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“One Struggle”: Examining Narrative Syncretism between Accelerationists and Salafi-Jihadists

Marc-André Argentino, Amarnath Amarasingam, Emmi Conley

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CONTACT DETAILS

For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact:

ICSR
King's College London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

T. +44 20 7848 2098

E. mail@icsr.info

Twitter: [@icsr_centre](https://twitter.com/icsr_centre)

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Executive Summary

This report looks at the evolving narrative and aesthetic convergence between elements of neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists. We argue that while extremism research generally takes seriously a movement’s ideological rigidity, there are interesting developments happening on the fringes of some of these groups that warrants academic and policy interest. These ecosystems and the networks they contain are not less serious or severe than the more centralised movements of the past and they present new opportunities for threat actors to influence one another through cohabitation of digital environments. This does not demonstrate weakened ideological commitment, but instead an enhanced focus on results over practice.

Key Findings

- Both of these movements find common cause in their support for natural hierarchy, racial and cultural supremacy, traditional family, antisemitism, anti-modernism and anti-government sentiment.
- Accelerationist movements look to salafi-jihadists with admiration and a strong desire to emulate them. Successful Islamic militant groups are evidence that an unrelenting focus on ultimate goals, an emphasis on tradition and culture, and battlefield patience could eventually bring about a victory against Western governments.

Overview

There has been a growth in academic interest related to the “common elements” between disparate ideological movements, such as cumulative extremism, reciprocal radicalisation and ideological side-switching, as well as more recent interest in the cross-pollination of subcultural aesthetics. While ideology remains important, there are also clear trends in the extremism space, at least on the fringes, that are more syncretistic, which need to be taken seriously and deserve more attention from researchers. This report focuses on how neo-fascist accelerationists leverage salafi-jihadist aesthetics and ideological elements to inspire their own base. We examine three major points of overlap in this report: admiration and emulation, anti-modernism, and antisemitism.

With growing awareness of the convergence of REMVE and salafi-jihadist media on the internet, it’s important to understand how and why these convergences take place. There is a common misconception that this is the result of “salad-bar ideology”, wherein extremist actors lack ideological commitment and instead pick and choose narratives, aesthetics, doctrines and tactics from various violent extremist movements to suit their preferences. For this report, we examined neo-fascist accelerationist and salafi-jihadist publications, podcasts, memes and other media outputs to get a better sense of what this narrative overlap looks like and why it might be important.

Key Findings

In examining major themes shared by neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations, we found that these threat actors support a similar world view, encompassing a natural hierarchy, racial and/or cultural supremacy, views of the traditional family, antisemitism, and anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-government sentiments. Neo-fascist accelerationist ideologues use these points of commonality to promote tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations.

- The findings in this report support the idea that propaganda, myths, martyrs and symbols are closely linked. Propaganda’s main job is to create symbols and portray them as convincing mental heuristics. Martyrs are revered as holy warriors who were prepared to give all for the cause.
- For neo-fascist accelerationists, the logic and purpose of martyrdom contributes to a hypermasculine warrior culture that incentivises a heroic battle until the death. Masculine identity is almost entirely defined by a warrior archetype, the embodiment of a both physical and spiritual soldier. Acts of violence, particularly those that result in the ultimate sacrifice of the person and the death of others, are praised in modern neo-fascist accelerationist texts.

- Neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations have a shared affinity for communicative and symbolic violence. They believe that cleansing society of those who weaken it is not only righteous but also strengthens the spiritual fortitude of those who do it. For salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations, the Day of Judgement figures prominently in their propaganda. Neo-fascist accelerationists find the imminent end times in Traditionalism. This report finds that Traditionalist fascism is an important trend in the REVME space that requires further investigation.
- Neo-fascist accelerationist anti-feminist themes appeal to the importance of maintaining ‘tradition’ as a way to claim an essentialised and largely ahistorical version of culture. However, we do not argue here that this means women are excluded from neo-fascist accelerationist ecosystems.
- Salafi-jihadist hatred of Jewish people is a point on which REMVE actors agree, and recent memes and online propaganda have increasingly emphasised this hatred. Neo-fascist accelerationists find common ground with salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations in their own perceived battle against the Jews and the ‘Zionist occupation’ of Europe and North America.

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1 Introduction

“Anyone who is willing to drive a plane into a building to kill Jews is alright by me...I wish our members had half as much testicular fortitude.”¹ One might think that such a statement, referring to the 9/11 attacks, would have come from one of al-Qaeda’s jihadist competitors. The words were actually penned by Billy Roper, one of the leaders of the National Alliance, before the dust had even settled at the World Trade Center. Rocky Suhayda, who succeeded Matt Koehl as the chairman of the American Nazi Party, similarly lamented, “if ‘we’ were one-tenth as ‘serious’...we just might start getting somewhere.”² Far-right responses to the 9/11 attacks ranged from lamenting the fact that their comrades on the far right lacked the same initiative and bravery demonstrated by the jihadists, to appreciating that al-Qaeda had “accurately” come to see America and Israel as one and the same.³

George Michael, writing as early as 2006, noted that “militant Islam and the extreme right seem to agree on several salient issues”, such as a desire to build a utopian society, a disdain for Israel and the Jews, and criticism of American foreign policy, as well as a broader disavowal of modernity, secularism and globalisation.⁴ In extremism research, there is not only intense debate about the role and impact of ideology, but also increased interest in ideological fluidity and syncretism. Over the years, there has been academic interest in researching “common elements” between disparate ideological movements,⁵ cumulative extremism and reciprocal radicalisation,⁶ ideological side-switching,⁷ and more recent interest in the cross-pollination of subcultural aesthetics.⁸ This is not to say that ideology is no longer important, but there are clear trends in the extremism space, at least on the fringes, that are more syncretistic and fluid that need to be better understood and taken seriously.

In this report, we seek to build upon our last report,⁹ which focused on some of the innovation in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by REMVE actors and salafi-jihadists, and examine ideological and inspirational material created by the former that focuses on their admiration of salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations. This report will focus more specifically on how neo-fascist accelerationists leverage salafi-jihadist aesthetics and ideological elements to inspire their own base, create propaganda and further their violent accelerationist

1 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Extremist Groups React to the 9/11 Attacks,” *SPLC Intelligence Report*, 29 November 2001.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 George Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right* (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 2.

5 J. M. Berger, *Extremism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018).

6 Roger Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,” *The Political Quarterly* 77, no. 2 (2006); Julia Ebner, *The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism* (London: I B Taurus, 2017).

7 Daniel Koehler, *From Traitor to Zealot: Exploring the Phenomenon of Side-Switching in Extremism and Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

8 Moustafa Ayad, “Islamogram: Salafism and Alt-Right Online Subcultures,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 16 November 2021, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/islamogram-salafism-and-alt-right-online-subcultures/>.

