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- Pagel, Beatrice & Wey, Christian (2012): Unionization structures in international oligopoly
We examine how competition in international markets affects a union's choice of wage regime which can be either uniform or discriminatory. Firms are heterogenous with regard to international competition. When unions choose their wage regimes sequentially, a discriminatory outcome becomes more likely when international competition increases.
RePEc:zbw:dicedp:44 Save to MyIDEAS - Ishikawa, Jota & 石川, 城太 & Okubo, Toshihiro (2010): Environmental Standards under International Oligopoly
We explore the effects of domestic environmental standards when a domestic firm and a foreign rival compete in the domestic market. We focus on a situation where the introduction of environmental standards forces the foreign product out of the domestic market because it does not meet the standards. Such prohibitive standards may induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good through R&D or licensing obtained from the domestic firm. However, this does not guarantee that the product, which now complies with the environmental standards, will improve the environment. In the case of licensing, governments may intervene to shift the rent from the domestic firm.
RePEc:hit:ccesdp:32 Save to MyIDEAS - Jota Ishikawa & Toshihiro Okubo (2010): Environmental Standards under International Oligopoly
We explore the effects of domestic environmental standards when a domestic firm and a foreign rival compete in the domestic market. We focus on a situation where the introduction of environmental standards forces the foreign product out of the domestic market because it does not meet the standards. Such prohibitive standards may induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good through R&D or licensing obtained from the domestic firm. However, this does not guarantee that the product, which now complies with the environmental standards, will improve the environment. In the case of licensing, governments may intervene to shift the rent from the domestic firm.
RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd10-141 Save to MyIDEAS - Ornella Tarola & Giulia Ceccantoni & Skerdilajda Zanaj (2016): Green consumption and relative preferences in an international oligopoly
We consider an open to trade North-South two-country model with two vertically differentiated goods and relative preferences in consumption. Differentiation is along an environmental quality dimension. Analyzing the equilibrium configuration, we find that the green firm obtains higher profits under relative preferences than in their absence, whereas a brown firm is penalized by them if trade is sufficiently liberalized. Moreover, under relative preferences in both countries, trade liberalization is beneficial for the green producer but detrimental for the brown rival. Importantly, this finding does not hold when these preferences are only present in the developing country where the brown good is produced.
RePEc:luc:wpaper:16-16 Save to MyIDEAS - Baye, Irina & Pagel, Beatrice & Wey, Christian (2016): Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly
We re-examine the common wisdom that cross-border mergers are the most effective merger strategy for firms facing powerful unions. In contrast, we obtain a domestic merger outcome whenever firms are sufficiently heterogeneous (in terms of productive efficiency and product differentiation). A domestic merger unfolds a “wage-unifying” effect which limits the union's ability to extract rents. When products become sufficiently homogeneous, then cross-border mergers are the unique equilibrium. However, they may be either between firms with the same cost efficiency or with different cost efficiencies.
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:127:y:2016:i:c:p:16-29 Save to MyIDEAS - Pagel, Beatrice & Wey, Christian (2013): Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly
We re-examine the common wisdom that cross-border mergers are the most effective merger strategy for firms facing powerful unions. In contrast, we obtain a domestic merger outcome whenever firms are sufficiently heterogeneous (in terms of productive efficiency and product differentiation). A domestic merger unfolds a wage-unifying effect which limits the union's ability to extract rents. When asymmetries among fims vanish, then cross-border mergers are the unique equilibrium. However, they may be either between symmetric or asymmetric firms.
RePEc:zbw:dicedp:89 Save to MyIDEAS - Gareth Myles (2001): Taxation and international oligopoly
The combined use of specific and ad valorem taxation as a policy response to the welfare losses caused by international oligopoly is explored. ... If a single country regulates the oligopoly, taxation can strictly dominate production control.
RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01h00001 Save to MyIDEAS - Myles, G.D. (1995): Taxation and the Control of International Oligopoly
The paper shows how the differing incidence of specific and ad valorem taxation in imperfectly competitive markest can be exploited to control international oligopoly. ... When a single country regulates the oligopoly, circumstances are shown to exist in which taxation is superior to production control.
RePEc:exe:wpaper:9506 Save to MyIDEAS - Pehr‐Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson (2005): Privatization Policy in an International Oligopoly
This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly.
RePEc:bla:econom:v:72:y:2005:i:288:p:635-653 Save to MyIDEAS - Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars (2003): Privatization Policy in an International Oligopoly
This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly.
RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0608 Save to MyIDEAS