



FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2022



**FRAGILE
STATES
INDEX** FFP

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
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
FRAGILE STATES INDEX



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THE WORLD IN 2022





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VERY SUSTAINABLE

- 15.1 Finland (179) ▲
- 15.6 Norway (178) ▲
- 17.1 Iceland (177) ▲
- 17.5 New Zealand (176) ▲
- 18.1 Denmark (175) ▲
- 18.9 Switzerland (174) ▲

SUSTAINABLE

- 20.0 Luxembourg (173) ▲
- 20.1 Canada (172) ▲
- 20.8 Ireland (171) ▲
- 20.9 Sweden (170) ▲
- 22.1 Netherlands (169) ▲
- 22.7 Australia (168) ▼
- 23.6 Germany (167) ▲
- 25.4 Austria (166) ▲
- 25.8 Singapore (165) ▲
- 27.5 Portugal (164) ▼
- 27.7 Slovenia (163) ▲

VERY STABLE

- 30.9 France (162) ▲
- 31.0 Japan (161) ▲
- 31.9 Belgium (160) ▼
- 32.7 South Korea (159) ▼
- 34.7 Malta (158) ▲
- 35.2 Uruguay (157) ▲
- 37.1 Slovak Republic (156) ▲
- 37.7 Estonia (155) ▲
- 37.9 Mauritius (154) ▲
- 38.6 Lithuania (153) ▲
- 39.1 United Arab Emirates (152) ▲
- 39.9 Czechia (151) ▼

MORE STABLE

- 40.6 United Kingdom (150) ▲
- 41.0 Costa Rica (149) ▲
- 42.2 Poland (148) ▲
- 42.3 Qatar (147) ▲
- 42.6 Israel (146) ▲
- 42.8 Latvia (145) ▲
- 43.2 Chile (144) ▲
- 43.4 Italy (143) ▲
- 44.4 Spain (142) ▲
- 45.9 Barbados (141) ▲
- 46.6 United States (140) ▼
- 47.5 Panama (139) ▲
- 47.9 Argentina (138) ▲
- 49.3 Croatia (137) ▲
- 49.5 Oman (136) ▲

STABLE

- 50.6 Bahamas (135) ▲
- 50.8 Hungary (=133) ▲
- 50.8 Romania (=133) ▲
- 51.6 Bulgaria (=131) =
- 51.6 Mongolia (=131) ▲
- 52.2 Kuwait (130) ▲
- 52.4 Trinidad and Tobago (129) ▲
- 54.2 Seychelles (=127) ▲
- 54.2 Antigua and Barbuda (=127) ▲
- 54.3 Grenada (126) ▲
- 55.1 Brunei Darussalam (125) ▲
- 55.8 Greece (124) ▼
- 56.1 Botswana (123) ▲
- 56.4 Malaysia (122) ▲
- 56.7 Albania (121) ▲
- 56.9 Cyprus (120) ▲
- 57.9 Montenegro (119) ▲
- 59.5 Kazakhstan (118) ▲

WARNING

- 60.1 Cuba (117) ▼
- 60.8 Suriname (116) ▲
- 60.9 Vietnam (115) ▲
- 61.4 Cabo Verde (114) ▲
- 62.1 Jamaica (=112) ▼
- 62.1 Belize (=112) ▲
- 62.6 North Macedonia (111) ▲
- 62.8 Dominican Republic (110) ▲
- 62.9 Namibia (109) ▲
- 63.0 Ghana (108) ▲
- 64.2 Guyana (107) ▲
- 64.5 Moldova (=105) ▲
- 64.5 Maldives (=105) ▲
- 64.8 Samoa (104) ▼
- 65.4 Paraguay (103) ▲
- 66.5 Turkmenistan (102) ▲
- 66.6 Indonesia (=100) ▲
- 66.6 Bahrain (=100) ▲
- 66.7 Gabon (99) ▲
- 66.9 China (98) ▲
- 67.0 Armenia (97) ▲
- 67.4 Bhutan (96) ▲
- 67.5 Saudi Arabia (95) ▲
- 67.8 Serbia (94) ▼
- 68.2 Tunisia (93) ▲
- 68.6 Ukraine (92) ▲
- 68.7 Belarus (91) ▼
- 68.9 Fiji (90) ▲
- 69.1 Ecuador (89) ▲
- 69.6 Uzbekistan (88) ▲
- 69.8 Peru (87) ▲