9 Marc-André Argentino, Shiraz Maher, and Charlie Winter, “Violent Extremist Innovation: A Cross-Ideological Analysis,” *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization*, 20 December 2021, <https://icsr.info/2021/12/20/violent-extremist-innovation-a-cross%e2%80%91ideological-analysis/>.

world views. We examine three major points of overlap in this report: admiration and emulation, anti-modernism, and antisemitism. We conclude by examining some emerging trends and avenues for future research.

2 Admiration and Emulation

With growing attention around the convergence of REMVE and salafi-jihadist media on the internet, it’s important to understand how and why these convergences are taking place. There is a common misconception that this is the result of a “salad-bar ideology”, wherein extremist actors lack ideological commitment and instead pick and choose narratives, aesthetics, doctrines and tactics from various violent extremist movements to suit their preferences, valuing violence for the sake of violence. However, this is inaccurate. What has taken place over the past five years has been a gradual shift whereby REMVE threat actors have decentralised into more fluid, ambiguously defined entities dictated by the movements they engage with and ecosystems they inhabit. These ecosystems and the networks within them are not less serious or severe than the more centralised movements of the past and present new opportunities for threat actors to influence one another through cohabitation of digital environments. This does not demonstrate weakened ideological commitment, but instead an enhanced focus on results over practice.

What we are seeing with the convergence of REMVE and salafi-jihadist actors and content is what Davey et al. have called “post-organisational violent extremism and terrorism” (POVET). POVET is a taxonomy developed to describe “violent extremism and terrorism where the influence or direction of activity by particular groups or organisations is ambiguous or loose. Accordingly, it is designed to be group-agnostic and is instead shaped around analysis of content which is influential to violent extremism and terrorism beyond that produced by proscribed terrorist organisations.”¹⁰ Though this has been a growing trend in light of the diffuse nature of the social media and communications spaces, it has accelerated with the pandemic, especially following the mass deplatforming of various actors in January 2021, leading to a new crop of individuals leaving mainstream platforms to join fringe social networking sites where violent extremist ecosystems thrive.¹¹

10 The Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s “group-agnostic taxonomy divides violent extremist and violent extremist world-view; and ‘instructional’ content designed to inform operational aspects of violent extremist activity”. Jacob Davey et al., “A Taxonomy for the Classification of Post-Organisational Violent Extremist & Terrorist Content,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 9 December 2021, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/a-taxonomy-for-the-classification-of-post-organisational-violent-terrorist-content/>.

11 Walsh, Nick Paton, “Will deplatforming make Trump and the far-right vanish, move – or radicalize further?” *CNN.com*. 12 January 2021. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/12/tech/deplatforming-trump-parler-effects/index.html>.



Figure 1. Meme depicting far-right movements and salafi-jihadism as “one struggle” against antifa, gender equality, communism, Jews and vaccines. Meme captured by researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Used with permission.

There are narratives and activities shared within neo-fascist accelerationist groups that rely on their admiration of salafi-jihadists threat actors and their violent and terroristic achievements. Represented in neo-fascist accelerationist manifestos, podcasts, videos, memes and chats, the relationship is usually unidirectional, whereby REMVE threat actors borrow TTPs and express admiration for salafi-jihadist terrorist organisations such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Islamic State, or Shia terrorist organisations like Hezbollah. Of note, however, as was highlighted by Moustafa Ayad, the newer generation of salafi-jihadists has begun to borrow the aesthetic and memes popularised by REMVE threat actors in its own propaganda efforts.¹² In turn, REMVE threat actors have utilised the imagery of Jihadi John (Figure 2), Osama bin Laden (Figure 3), Saladin, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and others in their own propaganda materials.

¹² Ayad, “Islamogram: Salafism and Alt-Right Online Subcultures.”



Figure 2. Image of Jihadi John in a June 2021 Terrorgram¹³ Collective Manifesto, used to inspire neo-fascist accelerationists to emulate his brutality.

Neo-fascist accelerationists¹⁴ admire and show support for counter-insurgencies such as the Bolsheviks, M-26-7, Viet Minh, Mao, the IRA, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, the PLO, the Taliban, the mujahideen, Darul Islam, and resistance fighters in East Timor and Bougainville. Neo-fascist accelerationists glorify war and conflict and thus admire insurgent victories against Western forces and governments, wishing that white Aryan men in the West would learn to emulate those counter-insurgents in the fight against the “system”.¹⁵ The founder of the neo-fascist Iron March forum, who operates under the pseudonym Alexander Slavros,¹⁶ wrote in the manifesto for the neo-Nazi website American Futurist: “We want to glorify war – the only cure for the world – militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of the anarchists, the beautiful ideas which kill, and contempt for woman.”¹⁷

13 Terrorgram refers to a network of Telegram channels used by ideologically motivated violent extremists who support the use of terrorism and violence to achieve their goals of taking down the government and disrupting the political order. Terrorgram is a prime example of the multifaceted POVET ecosystem, formed as it is by multiple actors and ideologies.

14 Accelerationism is an ideologically agnostic doctrine of violent and non-violent actions taken to exploit contradictions intrinsic to a political system to “accelerate” its destruction through the friction caused by its features. Matthew Kriner, Meghan Conroy, and Yasmine Ashwal, “Understanding Accelerationist Narratives: ‘There Is No Political Solution,’” *Global Network on Extremism and Technology* 2021, <https://gnet-research.org/2021/09/02/understanding-accelerationist-narratives-there-is-no-political-solution/>; Alex Newhouse, “The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism,” *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 5 (2021), <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-threat-is-the-network-the-multi-node-structure-of-neo-fascist-accelerationism/>; Jade Parker, “Accelerationism in America: Threat Perceptions,” *Global Network on Extremism and Technology*, 4 February 2020, <https://gnet-research.org/2020/02/04/accelerationism-in-america-threat-perceptions/>; H. E. Upchurch, “The Iron March Forum and the Evolution of the ‘Skull Mask’ Neo-Fascist Network,” *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 10 (2021), <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-iron-march-forum-and-the-evolution-of-the-skull-mask-neo-fascist-network/>.

15 Term used in accelerationist and siegekulture content to refer to the government or democratic institutions.

16 “Alexander Slavros”, the pseudonym of an Eastern European essayist and founder of the neo-fascist forum Iron March. The BBC’s Russian service identified Slavros as Alisher Mukhitdinov in January 2020. Michael Edison Hayden, “Mysterious Neo-Nazi Advocated Terrorism for Six Years Before Disappearance,” *SPLC*, 21 May 2019, <https://www.spicenter.org/hatewatch/2019/05/21/mysterious-neo-nazi-advocated-terrorism-six-years-disappearance/>; Андрей Сошников, “«Наполовину русский»: история москвича Алишера Мухитдинова и его глобальной фашистской сети,” *BBC News*, 30 January 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-51301305>.

