely in Soviet Central Asia.
- 24 Jul - The APOLLO astronauts splashed down 135 miles west of Niihau Island in Hawaii, thus ending the APOLLO/SOYUZ mission and the last scheduled APOLLO flight of the U.S. space program.
- The continuation of the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey, imposed on 5 February, was upheld by a 223 to 206 vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.

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- In Manila, President Marcos and Thai Prime Minister Khukrit issued a joint communique calling for the gradual phase-out of SEATO.
- 25 Jul - U.S. astronauts Thomas Stafford, Vance Brand, and Donald Slayton were hospitalized in Hawaii for observation of possible gas-induced lung damage incurred during descent from the APOLLO/SOYUZ mission.
  - The Turkish Government announced that U.S. operations at U.S. bases would be stopped, stating that existing joint defense agreements between Turkey and the United States "have lost legal validity." The base at Incirlik would be permitted to continue operations related to NATO defense.
- 26 Jul - Turkish military forces began to assume control of U.S. bases.
- 28 Jul - The U.S. State Department confirmed that all military activity at U.S. bases in Turkey had been halted.
  - The U.S. Senate, by rejecting a resolution to deny the funds, permitted the U.S. Navy to proceed with construction of the facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
- 31 Jul - In Helsinki, Finland, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger announced the refusal by the Prime Minister of Turkey of President Ford's offer of \$50 million in U.S. weapons in exchange for re-opening U.S. bases in Turkey.
- 1 Aug - The Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed on behalf of the United States by President Ford at Helsinki. It recognized the validity of European borders as of the close of World War II.
- 6 Aug - The United Nations Security Council refused to consider an application for U.N. membership from the Republic of (South) Korea.

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- 9 Aug - In Thailand, a border police station south of Bangkok was attacked by 200 communist guerrillas. Ten policemen were killed.
- The U.S. Defense Department reported that sales of U.S. armament overseas in Fiscal Year 1975 reached a record \$9 billion. Sales in Fiscal Year 1974 were also a record \$7 billion.
- 11 Aug - The United States cast its first veto against membership in the United Nations when U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan voted against North and South Vietnam.
- 12 Aug - The Democratic Union of Timor staged a coup and its leaders demanded immediate independence from Portugal. The next day, fighting broke out between the Democratic Union faction and the left-wing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor Fretilin.
- 14 Aug - The Republic of the Philippines announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached with rebel Muslim leaders of the Moro Liberation Front in Southern Mindanao.
- 15 Aug - Bangladesh President Mujibur Rahman was killed in a military coup d'etat. Martial law and a 24-hour curfew were declared.
- 19 Aug - In a speech to the American Legion, President Ford declared that, if a nuclear arms pact was not reached with Russia at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in Geneva, he would ask Congress for \$3 billion to increase spending on strategic nuclear arms.
- 23 Aug - Radio Vientiane, Laos proclaimed the complete takeover of the country by the Pathet Lao as the communist-led forces "liberate" Vientiane Province.

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- 27 Aug - In Seoul, South Korea, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and the intention of the United States to resist an attack from North Korea.
- 28 Aug - The Laotian acting Foreign Minister announced that 185 U.S. AID advisers had been replaced by 1,500 Soviet technicians.
- 1 Sep - An agreement providing for Israeli withdrawal from parts of occupied Sinai was initialed by Israeli and Egyptian representatives. A key stipulation of the accord specified the manning of an early warning system by U.S. civilians.
- 3 Sep - The assignment of Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific since September 1972, was extended for one year, to 31 August 1976, by President Ford.
- 4 Sep - Egypt and Israel ratified the initialed withdrawal agreement by signature at Geneva, formally stipulating the use of U.S. civilians for early warning.
- 9 Sep - Prince Norodom Sihanouk, nominal Head of State of Cambodia, returned to Phnom Penh after five years in exile.
- 16 Sep - Papua New Guinea, a colony of Australia since 1906, became an independent state.
- 17 Sep - Indonesia warned of possible retaliation if the left-wing Fretilin continued its military incursions into Indonesian territory.
- 22 Sep - Papua New Guinea was recommended for admission to the United Nations by the U.N. Security Council.
- 23 Sep - Demonstrators stoned the American Embassy in Panama City, demanding that United States' troops be removed from the Canal Zone.

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- 24 Sep - The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), comprised of representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States held its 20th annual meeting in New York City. The ministers agreed that, in view of the end of the Indochina War, SEATO should be phased out "in an orderly and systematic manner."
- 30 Sep - After the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution for reconsideration of the applications for membership of North and South Vietnam, the United States cast its second veto in the Security Council vote.
- 2 Oct - Emperor Hirohito was welcomed at the White House by President Ford. This was the first state visit by a Japanese sovereign to the United States.
- President Park Chung Hee of South Korea submitted a budget for 1976 which proposed the doubling of military spending.
- 3 Oct - President Ford acknowledged the passing by the Congress of S2230, which provided for partial lifting of the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey. Among other actions to be pursued by the United States, Ford declared that the U.S. would seek to rebuild its security relationship with Turkey in order to restore stability along the strategically important southern flank of NATO.
- 4 Oct - Secretary of State Kissinger and the Spanish Prime Minister (Pedro Cortina Mauri) announced a new skeleton agreement for cooperation relationships between the United States and Spain. When finally effective, the agreement would replace that of 1970 which had expired on 25 September 1975.
- 9 Oct - Sixty Nationalist Chinese prisoners released by the PRC were returned to the island of Quemoy. Five others were sent to Hong Kong. This followed a PRC announcement in September that 144 Nationalist Chinese would be released.

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- 10 Oct - Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako arrived in Honolulu enroute to Japan from their state visit. Thousands of Oahu residents viewed the visitors at two public receptions.
- 11 Oct - The leftist-oriented Fretilin faction in Timor established a transitional administration, but armed clashes with pro-Indonesian forces continued.
- 13 Oct - President Ford signed Public Law 94-110, the joint congressional resolution approving the participation of U.S. civilians in the Sinai early warning system.
- 16 Oct - In a report to the Senate, the State Department stated that the United States had sold POLARIS missiles to Britain at a reduced price in 1966 in return for the establishment of a British military base, to be shared by the U.S., on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
- 17 Oct - The Comoro Islands were recommended by the U.N. Security Council for membership in the United Nations.
- 19 Oct - Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Peking after an enroute stop in Tokyo. He also stopped in Tokyo enroute back to the United States on 23 October.
- 24 Oct - Secretary of Defense Schlesinger warned the Senate Appropriations Committee that, "by most of the available measures, American [military] power is declining and Soviet power is rising." He urged the restoration of the Defense budget as submitted.
- 25 Oct - The South Vietnam military government gave permission for the re-entry of 1,546 Vietnamese repatriates from Guam on a "one time only" basis.
- 30 Oct - Because of the serious illness of 82-year-old Francisco Franco, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon became acting Spanish Chief of State.

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- 1 Nov - Cambodia and Thailand announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations.
- 2 Nov - President Ford relieved Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and CIA Director William E. Colby. He also removed Secretary of State Kissinger as chairman of the National Security Council.
  - For the first time in 15 years, an Israeli-bound cargo ship passed through the Suez Canal. This was a concession by Egypt as part of the Sinai withdrawal agreement.
- 3 Nov - At a televised news conference, President Ford announced his nomination of White House chief of staff, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to be Secretary of Defense. He also nominated George Bush as CIA Director, and Elliot L. Richardson to replace Rogers C. B. Morton as Secretary of Commerce.
  - Vice President Nelson Rockefeller announced that he did not wish to be considered as the vice-presidential nominee in 1976. He had been Vice President since December 1974.
- 7 Nov - The Indian Supreme Court ruled against the conviction of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on two electoral offenses charged against her in June 1975.
- 9 Nov - President Ford admitted that "growing tension" in his cabinet influenced his decision to replace Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense.
- 10 Nov - Angola, which had been under Portugese rule since 1575, was granted independence.
- 11 Nov - Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia was dismissed by Governor General Sir John Kerr. Kerr dissolved both houses of parliament and appointed Malcom Fraser as interim prime minister pending elections.

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- 14 Nov - The first actual withdrawal of Israeli forces under the Sinai agreement of 4 September was from the Sudr oilfields.
- 17 Nov - Leaders of the six richest non-communist nations-- Japan, France, West Germany, Italy, Britain and the United States--pledged close economic cooperation after a three-day meeting in Ramboûillet, France.
- 18 Nov - The U.N. General Assembly adopted conflicting resolutions on Korea, with both Koreas claiming victory. The resolutions called for the dissolution of the United Nations Command.
- 20 Nov - Donald Rumsfeld was sworn in as Secretary of Defense.
- Former California Governor Ronald Reagan announced his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976.
  - Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain died.
- 22 Nov - Juan Carlos was sworn in as King Juan Carlos I; he was the first king of Spain in 44 years.
- Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger declared that the Administration budget for defense in 1977 was inadequate. He said this view was "an important issue" in President Ford's decision to replace him.
- 28 Nov - The Timor Liberation Front declared independence from Portugal and re-named the country the People's Republic of East Timor.
- 29 Nov - In a statement from Lisbon, President Costa-Gomes refused to recognize the independence of Timor.
- In an upset general election victory, the National Party of New Zealand won 53 of 87 seats in the House of Representatives. Prime Minister and Labor Party leader Wallace E. Rowling was replaced by Robert D. Muldoon as Prime Minister.

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- 30 Nov - Israeli forces withdrew from the Abu Rudeis oilfields on the Gulf of Suez.
- 1 Dec - President Ford arrived in Peking. At a state dinner hosted by China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-Ping, Teng declared that "rhetoric about detente" could not conceal the danger of appeasement of Russia in the name of detente. On his return trip, the President also visited Indonesia (5, 6 Dec) and the Philippines (6, 7 Dec).
- 2 Dec - Testifying before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., accused Secretary Kissinger of withholding evidence of "gross violations" by Russia of limitations on strategic arms from the President, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 3 Dec - In Vientiane, Laos the Pathet Lao announced the abdication of King Savang Vatthana. A "people's congress" voted to end the 600-year old monarchy and establish a people's democratic republic. The Prime Minister of the coalition government, Prince Souvanna Phouma resigned and a new government was proclaimed. The new president was Prince Souphanouvong, chief of the Pathet Lao, and Kaysone Phomvihan was announced as prime minister.
- In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger urged caution in the U.S. approach to detente with Russia.
  - President Ford met with the PRC Chairman Mao Tse-Tung for almost two hours.
- 5 Dec - The PRC announced that the ashes of two U.S. pilots shot down over China in the Vietnam war would be returned.
- 7 Dec - President Ford arrived in Honolulu enroute to Mainland USA. He placed a wreath at the ARIZONA Memorial commemorating the 34th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Later, the President spoke

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at the East-West Center, where he outlined a new "Pacific Doctrine" based on a strong and flexible U.S. military presence and a "new" structure of economic cooperation in the Pacific.

- Indonesian marines and paratroopers landed in Portuguese Timor and occupied the capital, Deli. The Fretilin faction offered no resistance and fled to the hills.
- 8 Dec - In Jakarta, Indonesian Prime Minister Adam Malik claimed that Indonesian troops had entered Timor at the request of anti-Fretilin forces already in control of Deli. In Lisbon, Portugal severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia.
- Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Delegate to the United Nations, charged that Soviet involvement in Angola and Somalia was an "effort to recolonize" the continent of Africa. He also denounced Cuba for supplying combat forces in Africa.
- 9 Dec - U.S. House and Senate conferees approved a defense budget of \$90.5 billion for Fiscal Year 1976, about eight percent more than for Fiscal Year 1975.
- 11 Dec - In remarks to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Secretary Kissinger reportedly criticized Soviet armament and interventionist policies; however, he concluded that economics would eventually bring the Russians to detente.
- 12 Dec - In Brussels, Kissinger and the Turkish Prime Minister reached an agreement in principle which could lead to the re-opening of U.S. bases in Turkey.
- 13 Dec - The Conservative Liberal party of Australia won a majority of seats in Parliament. Malcom Fraser became permanent Prime Minister.
- Opposition leader and government critic Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to a year in prison and fined \$100 for violation of South Korea's election laws. The court suspended the fine and did not order his arrest.

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- 16 Dec - Through White House spokesman William Greener, President Ford cited the geo-political significance of Angola to the United States and the West. He expressed "serious concern" over "actions taken by the Soviet union and Cuba in providing larger quantities of equipment and arms to Angola."
- 17 Dec - American and Soviet negotiations at the SALT talks in Geneva recessed until 12 January 1976.
- 19 Dec - By a 54 to 22 vote, the U.S. Senate cut off funds for covert military support operations in Angola. The President deplored the move as "a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States."
- 20 Dec - The U.N. Security Council approved a resolution calling for Indonesia to withdraw its military forces from Portuguese Timor.
- 23 Dec - The remaining 70 former Nationalist Chinese leaders captured in 1949 were released by the PRC.
- 26 Dec - According to a French radio interview with North Vietnam Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, general elections would be held in both Vietnams in early April 1976. One national assembly would be elected for all of Vietnam.

### Recapitulation of Chronology

(U) During the first three months of 1975, world attention was focused on the growing crisis in the Southeast Asian nations of Cambodia and South Vietnam. The intensity of military pressure against the government forces of both countries mounted rapidly, and the question of continued funding of U.S. aid to both countries was debated by the Congress, the Administration and the Press.

(U) In April the long campaign against communist subversion of Indochina ended. On 12 April the last official U.S. personnel were evacuated from Phnom Penh, and on 17 April the Khmer Rouge announced the surrender of the Cambodian Government. To the east, North Vietnam and Viet Cong pressure forced South Vietnamese abandonment of the Central Highlands; at the same time they began an offensive against the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. By the end of March, land routes were clogged with fleeing refugees and demoralized South

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Vietnamese soldiers. President Ford authorized a massive off-shore evacuation of refugees while the communist forces advanced toward Saigon with little or no opposition. On 29 April evacuation of the last official U.S. personnel began, and on 30 April the Republic of (South) Vietnam surrendered unconditionally to the Viet Cong. That same day, North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government troops occupied Saigon.

(U) Thus ended more than twenty years of effort by the United States to contain communism on the Indochinese peninsula. On 12 May an incident occurred which loomed large in the immediate concern for U.S. prestige after the debacle of the previous month. Naval forces of the new Cambodian Government seized a U.S. flag vessel, the SS MAYAGUEZ, on the high seas in the Gulf of Thailand. By 14 May the vessel and crew had been recovered by U.S. military forces in an operation hailed as heartening evidence that the United States was still a power to be reckoned with. President Ford was quoted as stating that the MAYAGUEZ rescue offered, "firm assurance that the United States is capable and has the will to act in emergencies." He also described the incident as, "a clear, clean indication we are not only strong but have the will to move quickly."<sup>1</sup>

(U) It was also in May that student agitators began to attack U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) posts in Laos. By July, the AID missions had been closed, and in December, the King of Laos was deposed and the coalition government replaced by the communist Pathet Lao.

(U) In the wake of the communist takeover in Southeast Asia, U.S. officials including the President and Secretaries of State and Defense beat a path to the doorsteps of Asian allies with assurances of continued support. In South Korea and the Philippines, Presidents Park and Marcos called for renewed defensive buildups. The passing of Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan caused as little commotion as the fall of Indochina. The Thai Government experienced instability and lack of leadership, but reacted to the events of April and May by ordering the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces and by prompt recognition of all adjacent communist governments including Peking. The day after President Ford's visit, Indonesian marines and paratroopers invaded Portuguese Timor on the grounds of national security against a communist guerrilla threat to Indonesian territory.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 23 May 75, "Ford Says Isolationism Weakening," date-line Washington (AP); for monograph on MAYAGUEZ, see Appendix VI of this history; although the MAYAGUEZ affair was a major incident in a one-year span of PACOM military history, it will be a footnote in the history of the United States for the Twentieth Century.

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(U) In the second half of 1975, the two most important international events for the United States were the Helsinki Summit of European (with Russia, Canada and the United States) Nations, and the President's visit to China in early December which culminated in his enunciation of the "New Pacific Doctrine" in Hawaii on 7 December.

(U) Meanwhile, in Europe the Cyprus issue continued to strain the political and military relationships of Greece and Turkey with the United States. The cutoff of U.S. military aid to Turkey, effective 5 February, was followed by the takeover of U.S. military operations by Turkish forces in late July. The arms embargo was partially lifted by Congress in October pending concrete evidence of efforts toward a settlement of the Cyprus issue. In Spain, the military bases agreement between the United States and Spain expired on 25 September, and negotiations were accompanied by Spanish threats to close the bases occupied by U.S. Forces.

(U) The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference adjourned its second session in Geneva without substantial progress toward agreement on key issues, and, in December, American and Soviet negotiations in Geneva also recessed without discernible progress in SALT II negotiations.

(U) In Africa and the Middle East, strife-torn Angola became independent from Portugal on 10 November, and the issue of Soviet involvement in Angola and Somalia surfaced in the United Nations and the U.S. Congress. The Suez Canal was opened by Egypt in June, and, in consonance with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gulf of Suez oilfields and the new U.S.-manned early warning system, Egypt allowed the passage to Israel of commercial cargo vessels.

(U) In the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, the Comoro Islands and Papua, New Guinea became independent states. The U.S. Congress allowed construction to proceed at Diego Garcia and convincing evidence of a Soviet buildup of bases in Somalia and Aden emerged. New governments came to power in the two U.S.-allied nations of Australia and New Zealand, and, farther north, the Northern Marianas voted for commonwealth status with the United States.

(U) Since the year had begun with Vietnam holding center stage, the irony of the foregoing chronology lay in the final entry--the announcement on 26 December that Vietnamese unification elections were scheduled for April 1976.

### Recognition of CINCPAC's Role

(U) In September 1975 the appointment of Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific was extended for one year by President Ford. Gayler was perhaps the most politically oriented CINCPAC in the history of the command,

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and certainly one of the most traveled, most interviewed, most quoted, and most visible. A made-to-order illustration of CINCPAC's political-military relationships was printed in the 8 January 1975 issue of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Headlined "Gayler Cautions on Vietnam Aid," the article cited the Admiral's objection to a previous day's headline stating that he had ruled out U.S. armed intervention in South Vietnam. By way of correction, the writer then quoted from Gayler's interview with National Broadcasting Corporation reporter Jim Hartz for the "Today" television show:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Hartz: What do you think that the United States should do if there is an all-out attack by North Vietnam on the South Vietnam forces?

Gayler: I think we should sustain our friends with material aid to the extent necessary for them to survive.

Hartz: Would that include sending American troops back in?

Gayler: No, I said material aid.

Hartz: Just material aid?

Gayler: Yes.

Hartz: You would not under any circumstances want to see American....

Gayler: Any circumstances covers a lot of ground. It is difficult to imagine.

Hartz: The imminent fall of the Thieu regime? Should we send ground troops, or air support or naval support in to save a particular regime?

Gayler: In the way in which you put the question, I think, my answer would be, no. Now, I would not wish to foreclose American intervention in any and all circumstances. I don't think we should put ourselves in that position.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 8 Jan 75, "Gayler Cautions on Vietnam Aid," by Lyle Nelson.

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Hartz: But you'd advocate giving them all the material help they would need?

Gayler: That they can reasonably use. I don't mean extravagantly -- there's no prospect of that anyway -- but I mean enough ammunition so that they are fighting for their lives -- they can save themselves -- enough food so that they can eat, and their families can eat, ponchos to keep the rain off.

(U) The writer speculated that CINCPAC's "sensitivity" on the matter of his views might be ascribed to recent statements about intervention in the Middle East attributed to Secretary of State Kissinger (see Chronology, 2 Jan 75). Perhaps more importantly, the writer noted, many historians believed that North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950 followed a remark of then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson that America's defense line in Asia did not include Korea.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 11 May CINCPAC was interviewed on a Honolulu televised talk show called "Cross-Fire." Despite Vietnam, he stated, the United States could not neglect Asia, where the evolving industrial revolution and the increasing gap between rich and poor demanded the stabilizing influence of the United States. He discussed the probable accommodation of Thailand to the realities of communist proximity in Southeast Asia, and noted the irreplaceable investment in U.S. security embodied in U.S. facilities in the Philippines. He discussed other issues ranging from the health of the refugees then at Guam and Wake Islands to the growing threat of the Russian Navy and the importance of U.S. naval strength in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Later in the year, after Gayler's 21 August keynote speech to the Kiwanis International convention in Honolulu, a newspaper publisher referred to CINCPAC's key political-military role in the Pacific area. He noted Gayler's coverage by national television and magazine media, and his recognition of the, "...political, economic, sociological, and military..." implications of United States' involvement in world affairs. The publisher went on to cite Gayler's "candor" at a time when, "...most military leaders have been driven into their cocoons by a combination of anti-militarism, an abrasive press and a Congress that includes a bunch of amateur first-term idealists..." He speculated that, "...in the absence of a senior State Department official,..." CINCPAC was,

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1. Ibid.

2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 12 May 75, "Gayler Cites Need for U.S. Role in Asia," p. A-15.

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"...a kind of visible quasi-statesman for the Pacific Basin...." The publisher concluded his essay with this observation:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...It might be valuable if the Pentagon would encourage more of its senior commanders to sound off on the concerns they all share about the nation's present indifference to international relations and America's position in world affairs.

(S) That CINCPAC's role as a "quasi-statesman" was credible in the State Department was evidenced by a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib to Admiral Gayler dated 24 November 1975. CINCPAC had expressed concern about the transfer of "advanced weapons" and other items of equipment which incorporated, "sophisticated military technology" to foreign countries. Habib agreed that CINCPAC's concern was legitimate, but cited the need to define the quoted phrases in layman terms so that State staff members could make competent recommendations to approve or deny such transfers. The Secretary noted apparent contradictions in the political parameters which had determined previous denials or approvals of such transfers, and requested CINCPAC to recommend which specific weapons or equipment and technology should be withheld. CINCPAC replied with a list which was, "not all-inclusive," but stated that each proposal should be examined on the basis of the country involved, political implications, level of technology and potential for engendering an arms race--all of which was, "a moving train." CINCPAC concluded that, in his opinion, the best solution was for the unified command to review each country request on a case-by-case basis and provide specific recommendations to the State Department.<sup>2</sup>

#### Detente Debate

(U) The efficacy of detente with the Soviet Union as a national policy was only occasionally questioned in 1974. During 1975, it became a cause celebre when the vital link was made by broad segments of the political community and news media to detente vis-a-vis the growing Russian military

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 29 Aug 75, "An Impressive Spokesman," by John A. Scott; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 22 Aug 75, "Gayler Lauds Servicemen as 'Best Ever'," p. C-8.
  2. Dept of State Ltr, 24 Nov 75, personal for ADM Gayler from Philip C. Habib; CINCPAC ALPHA 066/121954Z Dec 75 (EX); for more on this subject, see Chapter VII, Section II, "Political Aspects of Security Assistance Policy on Foreign Military Sales."

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threat. Contributing to the emergence of detente as a subject for debate were such newspaper articles as were cited in Chapter II of this history. For example, a 27 January 1975 article described the computerized analysis of international relations conducted over a 12-year period by a University of Hawaii political scientist. Millions of bits of information on hundreds of different activities such as exports, migration, tourism, alliances, treaties, United Nations votes, mail, international organizational memberships, threats, military movements, diplomatic protests, military clashes and wars were fed into a computer. The relationship of these behaviors to national wealth, industrialization, ideology, political institutions, race, religion, literacy, educational levels, population, riots, and revolutions was then examined. The results, according to the analyst, consistently showed that conflict and transactions were statistically independent. In other words, transactions and cooperation did not necessarily lead to peace:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Then what is related to peace? Power. Throughout our empirical studies, power, and only power, was found tied into a nation's conflict with others. Differences in wealth, in political systems, in social institutions, in culture had little influence on peaceful relations.

To maintain peace requires focusing on relative power. In particular, to maintain peace requires a dominance of power: peace is a condition of power inequality.

\* \* \* \* \*

But the managers of detente have approached power in the wrong way. It is not power parity that enhances peace. It is not equality in power that reduces hostility and conflict. Rather, it is power dominance or submission. Peace is purchased by making yourself much stronger than your adversary. Or by abdicating power.

In sum, scientific evidence shows that a path to peace lies not through the development of collaboration, transactions, cooperation. Sadly, a way to peace is through power. It is by either having sufficient dominance to ensure

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 27 Jan 75, "Testing the Paths to Peace," by R. J. Rummel.

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that the perceived costs of aggression outweigh the gains, or by dismantling power and submitting to one's enemies.

(U) A rebuttal to this thesis of dominant power was printed shortly thereafter, preceding which an editorial comment noted that the original article had attracted the interest of Tass, the Soviet news agency. One month after the original article appeared, another syndicated columnist analyzed the computer findings. William A. Rusher recalled Winston Churchill's statement in the 1950's that the only thing standing between free men and communist domination of the world was possession of the atomic bomb by the United States. He concluded that Americans can, "...have all the peace we want by reducing U.S. power below Russian levels...."<sup>1</sup>

(U) Still another reaction to the conclusion of the original article--that peace was assured only through absolute power--was that voiced by a former press secretary to President Ford in a syndicated article. He predicted that the question of a "power gap" between the United States and Russia might be a central issue in the presidential race of 1976. Some groups were certain, he said, to attack the computer analysis of international behavior on the grounds that the study reflected financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department. Others would cite the report as proof that peaceful coexistence with Russia was not conducive to ultimate world peace. This controversy, and the subsequent related media coverage described in Chapter II of this history, erupted even before the surrender of Vietnam and Cambodia to the communists.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Unrelated to the foregoing computer analysis, but in the same vein of the need for military strength, was an editorial in a Guam newspaper stressing the need for a strong Navy. The writer noted the planned reduction of the Navy to 490 ships, "...the smallest it has been since 1939." Considering the somewhat isolated position from which the editorial emanated, it was an excellent summation of the reasons for expanding, rather than reducing, U.S. Navy strength:<sup>3</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 11 Feb 75, "The Paths to Peace," by Richard W. Chadwick; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 28 Feb 75, "Peace through Power," by William A. Rusher, Universal Press Syndicate.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 26 Mar 75, "Power 'Gap' and '76 Campaign" by J. F. terHorst, Universal Press Syndicate.
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 13 Mar 75, "Strong Navy Needed," unsigned editorial from Pacific Daily News, Guam.

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1. The world energy situation, which is going to require that the oceans of the world be explored and exploited for oil. This is bound to cause a rash of incidents, especially in the Pacific, between various countries claiming oil rights. We've already seen conflicts between Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and Mainland China over resources and areas of exploration. Moreover, the sea routes delivering oil around the world are going to have to be patrolled, especially in the event of any major conflict.

2. The World Sea Conference apparently was a failure in trying to resolve such things as fishing and mineral rights in the sea. Different countries have claimed different territorial limits to the sea. The old three-mile zone is out. Some now claim 12, others 50 and still others 200 miles.

If the world community of nations can't get together on world sea laws, then it is pretty obvious that chaos is going to exist. The U.S. is going to need a strong Navy, not only to protect U.S. rights but to help prevent sea piracy and fights over mineral rights and fishing rights, which are bound to develop in the years ahead.

3. The Soviet Navy, despite detente, has made giant strides in improving its capabilities to match its expanded missions on the seas. These include the Persian Gulf and the strategic Indian Ocean, places where the Soviets had only a bathtub naval presence less than a decade ago.

The Soviets have established, where none existed 10 years ago, a continuous presence in the Mediterranean Sea, as well in the strategically important Caribbean Sea and waters near the coast of West Africa. More importantly to Guam, the Soviet Pacific fleet also has been growing in size and boldness. Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf told the Senate Armed Services Committee recently that "Soviet nuclear submarines armed with long-range nuclear strategic missiles regularly patrol our coasts and their surface ships deploy to every corner of the world's oceans."

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Middendorf said: "There is direct and abundant evidence that the Soviets have fully embraced the concept of sea power and have established themselves as a major maritime power." There are many who feel that the Soviet Navy now has surpassed the U.S. Navy, at least in numbers if not in firepower.

4. The world situation in general has never been more chaotic and never has the need for a superior Navy been more pressing.

(U) As evidence of the chaotic world situation, the writer cited the impending fall of Indochina, the tense situation between China and Russia, the Taiwan question, the explosive Korean situation, the Mid-East confrontation, and the erosion of the United States position in the Mediterranean littoral nations. He also noted the absence of the British Navy east of Suez and the need for a visible Navy to back up other U.S. forces in overseas areas.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In June, after the U.S. Senate had spent two days debating post-Vietnam foreign policy, one syndicated columnist stated that there had been more sham than substance to the debate. He cited a crying national need for a cogent examination and explanation of U.S. policy that would not only serve the United States but would be discernable to U.S. allies and adversaries. Among the questions postulated by the writer which should have been, but were not, debated were:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

What kind of nuclear arsenal does the U.S. need? What should be the size of America's conventional forces -- Army, Navy, Air Force?

Should the Defense Department be capable of fighting "one and a half" wars simultaneously -- one major conflict and a small one elsewhere? Or is that concept outmoded? Do we need more or fewer troops in Europe and South Korea?

Are we more likely to face a long land war in Europe? Or would it be a short one, capped perhaps with a nuclear exchange? Can we trust detente with the Soviet Union and

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1. Ibid.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 6 Jun 75, "U.S. Defense Policy Debate," by J. F. terHorst, dateline Washington (Universal Press Syndicate).

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if so, what effect will that have on U.S. spending for strategic weapons and conventional forces? Do we increase the risk of war by improving the accuracy and power of nuclear warheads vis-a-vis the Soviets?

(U) Later in June, an editorial writer in Honolulu speculated that U.S. development of the cruise missile would make the Russians wary of any arms agreement. Describing the missile as a pilotless plane small enough to be fired from a submarine tube, the writer stated that it could deliver nuclear or conventional warheads at intercontinental range with pinpoint accuracy. In August, high Administration officials were cited by another writer as sources for the belief of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger that progress toward a new Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms pact had been too slow and uncertain. Consequently, in a 19 August speech, Ford warned that he would ask for a \$2.8 billion increase in spending for strategic nuclear weapons unless a new nuclear arms pact was reached with Moscow. The reason for the tough line toward Russia on nuclear arms, according to the writer's "White House sources," was because members of the Republican Party, including former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, had urged it. Both the President and Kissinger, said the writer, had been heavily criticized in recent months for having placed too much faith in detente with Russia and for being too soft in their dealings with Moscow on nuclear arms.<sup>1</sup>

(U) During a talk in Los Angeles on 12 September, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger discussed some fundamentals of the world's order and international society as related to the appropriate military establishment for the United States and the role and responsibility of the United States internationally. He stated that political stability depended upon the maintenance of an equilibrium of force and worldwide military balance. United States military power was the fundamental counterweight to the military power of the Soviet Union, and the need for preservation of this equilibrium was rooted in the fact that the world was a set of interlocking regions constituting a single strategic theater. Discussing past U.S. contributions to the preservation of a pluralistic world society, the Secretary said, "...the United States does not live in a world in which it can wipe the slate clean merely as a result of changes of public mood. We live as all societies have lived, enmeshed in the web of history, and we have taken steps in the past that bind ourselves in a variety of ways to the well-being of other societies...." Regarding detente, the Secretary said:<sup>2</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 21 Jun 75, editorial "New Weapon," and 20 Aug 75, "What's Behind Ford's Tough Talk," by Leslie H. Gelb, dateline Wash (N.Y.T.S.).
  2. SECDEF 3719/130025Z Sep 75.

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First, and most fundamental, we must recognize and emphasize that the role of American military power is deterrence. Through deterrence we prevent conflict and we preserve peace.

The need to maintain military power for the purposes of deterrence implies that the United States and its allies will not be dependent on the forbearance, the good will, of other powers in the world. And we must keep in mind that the main power other than the United States that disposes of a vast array of military power is the Soviet Union.

If we are to maintain a military equilibrium, we must also recognize that the forces of the Soviet Union today continue to grow; they grow in the atmosphere of detente as they did in the spirit of Camp David, in the spirit of Geneva, and in the spirit of Glassboro....The fundamental statement of Soviet purposes reflects the fact that the Soviet state itself depends upon a growth in military power, and detente in the Soviet perspective is viewed as something that reflects the improved military posture of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the West.

Detente must be preserved not only by the United States, but with the aid and assistance of our allies which must do their own share.

(U) Perhaps the most damning comment on the efficacy of detente was the accusation by former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt on 2 December 1975 that the Soviet Union had turned the strategic arms limitation talks into a "grotesque mockery," and that information concerning Soviet violations had been withheld from President Ford. Zumwalt told the House Intelligence Committee that the Soviets had interfered with the U.S. long-range radar compliance and detection capability. He also charged that the Russians had built additional and larger missile silos, upgraded missile defenses, deployed mobile missiles and built larger missiles.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 3 Dec 75, "Russians Cheat, Zumwalt Says", dateline Washington (no source attribution).

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### The "New" Pacific Doctrine

(U) Following his trip to China (1-5 December) and one night stops in Indonesia (5 December) and the Republic of the Philippines (6 December), President Ford placed a wreath at Corregidor in the Philippines on 7 December, flew for 10 hours to Honolulu, and placed a wreath at the ARIZONA Memorial at Pearl Harbor, also on 7 December. The day of the week, 34 years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was Sunday. Later that day, the President visited the East-West Center, where he spelled out a six-point U.S. Pacific policy: "I subscribe to a Pacific Doctrine of peace with all, and hostility toward none." During his speech, he described the six major premises of his Pacific Doctrine:<sup>1</sup>

- ...American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific. We must reach beyond our concern for security. But without security, there can be neither peace nor progress....

- ...Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy. There is no relationship to which I have devoted more attention....

- ...Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the strengthening of our new ties with this great nation representing nearly one-quarter of mankind.... We share opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia or in any other part of the world....

- ...[A] continuing stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia.... We share important political and economic concerns with these five nations, who make up the Association of Southeast Asia Nations. Americans will be hearing much about the ASEAN organization. All its members are friends of the United States. Their total population equals our own....

- ...Peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts. In Korea, tension persists.... In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required....

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1. Periodical, Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Vol. I, No. 1, undated, published by CINCPAC, "Ford's Pacific Doctrine," pp. 14-15, no attribution; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 8 Dec 75, "Text of President's E-W Center Speech."

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We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will....If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than the past.

- ...Peace in Asia requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations of all the peoples in the region....

(U) Press reaction to the President's trip to the PRC, Indonesia and the Philippines and his Pacific Doctrine speech appeared to be a mixture of skepticism and optimism, both of which were evident in the 8 December issue of the Honolulu newspaper. The front page carried a straightforward political reporter's summation of the speech without speculation. Also on the front page was a description by an editor of the atmosphere of "easy informality" at the Sunday breakfast hosted for the President by Admiral Gayler at his Pearl Harbor quarters. Elsewhere, a Washington article quoted Ford that his 27,000-mile trip contained, "no minuses and many, many pluses." The article also quoted Senate Majority Leader Mansfield that Ford's Pacific proclamation was, "a most important historical document" and a significant statement of U.S. foreign policy. Another article, billed as a "news analysis," asked and answered the question, "What's new about President Ford's 'New Pacific policy' announced yesterday?" The answer, according to the writer, was nothing--that the speech was essentially a restatement and reaffirmation of existing U.S. policy as contained in the 1969 Nixon Doctrine. However, this writer speculated that the timing of the speech and its content could imply parallel PRC policy on many of the points. On the negative side, another Washington writer chose to stress his view that, "The modest goals of the trip were matched by modest attention paid it back home." He contrasted the comparative lack of ceremony and publicity adopted by Ford with Nixon's trip to the PRC, and questioned the scope of diplomatic progress made by Ford. He conceded that, "The most notable accomplishment of Ford's trip may have been his ability... to coin a phrase--New Pacific Doctrine--describing the adjustment of old American policies to the new realities of Asian self-sufficiency in a post-Vietnam Pacific." A New York Times editorial stated that, with one exception, Ford's speech reiterated familiar policies. That exception, stated the writer, was confirmation from the highest level of government that the United States would not harbor continued hostility toward, "...the former enemy in Vietnam." And finally, an editorial in the Honolulu newspaper by the editor who had attended the Ford-Gayler breakfast stated that, "The Ford Pacific Doctrine, enunciated at a time of peace, is quite different from the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, enumerated at Guam during the Vietnam War." The writer noted that the Nixon Doctrine stated in part, "We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose

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survival we consider vital to our security." While the Ford speech stressed U.S. strength, stated the editorial, it made no mention of either nuclear threats or the Nixon Doctrine, "...perhaps deliberately leaving it to other capitals to guess whether it is still in force...." The editorial concluded that the Pacific Doctrine was a significant statement of U.S. policy and a significant affirmation of the more important role now assigned to Pacific affairs.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid.; "Ford Sketches a New Doctrine for U.S.-Asian Cooperation Assistance," by Doug Boswell (Star-Bulletin); "Easy Informality Marks Reception for President," by A.A. Smyser (Star-Bulletin edit.); "Tax, Energy Issues Await Ford Decision," by Randolph E. Schmid, dateline Washington (AP); "Timing Gives New Gloss to Old Doctrine," by William Ringle (Gannet News Service); "Results of Ford's Trip," by James M. Naughton, dateline Washington (N.Y.T.S.); "The Pacific Doctrine," Editorial (N.Y. Times); "The Pacific Doctrine," Editorial (Honolulu Star-Bulletin).

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### SECTION II--THE DEBACLE IN SEA MINOR

(U) Until the end of April 1975, the words Southeast Asia and their acronym, SEA, were used by many political, military, and media writers to denote that area of Southeast Asia formerly called Indochina. In a geographic area which included Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, however, Indochina was a minor part of the whole. The precipitous victories of communist forces in Vietnam and Cambodia were possibly the most tactically significant events in the Pacific Command during 1975, but their strategic military and political significance in the context of greater Southeast Asia was less clear. As discussed in the following sections of this chapter, the impact of the debacle in SEA minor was debated extensively.<sup>1</sup>

#### Vietnam--Before the Fall

(U) On 11 January 1975 the State Department transmitted to Embassies in Budapest, London, Paris, Warsaw, Jakarta, Moscow, and Tehran, and to diplomatic posts in Peking and the United Nations, a diplomatic note regarding the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. The text of the note was released to the press on 13 January. Calling upon North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to re-open the talks in Geneva and Saigon mandated by the ceasefire agreement, the note also solicited the support and good offices of the addressee nations and posts toward that end. The specifications of violations of the ceasefire contained in the note constituted an encapsulated situation report and a damning indictment, stating that the North Vietnamese and PRG had:<sup>2</sup>

- Built up the North Vietnamese main-force Army in the South through the illegal infiltration of over 160,000 troops;
- Tripled the strength of their armor in the South by sending in over 400 new vehicles, as well as greatly increased their artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry;
- Improved their military logistics system running through Laos, Cambodia and the Demilitarized Zone as well

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1. CINCPAC's involvement in the off-shore movement of refugees, the evacuations of U.S. personnel from Vietnam and Cambodia, the orphan airlift, the refugee immigration and the MAYAGUEZ incident is covered in Appendices I through VI of this history.
  2. SECSTATE 7284/111725Z Jan 75.

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as within South Vietnam, and expanded their armament stockpiles;

- Refused to deploy the teams which under the agreement were to oversee the ceasefire;

- Refused to pay their prescribed share of the expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision;

- Failed to honor their commitment to cooperate in resolving the status of American and other personnel missing in action, even breaking off all discussions on this matter by refusing for the past seven months to meet with U.S. and Republic of Vietnam representatives in the Four-Party Joint Military Team;

- Broken off all negotiations with the Republic of Vietnam including the political negotiations in Paris and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission Talks in Saigon, answering the Republic of Vietnam's repeated calls for unconditional resumption of the negotiations with demands for the overthrow of the government as a pre-condition for any renewed talks; and

- Gradually increased their military pressure, over-running several areas, including 11 district towns, which were clearly and unequivocally held by the Republic of Vietnam at the time of the ceasefire. Their latest and most serious escalation of the fighting began in early December with offensives in the southern half of South Vietnam which have brought the level of casualties and destruction back up to what it was before the agreement. These attacks--which included for the first time since the massive North Vietnamese 1972 offensive the over-running of a province capital (Song Be in Phuoc Long Province)--appear to reflect a decision by Hanoi to seek once again to impose a military solution in Vietnam. Coming just before the second anniversary of the agreement, this dramatically belies Hanoi's claims that it is the United States and the Republic of Vietnam who are violating the agreement and standing in the way of peace.

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(S) There was no discernable response nor public acknowledgement of this note by the recipient nations. The day before the note was dispatched, the U.S. Senate Majority Leader was quoted to the effect that Congress would deny any request by the President for supplemental military assistance funds to save Vietnam or Cambodia. And, at the same time as the diplomatic note was transmitted, the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence provided a comparison of U.S. aid to South Vietnam versus Soviet/PRC aid to North Vietnam in response to a U.S. senator's request. He noted that U.S. figures were maintained on a fiscal year basis, while the U.S. intelligence community Sino/Soviet figures were maintained on a calendar year basis. Also, the U.S. figures were accurate but those for China/Russia were estimates. The U.S. fiscal year figure for 1975 was substantially lower than for 1974, while the Sino/Soviet calendar year 1974 figure showed a sharp increase over calendar year 1973:<sup>1</sup>

<u>U.S. (\$ millions)</u>			<u>USSR/PRC (\$ millions)</u>				
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Military</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 74	1,059.0	615.9	1,678.5	CY 73	(estimate)		790-860
FY 75	700.0	450.0	1,150.0	CY 74	216.0	1,200.0	1,416.0

(S) The intelligence comparison was also limited by the fact an undetermined amount of the economic aid level estimated for Russia/PRC was diverted to material, equipment, fuel, transportation, machinery, food and other items in direct support of the North Vietnamese military in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The report included, as a measure of the effective impact of current policies between the two aid programs, some statistics showing improvements in the North Vietnamese stockpiles in South Vietnam since the ceasefire: armor, plus 300%; combat troops, plus 24%; anti-aircraft artillery, plus 72%. More than 230,000 metric tons of stockpiled supplies had been accumulated in South Vietnam, including 66,000 metric tons of ammunition. An additional 230-300,000 metric tons were stockpiled in the North Vietnam panhandle. On the other hand, South Vietnam's reserve stockpile had dwindled as reserves were depleted to make up for funding shortfalls. To complete the picture, U.S. military budget figures included aid in the form of training, spare parts, costs of transportation, subsistence, fuel for the military, technicians, facilities, construction and equipment maintenance, administration, packaging, handling, crating, etc. Similar costs for the Sino/Soviet aid package were unknown and not included in the estimated figures provided.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 10 Jan 75, dateline Washington (AP); CINCPAC 111949Z Jan 75 (BOM).
  2. Ibid.

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(C) In March the U.S. Embassy in Saigon reported on a visit by a group of U.S. Congressmen during which free and frequent access to South Vietnamese opposition leaders was requested and provided. This visit, billed as a fact-finding tour to assess the validity of President Ford's request for \$300 million in supplemental military aid to Vietnam, was extensively reported by U.S. and foreign reporters. The reportage tended to emphasize the opposition to President Thieu, and, in one instance addressed by the Embassy, an entirely distorted episode carried by the Pacific Stars and Stripes implied restraint of movement of two female legislators by the South Vietnam national police.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On the heels of the congressional delegation visit, local and international press attention reverted to the gradually increasing military offensive of the North Vietnamese/PRC forces. The press reports concentrated on the success of the offensive, and even the official reports from the Defense Attaché's Office (DAO) in Saigon were prematurely pessimistic. On 12 March the DAO agreed with CINCPAC that intelligence and operational reports should acknowledge successful operations by the South Vietnamese forces as they occurred, noting that their defenses had not yet completely collapsed.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The following day, on 13 March, the Defense Attaché (DATT) transmitted a lengthy summation of the situation in South Vietnam to the principal deputy assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) at the Secretary's personal request. The DATT retransmitted this message to CINCPAC on 14 March, noting that CINCPAC might, "...deem it worthy of retransmission to the Chairman [of the JCS]." The message stated that North Vietnam had mounted an offensive greater in scope and intensity than any in the post-ceasefire period, and reviewed the military action throughout South Vietnam. While conceding that infiltration of individual soldiers and entire reserve divisions had increased, and noting that the training cycle for North Vietnamese soldiers had been drastically reduced, the message overall reflected continued viability of South Vietnamese defenses. In the long run, however, the DATT stated that, "...continued communist attacks throughout the country, possibly supported by additional reserve forces from North Vietnam, will take an increasing toll...and the Government's capacity to respond may well be critically curtailed." The somewhat unusual submission of this detailed situation report directly to the Defense Department was immediately challenged by the Chairman of the JCS, who informed CINCPAC that information such as that transmitted was required by U.S. commanders in the normal command chain, and that the JCS in particular needed such information to fulfill their statutory responsibilities as principal military advisers to

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1. AMEMB Saigon 2313/040320Z Mar 75, 3220/041030Z Mar 75, 2764/121130Z Mar 75, and 3077/181127Z Mar 75.
  2. USDAO Saigon 416/120653Z Mar 75 (BOM), which cited CINCPAC 120157Z Mar 75 (BOM).

