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- Colin Read (2011): The Principal—Agent Problem and Transocean
Corporate responsibility lies in three realms — the economic, the ethical, and the legal. Much of the posturing between half a dozen entities, BP, Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron International, the regulatory agencies, and even first responders, are all based on fears of legal liability. However, there are greater principles invoked by the disaster and the responsibility of various interested parties who could have helped avoid it.
RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30508-3_15 Save to MyIDEAS - Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J (1997): Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem
Consequently, the relationship between the public and the central bank can be characterized as a principal-agent problem. An inflation and stabilization bias arise as a result of this agency problem and the magnitudes of these biases depend on the political environment. ... However, they argue that central bank independence is preferable for resolving the agency problem.
RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:35:y:1997:i:2:p:378-93 Save to MyIDEAS - Boualem Djehiche & Peter Helgesson (2015): The Principal-Agent Problem With Time Inconsistent Utility Functions
In this paper we study a generalization of the continuous time Principal-Agent problem allowing for time inconsistent utility functions, for instance of mean-variance type.
RePEc:arx:papers:1503.05416 Save to MyIDEAS - Jewitt, Ian (1988): Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
It is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal-agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent's expected utility be stationary in effort. The Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic. Also, the Mirrlees-Rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent's action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model; it is too restrictive.
RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:5:p:1177-90 Save to MyIDEAS - Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés (2024): Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson (1982) formalizes general principal–agent problems, in which agents have private information and choose actions. His contribution is best known for a version of the revelation principle in the case of a single principal but he also introduces a model of interacting principals. We push the latter forward by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the corporations’ game in which every principal proposes a mechanism to his agents. We show that several versions of the revelation principle hold in our framework and that, under certain conditions, every principals’ equilibrium, as defined in Myerson (1982), is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the corporations’ game.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000831 Save to MyIDEAS - Françoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler & Andrés Salamanca Lugo (2024): Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
Myerson (1982) formalizes general principal-agent problems, in which agents have private information and choose actions. His contribution is best known for a version of the revelation principle in the case of a single principal but he also introduces a model of interacting principals. We push the latter forward by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the corporations' game in which every principal proposes a mechanism to his agents. We show that several versions of the revelation principle hold in our framework and that, under certain conditions, every principals' equilibrium, as defined in Myerson (1982), is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the corporations' game.
RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04535703 Save to MyIDEAS - Assaf, A. George & Bu, Ruijun & Tsionas, Mike G. (2020): A Bayesian approach to continuous type principal-agent problems
Singham (2019) proposed an important advance in the numerical solution of continuous type principal-agent problems using Monte Carlo simulations from the distribution of agent “types” followed by bootstrapping. In this paper, we propose a Bayesian approach to the problem which produces nearly the same results without the need to rely on optimization or lower and upper bounds for the optimal value of the objective function. Specifically, we cast the problem in terms of maximizing the posterior expectation with respect to a suitable posterior measure.
RePEc:eee:ejores:v:280:y:2020:i:3:p:1188-1192 Save to MyIDEAS - Haubrich, Joseph G (1994): Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem
This paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal-agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of CEO compensation.
RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:2:p:258-76 Save to MyIDEAS - Chao Li & Zhijian Qiu (2018): A Solvable Time-Inconsistent Principal-Agent Problem
We consider the dynamic contract model with time inconsistency preference of principal-agent problem to study the influence of the time inconsistency preference on the optimal effort and the optimal reward mechanism. We show that when both the principal and the agent are time-consistent, the optimal effort and the optimal reward are the decreasing functions of the uncertain factor. And when the agent is time-inconsistent, the impatience of the agent has a negative impact on the optimal contract. The higher the discount rate of the agent is, the lower the efforts provided; agents tend to the timely enjoyment. In addition, when both the principal and the agent are time-inconsistent, in a special case, their impatience can offset the impact of uncertainty factor on the optimal contract, but, in turn, their impatience will affect the contract.
RePEc:hin:jnddns:8512608 Save to MyIDEAS - Tomoyuki Nakajima (2021): Principal-Agent Problems with Hidden Savings in Continuous Time
In this paper, we consider a continuous-time principal-agent problem with hidden savings. The agent’s problem, which is non-Markovian, is formulated using the stochas- tic HJB equation. Without loss of generality, attention is restricted to those contracts for which the agent optimally chooses zero savings. Then, the principal’s problem can be ex- pressed as maximizing her expected profit subject to two SDEs: one equation describing the agent’s continuation utility process, and the other being the Euler equation concern- ing the agent’s marginal utility process.
RePEc:tky:fseres:2021cf1182 Save to MyIDEAS