17 Alexander Slavros, “American Futurist Manifesto,” *Ironmarch* 2016, 6.



Figure 3. *Dark Foreigner* was a REMVE propagandist who started leveraging jihadist figures in his violent extremist art and propaganda.¹⁸

The United States' exit from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 was discussed widely in REMVE ecosystems. In neo-fascist accelerationist spaces, the Taliban were touted as an example to be emulated by white Aryans in their own nations. The Taliban serve as a counter-argument to what REMVE actors call “movementarians”¹⁹ who want to work within the system, still believe that there can be a political solution or that the system is too big to be fought. An article on the *American Futurist* noted, “For this is clearly not true whatsoever. If it was then how come these Pashtun Islamic Scholars with old firearms and homemade bombs can completely humiliate NATO on the battlefield?”²⁰ The Taliban was able to fight NATO and the USA for twenty years as an insurgent force and won. The Taliban victory

18 Makuch, Ben and Mack Lamoureux, “Unmasking ‘Dark Foreigner’: The Artist Who Fueled a Neo-Nazi Terror Movement,” *Vice News*, 8 July 2021. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/93ynv8/unmasking-dark-foreigner-the-artist-who-fuelled-a-neo-nazi-terror-movement>.

19 Movementarians refers to the neo-fascist accelerationist rejection of movements. Ideologically neo-fascists accelerationists promote the self: self-reliance, self-sufficiency, self-insight and self-action. They reject REMVE actors who rely on groups or movements or leaders who dictate what they must do. According to a neo-fascist publication a “movementarian is one that, even redpill on National Socialism, will still find themselves behaving in a way that is detrimental to themselves and benefits the System.”

20 *American Futurist*, “Taliban victory and what it means for us,” *American Futurist*, 14 July 2021.

was used by James Mason as a prime example of how white Aryan men in the United States can achieve victory. As the American Futurist article noted, “The Taliban Themselves are a group that I myself support and I’m glad they won out in the end. Why though? Why support a group that are Islamic Militants? Simple, despite certain disagreements on things. The Biggest issue on religion. The Taliban support many of the same things that I and I imagine many of you support. Natural Hierarchy, Pride in your Heritage, Traditional Family, Anti-ZOG,²¹ Anti-Faggotry, and Anti-System.”²² The author hoped that white Aryan men could one day achieve notoriety comparable to that of the Taliban. In other words, for some in accelerationist movements, successful Islamic militant groups showcase what an unrelenting focus on ultimate goals, an emphasis on tradition and culture, and battlefield patience could eventually achieve.



Figure 4. Screenshot of an August 2021 neo-fascist accelerationist blog celebrating the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

In a 9/11 episode of a neo-fascist accelerationist podcast,²³ the speakers discussed how the majority of white people would never fight against the system. Rather, the responsibility rests with a small contingent of Aryan warriors to stand up and fight for their race. They used the example of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to shame the undedicated and inspire their listeners into action. This sentiment was echoed in a December 2021 Terrorgram manifesto²⁴ that claims that “just .4% of the Afghan population waged war against the regime” whereas “.79% of the masses fought against the guerillas”, leaving some 98.81% of the Afghan population uninvolved (see Figure 5). The accelerationist concept here borrows directly from *Mein Kampf*, wherein Hitler argues that the passive masses will obey the more dominant of two fanatical sides.²⁵ In this example, the Taliban and

21 ZOG is a white supremacist acronym for “Zionist Occupied Government,” which reflects the common white supremacist belief that the US government is controlled by Jews. ADL, “ZOG,” *Hate Acronyms/Abbreviations*, <https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/zog>.

22 American Futurist, “The Taliban Takeover,” *American Futurist*, 22 August 2021.

23 Authors’ analysis of the 2021 9/11 anniversary podcast.

24 Terrorgram Collective, “Title Withheld,” *Terrorgram Collective*, December 2021, 213.

25 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Thomas Dalton (Redpill Action Publications, 2021), 572-3.

the Nazis were both the dominant fanatics that gained the obedience of the population. Neo-fascist accelerationist propaganda therefore argues that if actors become as militant as these predecessors, they will be able to fight the system with actual results.




Figure 5. December 2021 neo-fascist accelerationist manifesto using the Taliban as an example of a successful revolutionary insurgency that can be emulated in the USA.

Similar to the Taliban, accelerationists also point to IS’s 2017 siege of the Philippine city of Marawi as an example of an insurgency that can be replicated by neo-fascist accelerationists in the West. Highlighted in this example is the importance of building trust within a local community: “This event in Marawi would not have been possible, had it not been a Muslim majority area; terrorism is more than anything, demographics-based. The terrorism itself needed a base of supporters among the general population.”²⁶ Taking the TTPs developed by salafi-jihadists in Marawi as an example, the Terrorgram Collective in their December 2021 publication discuss how in a future insurgency in Western cities, community building will be a significant component of supporting REMVE fighters. Some of the concepts that are reinforced ideologically as TTPs are “building up your own local communities of White Aryan families” and doing charity work and organising. Recent examples of community work include REMVE actors doing a toy drive for families affected by the tornadoes in Kentucky and several toy drives for less fortunate white families (see Figure 6).

26 Terrorgram Collective, “Title Withheld,” Terrorgram Collective, December 2021, 227.



Figure 6. Example of a call by a far-right group to help members of the Aryan community.

This type of charity work earns the favour of a local community, encourages self-sufficiency and softens the image of REMVE actors. Actors can point to this type of work to indicate that they protect their own, that they are concerned with more than simply violence and that they are able to carry out the work that the government has failed to do. When engaging in these types of campaigns, REMVE actors have also emulated the Taliban’s support for locals in Afghanistan and the similar efforts of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Building goodwill in the local community was a critical TTP for salafi-jihadist insurgencies. While it has not gone unnoticed by neo-fascist accelerationists, it has nonetheless been a cause of friction between them and movementarians: the latter’s public stunts, protests, violent acts and propaganda are often viewed by the former as ineffective at aiding the destruction of the system. Instead, accelerationists argue that movementarians actually harm the image of those trying to work against the system by building trust within their local communities and “tribes”.

Neo-fascist accelerationists take their lessons from other insurgencies and promote the idea that when white communities get fed up with Western society, liberal governments, the ZOG and “Woke Culture”, they will stand with those who choose to rise up and fight, even if most won’t embrace violence. This is

not unique to recent REMVE propaganda and is a concept also found in the works of George Lincoln Rockwell,²⁷ Ben Klassen,²⁸ James Mason,²⁹ William Luther Pierce,³⁰ and many more. These kinds of TTPs might fly under the radar of government analysts and researchers in the national security space at times, as they are not illegal and do not pose a threat to individuals, infrastructures or institutions. Nevertheless, these TTPs might be early indicators of more sophisticated organising efforts from networks planning future violence, especially when expressed by individuals and groups who are committed to offline violence.

