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- Köppl-Turyna, Monika (2014): Campaign finance regulations and policy convergence: The role of interest groups and valence
Regulation of campaign finance of political parties and candidates is intended to decrease the political influence of special interest groups and enhance the public interest in electoral outcomes.
RePEc:eee:poleco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:1-19 Save to MyIDEAS - Pittaluga, Giovanni B. & Reghezza, Alessio & Seghezza, Elena (2020): Reconsidering the modernization hypothesis: The role of diversified production and interest‐group competition
Using data on a large sample of countries over the period from 1995 to 2015, we show empirically that the hypothesis is valid by studying the role of diversified production and interest-group competition. Increases in income associated with production diversification foster the emergence of competing organized interest groups representing the different diversified sectors. The interest-group competition underlies democracy by restraining rent seeking for benefits that would otherwise be sought through single-decision-maker authoritarian government.
RePEc:eee:poleco:v:65:y:2020:i:c:s017626802030077x Save to MyIDEAS - Amy McKay (2008): A simple way of estimating interest group ideology
No abstract is available for this item.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:69-86 Save to MyIDEAS - Etienne Farvaque & Gaël Lagadec (2010): Politician - interest group relations under voters' supervision
This article analyzes the dynamics of electoral promises towards the population and interest groups, focusing on the reaction of voters to the proximity of a candidate to interests groups.
RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00072 Save to MyIDEAS - Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden (2006): On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1698 Save to MyIDEAS - Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden (2005): On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050034 Save to MyIDEAS - Frans A. A. M. Winden (2008): Interest Group Behavior and Influence
During the last two decades economics has witnessed a remarkable upsurge in theoretical as well as empirical studies of the behavior and of the political influence of interest groups. Recent books by Sloof (1998), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) refer to a wealth of evidence of the significance of organized interests in the political arena, besides presenting surveys of theoretical studies. ... Strict adherence to methodological individualism would require the modeling of the following chain of events regarding the interaction between policymakers and interest groups: group formation/adjustment → group decision making → group activity → political decision making → government policies (plus other relevant events) → group formation/adjustment. Due to the complexity involved, group formation and adjustment (influenced by policy outcomes) are typically neglected by taking the existence of interest groups as given, thereby sidestepping the thorny issue of individual incentives for participation in collective action (Olson 1965). In addition, interest groups are commonly assumed to act as single (unitary) actors.
RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-75870-1_20 Save to MyIDEAS - Sergei Guriev & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2010): Interest Group Politics in a Federation
We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups.
RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754421 Save to MyIDEAS - Guriev, Sergei & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina & Yakovlev, Evgeny (2008): Interest Group Politics in a Federation
We show that inter-state externalities are determined by spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighbouring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6671 Save to MyIDEAS - Guriev, Sergei & Yakovlev, Evgeny & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina (2010): Interest group politics in a federation
We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups.
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:9-10:p:730-748 Save to MyIDEAS