2022 SCORES

ELEVATED WARNING

- 70.0 Thailand (86) ▲
- 70.1 Morocco (85) ▲
- 70.3 Mexico (84) ▼
- 70.4 São Tomé and Príncipe (83) ▲
- 70.8 El Salvador (82) ▲
- 71.0 Micronesia (81) ▲
- 71.8 Georgia (80) ▲
- 72.0 South Africa (79) ▼
- 72.1 Senegal (78) ▲
- 72.2 Algeria (77) ▲
- 72.5 Benin (76) ▲
- 72.6 Russia (75) ▲
- 73.0 Bosnia and Herzegovina (74) ▼
- 73.1 Azerbaijan (73) ▲
- 73.4 Bolivia (72) ▲
- 73.9 Brazil (71) ▲
- 75.0 Tajikistan (70) ▲
- 75.3 India (69) ▲
- 75.5 Laos (68) ▲
- 76.6 Jordan (67) ▲
- 77.1 Kyrgyzstan (66) ▼
- 77.4 Lesotho (65) ▲
- 77.5 Guatemala (64) ▲
- 77.7 Nicaragua (63) ▼
- 78.1 Türkiye (62) ▲
- 78.2 Tanzania (61) ▲
- 78.4 Colombia (60) ▲
- 78.6 The Gambia (59) ▲
- 78.7 Honduras (58) ▲
- 79.3 Timor-Leste (=56) ▲
- 79.3 Sri Lanka (=56) ▲
- 79.5 Papua New Guinea (55) ▲

HIGH WARNING

- 80.4 Eswatini (=52) ▲
- 80.4 Solomon Islands (=52) ▼
- 80.4 Madagascar (=52) ▼
- 80.5 Philippines (=50) ▲
- 80.5 Cambodia (=50) ▲
- 80.6 Nepal (49) ▲
- 81.3 Djibouti (48) ▲
- 82.3 Comoros (47) ▲
- 82.4 Sierra Leone (46) ▲
- 83.0 Malawi (45) ▲
- 83.6 Egypt (=42) ▲
- 83.6 Zambia (=42) ▲
- 83.6 Togo (=42) ▲
- 83.7 Rwanda (41) ▲
- 84.1 Iran (=39) ▲
- 84.1 Equatorial Guinea (=39) =
- 84.5 Bangladesh (38) ▲
- 85.6 Palestine (37) ▲
- 87.9 Mauritania (36) ▲
- 88.1 Angola (35) ▲
- 88.2 Kenya (=33) ▲
- 88.2 Liberia (=33) ▲
- 89.1 North Korea (32) ▲
- 89.6 Côte d'Ivoire (31) ▲
- 89.7 Pakistan (30) ▲

ALERT

- 90.5 Burkina Faso (29) ▼
- 91.3 Lebanon (=27) ▼
- 91.3 Guinea-Bissau (=27) ▲
- 91.6 Venezuela (26) ▲
- 92.1 Uganda (25) ▲
- 92.2 Congo (Republic) (24) ▲
- 93.8 Iraq (23) ▲
- 94.3 Mozambique (=21) ▼
- 94.3 Libya (=21) ▲
- 95.2 Niger (20) ▲
- 95.4 Burundi (19) ▲
- 95.9 Eritrea (18) ▲
- 96.0 Cameroon (17) ▲
- 97.2 Nigeria (16) ▲
- 97.8 Zimbabwe (15) ▲
- 98.6 Mali (14) ▼
- 99.3 Ethiopia (13) ▼
- 99.6 Guinea (12) ▼
- 99.7 Haiti (11) ▼

