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- Leobardo Plata-Perez & Joss Sanchez-Perez (2011): Convexity and marginal contributions in bankruptcy games
In particular, we show that convexity in the sense of increasing marginal contributions is not satisfied by the game introduced by these authors.
RePEc:qua:journl:v:8:y:2011:i:1:p:61-72 Save to MyIDEAS - Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki (2007): Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the marginal contribution mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participations constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. ... We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object.
RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1616 Save to MyIDEAS - Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan & Tomoya Tajika (2021): Skill, power and marginal contribution in committees
Applying an extended version of the uncertain dichotomous choice model proposed, the objective of this paper is to clarify the relationship between two different types of power a voter may have: skill-dependent (s-d) power and marginal contribution (mc).
RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:2:p:225-235 Save to MyIDEAS - Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano (2007): Marginal contributions and externalities in the value
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to games with externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payoffs around an "externality-free" value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two-stage process of coalition formation in whose second stage our axiomatic results are applied. We find reasons to explain inefficient coalition structures, and provide sufficient conditions for efficiency.
RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-04 Save to MyIDEAS - Daniel Li Li & Erfang Shan (2020): Marginal contributions and derivatives for set functions in cooperative games
To generalize both of marginal contribution and Harsanyi dividend, we define derivatives of v as $$v^{(0)}=v$$v(0)=v and for pairwise disjoint subsets $$R_1,dots ,R_k$$R1,⋯,Rk of N, $$v'_{R_1}(S)=v(Scup R_1)-v(S)$$vR1′(S)=v(S∪R1)-v(S) for $$Ssubseteq Nsetminus R_1$$S⊆NR1, and $$v^{(k)}_{R1,dots ,R_k}(S)=(v^{(k-1)}_{R_1,dots ,R_{k-1}})'_{R_k}(S)$$vR1,⋯,Rk(k)(S)=(vR1,⋯,Rk-1(k-1))Rk′(S) for $$Ssubseteq Nsetminus cup _{i=1}^k R_i$$S⊆N∪i=1kRi. We generalize the equivalence between convexity and monotonicity of marginal contribution of v to total monotonicity and higher derivatives of v from several aspects.
RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:39:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10878-020-00526-y Save to MyIDEAS - Shmuel Nitzan & Tomoya Tajika (2022): Inequality of decision-makers’ power and marginal contribution
., the group members' marginal contribution (mc). ... For this reason, the current study focuses on the comparison between inequality of s-d power and marginal contributions showing that, in small (large) groups, on average, the latter is more (less) unequal than the former and both are more unequal than the optimal weights of the decision-makers and much more unequal than their skills.
RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09816-1 Save to MyIDEAS - Eric Benhamou & Beatrice Guez (2021): Computation of the marginal contribution of Sharpe ratio and other performance ratios
Computing incremental contribution of performance ratios like Sharpe, Treynor, Calmar or Sterling ratios is of paramount importance for asset managers.
RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03189299 Save to MyIDEAS - Mingming Leng & Chunlin Luo & Liping Liang (2021): Multiplayer Allocations in the Presence of Diminishing Marginal Contributions: Cooperative Game Analysis and Applications in Management Science
We use cooperative game theory to investigate multiplayer allocation problems under the almost diminishing marginal contributions (ADMC) property. This property indicates that a player’s marginal contribution to a non-empty coalition decreases as the size of the coalition increases.
RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:5:p:2891-2903 Save to MyIDEAS - Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki (2007): Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the marginal contribution mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participations constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. ... We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object.
RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000300 Save to MyIDEAS - Juuso Valimaki & Dirk Bergemann (2008): Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object.
RePEc:red:sed008:317 Save to MyIDEAS