European Transport\ Trasporti Europei n. 31 (2005): 28-45 28 Road pricing as a citizen-candidate ... more European Transport\ Trasporti Europei n. 31 (2005): 28-45 28 Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game Edoardo Marcucci 1*, Marco A. Marini 1, Davide Ticchi 2 1 Department of Economics, University of Urbino, Urbino,(Italy) and CREI, Rome,(Italy) 2 Department of Economics, ...
This paper examines the likelihood of credit rationing faced by firms of different size. Cantrar... more This paper examines the likelihood of credit rationing faced by firms of different size. Cantrary to common thought, several recent contributions on this topic argue that, when rationing credit, size alone is not a sufficient condition for discriminating between firms. We show that this result can be predicted using a framework based on the Stiglitz-Weiss model. In particular, in an environment of asymmetric information, we highlight how the likelihood of credit rationing depends upon the shape of the,distribution function of project returns, especially its asymmetry and Kurtosis. Our empirical results do not support the hypothesis that small firms face more credit rationing than larger firms. JEL Codes: D82, G21
Questo lavoro analizza la relazione tra incertezza di origine tecnologica e saldo delle partite c... more Questo lavoro analizza la relazione tra incertezza di origine tecnologica e saldo delle partite correnti. L'analisi viene svolta utilizzando un modello di equilibrio economico generale in cui l'impresa e una attivita rischiosa il cui tasso di rendimento viene determinato sul mercato delle attivita. Si tiene cosi conto non soltanto dell'effetto dell'incertezza sul risparmio ma, diversamente dalla letteratura tradizionale, anche sull'investimento. Sebbene l'effetto dell'incertezza sul saldo delle partite correnti sia complessivamente ambiguo, qualora l'effetto indiretto (positivo) sul risparmio generato dall'incremento del tasso di interesse rischioso sia superiore all'effetto diretto (negativo) si avra un miglioramento di tale saldo.
The paper proposes a dynamic partial equilibrium model where competitive firms with constant retu... more The paper proposes a dynamic partial equilibrium model where competitive firms with constant return to scale technology are risk averse. Firms are subject to output price uncertainty. We show that it is possible that the investment-uncertainty relationship is positive even when firms have a high degree of risk aversion. Indeed, the paper shows that risk aversion can explain the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty only in a static context. In a dynamic framework, the linkage between periods can lead risk aversion to have a positive effect on investment when uncertainty increases. Moreover, the paper shows that investment should be positively correlated with uncertainty for reasonable values of the preference and technological parameters.
The zipped folder contains all the files need to replicate the results reported in the paper &quo... more The zipped folder contains all the files need to replicate the results reported in the paper "Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth" by Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, published in the Review of Economic Studies.
In earlier work we identified a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per c... more In earlier work we identified a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per capita, holding across countries as well as US states. In this paper we relate 11 indicators of individual openness to innovation (e.g., attitudes toward science and technology, new versus old ideas, change, risk taking, agency, imagination, and independence in children) to 5 measures of religiosity, including beliefs and attendance. We use five waves of the World Values Survey and control for sociodemographics, country and year fixed effects. Across the 52 regressions, greater religiosity is almost uniformly associated to less favorable views of innovation, with high significance.
This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their own communi... more This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their own community and therefore help forming tax morale in a constituency. We derive a theoretical model to investigate government's decision to expand tax revenues from alternative sources, namely changing the country's culture of tax compliance or expanding fiscal capacity. Despite the two are initially substitute, we show how in equilibrium dynamic complementarity arises. Our mechanism exploits exogenous variation in the cost of tax morale formation, induced by an expected war (either internal or external) that makes easier for the government to mobilize the constituency. We motivate our theory through a novel cross-country analysis that uses information on war frequency, tax morale, and fiscal capacity. We additionally discuss some historical cases consistent with our mechanism.
We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the i... more We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex‐ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.
