<jats:p>Ockhamism, so named because it was developed and defended by the fourteenth-century... more <jats:p>Ockhamism, so named because it was developed and defended by the fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham, is a long-enduring response to fatalist arguments. Fatalism, the thesis that it is impossible for anyone to act freely, comes in two varieties: logical and theological. Logical fatalists begin their argument with the assumption that no matter what anyone does, it has always been true that she does it, while theological fatalists begin by assuming that no matter what anyone does, God has always known that she does it. Fatalists go on to argue that, since no one can change what has always been true or what God has always known, no agent can ever do anything other than what she does; hence, no agent ever acts freely. The Ockhamist response, in brief, is that arguments for fatalism trade on a failure to distinguish between changing the past, on the one hand, and its being up to an agent what the past was like, on the other. Once the relevant distinction is drawn, Ockhamists contend, it is clear that fatalist arguments are unsound.</jats:p> <jats:p>Though Ockham himself was primarily concerned with theological fatalism, his argument may just as well be formulated as a response to logical fatalism. It should be noted that there are many formulations of Ockhamism, just as there are many formulations of the fatalist argument.</jats:p>
Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism.... more Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1
1 Presentism and Ockham's Way Out Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Presentism is, roughly, the t... more 1 Presentism and Ockham's Way Out Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the ...
The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is ... more The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent's acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent's acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian's dialectical options.
Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the t... more Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the thesis that past, present, and future objects exist. Ockham's way out purports to be a way out of fatalist arguments for the impossibility of free action. Fatalist arguments come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism run something like this:¹ Let t −1B = a time that obtained exactly 1 billion years ago.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with ... more The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the combination of God's past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompatible with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the problems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one's view of the modal status of God's existence and God's rdation to free creatures should determine one's position on the relation between the two fatalisms.
In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral r... more In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate. According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically relevant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly connected to ordinary judgments. The purpose of this paper is to undermine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-isto-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians qua metaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum.
The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been und... more The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield's modal fallacy objection and Campbell's no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes transtemporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.
The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is ... more The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent's acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent's acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian's dialectical options.
... For responses to Warfield, see Kremer (2004) and Nelkin and Rickless (2002). It is noteworthy... more ... For responses to Warfield, see Kremer (2004) and Nelkin and Rickless (2002). It is noteworthy that Kremer anticipates Campbell's objection in fn. 5. For responses to Campbell, see Bailey (2011), Brueckner (2008), Loss (2009, 2010), Nagashima (manuscript). ...
Libertarians believe that free will exists and is incompatible with deter-minism. Among the many ... more Libertarians believe that free will exists and is incompatible with deter-minism. Among the many problems facing libertarians is the problem of the alleged incompatibility of free will and indeterminism. If free will is, as many have suggested, incompatible with indeterminism ...
<jats:p>Ockhamism, so named because it was developed and defended by the fourteenth-century... more <jats:p>Ockhamism, so named because it was developed and defended by the fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham, is a long-enduring response to fatalist arguments. Fatalism, the thesis that it is impossible for anyone to act freely, comes in two varieties: logical and theological. Logical fatalists begin their argument with the assumption that no matter what anyone does, it has always been true that she does it, while theological fatalists begin by assuming that no matter what anyone does, God has always known that she does it. Fatalists go on to argue that, since no one can change what has always been true or what God has always known, no agent can ever do anything other than what she does; hence, no agent ever acts freely. The Ockhamist response, in brief, is that arguments for fatalism trade on a failure to distinguish between changing the past, on the one hand, and its being up to an agent what the past was like, on the other. Once the relevant distinction is drawn, Ockhamists contend, it is clear that fatalist arguments are unsound.</jats:p> <jats:p>Though Ockham himself was primarily concerned with theological fatalism, his argument may just as well be formulated as a response to logical fatalism. It should be noted that there are many formulations of Ockhamism, just as there are many formulations of the fatalist argument.</jats:p>
Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism.... more Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1
1 Presentism and Ockham's Way Out Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Presentism is, roughly, the t... more 1 Presentism and Ockham's Way Out Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the ...
The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is ... more The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent's acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent's acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian's dialectical options.
Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the t... more Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the thesis that past, present, and future objects exist. Ockham's way out purports to be a way out of fatalist arguments for the impossibility of free action. Fatalist arguments come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism run something like this:¹ Let t −1B = a time that obtained exactly 1 billion years ago.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with ... more The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the combination of God's past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompatible with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the problems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one's view of the modal status of God's existence and God's rdation to free creatures should determine one's position on the relation between the two fatalisms.
In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral r... more In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate. According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically relevant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly connected to ordinary judgments. The purpose of this paper is to undermine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-isto-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians qua metaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum.
The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been und... more The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield's modal fallacy objection and Campbell's no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes transtemporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.
The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is ... more The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent's acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent's acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian's dialectical options.
... For responses to Warfield, see Kremer (2004) and Nelkin and Rickless (2002). It is noteworthy... more ... For responses to Warfield, see Kremer (2004) and Nelkin and Rickless (2002). It is noteworthy that Kremer anticipates Campbell's objection in fn. 5. For responses to Campbell, see Bailey (2011), Brueckner (2008), Loss (2009, 2010), Nagashima (manuscript). ...
Libertarians believe that free will exists and is incompatible with deter-minism. Among the many ... more Libertarians believe that free will exists and is incompatible with deter-minism. Among the many problems facing libertarians is the problem of the alleged incompatibility of free will and indeterminism. If free will is, as many have suggested, incompatible with indeterminism ...
Uploads
Papers by Alicia Finch