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- A. Garcia (2004): Forecast Horizon for a Class of Dynamic Games
In theory, a Markov perfect equilibrium of an infinite-horizon nonstationary dynamic game requires from the players the ability to forecast an infinite amount of data. In this paper, we prove that early strategic decisions are decoupled effectively from the tail game in nonstationary dynamic games with discounting and uniformly bounded rewards. ... In words, the first-period equilibrium strategies are invariant with respect to changes in the game parameters for periods beyond the forecast horizon. We illustrate our results in the context of dynamic games of exploitation of a common pool resource and make use of the rather natural monotonicity properties of finite-horizon equilibria.
RePEc:spr:joptap:v:122:y:2004:i:3:d:10.1023_b:jota.0000042591.71156.89 Save to MyIDEAS - Van Long Ngo (2010): A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics
A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics
RePEc:wsi:wsbook:7577 Save to MyIDEAS - Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps (2015): On dynamic games with randomly arriving players
We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. ... We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game.
RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-13 Save to MyIDEAS - He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng (2015): Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with almost perfect information, and (2) the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect-information dynamic games with uncertainty. Our results go beyond previous works on continuous dynamic games in the sense that public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. As an illustrative application, a dynamic stochastic oligopoly market with intertemporally dependent payoffs is considered.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:63345 Save to MyIDEAS - Ngo Van Long (2010): Dynamic Games In Macroeconomics
This chapter surveys applications of the theory of dynamic games to macroeconomic policies, growth, and distribution.
RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814293044_0007 Save to MyIDEAS - Ngo Van Long (2010): Dynamic Games In Industrial Organization
The theory of industrial organization has benefited much from dynamic game-theoretic models of interactions among firms, as well as those between firms on the one hand and far-sighted consumers on the other. In Section 5.1, we review models of dynamic duopoly where the state variables are maybe sticky prices, or sticky quantities, or capital stocks. Section 5.2 considers some extensions of the dynamic oligopoly models.
RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814293044_0005 Save to MyIDEAS - Ngo Van Long (2010): Dynamic Games In Trade And Development Economics
This chapter surveys dynamic game models in international economics and development economics. Section 4.1 is devoted to the effects of exogenously set trade policies (such as voluntary export restraints, quotas, export taxes or subsidies, trade liberalization) on welfare and profits when the market is dominated by international oligopolists that play a dynamic game. Section 4.2 shifts the focus to dynamic games played by two national governments: the classic problem of optimal tariffs and retaliation is examined in the light of the concept of feedback Nash equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts in dynamic games. ... Some dynamic game models pertinent to development economics are reviewed in Section 4.6.
RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814293044_0004 Save to MyIDEAS - Mikhael Shor (2003): Learning to Respond: The Use of Heuristics in Dynamic Games
While many learning models have been proposed in the game theoretic literature to track individuals’ behavior, surprisingly little research has focused on how well these models describe human adaptation in changing dynamic environments. ... The goal of this paper is to evaluate several prominent learning models in light of a laboratory experiment on responsiveness in a lowinformation dynamic game subject to changes in its underlying structure. While history-dependent reinforcement learning models track convergence of play well in repeated games, it is shown that they are ill suited to these environments, in which sastisficing models accurately predict behavior.
RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0301001 Save to MyIDEAS - Cezar Hantau & Dimitrios HATZIMANOUIL & Athanassios GIANNAKOS (2015): The Impact of Dynamic Games on the Coordination Development
This article aims to highlight the importance of dynamic games for the development of coordination abilities in children aged between 6 to 10 years. The research starts from the idea that the application of dynamic games in children training of the coordinative capacity at school age is more efficient than using conventional means of gymnastics and athletics.
RePEc:rom:marath:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:74-81 Save to MyIDEAS - Abito, Jose Miguel & Chen, Cuicui (2023): A partial identification framework for dynamic games
We develop a framework for partially identifying parameters of dynamic games without equilibrium selection assumptions. Our framework relies on incentive compatibility constraints that incorporate game theoretical results on equilibrium payoff sets to bound the unknown continuation payoffs. We apply this framework to identify cost parameters in three dynamic games where collusion is a potential outcome.
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:87:y:2023:i:c:s016771872200090x Save to MyIDEAS