Firejail is a SUID sandbox program that reduces the risk of security breaches by restricting the running environment of untrusted applications using Linux namespaces, seccomp-bpf and Linux capabilities. It allows a process and all its descendants to have their own private view of the globally shared kernel resources, such as the network stack, process table, mount table. Firejail can work in a SELinux or AppArmor environment, and it is integrated with Linux Control Groups.
Written in C with virtually no dependencies, the software runs on any Linux computer with a 3.x kernel version or newer. It can sandbox any type of processes: servers, graphical applications, and even user login sessions. The software includes sandbox profiles for a number of more common Linux programs, such as Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, VLC, Transmission etc.
The sandbox is lightweight, the overhead is low. There are no complicated configuration files to edit, no socket connections open, no daemons running in the background. All security features are implemented directly in Linux kernel and available on any Linux computer. To start the sandbox, prefix your command with “firejail”:
$ firejail firefox # starting Mozilla Firefox
$ firejail transmission-gtk # starting Transmission BitTorrent
$ firejail vlc # starting VideoLAN Client
$ sudo firejail /etc/init.d/nginx start
Project webpage: https://firejail.wordpress.com/
Download and Installation: https://firejail.wordpress.com/download-2/
Features: https://firejail.wordpress.com/features-3/
Documentation: https://firejail.wordpress.com/documentation-2/
FAQ: https://firejail.wordpress.com/support/frequently-asked-questions/
If you keep your Firejail profiles in a public repository, please give us a link:
Use this issue to request new profiles: netblue30#825
--x11=none
Blacklist /tmp/.X11-unix directory, ${HOME}/.Xauthority and the
file specified in ${XAUTHORITY} environment variable. Remove
DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY environment variables. Stop with error
message if X11 abstract socket will be accessible in jail.
--x11=xorg
Sandbox the application using the untrusted mode implemented by
X11 security extension. The extension is available in Xorg
package and it is installed by default on most Linux distribu‐
tions. It provides support for a simple trusted/untrusted con‐
nection model. Untrusted clients are restricted in certain ways
to prevent them from reading window contents of other clients,
stealing input events, etc.
The untrusted mode has several limitations. A lot of regular
programs assume they are a trusted X11 clients and will crash
or lock up when run in untrusted mode. Chromium browser and
xterm are two examples. Firefox and transmission-gtk seem to be
working fine. A network namespace is not required for this
option.
Example:
$ firejail --x11=xorg firefox
--put=name|pid src-filename dest-filename
Put src-filename in sandbox container. The container is specified by name or PID.
--allusers
All user home directories are visible inside the sandbox. By default, only current user home
directory is visible.
Example:
$ firejail --allusers
--join-or-start=name
Join the sandbox identified by name or start a new one. Same as "firejail --join=name" if
sandbox with specified name exists, otherwise same as "firejail --name=name ..."
Note that in contrary to other join options there is respective profile option.
--no3d Disable 3D hardware acceleration.
Example:
$ firejail --no3d firefox
--veth-name=name
Use this name for the interface connected to the bridge for
--net=bridge_interface commands, instead of the default one.
Example:
$ firejail --net=br0 --veth-name=if0
x11 xpra, x11 xephyr, x11 none, x11 xorg, allusers, join-or-start
qpdfview, mupdf, Luminance HDR, Synfig Studio, Gimp, Inkscape, feh, ranger, zathura, 7z, keepass, keepassx, claws-mail, mutt, git, emacs, vim, xpdf, VirtualBox, OpenShot, Flowblade, Eye of GNOME (eog), Evolution