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Found 5 results for '"Fiscal federalism" "policy innovation" "policy experimentation." ', showing 1-5
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  1. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager (2005): Policy Innovation In Federal Systems
    Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized---due to the existence of a horizontal information externality---by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competition political actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In the equilibrium analyzed policy innovation occurs more frequently than in a unitary system.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpur:0504001  Save to MyIDEAS
  2. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager (2005): On the Incentives to Experiment in Federations
    Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontal information externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competition political actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In the equilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1585  Save to MyIDEAS
  3. Giampaolo Garzarelli & Lyndal Keeton (2016): Policy Experimentation and Intergovernmental Grants in a Federal System
    A public sector organization that is often invoked to aid with this challenging activity is fiscal federalism, for a federation can act as a laboratory for policy experimentation. Yet there is no approach linking laboratory federalism to intergovernmental grants. This lacuna is puzzling, for grants are fundamental policy tools for federations. We develop an approach that fills this lacuna by interpreting grants as fiscal institutions for policy innovation: policy experimentation is encouraged or discouraged depending on the degree of grant conditionality, and a simple heuristic expresses mistake-ridden learning from experimentation.
    RePEc:saq:wpaper:8/16  Save to MyIDEAS
  4. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager (2005): On the Incentives to Experiment in Federations
    Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized—due to the existence of a horizontal information externality—by under-provision of policy innovation. ... ce and emphasizes that such competition plays an important role in shaping the incentives for experimentation. For, in this case, political actors use the innovative policies to signal ability to the electorate. ... ect that arises from the incentive to free ride, and so a federal system may generate more innovation than a unitary one.
    RePEc:exe:wpaper:0507  Save to MyIDEAS
  5. GARZARELLI, GIAMPAOLO & KEETON, LYNDAL (2018): Laboratory federalism and intergovernmental grants
    This article contributes to an institutional economics analysis of the public economy by answering the following question: what is the role of intergovernmental grants in laboratory federalism? In line with factual evidence, the fiscal federalism literature on policy experimentation hints that grants can be employed to stimulate policy innovation through trial and error learning. Yet it lacks a theory of policy experimentation through grants, meaning that, in effect, we lack a fiscal theory of laboratory federalism. In the proposed approach, an intergovernmental grant is likened to a fiscal institution for political compromise between levels of government that frames policy experimentation options and constraints. At the same time, since policy solutions are not always easy to find or to implement, policy experimentation requires some degree of flexibility.
    RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:14:y:2018:i:05:p:949-974_00  Save to MyIDEAS
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