In their “Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance” Kotzee, Carter and ... more In their “Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance” Kotzee, Carter and Siegel (2019) argue against what they call the intellectual virtues (IV) approach to the primary epistemic aim of education and in favor of what they call the critical thinking (CT) approach. The IV approach says that educating for intellectual virtue is the primary epistemic aim of education. The CT approach says that it is educating for critical thinking. They argue that the exemplarist/role-modeling pedagogy of the IV approach is not sufficiently action-guiding, because it does not teach students the know-how needed to think well. This they call the pedagogical challenge to the IV approach. We argue that their criticism of the IV approach fails. In general, possessing an intellectual virtue requires having a corresponding critical-thinking skill set. Also, for one to exercise critical-thinking skills well it is necessary that they possess dispositional components of corresponding inte...
When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker as... more When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker asserts, as opposed to merely implies or implicates, the associated inference claim to the effect that the conclusion follows from the premises. In defense of this, I argue that how an inference claim is conveyed when stating an argument is constrained by constitutive and normative conditions for core cases of the speech of arguing for a conclusion. The speech act of assertion better reflects such conditions than does implication, conversational implicature, or conventional implicature.
This Dover edition of the Tractatus is an unabridged republication of the English translation by ... more This Dover edition of the Tractatus is an unabridged republication of the English translation by C. K. Ogden and the Introduction by Bertrand Russell. It includes the index from the 1955 printing by Kegan and Paul and a Publisher's Note.
In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and Jam... more In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean require ment that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth o f a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the modal operator(s) which occur in the sentence. The primary goal here is to motivate the Kripkean requirement.
I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respec... more I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate a sufficient condition for a use of an argument to beg the question, highlighting why question-begging is a defect.
"The Concept of Logical Consequence" is a critical evaluation of the model-theoretic an... more "The Concept of Logical Consequence" is a critical evaluation of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic characterizations of logical consequence that proceeds from Alfred Tarski's characterization of the informal concept of logical consequence. This study evaluates and expands upon ideas set forth in Tarski's 1936 article on logical consequence, and appeals to his 1935 article on truth. Classical logic, as well as extensions and deviations are considered. Issues in the philosophy of logic such as the nature of logical constants, the philosophical significance of completeness, and the metaphysical and epistemological implications of logic are discussed in the context of the examination of the concept of logical consequence.
I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument beg... more I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument begs the question just in case it is used as a statement of inference and it fails to state an inference the arguer or an addressee can perform given what they explicitly believe. Accordingly, what begs questions are uses of arguments as statements of inference, and the root cause of begging the question is an argument's failure to state an inference performable by the reasoners the arguer targets. In these ways, my account is distinguished from other pragmatic accounts (e.g.
theoretical claims themselves. Are they necessary or are they modally neutral? The latter option ... more theoretical claims themselves. Are they necessary or are they modally neutral? The latter option is one that was seriously considered by Armstrong (p. 139), though he ruled out neither. Mumford offers limpid explanation of Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory of truth, incorporating his truthmaker maximalism (i.e., the thesis that for every truth, there is some entity that makes it true) and truthmaker necessitarianism (i.e., the thesis that when 5p4 is a true proposition there is a truthmaker T such that T could not exist without it being true that 5p4). The problem of negative truths and some classic and contemporary attempts to solve it are then set out with the exemplary clarity and directness that typify Mumford's approach. The chapter on necessity addresses a recent shift in Armstrong's approach to instantiation, with his Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), in which instantiation is viewed as partial identity between particular and universal. Though the chapter is not conclusive about this approach to instantiation, Mumford sets out how it is a necessitarian turn seriously at odds with Armstrong's prior thinking. The book is useful, informative and supremely clear. It should be of interest to anyone concerned with themes addressed in Armstrong's philosophy. In writing this book, Mumford has well exercised his evident pedagogic skill. The chapter on universals, for example, is among the most adept pieces suitable for beginners that I have read on the topic. The book is also valuable in that it is likely to help in opening up to students the path into analytic metaphysics.
