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- Wong, Sook Ching & Jomo, Kwame Sundaram & Chin, Kok Fay (2005): Malaysian 'Bail Outs'? Capital Controls, Restructuring and Recovery
As Malaysia's government responded to the 1997-98 financial crisis, the global financing community criticised its measures as bail outs for politically-influential corporate interests. When the economy recovered strongly in 1999 and 2000, Malaysian leaders claimed that their policies, including the capital controls so widely criticised at that time, were in fact responsible for recovery. ... With clear and concise arguments, this book sheds new light on the Asian crisis and government policy responses, with emphases on its capital controls as well as corporate, bank and debt restructuring exercises.
RePEc:ucp:bkecon:9789971693190 Save to MyIDEAS - Tröger, Tobias H. (2017): Why MREL won't help much: Minimum requirements for bail-in capital as insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI's operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. ... The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning.
RePEc:zbw:safewp:180 Save to MyIDEAS - Tobias H. Tröger (2020): Why MREL won’t help much: minimum requirements for bail-in capital as an insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remove the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) emanating from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficient minimum of high-quality, easy-to-bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. The main problem, echoing the general concerns scholars voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus fail to fully alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt. ... The pending European legislation aims to implement the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by making very detailed and case-specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning.
RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:21:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1057_s41261-019-00093-1 Save to MyIDEAS - Kund, Arndt-Gerrit & Hertrampf, Patrick & Neitzert, Florian (2023): Bail-in requirements and CoCo bond issuance
Based on the individual characteristics of the CoCo bond, they are counted either towards the going- (AT1) or gone-concern (T2) capital of a bank and therewith provide additional loss-absorbency. In this paper, we empirically investigate, whether banks manage potential fundings gaps in the respective capital ratios by issuing CoCo bonds.
RePEc:eee:finlet:v:53:y:2023:i:c:s1544612322007450 Save to MyIDEAS - Kupiec, Paul H. (2016): Will TLAC regulations fix the G-SIB too-big-to-fail problem?
An equivalent, but much simpler solution is to significantly increase regulatory capital requirements on systemically important bank subsidiaries.
RePEc:eee:finsta:v:24:y:2016:i:c:p:158-169 Save to MyIDEAS - International Monetary Fund (2011): Possible Unintended Consequences of Basel III and Solvency II
Basel III and Solvency II should improve the stability of these connections, but could have unintended consequences for cost of capital, funding patterns, interconnectedness, and risk migration.
RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2011/187 Save to MyIDEAS - Virginia Skidmore Rutledge & Michael Moore & Mr. Marc C Dobler & Wouter Bossu & Nadège Jassaud & Ms. Jianping Zhou (2012): From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions
Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.
RePEc:imf:imfsdn:2012/003 Save to MyIDEAS - Markus Demary (2013): Vernetzung der Banken und systemische Risiken: Wege zur Lösung des "Too-Interconnected-to-Fail"-Problems
However, they do not solve the problem of spillovers in case of a bail-in. The proposal of the Liikanen group should therefore be considered: a layer of bail-in-capital outside the banking sector should be implemented. ... Es sollte stattdessen der Vorschlag der Liikanen-Kommission aufgegriffen werden, dass ein Teil des Bail-in-fähigen Kapitals außerhalb des Bankensektors gehalten werden sollte.
RePEc:diw:diwvjh:82-4-5 Save to MyIDEAS - Mecatti, Irene & Tröger, Tobias (2023): Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
The first applications of the new European CMDI framework, particularly in Italy, have shown that a bail-in of debt holders is especially problematic if they are households or other types of retail investors. Such debt holders may be unable to bear losses, and the social implications of bailing them in may create incentives for decision makers to refrain from involving them in bank resolution. In turn, however, if investors can expect resolution authorities (RAs) to behave inconsistently over time and bail-out bank capital and debt holders despite earlier vows to involve them in bank rescues, the pricing and monitoring incentives that the crisis management framework seeks to invigorate would vanish. ... Therefore, the policy objectives of the CMDI framework will only be achieved if critical bail-in capital is not held by retail investors without sufficient lossbearing capacity. Currently, neither the CMDI framework nor capital market regulation suffice to assure that this precondition is met.
RePEc:zbw:safewp:379 Save to MyIDEAS - Tröger, Tobias (2017): Why MREL won't help much
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI's operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects. The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. ... The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning.
RePEc:zbw:imfswp:117 Save to MyIDEAS