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Secretary of Defense and the President. He acknowledged that requests for information from agencies outside the normal chain of command should be honored, but, in all cases, both he and the intermediate commanders in the unified chain of command, as well as appropriate intelligence agencies, would be information addressees.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ This deviation from established reporting channels was remedied in a later DATT report to CINCPAC, which included the Chairman, JCS and the Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group as information addressees. The DATT related comments made by the Chief of Staff of the South Vietnam Joint General Staff during a meeting on 23 March. This officer considered the morale of the populace and the armed forces to be as low as it could get. Beginning on 15 March, a withdrawal of South Vietnamese forces from the Central Highlands had turned into a rout, and a presidential decision to redeploy an airborne division from the northern provinces to the Saigon area had precipitated total panic and the loss of the northwest provinces to the North Vietnamese. Massive losses of materiel and equipment were anticipated, and refugees had saturated the roads and the cities of Hue and Da Nang.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Two days later, on 25 March, the American Consul in Da Nang warned that, if the only Marine division in the Da Nang enclave were withdrawn, as was planned by the South Vietnamese, Da Nang would be lost and evacuation of U.S. and associated Vietnamese personnel would almost certainly become impossible.<sup>3</sup>

~~(S)~~ On 2 April President Thieu reportedly ordered the armed forces to prevent the civilian population from fleeing, since their panic was contagious. According to an Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) report of the same day, however, the order was already moot. Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Tuy Hoa had already fallen. Only a small coastal strip in Military Region 2 had not been taken. Bien Hoa was within confirmed surface-to-air (SAM) missile range and the base was under steady rocket attack. Various approaches to the Tan Son Nhut airfield in Saigon were within SAM range, and IPAC noted the small arms and SAM threat to slow moving, low flying aircraft approaching Saigon. The IPAC report concluded that the stability of the Government was questionable. The second and third largest cities in South Vietnam had fallen

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1. USDAO Saigon 438/141101Z Mar 75 (BOM), which retransmitted USDAO Saigon 428/131103Z Mar 75 (BOM); JCS 2063/151747Z Mar 75 (EX).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 19 Mar 75, "Strategy in South Vietnam," by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP) and "Saigon will Abandon Province Near DMZ," by George Esper, dateline Saigon (AP); USDAO Saigon 500/230825Z Mar 75 (BOM).
  3. AMEMB Saigon 3475/252345Z Mar 75, which retransmitted DANANG 313 of 25 Mar 75.

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and law and order had broken down completely in Da Nang and Qui Nhon because of the mass of military and civilian refugees. A movement to oust Thieu was afoot, and morale among the populace and military was dangerously low.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 3 April, General Fred Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who had been sent by President Ford to assess the situation in Vietnam, informed Admiral Gayler that he would not be able to stop in Honolulu on his way back to Washington. Apparently, General Weyand had recommended that President Ford ask for a \$722 million supplemental appropriation for Vietnam for Fiscal Year 1975, because, on 8 April, Ambassador Martin informed State, Defense, and CINCPAC that he "thoroughly" endorsed the General's recommendation.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 10 April the State Department forwarded to the American Embassy in Saigon an advance copy of President Ford's speech to the Congress later that day. General Weyand's report to the President had been that the situation in Vietnam was critical, but that South Vietnam was continuing to defend itself with the resources available. He had, indeed, recommended that \$722 million be appropriated by the Congress to stabilize the military situation, permit the chance of a negotiated political settlement between the North and South Vietnamese, and "...if the very worst were to happen, at least allow the orderly evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese to places of safety." The President agreed that humanitarian and military assistance was needed and asked the Congress to appropriate \$722 million without delay for emergency military assistance and an initial \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid. The President also asked the Congress to clarify its restriction on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purpose of protecting American lives. He also described the situation in Cambodia as "tragic," stating that because of their military successes, steady external support and American legislative restrictions, the communists had shown no interest in negotiation, compromise, or political solution. Ford stated that, "...it may soon be too late" for the food and ammunition requested for Cambodia in January to save the country.<sup>3</sup>

(S) A copy of the President's speech, accompanied by another diplomatic note soliciting the active cooperation of various governments to restrain the North Vietnamese, was dispatched to U.S. diplomatic posts by the State Department on 11 April. Again there was no discernible response, and, in fact, negative response from the country usually considered to be the closest ally of the United States. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Elliot Richardson,

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1. CIA/MILDIST FVS 34148/020759Z Apr 75; COMIPAC Spec. Rpt. No. 1, 021025Z Mar 75.
  2. Gen. Weyand to Adm Gayler, 606/031127Z Apr 75 (BOM); AMEMB Saigon 4516/081200Z Apr 75.
  3. SECSTATE 82615/102347Z Apr 75 (EX).

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had invited special attention to the passage in the diplomatic note which urged the U.K. Government to call on Hanoi to adhere to the Paris Agreement. Foreign Secretary Callaghan's initial reaction was sharp. He said, "I don't go along with you on Vietnam." He did not agree that Britain could make a formal statement, asserting that the Saigon regime was finished because it did not have the moral authority to remain in control. Callaghan maintained that violation of the Paris Accords was a minor cause of the collapse in South Vietnam, as was the Congressional refusal to vote funds. He agreed, privately, that the present situation was caused by aggression from the North which ought to be condemned. When pressed for an expression of concern to help stabilize the situation at some point short of total surrender, however, Callaghan said that he would give careful consideration to a response to the note which, "...would not accentuate our differences but which would not take the U.S. line. He wanted to be as helpful as possible and would not rub salt in wounds."<sup>1</sup>

(C) The same day of the Ford speech, but not in response to it, the U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa reported on Canadian reaction to North Vietnamese aggression. The Ambassador reported that Canadian press reaction had been muted. Many news stories had been printed, but few editorials had appeared regarding communist advances in South Vietnam. These few had questioned the value of airlifting orphans to the United States and Canada, but had acknowledged the humanitarian motives behind the actions. The situation in South Vietnam had arisen during a House of Commons question period when several members asked the Foreign Minister whether the Government had protested the major military offensive by North Vietnam. He replied, "...Last week I issued a statement which contained the views of the Government of Canada...I have not made a protest or denounced the situation as such but have made the comment that a major military offensive is under way and that the Government of Canada deplores this fact..." Other members of Parliament had pointed out an apparent discrepancy in the fact that Parliament had issued a resolution condemning the U.S. bombing of Vietnam but was unwilling to take similar action against North Vietnam. The Ambassador also included in his message excerpts from a Montreal Gazette article entitled, "We'll Shed No Tears Over the Fallen Regime." The writer, in a "thoughtful and somewhat sarcastic" mood, had written:<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 4321/110530Z Apr 75; AMEMB Warsaw 2136/110950Z Apr 75; AMEMB Budapest 997/111130Z Apr 75; AMEMB Jakarta 4366/120700Z Apr 75; AMEMB London 5509/111730Z Apr 75.
  2. AMEMB Ottawa 1309/102115Z Apr 75.

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...Our diplomatic alignments would indicate that our sympathies would be with Hanoi, not with Saigon, just as they are with Peking, and not Taipei, or with Havana, and not Washington, in our confrontations. If this is a proper reading...the moment a communist government takes over in Saigon, we will recognize it, and shed no tears over the fallen regime. Our consciences, if they trouble us at all, will be eased by the evidence that the Government of Vietnam collapsed as much of its own internal rot as from communist pressure...according to this philosophy, the people... throughout South Vietnam will become part of the new reality... but we have ruled the ultimate state of affairs in all these lands to be satisfactory, and we have extended the hand of friendship to communist governments everywhere. Does anyone doubt that we shall shortly be joining in celebration of these dates in Vietnamese and Cambodian history as dates of liberation?

(G) The Embassy in Saigon reported that Vietnamese reaction to President Ford's speech was generally favorable and that sagging morale was boosted by Ford's request for substantial military aid and his emphasis on the special obligation of the United States toward Vietnam. Some ranking officials, however, expressed the view that the speech was not strong enough and were disappointed that no mention was made of U.S. military intervention to halt the offensive. One senior South Vietnam official said, "a single B-52 strike would do more for the morale of the Vietnamese than all of the fancy words." He contended that the communists were watching the situation carefully and were poised to exploit it militarily, and emphasized that the next few days would be critical."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The reaction in Hanoi to the President's speech was passed by the Embassy in Saigon the same day. A spokesman called "Commentator" said that, "no one will prevent" the evacuation of Americans, but if the U.S. "continues to act recklessly, it will cause the loss of more American lives." He discounted any threat to U.S.-associated Vietnamese if they cooperated with the PRG, but called Ford's new aid proposals, "nothing but a new dark scheme." The article, carried in the Hanoi Party newspaper Nhan Dan, concluded with the assertion that, "the only correct way for the U.S. to act is to put a complete end to its military involvement and interference in South Vietnam, respect the Paris Agreement and allow the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs...."<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Saigon 4861/121001Z Apr 75.
  2. AMEMB Saigon 4863/121057Z Apr 75.

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(S) By 19 April an IPAC assessment noted a rapid, continuous flow of enemy men and material to the South, and speculated that the North Vietnamese battle plan for Saigon would be a three-pronged assault. The communists would have clear superiority in numbers of main force troops (85,000 versus 60,000). Although the South Vietnamese forces continued to defend Xuan Loc, there was doubt that they would stand and fight in the midst of civilian panic and against a superior force. The IPAC estimate for continued survivability of Saigon and the South Vietnam Government was 10-30 days. This was followed on 24 April by a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report that the South Vietnamese commanders were consolidating the defenses of Saigon in spite of growing pessimism that it was a futile effort.<sup>1</sup>

(U) By mid-April press reports emphasized the "irretrievable" situation, and cited a "secret" report that the American Ambassador was delaying the evacuation of U.S. personnel unreasonably. Senators were quoted as urging the immediate evacuation of Americans, but, on 16 April, the President was quoted as "absolutely convinced" that South Vietnam could stabilize its defenses if Congress approved his request for \$722 million. According to the "secret" report, virtually all Vietnamese military and civilian leaders believed that President Thieu should be removed from office, but, also according to this report, U.S. intelligence officials believed that only decisive military action by the United States could reverse the situation in Vietnam. Associated Press stories from Washington and Saigon stressed the need to remove Thieu, as well as the growing despair among the people. Secretary of State Kissinger, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, accused Russia and China of making a mockery of the 1973 ceasefire agreement by supplying arms to North Vietnam. He also noted that none of the signers of the peace pact had joined the United States in protesting Hanoi's flagrant violations of the pact. These nations, in addition to the United States, were the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and the Secretary General of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

(U) One press story included speculation that the President had deftly involved the Congress in the future of Indochina:<sup>3</sup>

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1. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 23, 190404Z Apr 73; DIA 2097/241937Z Apr 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Apr 75, "Report Charges Evacuation Lag," dateline Washington (AP); "Growing Despair Seen in Saigon," dateline Saigon (AP); "Kissinger Assails Hanoi Backers," dateline Washington (AP).
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 Apr 75, "President Involves Congress," by J. F. terHorst (Universal Press Syndicate).

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The President, it can be said on highest authority, is under no illusions that congressional acceptance of his 11th-hour proposals would have guaranteed the survival of a non-communist government in Saigon. He made his request because he wanted it understood around the world that the presidency had not deliberately decided to "cut and run" in Indochina.

Mr. Ford now is saying that his administration will follow whatever policy Congress lays down on Vietnam. For the first time in years, and whether they like it or not, members of Congress will have to accept the responsibility for America's role in Indochina.

(U) By 19 April, the same day as the IPAC assessment of South Vietnamese longevity, the press reported on the movement of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific, naming specifically the MIDWAY, OKINAWA, HANCOCK, ENTERPRISE, and CORAL SEA. According to this report, U.S. officials acknowledged that many Americans had been evacuated from Saigon by air, and that only about 3,000 remained in Vietnam. Another article on the same day by a Honolulu reporter dealt with rumors that more U.S. Marines would be deployed from the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station on Oahu to the Western Pacific. The reporter noted that one helicopter squadron from the air group at Kaneohe had participated in the evacuation of Americans from Phnom Penh (q.v.), and speculated that more Marines were needed to back up those already deployed to Southeast Asia waters from Okinawa.

(S) Meanwhile, on 4 April the DAO had advised that President Thieu was expected to resign within three days and leave South Vietnam for Taiwan. Thieu's resignation did not actually take place until 21 April, and the U.S. Embassy in Taipei reported the arrival of the Thieu party in Taipei on 26 April. The Embassy noted in its report that the parole documents of some members of the Thieu entourage appeared to be irregular.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 29 April one Honolulu daily newspaper headline said, "Americans Flee Saigon"; this and several other articles and news reports described the American evacuation of Saigon in an armada of 81 helicopters guarded by 800

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 19 Apr 75, "U.S. Carriers Go to Sea in Far East Waters," dateline Washington (AP); "More Isle Marines Appear Set for Action," by Lyle Nelson, Star-Bulletin Writer.
  2. USDAO Saigon 040701Z Apr 75; SECSTATE 97608/261920Z Apr 75, which passed AMEMB Taipei 2256 of 26 Apr 75.

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Marines and U.S. fighter planes roaring overhead. Pentagon sources were quoted as admitting to a one-hour delay after a mysterious radio transmission ordered the helicopters to turn back. American sources in Bangkok were quoted that 74 South Vietnam Air Force planes had brought 2,000 Vietnamese into U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base. The ubiquitous Pentagon source was cited in the statement that at least 18 Vietnamese helicopters had landed on or ditched close to U.S. amphibious ships off-shore.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The following day, 30 April, the same newspaper carried a banner two-color headline proclaiming, "It's Over." In addition to the account of the unconditional surrender, the newspaper carried articles entitled, "The Cost of the War," "The Last American Handout in Saigon," "Ford Proud of Decision to Evacuate," "The Effect of the War in Hawaii," "Questions Surround U.S. Role," "Casualty Totals of All U.S. Wars," "Calley Silent on Red's Takeover of Vietnam," "U.S. Spent \$141 billion in War; 56,000 Died," "Top POW Fears the Consequences," "Quotes from U.S. Era in Vietnam," and, inevitably, an analysis of the aftermath vis-a-vis U.S. political-military relationships worldwide called, "Prestige of U.S., Allies Hurt by Indochina Fall."<sup>2</sup>

(C) An official recapitulation of the events leading to the surrender in Vietnam was found in an IPAC special report entitled "RVN: All Fini." The report began with a description of the massive North Vietnamese buildup of military strength in South Vietnam. According to intelligence information, heavy fighting in 1975 was expected to pave the way for victory in 1976. The possibility of American bombing intervention was a major factor, with the attack on Phuoc Long Province in the north as a test of American reaction. North Vietnam interpreted American inaction as a green light to initiate a heavy offensive, but, at that stage it was unlikely that North Vietnam expected the stunning successes which were to follow. After a short lull, battle erupted on 4 March along major lines of communication (LOC) to the Highlands. In 10 days, President Thieu ordered the withdrawal from the central provinces which became a rout. Within two hours, the road south was clogged with military and civilians in vehicles and on foot. Military units were completely disorganized and incapable of defending the fleeing column, which was pursued to the coast. The precipitous abandonment of the Highlands set a tone of panic and defeatism which rapidly spread to other regions. By 24 March Hue had fallen and Da Nang was isolated and surrounded. With Da Nang clearly indefensible, air and sea evacuation commenced. Air evacuation ended on

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 29 Apr 75, "Americans Flee Saigon," by George Esper, dateline Saigon (AP); "Mysterious Order Delayed Pullout," by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP); "Desperate Scene at U.S. Embassy," by Matt Franjola, dateline Saigon (AP).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 30 Apr 75.

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28 March, when uncontrollable mobs crowded onto the runways, making air operations impossible. By 29 March Da Nang was a scene of chaos with no organized defense. The city fell without a struggle. By 3 April the North Vietnam Army held all of Military Region I and most of Military Region II. After a short lull, pressure built up in Military Region III, and, when South Vietnamese forces were driven from Xuan Loc on 21 April, the way was clear to attack Bien Hoa and Saigon.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On the same day, 21 April, that Xuan Loc fell, President Thieu resigned and was succeeded by Vice President Tran Van Huong, who gave way to former general Duong Van Minh. On 28 April, Bien Hoa came under heavy attack, and, on 29 April, Bien Hoa and Vung Tau fell. Minh's last ditch effort toward a negotiated ceasefire without total surrender was rejected by the communists, and, on the morning of 30 April, he announced the unconditional surrender of the government. Why did the South Vietnamese lose the battle? The IPAC report stated that, in brief, the defeat was the culmination of a long series of military, political, economic and psychological blows which undermined the will and ability of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces to fight. While not considered by IPAC to be all-inclusive, the following were considered to represent some of the reasons "why":<sup>2</sup>

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U.S. logistical support for the RVNAF declined, while China and the USSR increased their support to the NVA. Communist command and control improved significantly, but RVNAF's command and control broke down and eventually was left leaderless.

On the political scene, U.S. war weariness, reflected by Congressional resistance to continued GVN support, increased drastically. In South Vietnam, cynicism about the ability and honesty of the Government grew among the population. Other than anti-communism, a total lack of political ideology existed in the country.

Reduction in U.S. aid coupled with inflation crippled the GVN economy and demoralized its armed forces. The combination of these and other factors resulted in serious psychological problems for the GVN. A sense of isolation, defeat, and abandonment became widespread, especially after

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1. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 28, 080449Z May 75.
  2. Ibid.

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the defeat in Phuoc Long Province and the central Highlands. Likewise, the absence of massive air and artillery support, which the RVNAF had come to rely on as a result of U.S. training, added another significant psychological blow to GVN's will to resist. The NVA exploited the opportunity and hammered on the final epitaph of the Republic of Vietnam-- "All Fini."

#### The Fall of Cambodia

(S) On 26 April 1975 IPAC summarized the military and political events which led to the surrender of the Cambodian Government and armed forces on 17 April 1975. On 1 January 1975 the Khmer Communists (KC) had launched their expected dry season offensive using a revised strategy. Instead of an all-out assault against Phnom Penh, as in the last two such offensives, the KC stressed coordination, command and control; the first objective was the isolation of all LOC leading to Phnom Penh with special emphasis on the Mekong River. At the same time, the KC were still able to maintain intense pressure on Phnom Penh. This strategy was successful. By early February the Mekong River had been closed to Cambodian supply convoys. The only route left for food, fuel, and munitions supply was by airlift to the Phnom Penh airport of Pochentong. Aerial resupply was provided by contract airlift, and, with minor exceptions, the civilian aircrews of these U.S. contractors kept the supply line open almost to the end. By early April the pressure against Phnom Penh had increased as the KC called in troops from outlying provinces. By 12 April the situation had become so critical that the U.S. Ambassador, his staff, other remaining Americans, some third country nationals and a number of Cambodians were evacuated by helicopter in Operation EAGLE PULL. By 16 April the KC had moved into the southern part of Phnom Penh, with infiltrators moving in from the Southwest, West, and North. Late on the 16th, Pochentong airport was overrun, and, on the morning of the 17th, the white flag of surrender was raised over the capital.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On the political front, even as the KC began their offensive in January, Cambodian Government leaders continued their infighting, patronage and political maneuvering. Pressure mounted within and outside the government to force the resignation of President Lon Nol at the same time that power struggles among the ranking military and cabinet officials were taking place.

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1. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 24, 260432Z Apr 75, hereafter cited as IPAC Spec Rpt; see Appendix I for EAGLE PULL.

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After weeks of mounting criticism and pressure, Lon Nol finally acceded and departed Cambodia on 1 April.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In the United States, President Ford told Congress on 25 February that, if his request for \$222 million in supplemental military aid to Cambodia was not approved quickly, "the government forces will be forced, within weeks, to surrender to the insurgents." On 27 February a newspaper columnist, citing Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's comment that without the money from Congress Cambodia would "absolutely" fall, began his article by asking: "Why doesn't Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger go on television and try to sell the Brooklyn Bridge?" Another columnist speculated on the reason for Administration insistence on money for Cambodia. The main issue, he speculated, was not whether Phnom Penh would fall, but how. The reasoning was that if American ammunition shipments to Cambodia were ended, this would blind world perceptions to Phnom Penh's incompetence. If the collapse came as aid continued, Washington would still be seen as a faithful ally and the fault would clearly be the Cambodians'. Two newspaper stories on 1 and 2 March discussed Lon Nol's purported willingness to step down as president and his appeal to visiting U.S. congressional fact-finders for more U.S. aid.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The tone of most news coverage pertaining to the Administration request for supplemental funds was skeptical, if not negative. However, the expressed need for funds by various U.S. Government officials in testimony before Congressional committees was based on solid and up-to-date reports from the field. For example, on 13 March, Brigadier General William Palmer, Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), summarized the situation in a message to the principal deputy assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Erich Von Marbod. He reviewed the consumption rate for various fuel and munition items, the remaining days of supply levels for critical items, and assessed the losses to date of major items of equipment to the KC. He stated that the continuing high level of combat intensity had resulted in accelerated attrition of materiel assets and manpower. Moreover, failure to receive supplemental funds would force further curtailment of Cambodian

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1. Ibid.; DOD/PRO Camp Smith 232132Z Jan 75 (EX), 242318Z Feb 75 (EX), 121901Z Mar 75 (EX), 202215Z Mar 75 (EX), and 212059Z Mar 75 (EX); AMEMB Phnom Penh 5860/011246Z Apr 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 25 Feb 75, "Ford Pleads for Aid, Says Loss is Near," dateline Washington (AP); 27 Feb 75, "The Cambodian Disaster," by Tom Wicker, dateline New York (N.Y.T.S.); 28 Feb 75, "Reason for Cambodia Policy," by Leslie H. Gelb, dateline Washington (N.Y.T.S.); 1 Mar 75, "Lon Nol Willing to Resign," Saigon (AP); 2 Mar 75, "Lon Nol: Would Quit to Help Bring Peace," dateline Phnom Penh (UPI).

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Air Force sortie rates and adversely affect aircraft maintenance. Palmer also supplied a brief resumé of the overall military situation, and concluded that, at that time:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The overall military situation is very serious but not yet critical. FANK's morale is fair and there is evident a certain determination to defeat the enemy at Phnom Penh and reopen the Mekong as primary objectives of the current dry season. However, there exist several factors which, either singly or combined, could destroy FANK's combat effectiveness overnight: namely, a directed termination of U.S. military aid, the closing of Pochentong to U.S. resupply airlift, and/or the depletion of Kantauk ammunition stocks to a dangerously low level.

(U) Shortly before the foregoing message was dispatched to Washington, the State Department had released, on 5 March, a statement summarizing the diplomatic efforts of the United States toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Cambodia. The statement asserted that major efforts toward a negotiated settlement in 1973 appeared to promise results, but that the bombing halt imposed by Congress in August 1973 thwarted a settlement. Reviewing subsequent overtures toward negotiations made in 1974 and in January and February 1975, all of which were rebuffed, the statement included the following principles endorsed by the United States in pursuit of a compromise settlement:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

- The United States will support any negotiations that the parties themselves are prepared to support.
- The United States will accept any outcome from the negotiations that the parties themselves will accept.
- As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

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1. CHMEDTC 367/131100Z Mar 75 (BOM).  
2. SECSTATE 49074/051829Z Mar 75.

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(U) As also noted in the statement released by the State Department, and as borne out by events little more than one month later, "...negotiating prospects will be dim as long as the Cambodian Government's military position remains precarious...." On 18 April President Ford's reaction to the fall of Cambodia was distributed by the State Department in a message to all U.S. diplomatic and consular posts worldwide, and, of course, the statement by Ford received nationwide press coverage. He expressed sadness, compassion, and admiration for the Cambodian Government leaders and people. The press dispatches from the scene, as usual, tended to deplore American military involvement in the five-year "civil war," and to paint a picture of the inevitability of the KC victory and of joy in the capital.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 18 April State also cancelled a request for continued airdrop planning after the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Phnom Penh, noting that, in view of the fall of Phnom Penh, the planning request had been overtaken by events. The Secretary of State expressed to the Secretary of Defense his appreciation of, "...effort made by SECDEF and all military commands in this exercise." Also on 18 April, the information spokesman for the Defense Department assured reporters that airdrops of rice and other supplies into Cambodia had stopped on 17 April, and summarized the total funds appropriated under the military assistance program as \$1.264 billion from Fiscal Year 1950 through 1975, with \$1.258 billion having been actually delivered.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The epilogue for ex-President Lon Nol began on 1 April with his exodus from Cambodia. His first stop was at U-Tapao in Thailand, where he received elaborate honors from the Royal Thai Government. The CINCPAC public affairs liaison officer to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) reported to CINCPAC that positive action had been taken to prevent any appearance of U.S. military involvement in Lon Nol's travels. Arrangements had been made for Lon Nol to be transported to Indonesia via Indonesian aircraft. He departed U-Tapao on the afternoon of 1 April as scheduled.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Prior to his departure, Lon Nol had taped a farewell address which was broadcast several times beginning about noon on 1 April. In his address, he gave the reasons for his departure, announced his designation of Saukam Khoy as

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1. Ibid.; SECSTATE 88993/180342Z Apr 75; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Apr 75, "Phnom Penh Cheers Triumphant Rebels/Jubilant Victory Parade," headline (AP); "Ford Expresses 'Sadness' at Loss," dateline Washington (AP); "U.S. Raid Started Cambodia's Agony," by William L. Ryan (AP).
  2. SECSTATE 89393/181915Z Apr 75; SECDEF 5639/182301Z Apr 75.
  3. CINCPAC PA LNO Bangkok 595/011010Z Apr 75 (BOM).

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acting president, and stated his intention to request the intercession of Indonesia in resolving the Cambodian conflict. He also stated his intention to travel elsewhere after his Indonesian visit for reasons of health. The State Department advised the American embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Cambodia, as well as CINCPAC, that Lon Nol would remain in Indonesia for two weeks, after which he had requested medical treatment at Tripler Army Medical Center in Honolulu. The United States had agreed, and all concerned were instructed that the U.S. Government role in Lon Nol's travel to Honolulu would be limited to a possible transit stop at Clark Air Base in the Philippines and to the possible use of a U.S. Air Force plane for onward travel from Clark.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 3 April the Embassy in Jakarta advised that the Indonesian Government desired to keep secret the fact that Lon Nol would be flown to Biak by Indonesia, where he would transfer to a U.S. Air Force aircraft. Four days later, Jakarta advised that the Indonesians had changed the plan, and that Lon Nol and party would be flown to Guam by a chartered Indonesian aircraft. The Ambassador requested clearance for the Garuda (Indonesian flag carrier) aircraft to land at Guam, arrangements for travel from Guam to Honolulu, and a French-speaking officer to be detailed by CINCPAC to accompany the party from Guam to Honolulu.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 9 April the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) authorized the 43d Strategic Wing at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam to receive the incoming Garuda Indonesian Airways aircraft as a government aircraft since it was transporting, "...head of state." Ground handling was to be done by the 43d, and the cost of 75,000 pounds of jet fuel for the return trip (\$4,371.09) was to be paid in cash by Garuda. CINCPAC informed all concerned that a Pacific Air Forces VC-135 aircraft would transport Lon Nol and party from Guam to Honolulu, arriving late (2330 local) on 10 April. Admiral Gayler was to meet the aircraft, after which Lon Nol would be admitted to Tripler.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The day after his arrival in Honolulu, a State Department representative informed Lon Nol of the planned evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh. The following day, 12 April, he was informed of the evacuation of Saukam Khoy and Lon Nol's brother, Lon Non, to Bangkok. Lon Nol also requested the State Department to contact Irving Trust in New York regarding a letter of credit signed by the Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia. The letter allotted a sum of money to Lon Nol to be paid quarterly, with the first installment amounting to \$200,000. He requested that the entire sum be transferred to a bank in Honolulu.<sup>4</sup>

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1. AMEMB Phnom Penh 5851/011107Z Apr 75; SECSTATE 73704/012240Z Apr 75 (EX).
  2. AMEMB Jakarta 3927/030515Z Apr 75 (EX) and 4106/070900Z Apr 75 (EX).
  3. CSAF 091550Z Apr 75; CINCPAC 100154Z Apr 75 (EX).
  4. CINCPAC 130852Z Apr 75 (EX).

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(S) After the surrender to the communists, State advised that no comment regarding Lon Nol should be made by CINCPAC other than on medical aspects, and that every effort should be made to insulate the Lon Nol party from the press. State expressed pleasure that Lon Nol had received his funds and was negotiating for the purchase of a house in Honolulu, and also advised that Secret Service protection was being withdrawn. Also, the U.S. Treasury had frozen all Cambodian Government funds after the surrender, which, State noted, was not aimed at Lon Nol personally but designed to prevent the new government from obtaining control of Cambodian funds. The Treasury did not block the withdrawal of \$200,000 by Lon Nol.<sup>1</sup>

(S) And finally, on 22 April, State directed its reception center in Honolulu to inform Lon Nol that neither he nor his party were entitled to diplomatic status, and recommended that he explore with the Immigration and Naturalization Service means to adjust his status in the United States after the expiration of his visa.<sup>2</sup>

(S) One post-mortem examination of the factors leading to the demise of Cambodia was that offered by IPAC on 26 April. One factor was the realization by the Cambodian Government and armed forces that U.S. assistance was ended, although the flow of rice, fuel, and ammunition continued to the end. Another factor was the greatly improved command, control and coordination shown by the KC in 1975, combined with the revised strategy of isolating and strangling Phnom Penh. The KC were more successful in replacing manpower losses. They also had retained the initiative throughout the war, except for a few months in 1974, and had inculcated ideological zeal for total military victory in their troops. One last factor, IPAC speculated, could have been the snowballing effect of each KC victory. The KC were motivated to press on, while the Cambodian armed forces lost morale and will to fight. Thus, during the last days, the armed forces were not talking about pushing back the KC, but rather, the timing of a ceasefire or the arrival of a United Nations peace-keeping force.<sup>3</sup>

#### Laos - The Third Domino

(U) The Lao Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) was formed on 5 April 1974 as a coalition of the pro-western Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the communist Pathet Lao in accordance with provisions of the Vientiane Agreement of 21 February 1973. This coalition had been an uneasy alliance from

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1. SECSTATE 90602/192301Z Apr 75.
  2. SECSTATE 92661/222254Z Apr 75.
  3. Op. Cit.; IPAC Spec Rpt.

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its inception, and, by early 1975, U.S. officials reported conversations which reflected bitter feuding between the two sides and hints of a possible coup.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 11 April (the day before the U.S. evacuation from Cambodia) the U.S. Defense Attaché (DATT) in Vientiane and the U.S. Ambassador each assessed the political mood in Laos in the light of events in Cambodia and Vietnam. The only common addressee on the two messages was CINCPAC. The DATT considered the situation in Laos to be slowly tilting in favor of the communists, who were better organized, more highly motivated, and backed by North Vietnam mentors. Events in Cambodia and Vietnam, the DATT stated, could serve as catalysts to speed up the erosion process. Officers on the RLG (Vientiane) side were worried and depressed, and sought daily assurance that U.S. aid would continue. The Ambassador, whose report was couched in terms of his imminent departure to another post, concluded that his diplomatic colleagues of all political persuasions continued to desire the United States to play an important role in, "...this part of the world." This was in part manifested by a tactful silence on the part of the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao with regard to recent events, he said, but more specifically:<sup>2</sup>

...by the gestures made by both Lao sides in connection with my departure and by the emphasis placed by the Lao of both sides and by communist and non-communist diplomats on the desirability of my replacement arriving promptly.

(S) The Ambassador "sensed" less reproach of the United States than he had expected, noting that the non-communists of the Vientiane side were shocked by the turn of events in Vietnam and Cambodia, "...but they are far from laying the blame on our doorstep." The non-communists were "heart sick" to see their Vietnamese friends in trouble, fearful of the arrogance which North Vietnamese successes would engender in the Pathet Lao, and blamed Thieu and the South Vietnamese army for, "...falling into the present mess." They "agonize" over the failure of Lon Nol and their other Cambodian friends to do better, stated the Ambassador, but they blamed the Khmer more than the United States.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Considering subsequent events in Laos, the attitude expressed by these Lao officials could only evoke a "glass house" image. But perhaps the most illuminating comments on the entire situation in Indochina were contained in

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1. IPAC Fact Sheet, 5 Jan 76, Subj: People's Democratic Republic of Laos; AMEMB Vientiane 1247/210825Z Feb 75.
  2. USDAO Vientiane Laos 110715Z Apr 75 (BOM); AMEMB Vientiane 2522/110437Z Apr 75.
  3. Ibid.

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this same Embassy message. The Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, was delighted to recall for the Ambassador the number of North Vietnamese he had punched in the head, "...when he was studying in Hanoi." And even more to the point of the Indochinese conundrum was the following passage:<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

...Finance Minister Ngon Sananikone, who is a pillar of anti-communism and has known Lon Nol (and Big Minh) since they were all Indo-china soccer football stars forty years ago, confided yesterday that the corruption and incompetence of Lon Nol and his people had brought about the present disaster. The Americans had supplied them amply, he said, but the mismanagement by the Khmer had been appalling....

(S) In April renewed conflict between the armed forces of the two sides in the coalition erupted, the National Assembly was dissolved, the new governments in Vietnam and Cambodia were recognized, and the Vientiane side cabinet ministers voluntarily surrendered their authority to Souvanna Phouma to deal with the Pathet Lao. [REDACTED] the gravest threat against the coalition was not military defeat, but the RLG perception that Vientiane could suffer the same fate as Saigon and Phnom Penh. This perception could lead to psychological resignation and the collapse of the PGNU without a battle.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In May left-wing student demonstrations and riots peaked in the seizure of U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) compounds in Savannaket and Vientiane itself. American personnel were held as hostages and the students demanded the termination of the U.S. AID programs. On 10 May the State Department approved U.S. Embassy plans to, "...begin quietly to thin out mission personnel." This was to be done as inconspicuously as possible, "...so as to avoid giving a wrong signal to our friends and creating the impression that we are pulling out of Laos." For the balance of the month, events moved in rapid sequence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another 11 May message from the Embassy documented, "...the magnitude of Vientiane side's collapse," and contained a list,

1. Ibid.
2. DIA 2097/241939Z Apr 75; SECSTATE 106103/070241Z May 75; COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 30, 100451Z May 75; IPAC Point Paper, 9 May 75, Subj: Laos Coalition in Trouble.

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admittedly incomplete, of persons known or believed to have fled the country, including some planning to leave that day. Most had fled to Thailand, a few to France, and two--the chief and deputy chief of military intelligence--to the United States. Among those known to have departed was the former soccer football star and pillar of anti-communism, Ngou Sananikone.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Embassy advised that the Pathet Lao had moved quickly on 12 May to exploit the virtual disappearance of the Vientiane side and to exert control over government operations, commercial activities, and movement of persons. On 14 May a student mob ransacked the U.S. AID facility at Savannaket and seized AID supplies at Luang Prabang, the royal capital 200 miles north of Vientiane. The demonstrators were believed to be protesting 70 percent inflation, skyrocketing prices and the U.S. presence in Laos. Including dependents, 18 Americans were held by the demonstrators in Savannaket. On 19 May the Embassy informed State that the PGNU would be queried, "...to find out exactly what the Lao now want in terms of economic assistance...." The intent of this initiative was to, "...defuse the whole USAID issue even as we proceed with accelerated thinning-out of dependents and non-essential personnel." The Charge d'Affaires, at that stage, postulated the following situation in his dealings with the Pathet Lao officials:<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The questions for our policy are therefore very basic ones. The LPF ministers say they want U.S. assistance to continue, but they do not want an AID mission of anything like the present size or structure and they do not want a USAID presence anywhere outside Vientiane. Their prescription for our operations seems to be based on the local French model: a handful of economic officers administering funds out of a relatively small diplomatic mission. (Ideally, the LPF would probably have us mail a check from Washington.) We in turn have legislatively mandated fundamental criteria of supervision and audit for project programs which will, to say the least, be difficult to reconcile with the new PGNU's demands.

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1. SECSTATE 109657/101650Z May 75; 109711/1102582Z May 75; USSAG DIS 131-75, 110910Z May 75 (BOM); AMEMB Vientiane 3217/111150Z May 75.
  2. AMEMB Vientiane 3247/121110Z May 75 and 3507/191042Z May 75; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 14 May 75, "Lao Students Ransack U.S. Installations," dateline Washington (AP).

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(c) The Charge also acknowledged the possible influence of Congressional reaction on the overall situation when he said:<sup>1</sup>

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We wish to emphasize that another reason for going to Phoumi (and Leuam) as we plan to do in coming week is to defuse the entire issue of USAID as a target by taking the lead in raising it. We are also mindful that some possibly dramatic curtailment of our assistance, both economic and military, particularly around the natural cutoff point for some programs of June 30, could increase tensions. This aspect of course relates to the accelerated thinning-out of personnel discussed...above. It is also directly linked to future of MAP (e.g., potential problems were we to terminate abruptly the feeding of 50,000 FAR troops and their dependents), which are being discussed in a separate series of messages between DATT and CINCPAC.

(c) On 21 May the press reported the seizure of the AID compound in Vientiane, where two U.S. Marines and a civilian were held behind the locked gates. The student demonstrations demanded the immediate dissolution of the U.S. AID program and the departure of all its employees. They also demanded that all AID facilities, material, and personal property not properly taxed be turned over to the government. At the American housing village four miles from the center of Vientiane, Pathet Lao troops stood guard; movement of Americans was not restricted, but no belongings could be taken out of the living quarters area. On 22 May the press reported that 18 Americans held by demonstrators in Savannaket had been flown to Thailand. The same article stated that substantial withdrawals of Americans from Laos had been announced by the United States Government. The following day, the press reported the departure of 150 American women and children from Vientiane. According to this report, the communist-dominated Lao Government announced that Washington had agreed to withdraw all U.S. AID personnel except a few experts to dismantle the 24-year old AID program. On the same day as this press dispatch, 23 May, the Embassy in Vientiane informed State that instructions had been carried out; in line with U.S.-PGNU discussions, the Charge had informed Souvanna that Washington had decided to close the U.S. AID mission and to withdraw its

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 3507/191042Z May 75.

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personnel. However, a great many administrative details remained in order to effect an orderly transfer of facilities to the PGNU:<sup>1</sup>

...For instance, today is payday for USAID employees and we had received threatening note that unless we effected payments the signatories (representative of USAID employees, Democratic Center for Justice, and President of Student Federation Khansai) would not guarantee security of property and lives of USAID personnel. It is therefore essential that we be able to pay the employees, close down the operation, and effect the transfer. Souvanna looked surprised that demonstrators still held the compound as he had given "orders" yesterday to evacuate the area.

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I did not rpt not indicate that we were suspending AID programs. Country Team is unanimous that however worded such a statement would be viewed by PGNU as threat and would not be helpful at this tricky time. We are administratively stopping economic aid in pipeline. Military aid, consisting of rice, some fuel and medicine, are continuing to be provided.

(X) Less than eight hours later, still on 23 May, the Embassy reported the receipt of a personal note from the PGNU foreign minister to the Charge d'Affaires containing a formal request to renegotiate the "Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation" signed on 9 September 1951 by the RLG and the United States. On 27 May the press reported that students in the Vientiane AID compound had agreed to leave. In return, the Charge had agreed, stated the article, to send all U.S. [REDACTED] of the U.S. AID mission out of the country by 30 June. The students asserted that the United States had also agreed to pay the back wages of all local AID employees and to continue to pay their wages until the mission was dissolved. A "U.S. spokesman" was cited for the statement that only about 300 American officials and dependents remained in Laos.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 21 May 75, "Students Seize AID Headquarters in Laos," dateline Vientiane (AP); 22 May 75, "U.S. Starting Pullout from Laos," by Peter O'Loughlin, dateline Vientiane (AP); 23 May 75, "Americans Begin Laos Exodus," dateline Vientiane (AP); AMEMB Vientiane 3627/230540Z May 75.
  2. AMEMB Vientiane 3649/231145Z May 75; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 27 May 75, "U.S. Gets Laos Mission Back," dateline Vientiane (AP).

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(C) On 2 June Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib arrived in Laos and called on Prime Minister Souvanna. Habib told Souvanna that, because of recent events, officials in Washington were re-examining America's relations with Laos, and that any future assistance would require Congressional authorization and be subject to the verification as to use required by U.S. law. The conversation reflected what the Chargé characterized as Souvanna's "...lack of touch with reality and his acceptance of Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) views." Souvanna said there had been no real change in Laos, only an evolution of attitudes. He also told Habib:<sup>1</sup>

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...The press says that the Pathet Lao are taking over. It's not true. They don't even want to....They respect the King. They never formed a separate government at Sam Neua.... Perhaps in five or six years Laos will be communist, but they are reasonable and nationalists. They respect our monarchy and there will be no dictatorship.

(C) During his talks with the Lao foreign minister, Habib was told that the PGNU desired continued relations with the United States and that, "Even if aid changes its form our good relations won't change. We want even more aid." Habib replied, inter alia, that there were many points of friction; that U.S.-Laos future relations would have to be orderly; that the time for playing games had passed; and that the United States was reconsidering its policy in Southeast Asia and events in Laos were receiving close attention. At the moment, Habib said, "...events in Laos raised questions about the value of our continuing relations."<sup>2</sup>



(U) On 20 June Pathet Lao troops took up positions inside the gate of U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Christian Chapman's home in Vientiane. The Foreign Ministry position was that they should not be there and would be ordered out.


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1. AMEMB Vientiane 3952/030712Z Jun 75.
  2. AMEMB Vientiane 3968/031038Z Jun 75.
  3. IPAC Spec Rpt No. 33, 190220Z Jun 75 and Spec Rpt No. 34, 202119Z Jun 75.

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Five days later, on 25 June, the Pathet Lao warned the United States to shut down its AID mission by 30 June, or, "face the responsibility for everything that might happen." A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy reportedly agreed that the remaining AID officials would depart by 30 June, but noted that the transfer of AID property to the Laotian Government would not be completed by that time. During the week of 28, 29 June, five U.S. facilities were seized by demonstrators, including the U.S. Information Service building, and, on 30 June, the AID office was closed. The U.S. military assistance program was terminated on 31 July 1975.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The U.S. Embassy noted the incredibility registered by RLG Pathet Lao officials at their realization that U.S. aid had been terminated. They appeared not to have ever considered such termination, and appeared to believe it unwarranted regardless of the events of May and June.



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(C) The State Department agreed that the preservation of a modest-sized embassy in Vientiane even in the face of severe provocation had served U.S. interests. As long as the safety of U.S. personnel was not seriously endangered and the mission could function effectively, State policy was to maintain a U.S. presence in Laos and to avoid confrontation with the PGNU.<sup>3</sup>

(U) According to a news dispatch from Hong Kong, the Pathet Lao announced on 23 August that they had seized power in the Kingdom of Laos and established a revolutionary government. However, the nomenclature continued to be the PGNU, which had, "overthrown the decaying old regime and reactionary old system and set up a new people's administration..." The announcement of the takeover was reportedly made at a mass rally in Vientiane attended by more than 100,000 people. On 28 August Laos, still under the label of PGNU, announced the

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 20 Jun 75, "Lao Troops in Compound of U.S. Envoy," by Neil Ulevich, dateline Vientiane (AP); 25 Jun 75, "U.S. Warned to Close AID," by Denis D. Gray, dateline Vientiane (AP); 3 Jul 75, "Lao Guard Threatens to Kill U.S. Official," dateline Vientiane (AP); COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76, 142245Z Feb 76.
  2. AMEMB Vientiane 4858/161034Z Jul 75, 5027/281144Z Jul 75, and 5065/311021Z Jul 75 (EX).
  3. SECSTATE 183058/021812Z Aug 75 (EX)..