Warrior Culture and Martyrdom

In addition to admiring community-building initiatives and TTPs, REMVE actors also take inspiration from the masculine warrior aesthetic and the approach to martyrdom found in salafi-jihadist groups. Contemporary REMVE manuals and adherents, more often than not, adhere to a strict interpretation of masculine identity. As Daniel Koehler writes:

“The ideological components shared by the contemporary far-right and German Nazism include a narrow and often racially conceived nationalism, hateful intolerance toward physically and/or culturally different people, the glorification of physical struggle and of a readiness to suffer in the spirit of traditional masculine values, an abhorrent fixation on the left, and a contempt for the established state, government, and other parts of the economic, social, or cultural establishment.”³¹

Masculine identity for neo-fascist accelerationists is almost exclusively some version of a warrior archetype as the embodiment of a both physical and spiritual soldier. In some neo-fascist accelerationist circles, committing acts of violence that do not achieve anything for the white Aryan race are considered pointless. However, acts of violence, especially those that lead to the ultimate sacrifice of the individual, are encouraged and celebrated in contemporary neo-fascist accelerationist materials. Martyrs are revered as holy warriors who were prepared to give all for the cause. Some of these martyrs are “sainted”, such as Dylan Roof and Timothy McVeigh, while others have had their manifestos elevated to sacred texts, such as Brenton Tarrant’s “The Great Replacement” manifesto or Anders Breivik’s “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence”. These acts of martyrdom have inspired movements and violent actors with the hope of following in the footsteps of the martyrs.

27 George Lincoln Rockwell, *White Power* (National Vanguard, 1967).

28 Ben Klassen, *RAHOWA! This Planet is All Ours* (North Carolina: Church of the Creator, 1987).

29 James Mason, *Siege*, 3rd ed. (Iron March, 2017).

30 William Luther Pierce, *The Turner Diaries* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1978).

31 Daniel Koehler, “Dying for the cause? The logic and function of ideologically motivated suicide, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice within the contemporary extreme right,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* September 2020 (2020): 8.

Within REMVE digital ecosystems, there are variations of calendars that are shared monthly, celebrating “days of actions”, “martyrs” or “saints” who have committed mass casualty attacks or other forms of terrorism. Accompanied with these calendars are infographics that highlight individual martyrs or saints, their images, their “kill score” and the date of their attack. All of this forms the “pantheon” of REMVE saints that are to be celebrated or emulated. Jihad and martyrdom for both salafi-jihadism and REMVE actors are driven by a wide range of personal and societal push and pull factors. Within the salafi-jihadist worldview, there are key ideological and theological incentives that often motivate acts of terrorism.³² Within neo-fascist accelerationist ecosystems, there are traditional ideological and theological motivators to push individuals towards suicide attacks rooted in the belief that they are the physical and spiritual embodiment of a warrior. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, in *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction*, argues, “Deaths and martyrdom have always been fecund sources of myth making ... martyrdom is a particularly persuasive way of inflating a sense of moral grandeur.”³³ In propaganda, myths, martyrs and symbols are closely linked. Propaganda’s main job is to create symbols and portray them as convincing mental heuristics.³⁴

In addition to the pantheon of real-world attackers who have been sainted, there are also fictional REMVE martyrs and martyr narratives, which are critical to propaganda and myth making. *The Turner Diaries*, as J. M. Berger has written, “is arguably the most important single work of white nationalist propaganda in the English language.”³⁵ Kathleen Belew similarly argues that *The Turner Diaries*, while a work of fiction, is also “a manual of operations and a cultural lodestar, or center point, for white power activists.”³⁶ This is further covered in Belew’s book, *Bring the War Home*, where she explains that *The Turner Diaries* is essential to white power, the militant right and neo-fascist accelerationist activists not because it’s a good read, but because it describes how a small group of individuals were able to topple the United States.³⁷ Michael Barkun notes that Earl Turner, before leaving on his mission, tells his colleagues, much in the manner of later Islamic suicide bombers, “I offer you my life.”³⁸

32 David B. Cook, “Contemporary Martyrdom: Ideology and Material Culture,” in *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists*, ed. Thomas Hegghammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

33 N. J. O’Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

34 Ari Ben Am and Gabriel Weimann, “Fabricated Martyrs: The Warrior-Saint Icons of Far-Right Terrorism,” *Perspective on Terrorism* 15, no. 5 (2020): 132.

35 J. M. Berger, “The Turner Legacy: The Storied Origins and Enduring Impact of White Nationalism’s Deadly Bible,” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, 16 September 2016, <https://icct.nl/publication/the-turner-legacy-the-storied-origins-and-enduring-impact-of-white-nationalisms-deadly-bible/>.

36 Dorany Pineda, “‘The Turner Diaries’ didn’t just inspire the Capitol attack. It warns us what might be next,” *Los Angeles Times*, 8 January 2021, <https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/books/story/2021-01-08/kathleen-belew-on-the-turner-diaries>.

37 Kathleen Belew, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018).

38 Michael Barkun, “Appropriated Martyrs: The Branch Davidians and the Radical Right,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 1 (2007): 122.



Figure 7. Example of how martyrdom is discussed, image captured from the June 2021 Terrorgram Collective Manifesto.

The logic and function of martyrdom for neo-fascist accelerationists, as well as the rational choice-based incentives offered to potential suicide attackers and the political mythology behind it, point to a hypermasculine warrior culture that incentivises a heroic struggle to the end or remaining steadfast in court or through societal stigmatisation.³⁹ If one cannot fit the model of the warrior, the martyr, the crusader or the white knight, the remaining role for Aryan men is to be a father and sire as many children as possible to increase the supply of future warriors and martyrs (see Figure 7).

Ultimately, as Ari Ben Am and Gabriel Weimann state, martyrdom plays an important role in the promotion of any ideology, as martyrs act as symbols for ideological movements.⁴⁰ Martyrs are also used as symbols to inspire a movement or ideology to act. Additionally, because of the apparent sacrifice of the person for the sake of the idea, martyrs are a source of inspiration for action and togetherness. Ben Am and Weimann highlight that martyrs serve as ideal promulgators of an ideology to be emulated, while also “humanizing” them and providing “adherents of an extremist movement both a symbol and figurehead to refer to and justify the rightness of their ideology or movement both in the eyes of adherents and parts of a wider public.”⁴¹

39 Koehler, “Dying for the cause? The logic and function of ideologically motivated suicide, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice within the contemporary extreme right,” 8.

40 Am and Weimann, “Fabricated Martyrs: The Warrior-Saint Icons of Far-Right Terrorism.”

41 Ibid. 134

Communicative and Symbolic Violence

Martyrology brings us to the next thematic overlap, which is the shared affinity for communicative and symbolic violence. While IS pioneered vehicle ramming attacks,⁴² it has become a common tactic of REMVE threat actors to target protestors and civilians.⁴³ Livestreaming mass casualty events, especially mass shootings, has also become a standard propaganda tactic. IS’s burning of a Jordanian pilot and its beheading videos that horrified the world set the tone for self-publicised terror media that was no longer dependent on global media outlets for distribution. Social media platforms provided new opportunities to broadcast terror to anyone with an internet connection. Most notably for REMVE threat actors, the massacre in Christchurch was livestreamed by the shooter from a first-person perspective, a method first used by jihadists.⁴⁴ Livestreaming has become a common way to disseminate and communicate symbolic acts of violence. The goal is not necessarily recruitment, but to contribute to the appearance of a growing crisis, to force governments and platforms to react to these incidents and threat actors (see Figure 8).



Figure 8. Example of propaganda shared by a neo-fascist accelerationist about the importance of communicating symbolic violence.

