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- Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman (2007): Special-Interest Groups and Volatility
This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-04 Save to MyIDEAS - Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson (2007): Determinants of interest group formation
It is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation’s stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation, as predicted by theory.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:3:p:377-391 Save to MyIDEAS - Filip Palda (2002): Interest Groups: An Introduction
This paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.
RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0209006 Save to MyIDEAS - Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman (2007): Special-Interest Groups and Growth
This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and economic growth, using newly assembled data on the number of groups observed across countries. In a sample of 86 countries at two points in time (for a total of 169 observations), we ¯nd support for Mancur Olson's theory that interest group activity reduces economic growth. We also ¯nd evidence that interest groups are negatively associated with both channels to growth - capital stock growth and productivity growth.
RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-01 Save to MyIDEAS - Heckelman, Jac C & Wilson, Bonnie (2023): Aid, Reform, and Interest Groups
We ask whether and how political markets for institutions have influenced the impact of aid allocations on reform, and we explore the extent to which the impact of aid on reform is conditional on the influence of a particular player in those markets - special interest groups. In a panel of 92 aid-receiving nations over four decade-long time periods, for several measure of reform, we find evidence that the aid-reform relation is conditional on the influence of interest groups.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:118182 Save to MyIDEAS - Sungmun Choi (2017): Politician’s ideology and campaign contributions from interest groups
This paper studies the effect of a politician’s ideological strength on campaign contributions that the politician receives from interest groups. If interest groups care mainly about current, or short-run, policy outcomes, they will make campaign contributions to ideologically neutral politicians who are often pivotal voters in the legislature. ... Thus, liberal (conservative) interest groups will make campaign contributions to liberal (conservative, respectively) politicians. Using data on the amount of campaign contributions given by interest groups to the members of the US House of the Representatives in the 111th Congress (2009–2010), I show that ideologically neutral politicians receive more campaign contributions from interest groups. This result suggests that interest groups are primarily motivated by the short-run incentive.
RePEc:spr:empeco:v:53:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1168-3 Save to MyIDEAS - Bonnie Wilson & Jac Heckelman (2015): Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility
In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special-interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society.
RePEc:slu:wpaper:2015-02 Save to MyIDEAS - Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman (2008): Democracy and Volatility: Do Special-Interest Groups Matter?
This paper empirically explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility, with focus on the interplay between groups and democracy and on the impact of groups on policy volatility. We find that countries with more interest groups are characterized by less policy volatility; that the number of interest groups has a direct impact on growth volatility, in addition to an indirect impact through policy volatility; and that interest groups appear to be a channel through which democracy impacts both policy volatility and growth volatility.
RePEc:slu:wpaper:2008-01 Save to MyIDEAS - Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson (2011): Special-interest groups and growth
This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and economic growth, using newly assembled data on the number of groups observed across countries. In a sample of 86 countries at two points in time (for a total of 169 observations), we ¯nd support for Mancur Olson's theory that interest group activity reduces economic growth. We also ¯nd evidence that interest groups are negatively associated with both channels to growth - capital stock growth and productivity growth.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:439-457 Save to MyIDEAS - Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman (2007): Determinants of Interest Group Formation
It is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation’s stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation, as predicted by theory.
RePEc:slu:wpaper:2007-03 Save to MyIDEAS