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establishment of diplomatic relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In September the Embassy estimated that Soviet presence in Laos had increased to between 700-900 people, including dependents. All four private banks in Vientiane were closed. Other reports noted increasing Pathet Lao political pressure against Prime Minister Souvanna and the King. While consolidating their political control, the communists also reorganized the military establishment. They disarmed the former royalist (FAR) and neutralist (FAN) troops and integrated them with the Pathet Lao forces. The Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) also included the former Royal Lao Air Force and the river flotilla. Many former royalist troops were assigned to farming and civil projects; some officers, senior noncommissioned officers and former government officials were assigned to "re-training" and indoctrination seminars. At one course in political subjects and socialism, the trainees were told that the Soviet's efforts to replace U.S. influence in Laos must be rebuffed, and that they should adhere more closely to the leadership, "...of their Chinese brothers in Peking." Throughout the months of June, July, and August, massive logistics buildups and supply movements from Laos to Thailand were detected, and the Pathet Lao had stepped up logistic and training support to the communist Thai insurgents across the border.<sup>2</sup>

(U) From 15 to 18 October newspapers and loudspeakers in Vientiane concentrated on "Criticize America Days" in Laos. One new Lao language newspaper asserted that the United States, "fomented war for years in Laos." Pathet Lao speakers at re-education rallies at Vientiane's temples and parks urged neighborhood audiences to join in the three "days of mourning," but did not urge any overt action against the approximately 100 official and private U.S. citizens in Laos.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 17 November a Thai patrol boat was sunk in the Mekong River by Pathet Lao troops. A Thai-Lao border clash erupted, involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The Thai aircraft encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire. The clash lasted only one day, but, on 18 November, the Thai closed the border between the two countries at Nonh Khai/Vientiane. The border remained closed until 1 January 1976, and, in the interim, Hanoi airlifted food and

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 24 Aug 75, "Communists Take Over in Laos," dateline Hong Kong (UPI); AMEMB Vientiane 5410/281045Z Aug 75.
  2. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76, 142245Z Feb 76; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log, Sep, Oct 75; CIA/MILDIST TDFIR-314/04054-75 of 302137Z Aug 75.
  3. CINCPAC ALPHA 64/162100Z Oct 75, which cited a Bangkok (UPI) dispatch.

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fuel to the people in Vientiane. On 30 November the U.S. Embassy was informed that the resignation of the prime minister and the abdication of the King were imminent.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 28 November thousands of demonstrators took to the streets, clamoring for an end to the coalition government. A meeting of high officials on 29 November was followed by a convention of the National Congress of People's Representatives in Vientiane on 1-2 December. The 264-member congress, which ostensibly represented the people of Laos, was dominated by the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front, most of whom were also members of the LPRP. Under the leadership of Kaysone Phomvihane, Secretary General of the LPRP, the congress approved the abolishment of the PGNU, the abdication of King Savang Vatthana and the resignation of Souvanna Phouma. Prince Souphanouvong, Chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front and the Joint National Political Council, was named president of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos (PDRL). Kaysone was named prime minister.<sup>2</sup>

(U) At the same time, a staff member of the U.S. House Select Committee on Missing Persons visited Laos from 1-8 December. He managed to meet several officials of the new government, whose primary concern appeared to be whether crash-site investigations to identify U.S. personnel missing in action were a quid pro quo for the resumption of U.S. aid. This visit was followed on 22-23 December by the visit of the House Committee chairman and three other members. Their reception during the 18-hour visit was not cordial. The PDRL had officially declined to meet with the Congressional Delegation (CODEL), and it was only by the intercession of United Nations officials in Vientiane that the Foreign Ministry "Chief of Cabinet" agreed to see the CODEL. In response to CODEL representations regarding the acquisition to information on Americans missing in action, the Lao official reportedly reminded the CODEL of Emmet Kay's release in September 1974. He claimed that that was a good-will gesture not reciprocated by the United States, complaining that the United States had bombed Laos but refused to help reconstruct the country. However, there was no substantive discussion of the question of resumption of U.S. economic assistance as a possible condition for admission to Laos of search teams.<sup>3</sup>

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1. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log, Nov, Dec 75; COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76, 142245Z Feb 76.
  2. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76, 142245Z Feb 76; IPAC Fact Sheet, 5 Jan 76, Subj: People's Democratic Republic of Laos; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 3 Dec 75, "Communists Abolish Lao Coalition," dateline Vientiane (AP) and 4 Dec 75, "New Lao Leaders are Named," dateline Vientiane (AP).
  3. AMEMB Vientiane 6515/090425Z Dec 75 and 6645/231140Z Dec 75.

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(C) There was no doubt, however, that a resumption of U.S. aid to the new government was the sine qui non of U.S.-Lao diplomatic relations. On 13 December the Political-Military Adviser of the U.S. Embassy reported the results of the courtesy call made by him (in the absence of the Charge) on the new PDRL president and prime minister. The Embassy representative confirmed the desire of the United States to continue diplomatic relations, noting that President Ford's trip to China and his Pacific Doctrine speech demonstrated U.S. interest in dialogue and friendly relations even with countries whose ideologies differed markedly with that of the United States. President Souphanouvong expressed the same sentiment, but noted that the long history of Lao-U.S. contact had left scars. Therefore, he hoped that relations could be "normalized," a process which would include an American contribution to the "healing of the wounds of war." When, at the conclusion of the meeting, toasts were exchanged, Souphanouvong expressed the hope that diplomatic relations would soon be expanded into "other areas," which, in the context, clearly meant resumption of aid.<sup>1</sup>

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 6558/130530Z Dec 75.

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SECTION III--OVERTURES IN SEA MAJOR

(S) As early as 10 April 1975 an IPAC report assessed the impact of the anticipated collapse of the existing governments of Cambodia and Vietnam on such nations in the PACOM area as Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore (the ASEAN nations), Australia, Laos, New Zealand, and North Vietnam. There was little doubt, stated the report, that these countries were in the process of evaluating the significance of then-current events in Vietnam and Cambodia. This evaluation would consider such subjects as the evolving new balance of power in Southeast Asia; further erosion of U.S. influence in the area; future communist strategy; diplomatic relations vis-a-vis new regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as other communist governments in Asia; and the political stability and internal security of the countries concerned. Communist successes in the two countries had served to highlight the continuing decline of U.S. military and political influence in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. There was growing apprehension that, after a period of consolidation, the communists would intensify their support of local insurgencies, particularly in Thailand. Faced with this threat, and realizing the new balance of power situation in the area, these countries would seek to strengthen regional alliances and/or seek accommodation with the Asian communist governments.<sup>1</sup>

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

(U) ASEAN was established in 1967 to promote the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of its member nations. The original declaration had affirmed the position that all foreign bases located within each sovereign state were temporary. In 1971, the ASEAN members declared the neutrality of Southeast Asia and their resolve that Southeast Asia be recognized by the world as a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality." The sponsor of this resolution was Malaysia. The member states themselves could not agree on the definition of neutrality, since two of the five (Thailand and the Philippines) had U.S. bases and were committed to the mutual defense pact against communism of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).<sup>2</sup>

(U) Perhaps more to the point, ASEAN as a bloc was originally not only non-communist, but anti-communist in its orientation. Two other members, Malaysia and Indonesia, had experienced direct confrontations with communism--Indonesia's 12-year encounter had ended in a bloodbath of general officers and the establishment of the Suharto regime in 1965; Malaysia's toll of human

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1. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 19, 100820Z Apr 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 663-664.

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lives in its victory over communist insurgency had been enormous. Singapore, the fifth ASEAN nation, had nursed a mortal fear of communism since achieving independence less than two months before the attempted communist coup in Indonesia.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In March 1975 the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand paid a farewell call on the SEATO Secretary General, who was a Thai. The Ambassador posed the question of whether ASEAN might evolve from its economic and social origins into some form of defensive alliance. The reply was negative, since it would take many years for the ASEAN relationship as presently constituted to fully develop. The Secretary General recalled that most of its members had been dominated by foreign powers over long periods of time, and had considered themselves pawns subject to conflicting great power alliances. In his judgment, these newly-independent nations were not then prepared nor willing to trade sovereignty for new and uncertain alliances. They would move slowly, and only time would permit any cohesive defensive arrangements to evolve.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Accordingly, and since SEA Major had not reached a viable plateau of collective security, the United States faced the tremendous task of reassuring its wavering friends. For example, President Marcos of the Philippines, on 4 April, informed U.S. Ambassador Sullivan in confidence of a visit by a representative of President Suharto of Indonesia. Suharto was deeply troubled by the "apparent collapse" of Indochina and by the, "resurgence of communist subversive activity in ASEAN region." In view of those circumstances, Suharto intended to propose to the other four ASEAN heads of government that a summit conference be called as soon as possible. Marcos signified willingness, but only following a meeting of foreign ministers to establish an agenda. The Marcos stipulation, and a subsequent reference to a scheduled ASEAN foreign minister's conference on 13-15 May in Kuala Lumpur by the Thai foreign minister at a press conference, negated the Suharto proposal, at least until after the scheduled meeting.<sup>3</sup>

(S) As published two days before the scheduled ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, the agenda included the proposal for a summit meeting; the concept of neutralizing Southeast Asia; invitations to the Indochinese states to assist in the neutralization proposal; and the extension of formal ASEAN membership to the Indochinese nations. The official report of the discussions on the first day of the conference reflected some semblance of that agenda except for the summit proposal and the neutrality concept. Little disagreement

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1. Current History, Dec 75, "Indonesia and the Changing Order in Asia," by Henri J. Warmenhaven, p. 245.
  2. SECSTATE 60511/181900Z Mar 75, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 4312 of 15 Mar 75.
  3. AMEMB Manila 4230/040937Z Apr 75; AMEMB Bangkok 6362/141104Z Apr 75.

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among the foreign ministers had surfaced on the first day, with some indication that they agreed on the need to cooperate for their own safety and well-being in view of the communist takeover in Indochina. The consensus appeared to reflect the doctrine of "resilience" in that ASEAN would offer friendship to the Indochina countries, but be prepared to react if ASEAN friendship were refused. On the first day, the issue of U.S. bases in Southeast Asia was not raised, officially or unofficially. An intelligence report speculated that the ASEAN foreign ministers preferred that all three major powers (United States, Russia, PRC) remain economically, politically, and militarily active in Southeast Asia.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The classified conclusions of the Eighth ASEAN Conference included agreement that the new governments of Cambodia and Vietnam could be expected to promote "wars of national liberation," to include subversion, in ASEAN countries. The delegates did not believe that the PRC nor Russia would collaborate in this subversion. The formation of three supranational ASEAN committees was proposed for approval by the member governments: political committee; economic committee; defense committee. Once the defense committee had been approved, an appeal by ASEAN, through the committee, would be made to western governments for military assistance, basically hardware and training. No specific western nation was singled out for appeal and all were considered eligible. All five delegates expressed the desire that the United States remain in Southeast Asia economically and continue to furnish military assistance. In addition, the presence of the Seventh Fleet and U.S. airpower was appreciated. However, the stationing of U.S. ground troops in ASEAN countries was considered unnecessary and undesirable. This motion was sponsored by Indonesia and Singapore and endorsed by the others. The Indonesian concept of "natural resilience," which meant "national strength resides in the people and is only supplemented by military power," was accepted as a guiding principle during the conference.<sup>2</sup>

(U) As previously noted in this chapter, the five ASEAN nations jointly extended recognition to the new Cambodian government on 18 April, the day following the Khmer Rouge occupation of Phnom Penh. On 9 June the Philippines and the PRC announced the establishment of diplomatic relations, and, on 1 July, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) followed suit. In a Peking speech during the signing ceremonies, the Thai prime minister referred to Thailand's interest in strengthening ASEAN, and warmly welcomed, "...the pronouncements of the Government of the People's Republic of China in support ASEAN and the desire of ASEAN countries to see Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom, and

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 11 May 75, "Neutral Southeast Asia?" editorial; CIA/MILDIST FMK 6332/141035Z May 75.
  2. CIA/MILDIST FMK 6342/151057Z May 75.

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neutrality." As one writer noted, "Within days, the Peking government was reinstating its warm support for the Communist Party of Thailand, congratulating it on its tenth anniversary of 'war against the Government' (of Thailand) as carried on by the Thai People's Liberation Army."<sup>1</sup>

(U) During one of the many visits to Asia made by U.S. officials before and after the loss of Indochina, one episode revealed some apparent confusion regarding the ASEAN concept of a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality," and another proposal called the "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" (q.v.). The former postulated an absence of foreign military bases and foreign military intervention in the ASEAN countries, to be guaranteed by the major powers. The latter postulated the prohibition of nuclear power in any form from a yet to be designated area of the South Pacific, including the territorial and high seas. When Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib was queried during a press conference in Manila regarding the United States Government view of the ASEAN zone of neutrality, he replied, "...the U.S. had never flatly opposed it but had always stated we needed more details, for example, on such subjects as passage." When another question was keyed to the U.S. force reductions in Thailand and U.S. bases in the Philippines, Mr. Habib addressed only the long-standing issue of U.S. bases' longevity without referring to the "zone of neutrality." Although the question of "passage" was related to the Law of the Sea and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone issue, and not to the ASEAN concept (as then presented), the confusion was understandable. There was yet a third, called the "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace" (q.v.).<sup>2</sup>

(S) By early October attempts to define the neutralization proposal and the proposed zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality had not been successful. Questions centered on intraregional disputes; the definition of recognition and respect by major powers (vice guarantees, which implied intervention); whether the waters between states could be included; and finally, the timing of a "denuclearization" proposal. At an ASEAN conference on strategy prior to the 30th United Nations General Assembly, the member nations could not agree on their draft resolutions pertaining to the Koreans and the United Nations Command nor support of candidates for various U.N. positions. However, they did agree on continued support for the goal of establishing an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, which was consistent with, and would enhance the importance of, the ASEAN concept of a zone of peace.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Current History, Dec 75, "Thailand: In Search of the Lost Trail," by L. Edward Shuck, Jr.
  2. AMEMB Manila 7894/091033Z Jun 75.
  3. CIA/MILDIST FMK 6549/150330Z Oct 75 and FMK 6553/150830Z Oct 75, both (EX).

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(U) By the end of the year, the notion of the past that the words "Southeast Asia" and the acronym SEA encompassed only Indochina had been dispelled. Both media writers and U.S. officialdom discussed Southeast Asia in the context not only of Indochina, but also the ASEAN nations, with occasional nods to Burma. One writer speculated that China would not be adverse to a U.S. military presence in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries as a counterbalance to Russia. He credited Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia with stating that the best role for the United States in Southeast Asia was to "help keep the balance" between the communist giants. This writer cited a "scorecard" compiled by Western and Asian experts which showed Russia gaining ground in the Vietnams and Laos, with China winning in Cambodia. The Chinese were also thought to have a greater chance of exercising influence in non-communist Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia. President Ford's fourth principle in his Pacific Doctrine speech was incontrovertible evidence that the ASEAN nations had been recognized as integral to United States foreign policy in the Pacific area. On 23 December 1975 a Honolulu editor associated the President's acknowledgment of ASEAN with the fact that, although ASEAN was eight years old, its national leaders had scheduled the first summit conference to be held in Bali in February 1976.<sup>1</sup>

#### Indonesia

(S) On 8 April the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta reported on a meeting between President Suharto and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the United States. General Brown gave Suharto a candid assessment of the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia, but stated that the end result could not yet be predicted. Suharto stressed the importance attached by Indonesia to developments in Indochina. The Embassy interpreted the fact that the visit by General Brown was given major prominence by Indonesia as evidence of the desire of the Indonesian military for continuing closer relationships with the United States. The briefing presented to the Chairman by the Indonesian Defense Department (HANKAM) implied the importance of the U.S. military assistance program (MAP) to its armed forces, but indicated understanding of the need for Congressional as well as executive support for the MAP in the United States.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In the diplomatic area, the Embassy reported that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the other ASEAN nations had considered seeking an avenue for dialogue between the two Cambodian sides to stop fighting. However, they were not optimistic since the military situation (10 April) favored victory

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Dec 75, "Competition in S.E. Asia," by Denis D. Gray, dateline Bangkok (AP) and 23 Dec 75, "Importance of ASEAN," editorial; Dept of State Bulletin, 29 Dec 75, p. 915.
  2. AMEMB Jakarta 4138/080452Z Apr 75 and 4203/090540Z Apr 75, both (EX).

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for the Khmer Rouge. One diplomatic official expressed appreciation for General Brown's candid assessment of the military situation during his visit, and said that the GOI recognized U.S. difficulties in Indochina but was not interested in "finding fault."<sup>1</sup>



The GOI was aware of the revival of insurgency in Malaysia and Thailand and feared renewed efforts by communist elements and sympathizers in Indonesia. No immediate divergence from basic GOI foreign policy was foreseen. A wait-and-see attitude was likely insofar as recognition of new regimes was concerned. Regarding the United States:<sup>2</sup>

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...Indonesians have never fully resolved public assertion of their independence and self-reliance with basic feeling of weakness and need for strong, but quiet, outside support. United States has filled this latter need for Suharto regime, although our support for security beyond assistance programs never spelled out. Congressional inaction on Indochina, apparent ineffectiveness of executive with Congress, combined with attitude manifested in Congress on aid and trade with Indonesia have caused doubts regarding reliability of U.S. as partner of free nations in SEA. This is perhaps most serious result, from our standpoint, of Indochina events as seen here. Nevertheless, hope remains that U.S. extricated from Indochinese dilemma will now concentrate more on relations with and helping buildup non-communist states in SEA; there is still feeling Indonesia and other non-communist states in Asia have no real alternative to close relationship with Japan, Australia, and Western powers, including U.S.

(C) The U.S. Embassy reported a possible shift in the public position of Foreign Minister Malik regarding the need for U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 4295/110150Z Apr 75.
  2. CIA/MILDIST TDFIROB-315/04623-75/180128Z Apr 75 (EX); AMEMB Jakarta 4875/250105Z Apr 75.

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During a press conference on 2 May, Malik noted the desirability of consultation between the GOI and the United States regarding U.S. policy toward Asia after Vietnam. He also said the U.S. defense perimeter for Southeast Asia would be withdrawn to the Philippines since U.S. bases were no longer needed in Thailand. This statement implied a possible modification of the previously expressed GOI position against any foreign bases in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Malik's public positions continued to be at variance with the privately expressed attitude of the GOI toward the United States. During a press conference on 16 May, Malik was asked whether U.S. action in the recovery of the MAYAGUEZ indicated any difficulty in the implementation of the zone of peace proposal:<sup>1</sup>

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...Malik replied, "All great powers must go far away from SEA." He regretted U.S. action and opined that other methods (than military action) could have been used. "This method was contrary to our desires and to the Asian way--entering someone's house without permission." Malik contrasted U.S. action to rescue thirty-nine crewmembers with U.S. inaction with respect to "thousands of Vietnamese" and desertion of Thieu despite commitment. "U.S. is over-dramatizing small problems and minimizing much bigger ones," Malik noted.

(S) Malik also reportedly said that ASEAN progress was too slow and that conditions would not allow ASEAN to operate at a leisurely pace in a "full speed" world. The Ambassador noted that Malik's comments about United States' actions were typical and probably designed to assist the GOI to maintain flexibility on the regional foreign policy scene. However, "...action decisions re Indonesian foreign and security policy will be made elsewhere in GOI and Malik will accommodate as necessary."<sup>2</sup>

(S) By mid-June the GOI and Thailand had exchanged views on the general thrust of their policies. Indonesia agreed that, because of Thailand's proximity, the RTG should use tact and diplomacy in its approach to the new regimes in Indochina. Both agreed that an ASEAN summit meeting at that time would be premature. Indonesia concurred that, if U.S. bases in Thailand no longer served the interests of the RTG, they should be eliminated; however, Indonesia stressed that the ASEAN nations still needed the United States, United

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 5319/050616Z May 75 and 5963/170510Z May 75.
  2. Ibid.

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Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and West Germany in a non-military role in Southeast Asia.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In early July President Suharto met with President Ford at Camp David, Maryland to review the East Asian situation following the communist successes in Indochina. Ford reportedly assured Suharto that the United States would play a constructive role in Asia despite the setbacks in Indochina. Suharto was the first head of a foreign government to be received by Ford at Camp David. However, Suharto followed leaders from Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea in receiving personal assurances from Ford that American goals in Asia had not changed. It was assumed that Suharto had discussed future MAP levels for Indonesia.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Suharto's trip to the United States was followed by that of a key staff officer who was also a close confidant of Suharto. This officer expressed pleasure, in his report to Suharto, at the reception accorded him in Washington, adding that it was obvious U.S. officials were concerned with insuring the success of his visit, and in assisting Indonesia in every way possible. Since the purpose of his visit had been to discuss U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, he expressed satisfaction that the United States had, "completely adhered to the points of discussion" between President Suharto and President Ford at Camp David. The officer recommended to Suharto that the U.S.-GOI joint commission, previously agreed upon, be created as soon as possible. The commission should strengthen cooperation between the two countries in all fields, including military assistance. He explained that military and defense matters should become integral parts of economic and political cooperation between the two nations. Specifically, he reported that:<sup>3</sup>

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...both sides fully appreciated the necessity of achieving satisfactory results. Indonesia expected an increase in the U.S. funds and equipment made available for a large modification and improvement of Indonesian military communications. Also, Indonesia sought U.S. support which would enable Indonesia to expand its intelligence gathering capabilities at sea and in Indonesia's far-flung Archipelago, so as to insure Indonesian territorial integrity. Development of this capability

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1. CIA/MILDIST TDFIRDB-315/06864-75/181606Z Jun 75 (EX).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Jul 75, "On Strong Asia Role," dateline Camp David (AP).
  3. CIA/MILDIST TDFIRDB-315/10971-75/182328Z Oct 75.

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is especially important with regard to infiltration by sea from the north, particularly along infiltration routes through the Malacca Strait and the Natuna Islands. Indonesia also hoped to acquire assistance with increasing its capability to transport troops and equipment by sea and air.

In relation to these aspirations, ...Indonesia's objectives were by and large achieved during his trip to Washington. The total cost of Indonesia's military improvement program is about U.S. \$400 million, of which U.S. \$75 million will be required for Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and the remainder after July 1976. U.S. aid will total U.S. \$33 million in grants and U.S. \$12.5 million in foreign military sales. This is a 100 percent increase from the previous year.

#### Malaysia

(S) The Government of Malaysia (GOM), as previously noted, had taken the lead in the promotion of a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace and Neutrality. On 11 June the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur reported an assessment of the political climate and opinion of the GOM and the Malaysian people. The assessment was based on editorial opinion in newspapers, radio and television, and on discussions with politicians, media people, professional people and academicians. The United States was still considered to be the world's strongest power, and its society to be dynamic, democratic, and the most open in the world. However, its society was also considered to be materialistic, permissive, and to the Muslim older generation, morally weak and confused. There was widespread yearning for mature and effective U.S. leadership, but concern that such leadership appeared to be erratic, with impulsive use of its power. The actions of the United States regarding MAYAGUEZ, massive but vain intervention in Vietnam, and seeming inflexibility in accommodating third world interests in commodity pricing, law of the sea issues such as straits passage, and the ASEAN neutrality zone were compared unfavorably with more forthcoming, albeit vague, expressions of Russia and the PRC. Malaysians still hoped, however, for a new "Marshall Plan" for Asia in the wake of the Indochina collapse as perhaps, "...an expiatory gesture...." The credibility of U.S. defense commitments remained high regarding Western Europe, Israel, Korea, and Japan, but Malaysians doubted that the United States would come to the defense of Southeast Asian countries:<sup>1</sup>

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1. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 3254/110930Z Jun 75.

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...There is feeling Congress will never permit further U.S. military involvement in this area, supported by "evidence" that recent actions by Congress have "shackled" conduct of foreign policy by president and executive branch. Regarding latter, most Malaysians do not understand adversary and checks and balances roles of U.S. branches of Govt.; consequently, they find it difficult to understand contrasting and often conflicting foreign policy statements by U.S. Congressional leaders and executive branch spokesmen.

(C) Malaysian opinion strongly favored the U.S. detente policy with the Soviet Union and even more so with China. The most obvious reaction of the GOM to the altered Southeast Asia balance of power situation was its stronger pressure for the Zone of Neutrality combined with the development of good relations with the Indochina regimes in the hope of drawing them in to the zone concept. Not often in public print, but widely expressed in personal conversation was the view that the United States should be encouraged to continue an active role in Southeast Asia and not provoked into a precipitate withdrawal of its forces. There was widespread uneasiness about the ultimate consequences of the communist victories, and concern that U.S. military power be not too distant--"just in case."<sup>1</sup>

#### The Philippines

(C) A re-reading of the history of U.S. political-military relationships with the Philippines revealed the difficulty in ascribing shifts in Filipino policies to any one specific event, even the fall of Indochina to the communist forces. The call for reassessment of relations with the United States had been sounded many times in Manila. When, on 13 April, President Marcos publicized an order for a review of his nation's security arrangements and military bases agreements, it was considered by some as a shrewdly calculated attempt to wring concessions from Washington, rather than a genuinely distressed reaction to the incipient disaster in Indochina. Marcos had already opened the door to the communist world, economically and culturally, and his wife had visited Peking and received lavish treatment and a visit with Mao Tse-tung. This shift antedated the collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia, and there was no clear evidence that either communist or domestic pressure had prompted the Marcos order. In any case, the U.S. Ambassador promptly replied in a Manila speech, stressing U.S. willingness to discuss readjustments which could be beneficial to both

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1. Ibid.

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sides. Marcos picked up the Ambassador's call for a measured, objective appraisal of security relations in another speech, making it clear that the review would be in the context of the fact that, "...U.S. was closest ally of Philippines." The Ambassador noted in passing that Imelda Marcos, the President's wife, was believed to be the instigator of press attacks on Philippine treaty relations with the United States, and speculated that Marcos' approach had been partly intended to rein in her propaganda campaign before it caused permanent damage to U.S.-Philippine relations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The State Department, nevertheless, acknowledged that the events in Indochina would inevitably affect U.S. relations with other friendly Asian nations, and that the Philippines needed reassurance that the current security arrangements served their interests if a satisfactory relationship was to be maintained. State informed the Ambassador that the Philippines would be considered in the itineraries of senior U.S. Government officials to underscore continued interest, but could offer no encouragement that President Ford's Far East trip would include the Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 25 April Ambassador Sullivan met privately with Marcos prior to a meeting of the Philippines Foreign Policy Council. Marcos wanted Sullivan to understand that this meeting on U.S.-Philippine security relations was to preclude events, "from getting out of hand." The President said there were elements of panic in the popular Filipino reaction to events in Indochina, and that much of this potential panic came from people reading the U.S. press and from the public statements of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. He was "sincerely worried" by the mood in the U.S. Congress, and feared a "mindless isolation" in the current mood which could damage Philippine reliance on the U.S. security commitment. After the "motions" of a profound discussion of security policy and after the Indochina panic had subsided, Marcos said he wanted to have a long private talk with the Ambassador about, "...the whole future of our bases and their relationship to Philippine security, U.S. strategy, and Southeast Asian self-reliance."<sup>3</sup>

(U) In contrast with Marcos' private assurances to the Ambassador, the press accounts of his pronouncements reflected at least an intimation that neither the U.S. press, President Ford, nor Secretary Kissinger were entirely to blame for the Filipino "panic." In a speech on 16 April Marcos was reported to have said that the defense and economic agreements between the Philippines

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 16 Apr 75, "Bases in Philippines," editorial; AMEMB Manila 4813/160948Z Apr 75.
  2. SECSTATE 87428/162128Z Apr 75; as already discussed, the President did stop in the Philippines on his return from China.
  3. AMEMB Manila 5351/250843Z Apr 75.

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and the United States must be urgently updated, "for reasons of survival," because the balance of power in Asia had been disturbed by developments in Indochina. He also said that the refusal of the U.S. Congress to provide military aid to Cambodia and Vietnam suggested that Indochina and Southeast Asia were no longer of vital interest to the United States. He noted that the fall of Indochina placed the Philippines in the "front line" of the U.S. defense perimeter, but also compared the "constitutional processes" provision of the bilateral U.S.-Asian defense treaties with the "automatic retaliation" provision in the NATO pact. "By sheer force of necessity," he said, "we Asians will find new accommodations with reality...We the Philippines shall strengthen our ties with our neighbors in Asia. We have the ASEAN, even if it is not a military alliance."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The Foreign Policy Council meeting which Marcos had intimated to the Ambassador was a "going through the motions" process was to have the following agenda, as reported from an 18 April Marcos speech:<sup>2</sup>

- Takeover of U.S. military bases, if necessary, and the change of administration of these bases.
- Discarding the mutual defense treaty with the United States if it does not guarantee any defense of the Philippines.
- Upgrading the Philippine armed forces to maintain facilities for international protection.
- Seeking a neutral zone in the Southwest Pacific area.

(X) The apparent anomaly of Marcos' public and private statements was explained, according to an Embassy report of 20 May, by the fact that it reflected the Philippines own uncertainty. Since the end of April, the government-controlled press in Manila had propagated a relatively responsible assessment of events in Southeast Asia. There had been a paucity of editorial comment on the significance of the Indochina debacle. Certain themes were evident. These were: events in Southeast Asia had proved Marcos to be correct in calling for a reassessment of Philippine relations with the United States and for a national policy of self-reliance; some new regional security arrangement

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Apr 75, "Marcos Says U.S. Worries Him," dateline Manila (AP).
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 Apr 75, "Philippines May Take U.S. Bases," dateline Manila (AP).

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was necessary; and, closure of U.S. bases would not represent economic disaster for the Philippines. One editorial indicated that ASEAN nations must take a long second look at the PRC. "The erosion of American influence has required reappraisal of relations between ASEAN members and China, and this might in the long run give the region the peace and stability which have eluded it for countless years." The Embassy also noted that the country's "most controversial" columnist, Teodoro Valencia, had prompted a spate of news stories and editorials by "pooh-poohing" the contributions of the U.S. bases to the economy. He also claimed, for good measure, that the conversion of the bases to Filipino control would make honest women out of a substantial bevy of prostitutes which infested the cities around the bases. Valencia's line was reinforced by Philippine Chamber of Commerce teams which visited these cities to "reassure" local businessmen that they would not suffer economically if the bases were converted. News stories cited potential benefits if John Hay Air Base were converted into a tourist resort and recreation area, of converting Clark Air Base into a vast university complex or international airport, and of changing Subic Naval Base into a commercial shipyard, harbor and industrial complex. The Ambassador concluded that his reading of the press during the previous two weeks suggested that the Philippines was still uncertain about what the "Indochina cataclysm" meant for it, the region, and the United States.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In another speech on 23 May Marcos spelled out the main foreign policy guidelines for the Philippines. He vacillated between questioning the reliability of the United States as an ally and assurances that the United States and the Philippines were old allies and the firmest of friends. He appealed for rational examination of the national interests of the two nations in view of the "disequilibrium" caused by the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, and ended his speech with these foreign policy guidelines:<sup>2</sup>

- Intensify relations with ASEAN.
- Pursue more vigorously the establishment of relations with Soviet Union, PRC, and other communist states.
- Closer identification with Third World, with whom the Republic of the Philippines shares similar problems.
- Continue the beneficial relationship with Japan.

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1. AMEMB Manila 6887/201000Z May 75.  
2. AMEMB Manila 7160/231022Z May 75.

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- Support Arab countries in their just struggle for peace in the Middle East.

- Continue efforts to find a new basis compatible with emerging realities in Asia for continuing healthy relationship with the United States.

(S) Meanwhile, the question of possible actions or initiatives on the part of the United States had been addressed by the Ambassador in response to a suggestion by the U.S. Ambassador in Indonesia. Ambassador Newsom had suggested that the Secretary of State address letters to individual ASEAN foreign ministers soliciting their views on the situation in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Sullivan recommended that this not be done because he did not believe these foreign ministers were likely to have well-conceived thoughts on such a complex subject. Some, he noted, such as Chatchai of Thailand and Romulo of the Philippines, were likely to, "commit glib and superficial observations to official letters." Sullivan also considered the timing somewhat premature for responsible views on the current situation, and suggested that it would be more prudent to counsel patience and caution rather than stimulating imaginations by soliciting unstructured views. In short, he concluded, there was quite a bit of dust to settle before a valid reassessment could be made-- perhaps "three or four months." Having made that recommendation (on 2 May), Sullivan referred on 6 May to his "dust would have to settle" message while making a suggestion of his own which raised some dust. He noted that one of the eventual considerations to be confronted at that time (in a few months) would be U.S. military deployments in the Philippines, which would also be a matter for direct bilateral discussion between the United States and the Philippines. After noting that, in general, it was assumed that the U.S. naval facilities at Subic Bay and Cubi Point would continue to be required for U.S. strategic purposes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, he said:<sup>1</sup>

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On the other hand, with the collapse or withdrawal of U.S. presence and/or responsibilities on mainland Southeast Asia, there does not appear to be an exclusively American rationale for the maintenance of U.S. air facilities at Clark Air Base. The only logical Air Force deployment at that facility, in newly changed circumstances, would be U.S. fighter interceptor units, provided for the explicit purpose of assisting in the air defense of the Philippines under our mutual defense treaty. It would be assumed that such units

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1. AMEMB Manila 5702/020238Z May 75 and 5914/060753Z May 75.

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would be deployed only if GOP explicitly requests them, and it would seem logical that they should become tenants on a Philippine controlled Clark Air Base, in much the same way as U.S. units were deployed to Mactan during the height of the Vietnam War.

(S) If his assumptions could be accepted as U.S. policy, Sullivan said, they would make the task of dealing with the military base issue in the Philippines "tractable," and would put the mutual defense arrangements "on a realistic footing."<sup>1</sup>

(S) Since CINCPAC and his Air Force component, Pacific Air Forces, had been information addressees on the Ambassador's message, CINCPAC immediately challenged the Ambassador's statement that the United States no longer had an exclusively American rationale for the retention of Clark Air Base. In a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC stated that Clark was strategically essential to the Pacific Command. He saw no change in national policy relative to U.S. commitments in the Pacific and Far East that would lessen its importance since U.S. Pacific Command military strategy depended on a forward presence as the key to support of U.S. national interests. Clark Air Base was the most important part of that forward base structure, CINCPAC stated, and it provided the essential link in the U.S. capability to project U.S.-based forces into the Southwest Pacific, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Middle East areas. It was the only large aerial port in the Southwest Pacific, and its operation by the United States accented U.S. resolve and commitment to Pacific affairs. CINCPAC acknowledged that U.S. military posture would undergo some reassessment, but saw no reason to believe that the key role of Clark Air Base should change.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 12 May the Ambassador reported a conversation with Marcos' Executive Secretary and the Philippine Secretary of Defense (Melchor and Ponce-Enrile) at a party attended by the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) and the Philippine Fleet Admiral. The conversation concerned what Melchor called the status of Subic when the current base agreement expired in 1991, "or earlier." In that connection, he had ordered a study of action taken by Singapore when the United Kingdom had pulled out and concluded that the Philippines could do the same thing with respect to Subic. Melchor believed that the U.S. Navy could get the same (but more economical) service at Subic if it became a "joint venture" under commercial management. CINCPACREPPHIL (Admiral Shelton) and the Ambassador stressed the complexities of the Subic Bay operation but the meeting was inconclusive. Practically nothing was said about Clark, "...except for mention of fact that it might become international 'air freight' port

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1. Ibid.
  2. CINCPAC 102120Z May 75.

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after 1991." The Ambassador considered the conversation to indicate that the Philippines was preparing to make some serious and far-reaching proposals on "reconstitution" of U.S. military facilities.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Two weeks later, the "study" question had become bilateral, since Marcos had requested that the United States accomplish a study concurrently, but not jointly. This was because the Philippine study was to focus on the use of the bases after U.S. withdrawal, while the U.S. study, according to Melchor, should focus on the procedures for U.S. use within the framework of "Filipinization" as discussed between Marcos and CINCPAC. The Ambassador committed the United States to address the operational requirements, from the military point of view, which Admiral Gayler had cited as essential to the continued effective U.S. use of the facilities. This study would then provide a backdrop for discussion and initiatives from the Philippine side about possible actions to effect "Filipinization."<sup>2</sup>

(D) After his return from Peking in June, according to the Ambassador, Marcos "...harped on the necessity of 'new look' in foreign policy, including revision of security arrangements with U.S., and called for domestic reforms inspired by 'Chinese model'...." At the same time Marcos and his aides had issued a stream of reassurances to those who were deeply fearful of possible "new look" consequences, above all communism and the loss of the U.S. relationship. On the pro-new look side of the ledger, Mrs. Marcos and her coterie were moving ahead with integrated family planning-welfare-nutrition under Project Compassion. This was supposedly designed to infuse the barrios with the Chinese spirit of self-reliance. On the other side of the ledger, GOP officials had issued a stream of reassurances that the Philippines would not go communist, would not embrace atheism, would not tolerate insurgency, would not desert old allies, etc. These contradictory developments prompted the Ambassador to comment that:<sup>3</sup>

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...despite considerable drama and pride with which President announced review of U.S. security relations and normalization of relations with China, experiences over past few months have reconfirmed that while many Filipinos genuinely want to leave the "cocoon of foreign protection" many more would be happier if they could remain inside. Fear of China by itself would not perhaps amount to much

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1. AMEMB Manila 6319/120705Z May 75.
  2. AMEMB Manila 7195/270717Z May 75.
  3. AMEMB Manila 9896/181024Z Jul 75.

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if not inextricably linked with much deeper anxieties re  
diminishment of U.S. presence.

The Military Bases Agreement (MBA)

(S) Renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) had been in abeyance for several years. Nothing in the trial balloons, hand-wringing, and posturing of the Filipino officials which linked the collapse of Indochina to an imperative reappraisal of the bases' status was new. In 1972 U.S. and Philippines negotiators had reached agreement on revision to all but six of the 29 articles in the MBA. These were criminal jurisdiction, immigration, shipping and navigation, exemption from customs and taxes, personal tax exemption, and the tenure of the MBA. The issue was dormant in 1973, but in 1974, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) indicated interest in resuming the MBA negotiations, setting off a flurry of U.S. exchanges of view already well massaged by all parties in previous years. Even though the negotiations were never officially resumed, "informal" papers were leaked during 1974 which contained many of the points belabored in public by Filipino officials in 1975. These included Filipino base commanders at U.S. bases; rental for use of the bases; specific reference to nuclear weapons control; immediate response by U.S. Forces to aggression against the Philippines; and the flying of only the Philippine flag over bases occupied by U.S. Forces. Another concept concerned the writing of a new treaty, to which the MBA would be an annex, which portrayed the U.S. bases in the Philippines in a key role either in the defense of the Western Pacific, or perhaps the smaller areas encompassed by ASEAN. Another of the annexes to the treaty was proposed to "comfort" ASEAN neighbors and to emphasize the defensive nature of the bases. It would state that the United States would never launch nuclear weapons from bases in the Philippines without the express consent of the GOP.<sup>1</sup>

1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 637-639.

~~(S)~~ In a carry-over from 1974, the U.S. Embassy and State Department exchanged information on the possible separate negotiation of Article XI, Immigration, of the MBA. The Embassy believed, and State concurred, that the immigration issue could be resolved by an exchange of notes without amending the existing Article. State cautioned the Embassy, in December 1974, not to encourage additional "piecemeal" negotiation of other MBA issues. Such an approach, State said, would reduce the planned negotiating leverage of relinquishment of base lands in the context of settlement of all MBA issues. Also, since resolution of the other issues involved amendments to the MBA, they should be dealt with as one package. Informal discussions continued in January 1975 when the United States tabled a draft note specifying conditions under which Philippine immigration officials would be stationed on U.S. bases, as well as the entry/exit procedures and documents needed for specified categories of military and civilian personnel. In February the GOP Bureau of Immigration passed to the Embassy, on an informal basis, its initially proposed guidelines, which covered all aspects of passenger arrivals and departures at Clark Air Base, but did not include Cubi Naval Air Station, at which space-available air travel was also scheduled. The Embassy considered the guidelines to be inadequate; however, a cover letter from the GOP Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation which forwarded the guidelines constituted a veiled threat and showed GOP concern that the second largest point of entry in the Philippines (Clark Air Base) was completely outside its control. The letter stated, in part:<sup>3</sup>

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1. SECDEF 6011/040047Z Jan 75.
  2. 13AF 091015Z Jan 75; COMUSNAVPHIL 110229Z Jan 75.
  3. SECSTATE 274566/132353Z Dec 74; AMEMB Manila 907/210859Z Jan 75 and 2286/210934Z Feb 75.

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...It is informed that if the assignment of immigration officers at the base, as herein proposed, cannot be put into effect for one reason or another, then we will, under the circumstances, be forced to institute alternative procedures to remedy the present arrangement existing at the base which has proved to be highly unsatisfactory....

(C) A GOP decision not to negotiate separately on the immigration issue was conveyed to the Embassy in March, and, by the end of April, State advised the Embassy that the subject should be avoided. This position was linked to the influx of refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam which were staged through Clark Air Base and Cubi Point in April. The subject of the refugees became another political football addressed in Appendices II and V of this history.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In August a visit to the Philippines by Senator Mansfield generated some insight as to possible Congressional opinion relating to the MBA. He noted that U.S. operations from the Philippines into the Indian Ocean were vulnerable to GOP perception of its interests in the Middle East, specifically because of GOP dependence on oil imports. Nevertheless, Mansfield felt that Congress would favor the retention of U.S. bases. Congress, he said, distinguished between the Asian mainland and the island defense chain in the Pacific of which the Philippines was a part. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the need of the United States, as a Pacific power, for permanent bases, those in the Philippines should be regarded as a bed-rock investment. Staff members accompanying Mansfield indicated that the concept of base rent would be acceptable to Congress since military assistance was frequently justified in terms of base rights. Also, rent for the bases was considered a more honest approach which would simplify the determination of actual need and separate this question from other forms of U.S. assistance.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Earlier in August, before the Mansfield visit, another Congressman visited the Philippines. President Marcos made a very tailored presentation on U.S. bases which appeared to shift the emphasis from an increasingly restrictive approach to a broader view. Marcos discussed the bases in the context of rising nationalism in Asia. He said that the Philippines had historically been very cooperative with the United States, but, in order for the Philippines to continue to be useful to the United States in terms of helping to preserve peace in the area, it would first have to rid itself of

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1. SECSTATE 101153/302357Z Apr 75.
  2. AMEMB Manila 11591/200948Z Aug 75.

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the dependent label. The Philippines had to be able to make clear to its neighbors in the area that it was sovereign and that it was voluntarily making bases available to the United States for peace-keeping purposes rather than succumbing to American pressure. Marcos assured the Congressman that he was prepared to make available whatever facilities the United States required in order to enable it to contribute to equilibrium in the area through control of air and sea lanes of the Western Pacific. These statements received wide coverage in the government-controlled press.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 21 August the State Department acknowledged an Embassy report of an exploratory conversation with Marcos regarding future base negotiations. State noted, however, that a clear statement was needed from Marcos of GOP desires regarding the bases before the issues could be examined realistically. In terms of U.S. preparations for a resumption of base negotiations, State postulated a three-stage process: the first, receiving Marcos' views, had already begun; the second involved examination of the impact of those views on the U.S. role in the Philippines and a detailed analysis of U.S. policy objectives; the third was the actual negotiation. State stipulated that, in any discussions with Marcos, all revisions of existing articles already accepted by negotiating panels over the past few years should be considered valid. State, however, apparently disagreed with the intimation by Mansfield's staff that payment of rent for the bases was an acceptable position.<sup>2</sup>

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...Fortunately request for payment of rent for bases has not figured prominently in Philippine speeches or conversations to date. Nevertheless, we anticipate that GOP will demand some explicit quid pro quo for continued U.S. use of bases. Payment of rent, as such, would entail financial, psychological and political disadvantages for U.S. There is no recent precedent for explicit rental payments for any major installation involving U.S. combat forces, or provided by a government with which the U.S. has a defense treaty. We fear that agreeing to rental payments would erode the principle of mutuality of interest inherent in the mutual defense treaty, lead to demands for renegotiations of arrangements elsewhere, lead to inflation in quids as negotiating demands would tend toward highest common denominator, and result in public and Congressional debate whether bases are worth the price. Should Marcos

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1. AMEMB Manila 10811/061000Z Aug 75.
  2. SECSTATE 198711/211440Z Aug 75.

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raise subject of rent, you should indicate to him that explicit direct cash rental would pose serious difficulties for U.S.