42 Argentino, Maher, and Winter, “Violent Extremist Innovation: A Cross-Ideological Analysis,” 7.
43 Argentino, Maher, and Winter, “Violent Extremist Innovation: A Cross-Ideological Analysis,” 15.
44 Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Chelsea Daymon, and Amarnath Amarasingam, “The Christchurch Attack Report: Key Takeaways on Tarrant’s Radicalization and Attack Planning,” *International Center for Counter Terrorism*, 18 December 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/the-christchurch-attack-report-key-takeaways-on-tarrants-radicalization-and-attack-planning/>.

In the communication of symbolic acts of violence, REMVE actors and salafi-jihadists have parallel mythologies that rely on the belief that the end times are imminent, for which they must prepare. Neo-fascist accelerationists have an apocalyptic desire to destroy the existing, corrupt world to usher in a promised golden age. Part of this apocalyptic desire is rooted in the hypermasculine warrior archetype found in neo-fascist accelerationist ideologies. However, it is also rooted in the belief that there is no salvation for the world as it is and that it must be totally destroyed before it can be saved.

The understanding is that those who are weak, corrupt or lack the appropriate commitment won't survive the coming battle. REMVE actors have multiple versions of an apocalypse, usually in the form of a civil or race war that forces the collapse of society and allows them to rebuild from the ashes; sometimes they refer simply to the Biblical apocalypse (see Figure 9).

Salafi-jihadists and neo-fascist accelerationists both believe that they are purging the land of evil and degeneracy by waging war against non-believers and that in this way they can achieve personal exaltation. While many REMVE actors refer to this event as 'RAHOWA' (Racial Holy War), the boogaloo or white Jihad, the concept is largely the same. Such actors believe that cleansing society of those who weaken it is not only righteous but also strengthens the spiritual fortitude of those who do it. For Islamic State, the Day of Judgement figures prominently in its propaganda, regardless of whether it is intended for Western audiences. In *Dabiq* magazine, IS's English language publication, writers reinterpreted the enslavement of Yazidis through a cosmic lens. The Yazidi world view, the authors of an article in *Dabiq* Issue 4 argue, "entails the worship" of Satan and needs to be taken to task because "they will be asked about it on Judgment Day."⁴⁵ Almost every issue of *Dabiq* contains some reference to the final hour and reinforces the message that to support the Islamic State is to support the righteous in a final cosmic battle between good and evil.⁴⁶

Neo-fascist accelerationists find the imminent end times in Traditionalism, which is "a form of hermetic occultism with the Hindu doctrine of cyclical time and a belief in a now-lost primordial European paganism." Adherents of this blend of doctrines, which can be termed "Traditionalist fascism" believe that a caste-based, racially pure, "organic" society will be restored after what they believe to be an ongoing age of corruption, the Kali Yuga,⁴⁷ is swept away in an apocalyptic war. It is their role to hasten the end of the Kali Yuga by generating chaos and violence.⁴⁸

45 Author Unknown, "The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour," *Dabiq* 4 (11 October 2014).

46 For more on IS's apocalyptic worldview, see: William McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015).

47 As H. E. Upchurch has written, "The Traditionalist concept of the Kali Yuga is derived from an idiosyncratic interpretation of the Hindu doctrine of the cycle of the four ages. In the first age, the Satya Yuga, humanity lives in harmony with the divine, but over the course of the rest of the cycle, human civilization is corrupted until in the last age, the Kali Yuga, humanity is completely corrupt and no longer has any contact with the gods. The Kali Yuga comes to an end in a cataclysm that wipes the slate clean and restores the harmonious relationship between humanity and the divine. In most Hindu philosophies, each age in the cycle is believed to be hundreds of thousands of years long. Traditionalists posit that they are much shorter, at most a few thousand years each." Upchurch, "The Iron March Forum and the Evolution of the 'Skull Mask' Neo-Fascist Network."

48 Ibid.




Figure 9. Example from a neo-fascist accelerationist Telegram channel of the perception of an imminent end time.

Recent manifestos by the Terrorgram Collective, the works of James Mason and the ideological and cultural media created in neo-fascist accelerationist ecosystems are couched in familiar tones of apocalypse, global change and epochal upheavals. Neo-fascist accelerationist propaganda, publications and podcasts are rooted in apocalyptic despair and millennial fervour. They see this same fervour in salafi-jihadists. For both threat actors, their apocalyptic despair is evident in their declaration of war against the West. Ultimately, as has been highlighted by Meleagrou-Hitchens, Crawford and Wutke, “These extremist movements have also made significant efforts to prove both the legitimacy and necessity of violence for the protection of their in-group and its interests. Both seek to either take part in,

or be the catalyst of, a violent conflict, be it a race or holy war. Not only must fighting be used to save and protect those under threat, but it also serves as a means to a glorious end in which humanity will live in peace and prosperity.”⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Blyth Crawford, and Valentin Wutke, “Rise of the Reactionaries: Comparing The Ideologies of Salafi-Jihadism and White Supremacist Extremism,” *George Washington Program on Extremism*, 6 December 2021, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Rise%20of%20the%20Reactionaries.pdf>.

3 Anti-Modernism and Disdain for the West

The second major theme in our analysis is the common disdain shown by REMVE groups and salafi-jihadists for the West and elements of modernity. Neo-fascist accelerationists and jihadists consider themselves to be acting against Western civilisation on the grounds that it is corrupt, degenerate, materialistic and meaningless. Consequently, they share similar content that rejects things they associate with the modern West. This includes liberal democracy, feminism, consumerism, LGBTQ+ liberation and other conditions or movements seen as perverse or corrupting (see Figure 1 above). Additionally, both neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists see the modern world as being in a dark age with civilisation in terminal decline. In the absence of spiritual guidance or adherence to the traditions of a premodern age that they deem more honourable, they declare themselves the enemy of things they see as representative of modern thinking and living. The popular slogan “Reject Modernity Embrace Tradition” is an example of a point at which neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists have a common disdain for the West and modernity. Mike Ma,⁵⁰ in *Gothic Violence*, writes how this hatred of modernity is the “jihad” of the white race:

“This hatred for modernity and technology comes off as bland or juvenile to a select few because they see it repeated so many times. I say get used to it. Embrace it. There is nothing truer to us. For the first time in millions of lives, an objective truth and direction has been found: the understanding that the further we wind things back and the more we remove ourselves from current ways, the better life gets. It’s nothing complicated. In fact, it is the total opposite of complication, and very innocent in its nature. This is the first period of time where man has realized that he’s gone too far ahead and that he would benefit by dialing back. This is our jihad.”⁵¹

The ideological culmination of this kind of anti-modernism is found in the attacks and manifestos of individuals like Breivik, Tarrant and Patrick Crusius. Both neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists understand the modern age to be meaningless and materialist, and that without spiritual guidance or a cultural legacy, individuals lack purpose. They devote themselves to a fictionalised, idealised version of the past that they hope to restore by disrupting current civilisation. Accelerationist ideologues like Miguel Serrano, Savitri Devi and Julius Evola are regularly leveraged by neo-fascist accelerationists to highlight how the modern world is in an advanced state of degeneration; this is a driving force behind their calls to violence.

