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- Joel Watson (2007): Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information.
RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:75:y:2007:i:1:p:55-81 Save to MyIDEAS - Watson, Joel (2002): Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological constraints, especially those having to do with the timing and nature of inalienable productive decisions. The main technical contributions include (a) results that characterize of the sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs under various assumptions about renegotiation opportunities, and (b) a result establishing conditions under which, when trading opportunities are durable and trade decisions are reversible, stationary contracts are optimal. The analysis refutes the validity of the "mechanism design with ex post renegotiation" program, it demonstrates the validity of other mechanism design models in dynamic environments, and it highlights the need for a more structured game-theoretic framework.
RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt18x0r2nn Save to MyIDEAS - Joel Watson (2002): Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information.
RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000006 Save to MyIDEAS - Watson, Joel (2006): Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information.
RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt2m08n7cg Save to MyIDEAS