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- Azar, Pablo D. & Micali, Silvio (2018): Computational principal agent problems
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to delegate the evaluation of f to an agent, whose cost of learning any number of components of x is always lower than the corresponding cost of the principal. We prove that, for every continuous function f and every ε > 0, the principal can— by learning a single component x1 of x—incentivize the agent to report the correct value f(x) with accuracy ε.
RePEc:the:publsh:1815 Save to MyIDEAS - Roland Vaubel (2006): Principal-agent problems in international organizations
No abstract is available for this item.
RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:125-138 Save to MyIDEAS - Vaubel, Roland (2003): Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen
Die von den Regierungen eingesetzten Kontrollgremien (Exekutivdirektoren, Rechnungshöfe, internationale Gerichtshöfe) können diese Probleme nicht wesentlich entschärfen.
RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26392 Save to MyIDEAS - Ueda, Masako & Li, Fei (2005): CEO-Firm Match and Principal-Agent Problem
We study the implication of the standard principal-agent theory developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) on the endogenous matching of CEO and firm. ... CEOs of safer firms are paid less than average, again contrary to the standard principal-agent theory.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5119 Save to MyIDEAS - Joshua Blonz (2019): The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem
In many settings, misaligned incentives and inadequate monitoring lead employees to take self-interested actions contrary to their employer's wishes, giving rise to the classic principal-agent problem. ... I show that contractors (agents) hired by the electric utility (the principal) increase their compensation by intentionally misreporting program data to deliberately authorize replacement of non-qualified refrigerators. ... The same program without a principal-agent distortion would increase welfare by $60 per replacement. The resul ts provide novel evidence of how principal-agent distortions in the implementation of a potentially beneficial program can undermine its value.
RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2019-71 Save to MyIDEAS - Carlier, Guillaume & Zhang, Kelvin Shuangjian (2020): Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions
We prove an existence result for the principal–agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ preferences.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:88:y:2020:i:c:p:64-71 Save to MyIDEAS - Jurgita Staniulyte (2022): Towards the entrepreneurial university: the principal-agent problem
The paper proposes a conceptual analysis that draws on the principal-agent problem to examine incentives that may stimulate institutional change. It considers the framework of a university becoming entrepreneurial and assumes that the principal is dean while the agent is a professor.
RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:56:y:2022:i:5:d:10.1007_s11135-021-01246-z Save to MyIDEAS - Cvitanic Jaksa & Wan Xuhu & Zhang Jianfeng (2008): Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
We consider the problem of when to deliver the contract payoff, in a continuous-time principal-agent setting, in which the agent's effort is unobservable. The principal can design contracts of a simple form that induce the agent to ask for the payoff at the time of the principal's choosing. The optimal time of payment depends on the agent's and the principal's outside options. ... One illustrative application is the case when the agent can be fired, after having been paid a severance payment, and then replaced by another agent.
RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:23 Save to MyIDEAS - Kim, Eun-Sung (2020): Deep learning and principal–agent problems of algorithmic governance: The new materialism perspective
However, they face a new material principal-agent problem, which occurs between computer scientists as principals and computer algorithms as agents. Drawing upon new materialism, this study investigates informational asymmetry, malfeasance, agency relationships, and solutions related to the principal-agent problem. ... The principal-agent relationship is viewed as the output of socio-material assemblages in which computer scientists strive to build trust with computer algorithms. The inscrutability of computer algorithms coupled with their performativity would make it challenging for human principals to ascertain the malfeasance of computer algorithms as agents, thereby forming the material principal-agent problem. Finally, this study recommends an incremental, precautionary, and technologically pluralist approach to cope with this problem.
RePEc:eee:teinso:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0160791x19306906 Save to MyIDEAS - Cecchini, Mark & Ecker, Joseph & Kupferschmid, Michael & Leitch, Robert (2013): Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming
While significant progress has been made, analytic research on principal-agent problems that seek closed-form solutions faces limitations due to tractability issues that arise because of the mathematical complexity of the problem. The principal must maximize expected utility subject to the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints. ... In this paper we show how to numerically solve principal-agent problems with nonlinear contracts. ... A principal-agent problem is a special instance of a bilevel nonlinear programming problem. We show how to solve principal-agent problems by solving bilevel programming problems using the ellipsoid algorithm.
RePEc:eee:ejores:v:230:y:2013:i:2:p:364-373 Save to MyIDEAS