Additionally, the accelerationist and salafi-jihadist disdain for the West is rooted in a shared belief in a cultural legacy that can be reclaimed. The respective movements claim a spiritual connection to the land that

⁵⁰ Mike Ma, born Mike Mahoney, is a former Breitbart writer, who became an ecofascist accelerationist ideologue following the publication of two accelerationist novels.

⁵¹ Mike Ma, *Gothic Violence* (Independently published, 2021), 68-9.

can be restored only when the groups reconnect with their history. For salafi-jihadists, this is the fight to make Islam triumphant, as the Companions of the Prophet, the *sahabah*, did, and the reconstruction of the Caliphate. Islamic State propaganda is replete with references to how this contemporary movement carries on the legacy of the Companions and those closest to the Prophet (see Figure 10). Foreign fighters who left their countries of origin and traveled to Syria and Iraq imagined their *hijrah* – or emigration – as akin to the seventh century *hijrah* of the Prophet and the early Muslim community from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution and establish a purely Islamic community.⁵²




Figure 10. Tweet from an Islamic State supporter, arguing that the Companions of the Prophet would support current followers of the Islamic State.

With neo-fascist accelerationists, this attachment to land and history is best demonstrated by ecofascists,⁵³ Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto, and the skull mask network.⁵⁴ Neo-fascist accelerationists frequently draw on the mythology and imagery of vikings, Spartans and ancient Rome. Both neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists use images depicting the Crusades and believe that they are reclaiming the legacy of ancient warriors through the glory of war.

Anti-LGBTQ+ Rights and Anti-Feminism

While several aspects of modernity are criticised by neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadist groups, one of the key points of convergence is their mutual disdain for progressive politics, characterised by feminism, pluralism, gender fluidity and same-sex rights (see Figure 11). They understand these social movements, especially those that champion equal rights for women and LGBTQ+ people, as representative of the decline of the modern age. Social progress is seen as unnatural, repulsive and the antithesis of the religious or historical conditions they hope to restore. Meleagrou-Hitchens and colleagues write that “on social issues jihadists and the extreme right have little to disagree on – both are deeply suspicious and hostile towards the gains made by pluralist progressive politics. As a result, they wish to see more traditional values

⁵² Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40, no. 3 (2016).

⁵³ “Ecofascists romanticise a mystical past in which they imagine that their society was ecologically harmonious and strong. They argue that the forces of modernity, such as industrialisation, urbanisation, materialism, and individualism have weakened their society and disrupted that ecological harmony. Multiculturalism and immigration are also considered disruptive, with immigrants perceived as parasites or foreign species in the ecosystem.” Kristy Campion, “Defining Ecofascism: Historical Foundations and Contemporary Interpretations in the Extreme Right,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 November 2021.

⁵⁴ Upchurch, “The Iron March Forum and the Evolution of the ‘Skull Mask’ Neo-Fascist Network.”

reinstated, be it on gender roles, or the blocking of minority groups’ (racial or religious) rights and access to power, and sexual ‘morality’ (in other words a hostility to homosexuality and other sexual orientations and sexualities that differ from what they view to be the ‘norm’).”⁵⁵



Figure 11. Meme made from an edit of a comic from a prominent white-nationalist webcomic creator depicting a salafi-jihadist aided in a tug-of-war against representations of LGBTQ+ people and wealthy capitalists by an individual wearing a “Kekistan” flag shirt.

For neo-fascist accelerationists, being part of the LGBTQ+ community is one of four things: a biological disorder that must be treated; a psychological disorder that must be treated; the result of indoctrination, which must be treated; or, finally, a hedonistic vice, which must be overcome.⁵⁶ A key narrative that has increasing resonance in REMVE environments is widespread hostility towards those who identify as transgender or nonbinary. As Argentino and colleagues note, “Much of this anti-trans rhetoric appears to stem from anxiety that the rigidity of traditional gender roles is threatened by transgender individuals.”⁵⁷ This danger to conventional gender roles is sometimes seen as a corrosive byproduct of modernity, necessitating a return to the supposed norms of a previous, more pure, traditional age. This is consistent with the

⁵⁵ Meleagrou-Hitchens, Crawford, and Wutke, “Rise of the Reactionaries: Comparing The Ideologies of Salafi-Jihadism and White Supremacist Extremism,” 34.

⁵⁶ Alexander Slavros, “The Fag Agenda,” *Wewelsburg Archives* 2016, 39.

⁵⁷ Marc-André Argentino et al., “Far From Gone: The Evolution of Extremism in the First 100 Days of the Biden Administration,” *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization*, 30 April 2021, <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ICSR-Report-Far-From-Gone-The-Evolution-of-Extremism-in-the-First-100-Days-of-the-Biden-Administration.pdf>.

broad traditionalism seen in most of the extreme right.⁵⁸ Transgenderism is often referred to as an “ideology” rather than as a gender identity by the extreme right, which presents trans persons as fundamentally part of a political – and politicised – agenda, and incorrectly suggesting that being transgender is a choice.⁵⁹ Trans “ideology” is believed to be a creeping social influence managed and disseminated by Jews or ZOG at the most extreme end of this discourse.⁶⁰ Ultimately the neo-fascist accelerationist “narrative marries transphobic hatred with traditional extreme-right antisemitism that contends that a small group of Jewish elites is behind a variety of perceived societal evils with the overarching aim of corrupting or exterminating the white race.”⁶¹

From the perspective of neo-fascist accelerationists, the Taliban was able to defeat not only the “degeneracy” that was occurring in its own country, but also overcome the progressive liberal “degeneracy” that the West was trying to impose on it. This was a topic that was often discussed in the summer of 2021 on Telegram (see Figure 12), as the Taliban was taking over Afghanistan and reports of violence and killings of members of the LGBTQ+ community were circulating. The way that the global alliance led by the United States failed in Afghanistan is used as an example of how the continuation of progressive policies will lead to the system being destroyed, as more Aryan men decide to rise against it.



Figure 12. Telegram conversation about how the Taliban was successful in combating societal degeneracy.

58 Benjamin Teitelbaum, “Benjamin Teitelbaum,” *The New Statesman*, 8 October 2020, <https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2020/10/rise-traditionalists-how-mystical-doctrine-reshaping-right>.
59 Ana Campoy, “A conspiracy theory about sex and gender is being peddled around the world by the far right,” *Quartz*, 4 November 2016, <https://qz.com/807743/conservatives-have-created-a-fake-ideology-to-combat-the-global-movement-for-lgbti-rights/>.
60 Joaquina, “Transphobia and Antisemitism,” *The Social Review*, 2 January 2021, <https://www.thesocialreview.co.uk/2021/01/02/transphobia-and-antisemitism/>.
61 Argentino et al., “Far From Gone: The Evolution of Extremism in the First 100 Days of the Biden Administration.”