HIGH ALERT

- 100.0 Myanmar (10) ▼
- 105.7 Chad (9) ▲
- 105.9 Afghanistan (8) ▼
- 107.1 Sudan (7) ▼
- 107.3 Congo (Democratic Republic) (6) ▲
- 108.1 Central African Republic (5) ▼
- 108.4 South Sudan (=3) ▲
- 108.4 Syria (=3) ▲

VERY HIGH ALERT

- 110.5 Somalia (2) ▲
- 111.7 Yemen (=1)

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Security Standard Compliance



Security Risk Assessments



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COMING APART AT THE SEAMS: FRAGILITY IN A TIME OF COVID-19

NATE HAKEN

The last two years have challenged many assumptions about what it means to be fragile and what it means to be resilient. Countries that were thought to be strong proved weak. Problems that were thought to be straightforward proved complex. It takes more than financial and human capital to manage and recover from a crisis.

In 2020, it became painfully obvious that a health crisis can be more than a health crisis.¹ We learned that pandemic preparedness and response require much more than a focus on health systems alone, as many countries with strong health infrastructure did even worse than countries with weak health infrastructure. Other factors measured in the Fragile States Index (FSI), such as social and political cohesion, had as much, or more impact on resilience than access to quality health services. As a result of the pandemic, virtually all countries experienced an economic shock as businesses were shut down, travel curtailed, and global trade and supply chains ground to a halt. In this context, 2020 had the worst recorded global GDP contraction in over 60 years (-3.3%).² This took a devastating toll on livelihoods, social protection, and essential services, especially for the most vulnerable. As 2020 came to a close, and the first vaccines were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the new year seemed to promise hope for recovery. Very quickly, in 2021, the economy did roar back to life with the highest global GDP growth (6.1%)³ since 1973. With the rapid rollout of the COVID-19 vaccines, case/fatality

MOST WORSENEDED COUNTRIES 2022

+6.2	↗	Myanmar	+2.0	↗	United States
+3.8	↗	Afghanistan	+2.0	↗	South Africa
+3.4	↗	Burkina Faso	+2.0	↗	Mali
+2.3	↗	Lebanon	+1.9	↗	Sudan
+2.2	↗	Haiti	+1.3	↗	Greece
+2.2	↗	Guinea	+1.1	↗	Solomon Islands

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES 2022

-3.1	↘	Maldives	-2.4	↘	Iraq
-2.8	↘	Cabo Verde	-2.4	↘	Vietnam
-2.8	↘	Armenia	-2.3	↘	Albania
-2.7	↘	Libya	-2.3	↘	Syria
-2.5	↘	Moldova	-2.2	↘	Saudi Arabia
-2.4	↘	Uzbekistan	-2.2	↘	Argentina

rates dropped precipitously, and restrictions were loosened. People went back to work. Businesses reopened. Travel picked up. Global trade resumed.

However, if the lesson of 2020 was that a health crisis was more than a health crisis, the lesson of 2021 was that a booming economy does not guarantee a reduction in fragility. Even as the economy was rebounding, overall COVID deaths increased as the second and third waves of the disease killed the unvaccinated, the elderly, the disabled, racial and ethnic minorities, the poor,⁴ and others with co-morbidities. According to the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE), about 1.9 million people died from COVID-19 in 2020.⁵ In 2021, that number increased by 3.6 million to about 5.4 million deaths. Even so, according to a study in the Lancet, those numbers could be less than a third of the actual number who died from the pandemic overall.⁶

Meanwhile, as more people were dying from COVID-19 in 2021, a record number of people (an increase of over 20 million) were internally displaced by violence and natural disasters including in places like **Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Myanmar**.⁷ According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the number of riots and protests and the number of conflict fatalities also increased in 2021 compared to the previous year. And there was an increase in the number of coups and coup attempts across the world.

In the FSI 2022 (which covers calendar year 2021), the five most fragile countries were **Yemen, Somalia, Syria, South Sudan, and Central African Republic**. With the exception of South Sudan, which was not an independent country until 2011, and Syria, these countries have been among the top 20 most fragile since the FSI started in 2005, with protracted and recurrent crises, making it difficult to gain traction in development and governance. Climbing out of a fragility trap is a generational project, particularly when starting from a disadvantage in terms of resources and external intervention.