(S) Later in August the Ambassador, GOP Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo, and Marcos discussed the U.S. bases renegotiation issue, and Marcos assured the Ambassador that a GOP paper on the subject would be forthcoming soon. During this period Executive Secretary Melchor was engaged in promotion of what the State Department termed "grandiose" ideas about commercialization of the U.S. bases and "...his proposed plunge into ship repair and ship-building..." at Subic Bay. The U.S. Ambassador disavowed Melchor's claims during the latter's talks in Washington that any timeframe had been discussed concerning Melchor's commercialization proposals. In fact, the Ambassador had waited until Melchor was absent before seeking a negotiation paper from Marcos in order to obtain a realistic framework for negotiations divorced from the commercialization scheme. Melchor had also apparently promoted inquiries by an American consultant to the GOP regarding possible commercialization of the bases. State informed the Embassy that the consultant had been emphatically cautioned that no arrangements would be allowed at Subic Bay which could in any way hamper the operations of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. State assured the Embassy that this stricture would be communicated to any other responsible business group "...whom the GOP seeks to interest in commercial development of bases...." Nor would the United States countenance negotiations in which business groups would participate with the United States and the GOP as a third force, State added.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Just prior to Melchor's trip to Washington, he had requested an appointment to meet with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who was in Korea. On 26 August Melchor and Schlesinger met in Seoul for thirty minutes, during which Melchor made three points. First, he brought Marcos' assurances that the United States would have continued use of Clark and Subic, regardless of "...what appears in Philippine newspapers." Secondly, Melchor informed Schlesinger that Marcos desired to invoke Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which called for the parties, through their foreign ministers, to consult from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty and whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the territorial integrity, the political independence, or security of either of the parties was threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. The reason advanced by Melchor for invoking Article III was the serious situation faced by the Philippines in the Muslim rebellion in the South. His purpose was to impel the grant by the United States to the GOP of military equipment recovered from Cambodia and

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1. AMEMB Manila 11978/270834Z Aug 75 and 12590/080923Z Sep 75; SECSTATE 238358/071245Z Oct 75.

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Vietnam. Both the State Department and the Embassy in Manila expressed consternation and concern over this apparent attempt to involve the United States in still another internal insurgency so soon after the Indochina withdrawal. When approached by the Ambassador, however, Marcos expressed surprise, shock, and disbelief that Melchor had implied GOP invocation of the MDT, which, in addition to the problems it would cause the United States, would also present problems for the GOP with its own people, the Arab bloc, and ASEAN. He went on to say that, "...Alex [Melchor] has overreached himself. I'll tell him to quit trying to be a lawyer."

(S) In September Marcos directed Melchor to develop a "massive cleanup" of governmental employees to combat what Marcos felt was backsliding and inefficiency sufficient to adversely affect the image and reality of his "new society" program. When word got around that Melchor had recommended the firing of some ranking officials, the various power centers in Manila, including Secretary of Defense Enrile, Mrs. Marcos and others drew up their own lists and presented them to Marcos for inclusion in the master purge list. The end product consisted of a conglomeration of individuals of high and low level against whom little preparation of charges had been made and for whom few arrangements for replacements had been made. The initial plan had been not to name the evil doers publicly, but, following the leak of the list, Melchor was caught in the vortex of the resultant power struggle. On 19 September, during a speech on the third anniversary of the declaration of martial law, Marcos announced widespread "resignations" from the civil service and the military. However, the Embassy reported on 1 October that the government was in great disorder. The dramatic Marcos announcement of the purge, to include the military, had developed into massive stagnation and disorientation. All flag and general officers had been asked to submit formal letters of resignation, but none was sure which would be accepted. Some senior civilian officials had been relieved and others were out of the country; the net result was a general slowdown of activity and decision making, including activity and decisions of interest to the U.S. Government. The GOP paper on base negotiations, for example, had been on the President's desk for some time but had not been approved for transmittal to the U.S. Embassy.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Essentially the same situation was reported to CINCPAC by CINCPACREPPHIL on 2 October. He noted that, although the threatened dismissal of senior military officers had not yet occurred, they were notably absent from their normal offices. He speculated that the military was flexing its muscle to

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1. AMEMB Seoul 6651/270921Z Aug 75; AMEMB Manila 12020/280626Z Aug 75; AMEMB Seoul 6704/280832Z Aug 75; SECSTATE 205866/290009Z Aug 75; AMEMB Manila 12239/020758Z Sep 75.
  2. AMEMB Manila 13785/010825Z Oct 75 and 13980/030854Z Oct 75.

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protect its own and that the delay in dismissals reflected Marcos' dilemma. He could not overrule them and still keep the loyalty needed to maintain martial law and fight the insurgency war. In spite of the instability, which would delay negotiations on the MBA, he believed that Marcos would maintain control. A few days later, the Embassy reported that the purge had spread to the local level. The Mayor of Manila had announced that he would recommend the separation from the municipal service of 2,000 corrupt and undesirable officials and employees. The Manila press reported, meanwhile, that Marcos had separated or retired 2,091 employees, mostly from the rank and file of 32 government agencies. One account noted that the President had not yet touched military nor local government officials. The press also had begun to reflect complaints about the indiscriminate nature of the purge, including one comment that, "Examples of how President Marcos was given the bum steer by his official family continue to swamp this quarter."<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 14 October President Marcos raised the question of opening negotiations on U.S. military facilities and acknowledged to the Ambassador that the long-awaited GOP paper had not yet been delivered. Marcos said that, because of disruptions in his government, preparatory work on the negotiating papers had been delayed, but that they might be available by the end of the month. The Ambassador reported that Marcos looked tired and seemed distracted. Also in October, there were indications that Marcos had become disillusioned with Melchor, who had been accused of meddling with the military and of unbridled ambition for higher office. On 29 October CINCPACREPPHIL advised CINCPAC that at least four high ranking military officers had been marked to retire for cause, but, on 14 November, he reported Secretary of Defense Enrile's public announcement that there would be no purge or revamping of the military. CINCPACREPPHIL opined that, since so many of Marcos' supporters were in the military, the announcement would look like a cover-up to his detractors. Combining this action with Marcos' recent appointment of his wife as the Governor/General Manager of the four cities and 13 municipalities of Greater Manila raised serious questions as to the future direction of his "new society."<sup>2</sup>

(S) In late November there was speculation that Marcos had given orders to reorganize the office of Executive Secretary Melchor and some indication that Marcos had acceded to pressure from Mrs. Marcos to eliminate Melchor, whom she blamed for the purge backlash. On 28 November Melchor was removed from his post as Executive Secretary. CINCPACREPPHIL advised CINCPAC that, while accurate evaluation was premature,

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 020710Z Oct 75 (BOM); AMEMB Manila 14066/060911Z Oct 75.
2. AMEMB Manila 14449/140905Z Oct 75; CIA/MILDIST FPM9709/210931Z Oct 75; COMUSNAVPHIL 290707Z Oct 75 (BOM); CINCPACREPPHIL 140732Z Nov 75 (BOM).
3. CIA/MILDIST FPM9742/230735Z Nov 75 (EX); CINCPACREPPHIL 280006Z Nov 75.

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(TS/FRD) While awaiting resolution of the political scene in the Philippines, and in anticipation of a JCS requirement to study U.S. base posture in Asia, CINCPAC initiated a review of possible alternatives to U.S. base arrangements in the Philippines. The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) was asked to consider the impact on U.S. operations at Clark Air Base of Philippine ownership, joint use agreements, tenant status, and contract operations. PACAF replied that Philippine ownership was not desirable. That option recognized Philippine sovereignty, but did not assure U.S. Air Force ability to deploy forces, construct facilities, or maintain the procedures necessary to accomplish the PACAF mission without interference or control by the GOP. There would also be a severe impact on base security. Control of Clark by the United States was essential so long as nuclear weapons were stored there. Also, increased theft of base equipment and blackmarketing would result without strict on-base security, and the posting of U.S. security guards at the gates would be vital. On the other hand, joint use would be workable. There would be considerable adverse impact on the freedom of U.S. Air Force operations because the existing facilities and support equipment were only adequate to support existing operations. Minimum aircraft separation criteria had already been adopted because of traffic congestion. Joint U.S.-GOP military use, combined with the anticipated commercial airfield use would add to the flight congestion problems, and, during contingencies, could limit U.S. Air Force flexibility to expand forces and increase operations.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The option of tenant status for U.S. Air Forces was also not desirable because command authority and operational freedom would be inhibited. Moreover, the rights and privileges which currently obtained for security, customs, immigration, weapon and war reserve materiel storage, aircraft staging, and contingency expansion would be jeopardized. The GOP could limit U.S. activities by imposing operational restrictions such that U.S. Forces would be ineffective. Because Philippine standards were inferior, services and facilities would be degraded. As for security, a satisfactory environment had been difficult to achieve even under the joint U.S. (on-base) and GOP (off-base) efforts. Under unilateral GOP security, the situation could be expected to deteriorate significantly. Regarding contract services, PACAF noted that, if the contractors were American, GOP concurrence was required and tax obstacles would arise. If the contractors were Filipino, the U.S. Forces would be subject to crippling strikes and other labor problems which would be raised for solution to the diplomatic level. Finally, PACAF suggested that the status quo might be maintained if the dollar and manpower costs of the three base-status options were made known to the GOP. More importantly, vital U.S. Government interests were at stake. The geographic locations of the U.S. bases in the Philippines made them the hub for logistical and tactical operations in the Western Pacific.

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1. CINCPACAF 170300Z Sep 75.

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With U.S. withdrawals from Thailand, the Philippine bases had even more Indian Ocean significance, and, in the event of Japanese political restrictions, Clark and Subic could be used as springboards for a Northeast Asian contingency.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In October the Military Airlift Command (MAC) queried CINCPAC on the status of the base negotiations, with particular attention to the portions of the bases to be retained by the United States, the possible assumption by Filipino officials of some duties performed by U.S. base commanders, and the possible dual control of the bases. CINCPAC replied that the themes of base sovereignty and commercialization were on the front burner of GOP rhetoric, but that the United States was waiting for a definitive paper on GOP views. Though unable to predict the eventual outcome, the CINCPAC staff did not anticipate real action for several months, nor was it expected that U.S. operations would be hampered significantly over the longer term.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Another discussion about possible U.S. positions during the negotiations was held in Manila on 4 November among Ambassador Sullivan, CINCPACREPPHIL (RADM Kilcline), the Commander 13th Air Force (MAJ GEN Manor), and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton Abramovitz (former CINCPAC Political Adviser). The Ambassador discussed issues which might have to be considered as negotiable, among which was the assignment of Filipino base commanders. The conferees recognized that terms of reference which would give the Filipino base commander meaningful and reasonable political responsibilities while maintaining U.S. control over all operational responsibilities and actual security would be difficult to frame. Regarding the transfer of real estate as a quid pro quo, only one parcel of some 40,000 acres on Clark Air Base would be acceptable to PACAF; all other transfers which could be accommodated by the United States were relatively small and of little apparent commercial value. All present agreed that the negotiations could be delayed for a few months, but a long-term delay or failure to negotiate a new agreement would subject the bases and U.S. personnel to considerable harrassment. As an aside, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines was larger than necessary, and that it probably could be phased out completely in a reasonable amount of time. The responsibility for coordinating arrangements for the training of GOP armed forces by the United States would be passed to the Defense Attaché Office.<sup>3</sup>

(C) During President Ford's visit, some details of the MBA negotiations were settled. Negotiations were to start on the ministerial level, with Romulo calling on Kissinger in Washington. The talks would then move quickly

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1. Ibid.
  2. J53 HistSum Oct 75; MAC 142130Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 180101Z Oct 75.
  3. CINCPACREPPHIL 051254Z Nov 75.

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to Manila where Ambassador Sullivan would lead the U.S. negotiators. It was agreed that negotiations would not start until after the scheduled ASEAN summit meeting in February 1976.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The last unofficial word on the negotiations was a newspaper editorial on 17 December 1975 which reviewed the "huffing and puffing" in Manila about the American military bases in the Philippines after Indochina "went down the drain." Then, noted the writer, Marcos' Peking visit had many Filipinos wondering whether their country was going communist. Perhaps to dispel that fear, Marcos staged a spectacularly lavish reception for President Ford. Subsequent to the Ford visit, the GOP Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs released the GOP terms for a new MBA. As listed in the newspaper, they were:<sup>2</sup>

- The United States would pay rent for the use of the bases.
- Only the Philippine flag would fly over the bases (at present the U.S. and Philippine flags fly side-by-side).
- Both Clark and Subic would have Filipino base commanders. But operational control would remain in American hands.
- The Philippines would have jurisdiction over American servicemen charged with crimes against Filipinos.
- Camp John Hay, a military recreational facility in the mountain resort of Baguio, would be handed over to the Philippine Government.

Mutual Defense Board (MDB)

(X) The MDB was established in 1958 under a U.S.-GOP Council of Ministers, as specified by the MDT. The purpose of the MDB was to allow direct liaison and consultation among appropriate authorities of the two countries on military matters of mutual concern. CINCPAC was the U.S. co-chairman, normally represented by CINCPACREPPHIL. Monthly meetings were held.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 100855Z Dec 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Dec 75, "Philippine Bases," editorial.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 639-640.

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(S) In October CINCPACREPPHIL noted the key political-military sensitivity of the meeting scheduled for November during a period of incipient base negotiations and political upheaval in the Philippines. He stressed the fact that good rapport with the GOP military leadership could be a significant asset during the MBA negotiations. Because of scheduling problems, CINCPAC was unable to attend the 75-11 meeting, and, for a time, no senior member of the CINCPAC staff seemed to be available. Recognizing the potential sensitivity of the November meeting, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN William G. Moore, represented CINCPAC and presided over the meeting. The CINCPAC Director for Intelligence, BGEN Doyle Larson also attended the Cubi Point meeting. Other senior U.S. attendees included General Manor, Admiral Kilcline, and BGEN J. R. Sadler, Chief, JUSMAG. The highlight of the meeting was the presentation by a member of the CINCPAC Intelligence staff entitled "Southeast Asia in Review - Post War Developments in Southeast Asia and Possible Effects Upon the Philippines."<sup>1</sup>

#### Singapore

(S) Singapore, of course, was the smallest state in area of the five ASEAN countries. Its Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, however, had been the most outspoken in his support of the United States presence in Indochina of any ASEAN official. In 1974 Lee had assured the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense of his support not only of U.S. Southeast Asian policy, but also of a strong and visible U.S. presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of U.S. plans to expand the facilities at Diego Garcia.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In 1975, and particularly after the collapse in Indochina, Lee emphasized the need for the United States to provide a naval umbrella and economic assistance to the ASEAN states. He anticipated many problems in Thailand, and professed little confidence in the ability of the Thai to deal with insurgency militarily. He stressed the need to assist Malaysia in technical training and sales of counterinsurgency-related military equipment, and he felt that, when Thailand weakened, Malaysia and Singapore would be subjected to increasing communist pressure. He believed that the communist successes in Indochina had given an immense shot in the arm to communist revolutionaries throughout Southeast Asia. When the destruction of the Indonesian communist movement was cited as a hopeful factor, Lee commented that the Communist Party leader in Indonesia, "...had made the mistake of having all his daisies planted above the ground; hence, it was easy for the GOI to cut them all down when the time

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 090855Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 070033Z Nov 75; CINCPACREPPHIL 070927Z Nov 75; J51 HistSum Nov 75, with encl: Verbatim Transcript 75-11 Meeting, MDB, 25 Nov 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 574-575.

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came." He said the same conditions would not exist in other Southeast Asian countries.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Ten days before the surrender of Cambodia, and about three weeks before the fall of Vietnam, Lee gave a speech to the New Zealand National Press Club. This 7 April speech was passed to all ASEAN diplomatic posts, the State Department, Australia, Hong Kong, Peking, and to CINCPAC by the U.S. Embassy in Wellington. This summation of the Singapore position at that time was replete with the full flavor of the Prime Minister, and is quoted below:<sup>2</sup>

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...I am not going to talk about dominoes. I have never played the game. Nor do I think it an appropriate figure of speech for the tragedy we are witnessing in South Vietnam and Cambodia. What is happening there is having a profound effect on the minds of others in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia's immediate neighbor, the Thai's. The Nixon Doctrine, announced in Guam in 1969, that America will materially help those who are ready to help themselves, died with Watergate. Everyone knew that no American soldier would ever fight a guerrilla in Asia after the Paris agreement of January 1973 allowed them to disengage with honour. By August 1973, the American Congress had interdicted their President from using American bombers without Congressional approval in Southeast Asia.

...Nixon resigned in August 1974. There has been no time to spell out a Ford Doctrine. But he did try to define his aid policy on South Vietnam, namely three more years of military and economic aid before a final cutoff. We knew that the American Congress did not agree with their President.

...The new Thai Prime Minister has now publicly asked American forces to leave within a year. Since American forces cannot help them on land or in the air, the Thais might as well make a virtue of requesting an American military withdrawal. From a symbol of power and security, they have become obstacles to a change in posture, which

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1. SECSTATE 109673/101800Z May 75 (EX); AMEMB Singapore 4717/310900Z Oct 75.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 924/080445Z Apr 75.

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must precede a change of relationships with the other great powers. I doubt if any Thai Government, civilian or military, will want to be engaged in the kind of guerrilla insurgency that has crushed Cambodia and South Vietnam. Rather than go through this mincing machine, it makes more sense to seek political and diplomatic solutions. Adjustment and accommodation to changed circumstances are necessary. Thais and others in Southeast Asia know that the patience and perseverance of Americans have not matched that of the communists, not simply communists in Vietnam, but also their suppliers, the PRC and the Soviet Union. Since the Thais are unlikely to be able to make amends to the North Vietnamese for the damage which the American B-52s, using air bases in Thailand, have caused, it will be easier for them to befriend the PRC than the North Vietnamese. After all, Thailand did no harm to China. In any case, the PRC have shown themselves to be more reliable friends, to judge from their support of what once looked the hopeless cause of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.

...The rest of Southeast Asia will have to live with whatever political accommodation the Thais make. Fortunately, Thailand has ample time to work out what is in her best interests. For the North Vietnamese will take many years to mend a war-shattered Vietnam before undertaking further adventure in helping Thai insurgents. And the Khmer Rouge or Grunk, the acronym for Prince Sihanouk's government, will be busy not only repairing the shattered economy of Cambodia and her displaced people, but also preventing the Vietnamese communists from becoming the dominant influence over their country. In fact, Prince Sihanouk took elaborate pains to state that Cambodia's number one friend will always be the PRC. If Khieu Samphan and other Khmer Rouge leaders share this view, then Hanoi's capacity for aiding and betting insurgency may not reach Thailand other than through Laos to the Northeast of Thailand.

...Thailand's southern neighbor, peninsular Malaysia, has a completely different situation. Malaysia's guerrilla movement has always been, and still is, led by ethnic Chinese. For a communist insurgency to succeed, the rebels must throw up Malay leaders to have a better ethnic balance in the leadership. Only in this way can they get more

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representative support from the ground. Whilst this is not impossible, it will take a very long time, if it can be done at all.

...An era has come to an end. America was the dominant power in Southeast Asia for thirty years since the end of World War II. Once America acknowledged that she could no longer intervene in Southeast Asia, it is fair to assume that the contest for influence over the peoples in the region will be mainly between the PRC and the Soviet Union, both of whom openly avow their duty to help communists everywhere and to promote revolution. The feat of Southeast Asian countries is to be caught in a competitive clash between these two. China has the advantage of historic associations with the region. Memories of past tributes paid and an awareness of geographical proximity make all in Southeast Asia anxious not to take sides with the Soviet Union against the PRC even though the Soviet Union is ahead on military technology. Most hope to maintain equable relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union. But this may not be possible unless these two communist centers cease to compete for ideological and nationalist supremacy--a prospect which appears remote. Meanwhile, a continuing American naval presence and increased economic relations will help the rest of Southeast Asia to adjust less abruptly and to make the task of learning to live with a communist Indochina less painful.

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(S) The U.S. State Department replied that no advantage was discernable in negotiations with a lame-duck government. Further, at that time (8 January) State was concerned about sending the wrong signals to Hanoi and all of Southeast Asia in view of the communist offensive underway in Vietnam and Cambodia.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Thailand's first general election in more than 25 years was held on 26 January. The coalition cabinet of Seni Pramoj was approved by the King on 21 February, but, on 6 March, he failed to obtain a mandatory vote of confidence for his proposed policy statement, which included the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces in Thailand within 18 months. On 17 March, the King approved a new coalition government headed by Khukrit Pramoj, which governed for the rest of 1975.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The Khukrit cabinet policy statement was released on 17 March. It stated that the RTG would pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence on a basis of friendship regardless of differences in ideologies and administrative systems. The RTG would take the initiative to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC), and would bring about a withdrawal of foreign troops from Thailand within one year, "...taking into consideration the regional situation and friendly negotiations...." The RTG would strengthen friendly relations with neighboring countries and regional cooperation, and would attempt to create contacts with North Vietnam. The U.S. Embassy noted that the policy statement seemed to be flexible, but that Khukrit's press statements to the effect that the fall of Cambodia would be an additional reason for withdrawal contracted that flexibility considerably.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 20 March the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok advised the State Department that there were several aspects of the new Khukrit government which had important implications for on-going U.S. programs and the U.S.-Thai relationship. The support being rendered to Cambodia at that time through Thailand could possibly be restricted; sizeable troop withdrawals in a limited timeframe could be hard to advert since many Thai had come to discount the value of our military presence; the future of our large special intelligence installations also appeared less than certain. However, the Embassy said, it was too early

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1. SECSTATE 283136/301708Z Dec 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 20195/301041Z Dec 74 (EX).
  2. SECSTATE 3604/081505Z Jan 75.
  3. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76 of 142245Z Feb 75; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Feb 76.
  4. AMEMB Bangkok 4395/171327Z Mar 75 and 4488/181130Z Mar 75.

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to foretell in detail the course [which the Khukrit Government would take during its sojourn in power].<sup>1</sup>

(S) On the same day as the U.S. Embassy assessment, the State Department sent to all diplomatic posts abroad a briefing memorandum entitled "The U.S. Military Presence in Thailand." This memorandum noted that the keystone to Thai foreign policy in the 1950's had been reliance on the United States as a security guarantor. While it was true that the prospect of increase military assistance could have influenced the Thai decision in the 1960's to allow the deployment of a large U.S. military force in Thailand, confidence in the U.S. security commitment to Thailand probably weighed more heavily than any other factor, and the deployment was regarded as a logical extension of Thailand's security alliance with the United States. As the Indochina situation worsened, State went on, Thai confidence in that alliance would crumble and probably diminish still further if Cambodia should fall. Even if Cambodia should survive, the Thai would be completely aware of the unpopularity in the United States of further Southeast Asian involvements, and, therefore, reluctant to expose themselves to the vagaries of U.S. policy in the area. Since Khukrit had already told the press that the fall of the Lon Nol government would not change the need for U.S. troop withdrawals, the U.S. military presence was increasingly seen as not only irrelevant to the fighting in Indochina, but even as a distinct liability to the Thai in their efforts to find the new arrangements they thought they needed in the absence of a credible U.S. security guarantee.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 28 March the Thai Foreign Minister, Chatchai Chunhawan, held a press conference in which a reporter asked him what made him certain that after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, communists would not continue infiltrating Thailand. Chatchai replied, "It is you who demanded for them to be withdrawn, so I am making arrangements for their withdrawal. If everybody demands for them to be withdrawn, they have to be withdrawn. When everybody says that their presence causes us loss of sovereignty and a loud outcry is made, then they must be withdrawn. In a democracy it is the majority, or the view of the majority, which counts. When the majority demands their withdrawal, I have to make arrangements for that withdrawal." When asked whether the U.S. Forces would be completely withdrawn within one year's time, Chatchai replied in the affirmative. But, he said, the RTG would hold negotiations in a friendly manner and with consideration to the situation in Indochina. Because violent fighting had broken out again in Vietnam and Cambodia, "...everything is so chaotic and confused that it is impossible to know what is what." Three days later, on 31 March, Chatchai had taken a little tougher line than in the news conference. He noted that negotiations for the renewed withdrawal of U.S.

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 4673/203006Z Mar 75.

2. SECSTATE 63379/202051Z Mar 75.

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Forces had not yet started; however, he also noted that the RTG was not concentrating on withdrawal of military forces only, but also intended to place restrictions on any activity beyond the limits of existing agreements or commitments. For example, he said, there were no commitments nor agreements for patrols to be carried on anywhere except over Indochina. No patrols would be allowed over the Indian Ocean.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The day after the surrender in Saigon, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand advised the State Department that the skein of often secret agreements made between the United States and the RTG relating to U.S. military presence in Thailand was becoming unraveled because of Thai nationalistic sentiment, Thai popular mistrust of the old military governments which had concluded the agreements with the United States, and a deep concern over the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence. Among the examples cited by the Ambassador and which was already a casualty was the exemption from Thai registration and hence taxation of Department of Defense contractors. Two other agreements which were in jeopardy were the granting of diplomatic immunity for certain categories of military personnel, and the exemption of the U.S. Government and its contractors from the Thai Labor Law. Part of the problem, according to the Ambassador, related to the fact that the previous military regimes had made most of those arrangements with the United States in secrecy, knowing full well that Thai public opinion even at that time would probably not have supported the government on these issues. Since the advent of militant nationalism in Thailand, such secrecy could no longer be maintained and Thai public opinion was even less willing than it would have been to tolerate the terms of these agreements. Nevertheless, said the Ambassador, RTG unwillingness to come to the defense of the United States in any confrontations over these various secret agreements did not imply the immediate termination of mutual cooperation on the international security problems. He conceded, however, that not much could be expected of the Thai in any case where delicate national political interests might be at stake, or where hypernationalistic public passions threatened to play a role. Included under such circumstances would be the Thai military which had already run for cover in some sensitive cases. By the middle of May, and in spite of the previously expressed opinion from some Thai officials that they were in no immediate danger from the new communist regimes in Indochina, the Ambassador noted that some Bangkok residents had become nervous about the stability of Thailand. Some well-to-do Thai and Sino-Thai were moving their capital out of Thailand and were making preparations to leave the country. That reaction was regarded by the U.S. Mission to be premature if not irrational. The Mission agreed that the current movement of capital and people from Thailand was an irrational reaction to the situation in the neighboring countries and that Thailand

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 5308/311036Z Mar 75 and 5469/020922Z Apr 75.

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stability and security were not immediately threatened. The current panic was expected to subside after a few months.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ The seizure of the MAYAGUEZ (on 12 May) by the naval forces of the new communist government in Cambodia proved to be just one more irritant in U.S.-RTG relations. As described in a news report of 13 May, the Pentagon announced that a group of about 150 Marines would be airlifted from Subic Bay in the Philippines to the air base at U-Tapao in southern Thailand. The same article, however, quoted Prime Minister Khukrit Pramoj to the effect that Thailand would not permit the United States to use Thai airbases for military action against Cambodia, saying, "We have enough trouble with Asian neighbors now." After the operation to recover the MAYAGUEZ, during which Marines were staged from the U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand, the Thai press claimed that this action was a downright insult to Thailand. The question was asked, "Why didn't the U.S. keep at least one carrier in these waters?" On 17 May approximately 2,500 to 3,000 demonstrators were reported to be in front of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. On the 18th, Thai nationalists were reported to be demonstrating at Korat Air Base and to have entered the base at the main gate carrying banners. The demonstration was peaceful and lasted less than an hour. No damage was reported. On the 19th, demonstrators were reported outside the Embassy where they had burned effigies and an American flag. An Embassy report said, "Burning effigies put out by method Gulliver used to quell flames in Lilliput palace." This affair was described later in the year by a U.S. journalist on a trip to Thailand. During the MAYAGUEZ incident, and without a word to the Thai Government or to the U.S. Embassy, Washington had sent U.S. Marines and fighter bombers to U-Tapao Air Base and then dispatched them to retrieve the ship seized by the Cambodians. In protest, 3,500 Thai had gathered outside the U.S. Embassy and one had urinated on the American flag. This writer noted that, in a nation of 41 million people, this could be called a measured response. It was understandable because the air base was legally theirs, and the United States had added to their problems with their neighbors. Even so, said the writer, the desecration of the American flag was deplored by a great many Thai. That statement was probably accurate because, on 27 May 1975, the King of Thailand was reported to have said that he was very upset by the demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy and he disagreed with the fact that the United States was forced to make an apology to the Thai Government by the demonstrators.<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 7857/011207Z May 75 and 8817/150841Z May 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 13 May 75, "Marines Going to Thailand," by Fred S. Hoffman, dateline Washington (AP); Honolulu Advertiser, 3 Sep 75, "U.S. Wants a 'Presence'," by George Chaplin, Editor-in-Chief, the Honolulu Advertiser, dateline Bangkok; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log May 75.

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(S) In late June the U.S. Ambassador provided an assessment of the current relationships between the United States and the RTG and some of the security dilemmas facing the Thai Government. The Ambassador noted that long before Indochina fell Thailand had begun to modify its foreign policy. This change was well underway, but not yet complete. It involved an expansion of diplomatic contacts with Eastern European and Asian communist countries, an attempt by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assert dominance over the military in relations with the United States, and an enhanced affinity with ASEAN neighbors that would probably stop short of a formal collective security arrangement. The Ambassador noted the differing signals being received from official RTG channels and from top military leaders regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops. However, even the military leaders who most wanted the United States to stay in Thailand realized that in practical terms the U.S. Mission and the U.S. Government had to deal with the publicly stated official RTG message. The leading role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1974 in forbidding P-3 reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean from U-Tapao had been the salient episode in wresting away some of the Supreme Command's monopoly on U.S.-Thai security matters. In an affirmation of the Embassy's previous comment, the MFA was chairing the review of all bilateral agreements, a role which gave it considerable leverage over the military in shaping the result of the review. But, the Embassy added, the contest with the Thai military over domination of policy continued.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Thailand had also intensified its relationship with its ASEAN partners in their espousal of a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. These ASEAN associations promised to become a linchpin in Thailand's emerging foreign policy. Although ASEAN would probably not assume a formal collective security function, the Embassy added, the Thai derived reassurance from ever-closer relations with those neighboring states which faced, though less intense, security problems. The RTG had not decided the exact extent, nature, and timing of the North Vietnamese menace to Thai security. There was a lot of talk that the Vietnamese would need several years to consolidate their administration over South Vietnam and develop Vietnam's economy and that likewise the Khmer Communists would have a period of consolidation in Cambodia. At the same time there was wide belief that the Vietnamese would step up their support to the Thai insurgency; thus, the Thai move toward improved Russia-Thai relations and the approach toward normal relations with Peking. Although the insurgency was largely a domestic problem, the Thai believed that it also could be surmounted through joint diplomacy. Conservative elements within Thai officialdom including the Thai military recognized that rapprochement with the

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 12351/251218Z Jun 75.

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PRC, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam was advisable but questioned the haste with which the MFA was plunging ahead. They feared that such precipitous accommodation would in fact be endangering Thailand by making deals that were ill-conceived and giving away too much in the bargaining process. There was a widespread recognition of the need to strengthen Thai society by lessening social inequality and the disparities in the distribution of wealth. At the same time the need was recognized to reorganize the counterinsurgency effort. And finally, the Embassy stated its expectation that notwithstanding Thai skepticism regarding the future security role of the United States with Thailand, the Thai would perceive that close relations with the United States were desirable even if those ties were not primarily in the security field. Other ASEAN leaders, who regarded Thailand as both the weakest reed in the association and also the most threatened, were likely to urge Thailand toward this recognition.

(S) In early July, in spite of the fact that a publicly announced reduction of U.S. strength in Thailand had been completed, the Embassy was under steadily growing pressure to divulge to the Thai the next step in the U.S. Force reduction. The Embassy urged that in order to render negotiations for a residual presence or re-entry rights less difficult, that additional U.S. Force reductions should be made but that they should be handled on the basis of base closures rather than overall force level reductions.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 22 July the Embassy reported an approach by former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman who said that he was worried over the casual and apparently ill-thought-out manner in which the RTG was handling the question of maintaining close security ties with the United States. Thanat said that the Thai were normally rather astute in the handling of foreign affairs, but that Khukrit's government seemed to be wearing blinkers on the subject of possible advantage to Thailand as well as to the United States of having some American military facilities remain in Thailand after March 1976. Thanat suggested that the Embassy press for visits by U.S. aircraft to Thai bases as a useful political weight in the future. He also said that he thought the government would wish to see some small facilities maintained in Thailand. He hastened to add, however, that he was speaking totally unofficially. One week later, on 29 July, press reports from Bangkok highlighted a major dispute which had developed between the Thai Government and Thai military authorities over the review of Thai/U.S. treaties. The Thai Supreme Command had reportedly refused to hand over the texts of military agreements with the United States to government-appointed committees reviewing the treaties.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ibid.

2. AMEMB Bangkok 13498/091039Z Jul 75 and 14813/221220Z Jul 75.

3. AMEMB Bangkok 14814/221226Z Jul 75; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Jul 75.

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(~~S~~) In an interesting parallel to the events in the Philippines previously discussed, and at almost the same time of the year, the Embassy reported that the Khukrit government had taken several small steps toward attacking official corruption, notably a reform of the civil service structure. In this September message the Embassy noted that these efforts were running into trouble from vested interests, especially in the parliament. Official corruption, the Embassy added, was probably the single most difficult and serious problem facing Thailand. It involved more than just abuse of power and influence peddling. It affected the entire structure of government, the formation and implementation of public policy, the allocation of public resources, promotions and appointments within the civil-military bureaucracies, and virtually every other phase of government activity. The Embassy was unable to predict how much of an effort the Prime Minister could put into reform of the bureaucracies. He had made important but limited steps in the right direction; however, the strong conservative opposition could put a break on further reform.<sup>1</sup>

(~~S~~) By October large-scale military attacks by insurgent forces on RTG regular force personnel and installations had focused increased international and national attention on the Thai insurgency. A Thai agency report revealed that the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had some degree of influence over almost four million people in Thailand. The CPT continued to pursue a protracted struggle, with armed rebellion and revolutionary violence as the critical ingredients to the seizure of state power. Armed communist jungle soldiers were estimated to number at least 8,400, with as many as 84,000 active supporters. Communist soldiers were well armed, particularly in the north and northeast, and communist external support appeared to keep the insurgents well supplied with weapons and ammunition. The Embassy prognosis was for the CPT, not yet a major short-range threat to the RTG, to continue its growth, accelerated by external support and an intensification of the insurgency, unless the RTG undertook a massive coordinated counterinsurgency effort. There was no evidence at hand to indicate the RTG planned to undertake such an effort. In the absence of this effort, it was anticipated that the expanding growth of the movement could manifest itself in a higher level of violence in the affected areas as the CPT military forces continued to mount large-scale, high intensity attacks against RTG installations and personnel.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Some three months after his initial approach to the Ambassador regarding a U.S. residual presence in Thailand, the former Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, presented a paper at a seminar on Asian affairs in Hong Kong. A press report described the paper as a complete about-face on the issue of

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 19893/221020Z Sep 73.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 20942/031004Z Oct 75.

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American troops. The article went on to state that with the withdrawal of American troops and warplanes from Thailand entering its final phases, some leading Thai who had been anxious to get the United States out of Southeast Asia now appeared to be having second thoughts. Thanat, stated the article, had loudly and repeatedly called for the removal of U.S. Forces from the country on the grounds that their presence would in fact draw the enemy into Thailand. Thanat's view during the waning days of the Indochina war was that, once the American bases had closed, the insurgency would shrink. Although the bases had begun to close there had been a stepup in insurgent activity and signs that North Vietnam was supplying more war material for it. The former Foreign Minister advanced the view in his paper that the remaining American troops should be a bargaining point for achieving a negotiated peace and security in the area. The article credited "ranking American officials" in Bangkok with the statement that even if some U.S. troops were to stay on past March, they saw little chance that they would play an active role in the defense of the region given the views of Congress and the American public.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The mounting ascendancy of the MFA over the Thai military in the conduct of relations with U.S. authorities in Thailand was reaffirmed by the Ambassador in November. This relationship had been the almost exclusive preserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (forward) and its Chief of Staff, General Kriangsak Chamanan. As Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Sanya government and as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Khukrit government, Major General Chatchai Chunawan had been the driving force behind MFA efforts in this area. Indicative of Chatchai's progress was the promotion of General Pongpanich to replace Kriangsak. The Ambassador observed that, unless the current trend was reversed, the United States would find (and indeed already had found) that it was in a new ball game. This would be especially apparent as arrangements were negotiated for the residual U.S. presence in Thailand. Instead of a series of handshakes, gentlemen's agreements, and the like with the Thai military, the U.S. Government would be negotiating much more detailed written agreements with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was determined to assert Thai sovereignty. The Ambassador stated that this change would result in arrangements that would prove more durable under the political realities of the day in Thailand than anything that could have been worked out in the old days with the military.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 26 November Chatchai and Secretary of State Kissinger met in Washington. At a press conference in Bangkok on 4 December Chatchai described the results of his meeting with Kissinger. In the context of security in the Pacific area, Kissinger had informed Chatchai that the

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 174/222215Z Oct 75.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 24275/181152Z Nov 75.

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United States would not desert Thailand under any circumstances. Chatchai told the press that, while Kissinger had pledged that the United States would give full cooperation in regard to the safety and security of Thailand, they had agreed that Thailand would fight its own battles from the military standpoint. Other sources within the Thai Government were reported to be pleased with the outcome of Chatchai's talk with Kissinger, but for more specific reasons. One such source was reported to have said that Chatchai had gone to Washington prepared to listen and to accept what might be offered. Kissinger had actually saved the RTG some potential embarrassment by proposing more military assistance to the RTG than had been anticipated. Among the steps proposed during the talks had been the modernization of 14 Royal Thai Army infantry battalions, two Marine infantry battalions, and the development of a small arms and ammunition manufacturing facility. These steps were expected to prepare the Thai armed forces for an expanded counterinsurgency capability.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In December 1975 U.S. intelligence sources reported that the King of Thailand had decided that there was no way for Thailand to maintain friendly and normal relations with Laos and Cambodia. The King was reported to have stressed that he was determined to preserve the integrity of the country. For that reason, the King said, it was time to face the truth, regard Laos and Cambodia as enemies, and entrust the preservation of Thailand's security to its military forces. The Queen of Thailand, who rarely discussed politics and who was even more rarely given to pessimistic comments, was reported to have said that the United States was leaving Thailand but that Thailand was unprepared to meet the external and internal threats of communism. She also reportedly said that time was running out for Thailand because the Thai communist insurgency was growing daily in strength and the Government was unable to reverse this trend. These opinions were reflected later in the month by remarks of the Prime Minister to a group of close friends and associates. He was reported to have said that the greatest threat to Thailand was the presence on its borders of the hostile governments of Laos and Cambodia. He said these neighboring communist states had begun to support Thai communist insurgents, thus increasing the threat to Thailand security.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Although the reason for the apparent stiffening of Thai attitudes toward Laos and Cambodia was not immediately apparent, events during the last few months of the year shed some light on the situation. In October the RTG Supreme Command reported incidents on the Mekong River between Laos and Thailand on five successive days. These incidents, according to the RTG, were always initiated by the Pathet Lao. As previously discussed, a major Thai-Lao

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 25779/091229Z Dec 75; CIA/MILDIST GDFIRDD-315/13014-75/092128Z Dec 75 (EX).
  2. CIA/MILDIST TDFIR-314/05773-75/291945Z Dec 75 and FPD-20, 838/301430Z Dec 75.

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border clash occurred on 17 November when a Thai Navy boat got stuck on a sandbar. Forces on the Lao bank opened fire, killing and wounding some people on the boat. A second Thai Navy boat tried to rescue them but was driven off by hostile fire. Later in the day Thai reinforcements, including artillery and tanks, were sent to the area. On the morning of 18 November a 12-man commando team attempted a rescue but was also driven off by Lao fire. The Embassy reported what was described as a first-class Thai-Lao border clash in which Thai tanks, artillery, and small arms were firing at the Lao bank. Also, two Royal Thai Air Force T-28s were laying in air strikes on positions on the Lao side and drawing anti-aircraft fire. On the following day the Foreign Minister confirmed to the Ambassador that the RTG wished to handle this incident in a calm and restrained fashion and that a peaceful solution to the problem would be sought; however, the Prime Minister reviewed the boundaries of the French-Thai border treaty and stated that Thailand must retrieve the boat because the treaty map showed that it was on the Thai side of the river. During a meeting on 21 November with the Ambassador, Chatchai said that his talks with the Cambodian Deputy Premier had been highly successful. He had found the Cambodian official to be moderate and reasonable and was convinced that he was not a doctrinaire communist but rather a Cambodian nationalist. In contrast, Chatchai stated that Thailand's relationships with Laos were extremely difficult. He was convinced that someone was "egging them on" in their provocations. In his comments to the press, Chatchai said he had carefully refrained from identifying the source of this external pressure on Laos, but he did not disagree when the press assumed that he referred to North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. On 30 November the Thai patrol boat was successfully retrieved without incident. The Thai-Lao border remained closed and Royal Thai Army forces remained deployed along the river. On 3 December the Thai intelligence chief at Nakhon Phanom reported Lao small arms fire against a Thai patrol boat, after which there was a brief exchange of gunfire between local Thai forces and Pathet Lao on the Lao bank. On 9 December Prime Minister Khukrit, for the first time, was reported to have officially pointed an accusing finger at North Vietnam for supporting insurgency in Thailand. He maintained that the RTG had solid evidence; nevertheless, he said, insurgencies were not an obstacle to resuming normal diplomatic relations. When queried about North Vietnam's publicized desire to establish hegemony in the area, he was reported to have said, "I think it's all for the good. Somebody has got to be in control of what was known as French-Indochina." On 14 December it was reported that Thai Army troops and police paratroopers had been sent to the Cambodian border where border security forces were fighting intruding Cambodian communist forces for the third consecutive day. Two reasons were advanced for this particular border clash; one was that the Cambodian communists were attempting to capture fleeing Cambodian refugees. Another, however, attributed the clash to activities of former Cambodian Prime Minister In Tam while staging a liberation movement in the vicinity of the clash. The second reason was

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closer to the truth. On 16 December Chatchai announced to newsmen that General In Tam would be brought to Bangkok and then deported to France. This expulsion was intended to ease Cambodian tensions and misunderstanding. On 25 December the Thai press reported the claim of Thai military intelligence that four companies of North Vietnamese-trained Lao commando units were operating from bases in Northeast Thailand in preparation for a massive summer campaign in 1976. And finally, on 29 December a reflection of the hardened attitude of the RTG toward Cambodia and Laos came from the Thai Parliament. The House Administrative Committee warned that "a communist takeover is near." After a field inspection of the northeast border area the Committee said threats to national security were coming from within and outside the country.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile the American military and diplomatic community had been discussing some of the finer points of the residual U.S. military presence in Thailand. Early in September the Ambassador congratulated Admiral Gayler upon his extension for an additional year as CINCPAC and stated that he was looking forward to a continuation of their close association. He referred to previous talks involving CINCPAC, the RTG Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister and stated that he looked to seeing CINCPAC again in the near future.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ Admiral Gayler and key members of the CINCPAC staff did visit Bangkok from 16 to 18 October. The visit was handled in very low-key by the RTG. CINCPAC made calls on the RTG Defense Minister and Foreign Minister. These calls exposed the Admiral and his staff to the confused and often contradictory concepts regarding the defense of Thailand which were held by senior Thai officials. The Defense Minister, for example, expressed the great importance he attached to the acquisition by Thailand of an anti-aircraft capability, particularly for the defense of Bangkok. He did not appear to be unduly concerned over the likelihood of the Thai insurgency becoming more virulent. The Foreign Minister expressed his concern regarding both the insurgency and the possibility of an eventual direct attack on Thailand in the northeast. He expressed his view that Thailand would need additional military equipment in coming years. He emphasized the importance he attached to self-sufficiency and the achievement of standardization of weapons with Thailand's ASEAN neighbors. During this meeting, neither CINCPAC nor the RTG officials broached the question of residual U.S. military activity in Thailand after March 1976.<sup>3</sup>

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 21866/160855Z Oct 75, 24202/180607Z Nov 75, 24432/191213Z Nov 75, 24627/211247Z Nov 75, and 25394/031221Z Dec 75; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Dec 75.
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 18804/080805Z Sep 75.
  3. AMEMB Bangkok 22033/180511Z Oct 75.

