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- Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau (2007): Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?
Law enforcement is decentralized. ... To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. ... We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0719 Save to MyIDEAS - Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Marceau, Nicolas (2009): Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized?
Law enforcement is decentralized. ... To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. ... We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.
RePEc:tse:wpaper:22142 Save to MyIDEAS - Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli (2014): Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location
This paper incorporates the reality that the bulk of law enforcement is decentralized while sanctions are chosen centrally, and explores the implications for the socially optimal sanction level. The presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive law enforcement incentives at the local level. We show that the adverse repercussions of uncoordinated enforcement decisions at the local level may be ameliorated by setting a nonmaximal sanction at the central level. In other words, we establish that the decentralization of law enforcement may effectively constrain socially optimal sanction levels.
RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-31 Save to MyIDEAS