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- Andrea Attar & Nicolas Porteiro & Gwena�l Piaser (2006): A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard
We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.
RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_36 Save to MyIDEAS - Boultzis, Ilias (2015): Common agency with caring agents
This paper considers two extensions to the standard common agency model.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:71-74 Save to MyIDEAS - Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel (2002): From Private to Public Common Agency
This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (2001, J.
RePEc:iea:carech:0206 Save to MyIDEAS - Keeler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean-Baptiste Tondji (2022): Robust Contracts in Common Agency
We consider a game between several principals and a common agent, where principals know only a subset of the agent’s available actions. ... This robust approach allows for a crisp characterization of the equilibrium contracts and payoffs and provides a novel proof of equilibrium existence in common agency by constructing a pseudo-potential for the game.
RePEc:uwo:uwowop:20222 Save to MyIDEAS - Bruno Versaevel & Etienne Billette de Villemeur (2003): From Private to Public Common Agency
This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (2001, J.
RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00161728 Save to MyIDEAS - David Martimort & Lars Stole (2001): Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. ... Both under complete and asymmetric information, we show that the equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game are also equilibrium outputs of the delegated common agency game, although the two games differ in terms of the distribution of surplus they involve.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_581 Save to MyIDEAS - Semenov, Aggey (2010): Common agency with risk-averse agent
In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:1:p:38-49 Save to MyIDEAS - Attar Andrea & Gwen�el Piaser & Nicolas Porteiro (2006): Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences
This paper examines the role of the direct mechanisms in common agency games.
RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_28 Save to MyIDEAS - Szentes, Balázs (2015): Contractible contracts in common agency problems
This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game.
RePEc:ehl:lserod:66071 Save to MyIDEAS - Antonio Nicita & Simone Sepe (2012): The Hold-up Problem Under Common Agency
Many real world transactions occur in a common agency environment in which an agent interacts with several principals having competing interests. The hold-up literature, however, has so far neglected to investigate common agency transactions. ... Second, we show that introducing initial simple contracts allows parties to reach the first best only under cooperative common agency. Absent this machinery, competition among the principals emerges as a more efficient governance structure for common agency in incomplete transactions.
RePEc:usi:wpaper:636 Save to MyIDEAS