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- Peter Sudhölter & Jos A. M. Potters (2001): The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced. This solution is in general a subsolution of the bargaining set and a supersolution of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. ... Furthermore, it is shown that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability, which allows to characterize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game and employing individual rationality as an additional axiom yields characterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining set.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:117-139 Save to MyIDEAS - Josep M Izquierdo & Carles Rafels (2012): On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets
We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we sufficiently raise the worth of the grand coalition (the efficiency level). This coincidence result does not hold for other well-known bargaining sets like the Mas-Colell bargaining set and its variants.
RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00366 Save to MyIDEAS - Ezra Einy & David Wettstein (1999): A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets
This paper provides a non-cooperative interpretation for bargaining sets concepts in economic environments. We investigate the implementability of the Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets, and provide mechanisms whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes realize these sets. These mechanisms, in contrast to general mechanisms suggested in the implementation literature, have a natural structure closely related to that of the rationale underlying the bargaining sets. Furthermore, the strategy sets consist mainly of allocations and coalitions (thus avoiding any reference to preference parameters) and are finite dimensional.
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230 Save to MyIDEAS - Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura (2020): The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
., the kernel and the bargaining set.
RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_712_0225 Save to MyIDEAS - Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura (2019): The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
., the kernel and the bargaining set.
RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2019-12 Save to MyIDEAS - Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma (2018): Bargaining sets in finite economies
We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism à la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colell’s bargaining set for replicas of a finite economy. Our main result shows the persistence of Anderson et al.’s (1997) non-convergence of the bargaining sets to the set of Walrasian allocations. In addition, we analyze how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:93-98 Save to MyIDEAS - Sudhölter, Peter & Potters, Jos (2017): The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game
The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced. This solution is in general a subsolution of the bargaining set and a supersolution of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. ... Furthermore, it is shown that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability, which allows to characterize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game and employing individual rationality as an additional axiom yields characterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining set.
RePEc:bie:wpaper:313 Save to MyIDEAS - ATAY Ata, & MAULEON Ana, & VANNETELBOSCH Vincent, (2019): A bargaining set for roommate problems
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate problem: The bargaining set. Klijn and Masso (2003) show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the marriage problem. ... However, weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. Second, we prove that the bargaining set is always non-empty. Finally, as Klijn and Masso (2003) get for the marriage problem, we show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the roommate problem.
RePEc:cor:louvco:2019012 Save to MyIDEAS - Chih Chang & Peng-An Chen (2006): Subbalanced games and bargaining sets
In defining a bargaining set, it is desirable to require that a counterobjecting coalition has a non-empty intersection with the objecting coalition. We refer to this as the intersection property and define a bargaining set, MB 1 , that imposes this property on a variant of the bargaining set defined by Vohra (1991). ... We also provide conditions for the non-emptiness of MB 2 , a bargaining set introduced by Zhou (1994) which imposes the additional restriction that the objecting coalition not be a subset of the counterobjecting coalition.
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:643-656 Save to MyIDEAS - Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma (2014): On bargaining sets for finite economies
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrasian allocations.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:62303 Save to MyIDEAS