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Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno

Abstract

We study a notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that only some agreements among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudholter (1998,1999). We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not for a large family of public good decision problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016. "Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth," Working Papers 893, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:893
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg, 1999. "Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(4), pages 381-387.
    2. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    5. Michel Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2009. "On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(2), pages 287-309, August.
    6. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    7. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016. "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1073-1099, April.
    8. Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
    9. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 305-331, April.
    10. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    11. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-85, August.
    12. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
    13. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    14. Peleg, Bezalel, 1998. "Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 157-162, August.
    15. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
    16. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; credibility; Voting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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