I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth ... more I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based
In their “Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance” Kotzee, Carter and ... more In their “Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance” Kotzee, Carter and Siegel (2019) argue against what they call the intellectual virtues (IV) approach to the primary epistemic aim of education and in favor of what they call the critical thinking (CT) approach. The IV approach says that educating for intellectual virtue is the primary epistemic aim of education. The CT approach says that it is educating for critical thinking. They argue that the exemplarist/role-modeling pedagogy of the IV approach is not sufficiently action-guiding, because it does not teach students the know-how needed to think well. This they call the pedagogical challenge to the IV approach. We argue that their criticism of the IV approach fails. In general, possessing an intellectual virtue requires having a corresponding critical-thinking skill set. Also, for one to exercise critical-thinking skills well it is necessary that they possess dispositional components of corresponding inte...
When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker as... more When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker asserts, as opposed to merely implies or implicates, the associated inference claim to the effect that the conclusion follows from the premises. In defense of this, I argue that how an inference claim is conveyed when stating an argument is constrained by constitutive and normative conditions for core cases of the speech of arguing for a conclusion. The speech act of assertion better reflects such conditions than does implication, conversational implicature, or conventional implicature.
This Dover edition of the Tractatus is an unabridged republication of the English translation by ... more This Dover edition of the Tractatus is an unabridged republication of the English translation by C. K. Ogden and the Introduction by Bertrand Russell. It includes the index from the 1955 printing by Kegan and Paul and a Publisher's Note.
In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and Jam... more In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean require ment that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth o f a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the modal operator(s) which occur in the sentence. The primary goal here is to motivate the Kripkean requirement.
I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respec... more I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate a sufficient condition for a use of an argument to beg the question, highlighting why question-begging is a defect.
"The Concept of Logical Consequence" is a critical evaluation of the model-theoretic an... more "The Concept of Logical Consequence" is a critical evaluation of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic characterizations of logical consequence that proceeds from Alfred Tarski's characterization of the informal concept of logical consequence. This study evaluates and expands upon ideas set forth in Tarski's 1936 article on logical consequence, and appeals to his 1935 article on truth. Classical logic, as well as extensions and deviations are considered. Issues in the philosophy of logic such as the nature of logical constants, the philosophical significance of completeness, and the metaphysical and epistemological implications of logic are discussed in the context of the examination of the concept of logical consequence.
I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument beg... more I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument begs the question just in case it is used as a statement of inference and it fails to state an inference the arguer or an addressee can perform given what they explicitly believe. Accordingly, what begs questions are uses of arguments as statements of inference, and the root cause of begging the question is an argument's failure to state an inference performable by the reasoners the arguer targets. In these ways, my account is distinguished from other pragmatic accounts (e.g.
theoretical claims themselves. Are they necessary or are they modally neutral? The latter option ... more theoretical claims themselves. Are they necessary or are they modally neutral? The latter option is one that was seriously considered by Armstrong (p. 139), though he ruled out neither. Mumford offers limpid explanation of Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory of truth, incorporating his truthmaker maximalism (i.e., the thesis that for every truth, there is some entity that makes it true) and truthmaker necessitarianism (i.e., the thesis that when 5p4 is a true proposition there is a truthmaker T such that T could not exist without it being true that 5p4). The problem of negative truths and some classic and contemporary attempts to solve it are then set out with the exemplary clarity and directness that typify Mumford's approach. The chapter on necessity addresses a recent shift in Armstrong's approach to instantiation, with his Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), in which instantiation is viewed as partial identity between particular and universal. Though the chapter is not conclusive about this approach to instantiation, Mumford sets out how it is a necessitarian turn seriously at odds with Armstrong's prior thinking. The book is useful, informative and supremely clear. It should be of interest to anyone concerned with themes addressed in Armstrong's philosophy. In writing this book, Mumford has well exercised his evident pedagogic skill. The chapter on universals, for example, is among the most adept pieces suitable for beginners that I have read on the topic. The book is also valuable in that it is likely to help in opening up to students the path into analytic metaphysics.
I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth ... more I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based
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