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- Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau (2007): Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?
Law enforcement is decentralized. ... To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. ... We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0719 Save to MyIDEAS - Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Marceau, Nicolas (2009): Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized?
Law enforcement is decentralized. ... To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. ... We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.
RePEc:tse:wpaper:22142 Save to MyIDEAS - Yahagi, Ken (2021): Law enforcement with motivated agents
This paper provides a law enforcement framework through which to consider principal-agent relations among citizens, an elected official, and a law enforcer. This paper investigates how citizens’ interests are reflected in political competitions in terms of the use of financial incentives, e.g., the allocation of fine revenues, to control the intrinsically motivated law enforcer. This paper points out the limitation of using financial incentives to fully internalize society members’ interest in the enforcer's behavior from a normative perspective.
RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000065 Save to MyIDEAS - Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi (2024): Law enforcement and political misinformation
Why is criminal law enforcement increasingly punitive, despite that the situation has improved for decades? ... To this end, we develop a law enforcement model with political competition and examine how political parties’ campaigns affect voters’ perceptions of crime and equilibrium law enforcement policy.
RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:36:y:2024:i:1:p:3-36 Save to MyIDEAS - Nikolay Koval & Igor Kovbas (2019): On The Influence of The Human Factor in the Activities of Law Enforcement Institutions in Ukraine
In this scientific work, the authors consider issues related to the study of ways of building a civilized society and the state on the territory of Ukrainian lands and participation in this process of law enforcement agencies, in particular law enforcement and law enforcement agencies of the state. Accordingly, the article deals with aspects of how and in what ways law enforcement institutions, including law enforcement agencies, as legal entities, are taken up in the development of a civilized state in Ukraine, and what productive role in this process is given to the human factor. Therefore, issues affecting the range of law-enforcement institutions and law-enforcement bodies, as state formations, their legal status, as well as the legal status of employees of these formations, which, as individuals, in accordance with the procedure established by law, with the observance of the established requirements become a civil servant. When appointing to a regular post in law-enforcement formations, individuals as civil servants receive the legal status of an official or official of these institutions. The issues outlined are essential and important in the organization and functioning of state law enforcement institutions in the implementation of law enforcement activities in order to carry out tasks and perform functions in the life of society and the state.
RePEc:lum:ejlpa1:v:6:y:2019:i:1:p:26-38 Save to MyIDEAS - Roland, Gérard & Verdier, Thierry (2000): Law Enforcement and Transition
We present a simple model to analyse law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2501 Save to MyIDEAS - Robert Dur & Ben Vollaard (2017): Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment
We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement can be strengthened by making law enforcement activities more salient. ... At a random subset of 56 locations in a city in the Netherlands, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting bright warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags saying that the item was “Found by law enforcement; fine minimally 90 euros”.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6499 Save to MyIDEAS - Robert Dur & Ben Vollaard (2013): Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment
We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement can be strengthened by making law enforcement activities more salient. ... At a random subset of 56 locations in a city in the Netherlands, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting bright warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags saying that the item was “Found by law enforcement; fine minimally 90 euros”.
RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170007 Save to MyIDEAS - Ken Yahagi (2018): Private law enforcement with competing groups
This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. ... Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided.
RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:19:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10101-018-0210-7 Save to MyIDEAS - Horowitz, Ira (2006): A law enforcement perspective of electricity deregulation
In April 2004, the California Attorney General's (AG) office issued a white paper that provided a “law enforcement perspective of the California energy crisis.” To complete this special issue's coverage, I summarize three aspects of that paper: notably, the deficiencies in market oversight and enforcement that left the deregulated market prone to potential abuse, the principal modus operandi that some market agents used to exploit those deficiencies without fear of retribution, and the AG's “recommendations for improving enforcement and protecting consumers in deregulated energy markets.”
RePEc:eee:energy:v:31:y:2006:i:6:p:905-907 Save to MyIDEAS