It is not impossible, however. **Uzbekistan**, which started as the 22nd most fragile country in 2005, has been steadily improving for the last 17 years due to a series of political and economic reforms, and positive development outcomes, and was again among the most improved in 2021. Others which improved in 2021 include **Cabo Verde** and **Maldives**, which rely heavily on tourism and shipping and were hard hit by the global shutdown in 2020. Like Uzbekistan, Cabo Verde has steadily improved over the last decade, despite facing economic, political, and environmental challenges, due to growing democratic governance and inclusive development policies. Maldives had an enormous 33.4% GDP growth in 2021.⁸ **Libya**, which is heavily reliant on oil exports, also improved in 2021. Libya has been in an increasingly volatile cycle of boom and bust since 2010, and 2021 was a major boom year with an unprecedented 177.3% GDP growth.⁹ In addition to the startling economic performance, there was also some progress in the peace process which will hopefully be built upon in future years, though Libya remains highly fragile overall. Finally, among the top, most improved counties, is **Armenia**, which improved in comparison to 2020 during which it was at war with Azerbaijan. Now in a post-conflict phase, there remain lingering geopolitical challenges but with reintegration of displaced persons and efforts at reconstruction, Armenia improved significantly in 2021.

The most worsened were **Myanmar, Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Haiti, and Lebanon**. Myanmar had a coup. Afghanistan had a violent change of power. Burkina Faso had a rise in violent extremism. Haiti's president was assassinated. Lebanon had a deepening economic and political crisis, and a rise in protest and violence.

But more broadly speaking, the lessons of 2020 and 2021 are as follows:

- 1) *There has been an erosion in public confidence in democratic institutions and an increase in social and political polarization in both rich and poor countries across the globe, which has*

contributed to a rise in authoritarianism.

- 2) This bodes ill for country-resilience and the ability to manage the next shock and bounce back successfully. Without an improvement in social and political cohesion scores, even rich countries can be destabilized.
- 3) Previously, state fragility was seen as something to be contained and mitigated in the developing world so that it does not spread to the rich countries. Now, however, we are discovering that fragility can flow both ways. War in Europe can lead to food crises in Africa. A pandemic can just as easily spread from North to South. Same with xenophobic nationalism and violent extremism. Fragility is something that must be addressed everywhere all at once, and core to that strategy must be a focus on social and political cohesion and inclusiveness.

In the previous year's FSI, the United States was the most worsened due to the cascading effects of COVID-19, which included growing social and political polarization, economic downturn, rising political violence, and group grievance. Every country can have a bad year. But a resilient country usually improves the following year. In 2021 the United States worsened yet again. Even as the economy and public services improved, and child poverty was significantly reduced,¹⁰ there was a violent mob attack on the Capitol to stop the peaceful transfer of power, an increase in radicalization by extremist groups, crime, and the worst year on record for gun violence.

The FSI 2022 report illustrates how far the world has come. While much progress has been made over the last 17 years in terms of poverty reduction, mortality and public health, and essential service worldwide, it does not mean that the world is necessarily better positioned to withstand the next global shock. And although the worst of COVID-19 may be behind us, we are not out of the woods quite yet.

LONG-TERM MOST WORSENEDED 2012-2022

+20.7		Mali	+9.8		Brazil
+14.3		Venezuela	+9.4		Libya
+13.9		Syria	+6.9		Yemen
+11.9		Mozambique	+5.5		Lebanon
+11.8		United States	+5.4		Greece

LONG-TERM MOST IMPROVED 2012-2022

-17.9		Uzbekistan	-13.4		Timor-Leste
-15.0		Bhutan	-13.3		Cabo Verde
-14.2		Moldova	-13.1		Vietnam
-14.0		Indonesia	-13.0		Georgia
-14.0		Côte d'Ivoire	-13.0		Cuba

Footnotes

¹ <https://fragilestatesindex.org/2021/05/20/a-health-crisis-is-more-than-a-health-crisis/>