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(S) Among those finer points discussed by CINCPAC had been the retention of U.S. intelligence-gathering facilities in Thailand. The largest of these was Ramasun Station which was an intelligence-gathering and processing center under the operational control of the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA). In October the USASA advised CINCPAC of its concern about the residual support establishment remaining in Thailand if Ramasun Station were retained as an active U.S. facility. Such support activities as medical, engineering, legal, postal, laundering and drycleaning, base security, and medical evacuation capability would be needed to support the U.S. personnel remaining at the facility. In November the Embassy provided information regarding the tenure of Ramasun Station during Fiscal Year 1976. He advised that RTG policy only required the withdrawal of U.S. "combat" forces, and since Ramasun Station was not classified as a "combat" force, it was not affected by the RTG policy regarding the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. The Ambassador had advised the RTG that the United States "attaches the greatest importance to Ramasun Station" and had proposed terms of negotiation for long-term use of the facility.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Related to the Ramasun facility was the operation of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft which had been staged from U-Tapao. The U-2 was a collection platform to acquire North Vietnam and Chinese communications, and was directly linked to the Ramasun installation. If the U-2 program were eliminated, the equipment at Ramasun used to support it would, in effect, be useless. Continuous attempts were underway by the U.S. Mission in Bangkok to convince RTG officialdom of the vital importance of this intelligence link, not only to the United States but also to Thailand. Early in November the Ambassador reported on contacts with RTG Air Marshal Sit Sawettasilla regarding the U-2 aircraft. The Ambassador suggested that two U-2 aircraft could be based at Udorn after March 1976 and explained to Sit the value of the U-2 as a platform. Sit agreed that the U.S. position was technically sound, but that U-2s were popularly viewed as "spyplanes" and were, therefore, too hot politically for the RTG to accept. He stated that he was reflecting the Prime Minister's views and saw no chance of the Prime Minister changing his mind. Nevertheless, he discussed the issue again with the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister was amazed to learn that the U-2 was a collection platform and that, moreover, it was linked to the Ramasun installation. He agreed that if the U-2 program were eliminated the equipment at Ramasun would be useless. Sit suggested to Khukrit that if the aircraft were to be retained in country, press attention could be avoided by moving them to a more "secret" base like Takhli. After the Foreign Minister's return from the meeting with Kissinger, discussed previously, there were indications

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1. CDRUSASA 211300Z Oct 75 and 071935Z Nov 75, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 031255Z Nov 75.

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that Khukrit had indeed changed his mind about the U-2, according to an informal intelligence report on 5 December. Khukrit had been so pleased by the positive tone of Kissinger's assurances that the United States would continue to support Thailand that he would approve the U-2 aircraft in Thailand for intelligence gathering missions.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Another intelligence report on 9 December tended to reinforce the reversal by Chatchai on the retention. The Defense Minister was reported to have said it would be to Thailand's advantage to retain the U-2 overflight operations against North Vietnam, and that he and Chatchai had accepted the responsibility for this decision because the Prime Minister had indicated his preference to delegate the decision-making authority on this subject matter to the National Security Council and the Minister of Defense.<sup>2</sup>


(S) On 8 December the Ambassador met with Chatchai to discuss his 26 November visit to Washington. The Ambassador stressed the need to start technical level talks regarding the "new look" at Ramasun, considering the short time remaining before the March deadline. Chatchai agreed that the technical level discussions should start immediately and that training would be an important element of the new facility. The Ambassador assured Chatchai that the United States was in fact anxious to get on with the job of training Thai to take on the bulk of the station's activities. Shortly thereafter U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Habib visited Thailand for talks with Foreign Minister Chatchai. As he had in Washington with Kissinger, Chatchai stressed Thailand's desire for additional defense production facilities. He mentioned in particular the need for a capability to produce various kinds of munitions. Chatchai said he recognized that it would not be economical to establish such a plant to meet only Thailand's needs; however, Thailand hoped that it would be possible to standardize the use of certain items among all ASEAN members and have common production facilities. Habib suggested that if Thailand wished to pursue this matter, it should prepare a proposal for future consideration. Habib also said that he believed the residual U.S. elements in Thailand would be helpful to the RTG, and that the United States would move ahead with plans to bring the Thai into our intelligence facilities to the maximum extent possible.<sup>3</sup>

(S) As the year ended the U.S. Embassy reported, on 29 December, that the RTG had concluded that the next step toward residual configuration of Ramasun,

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1. SECSTATE 261866/051629Z Nov 75, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 23263; SECSTATE 267046/112144Z Nov 75, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 23717/111200Z Nov 75; CIA/MILDIST TDFIRDB-315/12871-75/051444Z Dec 75.
  2. CIA/MILDIST TDFIRDB-315/13014-75/092128Z Dec 75.
  3. AMEMB Bangkok 25660/081330Z Dec 75 and 26002/131111Z Dec 75.

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
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1. AMEMB Bangkok 26892/291153Z Dec 75; CINCPAC PA LNO Bangkok 160610Z Dec 75.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 562-564.

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
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1. USDLO Hong Kong 611/140805Z Apr 75 and 141155Z Apr 75; DIA 1656/151911Z Apr 75; USDAO Manila 160643Z Apr 75 and 170320Z Apr 75.


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1. AMEMB Manila 5250/240627Z Apr 75.
  2. DIA 2097/241937Z Apr 75.
  3. CINCPACREPPHIL 250734Z Apr 75.

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
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1. AMEMB Manila 5355/250852Z Apr 75.
  2. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log May 75; IPAC Point Paper, 21 May 75, Subj: Spratley Islands Update.

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1. SECSTATE 116037/201700Z May 75 and 128523/030002Z Jun 75 (EX).
2. JCS 7817/092207Z Sep 75.

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SECTION IV--NORTHEAST ASIA

Overview

(U) For America's allies in Northeast Asia--Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan--the events in Indochina carried different implications than for the nations of Southeast Asia. Perhaps typical of the reaction in Northeast Asia was the reported comment by one Japanese official when asked what the long-run impact of the fall of Indochina would be on Japan. He said, "Indochina is of no real concern to us. We are sorry about the refugees and all that. But it is a long way from us. Korea is our next-door neighbor." The following overview of Northeast Asia for 1975 was published by the Intelligence Center of the Pacific (IPAC).<sup>1</sup>

(S) Diplomatically, Russia revived its proposal for an Asian collective security system during the latter half of the year, but this effort was considered a long-range Soviet objective. In January the Soviets set back detente slightly by rejecting the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement because of Soviet emmigration stipulations added to the U.S. trade act by Congress. Later in the year, massive Soviet support of Marxist-oriented popular movement and Cuban forces in Angola indicated that Soviet military activities in support of "liberation" movements would continue despite detente. In fact, Soviet leaders repeatedly stated that detente would not be allowed to interfere with their efforts in the ideological conflict with the West. In December the Soviets were quick to criticize the U.S. "New Pacific Doctrine" announced by President Ford on the conclusion of his trip to the PRC, and overall, relations between the U.S.S.R. and China remained cool. The careful and systematic development of Soviet strategic and conventional military forces served to support both long-range goals and short-term objectives. The potential demonstrated by these military forces, especially the navy, added increased leverage to Soviet political and economic endeavors worldwide. Russian support capabilities in the Indian Ocean improved during the year, and their qualitative upgrade of armed forces in the Far East continued.

(S) For the PRC 1975 was a period of sustained economic growth against a background of political uncertainty. Peking continued to enlarge its sphere of diplomatic activity but had yet to solve severe balance of payments problems in foreign trade. Military affairs were highlighted by signs of growing concentration on professional development, improvement of weapons systems,

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 14 May 75, "With Indochina Gone, Korea Worries Japan," by Richard Halloran (N.Y.T.S.); COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 2-76 of 142245Z Feb 76.

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and a more extensive role for the navy. China's borders were generally quiet, with minor incidents reported or rumored on the two most tense--India and the U.S.S.R. The PRC foreign policy was dominated by Peking's desire for a major world role and its fear of Soviet ambitions. By the end of the year, China has established diplomatic relations with 106 countries and with the European Economic Community. The PRC remained an active participant in the United Nations and other international forums, and a first among equals, if not a leader, of the Third World. Relations with Russia were formally correct, but Chinese leaders made special efforts to warn other nations of the dangers of Soviet imperialist designs. Peking strengthened its ties with Europe and worked hard to establish Chinese leadership or patronage over the countries of East Asia. This latter program and the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea contributed to Peking's apparent opposition to a North Korean attack against the South. The PRC generally seemed less bellicose toward Taiwan but may have begun a campaign of subversion there. Relations with Japan had strengthened, and formal relations were established with Thailand and the Philippines. In ASEAN, only Singapore and Indonesia remained aloof. The greatest challenge to the PRC in East Asia resulted from the sudden fall of South Vietnam and the subsequent change of government in Laos. At the end of the year Peking faced direct competition in one of its traditional areas of influence from both Hanoi and Moscow. Relations with the United States, highlighted by President Ford's December visit, were essentially static. Although continued U.S. presence on Taiwan remained the principal obstacle to full normalization of relations, Peking seemed to reserve its strongest criticism for Washington's presumed policy of appeasing Moscow.

(S) The situation in Taiwan remained basically unchanged from a year ago. Politically, the Republic of China (ROC) had continued to maintain stability in the face of eroding diplomatic relations. Internal reaction to Chiang Kai-shek's death in April was as expected--one of grief, but not loss of hope. The transition to power of Chiang Ching-kuo occurred well in advance of the generalissimo's death, and a period of instability was avoided. In late December the ROC announced a budget surplus of more than \$1 billion, accumulated over the past 10 years. Militarily, the ROC stressed self-sufficiency and a strong defense posture. Increased emphasis on vigilance in the Taiwan Strait and development of missile capabilities highlighted naval activity.

(S) On the Korean peninsula, the year 1975 was highlighted by Kim Il-song's visit to Peking and the United Nations' vote. Kim's hurried trip on 18-26 April caused immediate concern regarding his intentions toward South Korea. Seoul's reaction was to seek reassurances of continued U.S. support and to increase its defense spending. Relations between the two Koreas continued to be strained as Pyongyang reaped diplomatic victories at the expense of Seoul. Indochina events increased Pyongyang's diplomatic standing in East Asia, and

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at the end of the year, North Korea had diplomatic ties with ten East Asian nations, while Seoul had diplomatic ties with nine. Two major diplomatic coups for Kil Il-song occurred when North Korea was admitted to the conference of non-allied nations in August, and when the U.N. General Assembly passed conflicting Korea resolutions in November. Pyongyang's diplomatic progress probably figured prominently in President Park's December cabinet reshuffle in which the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were replaced by persons with backgrounds in foreign affairs. Following a year of large student revolts, a national referendum was held in South Korea on 12 February during which the Park regime received a 73 percent vote of confidence. President Park Chung Hee received reassurances of U.S. support following the fall of Indochina and began an ambitious force improvement program to upgrade the armed forces and defense industries' capabilities. A special defense tax was passed, a civil service defense corps was formed, and the calendar year 1976 budget raised defense spending by 57 percent to \$1.4 billion. Park generated concern regarding Korea's nuclear program during the summer when he stated that the Republic of Korea (ROK) possessed the capability to develop nuclear weapons. In furtherance of its nuclear program, Seoul purchased a Candu reactor from Canada and a fuel reprocessing plant from France. Following his trip to Peking, Kil Il-song visited five countries in Eastern Europe and Africa to improve relations with Third World nations. Though North Korean propaganda emphasized a peaceful solution to the Korean issue, Pyongyang continued to upgrade the capabilities of its armed forces during the year. However, the PRC was believed to have forestalled any immediate aggressive intentions by North Korea.

(C) In Japan during 1975, Prime Minister Miki had substantial accomplishments to his credit after his first year in office. Despite his weak power base in the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), Miki survived maneuvers by his political rivals to oust him. His major setbacks came from his inability to push through an anti-trust law and three important international agreements--the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, an agreement with the ROK to develop the mutual continental shelf, and a peace treaty with the PRC.

After the Indochina collapse, Miki sought to stabilize Japan's position in Southeast Asia by offering economic aid to Hanoi and exchanging embassies. He cultivated new ties with ASEAN countries and even made a few cautious approaches to North Korea.

In August U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited both Korea and Japan. While in Japan, agreement was reached on the coordination of military

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operations under the MST. It was also in August that Prime Minister Miki visited Washington, and ties with the United States were further cemented when Emperor Hirohito toured the United States in October 1975.

(C) Meanwhile, inflation had struck hard at Japan's military programs. Defense force expansion fell behind schedule, and the outlook was for little qualitative improvement, since increased costs went mainly for personnel expenses. The Defense Minister promised to upgrade the quality of the military establishment, and he began to develop fresh approaches to defense planning and strategy and sought closer ties with the United States under the MST. He and Miki launched frank public debate on Japan's security, an area past governments had avoided because of political hazards. U.S.-Japan military relations remained amicable in 1975 despite traditional problems such as the alleged transit of nuclear weapons, strains between U.S. bases and local communities, the cost of maintaining bases, and the environmental pollution resulting from them. Two of the four major opposition parties (Komeito and the DSP) dropped their long-standing demand for early abrogation of the MST. Even among the Socialists, a small group recommended a more realistic attitude toward the treaty. Only the communists remained unalterably opposed to the MST.

#### Japan

(S) CINCPAC's political-military responsibilities in Japan were discharged through, and in close coordination with, the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan) and the U.S. Embassy. To assist CINCPAC and his staff in matters relating to U.S. political-military relationships, COMUS Japan submitted to CINCPAC a bi-weekly report of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) matters of interest.

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CINCPAC was also involved in the complementarity of military forces between the United States and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). CINCPAC was concerned with such subjects as the wages paid to Japanese nationals working on U.S. bases; adherence to the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in such matters as criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel; [REDACTED]

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#### The View from the Embassy

(C) Shortly after Prime Minister Miki took office, the Embassy reported his request for a meeting with the Ambassador. During this meeting, on

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17 January, Miki commented that President Ford's visit to Japan in 1974 had been an event of historic significance and one which "solidified the foundation of our relationship." He also remarked that very recently he had had an opportunity to discuss the visit with the Emperor who had expressed his complete satisfaction with the visit and with the fact that it had served the purpose of strengthening relations between the United States and Japan. Miki expressed his appreciation for President Ford's personal message to him concerning the Ford State-of-the-Union speech. The Ambassador invited the Prime Minister's attention to certain aspects of the State-of-the-Union speech which he felt were of special importance and interest to Japan. In particular he noted the clear determination the President had shown to insure that the United States was less vulnerable to changes in price and availability of energy sources from outside the borders of the United States, to the clear priority given to measures to reinvigorate the U.S. economy, and to the reaffirmation of continuity of basic elements of U.S. foreign policy. The Ambassador made special note of the President's desire to continue to work closely with other nations to solve the pressing multilateral problems.<sup>1</sup>


(S) On 14 April the Embassy reported on the airport press conference held by Foreign Minister Miyazawa upon his return from a Washington visit. The Foreign Minister described his talks with Secretary Kissinger as "frank" and said the Secretary was "easy to talk with." He informed the press of agreement with the U.S. Government for a visit by Prime Minister Miki in late July or early August and also revealed that Japan Defense Agency Director General Sakata had invited Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to visit Japan. The Ambassador reported that the media had focused on two aspects of the talks: the reported differences of views between Miyazawa and U.S. officials on Indochina; and, U.S. security reassurances and the significance of the phrase regarding U.S.-Japan MST as "cornerstone of the stability in Asia and the Pacific." Some newspapers generally subscribed to Miyazawa's purported position which anticipated that "liberation forces" would win in Indochina and thereby Cambodia and South Vietnam would achieve "self-determination." In marked contrast, one editor regretted that the "unity" President Ford had sought with Congress in assisting South Vietnam and other allies was lacking, but in this editor's assessment Japan and other nations were even more pusillanimous in responding to the plight of the South Vietnamese. He heaped scorn on Miyazawa's pious phrases about "self-determination" and "liberators" as "meaningless when determining is imposed by aggression and military might." Citing Japan's quick recognition of Peking at Taiwan's expense, the rush to the Middle East during the "oil shock," and Japan's current "neutral" stance toward South Vietnam (conveniently forgetting big profits during earlier stages of the war), the editor said the Japanese could

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 714/180435Z Jan 75.

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 4875/141120Z Apr 75.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 6616/200355Z May 75.

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(S) In July the Embassy reported on a three-day visit to Tokyo by Indonesian President Suharto, who expressed his conviction that the United States would remain in Asia. Suharto stated that he welcomed the United States' presence in Asia including, by implication, the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He also expressed the theory discussed earlier in this chapter that military means were insufficient to cope with insurgencies and that "national resilience" based on strong economies and social conditions was the most effective bulwark against communism. He said this same formula applied to all ASEAN states and advocated strengthened ties among the ASEAN states. He also envisioned ASEAN cooperation in military security matters in the future. His primary anxiety was that weapons from Indochina would find their way to ASEAN insurgencies. The Ambassador commented that the visit to Japan by Suharto, which had followed visits by Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines, would help Prime Minister Miki prepare for his visit to the United States. Suharto's visit was expected to be followed by a visit from Malaysia's acting foreign minister.<sup>2</sup>

(S) In August the Embassy reported on the return to Japan of a group of Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) members from their visit to the United States. The Party Secretary General was quoted as being impressed by the unanimity

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 8027/170521Z Jun 75.
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 9608/150915Z Jul 75.

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of American opinion that the United States should continue its policy of seeking stability on the Korean peninsula. He added that the United States Administration, Congress, and scholars all believed that the possibility of a North Korean advance to the South was slight because neither Peking nor Moscow wanted an armed clash on the Korean peninsula. He also said that he was impressed by the importance Washington officials and the Congress attached to the U.S.-Japan relationships. The Embassy also reported on ministerial level talks between the South Korean and Japanese Governments, whose relations had been strained since the Kim Dae-jung abduction and the assassination of Madame Park Chung Hee.

(S) After their visit to the mainland United States in October 1975, the Emperor and Empress of Japan stopped in Honolulu prior to their return to Japan. On 12 October the Department of State sent to CINCPAC, for delivery to the Ambassador, President Ford's farewell message to the Emperor and Empress. Ford's message, delivered while they were still in Honolulu, wished them God-speed on their journey home on behalf of all Americans. He said, "We all shall remember your historic visit as a profound expression of the strong ties between our countries." After their departure, CINCPAC expressed his appreciation to all the military personnel in Hawaii who had contributed to the success of the visit by the Emperor and Empress in Hawaii. He said, "Many Japanese and U.S. dignitaries have expressed their appreciation for the cooperation and support of the military. Governor Ariyoshi extended his praise and thanks for a precision honors ceremony on departure from Hickam." On 14 October the Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported on the Emperor's statement after his return to Japan. He expressed his gratitude to the President and to the American people for their kindness and special consideration. He also remarked on America's vigorous society and its efforts to achieve prosperity and peace in the world. He was greatly impressed with the way the Americans of Japanese ancestry were living in the United States, and he said the trip made him realize how important it was to achieve international friendship through mutual understanding. On 16 October the Embassy reported that the Emperor's visit had been successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of either the Japanese or the United States. The Embassy observed that, clearly, a new era had begun in U.S.-Japan relations and that the foundations for the relations had been reconfirmed at the highest levels. The Embassy cautioned, however, that while the atmosphere had clearly changed for the better, it would be foolhardy to assume that Japanese positions on questions of importance to the United States would change overnight. Only an American determination to maintain the momentum through a continuation of


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1. AMEMB Tokyo 12899/121010Z Sep 75 and 13092/170950Z Sep 75.

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full and frank consultations with the Japanese on issues of importance would ultimately have a concrete effect on Japanese attitudes.<sup>1</sup>




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1. SECSTATE 243404/121753Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 170205Z Oct 75; FBIS Tokyo 140735Z Oct 75; AMEMB Tokyo 14751/161044Z Oct 75.
  2. AMEMB Tokyo 14684/160737Z Oct 75 and 14745/170646Z Oct 75.

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
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1. CINCPAC 191910Z Jul 75.

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1. JCS 6944/102330Z Oct 75.

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
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1. JCS 9976/032018Z Oct 75; COMUS Japan 152308Z Oct 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 238/  
252005Z Oct 75; J51 HistSum Nov 75.

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
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1. 5AF 130710Z Jan 75; AMEMB Tokyo 11354/150745Z Aug 75, 11402/151035Z Aug 75, and 11407/151101Z Aug 75.

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
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1. CINCPACFLT 182015Z Oct 75; CINCPAC TANGO 27/240430Z Oct 75.

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1. CINCPAC AIRBORNE TANGO 24/230845Z Oct 75.


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


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The Schlesinger Visit



1. COMUS Japan 210045Z Aug 75; AMEMB Tokyo 11748/220800Z Aug 75.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 16224/130001Z Nov 75.

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As the time approached for the visit by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to Korea and Japan, CINCPAC informed the Defense Intelligence Agency of Hawaiian media interest in the Secretary's trip. Three network-affiliated television stations, two daily newspapers, and the Associated Press and United Press International wire services had indicated interest in a short meeting with the Secretary on his arrival in Honolulu. Admiral Gayler was scheduled to meet the Secretary on his arrival and introduce him to the newsmen. CINCPAC suggested a short arrival statement covering the purposes of the visits to Korea and Japan, the importance of consultations, and the fact that the Secretary would meet with CINCPAC and his component commanders while he was in Hawaii. One result of this airport press briefing was the coverage by a writer for one of the Honolulu daily newspapers. The article stated that Schlesinger had said he was going to Japan to encourage closer dialogue with the Japanese on security matters. He said he would not make any specific requests, but rather the meeting would be used to define the joint responsibilities of Japan and the United States.

(C) On 29 August Secretary Schlesinger met for over two hours with the Minister of State for Defense, Michita Sakata. Sakata informed the Secretary that the firm U.S. commitment to various countries had been very reassuring.

[REDACTED]

Schlesinger told Sakata that the fall of Vietnam forced upon the United States a reinterpretation of the various security elements in areas close to U.S. interests. The outcome in Vietnam may even have provided a firmer basis for security in the region. The Secretary said the emphasis placed by Prime Minister Miki on trust and confidence between nations was one of the outcomes of Vietnam, and a fortunate one. Another beneficial result was that the situation in the Korean peninsula was inherently stable. The reiteration by the United States of a policy of firmness and Miki's statement of recognition of the threat to South Korea had had a reassuring effect.

(C) The Secretary reassured Sakata that the military balance in Korea was sufficient to deter aggression and in the event of aggression to defeat it.


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1. COMUS Japan 200725Z May 75 (EX); AMEMB Tokyo 6631/200748Z May 75 (EX); CINCPAC 210105Z Aug 75 (BOM); Honolulu Advertiser, 23 Aug 75, "Schlesinger Will 'Reassure' Japan, Korea," by David Tong, Staff Writer.

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By themselves, he said, the ROK forces are well-trained and disciplined, fully as competent as the North Korean forces. The Secretary said that he could foresee the time when the United States would be able to withdraw from Korea. In the meantime, however, the United States would remain as long as needed to protect the ROK.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Sakata asked the Secretary for an explanation of U.S. strategy, both long-range and worldwide with emphasis on Asia. The Secretary replied that because of communications and transportation, the whole world had been transformed into a single theater. Europe and Asia were therefore related, so the objective of the United States and its allies must be a worldwide military balance that dealt with the reality of Soviet military power. On his part, Sakata offered as a summary of U.S. strategy in Asia the concept of preventing any single nation from achieving preponderance, and he suggested that with the differing capabilities of China and the Soviet Union, the U.S. presence in Asia was essential to the maintenance of military balance.<sup>2</sup>




(S) A few days later the U.S. Embassy provided the Secretary of State with an assessment of the impact of Secretary Schlesinger's visit and the

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 12373/050520Z Sep 75.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid.

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reception given to him by the Japanese Government and people. The Embassy assessed the visit as highly successful, noting that the Secretary was especially effective in placing on the public record clear statements about U.S. policy in Asia, particularly toward Korea and Japan. A number of distortions and misperceptions about the intentions of the United States which had long plagued the Japanese political scene were reduced. In addition, the Embassy noted, the specific agreement to expand security consultations between the countries opened the way for more concrete and realistic discussions, and this was done without provoking a counterproductive furor over any of the time-honored controversies which had diverted Japanese attention and divided opinion in the security area for so long.<sup>1</sup>



(C) When, in November 1975, Secretary Schlesinger was replaced by Donald H. Rumsfeld, the new Secretary sent a personal letter to the Japanese Defense Minister. He extended his greetings and emphasized his belief in the importance of the strong and friendly relationships which existed between Japan and the United States. He said that the MST embodied the spirit of the security relationship between the two countries and the mutual interest in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] He stated that continued, frank, and candid discussions between the United States and Japan were essential to enhance combined abilities to contribute to the security of Japan and stability in Asia.<sup>3</sup>



1. AMEMB Tokyo 12486/080455Z Sep 75.
2. COMUS Japan 110606Z Sep 75.
3. SECDEF 7434/262311Z Nov 75 (EX).

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
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1. AMEMB Tokyo 18293/240849Z Dec 75.

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Translation of CINCPAC's Congressional Testimony

(U) On 12 December COMUS Japan forwarded to CINCPAC some Japanese press translations for that day. Among these was the translation entitled "CINCPAC Expresses Importance of Japan." The Japanese newspaper related the testimony of Admiral Gayler before a U.S. House subcommittee on 10 December. The article stated that CINCPAC had presented his views, from a military standpoint, about future American policies for Asia. The Admiral reportedly referred to President Ford's 7 December speech in Honolulu about the "New Pacific Doctrine" and stressed, along with the importance of continued American presence in the Pacific area, the significance of the American relationship with Japan as an ally. In particular, the article stated, he pointed out the indispensability of U.S. Forces bases in Japan to the American strategic system. CINCPAC expressed strong concern over the Soviet naval inroads into the Pacific. He called Japan the "most important ally in the Pacific area" and praised the Japan Self-Defense Force. The subcommittee chairman referred to the Japanese fear of involvement in a future North-South Korean armed conflict because of the presence of U.S. bases in Japan. CINCPAC reportedly replied with a negative view, saying that "North Korean air force has no long-range bomber or attack aircraft, and therefore, the possibility of attack upon bases in Japan was small."

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1. COMUS Japan 120636Z Dec 75.

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Republic of Korea

Indochina Reaction

(S) On 4 April, before the fall of either Cambodia or Vietnam but after the sudden and massive collapse of Vietnamese resistance and the reported loss of enormous amounts of U.S.-provided equipment, the U.S. Embassy commented on the ROK views regarding the Indochinese situation. In various conversations with government-oriented officials and observers including influential Assembly members, the Embassy gained the impression that the chaotic Vietnam situation had caused a shift in Korean thinking on the reasons for Vietnam's troubles. Two weeks before, the Embassy noted, many government figures tended to take the United States to task for failing to provide more aid to Vietnam and for leaving a trusted ally in the lurch. Since the rout of the Vietnamese armed forces, however, some expressed the view that no amount of material aid would have saved Vietnam and that, in fact, the United States over the years had done about all that could have been expected to be done to help Vietnam. Nevertheless, the ROK was expected to place greater emphasis on a self-reliant defense posture. One more direct possible effect of this new perception of the Vietnam situation could be the strengthened belief that discipline must be tightened within South Korea. If the Vietnam debacle were seen more as a result of internal rot than the withdrawal of United States aid, the ROK Government might be convinced more than ever that new restraints were necessary within country.<sup>1</sup>

(S) It was also in early April that the Republic of Korea Ambassador to the United States sought audience with Secretary Schlesinger. The Secretary acknowledged that the situation in Indochina was very serious and attributed the swift deterioration to poor command and control and vacillation regarding the strategy to be pursued in a delicate situation. The Korean Ambassador observed that the nations of Asia were caught between two major world powers. Recent events could be interpreted by some observers as illustrating the seemingly inexhaustible commitment of the communists to their cause and the superior vitality of the communist economic system, as contrasted to the U.S. lack of will and its economic recession. During this visit Secretary Schlesinger assured the Ambassador that if he visited the Far East he would stop in Korea.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Still early in April the Ambassador reported that the ROK press was displaying increasing nervousness over the likely effect on Korea of the Indochina situation. The cold war fears of communist grand design

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1. AMEMB Seoul 2254/040751Z Apr 75.
  2. OASD(ISA) 03720/072237Z Apr 75 (BOM).

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for Asia were implicit in the press' reaffirmation of belief in the domino theory and concern that the PRC was behind moves to communize Indochina, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The press stressed that the collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia was due both to United States indifference and to internal weaknesses of the Indochina regimes. The press called for assurances of U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and to the Korean forces modernization plan. Assurances of U.S. support from high American officials including President Ford had had some affect. However, the press remained openly skeptical of the U.S. Government's ability to carry out its good intentions, pointing out that "this express firm stand of the U.S. Administration with respect to its security commitments abroad has to be as explicitly endorsed and succored by the U.S. Congress and the American people." The feeling of uncertainty over the extent of U.S. support had led most newspapers to call for an increase in self-reliance and the strengthening of national unity as the best hope for resisting North Korea. By 11 April U.S. wire service reports from Korea related what one reporter called "characteristic toughness" with which President Park Chung Hee had reacted to the shock waves set off by the communist successes in Vietnam. Students had demonstrated against Park for four days consecutively, defying a threat that troops would be called. Nine of sixteen colleges in Seoul had been shut down to stop the protest, including Seoul College. After the students had battled police, tear gas was used. Because the government closed the Korea University, the university president had resigned and the troops had raided the campus and arrested students. One wire service report stated that police had blocked the funeral mass for one of eight men who had been hanged the day before. The police reportedly seized and cremated one body without the consent of the family, and witnesses were cited who saw an American citizen Roman Catholic priest being clubbed and kicked for interfering with the police.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 18 April President Kim Il-Sung of North Korea was welcomed in Peking, where he stayed for a 9-day visit. During that time he conferred with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and also met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. During departure speeches, both Kim and the Chinese Vice Premier stressed that the two countries shared identical views and would help each other in the struggle against "imperialism." The North Korean leader made no mention of the question of unification of North and South Korea, although this had been the main theme of his speech at a banquet on the evening of his arrival.<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Seoul 2394/090948Z Apr 75; SECSTATE 83924/112351Z Apr 75.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 Apr 75, "N. Korean Leader Asks Chinese Aid," dateline Tokyo (N.Y.T.S.); Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 27 Apr 75, "Park Sees Rising Peril of Invasion," dateline Seoul (UPI), and "Kim Ends China Visit," dateline Peking (Agence France-Presse).

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(S) U.S. intelligence reports tended to confirm that the policies of President Park had the full support and backing of the ranking officers within the ROK Army. Most of them had had combat experience in Vietnam and appeared to accept the situation in Indochina as inevitable in terms of their own knowledge of the Vietnamese national character and military effectiveness. They viewed domestic opposition to President Park as misguided and irresponsible, and most would support whatever measures, legal or otherwise, the President might enact to suppress or restrain opposition unrest. Nevertheless, the President was worried and depressed by the Indochina developments as well as by Kim Il-Sung's visit to Peking. He feared a possible misinterpretation of Chinese reaction by Kim which might result in a North Korean attack on the South. Park was reportedly quoted as saying that he would place the country on a war alert footing if large-scale student demonstrations occurred, or in the event of North Korean military provocation. He also believed that, as a result of the Indochina situation, the next step was for the ROK, the United States, and Japan to form a military alliance to fortify the outer perimeter of the U.S. defense line.<sup>1</sup>

(U) During the month following the surrender of Cambodia and Vietnam, other reactions of the ROK to the changed situation were reported. On 12 May President Park was reported to be moving South Korea toward what his government called a "total security posture" or a "wartime emergency system." According to this news report, the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and Cambodia had caused a crisis mood among the South Koreans. Tens of thousands of citizens turned out daily for rallies across the country intended to support Park's views. Local newspapers were deluged with paid advertisements containing resolutions from various organizations, and pro-Park rallies had even been held on campuses, the scenes of riotous anti-government demonstrations only weeks before. In late May two articles addressed the Korean question, both of them from Washington. In one, Administration officials reportedly stated that China had cautioned North Korea against launching a military attack against South Korea. The policy of restraint was made known, according to State Department officials, through public statements, comments by Chinese officials and diplomats to third parties, and through conversations with American officials. The other article alleged that some U.S. officials believed the American commitment to South Korea was not as deep as the Administration's public statements suggested. The Government was bound by treaty to defend South Korea, but the question asked, according to this reporter, was how long the American people would accept a commitment of American troops in such a conflict. The reporter acknowledged, however, that

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1. CIA/MILDIST FKS 10691/160844Z Apr 75 and 10710/280859Z Apr 75 (EX).

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President Ford had said repeatedly that the communist successes in Indochina had not weakened American solidarity with the Seoul regime.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 28 May Canada announced that it had granted South Korea a \$380 million loan to finance the sale of a Canadian nuclear power reactor. The sale was contingent upon agreement for bilateral safeguards. On 12 June a legislator from the South Korea delegation to Washington, discussed in a previous chapter of this history, was quoted. He said South Korea was ready to develop its own nuclear weapons without the United States and could do so if the United States should withdraw from Asia. He said, "We are truly capable of developing nuclear weapons anytime we want," and if the United States abandoned Korea, "we would have to make a choice to develop nuclear weapons." This news report stated that nuclear weapons experts in the United States generally agreed that South Korea was among a handful of nations capable of developing nuclear weapons. These Korean legislators stressed at a news conference that South Korea had no plans to develop nuclear bombs at present, pointing out that the country had recently ratified the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, at about the same time, President Park was reported from Korea to have declared that the ROK would develop nuclear weapons on its own if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were removed. He also indicated that such development was within the ROK capability.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 20 June Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was reported to have issued a warning to North Korea saying that the use of tactical nuclear weapons "would be carefully considered" in the event of a new invasion of South Korea. Schlesinger underscored his warning by acknowledging publicly that the United States had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. By coincidence, the following day the South Korean Government ordered all of its employees on alert and cancelled leaves to shore up national security in the face of what it called rising provocation and threats from the North Korean communists. The order was accompanied by a government plan to organize a civil defense corps made up of men between the ages of 17 and 50 and of women volunteers. This corps, when organized, would have from 3 to 3.5 million members.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 12 May 75, "Red Victors Fuel Park's Efforts," dateline Seoul (AP), and 29 May 75, "China Puts Rein on N. Korea," dateline Washington (N.Y.T.S.); also, "U.S. Support of South is Questioned," dateline Washington (AP).
  2. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log May and Jun 75; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 13 Jun 75, "Seoul Eyes Use of A-Bombs," dateline Washington.
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 21 Jun 75, "S. Korea Goes on Alert Status," dateline Seoul (UPI), and "Nuclear Warning Issued by U.S.," dateline Washington (AP).

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The United Nations Issue

(S) On 9 December 1974 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) had voted against a resolution to dissolve the United Nations Command. In April 1975 a joint State/Defense message was passed to CINCPAC, the U.S. Embassy in Korea, and to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) relating to a possible restructuring of the United Nations Command. The basic approach regarding the subject of the United Nations Command at the next UNGA meeting was to proceed in a way that would not jeopardize the stability of the Korean peninsula by preserving the essential security arrangements while trying to keep the UNGA threat to these security arrangements, and to the ROK's diplomatic position, within manageable bounds. It was proposed to limit the United Nations Command to its armistice-administering functions, if feasible, and if satisfactory arrangements could be worked out with the ROK. It was essential, however, to avoid any unilateral termination of the United Nations Command. Unilateral termination, particularly in the light of uncertainty as to how far North Korea might go to exploit the Indochina setback, could give a completely wrong signal to Pyongyang and to others, and could risk the effective continuation of the armistice agreement. During a visit to Washington by the ROK foreign minister, senior State Department officials had opened preliminary discussions on the strategy for the 30th UNGA. The Korean official agreed that there was little prospect of avoiding confrontation with North Korean supporters, and despite hopes that the Korean question could somehow be transferred to the Security Council, the Foreign Minister was extremely pessimistic that debate and defeat in the UNGA could be avoided. The U.S. goal was an initiative involving a limited reorganization of the United Nations Command which would result in lowering its profile. The goal was to remove the implication of a link between the United Nations involvement in Korea and the presence of U.S. Forces in the peninsula. It was proposed to send a letter to the Security Council indicating the willingness of the United States to terminate the United Nations Command subject to agreement of the parties directly concerned on alternative means of preserving the armistice. At the same time the United States and the ROK would indicate willingness to discuss the matter with other parties concerned. The joint message suggested that the restructured character of the United Nations Command should be clear, and, if possible, United Nations headquarters should be physically relocated distinctly separate from USFK. The display of the U.N. flag and insignia would be limited to Panmunjom and United Nations headquarters, and would be generally removed from other units and bases. Since these changes would effect bilateral relationships with the ROK, it was necessary to address the question of operational control. The ROKs had stated their unwillingness to place ROK forces under an American commander lacking U.N. coloration or in the absence of some form of joint controlling body. The State/Defense message suggested three alternatives for readdressing the United

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Nations Command posture in the Republic of Korea. These various arrangements for command and control of U.S. and ROK military forces were addressed in Chapter I of this history.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 4 September a draft letter from the State Department to the United Nations Security Council president was forwarded for review and consultation by the ROK Government. The text invited the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, as of 25 August 1975, the United Nations flag no longer flew over military installations in the Republic of Korea except at those facilities directly associated with the Armistice Agreement. The letter noted that this act would contribute to making an appropriate distinction between forces directly involved in the United Nations Command's performance of its armistice agreement responsibilities, and the United States Forces serving in the Republic of Korea in accordance with the MDT of 1954 at the request of the Government of the ROK. The letter also noted that the lowering of the United Nations flag did not alter the responsibilities of the United Nations Command under the terms of the Military Armistice Agreement. The letter reiterated that the United States and the ROK were prepared to discuss the question of the termination of the United Nations Command, subject to the continuation of the Armistice Agreement, with the other parties directly concerned at any time and at any place agreed upon, as well as with the members of the Security Council should they so desire. Later in September the State Department provided additional background material regarding the United Nations question. The United States had made it clear that it was willing to see the United Nations Command dissolved as early as 1 January 1976, provided that the integrity of the Armistice Agreement was maintained. In addition, Secretary of State Kissinger had announced that the United States and the ROK proposed to the other parties to the armistice, i.e., China and North Korea, the convening of a conference to discuss ways to preserve the Armistice Agreement. The Secretary had stated, "At such a meeting we would also be prepared to explore other measures to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement." State noted that in 1974 the United States had indicated willingness to talk about means to replace the Armistice Agreement. But in the meantime a proposal had been received from North Korea for a peace agreement just with the United States; that was not acceptable. The United States was not prepared to participate in any discussion of far-reaching agreements on arrangements on the peninsula without the participation of the Republic of Korea. However, the United States did support a conference involving four nations. The four nations were South Korea, North Korea, the PRC, and the United States.<sup>2</sup>

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1. SECSTATE 97867/272243Z Apr 75 (EX).
  2. SECSTATE 210807/042321Z Sep 75 and 226953/232257Z Sep 75.

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(C) The reaction in Korea to the proposals of Secretary Kissinger was generally favorably not only among government officials, but among the Korean press as well. Press coverage had been universally receptive to the proposal, and two senior editorial writers stated that they were sure that the proposal would be welcomed and applauded by the Koreans in general because they yearned for a resolution of the current hostility between North and South and wanted reunification above all. Although these men were hopeful that the initiative would produce some positive political result, they did not really expect much more than protection of the status quo, and viewed the U.S. proposal as essentially a tactic to blunt the hostile United Nations resolution. When the Korea question arose during the UNGA meeting, two contradictory resolutions were passed. The pro-Seoul resolution called for all parties concerned (including ROK) to agree on measures to maintain the armistice machinery after the United Nations Command was terminated. The pro-North Korean resolution called for the withdrawal of foreign forces under the United Nations flag and negotiation of a bilateral peace treaty to replace the armistice (ROK excluded). As noted elsewhere in this history, the United States also twice exercised its veto in the Security Council on the question of admission to membership of both North and South Vietnam. This veto was cast because the Security Council had refused to consider the admission of South Korea.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Some of the political repercussions of the two contradictory United Nations resolutions became evident in December 1975. According to a news dispatch from Seoul, South Korea, some political circles believed that secret contacts were going on between Washington and North Korea. A spokesman for the opposition party told one reporter that he believed the United States was currently conducting secret contacts with Pyongyang to find a compromise following the recent impasse in the United Nations on the Korean issue. He said the communists had long sought to conclude a peace treaty with the United States excluding South Korea. Similar fears had been expressed privately in official circles, although the Government had made no comment. However, a Government spokesman did say that the two contradictory United Nations resolutions proved that the United Nations was incapable of solving the Korean problem. There was agreement, according to this report, among all South Korean officials that the unconditional disbandment of the United Nations Command would be giving North Korea a "free hunting license" in the South.<sup>2</sup>

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1. AMEMB Seoul 7493/240845Z Sep 75; J51 Point Paper, 13 Nov 75, Subj: Political/Military Situation - Korea.
  2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 7 Dec 75, "Seoul Leaders Suspect U.S.-N. Korea Contacts," dateline Seoul (Agence France-Presse).

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Violations of the Armistice Agreement

(S) Throughout 1975, as in previous years, armed skirmishes occurred between the forces of the two Koreas, and North Korea continued to infiltrate agents into the South. In March the ROK media gave prominent coverage to a United Nations Command announcement of a discovery of a tunnel leading in to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) from the North. On 31 May it was reported that the ROK planned to retrieve a North Korean patrol boat which had been sunk earlier in the month near the eastern Northern Limit Line.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 19 and 21 June 1975 the discoveries of infiltrator caches in South Korea had caused the ROK forces to assume the alert condition DEFCON 4. This alert applied to the I Corps Group and the In-Chon defense command. On 18 July a ROK patrol inside the DMZ was fired on by North Koreans using small arms. On 2 September, in an incident not related directly to the armistice between the Koreas, but indicative of the aggressive tactics of North Korea, a Japanese fishing boat in the northern Yellow Sea was attacked and seized by North Korean forces and nine crew members were killed. Later in the month, on 13 September, a ROK Marine Corps unit exchanged fire with a suspicious boat near Pohang. One Marine was killed and four others were wounded. A search by aircraft and surface vessels, however, failed to locate the boat. On 4 October an unidentified vessel was sighted off the southwest coast of South Korea. A ROK destroyer engaged the vessel and sunk it.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In June the South Korean National Assembly delegation previously referred to discussed the problem posed by the tunneling from North Korea into the DMZ. One spokesman noted that two tunnels had recently been found which were approximately 3.5 kilometers in length. Although only two were found, the spokesman said, the ROK estimated that there were many more, perhaps as many as 15 to 17. The spokesman claimed that the North Koreans could send a regiment through the tunnels in one hour's time. In one possible scenario involving the infiltrators the spokesman suggested that the North Koreans could dress like South Koreans and arm themselves with U.S. weapons. They could then feign a South Korean attack on the northern area, and North Korea would then accuse South Korea of "launching an attack and starting war."<sup>3</sup>

(S) In September IPAC published a special report regarding agent infiltration. The report described one individual who had been killed in a fire fight with ROK forces who had been dressed in the uniform of the ROK Homeland

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1. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Mar and May 75.
  2. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Jun, Jul, Sep, and Oct 75.
  3. Honolulu Advertiser, 6 Jun 75, "S. Koreans Seek Funds for Defense," by Vickie Ong, Staff Writer.

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Defense Force. The report stated that North Korean infiltrators often disguised themselves, including wearing ROK Army uniforms. This agent had had a forged ID card, a forged ROK Army discharge certificate, an AK-47 rifle, and communications scramble sheets. Two other agents killed in late August had carried sketches of a Korean air base. The missions of these agent infiltrators, said the IPAC report, had been varied and had included the collection of military information, the distribution of propaganda, the recruitment of ROK citizens for underground cells, and assassination and abduction. One significant comment in the IPAC report had a bearing on the alleged suppression of freedom in South Korea. Ordinary citizens could move with relative freedom throughout the ROK. No travel documentation or special permission was required. Therefore, said the report, an agent posing as an ordinary citizen could move around with relative ease. Once an individual was identified as a suspected North Korean agent or a dangerous dissident, however, he was immediately apprehended. North Korea was expected to continue to infiltrate agents into the South, but because of the general anti-communist nature of the ROK citizenry, it was unlikely that North Korean infiltrators would pose a threat to the ROK Government by fomenting violent revolution in the South.<sup>1</sup>

#### Eighth U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting

(S) At the Seventh Annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the work of the existing joint U.S.-ROK ad hoc committee was institutionalized in the form of a joint standing committee. It was envisioned that the standing committee would provide a forum to analyze changing requirements and sources of funds for the planning, budgeting, and management of ROK defense requirements.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Prior to the Eighth SCM the ROK surfaced a new Force Improvement Plan (FIP). It projected a \$4.5 billion program over a five-year period. That amount was to be raised by a new special tax placed in effect on 1 July and "other sources." The aim of the program was to increase ROK self-reliance in the area of defense and presumed a greatly expanded industrial base. The ROK had listed proposed major improvements by service, an equipment listing by priority, and a time-phased program expenditure list covering five years. In this connection President Park had been quoted in an interview for the New York Times on 22 August as saying, "In five years South Korea will no longer need American ground, air, or naval forces, or even logistic support to help defend itself if North Korea attacks without Chinese or Soviet aid."<sup>3</sup>

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1. IPAC Spec Rpt No. 38, 280153Z Sep 75 (BOM).
  2. JCS 5115/022020Z Jan 75.
  3. CHJUSMAGK Seoul Korea 2912/221042Z Aug 75 (BOM).

