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- Schmidt, Robert & Heinicke, Franziska & König-Kersting, Christian (2022): Using coordination games to measure beliefs
Krupka and Weber (2013) propose using coordination games to measure social norm perception. ... Subjects are asked about their probabilistic beliefs regarding behavior in an ultimatum game, and they then coordinate on a number between 0 and 100. ... This indicates that coordination games can be used as a simple tool for measuring beliefs when there is no ground truth.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003068 Save to MyIDEAS - Aner Sela & Dorothea Herreiner (1999): Fictitious play in coordination games
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. In particular, this implies that a FP player's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoff in 2þ2 coordination games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:189-197 Save to MyIDEAS - Edoardo GAFFE0 & Mauro GALLEGATI (2003): Informational Interaction in Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence
We present experimental evidence on equilibrium selection and rates of convergence in a simple N-player coordination game with different communication structures.
RePEc:vep:journl:y:2003:v:111:i:4:p:533-551 Save to MyIDEAS - Pęski, Marcin (undated): Random utility coordination games on networks
We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. ... The definition generalizes Harsanyi-Selten's risk dominance to coordination games with random utility.
RePEc:the:publsh:5653 Save to MyIDEAS - Vladislav Kargin (2004): Coordination Games with Quantum Information
The paper discusses coordination games with remote players that have access to an entangled quantum state. It shows that the entangled state cannot be used by players for communicating information, but that in certain games it can be used for improving coordination of actions. A necessary condition is provided that helps to determine when an entangled quantum state can be useful for improving coordination.
RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409006 Save to MyIDEAS - Naoki Funai (2013): An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. ... We show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes games; the stag hunt game; and the first order static game. In the game of chicken and market entry games, players may end up playing a maximum action profile.
RePEc:bir:birmec:13-14 Save to MyIDEAS - Berninghaus, Siegfried & Vogt, Bodo (2003): Network formation and coordination games
A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2x2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if neighbors play a pure coordination game.
RePEc:mnh:spaper:2769 Save to MyIDEAS - Marco Tomassini & Enea Pestelacci (2010): Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks
We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. ... We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:242-261:d:9125 Save to MyIDEAS - Philip J. Grossman & Catherine Eckel & Mana Komai & Wei Zhan (2017): It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game
We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game; 10 periods without a leader and 10 periods after the leader makes a short, “scripted” speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings.
RePEc:mos:moswps:2017-01 Save to MyIDEAS - Michael Kosfeld (2002): Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. ... Moreover, agents stay with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents.
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:2:p:321-339 Save to MyIDEAS