On the salafi-jihadist side, researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue have recently found an interesting cultural convergence as well. In their study of over 5,000 memes and over 3,500 videos, they found that a new generation of salafis from around the world was blending “traditional Salafism with alt-right-style activism by drawing on ubiquitous gaming and wider internet subcultures” and “adopting, altering and amplifying chan communities, alt-right and far-right narratives, and in some cases glorifying Nazism”.⁶² As noted above, while historically far-right movements have respected and sought to emulate jihadist groups, their admiration was not reciprocated. However, a new generation of young salafis, who came of age in “chan culture” and on gaming platforms, has come to see far-right arguments against pluralism and progressive politics and for a return to tradition as a potential point of narrative convergence (see Figure 13).



Figure 13. Meme captured by ISD: “A GigaChad wearing a Kufi – an Islamic hat – is being targeted for being Homophobic. The image is representative of the deep-seated hatred for the LGBTQ+ community within Islamogram.”⁶³

In addition to anti-LGBTQ+ content, both accelerationists and salafi-jihadists see feminism and feminists as representative of the degeneracy of the modern West. Both neo-fascist accelerationists and salafi-jihadists reject the right of women to personal autonomy and equality with men, and want to restrict them to roles as wives and mothers. Occasionally, both sides will use “warrior woman” images for recruitment, displaying women as valkyries or rebel

⁶² Ayad, “Islamogram: Salafism and Alt-Right Online Subcultures.”

⁶³ Ibid.

insurgents. However, this is not the dominant depiction of women in most propaganda. Both sides frequently make and share memes about how feminism is corrupting women and driving them away from their responsibilities as mothers. The narrative overlap regards feminism as a progressive liberal and Jewish tool used to weaken society by destroying traditional societal and familial structures.



Figure 14. Memes advocating for and romanticizing traditional gender roles, suggesting that a better, more authentic relationship could be had, if men and women each embraced their “true” gender roles.

Therefore, in neo-fascist accelerationist ecosystems, “appealing to the importance of maintaining ‘tradition’ is one of the ways in which nationalist rhetoric claims an essentialized and largely a-historical version of culture”.⁶⁴ This does not mean that women are excluded from neo-fascist accelerationist ecosystems. TradWives is an example of how these threat actors used their perception of familial structures to recruit women into white-supremacist hate movements.⁶⁵ Islamic State supporters, for instance, released a guide in 2015 called “Sister’s Role in Jihad”, which discussed the most important ways for a Muslim woman to contribute to the Caliphate. Similar to what Diana Moore has called “Revolutionary Domesticity”,⁶⁶ the Islamic State encouraged female supporters to reject Western notions of feminist liberation and adopt conservative and traditional life choices as a revolutionary act. A woman’s role in the Caliphate, according to “Sister’s Role in Jihad”, was to raise mujahid children, teach children stories of martyrs and fighters, and show them how to stand “strong against the disbelievers”.⁶⁷ In other words, domesticity was reimagined as contributing to the Caliphate’s transformative project. Similar dynamics are visible on the far right.⁶⁸

64 Miranda Christou, “#TradWives: sexism as gateway to white supremacy,” *Open Democracy*, 17 March 2020, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/tradwives-sexism-gateway-white-supremacy/>.

65 Annie Kelly, “The Housewives of White Supremacy,” *The New York Times*, 1 June 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/sunday/tradwives-women-alt-right.html>.

66 Diana Moore, *Revolutionary Domesticity in the Italian Risorgimento: Transnational Victorian Feminism, 1850-1890* (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

67 Gina Vale, “Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps,” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism*, 17 October 2019, <https://icct.nl/publication/women-in-islamic-state-from-caliphate-to-camps/>.

68 Kathleen M. Blee, *Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

4 Antisemitism

Even after exploring the far right’s admiration of salafi-jihadist groups and their mutual anti-modernism, there is no other issue upon which there is more unanimous agreement than their unbridled hatred of the Jews. Sayyid Qutb, a key ideologue of salafi-jihadism, combined hatred of the West and antisemitism into a kind of single ideology and, rejecting the notion of the “People of the Book”, argued “that Jews were actually more dangerous and loathsome than polytheists”.⁶⁹ In his text *Our Struggle with the Jews*, Qutb writes:

“Who tried to undermine the nascent Islamic state in Medina and who incited Quraish in Mecca, as well as other tribes against the foundation of this state? It was a Jew! Who stood behind the fitna-war and the slaying of the third caliph Osman and all the tragedies that followed hereafter? It was a Jew! And who inflamed national divides against the last caliph and who stood behind the turmoil that ended the Islamic order with the abolition of shari’a? It was Ataturk, a Jew! The Jews always stood and continue to stand behind the war waged against Islam. Today, this war persists against the Islamic revival in all places on earth.”⁷⁰

In al-Qaeda and IS propaganda, the hatred of the Jews and the view that Jews have infiltrated different levels of Western government is largely accepted as true. In their propaganda, “crusaders” and “Jews” are often used side by side to mean the same enemy. In the fifth issue of the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine, the writers note that they are at war with the Kurds not because of their ethnicity but because of their disbelief: “we fight the disbelievers amongst them, the allies of the crusaders and Jews in their war against the Muslims”.⁷¹

For some accelerationist groups, jihadist hatred of the Jews is another point on which they agree, and recent memes and online propaganda have increasingly hammered home this point. Some also support Islamic militant organisations who are fighting against the state of Israel.⁷² For instance, such actors perceive Hamas as a successful insurgent force defending its land and race against Zionists. Neo-fascist accelerationists find common ground with Hamas in their own perceived battle against ZOG, where they are fighting against a presumed Zionist occupation in Europe and North America in a similar fashion to how Hamas is battling Zionists in Gaza. Most recently, in 2021 James Mason and the American Futurist showed support for Hamas twice. In May 2021, Mason penned a letter of support for Hamas whereby he stated that, “we see Hamas as the only legitimate government within the land that is claimed by Jews.”⁷³ Hamas and its allies are examples that white Aryans should strive to emulate

69 Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right*, 44.

70 Quoted in Bassam Tibi, “From Sayyid Qutb to Hamas: The Middle East Conflict and the Islamization of Antisemitism,” *The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism* (2010).

71 Author Unknown, “Unifying the Ranks,” *Dabiq* 5 (21 November 2014).

72 Many on the far right are torn on the state of Israel because, on the one hand, they desire an ethno-state but, on the other, hate the Jews.

73 American Futurist, “A Letter of Support for Hamas,” *American Futurist*, 12 May 2021.

as “they are the only ones fully willing to stand up to the Jews in question and address the Jewish Question.”⁷⁴ American Futurist states clearly that its sole reason for supporting Hamas is that the group is anti-Jewish.