European Transport\ Trasporti Europei n. 31 (2005): 28-45 28 Road pricing as a citizen-candidate ... more European Transport\ Trasporti Europei n. 31 (2005): 28-45 28 Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game Edoardo Marcucci 1*, Marco A. Marini 1, Davide Ticchi 2 1 Department of Economics, University of Urbino, Urbino,(Italy) and CREI, Rome,(Italy) 2 Department of Economics, ...
This paper examines the likelihood of credit rationing faced by firms of different size. Cantrar... more This paper examines the likelihood of credit rationing faced by firms of different size. Cantrary to common thought, several recent contributions on this topic argue that, when rationing credit, size alone is not a sufficient condition for discriminating between firms. We show that this result can be predicted using a framework based on the Stiglitz-Weiss model. In particular, in an environment of asymmetric information, we highlight how the likelihood of credit rationing depends upon the shape of the,distribution function of project returns, especially its asymmetry and Kurtosis. Our empirical results do not support the hypothesis that small firms face more credit rationing than larger firms. JEL Codes: D82, G21
Questo lavoro analizza la relazione tra incertezza di origine tecnologica e saldo delle partite c... more Questo lavoro analizza la relazione tra incertezza di origine tecnologica e saldo delle partite correnti. L'analisi viene svolta utilizzando un modello di equilibrio economico generale in cui l'impresa e una attivita rischiosa il cui tasso di rendimento viene determinato sul mercato delle attivita. Si tiene cosi conto non soltanto dell'effetto dell'incertezza sul risparmio ma, diversamente dalla letteratura tradizionale, anche sull'investimento. Sebbene l'effetto dell'incertezza sul saldo delle partite correnti sia complessivamente ambiguo, qualora l'effetto indiretto (positivo) sul risparmio generato dall'incremento del tasso di interesse rischioso sia superiore all'effetto diretto (negativo) si avra un miglioramento di tale saldo.
The paper proposes a dynamic partial equilibrium model where competitive firms with constant retu... more The paper proposes a dynamic partial equilibrium model where competitive firms with constant return to scale technology are risk averse. Firms are subject to output price uncertainty. We show that it is possible that the investment-uncertainty relationship is positive even when firms have a high degree of risk aversion. Indeed, the paper shows that risk aversion can explain the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty only in a static context. In a dynamic framework, the linkage between periods can lead risk aversion to have a positive effect on investment when uncertainty increases. Moreover, the paper shows that investment should be positively correlated with uncertainty for reasonable values of the preference and technological parameters.
The zipped folder contains all the files need to replicate the results reported in the paper &quo... more The zipped folder contains all the files need to replicate the results reported in the paper "Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth" by Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, published in the Review of Economic Studies.
In earlier work we identified a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per c... more In earlier work we identified a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per capita, holding across countries as well as US states. In this paper we relate 11 indicators of individual openness to innovation (e.g., attitudes toward science and technology, new versus old ideas, change, risk taking, agency, imagination, and independence in children) to 5 measures of religiosity, including beliefs and attendance. We use five waves of the World Values Survey and control for sociodemographics, country and year fixed effects. Across the 52 regressions, greater religiosity is almost uniformly associated to less favorable views of innovation, with high significance.
This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their own communi... more This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their own community and therefore help forming tax morale in a constituency. We derive a theoretical model to investigate government's decision to expand tax revenues from alternative sources, namely changing the country's culture of tax compliance or expanding fiscal capacity. Despite the two are initially substitute, we show how in equilibrium dynamic complementarity arises. Our mechanism exploits exogenous variation in the cost of tax morale formation, induced by an expected war (either internal or external) that makes easier for the government to mobilize the constituency. We motivate our theory through a novel cross-country analysis that uses information on war frequency, tax morale, and fiscal capacity. We additionally discuss some historical cases consistent with our mechanism.
We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the i... more We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex‐ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.
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Papers by Davide Ticchi