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(S) The Eighth Annual SCM was held on 26 and 27 August 1975 in Seoul Korea. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger led the 11 member U.S. delegation. The Chairman of the JCS, General Brown, participated as a member of the U.S. delegation, as did Admiral Gayler, CINCPAC. During the first plenary session the two sides were in substantial agreement in discussions of the threat and the ROK FIP, with some differences over detail. The ROK considered the likelihood of both general attack and attack on the Northwest Islands more imminent than did the United States. Secretary Schlesinger called for the development of countermeasures to the tunnels, the reported Northern violations, and its psychological warfare. In describing their rationale for their new five-year FIP, the ROK noted that past North defense expenditures had surpassed the South's expenditures and listed areas of Southern deficiency. The ROK planned to spend \$500 million per year to bring ROK forces to closer parity with North Korean forces. In support of these efforts the Koreans requested continued U.S. troop presence, completion of the old modernization plan by the end of Fiscal Year 1977, foreign military sales credit support for the FIP, and technical data assistance and support for the ROK defense industry. Secretary Schlesinger replied that he thought the highest priority for force improvement lay in areas of close air support, armor, and anti-tank capabilities. Broaching a theme which he repeated several times during the conference, Secretary Schlesinger recommended "complementarity" of ROK and U.S. forces with the Koreans concentrating on ground force development while the United States provided the more complex air and naval support. During the second plenary session Secretary Schlesinger made four concluding points:<sup>1</sup>

- While North Korea strength had grown, ROK strength had grown relatively faster.
- The political cohesion and will of the Koreans were strong and this was vital.
- There was a need for complementarity of forces and in this regard the United States would increase the number of military exercises to show the enemy its capability, and would pursue plans to introduce U.S. air should an invasion take place.
- All of the recent developments brought out during the meeting reflected commendable greater self-help on the part of the ROK and were encouraging testament to ROK determination.

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1. J51 HistSum Aug 75; AMEMB Seoul 6763/300407Z Aug 75.

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(S) Following the meeting General Stilwell, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, reported to the Chairman, JCS and to CINCPAC on the aftermath of the visit by the Secretary of Defense and the Eighth SCM. The overall reaction in Korean circles--government, military, and press--had been enthusiastic and positive. The Koreans had been impressed by Secretary Schlesinger not only by what he said, but by the man himself. Korean Defense Minister Suh was particularly pleased about the outcome of the SCM and proud of what he perceived to be the development of a warm, professional and personal relationship with the United States Secretary of Defense. Less than a month after the SCM, General Stilwell reported that there were clear indications that the acquisition of submarines by the ROK had been put on the back burner, and that the ROK Navy had dropped the idea of ship-based ASW helicopters. Consistent with Schlesinger's comments on "complementarity," the need to get the priorities right, and his caution to avoid jeopardizing long-range economic growth, the new FIP was being scrubbed and realigned in consonance with previously agreed joint priorities. The biggest question in ROK minds, General Stilwell said, was just how much dollar credit the U.S. Government would provide or arrange in the years immediately ahead, and just how much the United States was willing to do to assist them in improving their logistic readiness. And finally, the ROK continued to assess the implications of "complementarity" since in past years the message had been different--they had been impelled along the path of maximum self-sufficiency, which itself had been vaguely defined.<sup>1</sup>

(S) When, in November, Secretary Schlesinger was replaced by Secretary Rumsfeld, General Stilwell recommended to the Chairman, JCS that the new Secretary of Defense dispatch a personal message to Korean Defense Minister Suh. The Chairman responded that he agreed and would recommend an early expression of assurance to key U.S. allies such as Korea and Japan. On 28 November Secretary Rumsfeld forwarded by message the text of his letter to Minister Suh. As he had with Japan, he repeated his endorsement of President Ford's reaffirmation that the United States would render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against the ROK in accordance with the MDT of 1954. He also assured the Korean Defense Minister of his support for ROK efforts to improve and modernize the armed forces of the ROK.<sup>2</sup>

Republic of China

(S) The problem of two Chinas had been a U.S. foreign policy dilemma since the ouster of the Republic of China (ROC) from the United Nations in

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1. CINCUNC/COMUS Korea 3161/120527Z Sep 75 (BOM).
  2. CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA Seoul 050915Z Nov 75; JCS 2712/111726Z Nov 75; SECDEF 8835/282324Z Nov 75 (all EX).

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1971. The Shanghai Communique of 28 February 1972, issued during President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC), had a more lasting effect on U.S.-ROC relationships. The progressive reduction of U.S. military forces and installations on Taiwan "as tensions in the area diminished" had proceeded apace, and by late 1974, some chinks in the armor of "oriental inscrutability" were apparent. Despite repeated assurances that overtures to Peking had not altered the long-standing obligations of the United States under the mutual security treaty, there was evidence that senior ROC military leaders had begun to reassess the United States policy toward the ROC.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The most significant historical, if not political, event on Taiwan during 1975 was the death of President Chiang Kai-shek on 4 April 1975. The 87-year-old leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party-KMT) was the last surviving leader of the "big four" of World War II. Although he had been the nominal head of state of the ROC, because of his old age and deteriorating health in recent years Chiang's role in the routine affairs of government had progressively diminished. Officially, Chiang was succeeded automatically by Vice President C. K. Yen, aged 70. Actually, power rested in the hands of his son the Premier, 65-year-old Chiang Ching-kuo, who had been making most of the routine national policy decisions for the past few years.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Immediately after the fall of Indochina, and less than one month after Chiang's death, an IPAC report stated that the Taiwan problem remained relatively unaffected by the events in Southeast Asia. Peking appeared to have made a determination to defer military action against the ROC indefinitely, but one possible problem remained. A remote possibility, but one of concern to Peking, was the provision of Soviet assistance to fill any vacuum which might be left by receding U.S. interests. At that time, however (May 1975), there were no indications of Taipei's interest in such an arrangement, but a renewed Soviet-KMT association would be a "nightmare" to the Chinese communists. In early June, to prevent possible PRC infiltration, the ROC altered its policy regarding PRC ships in the Taiwan Strait. The first intelligence indicated that ROC naval forces had received authorization to fire on PRC fishing boats which strayed eastward across the center line of the Taiwan Strait. This was later modified in a message from the JCS to CINCPAC which noted that previous to April 1975 PRC fishing boats captured east of the midline through the Taiwan Strait had been escorted to Taiwan, given friendly treatment, and released. The new guidelines, stated the JCS, directed that PRC fishing boats be chased from the waters east of the midline of the Taiwan Strait, and that attempts be made to capture one boat for inspection and crew interrogation. In view of this alleged change in policy,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 613-614.
  2. DIA 2124/060346Z Apr 75.

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all rules and instructions governing U.S. Forces operating in the vicinity of Taiwan were reviewed to insure that circumstances which might arise from this change of policy would not lead to involvement of U.S. military forces.<sup>1</sup>

(U) In September the U.S. Embassy reported that military self-reliance was being stressed more and more on Taiwan. A report that the ROC would start production of an improved model of the SIDEWINDER missile received wide press coverage. Newspapers predicted a large-scale Double-ten Day parade, with the participation of "several tens of thousands of troops" and the display of Taiwan's latest military hardware, including some developed locally. On 18 September it was announced that the Chinese Air Force and the Hughes Aircraft Company had signed a \$295,000 contract for the planning phase of a semi-automated air defense program. It was expected that an implementation contract would be signed about the middle of 1976 at an estimated \$30-35 million. The Embassy also reported a 17 September UPI interview with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in which he said that the ROC had the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons (but would not do so), that the ROC had adequate manpower to defend itself, and that it did not "need American troops to fight" for it. Anti-PRC propaganda was also on the upswing and the press and various local personalities repeatedly referred to the importance of the ROC to America's so-called new "forward line of defense"--a line anchored to the north by the Republic of Korea and Japan. In a more detailed report of the Prime Minister's comments, the UPI stated that Nationalist China had proposed to manufacture nuclear weapons in 1974 but the idea was vetoed by the late President Chiang Kai-shek. Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said that Taiwan had started nuclear weapon research 17 years before, and was considering "to build up a nuclear arsenal last year. When I brought up the idea to the late President," he said, "he rejected it immediately on the grounds that we cannot use nuclear weapons to hurt our own countrymen."<sup>2</sup>

(S) In October the U.S. Embassy noted wide discussion on Taiwan of Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming visit to the PRC. Nevertheless, there was widespread reaffirmation of previous policies and trends. The emphasis had been on self-reliance, military strength, and economic stability, all of which contributed to a continued sense of self-confidence. The Embassy also noted that possibly because of Kissinger's upcoming trip, condemnation of detente and opposition to negotiations with the PRC were receiving greater than usual official and public attention. Although Kissinger's visit and that of President Ford later in the year were being widely and critically addressed in

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1. COMIPAC Spec Rpt No. 26, 022337Z May 75; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Jun 75; JCS 3635/101901Z Jun 75.
  2. AMEMB Taipei 6231/230636Z Sep 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 32/240229Z Sep 75 and ALPHA 20/230250Z Sep 75.

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
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the public media, there appeared to be little apprehension that the visits would result in U.S. recognition of the PRC. Later in the month the Embassy described what it called the "conditioning process," an effort on the part of ROC officials to lead the public to learn to live with Taiwan's uncertain future. In particular there was an attempt to condition the public as to the possible consequences of diplomatic recognition by the United States of the PRC. One of the most important themes of the conditioning process was self-reliance, both economic and military. On the economic side, stability and progress on Taiwan were emphasized as evidence of this self-reliance, especially in comparison with economic conditions in other developing countries. The theme of military self-reliance, which seemed to be getting somewhat greater emphasis than previously, included the Premier's statements on the nuclear potential of the ROC and his disclaimer for the need for U.S. troops to defend Taiwan. In addition, the Defense Minister had stressed the ROC's ability locally to produce conventional and nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In November the Embassy continued to report comparative equanimity on Taiwan regarding President Ford's December visit to the PRC. Editorials continued to warn the United States of the dangers of negotiating with the PRC and urged President Ford to visit Taiwan. The two largest circulation newspapers both reported Secretary Kissinger's categorical "no" to the question of the possibility of simultaneous diplomatic relations with the PRC and the ROC. The Embassy noted that the translation of the Secretary's response using the Chinese word for impossible was even more forceful than the English. And finally, in December the Embassy reported that the Taiwan press was upset over the possible proposal by the United States of the "Japanese model" as a basis for United States-ROC-PRC diplomatic relations. Many articles stressed the need for new talks between the United States and the ROC regarding future relations.<sup>2</sup>

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1. PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Oct 75; AMEMB Taipei 6799/180600Z Oct 75 and 6919/230746Z Oct 75.
  2. AMEMB Taipei 7459/200845Z Nov 75; PACOM Intelligence Watch Log Dec 75.

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## SECTION V--THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

(C) CINCPAC had stressed for many years the imperative of the protection of air and sea lines of communications (LOC) in the context of credible national strategy and national defense. The LOC in the Indian Ocean, because of the distances involved, were particularly vulnerable to interdiction by hostile forces. The U.S. policy decision to make periodic port calls and transits of straits and to conduct naval exercises in the Indian Ocean was complicated by substantive political and military issues. For example, many of the littoral states advocated an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), and opposed any increase in the U.S. presence. As discussed previously in this chapter, many Southeast Asian nations, and nations of Pacific Oceania including such U.S. allies as Australia and New Zealand, supported a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Many opposed further expansion of the Diego Garcia base. India supported the IOZP which had originally been presented in the United Nations by Sri Lanka, and was highly critical of U.S. naval deployments. The reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 foreshadowed a stronger Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the United States Congress had resisted the allocation of Diego Garcia construction funds at the same time that Thailand had balked at the staging of Indian Ocean reconnaissance flights from Thai bases. Contributing to the strategic imperative for the United States for a stronger and more visible presence in the Indian Ocean was the reduced United Kingdom strength in the Singapore area, which made the Malacca Strait more vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Some of these subjects are addressed below.<sup>1</sup>

### Indian Ocean Deployments

(S) As previously noted, U.S. policy was to conduct periodic naval task force port visits, transits, and exercises into the Indian Ocean. In May 1975 the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) proposed and CINCPAC approved a schedule for Fiscal Year 1976 Indian Ocean deployments. The JCS advised CINCPAC that public acknowledgement of Indian Ocean deployments would be coordinated in Washington for task group transits of the Malacca Strait. In September the JCS approved a USS MIDWAY carrier task group (CTG) deployment to the Indian Ocean beginning on 18 October 1975 and terminating on 11 December 1975. The MIDWAY and escorts were scheduled to participate in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Exercise MIDLINK-75 during the deployment. Enroute to Singapore the CTG participated in an exercise called MERLION on the 18th of October with the Royal Singapore Air and Navy units. The Singapore units searched for and simulated attacks on the task group while the task group

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 564-565.

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trained in air/surface defense and sea control. Carrier Task Group 77.4 arrived in Singapore on 20 October. By 28 October the six-ship CTG had transited the Malacca Strait for operations in the Indian Ocean. On 29 November it was announced that the CTG and a three-ship U.S. Middle East Force had completed two weeks of operations with the CENTO member nations in the Gulf of Oman.<sup>1</sup>

#### British Defense Review

(S) In November 1974 U.S. Defense officials were advised by the British of a multifaceted force reduction program, part of which was the continuing withdrawal of forces east of Suez. These British evacuations and abandonments in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas reduced the allied presence and influence and restricted the flexibility of deployed forces by the elimination of strategically significant base sites. Among the potential problems caused by the British withdrawal was the question of continued U.S. Navy access to the storage basin and fuel depot in Singapore and the loss of existing intelligence gathering capability. Negotiations between the United States and the nations of the five-power defense arrangement (FPDA), which included the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, continued for the balance of the year. Among the proposed solutions to continued U.S. Navy access to the Singapore facilities was the operation by New Zealand of the shipberths and fuel depot previously handled by the Royal Navy. Singapore, however, wanted to convert the facilities to commercial operations, with concurrent use by the U.S. Navy. On 25 September a press dispatch from Singapore reported that Britain's last war ship stationed in Singapore under the FPDA had departed, thus ending Britain's permanent naval presence in the Singapore-Malaysia region. The same article stated that by the end of March 1976 all of the more than 2,000 British servicemen stationed in Singapore would have returned to the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup>

#### Diego Garcia

(U) The development of a U.S.-U.K. military facility on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago had been proposed in 1966. The first increment of funds was approved by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1971 Military Construction bill. Formal agreement for joint operation of the facility by the United States and the United Kingdom was signed on 24 October 1972. In

1. JCS 2088/111836Z Jun 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 46/250142Z Sep 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 99/180317Z Oct 75; CINCPAC ALPHA 143/210343Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 281958Z Oct 75; CNO 291659Z Nov 75.
2. USDAO Singapore 259/180645Z Feb 75; AMEMB Singapore 746/241015Z Feb 75, 772/260353Z Feb 75, 2862/030630Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 260012Z Jul 75; J51 Point Paper, 15 Aug 75, Subj: British Defense Review.

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late 1973 and early 1974 consultations began between the United States and Britain toward an agreement on expanded Diego Garcia construction. In October 1974 the U.S. State Department had reported British concern over littoral country (especially commonwealth) and other pressures for some form of arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. Citing such factors as the Australian proposal for U.S. - Russia talks on naval force restraint and the United Nations resolution favoring an IOZP and an SPNFZ, the British officials foresaw increasing public and parliamentary queries relating to the Diego Garcia expansion. By the end of 1974, Congress had passed, and President Ford had signed, the Fiscal Year 1975 Military Construction authorization bill which included \$18.1 million for Diego Garcia--\$3.3 million for the Air Force and \$14.8 for the Navy. The bill stipulated that the President must advise Congress in writing that he had evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia. He also was required to certify in writing that the Diego Garcia expansion was essential to the national interest.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 10 June 1975 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee relating to Diego Garcia. He noted that the President had signed the Military Construction Act of 1975, which authorized \$18.1 million to begin construction of these facilities, subject to certain qualifications. On 12 May 1975 the President had certified to the Congress that he had evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia and had concluded that the construction of such a project was essential to the national interest of the United States. The Secretary noted that an additional \$13.8 million in military construction funds had been requested in the Fiscal Year 1976 budget for Diego Garcia. It was during this testimony that Secretary Schlesinger informed the Congress of the Russian construction of port facilities in Berbera, Somalia, which included a naval communications site, a barracks, a repair ship and the missile storage and handling facility described in other chapters of this history. He also advised the Congress that Russia had provided assistance to the government in South Yemen in managing the former British port of Aden, which had been the fourth largest bunkering port in the world when the Suez Canal was in operation. This port was directly across the Gulf of Aden from Berbera and commanded the northern side of the Red Sea. In addition Russia was assisting Iraq in the construction of a port at Umm Qasar, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. It was also at this hearing that the Secretary submitted for Congressional examination the photos and charts acquired through reconnaissance activities also described in other chapters of this history.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 565-569.

2. SECDEF 3761/102052Z Jun 75.

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(U) In September, in response to questions raised by Senator Ted Kennedy and media representatives, the Secretary of Defense published the following information:

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Initial planning discussions with the United Kingdom in the mid-1960's for the use of Diego Garcia indicated that copra plantations operating there made use of migrant labor for the sole productive activity on the island. In 1969, when the UK and the U.S. were considering the possibility of a communications facility, the population of Diego Garcia was 360 men, women and children, mostly of Mauritian and Seychellois descent. Those born on Diego Garcia were children of contract laborers who had brought their wives. In 1970, more islanders were living in Mauritius than on Diego Garcia itself, for the economic cycle of copra farming perforce determined the migratory nature of this population.

Under the 1966 published agreement making Diego Garcia and other islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory available for the defense needs of both governments the British government maintained continuous administrative control of the islands and the contract labor there.

When the Diego Garcia plantations were closed down in 1971 to enable the island to be used for defense purposes, the plantation company which had been responsible for their workmen over many years undertook the arrangements for the evacuation which the closure of the plantation necessitated. In 1973 an agreement was concluded between the UK and Mauritian Governments whereby the UK paid 650,000 pounds to Mauritius for relief and restitution. We understand that the Mauritian Government acknowledge that the 1973 payment represented a full and final discharge of British obligations in this regard.

(U) On 7 November 1975 the State Department notified all diplomatic posts and unified military commands that the Senate had adopted an amendment by Senator Culver to the Fiscal Year 1976 Military Construction Appropriations Bill which delayed the use of the \$13.8 million for Diego Garcia until 1 July 1976. The amendment stated, "none of the funds appropriated in this act may

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1. SECDEF 3138/121738Z Sep 75.

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be used prior to 1 July 1976 for the purpose of carrying out any military construction project on the island of Diego Garcia." Senator Culver said the deferral of the use of these funds would allow time to "test the Soviets out regarding mutual arms restraint in this presently stable area of the world." State noted that Fiscal Year 1975 funds were not affected. The \$18.1 million for Fiscal Year 1975 was still available, if and when the United Kingdom approved the expansion agreement.<sup>1</sup>

(U) And finally, on 9 January 1976, the U.S. Information Service in Canberra reported on the press coverage of the visit by a four-man U.S. Senatorial delegation which included Senator Culver. The press reported that the Senators had asked Australia to play a go-between role with the Soviet Union to try to curb the super-power buildup in the Indian Ocean. Although the delegation denied the press report, Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a background paper on the subject. It said:<sup>2</sup>

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● We would like to see the extensions at Diego Garcia completed to maintain a naval balance in the Indian Ocean.

● It is of course in the Australian interest that this balance should be kept at the lowest practical level.

● We would therefore welcome the negotiation of an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on mutual restraint in naval deployments in the Indian Ocean if this could be achieved. In advance of any negotiations, however, it would not be appropriate to foreshadow the possibility of any diplomatic action by Australia.

#### South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ)

(S) The concept of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone had its strongest backer in New Zealand, one of the United States' partners in the Australian, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) mutual security pact. On 4 April 1975 the U.S. Ambassador in Wellington, New Zealand forwarded to the State Department a copy of the Government of New Zealand proposal entitled "A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific." The text listed several purposes for the establishment for such a zone, suggested means for implementation, and delineated tentative boundaries for the zone. State replied that it was U.S. policy to support

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1. SECSTATE 264692/072309Z Nov 75.
  2. USIS Canberra 090354Z Jan 76.

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in principle the concept of nuclear free zones when they played a useful role in preventing nuclear proliferation. In assessing any specific regional arrangement the United States would take into account the extent to which that arrangement met the following criteria: the nuclear free zone should be sponsored by states in the areas concerned; it should include all states whose participation was deemed important; it should not disturb necessary security arrangements; and, it should provide adequately for verification of compliance. In addition to those four criteria, a critical factor was whether it excluded indigenous development or possession of all nuclear explosives for whatever purpose.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In anticipation of the presentation to the U.N. General Assembly by New Zealand of a resolution to adopt the proposal of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, United States representatives sought the views of the United Kingdom on the proposal. They were informed that while the U.K. was not opposed to land-based nuclear free zones, the likelihood that the SPNFZ would encompass large ocean areas created serious problems for them. The U.K. wished to safeguard the right of area passage on the high seas and the right to introduce warships into an area. On 23 October the United Nations Secretariat circulated the text of a New Zealand draft resolution on the SPNFZ dated 20 October 1975. The paper was entitled "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the South Pacific." Papua New Guinea was shown as a co-sponsor. A map circulating in the United Nations, but not connected with the resolution itself, showed the northern limits of the SPNFZ to be just south of Hawaii but north of Wake and Guam. The zone extended east to 115 degrees west longitude with a protrusion encompassing Easter Island, south to 60 degrees south longitude and west to Australia and Papua New Guinea. The map was not endorsed by the co-sponsors of the SPNFZ resolution. On 8 November the State Department advised the U.S. Embassy in Wellington that, based upon conversation in the United Nations, there was a need to reinforce United States views in Wellington. Nothing in the resolution nor in statements pertaining thereto obviated U.S. concerns regarding overflight or transit questions. The United States could not accept a concept which appeared to contemplate eventual restrictions on internationally recognized rights of navigation and overflight of marine areas, and which might lead to restrictions on transit of U.S. military aircraft. State also said that the impact of the zone would not be the same on all major nuclear weapon states, since the Soviet Union and China did not have a traditional presence, strategic interest, alliance commitments, nor territory in the South Pacific as did the United States. With respect to the prospect of including U.S. territories in the South Pacific in such a zone, the United States continued to distinguish between nuclear weapons free zones which applied to the states of the region and one

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1. SECSTATE 84062/120027Z Apr 75 (EX), and 89802/182242Z Apr 75.

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which applied to states external to the region, but having territories within the region.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 14 December 1975 the U.S. Embassy, Wellington forwarded to the State Department a press association story of 13 December under the heading "Mr. Talboys Scorns Nuclear-Free Zone." The new Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. Talboys) was reported to have said that the drive for a nuclear-free zone was merely "the pursuit of an ideal. You might as well talk of a devil-free zone." The press report also said the plenary session of the United Nations on 12 December had endorsed the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific by a vote of 110-0 with 20 abstentions, including four of the five nuclear powers--Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. China, the fifth nuclear power, voted for the measure. Speaking at a press conference with the new Prime Minister (Mr. Muldoon) after the new government's cabinet meeting, Mr. Talboys said the National party saw the United Nations resolution as part of a general pursuit of disarmament. The crux of the matter was that a nuclear-free zone could not be made effective. "...you can't control the high seas," he said, "...how do you keep the people out?". The new Prime Minister, Mr. Muldoon, was reported to have said his party was opposed to nuclear testing and nuclear weapons of all kinds "wherever they may be." He also said that in certain circumstances nuclear-powered vessels would be allowed to visit New Zealand ports under defense obligations.<sup>2</sup>

Nuclear-Powered Warship (NPW) Visits--Australia and New Zealand

(C) Even without the establishment of the SPNFZ, the policy of Australia and New Zealand, both signatories to the ANZUS mutual security pact, was not to allow visits by NPWs. The adverse implications of this policy were clarified by the Chief of Naval Operations on 20 October 1975 when he noted that the United States Navy was increasingly converting to nuclear power with nearly a third of its major combatants, including many of its most modern surface ships and almost all of its submarines, now nuclear-powered. In addition, the U.S. Congress had enacted and the President signed into law a bill which effectively required that all future major U.S. combatants be nuclear-powered. The United States further considered that major naval forces which supported the ANZUS alliance should not be banned from alliance ports.<sup>3</sup>

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1. US Mission UN 4235/130024Z Sep 75 and 5289/232312Z Oct 75; SECSTATE 265422/080237Z Nov 75.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 3765/142320Z Dec 75.
  3. CNO NO3128/202328Z Oct 75.

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(C) On 24 March 1975 the U.S. Embassy, Wellington reported that, in spite of U.S. legislation which provided for payment of claims arising from a naval reactor incident on the basis of absolute liability, the Government of New Zealand (GNZ) was unlikely to make a decision on American NPW visits before the end of 1975. In a 12-16 May Labour Party Conference, one of the 189 resolutions voted was "...that no foreign ship or aircraft that normally carries or could carry nuclear weapons be permitted to visit New Zealand or to use New Zealand facilities." Later, on 9 July 1975, following a brief visit to New Zealand by the Australian Minister of Defence, Morrison, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, Fraser, was interviewed on TV regarding visits by U.S. NPWs and nuclear-armed warships. He acknowledged that if Australia allowed NPW visits, it would have a bearing on the New Zealand attitude.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In August 1975 Australian Minister of Defence Morrison told Acting Secretary of State Ingersoll that the Australian Government would make the ultimate decision on overall policy concerning nuclear-powered vessels after a meeting of Federal and State Ministers of Environment on 8 August. The GOA was favorably disposed to receiving U.S. nuclear-powered vessels, but it was necessary to have Australian scientists make an independent environmental impact survey. This survey resulted in some reservations, but Australia was thinking ahead to when there were also nuclear-powered merchantmen and, therefore, they realized that the matter should be settled.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In July, the American Embassy Wellington requested copies of environmental impact statements prepared in connection with planned visits by nuclear-powered warships to U.S. ports for turnover to GNZ officials responsible for preparing environmental impact statements if and when the GNZ decided to allow visits by nuclear-powered warships. The Department of State replied that environmental impact statements had not been required in conjunction with visits by nuclear-powered warships to U.S. ports; however, they sent Navy Report NT-75-1, the latest annual Navy assessment which provided information used by the U.S. Government in satisfying requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act for U.S. Navy nuclear-powered warship operations.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In October 1975 the American Embassy, Wellington reported that the New Zealand Acting Foreign Secretary said he personally was anticipating that the GNZ would make a favorable decision on NPW visits early in 1976; however, the U.S.

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1. AMEMB Wellington 783/242115Z Mar 75, 1418/192212Z May 75 and 1937/102310Z Jul 75.
  2. SECSTATE 184175/050107Z Aug 75.
  3. SECSTATE 179764/302016Z Jul 75.

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Embassy was not so optimistic. It seemed unlikely that the Labour Government would approve NPW visits in the absence of a similar decision by the Australian Government.<sup>1</sup>

(D) On 23 October the Embassy of Australia sent the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) a letter concerning NPW visits. The letter discussed the Australian environmental impact study which was in progress. It also requested DOD advice on several NPW-related matters and possible assistance in presenting the issue to the public. The letter proposed having three categories of berths which would have different restrictions on reactor conditions. Views were also solicited on a "standard statement" that would set forth conditions and precautions taken for visits by U.S. nuclear-powered warships. Reference was also made to Public Law 93-513, signed into law in December 1974, by which the United States assumed absolute liability for claims arising out of nuclear-powered warships. There was a proposal for an exchange of notes setting out procedures for the settlement of claims.<sup>2</sup>

(D) In November 1975 the U.S. Embassy Canberra briefed Australian officials on the U.S. position concerning NPW visits. The Australian DFA believed that environmentalists, peace groups, assorted left-wingers and others would use public hearings to oppose the visits. The U.S. Embassy did not believe the Whitlam Government would be willing to take the political heat which would arise from the public hearings. Therefore, visits by nuclear-powered warships were not expected to be approved by the Labour Government.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In a 6 November press conference, Prime Minister Rowling of New Zealand said the U.S. Navy ships participating in a forthcoming multinational exercise would be conventionally powered and armed. He further said: "As far as any subsequent visits to New Zealand are concerned our position is quite clear. We are opposed to nuclear-propelled at the moment, and certainly more strongly to vessels that might be carrying a nuclear weapon entering New Zealand territorial waters and New Zealand ports, and believe that our allies respect New Zealand's view on this situation." In the U.S. Embassy's judgment, Prime Minister Rowling had now taken a position before the electorate which foreclosed any possibility that the Labour Government, if re-elected on 29 November, could permit visits by nuclear-armed U.S. Navy ships. It also only barely left the door ajar for eventual approval of visits by U.S. Navy ships which were nuclear-propelled but not nuclear-armed. The U.S. Embassy recommended that the Department of State raise the issue with Ambassador White in Washington

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1. AMEMB Wellington 2784/220402Z Sep 75.
  2. SECSTATE 228946/1/251902Z Sep 75, 259139/1/010104Z Nov 75.
  3. AMEMB Canberra 7466/060410Z Nov 75.

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and Ambassador Selden was to do the same with the GNZ in Wellington. The implications of Prime Minister Rowling's statement on U.S.-NZ military cooperation under ANZUS were to be emphasized.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The election of the National Party in New Zealand in November 1975 was expected to impact favorably on the New Zealand relationships with ANZUS and visits by NPW. The National Party considered ANZUS to be the keystone of New Zealand's collective defense policy, and Party Leader Muldoon had already said that they would not object to visits by NPW.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 17 December 1975 the American Embassy Wellington reported that New Zealand Foreign Minister Talboys said that the issue of U.S. Navy NPW visits would definitely be discussed at a meeting between Prime Minister Muldoon and Prime Minister Fraser of Australia, thus providing some hope by the end of 1975 that this issue might be favorably resolved in 1976.<sup>3</sup>

Nuclear Transit - Japan

(U) On 21 January 1975 the Government of Japan issued a formal written statement in answer to questions by a Japanese Socialist Party member of the Diet. Among other things, the GOJ said, "As to the Naval ships which are constantly equipped with nuclear weapons, their passage through our territorial waters or calls at the ports of our country are considered to come under the category of the bringing in of nuclear weapons."<sup>4</sup>

Protocol - Kuwait

(C) In February 1975 the U.S. Navy took a firm stand against flying the Kuwaiti flag on U.S. naval vessels in Kuwaiti ports. The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry was informally so advised by the U.S. Embassy. The Foreign Minister informally responded that he could not accept the U.S. position since it "contradicts national laws" and he "cannot waive sovereignty" in the matter. The Embassy recommended that no U.S. naval vessel visits be scheduled to Kuwait.<sup>5</sup>

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1. AMEMB Wellington 3310/070417Z Nov 75.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 291039Z Nov-75.
  3. AMEMB Wellington 170202Z Dec 75.
  4. AMEMB Tokyo 0998/240845Z Jan 75.
  5. AMEMB Kuwait 0507/020630Z Feb 75.

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## CHAPTER XI

### OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

#### SECTION I--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

##### Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) Admiral Gayler's numerous trips, speeches, and press conferences are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors and visits by news media personnel are listed separately. Events for the year are listed chronologically.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Retired Flag Officers Briefing, 16 January: Admiral Gayler hosted the annual retired flag and general officers briefing at his Camp H. M. Smith headquarters.

(U) Washington, D.C. and Buckley, Colorado Trip, 25-31 January: Admiral Gayler departed Hawaii on 25 January en route to Washington, D.C., with stops in Greensboro, N.C., and at Andrews Air Force Base. He arrived in Washington on 27 January and met with Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, and other Defense Department officials before attending a reception at the Australian Embassy Chancellery that evening. On the 28th the Admiral met with other Washington dignitaries including Senator Sam Nunn (D.-GA) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Honorable Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Admiral Gayler met with Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements on the 29th, and later had background discussions with Mr. Mike Getler of the Washington Post and Mr. Charles J. V. Murphy of Reader's Digest. He left Washington on 30 January, arriving at Buckley Air National Guard Base for an afternoon discussion. The Admiral began a week's leave on 31 January in Steamboat Springs, Colorado.

(U) Thailand-Cambodia-South Vietnam Trip, 10-15 February: Admiral Gayler departed for a four-day visit to Thailand, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam on 10 February. He arrived at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base and proceeded to U.S. Support Activities Group Headquarters for a day of meetings with Ambassador John G. Dean and other U.S. officials. On 13 February Admiral Gayler departed for Phnom Penh for a briefing by U.S. officials and an official call on Cambodian President Lon Nol. The Admiral flew to Thailand

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1. Material for this section was taken from J74 HistSums Jan-Jun 75 and J003/74 HistSums Jul-Dec 75.

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where he spent the night at Nakhon Phanom. Admiral Gayler arrived in Saigon on 14 February for two days of talks with American Embassy and USDAO officials culminating with an official call on Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu on 15 February. He returned to Hawaii later that day.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 5-8 March: Admiral Gayler flew to Washington on 5 March and on 6 March met with General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Pentagon officials.

(U) KITTY HAWK Visit, 20 March: Admiral Gayler flew from Barbers Point Naval Air Station to the carrier KITTY HAWK, deployed in Hawaiian waters, to observe Fleet Exercise RIMPAC 75.

(U) Thailand-Cambodia Trip, 27-30 March: Admiral Gayler departed for Phnom Penh to get a first-hand look at the military situation there and confer with top level U.S. and Cambodian officials. He returned to his headquarters on 30 March. Both local newspapers and the United Press International reported on the trip at its conclusion.

(U) Guam-Wake Trip, 8-9 May: Admiral Gayler departed Hawaii on 8 May for a two-day tour of refugee facilities on Guam and Wake Islands.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 11-14 May: Admiral Gayler departed on 11 May. The following day he met with Secretary Schlesinger; Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations; General David C. Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff; and Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs, for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), among others. The Admiral had begun the next day's schedule and met with Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-AZ) when the MAYAGUEZ incident summoned him to the National Military Command Center, where he spent the remainder of the day. He departed Washington very early on 14 May and arrived at Hickam Air Force Base by 1100 that day.

(U) San Francisco Trip, 15-16 May: Following the MAYAGUEZ press conference, Admiral Gayler flew to San Francisco to address the USO Man of the Year awards dinner. He returned to Hawaii the following day.

(U) Armed Forces Day Address, 20 May: Admiral Gayler addressed the Kiwanis Clubs of Honolulu Armed Forces Day luncheon at the Ala Moana Hotel. Representatives from all components were in attendance as well as members of the local press corps.

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(U) Philippines-Korea-Japan Trip, 24 May-2 June: In the Philippines on 25 and 26 May, Admiral Gayler met with President Marcos at the Palace, with Ambassador William H. Sullivan, and with U.S. military officials. He departed on 26 May for Seoul. In Korea he met with President Park Chong Hee, Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il, Minister of National Defense Suh Jyong Chul, and General No Chae-Hyon, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He met with many Americans, including Ambassador Richard L. Sneider and General Richard G. Stilwell, USA. On 27 and 28 May he visited a wide variety of U.S. and Korean military facilities, where numerous tours, briefings, and demonstrations were provided. The meetings with key Korean officials occurred on 29 May. The Admiral arrived in Japan on 30 May, at which time he met with COMUS Japan, LT GEN Walter T. Galligan, USAF, and other key U.S. military officials. That same day he met with Ambassador James D. Hodgson and other Embassy officials, and then with members of the Japan Foreign Office. The next day, following an honors ceremony for Admiral Gayler by General Shirakawa Motoharu, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, the Admiral called on Minister Sakata Michita, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, and held discussions with JDA officials. On 2 June he met with officials of the Liberal Democratic Party and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa Kiichi, and with members of other Japanese agencies. On 3 June he returned to Hawaii (arriving late on 2 June because of the International Date Line).

(U) Washington, D.C.-Europe-Seattle Trip, 18 June-2 July: Admiral Gayler and party departed Honolulu on 18 June en route to Europe, stopping briefly in Washington, D.C. where he met with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Pentagon officials. Admiral Gayler and his entourage arrived in England on 23 June. While there he addressed the International Institute for Strategic Studies and met with the Honorable Elliot Richardson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom. On 24 June Admiral Gayler met Admiral David Bagley, CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in London. The Admiral and party departed London on 25 June for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near Brussels, Belgium. After meeting with General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and the CINC U.S. European Command, Admiral Gayler flew to Munich, Germany, where he was met by U.S. Consul General Herbert D. Spivach. On 26 June Admiral Gayler, accompanied by Mr. George D. Henry, Jr., Director of the United States Information Service in Munich, traveled to Ebenhausen, Germany where the Admiral gave a speech and held a series of discussions at the Institute for Politics and Science. Later that day the Admiral met with representatives of the Munich press. On 29 June Admiral Gayler and party left Munich and flew to Stuttgart, Germany where they were met by General and Mrs. George Eade, Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command. Later that day the Admiral and General Eade met in the General's office for a series of discussions. The Admiral and party departed Stuttgart on 30 June for Washington, D.C., where he met on 1 July with

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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and other government officials. On 2 July Admiral Gayler flew to Seattle for five days leave. The remainder of the party returned to Hawaii.

(U) FMFPAC Change of Command, 11 July: Admiral Gayler attended Marine Corps change of command ceremonies at Camp Smith on 11 July. General Louis Wilson relinquished command of Fleet Marine Force Pacific to LT GEN John N. McLaughlin. General Wilson departed for his new assignment as Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

(U) Johnston-Kwajalein Atoll Trip, 23-24 July: Admiral Gayler departed Hawaii on 23 July for a tour of the facilities at Johnston Island. He was met on arrival by the island commander. Later the same day the Admiral flew to Kwajalein Atoll for briefings on the Kwajalein Missile Range. On 24 July he attended a Trust Territory briefing and toured the various islands which make up the Atoll of Kwajalein, before flying back to Hawaii.

(U) NAS Barbers Point Change of Command Ceremony, 29 July: Admiral Gayler flew by helicopter to Barbers Point Naval Air Station where he attended a change of command ceremony. Captain J. H. Koach, USN, was relieved by Captain George S. Phillips, USN.

(U) CINCPAC Staff Address, 31 July: On 31 July Admiral Gayler addressed the CINCPAC staff in Camp Smith's Pollack Theater and outlined current operations and procedures; he also fielded questions from the staff.

(U) Newport-Norfolk-Washington, D.C. Trip, 8-14 August: On 9 August Admiral and Mrs. Gayler arrived at Anderson Air Force Base and departed for the Naval War College, Providence, Rhode Island. After an overnight stay, the Gaylers attended an evening reception in honor of the Defense Science Board (DSB). On 11 August the Admiral met with DSB members prior to delivering a speech entitled "Problems and Prospects in the Pacific" at their executive session. He remained at the Naval War College attending DSB sessions until 13 August. He arrived in Norfolk, Virginia that afternoon, and that evening attended a stag dinner at the quarters of the Commander in Chief Atlantic, Admiral Isaac Kidd, USN. On 14 August Admiral Gayler attended a conference of Commanders in Chief and then departed for Washington, D.C. On 15 August the Admiral met with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger; General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and other Washington officials prior to departing for his Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii.

(U) Kiwanis Speech, 21 August: On 21 August Admiral Gayler was guest speaker at the Western Region convention of the Kiwanis at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel.

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(U) Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting Trip, 24-27 August: Admiral Gayler arrived at Kimpo Air Base, Korea, the afternoon of 25 August, and had an informal dinner-discussion with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider at the Ambassador's residence that evening. On 26 August Admiral Gayler accompanied U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and the JCS Chairman, General Brown, to a meeting with the Korean Minister of National Defense, the Honorable Suh Jyong Chul. Later that morning he attended the first plenary session of the Korea-U.S. annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). After a luncheon with General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Commander in Chief United Nations Command and COMUS Korea Admiral Gayler attended the first working session of the SCM, and that evening was a guest at dinner hosted by Minister Suh. On 27 August the Admiral accompanied Dr. Schlesinger as they called on Korean President Park Chong Hee and Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il. After luncheon with President Park, the Admiral attended the second plenary session of the SCM, and departed Korea that evening for Hawaii.

(U) Albuquerque-San Diego Trip, 28-30 August: On 29 August Admiral Gayler arrived at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Shortly after his arrival the Admiral attended a retirement-change of command ceremony for the Defense Nuclear Agency Field Command: retiring RADM L. V. Swanson, USN, was relieved by BGEN T. E. Lacey, USAF. With RADM Swanson's retirement, Admiral Gayler was passed the distinction of being the "Gray Eagle of the Navy" at a special reception that afternoon at the Kirtland Officers Club. (The "Gray Eagle of the Navy" was the naval aviator with the longest active service.) He arrived that afternoon in San Diego and attended another retirement-change of command ceremony: retiring RADM F. B. Gilkeson, USN, was relieved by RADM Samuel L. Gravely, USN, as Commander ELEVENTH Naval District. On 30 August Admiral Gayler departed San Diego en route to Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado, and the commencement of leave.

(U) Admiral Gayler Extended, 3 September: On 3 September Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced that the President had extended Admiral Gayler in his assignment as CINCPAC for one year ending 31 August 1976.

(U) Waikiki Rotary Club Speech, 10 September: On 10 September Admiral Gayler addressed the Waikiki Rotary Club luncheon at the Hawaiian Regent Hotel.

(U) COMSUBFORPAC Change of Command, 12 September: On 12 September Admiral Gayler attended change of command ceremonies at the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base at which RADM F. D. McMullen, Jr., USN, was relieved by RADM C. H. Griffiths as Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific.

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(U) Aloha Stadium Opening, 12 September: On the evening of 12 September Admiral Gayler attended opening ceremonies for Hawaii's new Aloha Stadium, located between Pearl Harbor and Camp H. M. Smith.

(U) USNA Alumni Address, 17 September: Admiral Gayler addressed the annual meeting of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni at the Pearl Harbor Officers Club on the evening of 17 September.

(U) California Trip, 20-25 September: Admiral and Mrs. Gayler departed Hawaii on 20 September arriving 21 September at the Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California, where they continued on to the Pebble Beach estate of television personality Merv Griffin. On 22 September Admiral Gayler toured the Advanced Research Projects Agency Acoustic Research Center at NAS Moffett Field, before departing for the Naval Air Station, North Island. Upon arrival at North Island, the Admiral and his party departed for the Naval Undersea Center, Point Loma, where he toured the facilities. On 23 September Admiral Gayler traveled to the Naval Training Center, San Diego, where he delivered the keynote address to the "Old Crows" convention. (The organization "Old Crows" is an association of military officers and others interested in electronic warfare matters.) The Joint U.S.-NATO Conference concluded on 24 September and Admiral Gayler departed California that evening for Hawaii, arriving the next morning.

(U) Korean National Day, 3 October: Admiral and Mrs. Gayler attended a reception commemorating Korean National Day, hosted by Consul General of the Republic of Korea and Mrs. Yoon Hee Lee, at the Korean Consulate in Honolulu on 3 October.

(U) National Defense Transportation Association Awards Luncheon, 6 October: Admiral Gayler addressed the awards luncheon for the National Defense Transportation Association at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel on 6 October.

(U) Navy Bicentennial, 9 October: Admiral Gayler attended a sunset retreat parade in honor of the Navy's 200th birthday at the parade field of the Marine Barracks at Pearl Harbor.

(U) Salute to Hawaii, 10 October: On 10 October Admiral Gayler hosted Governor George R. Ariyoshi and other state and city dignitaries aboard the frigate USS RATHBURNE. The occasion was a naval gun salute to Hawaii in honor of the Navy bicentennial. Honors were rendered as the RATHBURNE and the frigate USS OUELLET cruised in formation off Waikiki Beach.