In its September publication about Hamas, American Futurist penned an article arguing that Hamas is a model for white Aryans to follow for their own liberation in North America. Some of the key factors the article highlights are how Hamas did not start off with weapons and armed combat, but grounded its insurgency in maintaining “militant and revolutionary beliefs”, like being anti-Jewish and seeking the destruction of Israel to liberate Palestine. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, or al-Qaeda, or IS in Marawi, Hamas focused on building a powerbase within the Palestinian population and its communities. The article highlights how the group started food banks, taught Palestinians how to read and write, and gave them a political education. Rather than “begging the masses to join them through useless marches” or threatening people with guns to join them, Hamas started from the ground up. American Futurist emphasises that rural white Americans suffer from hunger and poverty, job prospects are non-existent and the System has no intent in helping them. These are the masses that neo-fascist accelerationists need to reach out to as their base, to back their own revolution in North America against ZOG. Their hate for the Jews is the cornerstone of neo-fascist accelerationism, and they find a common ally in salafi-jihadists in this space, which translates not only in the sharing of TTPs, but also in shared aesthetics and propaganda.

Indeed, as George Michael argues, “the genesis of the cooperation between militant Islam and the extreme right can be traced back to the early years of the Third Reich”⁷⁵ and is best exemplified by the relationship between Adolf Hitler and the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. Famously in 1920, al-Husseini’s followers went on a violent rampage at the time of the Nebi Musa religious festival, killing and injuring dozens of Jews and moderate Arabs. He led another massacre of Jews in Hebron in 1929 and a third in 1936. He openly expressed support for Nazi Germany in 1937 and asked for Hitler’s help in his campaign to halt the immigration of Jews to Palestine.⁷⁶ Al-Husseini also travelled to different parts of the Muslim world to garner support for Hitler’s war effort. He helped to organise the Waffen-SS Handschar Division in Yugoslavia, which was made up of Bosnian Muslim volunteers, and made several radio broadcasts to the Arab world to shore up support for the war effort.⁷⁷ Some scholars also charge al-Husseini with “playing a major role” in the Holocaust, because he and other Muslim leaders discouraged the expelling of Jews from Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria to Palestine.⁷⁸ In contemporary accelerationist aesthetics, al-Husseini is celebrated as an ally against the Jews and as someone having received a stamp of approval from Hitler himself (see Figure 15).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right* 112.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 113

⁷⁷ Ibid., 117

⁷⁸ Ibid., 118



Figure 15. Meme by Dark Foreigner depicting al-Husseini.

5 Conclusion and Future Directions

While we have explored numerous points of narrative convergence between accelerationists and salafi-jihadists in this report, there are also new developments occurring on the fringes of these movements online that require further research and exploration. For one, an often overlooked cause of convergence is shared recruitment demographics. Both seek to recruit and influence young men of military age or younger. To do this, they must go where young men are, requiring them to engage more with pop culture, digital communities, memes and popular media. In some cases, such as the appropriation of video game aesthetics in propaganda, accessing the recruitment demographic is more important to them than the propaganda content itself, resulting often in strong stylistic and aesthetic convergence.

With a universal reliance on the internet, many of the memes and propaganda materials posted by all manner of violent extremists are very similar in production and style. This includes memes that originated on 4chan, vaporwave aesthetics and certain performative military aesthetics. Vaporwave has become almost the default propaganda style for any extremist movement operating on the internet, especially if the demographics for that movement are thirty-five years old or younger. It stylises a certain type of techno-dystopian decay that embodies these groups' nihilistic beliefs about modern civilisation while reflecting the culture of digital media. While there is some research on this dynamic, it remains frustratingly under-researched.

Tacticool, in turn, refers to the style of wearing tactical gear for its intimidating or impressive appearance more than its function. Since so many of these movements are reliant on embodying certain archetypes around strength and masculinity, one of the most important things they can do is look the part, regardless of practicality. Jihadists and REMVE actors both habitually post photos in elaborate tactical gear to show how prepared they are for war, even if the body armour is ill-fitting and they are carrying too many weapons to move freely.

As far as direct inspiration and influence, neo-fascist accelerationists are more interested in the actions of jihadists than the other way around. While logically racism and Islamophobia would make most white nationalists hate jihadists, many neo-fascist accelerationists, white nationalists and neo-Nazis have a certain amount of aspirational respect for them. Aside from some of the emerging Islamogram research cited above, this level of admiration is not reciprocated by jihadists towards members of the far right. This is largely because jihadists successfully captured the attention of the international media and the security agencies of every nation on the planet, which is a degree of notoriety that neo-fascist accelerationists have yet to reach. Additionally, most jihadists recognise that whatever gestures of alliance-building members of the far right express are likely to be inauthentic and disingenuous.

As noted above, there have been several historical instances when the far right and jihadists have seen eye-to-eye on aspects of ideology or political goals. This is not altogether exceptional. However, we argue, there are indeed unique dynamics taking place to which extremism researchers ought to pay some attention. We conclude here with a brief discussion of some points of similarity that might take on increasing importance in the years ahead.

A) Success Fighting State Powers

For one, salafi-jihadist groups successfully made themselves a challenge to state power. They were able to claim territory, influence regimes and become a genuine adversary to both Western governments and governments at home. This is something most Western neo-fascist accelerationists movements have never come close to accomplishing, except for a few odd political parties and militia activities. However, this may change.

B) Violent Action Sanctioned and Taken

From the perspective of neo-fascist accelerationists, the willingness to engage in violent action for a cause is a source of pride. An ongoing point of contention among REMVE groups is the concern that their members are uncommitted or too fearful of consequences to take up arms against enemies. To neo-fascist accelerationists, salafi-jihadists have a reputation for acting upon their ideological positions no matter how brutal or criminal. Examining the propaganda posturing related to these arguments could be important going forward.

C) Cell Structure and Lone Actors

While neo-fascist accelerationists are generally less organised and hierarchical than salafi-jihadist groups, they learned that operating under cell structures and utilising lone actors in a similar fashion to IS was an effective way to build notoriety and avoid detection or infiltration from law enforcement agencies. It also allows for those prepared to do violence to do so for a stated cause without ever having to formally organise or communicate with the main group.

D) Digital Recruitment Tactics

As salafi-jihadist and neo-fascist accelerationists are trying to reach similar demographics, they both use the power of digital networking and communities to do it. This means chat rooms, ban evasions, hashtags, memes, gaming and other forms of digital engagement are habits of both types of movements. As new kinds of aesthetics take root and evolve rapidly, social media companies may also find themselves struggling to keep up.

E) Mandatory Religious System and Ethno-states

While there are substantial disagreements about what it would look like, neo-fascist accelerationists have their own fantasies of constructing ethno-states with mandatory religious practices. They understand this to be part of restoring the glory of the West, much as salafi-jihadists believe that they are rebuilding the Caliphate.

F) Authoritarianism and the Murder of Dissidents

The execution of traitors, rule breakers and non-believers is something many neo-fascist accelerationists wish they had the power to do. Since they have no territory on which they could enact and enforce their own rules without intervention, they are unable to live out their authoritarian fantasies. However, they admire the ways in which groups like IS are able to eliminate traitors to the cause.



CONTACT DETAILS

For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact:

ICSR
King's College London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

T. +44 20 7848 2098

E. mail@icsr.info

Twitter: [@icsr_centre](https://twitter.com/icsr_centre)

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