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- Tamás Solymosi (2002): The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {cal M}i1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set {cal M}i1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. ... We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {cal M}i1.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:1-11 Save to MyIDEAS - Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter (2005): Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games
We define the NTU game V u N that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m £ 3 and it may be empty for m ³ 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m £ 5 and it may be empty for m ³ 6. ... Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of R N is nonempty, provided that k ³ n + 2.
RePEc:huj:dispap:dp410 Save to MyIDEAS - Grahn, Sofia (2001): Core and Bargaining Set of Shortest Path Games
In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of shortest path games.
RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2001_003 Save to MyIDEAS - José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Cori Vilella (2015): On the Coincidence of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set and the Core
In this paper we analyze the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core for the class of balanced and super additive cooperative games. ... Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed.
RePEc:rss:jnljse:v2i3p4 Save to MyIDEAS - TamÂs Solymosi (1999): On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games
We prove that for superadditive games a necessary and sufficient condition for the bargaining set to coincide with the core is that the monotonic cover of the excess game induced by a payoff be balanced for each imputation in the bargaining set.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:229-240 Save to MyIDEAS - Hellman, Ziv (2008): Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games
This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. ... Two alternative definitions of what a ‘sequence of coalitions’ means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a dynamic game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term ‘subgame-stable bargaining set sequences’ is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the non-emptiness of subgame-stable solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:8798 Save to MyIDEAS - Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma (2018): Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: A convergence result
We provide a notion of bargaining set for finite economies where the proponents of objections (leaders) are endogenous. We show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations when the economy is replicated.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:10-13 Save to MyIDEAS - Jesús Getán & Josep Izquierdo & Jesús Montes & Carles Rafels (2015): The bargaining set for almost-convex games
We generalize the well-known result of the coincidence of the bargaining set and the core for convex games (Maschler et al. 1972 ) to the class of games named almost-convex games, that is, coalitional games where all proper subgames are convex.
RePEc:spr:annopr:v:225:y:2015:i:1:p:83-89:10.1007/s10479-012-1226-y Save to MyIDEAS - Ken-Ichi Shimomura (2021): The Bargaining Set and Coalition Formation
We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set, a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non-crossing condition. In addition, we show the nonemptiness and possible inefficiency of the Mas-Colell bargaining set if this condition is not assumed.
RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2021-15 Save to MyIDEAS - Klijn, F. & Masso, J. (1999): Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model
Our main result is that under the assumption of strict preferences, the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings coincides with the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) for this context.
RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12 Save to MyIDEAS