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Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs

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  • FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro

Abstract

This paper analyses how worker optimism (and pessimism) affects subjective performance evaluation (SPE) contracts. We let an optimistic (pessimistic) worker overestimate (underestimate) the probability of observing an acceptable performance. The firm is better informed about performance than the worker and knows the worker's bias. We show that optimism (and pessimism): i) changes the optimal incentive scheme under SPE, ii) lowers the deadweight loss associated with SPE contracts, iii) can lead to a Pareto improvement by simultaneously lowering the firm's expected wage cost and raising the worker's expected compensation. In addition, we show that worker pessimism can lead to SPE contracts without a deadweight loss, in contrast to the standard case in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017. "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/08, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2017/08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin & Shvets, Julia, 2023. "Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers," IZA Discussion Papers 16283, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimism; Overconfidence; Contract; Moral Hazard; Biased Beliefs; Mechanism Design.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination

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