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The Design and Efficiency of Loyalty Rewards

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  • Ramon Caminal

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards (LRs) in markets for final consumption goods. Although the literature to date has emphasized the role of LRs as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), l analyze instead the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of LRs depends on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price‐cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramon Caminal, 2012. "The Design and Efficiency of Loyalty Rewards," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 339-371, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:339-371
    DOI: j.1530-9134.2012.00334.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00334.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wesley Hartmann & V. Viard, 2008. "Do frequency reward programs create switching costs? A dynamic structural analysis of demand in a reward program," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 109-137, June.
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    3. Caminal, Ramon & Claici, Adina, 2007. "Are loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes anti-competitive?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 657-674, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ramon Caminal, 2022. "Time‐Limited Loyalty Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 962-998, December.
    2. Yang, Hai & Shao, Chaoyi & Wang, Hai & Ye, Jieping, 2020. "Integrated reward scheme and surge pricing in a ridesourcing market," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 126-142.
    3. Luttmann, Alexander & Ladd, Daniel, 2023. "Loyalty rewards and redemption behavior: Stylized facts for the U.S. airline industry," MPRA Paper 119214, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Andrew T. Ching & Masakazu Ishihara, 2018. "Identification of Dynamic Models of Rewards Programme," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 306-323, September.
    5. Foschi, Matteo, 2017. "Self-Control in the Retailing Industry: Inducing Rejection of Loyalty Schemes," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 37, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    6. Castillo-Manzano, José I. & López-Valpuesta, Lourdes, 2014. "Living “up in the air†: Meeting the frequent flyer passenger," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 48-55.
    7. Wang, Hai & Yang, Hai, 2019. "Ridesourcing systems: A framework and review," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 122-155.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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