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- Philippe Uyttendaele & Frank Thuijsman & Pieter Collins & Ralf Peeters & Gijs Schoenmakers & Ronald Westra (2012): Evolutionary Games and Periodic Fitness
One thing that nearly all stability concepts in evolutionary game theory have in common is that they use a time-independent fitness matrix. ... We present a model of an evolutionary game, driven by replicator dynamics, where the fitness matrix is a variable rather than a constant, i.e., the fitness matrix is time-dependent. In particular, by considering periodically changing fitness matrices, we model seasonal effects in evolutionary games.
RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:3:p:335-345 Save to MyIDEAS - Philippe Uyttendaele & Frank Thuijsman (2015): Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics
In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory.
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:02:n:s0219198915400162 Save to MyIDEAS - THOMAS L. VINCENT (2006): Carcinogenesis As An Evolutionary Game
As such, it may be modeled using evolutionary game theory. Winners in this game are able to maintain viable population numbers while losers go extinct. A model for somatic evolution is presented that shows how cancer can evolve to become a winner in this game. Associated with the model is an adaptive landscape that illustrates the evolutionary potential of cells as a function of adaptive parameters used by cells.
RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:09:y:2006:i:04:n:s0219525906000872 Save to MyIDEAS - Daniel Friedman (1998): On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.
RePEc:spr:joevec:v:8:y:1998:i:1:p:15-43 Save to MyIDEAS - , H. (2010): Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
RePEc:the:publsh:505 Save to MyIDEAS - Daniel Lempert (2018): On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning
Evolutionary game theory has a lengthy history of modeling human interactions, and has been recently used to analyze the emergence and long-term viability of team reasoning. I review some basic elements of evolutionary analysis, and discuss a few issues attending evolutionary game theory?... After sketching a few fundamental results, I describe recent evolutionary analyses of team reasoning.
RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_283_0423 Save to MyIDEAS - Larry Samuelson (1998): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. ... Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book goes on to discuss evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
RePEc:mtp:titles:0262692198 Save to MyIDEAS - Friedman, D. (1992): Economically applicable evolutionary games
No abstract is available for this item.
RePEc:tiu:tiucen:92b42ca6-0b7a-45d2-80cb-79d019fae691 Save to MyIDEAS - Szabó, György & Hódsági, Kristóf (2016): The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games
We study three-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice when the third strategy is a mixed strategy of the first and second ones. It is shown that the resultant three-strategy game is a potential game as well as its two-strategy version. ... The effects of two different dynamical rules are analyzed by Monte Carlo simulations and the results of imitation dynamics indicate the dominance of the mixed strategy within the region of the hawk–dove game where it is an evolutionarily stable strategy.
RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:462:y:2016:i:c:p:198-206 Save to MyIDEAS - ALEKSANDRA MURKS & MATJAŽ PERC (2011): Evolutionary Games On Visibility Graphs
We show that time series of different complexities can be transformed into networks that host individuals playing evolutionary games. The irregularity of the time series is thereby faithfully reflected in the fraction of cooperators surviving the evolutionary process, thus effectively linking time series with evolutionary games. ... By employing the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, we demonstrate that such heterogeneous interaction networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation if compared to the traditional square lattice topology. Due to the simplicity of the employed methodology, newcomers with a basic command of nonlinear dynamics or stochastic processes can become easily acquainted with evolutionary games, and moreover, integrate these interesting and vibrant subfields of physics more effectively into their research.
RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:14:y:2011:i:03:n:s0219525911002974 Save to MyIDEAS