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- Adedamola Adesokan & Rowan Kinney & Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou (2024): CROWDMATCH: Optimizing Crowdsourcing Matching through the Integration of Matching Theory and Coalition Games
Specifically, the paper presents an initial Approximate CROWDMATCH mechanism grounded in matching theory principles, eliminating externalities from crowdworkers’ decisions and enabling each entity to maximize its utility. Subsequently, the Accurate CROWDMATCH mechanism is introduced, which is initiated by the outcome of the Approximate CROWDMATCH mechanism, and coalition game-theoretic principles are employed to refine the matching process by accounting for externalities.
RePEc:gam:jftint:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:58-:d:1337507 Save to MyIDEAS - Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo (2020): Agency Theory Meets Matching Theory
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. ... Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the matching between principals and agents that we may observe at equilibrium, compared to the matching that would happen if incentive concerns were absent.
RePEc:bge:wpaper:1140 Save to MyIDEAS - Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo (2021): Agency theory meets matching theory
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general equilibrium framework. ... Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the matching between principals and agents that we may observe at equilibrium, compared to the matching that would happen if incentive concerns were absent.
RePEc:spr:series:v:12:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s13209-020-00215-3 Save to MyIDEAS - Ibrahim Sami Attar & Nor Muzlifah Mahyuddin & M. H. D. Nour Hindia (2024): Joint mode selection and resource allocation for underlaying D2D communications: matching theory
The proposed approach is based on a greedy strategy and a modified many-to-many matching technique that effectively selects the best communication mode and assigns the optimal channel for each D2D pair, respectively.
RePEc:spr:telsys:v:87:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11235-024-01206-6 Save to MyIDEAS - Melvyn Coles & Barbara Petrongolo (2005): A test between matching theories
This paper tests whether aggregate matching is consistent with random matching or stock-flow matching. Using U.K. matching data and correcting for temporal aggregation bias, estimates of the random matching function are consistent with previous work in this field. The data however support the "stock-flow" matching hypothesis. Estimates find that around 50% of newly unemployed workers match quickly. The remaining workers match slowly, their re-employment rates depending statistically on the inflow of new vacancies and not on the vacancy stock.
RePEc:bge:wpaper:175 Save to MyIDEAS - Aliprantis, C. D. & Camera, G. & Puzzelo, D. (2004): A Random Matching Theory
We develop the theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching mechanisms. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different mechanisms and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing exact mappings between matching technologies and informational constraints.
RePEc:pur:prukra:1168 Save to MyIDEAS - Aliprantis, C.D. & Camera, G. & Puzzello, D. (2007): A random matching theory
We develop the theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching mechanisms. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different mechanisms and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing exact mappings between matching technologies and informational constraints.
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:1-16 Save to MyIDEAS - Umutcan Salman (2024): Essays on Matching Theory
Echenique et. al. (2013) established the testable revealed preference restrictions for stable aggregate matching with transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) and for extremal stable matchings. ... From this, we obtain a simple condition that verifies whether a given aggregate matching is rationalisable. For matchings that are not rationalisable, we provide a simple greedy algorithm that computes the minimum number of matches that needs to be removed to obtain a rationalisable matching. We also show that the related problem of finding the minimum number of types that we need to remove in order to obtain a rationalisable matching is NP-complete.
RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/375261 Save to MyIDEAS - Merve Burnazoglu (2021): An Identity-Based Matching Theory Approach to Integration
Integration concerns the evolution of migrants’ identities and of consequent behaviors in the matching processes between immigrants and social groups in host countries. I suggest that we switch the basis for motivation to form matching from price to social identities and explain migrants’ interactions in host countries in individual-to-group types of interactions rather than the individual-to-individual types of interactions that standard approach employs. Thus, I propose a shift from an isolated individual economic approach through the market mechanism to an identity-based matching theory approach to integration.
RePEc:taf:fosoec:v:50:y:2021:i:1:p:108-123 Save to MyIDEAS - Aloysius Siow & Eugene Choo (2007): Lifecycle marriage matching: Theory and Evidence
estimated model shows that a concern for accumulating marriage specific capital is quantitatively significant in generating positive assortative matching in spousal ages at marriage, gender differences in spousal ages at marriage, and a preference for early marriage.
RePEc:red:sed007:550 Save to MyIDEAS