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Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen

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  • Vaubel, Roland

Abstract

Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Organisationen – mehr als alle anderen staatlichen Institutionen – ein extremes Kontrolldefizit aufweisen. Umfragen belegen, dass sie andere Interessen als die Bürger haben. Sie können diese Interessen auch durchsetzen, weil die Informationskosten der Bürger hoch, ihre Kontrollanreize gering und ihre Ausweichmöglichkeiten eingeschränkt sind. Die Parlamente können ihrer Kontrollfunktion nicht gerecht werden, weil sie von den nationalen und internationalen Exekutivorganen entmachtet werden. Von den nationalen Regierungen werden die internationalen Organisationen nur sehr unvollkommen kontrolliert, weil sie Agenda-Setting Macht besitzen und weil die Kontrollkosten der zuständigen Minister und ihre Kontrollanreize zu gering sind. Die von den Regierungen eingesetzten Kontrollgremien (Exekutivdirektoren, Rechnungshöfe, internationale Gerichtshöfe) können diese Probleme nicht wesentlich entschärfen. Außerdem teilen sie häufig die Interessen der internationalen Bürokratie, die sie kontrollieren sollen. Der Mangel an demokratischer Kontrolle stärkt den Einfluss der Interessengruppen.

Suggested Citation

  • Vaubel, Roland, 2003. "Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen," HWWA Discussion Papers 219, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26392
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    3. Blankart Charles B, 2008. "Wege zu mehr Steuerehrlichkeit / Towards a Better Tax Compliance," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 63-90, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International organisations; principal-agent problem;

    JEL classification:

    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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