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(U) Thailand-Burma-Pakistan-Sri Lanka-Malaysia Trip, 11-27 October: Admiral Gayler departed Hawaii on 11 October, arriving in Thailand on the 13th. There he met with senior MACTHAI and U.S. Embassy officials before departing via commercial aircraft for Rangoon, Burma. The Admiral was the guest of U.S. Ambassador David Osborn during his stay in Rangoon. On the 14th the Admiral departed for Mandalay and Pagan where he was briefed. He returned to Rangoon that evening. On 15 October he met with General Tin Oo, Minister for Defense and Chief of Staff, Burma Defense Services. The Admiral was accompanied by Ambassador Osborn.

Admiral Gayler flew to Bangkok on 16 October and met with members of the Country Team at the American Embassy. Later that afternoon the Admiral met with Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Chatchai Chunhawan. On 17 October the Admiral held a series of discussions with the MACTHAI staff, and, accompanied by Ambassador Charles S. Whitehouse, met with MAJ GEN Paramarn Adireksarn, Minister of Defense for the Royal Thai Government. Later that morning the Admiral met with Admiral Sa-Ngad Chaloryoo, Supreme Commander of Royal Thai Armed Forces.

On 18 October the Admiral departed for Karachi, Pakistan. Upon arrival he met with Ambassador Henry A. Byroade and Prime Minister Ali Bhutto. Admiral Gayler held another series of discussions with Ambassador Byroade on 20 October at the Embassy in Islamabad. On 21 October the Admiral met with the Pakistan Secretary of Defense and other high ranking Pakistan military officials. He departed for Peshwar on 22 October where he met with the Chief of Air Staff of Pakistan. Following that meeting, he was escorted to the Khyber Pass where he had lunch at the Khyber Rifles Mess.

On 23 October Admiral Gayler flew to Colombo, Sri Lanka where he met with Ambassador and Mrs. Christopher Van Hollen and Commodore Don Basil Goonesekera, Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy. On 24 October the Admiral was briefed by the U.S. Ambassador and went to Kandy, Sri Lanka for an orientation visit. The 25th was devoted to more orientation visits and a dinner with defense representatives and service chiefs given by the U.S. Ambassador. On 26 October the Admiral flew to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for discussions with the U.S. Ambassador and the Country Team there. On 27 October Admiral Gayler met with Malaysian Chief of Armed Forces Staff, General Tan Sri Datuk Ibrahim and Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Tan Sri Samad. The Admiral returned to Hawaii via Guam on 27 October.

(U) Exercise COPE ELITE, 31 October: On 31 October Admiral Gayler flew to the island of Hawaii to view troops of the 25th Infantry Division based at Schofield Barracks participating in Exercise COPE ELITE. The Admiral was

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escorted through the exercise area by MAJ GEN Harry W. Brooks, Jr., USA, the 25th Division commander.

(U) Pennsylvania-New York-Washington, D.C. Trip, 6-17 November: Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu on 6 November for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The next day he addressed the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, after which he flew to New York City. On 8 November the Admiral was the dinner guest of RADM Jack Bergen, USNR (Ret). On 9 November the Admiral had lunch with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel P. Moynihan. On 10 November the Admiral met with the following newsmen: Drew Middleton, the New York Times; William F. Buckley, Jr., syndicated columnist and television personality; Abe Rosenthal of the New York Times; John Chancellor, NBC News; Robert Bartley, The Wall Street Journal; and the Time editorial board.

The next day the Admiral met with the Newsweek editorial staff; addressed the International Affairs faculty and graduate students at Columbia University; flew to Washington, D.C. and attended a dinner given in honor of Dr. James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense.

On 13 November the Admiral attended the Chairman's briefing at the Pentagon and met with the Honorable Philip C. Habib and Mr. Ingersol of the State Department; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General David C. Jones, USAF, Chief of Staff, USAF; and Admiral Shear, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

On 14 November the Admiral again attended the Chairman's briefing, following by meetings with LT GEN Eugene F. Tighe, USAF, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; General Frederick C. Weyand, USA, Army Chief of Staff; and Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations before departing for a short leave in Washington State. The Admiral returned to Hawaii on 17 November.

(U) Washington, D.C.-Virginia Trip, 8-16 December: On 8 December Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu for Washington, D.C. He and his party arrived on 9 December and proceeded to the Pentagon where he attended the Chairman's briefing. Later that morning he met with LT GEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. On 10 December he met with Mr. Dennis J. Doolin, Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs. The Admiral had lunch with Crown Prince Hassan of Morocco at a Washington restaurant. On the afternoon of the 10th the Admiral met with Congressman Wolff (R.-NY) and the Future Foreign Policy Research and Development Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee in the House Rayburn Office Building.

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On 11 December Admiral Gayler flew to Norfolk, Virginia where he addressed the Armed Forces Staff College. He had lunch with RADM Denton and VADM Forbes and later met with selected senior CINCLANT staff members.

The next day Admiral Gayler met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, East Asia and Pacific Affairs; and also attended a meeting of the JCS in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon. The Admiral returned to Hawaii on 16 December.

### Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) Presidential Visit, 7 December: Air Force One touched town at Hickam Air Force Base in the early hours of Sunday, 7 December. It was preceded by



President and Mrs. Gerald R. Ford  
flanked by Admiral and Mrs. Noel Gayler

two planeloads of media representatives. On the flightline to greet President Gerald R. Ford, Mrs. Ford, and Susan Ford were Admiral and Mrs. Gayler, Governor and Mrs. George R. Ariyoshi, Admiral and Mrs. Maurice F. Weisner, CINCPACFLT, General Louis Wilson, USAF, CINCPACAF, and various other dignitaries both civilian and military. The Presidential group and welcoming party went by

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motorcade to the Arizona Memorial where the President laid a memorial wreath. The Gaylers hosted the Presidential party and a select group of island notables at breakfast at their Pearl Harbor quarters following this ceremony.<sup>1</sup>



President Ford chats with Governor and Mrs. George R. Ariyoshi and Admiral Gayler, while Mrs. Ford and Mrs. Gayler pass through the buffet line in the foreground.

The Presidential motorcade proceeded then to the East West Center on the campus of the University of Hawaii where the President gave a "major policy address" on the Pacific area. The President went next to Hickam Air Force Base where Admiral and Mrs. Gayler and the Governor and other dignitaries saw the President off. Mrs. Ford stayed at the Kahala Hilton to give a speech on Monday; she departed on Tuesday.

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1. The breakfast for President Ford had been originally planned for Washington Place, the Governor's residence. There were political disagreements over the guest list, however, and the affair was moved to the Gayler quarters at Pearl Harbor.

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(U) Other distinguished visitors during 1975 included:

10 January - Senators Strom Thurmond (R.-SC) and William L. Scott (R.-VA).

14 January - LT GEN Lee M. Paschall, Director, Defense Communications Agency.

17 January - The Honorable Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

17 January - The Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan, outgoing U.S. Ambassador to India.

17 January - General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

20 January - Mr. Cornelius R. Anderson, Chief, Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Committee on Appropriations.

10 February - Mr. Spencer M. King, Senior Foreign Service Inspector, U.S. Department of State.

19 February - LT GEN James E. Hill, USAF, CINC, Alaskan Command.

19 February - The Honorable Henry A. Byroade, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.

25-26 February - Admiral Gayler met and briefed a congressional delegation en route to Southeast Asia. The delegation was headed by Representative John J. Flynt, Jr., (D.-GA), and included Representatives D. M. Fraser (D.-MN), B. Chappell, Jr., (D.-FL), B. S. Abzug (D.-NY), J. P. Murtha (D.-PA), and M. Fenwick (R.-NJ). The delegation was accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Philip C. Habib and other government officials.

5 March - Sir Patrick Shaw, Australian Ambassador to the United States.

17-18 March - General George Eade, Deputy CINC, European Command.

19 March - Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr.

20 March - MAJ GEN Slade Nash, USAF, Chief MAAG Taiwan.

24 March - William R. Kintner, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.

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27 March - Ambassador Yaqub-Khan, Pakistan Ambassador to the United States.

27 March - Admiral Gayler hosted a buffet luncheon for members of the International Parliamentary Union.

27 March - Congressmen Carl Albert (D.-OK), Speaker of the House, and John J. Rhodes (R.-AZ), en route to Southeast Asia, were briefed by Admiral Gayler.

1 April - The Honorable Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.

2 April - Mr. Samuel R. Preston, Senior staff member of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations.

4 April - Mr. David P. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

10 April - Ms. Georgiana H. Sheldon, Deputy Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and DOD Co-chairman for International Womens Year.

15 April - Ex Preung, secretary to former Cambodian President Lon Nol.

24 April - RADM M. P. Frudden, Commander Naval Forces Korea (Designate).

28 April - Ambassador Ushiba, Former Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

29 April - Mr. Thomas Aston, British Consul General, Los Angeles.

1-3 May - Admiral Gayler and other state dignitaries met Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip at planeside in Honolulu on 1 May, after which Admiral Gayler escorted Prince Philip on a boat tour of Pearl Harbor aboard the CINCPACFLT barge. Later that evening, Admiral and Mrs. Gayler attended a state dinner for the royal couple given by Governor and Mrs. George R. Ariyoshi at Washington Place. On 2 May Admiral and Mrs. Gayler entertained the royal party at a barbeque luncheon at CINCPACFLT's Makalapa Kai guest cottage on Barber's Point Naval Air Station.

6 May - Former CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff and now Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan, LT GEN John R. Guthrie, USA.

19 May - The Honorable Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

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3 June - VADM Thomas B. Hayward, incoming Commander U.S. SEVENTH Fleet.

3 June - Staff delegates John Brady and Gerald Pitchford, House International Affairs Committee.

4 June - Admiral Gayler met with a delegation from the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and members of the Defense Committee of the Republic of Korea in his office.

4 June - Outgoing Australian Consul David Wadham.

4 June - BGEN R. E. Carey, USMC, Ground Security Force Commander, Operation FREQUENT WIND.

5 June - RADM James W. Moreau, USCG, Commander, 14th Coast Guard District.

10 June - The Honorable Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

10 June - Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs, East Asia and Pacific Affairs).

10 June - Mr. Michael H. Armacost, Member, Policy and Planning Staff, State Department.

8 July - Air Chief Marshal Earn Kemasingki, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters Thailand.

9 July - The Honorable David L. Osborn, U.S. Ambassador to Burma.

10 July - Consul General Bill Rowe of Australia.

11 July - MAJ GEN Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC, departing Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan.

14 July - The Honorable William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.

15 July - Mr. David T. Schneider, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, New Delhi, India.

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17 July - VADM Edwin K. Snyder, USN, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.

17 July - General William V. McBride, Commanding General, Air Force Logistics Command.

21 July - Mrs. Gaetana Enders, member of the President's Committee on Refugees.

22 July - The Honorable Takeshi Yasukawa, Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

25 July - On the morning of 25 July Admiral Gayler visited dockside at Pearl Harbor to greet American astronauts who participated in the successful APOLLO-SOYUZ joint space mission. Ceremonies were brief and the astronauts were immediately flown to Tripler Army Medical Center for examination.

25 July - The Honorable John H. Holdridge, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore.

29 July - Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji.

29 July - The Honorable William L. Morrison, Minister for Defense, Australia.

31 July - The Honorable Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Australia.

31 July - RADM William J. Crowe, USN, Director, East Asia and Pacific Region Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

1 August - BGEN R. A. Round, USA, Defense Attache', Vientiane, Laos.

7 August - VADM Robert B. Baldwin, USN, Commander, Naval Air, Pacific.

12 August - LT GEN J. R. Murphy, USAF, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea.

20 August - Mr. Clyde G. Hess, Director, U.S. Information Service, Seoul, Korea.

20 August - Catherine Foy, Miss Hawaii 1975, visited Admiral Gayler. Miss Foy's father, John Foy, is a civilian employee at PACOM headquarters.

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22 August - Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, and party arrived in Hawaii en route to Korea for the annual Security Consultative Meeting. While in Hawaii, the Secretary met with Admiral Gayler and the Pacific component commanders. He departed on 24 August.

During the month of August, several U.S. Congressmen visited Hawaii and met with Admiral Gayler. They were the Honorable Charles H. Wilson (D.-CA); the Honorable Mendel J. Davis (D.-SC); the Honorable Joseph P. Addabbo (D.-NY); the Honorable Robert N. Giaimo (D.-CT); the Honorable Paul Findley (R.-IL); the Honorable William J. Edwards (R.-AL); the Honorable Clarence E. Miller (R.-OH); the Honorable Robert L. Coughlin (R.-PA); the Honorable Kenneth Robinson (R.-VA).

8 September - Admiral Gayler met with a delegation of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan in his Camp Smith office.

15 September - The Honorable David L. Osborn, U.S. Ambassador to Burma.

15 September - Dr. Robert Brownlee, Assistant to the Director, Los Alamos (New Mexico) Laboratory.

15 September - RADM J. W. Moreau, USCG, Commander, 14th Coast Guard District.

17 September - Captain H. E. Darton, USN, incoming Editor in Chief, Pacific Stars & Stripes.

18 September - Captain Peter Conrad, USN, Commander, Naval Station, Pearl Harbor.

25 September - Admiral Gayler hosted a barge luncheon for General Alfredo Stroessner, President of Paraguay, while the President's plane was being refueled and serviced at Hickam Air Force Base.

25 September - Mr. Raymond Garthoff, Senior Foreign Service Inspector, U.S. State Department.

25 September - Admiral and Mrs. Gayler hosted Mr. Norman Augustine, Under Secretary of the Army, and his wife at dinner at the Admiral's quarters. On 26 September the Admiral and the Under Secretary held a series of discussions at Pacific Command headquarters.

26 September - RADM Julian Lake, USN, Commander, Naval Electronics Command.

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1 October - The Honorable Francis J. Galbraith, Coordinator for Population Affairs and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Kissinger.

1 October - Mr. Robert P. Keeley, former Deputy Chief of Mission, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

6 October - Admiral Gayler hosted a staff delegation from the House Armed Services Committee at breakfast in his quarters.

9 October - LT GEN Samuel Jaskilka, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

29 October - Admiral Gayler briefed a congressional delegation of Korean War veterans at the Ala Moana Hotel. Later that evening he attended a reception given by the Commander, Japanese Training Squadron aboard the Japanese training ship KATORI.

30 October - BGEN Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Commander, USAF Security Service.

30 October - The Honorable Lee Stull, newly appointed Deputy Chief of U.S. Mission, Manila, Republic of the Philippines.

30 October - Admiral Gayler met with a delegation from the Japanese Defense Society. Following a briefing in the PACOM Command Center conference room, the Admiral was host to the delegation at luncheon at the Camp Smith Flag Officers Mess.

17 November - Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN (Ret), former CINCPAC, and Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, CINCPACFLT.

17 November - LT GEN John Pauly, USAF, Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force.

18 November - BGEN Harry C. Aderholt, USA, Chief JUSMAG Thailand.

24 November - MAJ GEN Oliver D. Street, Chief JUSMAG Korea.

28 November - MAJ GEN Robin H. F. Holloway, Chief of the General Staff, Royal New Zealand Army.

2 December - RADM Shimazu of the Japanese Self Defense Force.

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3 December - VADM Downey, Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT).

4 December - The Honorable Donald G. Harper, Consul General of New Zealand at Honolulu.

8 December - The Arafune delegation from the Japanese Diet.

Press Conferences and Media Representative Visitors

(U) The following list reflects press conferences and visits by media representatives to Admiral Gayler during 1975:

2 January - Mr. Jim Hartz, NBC-TV "Today" Show.

10 January - Mr. Don Holt, Newsweek Magazine.

28 February - Admiral Gayler held a press conference at his Camp Smith headquarters. Attending were media representatives from the Honolulu Advertiser, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, United Press International, and Honolulu radio and television stations.

18 March - Mr. Dave Polis, San Diego Union.

21 March - Mr. John Peterson, West Coast representative for the National Observer.

26 March - Mr. Walter Pincus, New Republic.

12 April - The U.S. evacuation of Phnom Penh, code named "Operation EAGLE PULL," was successfully accomplished on 12 April. At the conclusion of the operation, Admiral Gayler held a news conference in the Command Center conference room. In attendance were representatives from the three local network television affiliates, both Honolulu newspapers, and KHVH radio.

30 April - Admiral Gayler met with the press following completion of Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of South Vietnam.

11 May - Admiral Gayler was interviewed on KGMB-TV's "Crossfire," a public affairs program featuring newsmakers in a panel-type discussion.

13 May - Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Mr. Peter Jennings on the ABC Television Network's "AM America" morning talk show.

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15 May - Following the rescue of the USS MAYAGUEZ and her crew, Admiral Gayler conducted a press conference in the CINCPAC Command Center attended by representatives from both Honolulu newspapers, three television stations, and radio stations KHVH and KORL.

23 May - Mr. Akira Yamazaki of the Japanese Newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun.

4 June - WCAU, a CBS owned and operated affiliate radio station in Philadelphia, PA, called Admiral Gayler to obtain a telephone interview. The conversation consisted primarily of questions pertaining to the rescue of the MAYAGUEZ, and was broadcast "live."

12 June - Colonel P. L. Mason, USA, Editor-in-Chief of the Pacific Stars & Stripes interviewed Admiral Gayler in the Admiral's office. The interview was published in the 4 July editions of that paper.

13 June - Admiral and Mrs. Gayler hosted at their quarters an "off-the-record" reception and buffet supper for local media representatives and their wives/husbands.

25 July - Mr. Akiro Saito of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, Japan.

1 August - Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News.

6 August - Tom Schell, ABC-TV News.

19 August - Otto Fuerbringer, Time.

15 September - Admiral Gayler met with Mr. Tom Tomizawa, NBC-TV, who was co-producing a special on U.S. foreign policy scheduled to be aired in January 1976.

16 September - Mr. Gordon Joseloff, UPI, outgoing Moscow Bureau Chief.

29 September - Mr. Sidney Liu, Newsweek.

24 November - Mr. Joseph Kraft, syndicated columnist.

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## SECTION II--LEGAL ACTIVITIES

### Legal Limitations on Military Assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam

(U) On 3 March 1975 the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) provided a succinct listing of key legal limitations to CINCPAC military assistance efforts in Cambodia and Vietnam imposed by Congressional restrictions:<sup>1</sup>

- Cooper-Church Amendment (22 USCA §2411 note; §7(a), P.L. 93-189 as amended by §408, P.L. 92-266) - prohibited the use of funds to finance the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops or advisers into Cambodia.

- Stop the Bombing Amendment (Permanent Law 22 USCA §2151 note; §30 P.L. 93-189 Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and FY 75 DOD Appropriation Act §839, Title VIII, P.L. 93-437) - prohibited the appropriation or expenditure of funds to finance U.S. military operations in or over or from off the shores of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

- Cambodia Personnel Limitations (22 USCA §2416, Pt. III, §304(b), P.L. 92-226) - limited to 200 the number of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel authorized inside Cambodia at any one time.

- Vietnam Personnel Limitation (FY 75 DOD Appropriation Act, Title VII, P.L. 93-437 and the current Foreign Assistance Act, Enacted 30 Dec 74, P.L. 93-559, Secs. 38(f)(1)-(4)) - limited authorization for no more than 3,000 U.S. citizens to be in South Vietnam by 30 December 1975, and limited funds to pay no more than 2,850 U.S. citizens in South Vietnam for FY 75.

### Law of War


(U) On 5 November 1974 DOD Directive 5100.77 was published establishing a Law of War Program. The directive required all unified commands to implement the program and issue instructions. Accordingly, CINCPAC published CINCPAC

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1. J73/Memo/0088-75 of 3 Mar 75, Subj: Legal Aspects of U.S. Military Assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam, information concerning w/enclosed J733 Point Paper, 10 Feb 75, Subj: Key Congressional and International Limitations Concerning Cambodia and Vietnam.

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# ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER U.S. FORCES IN THE PACOM



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 27.

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Instruction 5711.5 on 16 June 1975. The instruction required all subordinate units to comply with the laws of war and report all violations to CINCPAC.<sup>1</sup>

### 1975 PACOM Legal Conference

(U) The CINCPAC SJA sponsored a PACOM Legal Conference at the Hale Koa Hotel in Honolulu, 1 through 5 December 1975. Sixty-three civilian and military lawyers from PACOM participated. In addition, representatives from the Department of State and the International Law Divisions, Offices of the Judge Advocates General of the Services attended.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The theme for the conference was "International Law in a Changing Pacific." It covered current developments and problems involved in the Law of the Sea negotiations, law of war negotiations, foreign criminal jurisdiction, foreign claims, and inspection of APO/FPO mail for contraband.<sup>3</sup>

### Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction (FCJ)

#### PACOM FCJ Confinement Statistics

(U) The following is a comparison of U.S. personnel in post trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in the PACOM during 1975:<sup>4</sup>

<u>Country</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>28 Feb 75</u>			<u>USAF</u>	<u>31 Aug 75</u>		<u>Total</u>
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	
Australia						1		1
Hong Kong							2	2
Japan	38	34	90	162	35	27	75	137
Korea		3		3	1	10		11
Taiwan	2		1	3	3		3	6
Thailand	3	4		7	1	3		4
Total	43	41	91	175	40	41	80	161

(U) Worldwide totals of personnel confined as of 28 February and 31 August were 321 and 325, respectively. The CINCPAC percentage of worldwide totals was 55 percent and 50 percent, respectively.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J73 HistSum Jun 75.
  2. J73 HistSum Dec 75.
  3. J73 Booklet "Pacific Command Legal Conference 1975" of 25 Mar 76.
  4. CINCPAC SJA Newsletters (1-75) of 31 Mar 75, and (3-75) of 30 Sep 75.
  5. Ibid.

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(U) On 30 June 1975 the SJA revealed the high percentage of FCJ confinements in PACOM resulting from narcotics offenses:<sup>1</sup>

FCJ Confinement Report

	<u>Number of Confinements</u>	<u>Percent Narcotics-Related</u>
<u>By Country:</u>		
Japan	162	59
Thailand	3	67
Taiwan	2	50
Korea	11	27
Australia	1	0
<u>By Service:</u>		
Air Force	35	97
Army	45	69
Navy	14	86
Marine Corps	79	32
Civilian	6	50
<u>Total:</u>	179	56

Ie Shima Range - Locke and Johnson (Japan)

(U) In January 1975 the Air Force International Law Division informally advised that the DOD was opposed to the December 1974 Japanese proposal that they be permitted to exercise jurisdiction under summary procedures to try the case of Air Force Sergeants Locke and Johnson for the 10 July 1974 Ie Shima Gunnery Range flare gun shooting incident on Okinawa.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 19 March 1975 the American Embassy reported that the Government of Japan (GOJ) had agreed not to object to U.S. Government exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The GOJ further proposed that a public announcement be made in the context of Joint Committee consideration of the matter. On 11 April the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee Chairmen signed a memorandum formally referring the case back to the Joint Committee. On 24 April the Joint Committee referred the case to the two governments for further consideration. Agreement in principle for a settlement was worked out between the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agreement stipulated that the United States

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1. CINCPAC SJA Newsletter (2-75) of 30 Jun 75.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 627-628; J73 WEB 6-12 Jan 75.

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apologize for the incident and for the confusion concerning the duty certificates. The United States also promised to take action against the offenders under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and to compensate the victim, while the GOJ declared it would not exercise jurisdiction.

(S) The U.S. and Japanese Governments reached formal agreement in the Locke and Johnson case along the lines previously agreed, and the GOJ announced in the Diet the conditions of the settlement and that the United States would exercise jurisdiction. On 7 May 1975 SGTs Locke and Johnson were reprimanded, reduced one grade (suspended for six months), and given \$150 and \$100 forfeitures, respectively, under Article 15, UCMJ. They left Okinawa for new assignments on 10 May. When the punishment was announced publicly the Okinawa press and leftists denounced what they termed GOJ subjection to the United States and light sentences. The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly unanimously passed a resolution complaining of the action of both governments and demanding instant removal of the range from Ie Shima, but publicity soon subsided. While it was noted that Japanese leftists and opponents of the current government would probably cite it from time to time in their various lists of grievances, the incident was considered closed by 9 June 1975.<sup>2</sup>

#### Rape/Injury Case - Flores

(U) On 19 April 1975 PFC Sammy Flores, USMC, allegedly assaulted two junior high school girls on Kin Red Beach in Okinawa. He allegedly struck both girls on the head with a rock and attempted to rape them. The girls were reported to be retarded. PFC Flores was apprehended by two Marines who turned him over to the military police for confinement in the Correctional Annex at Camp Kuwae. Japanese authorities in Okinawa asserted that PFC Flores should have been turned over to Japanese police and demanded that custody be immediately transferred to the GOJ. The U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) contended that under Article XVIIIC of the SOFA, the United States was entitled to custody until the accused was indicted. The GOJ countered that Article XVII was inapplicable because PFC Flores was erroneously turned over to U.S. custody in the first place. The incident was extensively reported by the news media in Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. On 22 April 1975 Governor Yara met with MAJ GEN David, the Okinawa Area Coordinator, and indicated that public sentiment was running very high for the immediate turnover of the suspect. On 28 April the GOJ indicted PFC Flores for rape/injury and U.S. Forces transferred him to GOJ custody. On the same day the Okinawa Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling for withdrawal

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 3564/190530Z Mar 75; COMUSJ 140620Z Apr 75; AMEMB Tokyo 9721/251001Z Apr 75.
  2. 5AF 130155Z May 75; AMCONSUL Naha 1716/120632Z May 75 and 1723/190931Z May 75; J73 WEB 2-8 Jun 75.

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of U.S. Marines from Okinawa and dismissal of the 3rd Marine Division Commander. Apparently the Assembly acted before it heard of the custody transfer. On 6 September 1975 PFC Flores was convicted of the violation of injury resulting from rape and sentenced to confinement at forced labor for six years.<sup>1</sup>

Civilians "Apprehended" on Okinawa

(C) On 24 May 1975 two Marine military policemen (MPs), LCPLs Roseboro and Murray, pursued a speeding motorist suspected of drunken driving as the vehicle raced out of a gate at Camp Foster, Okinawa. The MPs were successful in stopping the car soon after leaving the Camp and were in process of arresting the occupants, two Marines and a DOD dependent, when two civilians intervened. The civilians refused to identify themselves or to depart and desist in interfering in police functions. Altercations ensued and the two individuals were taken into the MP station. A delay of approximately three hours was attributed to relaying a message from U.S. Army police liaison, and Japanese police waiting for an interpreter before responding to the call. The Commander, USFJ (COMUS Japan) expressed the opinion that the MPs were within their legal authority under the circumstances, but also noted that the Joint Committee should review current procedures for notification and cooperation between U.S. and Japanese police.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 6 June Okinawa Governor Yara protested in writing that the apprehension violated the SOFA. COMUS Japan requested that the Okinawa Area Coordinator review communication facilities, procedures, and methods of enhancing interpreter capability to expedite police coordination.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 25 June the Okinawa local police submitted a report on the alleged illegal arrest to the Naha District Prosecutor's Office. According to news reports, the Okinawa police concluded that the military police had violated the SOFA; however, GOJ officials notified COMUS Japan on 1 July that an indictment would not be brought against LCPLs Roseboro and Murray for making an illegal arrest. The officials did not agree that the act constituted an offense arising out of an official duty, but they determined that under the

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1. NAVINSERVRA 220010Z Apr 75; AMCONSUL Naha 179/230931Z Apr 75; CG MCB 230645Z Apr 75; COMUSJ 242320Z Apr 75; CG MCB Camp Butler 240852Z, 240901Z Apr 75, and 170018Z Sep 75; COMUSJ 300505Z Apr 75; OAC Zukeran 220730Z Apr 75.
  2. CG MCR 241945Z May 75; COMUSJ 280620Z May 75; AMCONSUL Naha 266/280849Z May 75; AMEMB Tokyo 7010/281020Z May 75; CG MARCORB CAMBUT 310252Z May 75; COMUSJ 020901Z Jun 75.
  3. COMUSJ 090705Z Jun 75 and 231007Z Jun 75.

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circumstances it was a legitimate act for the two MPs to apprehend the civilians in the vicinity of the base.<sup>1</sup>

(C) COMUS Japan recommended that since the question of jurisdiction was moot, the United States should avoid any possible arguments by not issuing an official duty certificate in the case. On 4 July the CINCPAC SJA concurred in this proposed course of action and the case was closed.<sup>2</sup>

Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee--Philippines

(C) The joint Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines held its 10th quarterly meeting at the Department of Justice, Manila on 11 February 1975. Ten cases involving official duty certificates were on the agenda and they were all satisfactorily resolved. In addition, the Philippine Department of Justice revealed concern over the following aspects of U.S. law enforcement activities in connection with official duty incidents:<sup>3</sup>

- U.S. military law enforcement authorities conducting off-base investigations without the cooperation of local Philippine police.
- Detention of Philippine nationals arrested or questioned on base beyond the minimum time needed to turn them over to Philippine authorities.
- Alleged derogatory remarks by U.S. authorities making arrests or questioning local nationals on base.

Altered Sentence - Lutz (Taiwan)

(C) On 10 January 1973 SGT Ronald A. Lutz, USAF, was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for negligent homicide in the strangulation murder of a Chinese female on 22 April 1972. Against the advice of his counsel, he appealed for a retrial and, on 12 July 1973, his sentence was changed to five years imprisonment for homicide under a different article of the Chinese criminal code. He appealed again and on 30 November 1973 the case was returned to the Taiwan High Court, which reconfirmed a five year sentence on 28 May 1974. On 19 December 1974 another investigative hearing was held by the Taichung Branch of the Taiwan High Court based upon Supreme Court advice that the five year sentence

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1. COMUSJ 270216Z Jun 75.
  2. COMUSJ 020716Z Jul 75; CINCPAC 040127Z Jul 75.
  3. AMEMB Manila 2720/040930Z Mar 75.

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was a procedural error because Chinese law specified a minimum of 10 years for homicide. At the hearing, Lutz requested the testimony of three witnesses and presented documentary evidence in mitigation.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 9 January the Taiwan High Court held another hearing but, due to inability to locate the three witnesses requested by the defense and the need for more information from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in Washington, D.C., the trial was postponed. Meanwhile, it was apparent to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base (CCK) officials that Lutz wanted to get permission to depart Taiwan. On 7 February 1975 Republic of China (ROC) authorities informed the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command that Lutz would not be permitted to leave the ROC pending the rehearing in his case which was held on 25 February. At this hearing, Lutz was denied a request for a two-week delay to prepare his argument, and on 4 March 1975 he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for international homicide under Article 271 of the ROC Criminal Code. Again, he indicated intent to appeal the decision and requested the Air Force to provide counsel. The 6217 Combat Support Squadron (CSS) Commander at CCK recommended denial of this request because SGT Lutz's deteriorating military behavior, which resulted in his receiving Article 15 punishment, but 13th Air Force authorized counsel for his appeal. On 18 June 1975 the Taiwan Supreme Court denied SGT Lutz's appeal; on 27 June the sentence was ordered executed, and he was confined in Taipei Prison, Tao Yuan, Taiwan.<sup>2</sup>

Status of Dependent - Lutz (Taiwan)

(U) On 28 March 1975 Mrs. Ching Ping Lutz, dependent wife of SGT Ronald A. Lutz, USAF, was arrested by Chinese authorities for attempting to smuggle heroin and marijuana into Taiwan from Thailand. SGT Lutz requested that counsel be provided at U.S. Government expense to represent his wife. The 6217 CSS recommended approval of this request, but Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) disagreed, and on 17 April 1975 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force advised that the request had been denied. Meanwhile, at the preliminary hearing on 4 April, the Procurator announced that, while Mrs. Lutz was a Chinese National and not entitled to SOFA status, she would be accorded all the SOFA rights. She waived her right to remain silent and made a statement admitting commission of the offense and the trial commenced on 28 April 1975. On 5 May 1975 Mrs. Lutz was found guilty of violating the drug laws and was sentenced to life in prison. Appeal was automatic and it commenced on 20 May in the High Court. On 17 June 1975 the High Court convicted Mrs. Lutz of transporting heroin and marijuana into Taiwan. She was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment; however, the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 615-616.
  2. 6217 CSS 100901Z Jan 75, 270650Z Jan 75 and 270751Z Feb 75; COMUSTDC 070759Z Feb 75; CINCPACAF 192000Z Jun 75; 6217 ABS 270710Z Jun 75.

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clemency statute in memory of President Chiang Kai-Shek, passed on 31 May, reduced the sentence by one-third to 10 years, and she was confined in Taipei Prison, Tao Yuan, Taiwan, on 18 July 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Legal Opinions

Article 7 of the Vietnam Peace Agreement

(U) On 27 January 1973 in Paris, agreement had been reached on ending the fighting in Vietnam, entitled "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam." Article 7 of that agreement stated:<sup>2</sup>

...From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of Control and Supervision.

(S) In 1975, prior to the fall of Vietnam on 30 April, the SJA offered several opinions involving Article 7, as follows:<sup>3</sup>

• During the North Vietnamese Army offensive in South Vietnam in February 1975, seven U.S. airmen were sent to Saigon on temporary duty to help the U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Saigon properly receive, store, and account for an influx of spare parts. Since the airmen were in Vietnam to assist in delivery of U.S. Military Assistance material and not to advise or render technical military assistance to

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1. 6217 CSS 290415Z Mar 75, 020939Z Apr 75 and 070825Z Apr 75; 6987ABS 050735Z May 75, 202300Z May 75 and 170506Z Jun 75; 13AF 030130Z Apr 75; CINCPACAF 032030Z Apr 75 and 142030Z Apr 75; CSAF 171800Z Apr 75; ADMIN COMUSTDC 180250Z Jul 75.
  2. DOD Commanders Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 5.
  3. J73 HistSums Feb-Apr 75, with enclosures.

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the South Vietnamese forces, the SJA concluded that their presence did not violate Article 7 of the Vietnam Peace Agreement.

- On 18 March 1975 the SJA considered the legality of sending 5 to 10 USAF personnel to Vietnam for a short period to observe Vietnamese Air Force air operations and make recommendations or suggestions for improvement. It was determined that these activities would constitute a violation of Article 7. The SJA concluded that introduction of the team could not be authorized by CINCPAC.

- On 19 March 1975 the SJA concluded that there were several problems in permitting U.S. Navy LSTs to undergo rehabilitation at a Government of Vietnam shipyard in advance of Congressional approval of the transfer. It was considered a possible violation of Article 7, which could jeopardize Congressional approval of the transfer.

- On 21 March 1975 the SJA prepared an opinion on whether U.S. Government resupply of Cambodia could be legally staged from Vietnam if the United States was required to depart from Thailand. It stated that Article 7 did not prohibit staging from Saigon. Although this would not be considered combat activity by U.S. military personnel under the "Stop the Bombing Amendment," political considerations encouraged use of civilian contractors for that purpose.

- On 27 March 1975 the SJA advised that Article 7 was the major legal impediment to U.S. assistance to the RVN, the provision most frequently transgressed by North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Continued unilateral adherence to Article 7 by the U.S. Government was deemed both counterproductive and unnecessary. The SJA recommended that CINCPAC urge higher authority to affect suspension of Article 7.

- On 9 April 1975 the SJA opined that U.S. Forces could be legitimately used to deliver U.S. equipment to Vietnam under the Peace Agreement, but that the use of USAF crews to ferry VNAF C-130 aircraft would be a violation of the Agreement. (See also the Security Assistance chapter.)

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Military Assistance to Cambodia

Transportation Costs for Smoke Tanks

(S) On 7 February 1975, in response to an inquiry as to whether five smoke tanks could be airlifted from the Continental United States to Thailand by USAF aircraft for subsequent use by Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK), the Cambodian Army, without charging the Cambodian Military Assistance Program (MAP) ceiling for transportation costs, the SJA replied that the Secretary of Defense had previously ruled, "Basic MAP funding policy requires that country programs be charged for all assistance provided that can be identified to a specific program." Transportation costs for the smoke tanks fell within this policy and had to ultimately be charged against the MAP Cambodia ceiling (also, see the Security Assistance chapter for Cambodia Funding Ceiling).<sup>1</sup>

Loan of LCM-6 Monitors

(S) On 15 February 1975 the SJA opined that Vietnam could loan Cambodia four LCM-6 monitors which had been given to Vietnam by the U.S. Government without violating any U.S. laws (also, see the Logistics chapter). The DOD Appropriation Act, 1975, prohibited the use of funds to support Vietnamese forces in actions in Cambodia or Laos, but the prohibition did not apply to equipment where Vietnamese forces did not accompany it. Title IV, P.L. 89-367 expressly permitted the President to authorize a Military Assistance Service Funded or Defense Assistance to Vietnam recipient country to transfer equipment to someone other than the U.S. Government.<sup>2</sup>

Status of Khmer Trainees in Thailand

(S) On 18 March 1975, in response to an inquiry on the political/legal status of Khmer military personnel undergoing U.S.-sponsored training in the event of a change in Cambodian government, the SJA opined that there was no legal obligation to provide aid to the Khmer trainees merely because they were U.S.-sponsored. Uniformity in treatment was desirable; however, the trainees within the United States could legally seek political asylum while those trainees in Thailand had to appeal to the Thai Government (also, see the Security Assistance chapter).<sup>3</sup>

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1. J73 HistSum Feb 75; J73/Memo/057-75 of 7 Feb 75, Subj: Transportation Costs of Smoke Tanks.
  2. J73 HistSum Feb 75; J73/Memo/0066-75 of 15 Feb 75, Subj: Loan of Monitors by RVN to Cambodia (S).
  3. J73 HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/S112-75 of 18 Mar 75, Subj: Contingency Planning for Khmer Students Training Outside Cambodia.

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Reimbursement for Damages in Connection with Training

(C) On 26 March 1975 the SJA opined that there was no legal responsibility on the United States to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) for damage to MAP-furnished aircraft caused by a Khmer student. If the policy decision were made to reimburse the RTG, it would have been an indirect expenditure in connection with training Khmer students and would have to be charged to Cambodia MAP.<sup>1</sup>

Status of Equipment Evacuated from Southeast Asia

Cambodian and Vietnamese Equipment

(C) On 18 and 27 April 1975 the SJA expressed the opinion that by virtue of the agreements under which equipment was given to Cambodia and Vietnam the United States retained a residual interest in the equipment when it was no longer used for the purpose intended. This residual interest gave the United States a stronger claim to the property than that asserted by other countries (also, see the Security Assistance chapter).<sup>2</sup>

Laotian Equipment

(C) On 16 May 1975 the SJA opined that the United States would have a reversionary interest in equipment furnished to Laos for military assistance which was in third countries. The equipment was furnished to assist in defense against communist aggression and since such purpose no longer existed the property should be returned to the United States according to the international agreement under which it was furnished. It was also noted, however, that political considerations could exist which might dissuade the United States from asserting its reversionary interest (also, see the Security Assistance chapter).<sup>3</sup>

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1. J73 HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/C127-75 of 26 Mar 75, Subj: Reimbursement for Aircraft Damage.
  2. J73 HistSum Apr 75; J73/Memo/C146-75 of 18 Apr 75, Subj: Ownership of MAP/MASF Furnished Aircraft which come into U.S./Third Country Control; J73/Memo/C157-75 of 27 Apr 75, Subj: U.S. Reversionary Interest in Cambodia Vessels.
  3. J73 HistSum May 75; J73/Memo/S170-75 of 9 May 75, Subj: Laos Contingency Planning; J73/Memo/S177-75 of 16 May 75, Subj: Laos Contingency Planning; CINCPAC 191919Z May 75.

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Vietnamese Refugees in Guam

Exclusion/Restraint of Refugees

(D) On 25 May 1975 the CINCPAC Representative (CINCPACREP) Guam sought concurrence in administering a separate holding area for Vietnamese refugees who were considered a threat to persons, property, or self. CINCPAC replied that there was no authority vested in the Armed Forces to restrain or confine refugees. Such activity also possibly violated the Posse Comitatus Act. CINCPACREP Guam was instructed that any restraint of refugees for protection of the installation should be for only so long as was required to deliver them to appropriate civilian law enforcement agencies but no more than a few hours. The JCS concurred in CINCPAC's position.<sup>1</sup>

Military Assistance to Maintain Law and Order on Guam

(D) CINCPAC informed CINCPACREP Guam that, if available, off-base facilities should be used as administrative hold areas for refugees desirous of repatriation. If such arrangements were not feasible, then facilities on Orote Point could be made available to U.S. Maritime Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, or other civilian authorities for such purposes. The military could provide administrative and logistical support but could not control ingress or egress or participate in law enforcement activities. U.S. Navy correction facilities or other places of detention could be utilized to detain repatriates only upon request of the Governor of Guam and with CINCPAC approval.<sup>2</sup>

(G) CINCPAC emphasized to CINCPACREP Guam that Secretary of State disapproval of civilianization of refugee processing did not alter the law enforcement and security planning. CINCPACREP Guam had the inherent power to insure safety of persons and property on military installations. However, military personnel could not be used to maintain order, engage in law enforcement, or to control ingress and egress from camps in Guam. If the Governor of Guam declared an emergency he could request military assistance. CINCPACREP Guam was instructed to give no advance assurances. All requests for assistance were required to be submitted to CINCPAC for approval.

Return of Repatriates to Vietnam by Ship

(U) On 4 September 1975 the SJA stated that there were two legal issues involved in returning repatriates to South Vietnam via a Vietnamese merchant

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1. CINCPACREP Guam 250115Z May 75; CINCPAC 290220Z May 75; JCS 302236Z May 75.
  2. CINCPAC 232131Z Jul 75.

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vessel. Addressing the first issue, U.S. law provided authority to temporarily prohibit the repatriates from returning to South Vietnam. International law, however, supported a right of repatriates to return to their country. Control of repatriates' movement was exclusively within the purview of civilian authorities. The second issue involved the requirement for the U.S. Government to indemnify owners of the Vietnamese vessel which was used for transport of the repatriates.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 1 October 1975 the Legal Adviser to CINCPACREP Guam reported that several individuals had filed claims against VIETNAM THUONG TIN 1, the Vietnamese merchant vessel intended to return repatriates to South Vietnam. The vessel was owned by Vietnam Marine Line Company. Of 100,000 shares, 99,860 shares were owned by the Credit Commercial Bank of Vietnam, a government instrumentality. One hundred and forty shares were owned equally by 14 individuals, some of whom were refugees in the United States, Canada, France, and other countries. In addition to ownership claims, there were claims for repairs, insurance, and docking fees. It was estimated that the total claims would be approximately \$200,000.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The DOD General Counsel called the Director, Interagency Task Force (IATF) to insure that she was aware of the claims and the need to take action to resolve the problem. She stated that the IATF had requested the Admiralty and Shipping Section of the Department of Justice to settle the matter. The claims were reviewed by the attorney in charge of the West Coast Office, Admiralty and Shipping Section, who then advised IATF of their validity. IATF then settled all valid claims and the ship sailed with the repatriates aboard on 16 October 1975.<sup>3</sup>

### Legality of MAYAGUEZ Seizure by Cambodia

(U) On 21 May 1975 the SJA issued the opinion that there may have been some legal basis for Cambodia to stop and inspect the merchant ship, MAYAGUEZ, if it was in Cambodian territorial waters, but there was no authority to seize the ship absent a violation. Any right to verification of innocent passage under Article 16, 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, had to be exercised

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1. J73 HistSum Sep 75; J73/Memo/312-75 of 4 Sep 75, Subj: Legal Issues re Return of Repatriates by Ship.
  2. J73 HistSum Oct 75; J73/Memo/344-75 of 2 Oct 75, Subj: Ex-RVN Merchant Vessel VIETNAM THUONG TIN 1.
  3. J73/Memo/C347-75 of 6 Oct 75, Subj: WEB, 29 Sep-5 Oct 75; STATE 062246Z Oct 75; CINCPAC 180319Z Oct 75.

