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Sharing the cost of redundant items

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  • Hougaard, Jens Leth
  • Moulin, Hervé

Abstract

We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly inefficient) network must be maintained.

Suggested Citation

  • Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Sharing the cost of redundant items," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 339-352.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:339-352
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357, Elsevier.
    2. BALL, Michael O., 1979. "Computing network reliability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 377, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Cost Sharing In Networks: Some Open Questions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-10.
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    7. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Berganti~nos & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2023. "Revenue sharing at music streaming platforms," Papers 2310.11861, arXiv.org.
    2. Gildas Sédry Fopa & Issofa Moyouwou & Joseph Siani, 2022. "Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 567-587, April.
    3. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/06, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    4. Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2013. "Additive cost sharing on a tree," Working Papers 1307, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    5. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu & Zhang, Xuyao, 2023. "A conceptual model for FRAND royalty setting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 167-176.
    6. Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian, 2019. "Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2022. "Minimum coloring problems with weakly perfect graphs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 211-231, June.
    8. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Trouble Comes in Threes: Core stability in Minimum Cost Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    9. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2021. "Minimum coloring problem: the core and beyond," Working Papers 2005, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    10. Munich, Léa, 2024. "Schedule situations and their cooperative game theoretic representations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(2), pages 767-778.
    11. Yuntong Wang, 2013. "An Axiomatic Approach to the Airline Emission Fees Problem," Working Papers 1308, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    12. Léa Munich, 2023. "Schedule Situations and their Cooperative Game Theoretic Representations," Working Papers 2023-08, CRESE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost sharing; Redundant costs; Connection networks; Connectivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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