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in a reasonable manner under the circumstances and with minimum interruption of the ship's voyage.<sup>1</sup>

#### Evacuation of Personnel from Laos

(S) On 3 June 1975 the SJA opined that there was ample legal authority for U.S. military operations to evacuate endangered U.S. citizens from Laos. There was, however, insufficient legal justification for U.S. evacuation of third country nationals and 3,200 Laotians, without the consent of the Provisional Government of National Union.<sup>2</sup>

#### Section 514, Foreign Assistance Act of 1974

##### Storing Evacuated Ammunition in Korea

(U) On 9 June 1975, in response to an inquiry as to whether ammunition taken out of Vietnam and Cambodia could be stored in Korea, the SJA replied that Section 514, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1974, did not prohibit stockpiling but only required that any material intended for foreign countries must be charged against Military Assistance funding in the year it was stockpiled.<sup>3</sup>

##### Ammunition in Thailand (AIT)

(S) In commenting on a proposed message, on 21 October 1975 the SJA noted that there were legal problems involved in plans to leave U.S. ammunition in Thailand after a reduction in forces. A previous message had indicated an intent to leave considerable amounts of ammunition for contingency use by the Thai and to serve as quid pro quo for successful U.S. withdrawal from Thailand. CINCPAC had proposed to leave the ammunition as U.S. reserve stocks and the JCS had concurred. The SJA stated that Section 514 of the FAA required Thailand Military Assistance funds to be charged for any war reserves stockpiled for use by that country. In view of the history of the AIT program, the U.S. assertion that the ammunition was for U.S. war reserves exclusively would be a sham and undoubtedly would be discovered by the General Accounting Office. It was recommended that the legal issues be left for the Departments of State and

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1. J73 HistSum May 75; J73/Memo/184-75 of 21 May 75, Subj: U.S. Position re MAYAGUEZ Seizure by Cambodia.
  2. J73 HistSum Jun 75; J73/Memo/S199-75 of 3 Jun 75, Subj: Evacuation of U.S. Citizens, Third Country Nationals, and Laotians from Laos.
  3. J73 HistSum Jun 75; J73/Memo/205-75 of 9 Jun 75, Subj: Interpretation of Section 514, Foreign Assistance Act, 1974.

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Defense to resolve, with the possibility of going to Congress for an exception to Section 514, FAA.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 5 November 1975 the SJA expressed the opinion that there was no significant legal distinction between defense articles procured for allied use and those defense articles possessed by the U.S. Government which were earmarked for future allied use. Both categories require compliance with Section 514 of the FAA of 1974. Section 514 required that any stockpiling of defense articles or material which were "set aside, reserved, or in any way earmarked or intended for future use by, for, or on behalf of any other foreign country shall be charged against (the current fiscal year MAP ceiling)." The key to the operation of Section 514 was the U.S. intent--a subjective determination based upon all the circumstances surrounding a specific situation. Those items which could not be justified for U.S. use immediately raised the appearance of a violation of Section 514. In connection with the U.S. withdrawal from Thailand, storing of ammunition there had to be either tied to valid U.S. requirements or justified as necessary for a re-entry contingency. Instead of promising the Thai any specific ammunition, the United States had to couch its commitment in terms of support from MAP, U.S. defense materials, or war reserves, wherever situated.<sup>2</sup>

#### Hq PACOM Administrative and Logistical Support

(U) On 10 March 1975 the SJA concluded that administrative and logistic support for the headquarters was a supply or service activity common to more than one military department, and thus Congress need not be notified to effect a change in PACOM support responsibility. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense could reorganize departmental support of PACOM without informing Congress by merely rewriting the DOD Directive.<sup>3</sup>

#### Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S) Courts-Martial Jurisdiction

(U) On 13 March 1975 the SJA prepared a letter informing the Commander/Editor-in-Chief, Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S) that he did not have

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1. J73 HistSum Oct 75; AMEMB Bangkok 310751Z May 75; COMUSMACTHAI 310830Z May 75; CINCPAC 021030Z Jun 75; JCS 051420Z Jun 75; J73/Memos/205-75 of 9 Jun 75, Subj: Interpretation of Section 514, Foreign Assistance Act, 1974, and C368-75 of 21 Oct 75, Subj: Ammunition in Thailand Program (AIT).
  2. J73 HistSum Nov 75; J73/Memo/S382-75 of 5 Nov 75, Subj: Stockpiling Defense Articles.
  3. J73 HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/101-75 of 10 Mar 75, Subj: Why Navy Provides Administrative Support of Unified/Sub-Unified Command Headquarters in the Pacific.

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courts-martial jurisdiction. The letter recommended coordination with Service components for judicial and nonjudicial punishment involving members of the PS&S.<sup>1</sup>

#### Use of Government Vehicles

(U) On 19 March 1975 the SJA issued the opinion that the use of government vehicles for medical appointments was within the discretion of the commander having control of the vehicles, considering the overall best interest of the government, including resources available to meet commitments, urgency of the medical problem, alternate means of transportation available, and conservation of energy.<sup>2</sup>

#### Inquiries Concerning Insurance Solicitors

(U) On 21 March 1975 the SJA prepared a memorandum stating it was not illegal to make reasonable inquiries concerning insurance solicitors applying to do business on military installations. Consent to investigation was an implicit condition to granting the privilege of solicitation on-base.<sup>3</sup>

#### Law of the Sea (LOS)

##### United Nations LOS Conference

(U) The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference reconvened at Geneva on 17 March 1975 and concluded on 10 May. No agreement, other than to meet again in New York on 29 March 1976 for eight weeks, was reached; however, the press reported that the three main committee chairmen had prepared a "single negotiating text" to serve as the basis for study and negotiation in the interim.<sup>4</sup>

(C) On 21 August 1975 the U.S. Defense Attaché in Moscow reported that Russian Admiral Alekseyev told Congressman Robert H. Michel (R.-IL) that U.S. and Soviet interests in LOS conferences coincided and contributed greatly to freedom of the seas; however, a principal goal of the People's Republic of China strategy at the last conference in Geneva was to split the U.S. and Soviet position on LOS issues.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J73 HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/107-75 of 13 Mar 75, Subj: Courts-Martial Jurisdiction of the Pacific Stars and Stripes.
  2. J73 HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/117-75 of 19 Mar 75, Subj: Legal Interpretation of Services to be Rendered Under OPNAV P44-2.
  3. J73HistSum Mar 75; J73/Memo/119-75 of 19 Mar 75, Subj: Investigation of Civilian Solicitors
  4. J73/Memos/C121-75 of 24 Mar 75, Subj: WEB, 17-23 Mar 75, and C180-75 of 19 May 75, Subj: WEB, 12-18 May 75.
  5. J73 WEB 25-31 Aug 75.

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South Pacific LOS Conference

(S) Representatives of seven areas (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Tonga, Western Samoa, and Nauru) convened in Port Moresby on 4 March 1975 to discuss LOS. The talks were in preparation for the LOS Conference which opened in Geneva on 17 March. The purpose of the talks was to exchange views on economic and environmental aspects; however, they did not expect to develop a common South Pacific point of view at that time.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ)

(S) On 12 April 1975 the U.S. Embassy in Wellington was reported as having received a copy of the Government of New Zealand (GNZ) proposal entitled, "A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific." Among other things, the proposal contemplated a ban on nuclear weapons in territorial waters. Later in the proposal, however, the GNZ recognized, "...the question of transit is a thorny one..." but opined that it could be made clear that the zone did not circumscribe a state's right, under international law, to grant or deny transit.<sup>2</sup>

(S) As the year progressed, New Zealand's efforts to gain support for the SPNFZ increased. The Secretary, Department of Foreign Relations and Trade, New Guinea was reported to have said that he expected the subject of a nuclear free zone would be discussed in some detail at the South Pacific Forum in July; however, he did not anticipate any results because of differences between Australia and New Zealand on the issue. He recognized the importance of security aspects to the United States and indicated that New Guinea did not have a position on the SPNFZ. He thought the island countries would be opposed to nuclear testing but would not be too concerned about other aspects.<sup>3</sup>

(S) The New Zealand Ambassador, on 14 July 1975, gave the U.S. Department of State the text of a GNZ draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly concerning a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. State expressed gratitude for consideration of the U.S. point of view; nevertheless, basic differences still existed on the utility of any SPNFZ proposal, particularly concerning relative disadvantages that would accrue to the United States as compared with other nuclear powers.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J73/Memo/C102-75 of 10 Mar 75, Subj: WEB, 3-9 Mar 75.
  2. J73/Memo/S142-75 of 14 Apr 75, Subj: WEB, 7-13 Apr 75.
  3. J73/Memo/00231-75 of 30 Jun 75, Subj: WEB, 23-29 Jun 75.
  4. J73 WEB 14-20 Jul 75.

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(S) In August 1975 Australia indicated that it would vote for the resolution if it came to a vote but would neither co-sponsor it nor speak in favor of it. Australian officials said the resolution was of little real value and potentially troublesome. The New Zealand political opposition leader stressed the significance of Australia's failure to support GNZ initiatives for a nuclear free South Pacific, and pointed out that the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Pact was totally incompatible with such a concept. He said that the Americans could not be expected to defend New Zealand with Lee Enfield rifles. Soviet long-range missiles would make a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone totally irrelevant because they could be fired with a high degree of accuracy right over the top of it.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In October 1975 the Fijian Deputy Prime Minister told the U.N. General Assembly that it was not the intention of his government to ignore or deprive the right of any state to free and unimpeded passage in the high seas or the right of innocent passage in other waters. They would, however, vigorously oppose any implacement or testing of nuclear weapons by non-Pacific states within territories in the South Pacific region. About the same time, Prime Minister Razak indicated that Malaysia would support the New Zealand initiative for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific.<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 23 October the U.N. Secretariat circulated the text of the draft resolution on the SPNFZ. The text was basically the same as previously given to the United States except that Papua New Guinea was shown as a co-sponsor. The U.S.U.N. Mission Officer asked the New Zealand Mission Officer if there was any possibility that the SPNFZ proposal could be amended to refer only to land masses. The New Zealand Mission Officer stated that she did not personally think so because the nonaligned nations already thought the proposal did not go far enough. The French U.N. Mission Officer<sup>3</sup> assured New Zealand that France would abstain from voting on the resolution.

(C) On 11 November 1975 Ambassador Selden discussed the U.S. position on the SPNFZ with Foreign Secretary Corner of New Zealand. Secretary Corner said other countries had also raised the possibility of amending the resolution. He did not absolutely rule out such action but did not think it would be good tactics to introduce amendments so early. There were delegations waiting in the wings with amending language that would be of much more concern to the United States and New Zealand. He said the delegations could discuss this matter as the tactical situation developed in the U.N.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J73 WEBS 18-24 Aug, 25-31 Aug 75.
  2. J73 WEB 13-19 Oct 75.
  3. J73 WEB 20-26 Oct 75.
  4. J73 WEB 10-16 Nov 75.

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(C) On 25 November 1975 United Kingdom officials from the Arms Control and Disarmament Department informed the U.S. Embassy in London that the New Zealand High Commission was making strong efforts to obtain U.K. support for the SPNFZ. The New Zealanders were told that the United Kingdom would be abstaining on the SPNFZ resolution. There were indications that New Zealand would continue attempts to gain U.K. support.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The election of the National Party in New Zealand in November 1975 was expected to impact on the SPNFZ, since opposition party leader Muldoon had said that the SPNFZ concept was inconsistent with ANZUS and Foreign Minister Talbot had compared the SPNFZ concept to "a Devil Free Zone," thinking it totally impractical and having never understood the Labor Government's support of the idea.<sup>2</sup>

### Malacca Strait

(C) On 6 January 1975 the SHOWA MARU went aground and spilled large quantities of oil. Indonesia proposed a special meeting with Malaysia and Singapore to discuss, among other things, "joint policy on possible limiting of tonnage and draft and other safety measures for passage through Malacca Strait." The day before the Indonesian proposal, the Singapore Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs told the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission the accident would not affect Singapore's position favoring unimpeded passage of international straits.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The scheduled "Malacca Strait" meeting among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore precipitated by the SHOWA MARU oil spill was apparently downgraded from foreign minister to technical expert level. Singapore's Foreign Minister confirmed that his government would oppose any, "policies and measures which would violate existing international law of the sea or adversely affect forthcoming Geneva [LOS] negotiations." The Malaysian Principal Assistant Secretary in Charge of LOS Matters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a U.S. Embassy officer that "GOM [Government of Malaysia] did not plan action in support of its claim of territoriality over waters in the strait pending resolution of this matter in the United Nations LOS Conferences." Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Malaysia noted apparent USS ENTERPRISE flight operations while transiting the Strait of Malacca. An aircraft accident could occur which would draw public attention to transits and require Malaysia to take a public stand against our interests. Therefore, the Embassy recommended that a restriction of flight operations be considered. The U.S. Navy and Defense Department advised the

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1. J73 WEB 24-30 Nov 75.
  2. J73 WEBS 1-7 Dec 75 and 15-21 Dec 75; AMEMB Wellington 291039Z Nov 75 and 170202Z Dec 75.
  3. J73/Memo/017-75 of 13 Jan 75, Subj: WEB, 6-12 Jan 75.

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Secretary of State that flight operations in restricted waters were normally not conducted unless absolutely necessary.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 21 January 1975 the American Embassy in Jakarta reported that Indonesia had issued an eight-point statement concerning the SHOWA MARU oil spill incident. It concluded, "This harmful experience 'has compelled Indonesia to invite, in good faith, the other littoral states, either on a tripartite or if necessary bilateral basis to promptly regulate the safety of the straits....'"<sup>2</sup>

(C) On 7 February 1975 the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur reported that the scheduled meeting would take place 17-19 February in Singapore to discuss regulations of passage through the Malacca Strait. At this meeting concerning safety of navigation and oil pollution in Malacca Strait, a cautiously worded statement was approved, agreeing on the following points:<sup>3</sup>

- A traffic separation scheme for the strait would be established in which international interests would be taken into account.

- Certain limitations would have to be imposed on very large, crude-oil carrier ships.

- A ministerial council would be established on the safety of navigation and control of marine pollution in the strait.

(C) On 27 February 1975 the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur reported that a senior Malaysian Foreign Ministry official said that a council of experts was to formulate the implementing specifics of the tripartite agreement on the Malacca Strait. The council would consider draft/tonnage limitations for very large crude carriers, methods of enforcing limitations, and funding of a regulatory/policing system. The council was to complete its work by 15 May.<sup>4</sup>

(C) On 18 April 1975 intelligence channels reported that the Government of Malaysia conveyed to the Government of Indonesia its unhappiness with Indonesian maneuverings at the LOS Conference and on other matters dealing with the transit rights and regulations on the Strait of Malacca. Malaysia claimed that, in

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1. J73/Memo/035-75 of 20 Jan 75, Subj: WEB, 13-19 Jan 75; J73/Memo/068-75 of 18 Feb 75, Subj: WEB, 10-17 Feb 75.
  2. J73/Memo/041-75 of 27 Jan 75, Subj: WEB, 20-26 Jan 75.
  3. J73/Memo/059-75 of 10 Feb 75, Subj: WEB, 3-9 Feb 75; J73/Memo/077-75 of 24 Feb 75, Subj: WEB, 18-23 Feb 75.
  4. J73/Memo/085-75 of 3 Mar 75, Subj: WEB, 24 Feb-2 Mar 75.

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return for support of its archipelagic preferences, Indonesia sold out to the major maritime powers on passage for warships through designated sealanes and overflights without prior notification to the country concerned. In addition, Malaysia claimed Indonesia had proposed that the membership on the ministerial council for the safety of navigation and control of pollution in the Strait of Malacca be expanded to include a representative of the maritime powers. Malaysia alleged that this was contrary to an earlier agreement restricting membership to Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Malaysia's Chief Delegate to the U.N. LOS negotiations, Attorney General Yusof, claimed that due to dangers posed by oil tankers, Malaysia and Indonesia "cannot wait for end of LOS negotiations before implementing laws and regulations governing transit of Malacca Strait." Both Yusof and a Foreign Ministry official expressed discouragement over the lack of progress at the Geneva session of the U.N. LOS Conference.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 14 August 1975 the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur reported that the Malaysian Attorney General said his country would make concessions on Strait of Malacca if the United States and Soviet Union adopted a less rigid position on use of that waterway. Malaysia and Indonesia had no objections to innocent passage through the strait but wanted restrictions on warships and vessels over 200,000 tons.<sup>3</sup>

(C) As of 14 August 1975 the Department of State had not ascertained any indication that the People's Republic of China had retreated from its opposition to the right of unimpeded transit through straits used for international navigation which would be overlapped by a 12-mile territorial sea, such as Malacca.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In an address to the American Bar Association on 11 August 1975 Secretary of State Kissinger said the LOS Conference was approaching a consensus on a 12-mile territorial limit. The United States was prepared to accept this solution if the unimpeded transit rights through and over straits used for international navigation were guaranteed. Without such guarantees, a 12-mile territorial sea would place over 100 straits, including Gibraltar, Malacca, and Bab-Al-Mandab, under the jurisdictional control of coastal states. He said the United States would not join in an agreement which left any uncertainty about the right to use world communication routes without interference.<sup>5</sup>

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1. J73/Memo/0152-75 of 21 Apr 75, Subj: WEB, 14-20 Apr 75.

2. J73/Memo/C207-75 of 9 Jun 75, Subj: WEB, 2-8 Jun 75.

3. J73 WEB 11-17 Aug 75.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.; Dept. of State Bulletin, 8 Sep 75, "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress, pp. 353-362.

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(S) On 26 November 1975 the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta reported that Indonesian officials recently stated that Russia was more flexible than the United States on the archipelago and straits issue. The only indication the Department of State had that the Soviet position was in fact more flexible came from occasional comments by Indonesians that the Soviets would be satisfied with sealanes much narrower than the United States required. It appeared that since the United States had undertaken to negotiate with Indonesia on questions of archipelagic and straits passage in return for recognition of the archipelago principle by the maritime powers, the Soviets could take the politically advantageous position of recognizing the archipelago principle and appearing flexible without risk to their basic interests. The Indonesians recognized this but occasionally employed the tactical maneuver of comparing Russian "flexibility" with U.S. "rigidity."<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 3 December 1975 Marshal Soedarmono of Indonesia told Ambassador Newson that the time was not ripe for agreement between the two countries on LOS issues because Indonesian-Philippine talks would not take place until the second week of January, and because U.S.-Indonesian positions were still too far apart. The crux of the problem was a transit regime for straits because the United States wanted "free passage" and Indonesia wanted "restricted passage. The issue went beyond the width of the sealanes, which the two sides could easily negotiate. Marshal Soedarmono said he had recommended to President Suharto that he suggest to President Ford at the scheduled 6 December meeting that the two leaders agree that both sides must compromise. Accordingly, each should then issue orders to their subordinates to move their respective positions closer. He said, however, that the agreement should be in a package context including transit, sea beds, fisheries, etc. This suggestion reflected a continuing unwillingness of Indonesia to offer an acceptable transit formula in return for recognition of the archipelago by the maritime powers. Contrary to expectations, LOS issues were not raised during meetings between President Ford, President Suharto, and Foreign Minister Malik on 6 December.<sup>2</sup>

Micronesia.

(S) The United States decided to support "Observer Status" for Micronesia at the U.N. Conference on LOS. The United States also indicated it had no objection to a Micronesian Delegation attending an LOS Conference of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, Niue Island, the Tokelau Islands, the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.<sup>3</sup>

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1. J73 WEB 24-30 Nov 75.
  2. J73 WEBS 1-7 Dec 75, 8-14 Dec 75.
  3. J73/Memo/068-75 of 18 Feb 75, Subj: WEB, 10-17 Feb 75.

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U.S. National Fisheries Limit

(U) On 9 October 1975 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to create a 200-mile national fisheries limit. The vote was 208 to 101 in favor of limiting foreign fishing. The Senate had approved similar measures in past sessions of Congress and the Commerce Committee had also approved a similar bill. The Ford Administration opposed such a unilateral restriction, supporting instead a U.N. treaty on fisheries. Two LOS conferences, however, had failed to reach an agreement. Under the bill, the fishing limitation would be effective 1 July 1976, and the law would lapse with U.S. ratification of a U.N. treaty.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 13 November 1975 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to recommend rejection of legislation passed by the House of Representatives to extend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction 200 miles out to sea. Approval of the bill had been recommended by the Senate Commerce Committee and the measure had to go to the Senate floor for a final vote. In a similar situation in 1974, the Senate had approved the measure. The legislation was opposed by the State Department on the grounds that unilateral action by the United States could endanger LOS negotiations on a 200-mile economic zone.<sup>2</sup>

(C) During the middle of November 1975, Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that unilateral extension of its fishing jurisdiction 200 miles out to sea could lead to confrontation and conflict with other coastal nations. Such a move could prompt more countries to claim 200-mile territorial zones and to close most of the world's straits to free passage, thus denying access to the Mediterranean, Caribbean, the Red Sea, and other key waters. The U.S. Representative to the LOS Conference, Ambassador Moore, was also deeply involved in attempts to defeat this legislation which he considered prejudicial to the LOS Conference.<sup>3</sup>

U.S.-USSR Incidents at Sea Agreement

(C) The third annual review of the U.S.-USSR Incidents at Sea Agreement was held in Washington, 19-23 May 1975. Both sides expressed the opinion that the agreement was working and, therefore, no changes were made. The agreement was renewed for another three years.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J73 WEB 6-12 Oct 75.
  2. J73 WEB 10-16 Nov 75.
  3. J73 WEB 17-23 Nov 75.
  4. J73/Memo/223-75 of 23 Jun 75, Subj: WEB 16-22 Jun 75.

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Hong Kong

(S) On 20 August 1975 an informal agreement was reached between the United States and Hong Kong that the total number of visits to Hong Kong would not exceed 15 U.S. Navy nuclear-powered vessels per year. The limitation was subject to review as circumstances demanded.<sup>1</sup>

South Korea

(S) On 28 February 1975 the State Department expressed concern on the LOS ramifications of a Republic of Korea sinking of a North Korean craft. It noted that the Northern Patrol Limit Line (NPLL) did not have international legal status and insofar as it purported to unilaterally divide international waters it was contrary to the U.S. LOS position. Furthermore, it did not view armed enforcement of ROK fishing claims as legitimate functions of the United States or the United Nations Command.<sup>2</sup>


Territorial Waters - Japan

(S) On 10 December 1975 Foreign Office Treaties Bureau Director Matsunaga indicated the possibility of Japan elastically applying the three-point non-nuclear principle to straits passage if Japan declared a 12-nautical-mile territorial water zone. He told the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee that Japan would adopt a policy that was not contradictory to the American and Soviet positions seeking free passage of warships through territorial waters if they were expanded. He said the general trend of the U.N. LOS Conference was similar to the American and Soviet view. Earlier, Japan Defense Agency Defense Bureau Director Maruyama had implied that the 12-mile Japanese territorial zone would restrict movement of the U.S. Navy's nuclear-carrying ships.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 17 December Prime Minister Miki told the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee that "even in the event territorial waters are expanded to 12 nautical miles, GOJ would not change the present three-point non-nuclear principle for application to areas under Japanese control though this had something to do with future arrangements of the international sea laws conference for international water channels." This statement was interpreted to mean a Japanese readiness to acknowledge free passage of nuclear-carrying warships through the Tsugaru Strait even after the strait was included in the Japanese territorial waters under a 12-mile rule.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J73 WEB 18-24 Aug 75.
  2. J73/Memo/085-75 of 3 Mar 75, Subj: WEB 24 Feb-2 Mar 75.
  3. J73 WEB 8-14 Dec 75.
  4. J73 WEB 15-21 Dec 75.

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## SECTION III--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

### Funding

(U) Several changes were affected in PACOM funding during 1975:<sup>1</sup>

- On 16 June 1975 the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (Administration) advised that approval had been obtained to designate the Army as the Executive Agent for the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters vice the Navy as an exception to DOD Directive 5100.3. However, the Navy was to continue to function as the Executive Agent for the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea. This change in funding came in response to organizational changes effected in 1974.

- Effective 1 July 1975 funding for the total PACOM World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) changed from the Operations and Maintenance, Navy Appropriation Program 2 to Program 3.

- Also effective 1 July 1975 funding for the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan changed from the Military Assistance Executive Appropriation to the Operations and Maintenance, Navy appropriation.

- Subsequent to 15 August 1975 accounting responsibility for Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) funds was transferred to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.

(U) The accompanying charts show FY 76 PACOM Joint Commands programmed administrative costs, and FY 76 PACOM Military Assistance Program (MAP) programmed administrative costs. In addition, on 1 July 1975, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized \$30,000 for FY 76 Operations and Maintenance, Navy Official Representation funds for PACOM joint commands, and on 2 July the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Defense Security Assistance Agency) authorized FY 76 MAP representation allowances totaling \$19,000 for CINCPAC area MAP activities as follows (also, see Security Assistance chapter).<sup>2</sup>

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1. J724 HistSum Dec 75; OASD, Compt (Admin) Memorandum, 16 Jun 75, Subj: Executive Agent Responsibility for the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters.
  2. J724 HistSum Dec 75; SECDEF 3220/021954Z Jul 75.

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**PACOM JOINT COMMANDS (O&M (N) FUNDED)**

**FY 1976 PROGRAMMED ADMINISTRATIVE COST**

AS OF 30 JUNE 1975

(IN THOUSANDS)

ORGANIZATION	U.S. COSTS					HOST COUNTRY	
	CINCPAC O&M(N) FUNDED	SHARED ADMIN SUPPORT	MILITARY DEPT. SUPPORT**	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	ASSISTANCE IN KIND	CONTRIBUTED CURRENCY	
PACOM HQ	\$ 9,573.8	\$	\$ 14,298.1	\$ 23,871.9	\$	\$	
COMUS JAPAN	1,078.1		1,223.1	2,301.2			
COMUS KOREA	974.0		792.4	1,766.4			
COMUS TDC	596.4		1,595.6	2,192.0	41.5		
USSAG	40.0		0	40.0			
COMUS MACTHAI	30,902.0*	68.7	18,282.5	49,173.2			
JCRC	641.7		938.7	1,580.4			
IPAC	2,617.0		3,715.1	6,332.1			
MDAO JAPAN	283.9	88.1	193.9	565.9	196.3	241.8	
DAO SAIGON	5,063.0		23.2	5,086.2			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 51,769.9</b>	<b>\$ 156.8</b>	<b>\$ 40,982.6</b>	<b>\$ 92,909.3</b>	<b>\$ 237.8</b>	<b>\$ 241.8</b>	

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 29.

\* Includes unfunded reimbursable authority of \$9,043.0

\*\* Military Pay Only.

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# PACOM MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

FY 1976 PROGRAMMED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

AS OF 30 JUNE 1975

(IN THOUSANDS)

ORGANIZATION	CINCPAC FUNDED			SHARED ADMIN SUPPORT	MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	HOST COUNTRY COSTS ASSISTANCE IN KIND	GRAND TOTAL
	MAP	O&M(IN)	TOTAL					
PACOM HQ	\$ 624.0		624.0		*	624.0		624.0
MAAG CHINA	334.9		334.9	15.6	1,112.8	1,463.3	831.0	2,294.3
ODR INDIA	96.1		96.1	109.4	99.4	304.9		304.9
DIG INDONESIA	375.8		375.8	741.0	979.5	2,096.3	478.3	2,574.6
DEPCHUSMAGTHAI	91.1		91.1		92.1	183.2		183.2
MDAO JAPAN						*		*
MAG KOREA	2,101.2		2,101.2	8.9	3,039.0	5,149.1	54.5	5,203.6
ODR PAKISTAN	73.5		73.5		159.2	232.7		232.7
MAG PHILIPPINES	395.2	126.1	521.3	65.0	935.7	1,522.0	295.1	1,817.1
MAG THAILAND	603.9		603.9	47.5	3,541.0	4,192.4	1,430.3	5,622.7
DAO SINGAPORE	6.8		6.8		18.9	25.7		25.7
FMS AUSTRALIA	6.1		6.1		69.4	75.5		75.5
DAO MALAYSIA	3.4		3.4		16.6	20.0		20.0
	\$ 4,712.0	126.1	4,838.1	987.4	10,063.6	15,089.1	3,089.2	18,978.3

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 30.  
 ALL PACOM HQ O&M(IN) AND MILITARY DEPARTMENT COSTS  
 REFLECTED UNDER COST SUMMARY FOR JOINT COMMANDS  
 \* FUNDED FROM O&M(IN) APPROPRIATION

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Allowance</u>
China	\$ 3,500
India	500
Indonesia	2,000
Korea	5,300
Laos	400
Pakistan	900
Philippines	4,000
Thailand	<u>2,500</u>
Total	\$19,100

### Military Banking

(U) The American Express Government Finance Facility in Saigon officially closed as of 21 April 1975, and members' account balances were transferred to the Taipei Military Banking Facility.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 7 March 1975 the Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) comptroller advised that a check for \$113,893.19 in excess profits made by the Bank of America in baht sales was forwarded to the Treasury Department.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 3 January 1975 the Secretary of Defense announced new Treasury procedures increasing the limit on cashing stateside checks from \$100 to \$300 effective 4 February 1975. Also, effective 20 January 1975, overseas Military Banking Facilities were authorized to issue interest-bearing certificates of deposit to the minimum amount of \$1,000.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The spiraling costs of maintaining Military Banking Facilities in Japan led to the decision to relocate the American Express Military Banking Facility Area Headquarters from Okinawa to Hawaii. On 21 March 1975 the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury concurred in the proposal to relocate this office to Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii. Relocation was accomplished by the middle of April 1975. It was estimated that this relocation would save the Treasury \$500,000 annually.<sup>4</sup>

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1. American Express Memorandum, 6 May 75, Subj: Saigon DAO (Military Banking) Office.
  2. MACTHAI 070040Z Mar 75; CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 680.
  3. SECDEF 4776/302313Z Jan 75.
  4. SECDEF 7467/212229Z Mar 75; J72 WEBS 3-9 Mar and 17-23 Mar 75.

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### Piaster Exchange Rates

(U) The piaster continued to devalue periodically in Vietnam during 1975 until the fall on 30 April 1975. On 21 January the rate was 700 to \$1 U.S.; on 8 March it was 725 to \$1; and on 19 April, the last official exchange rate before the fall was reported at 755 to \$1. On 23 April the U.S. Defense Attaché Office Saigon requested, and CINCPAC supported, that a banking facility be established at Clark Air Base, Philippines to convert piasters to U.S. dollars for refugees out of Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense advised, after referral of this request to a special interagency task group for review, that such action was not authorized. The Secretary of Defense further advised that the piaster was never a freely convertible currency, that its current effective value was virtually zero, and that the ultimate solution rested on assistance to refugees which could be provided under authority of separate Congressional action which was under consideration.<sup>1</sup>

### U.S. Currency in Vietnam

(U) On 24 February 1975 the Disbursing Officer at DAO Saigon requested authority to hold at personal risk \$800,000 in U.S. currency. This request was based on providing \$100,000 weekly to the embassy and increased dollar demands caused by the differential between the official and unofficial piaster exchange rate. Authority was granted to the DAO to hold \$800,000 at personal risk for 90 days to enable the embassy to hold its own cash and provide inquiry into the potential for DAO employees and contractor personnel to engage in currency exchange for personal gain. A check cashing limit for U.S. currency of \$50 per day per individual was put into effect on 18 February 1975 to curb increased outflow of U.S. currency.<sup>2</sup>

### Loss of Funds - USDAO Saigon

(U) During the evacuation of Saigon on 29 April 1975, the USDAO Disbursing Officer reportedly destroyed \$3,624,800 in U.S. currency and \$85,344,000 in Vietnamese piasters. Also, \$6,757,170 in piasters was certified destroyed at Subic Bay Naval Station, Philippines after the evacuation. In addition, a formal investigation was conducted on losses of funds by 17 Paying Agents during the evacuation. This investigation, completed on 31 July 1975, concluded that the loss of funds was through no fault or negligence of the individuals concerned and recommended that they be granted relief from the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 681; J722 HistSums Mar and Jun 75; USDAO Saigon 100735Z Mar 75; SECDEF 3296/251937Z Apr 75.
  2. J7221 Point Paper, 26 Feb 75, Subj: U.S. Currency in Vietnam; CINCPAC 262232Z Feb 75.

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losses. By the end of the year, 12 of the individuals involved had submitted requests for relief from liability to the Secretary of the Navy for \$110,929.06 of a total deficit of \$130,697.82. Requests from five additional individuals, accountable for \$19,768.76 of the total, had not yet been received at year's end.<sup>1</sup>

### Audits

(U) On 2 and 3 February 1975 Mr. M. Meling, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Audit (OASD-Audit), debriefed the CINCPAC staff on audits performed in Vietnam by the Defense Audit Office, Saigon during the period July through December 1974.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 12 February 1975 CINCPAC forwarded the annual progress report on the status of actions to correct deficiencies disclosed by audits to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (Comptroller).<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 30 January 1975 CINCPAC concurred in the General Accounting Office draft report entitled "Better Management of Secondary Items by the RVNAF Would Reduce U.S. Investment," as modified by USDAO comments.<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 7 February 1975 CINCPAC provided to the OASD-Audit the status of the audit on fraudulent in-country procurement of lumber and building materials for the RVNAF (OASD-Audit Report No. 510, 12 July 1974). The information was needed for Congressional (Proxmire) hearings in progress.<sup>5</sup>

(U) On 15 February 1975 CINCPAC concurred in a USDAO Saigon response to a General Accounting Office request for information on DOD support to police organizations, law enforcement, and public safety programs in South Vietnam.<sup>6</sup>

(U) On 20 February 1975 the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested CINCPAC comments on a General Accounting Office draft report entitled "Opportunities to Consolidate Support Functions in the Pacific to Reduce Costs." The CINCPAC

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1. Res USDAO Ft Shafter 210041Z May 75; J721 HistSum Dec 75; Navy Accounting and Finance Center Ltr, NCF-123/7210/2, 18 Nov 75, Subj: Relief of Reliability for Loss of Public Funds; requests for.
  2. J722 HistSum Mar 75; USDAO Saigon 270620Z Jan 75.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, p. 682; J722 HistSum Mar 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S110, 12 Feb 75, Subj: Annual Progress Report on Status of Actions to Correct Deficiencies Disclosed by Audits.
  4. CINCPAC 300032Z Jan 75.
  5. J722 HistSum Mar 75; CINCPAC 072250Z Feb 75.
  6. CINCPAC 150022Z Feb 75.

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Director for Logistics coordinated the review and provided the response. (Also, see Logistics chapter.)<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 27 February 1975 the General Accounting Office auditors commenced a review of compliance with the FY 75 expenditure ceiling in Cambodia (also, see Security Assistance chapter).<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 5 March 1975 General Accounting Office representatives began a review of DOD Headquarters activities in Hawaii.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 6 May 1975 General Accounting Office representatives began a review of bilateral agreements with Korea in response to Congressional interest in compliance by executive agencies with the provisions of the Case Act. (Passed in August 1972, this act required that the final texts of any international agreements other than treaties be transmitted through the State Department to Congress within 60 days of consummation.)<sup>4</sup>

(U) On 20 November 1975 the CINCPAC Comptroller, with Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrence, forwarded photographs taken during the MAYAGUEZ incident to the Director, USGAO, Far East Branch, Honolulu, Hawaii.<sup>5</sup>

### Transfer of Functions

(U) On 2 June 1975 the responsibility to publish the PACOM Command Digest was transferred from the Office of the Comptroller to the Office of the Joint Secretary, Command History Branch.<sup>6</sup>

(U) On 10 December 1975 the Comptroller provided files to the Office of the Special Assistant for Public and Governmental Affairs as part of the functional transfer to the latter of staff responsibility to monitor General Accounting Office audits (also, see Chapter I, The Status of the Command).<sup>7</sup>

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1. JCS 6632/200001Z Feb 75; J722 HistSum Mar 75.
  2. MACTHAI 210506Z Feb 75; J722 HistSum Mar 75.
  3. J72 HistSums Apr-May 75.
  4. Ibid.
  5. J72 WEB 17-21 Nov 75.
  6. J72 HistSums Apr-May 75.
  7. J72 WEB 8-12 Dec 75.

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Transition to New Fiscal Year

(C) On 12 August 1974, the DOD Comptroller advised that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 imposed requirements and changes which affected the formulation and presentation of all future budget estimates including those for security assistance (also, see Chapter VII, Security Assistance). Of primary significance to overall planning was the fiscal year change from 1-July - 30 June to 1 October - 30 September beginning in FY 77 and the need to prepare a three month transition budget (FY 7T) for the period 1 July - 30 September 1976 in addition to the normal fiscal year budget. The transition to the new procedures commenced with the preparation and transmission of the FY 76 budget. All fiscal year designations beginning with FY 77 denoted the 1 October - 30 September fiscal year.<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 375-376.

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## GLOSSARY

### A

ABCCC	Airborne Command and Control Center
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACCS	Airborne Command Control Squadron
ADC	Aerospace Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFCC	Air Force Component Commander
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AID	Agency for International Development
AIG	Air Intelligence Group; Address Indicator Group
AIT	Ammunition in Thailand
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMPAC	American Pacific
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier; Army Petroleum Center
AROP	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Regional Office Pacific
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIC	All-Source Information Center
ASICOMM	All-Source Information Center Communications Network
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier; Air Training Command
ATTG	Automated Tactical Target Graphics
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWADS	Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System

### B

BALFRAM	Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology
BDP	Base Development Plan
BOM	By Other Means

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C

C	Confidential
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
CAOSOP	Coordination of Atomic Operations Standard Operating Procedures
CAT	Civil Action Team
CDC	U.S. Army Combat Developments Command; Control Data Corporation
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHUSDLG	Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIL	Central Identification Laboratory
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCADC	CINC Aerospace Defense Command
CINCAL	CINC Alaskan Command
CINCEUR	CINC U.S. European Command
CINCLANT	CINC Atlantic Command
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD	CINC Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	CINC Pacific
CINCPACAF	CINC Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	CINC Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	CINC Strategic Air Command
CINCUSARPAC	CINC U.S. Army Pacific
CINDIS	CINCPAC Display and Information System
COCOM	Coordinating Committee
COINS	Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems
COMDRAAC	Commander, Alaska Air Command
COMMARCORBASES	Commander, Marine Corps Bases
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMUS	Commander, U.S. Forces
COMUS Japan	Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Korea	Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSTDC	Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
COTCO	Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority
CSAF	Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CSG	CINCPAC Support Group; Combat Support Group
CTG	Commander Task Group
CZTE	Combat Zone Tax Exemption

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D

DAASO	Defense Automatic Addressing System Office
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DATT	Defense Attache
DAV	Defense Assistance for Vietnam
DCAPS	Dual Criteria Aimpoint Selection Program System
DEC	Digital Equipment Corporation
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPREP	Deployment Reporting System
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFM	Diesel Fuel Marine
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
DH	Direct Hire
DIOBS	Defense Intelligence Order of Battle System
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Days of Supply
DRIS	Defense Retail Inter-Service Support
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency

E

EAM	Emergency Action Message
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
EDP	Emergency Defense Plan
E&E	Evasion and Escape; Emergency and Evacuation
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
EUCOM	European Command
EUDAC	European Defense Analysis Center
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
EWIS	Electronic Warfare Information System
EX	Exclusive (for)

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## F

FAA	Federal Aviation Agency; Foreign Assistance Act
FAAR	Forward Area Alerting Radar
FAISC	Fleet Air Intelligence Service Center
FCC	Federal Communications Commission; Fleet Command Center
FCJ	Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
FF&V	Fresh Fruits and Vegetables
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FIP	Force Improvement Plan
FMR	Fair Market Rental
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMSCR	Foreign Military Sales Credit
FPJMT	Four Party Joint Military Team
FOP	Field Office Pacific (MTMC)
FOSIC	Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center
FRESH	Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity (report)
FY	Fiscal Year

## G

GA	Grant Aid
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment; Gross Feasibility Estimator
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic
GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GOA	Government of Australia
GOI	Government of India; Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOM	Government of Malaysia, Mauritius, Maldives, etc.
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Singapore
GOT	Gulf of Tonkin; Gulf of Thailand
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam

## H

HistSum	Historical Summary
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence

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## I

IATF	Interagency Task Force
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICR	Intensive Combat Rate
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IFFN	Identification, Friend, Foe, or Neutral
IMP	Inventory Management Plan
IOCTL	Indian Ocean Conventional Target List
IOEOB	Indian Ocean Electronic Order of Battle
IOZP	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
IPAC	Intelligence Center Pacific
IPIR	Initial Photo Interpretation Report
IRCM	Infrared Countermeasures
ISA	International Security Affairs
I&W	Indications and Warning

## J

JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JFY	Japan Fiscal Year
JIEP	Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning
JIS	JOPS Interim Software
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSO	Joint Staff Office (Japan)
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

## K

KC	Khmer Communists
KMT	Kuomintang

## L

LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
LCU	Utility Landing Craft

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LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel  
LDMX Local Digital Message Exchange  
LF Low Frequency  
LGB Laser Guided Bomb  
LN Local National  
LNO Limited Nuclear Option  
LOC Line of Communication  
LOS Law of the Sea; Line of Sight  
LPRP Laos People's Revolutionary Party

### M

MAAB Military Assistance Activities Bulletin  
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group  
MAC Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command;  
Military Armistice Commission  
MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand  
MAO Mailing Address Only  
MAP Military Assistance Program  
MARCE Materiel Asset Redistribution Center, Europe  
MASF Military Assistance Service Funded  
MBA Military Bases Agreement  
MCD-P Management Control Detachment-Pacific  
MDAO Mutual Defense Assistance Office  
MDB Mutual Defense Board  
MDT Mutual Defense Treaty  
MEDTC Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia  
MFA Minister of Foreign Affairs  
MIA Missing in Action  
MIJI Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion  
MILCON Military Construction  
MILGP Military Group  
MIRV Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle  
MOD Ministry of Defense; modernization  
MOGAS Automotive Gasoline  
MOU Memorandum of Understanding  
MPC Military Payment Certificate; Mobile Processing Center  
MPO Military Post Office; Military Planning Office (SEATO)  
MRG Movement Requirements Generator  
MSM Minesweeper, River  
MSR Minesweeper, Patrol  
MST Mutual Security Treaty; Mobile Support Team  
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command  
MTT Mobile Training Team

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## N

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEMVAC	Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation
NKP	Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
NKTTL	North Korean Tactical Target List
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NMCSSC	National Military Command System Support Center
NOA	New Obligational Authority
NP	Non-perishable
NPS	National Personnel System
NPW	Nuclear-powered Warship
NSA	National Security Agency
NSFO	Navy Special Fuel Oil
NUWEP	Nuclear Weapons
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

## O

OAC	Okinawa Area Coordinator
OAG	Operations Action Group
OB	Order of Battle
ODR	Office of Defense Representative
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
OJT	On-the-job Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMB	Office of Manpower and Budget (DOD)
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OPSEC	Operations Security
OTHR	Over-the-horizon Radar

## -P

P	Perishable
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation
PDRL	People's Democratic Republic of Laos

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PDSC	PACOM Data Systems Center
PGNU	Provisional Government of National Union (Laos)
PHOTINT	Photographic Intelligence
PLA	People's Liberation Army
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum (MAP)
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSMM	Patrol Ship Multi-Mission
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PURS	PACOM Uniform Reporting Structure
PWRMR	Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirements
PWRR	Prepositioned War Reserve Requirements
PWRS	Prepositioned War Reserve Stock

### R

RECA	Residual Capabilities Assessment
REDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
RIF	Reduction in Force
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
RNO	Regional Nuclear Option
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan); Required Operational Capability
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RTG	Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

### S

S	Secret
SAG	Special Activities Group; Systems Architectural Group
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-air Missile; Space Available Mail
SAO	Selected Attack Options
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
SCOOT	Support Cambodia Out of Thailand
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense

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SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SHF	Super High Frequency
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPNFZ	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
SRF	Ship Repair Facility; Special Reporting Facility
SZG	Special Zone Group

### T

TAC	Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air Control
TACE	Technical Analysis and Cost Estimate
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TADS	Tactical Air Defense Systems
TAM	Theater Airlift Manager
TCN	Third Country National
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TDMA	Time Division Multiple Access
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TJCGI	Thai Joint Customs Group Inspectors
TLD	Training and Logistics Detachment
TLRG	Target List Review Group
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-command
TRE	Thailand Regional Exchange
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
TS	Top Secret
TSG	Thai Security Guard
TSP	Test Support Position
TTM	Tactical Target Materials
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

### U

UCP	Unified Command Plan
UNC	United Nations Command
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USACSG	U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group
USARJ	U.S. Army Japan
USCINCSOUTH	CINC U.S. Southern Command
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attache Office

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USDLG	U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
USDLO	U.S. Defense Liaison Officer (Hong Kong)
USDR	U.S. Defense Representative
USFJ	U.S. Forces, Japan
USFK	U.S. Forces, Korea
USG	U.S. Government
USSAG	U.S. Support Activities Group
USSAT	U.S. Support Agency, Thailand
USTDC	U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

### V

VHF	Very High Frequency
VIP	Visual Information Processor
VLF	Very Low Frequency
VNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force

### W

WEB	Weekly Executive Brief
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WICS	Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems
WIMS	Worldwide Integrated Management of Subsistence
WRM	War Reserve Materiel
WWMCCS	World-Wide Military Command and Control System

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