² <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

³ https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

⁴ [https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanam/article/PIIS2667-193X\(21\)00111-3/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanam/article/PIIS2667-193X(21)00111-3/fulltext)

⁵ <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>

⁶ <https://www.healthdata.org/news-release/lancet-global-death-toll-covid-19-pandemic-may-be-more-three-times-higher-official>

⁷ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118602>

⁸ https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/MDV

⁹ https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/LBY

¹⁰ <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/61e73f1169294a3c6af9d9/1642544913557/Monthly-poverty-December-2021-CPSP.pdf>

¹¹ <https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls>



SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL FRAGILITY ACT: AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH

LIZ HUME

Executive Director of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a nonprofit and nonpartisan network of 160+ organizations working in 181 countries to prevent conflict, reduce violence, improve lives, and build sustainable peace. Liz is a conflict expert and has more than 20 years of experience in senior leadership positions in bilateral, multilateral institutions and NGOs.

In Spring 2022, the Biden Administration released the Global Fragility Act's (GFA) long-awaited four priority countries, Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, and Papua New Guinea, and one region, Coastal West Africa.¹ The release of these priority areas is a welcomed and critical step forward to implementing the bipartisan GFA signed into law in December 2019. The GFA is a game-changing law that puts peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the center of U.S. foreign policy, assistance, and security strategy.² As recommended by AfP from the start, the Fragile States Index (FSI) was critical in this selection process with over seventeen years of evidence-based quantifiable data. The FSI will also be essential in monitoring the success and failure of the GFA strategies and, more importantly, understanding the causes of conflict and areas to target. While there was considerable debate about the selection of these countries and one region, it is critical to remember this is not the only bite of the apple. If the GFA's strategy is successful, it will become the norm in all U.S. foreign policy strategies in conflict-affected and fragile states.


The GFA puts peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the center of the U.S. government's strategy and requires developing a whole-of-government 10-year strategy to prevent

and reduce violent conflict and build sustainable peace.³ It requires evidence-based monitoring and evaluation, bi-annual reporting to Congress, and ongoing consultations with civil society. By September 2020, the GFA required at least five countries/regions to be selected. However, this deadline slipped due to the Presidential administration transition, the global pandemic, and ongoing global violent conflicts from Afghanistan to Ukraine.

The selection of these priority countries and one region resulted from a significant process that included reviewing conflict watch lists such as the Fragile States Index backed by evidence-based quantifiable negative and positive indicators and consultations with civil society. The selection process also included evaluating U.S. national security interests and other key criteria, such as strong buy-in from the highest levels at the U.S. missions.


All the countries and one region selected are great opportunities where a new U.S. peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategy can significantly impact preventing and reducing violent conflict and fragility and building sustainable peace. Additionally, priority countries and region will provide key lessons for other conflict-affected and fragile states, and many U.S. missions are already eager to implement them.

OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:
Haiti



In 2022, the Fragile States Index listed Haiti as one of the most worsened countries due to political violence, including the assassination of the President, crippling gang violence and poverty, and humanitarian disasters.⁴ This year, Haiti’s fragility rank fell to number 11 from 13. Given its proximity to the U.S., large diaspora community, and ongoing migration to the United States, Haiti is vital to the U.S. national interests. Over the years, the U.S. and the international community have conducted multiple stabilization and humanitarian missions that have not resulted in peace and stability in Haiti. However, the GFA offers a new approach that must support citizen security and developing an effective and legitimate government.


OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:
Mozambique



Mozambique's 2022 FSI rank deteriorated from number 22 in 2021 to number 21. Mozambique is experiencing an increasingly violent extremist ISIS-M destabilizing threat in the north that is displacing thousands and impacting infrastructure, including its vital natural gas production.⁵ Mozambique's FSI indicator scores show the most severe levels of stress in Public


Services and Demographic Pressures. While the United States is the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Mozambique, it is time for a more integrated strategy that targets the causes of increasing violent conflict and extremism.⁶ Fortunately, the government has publicly acknowledged its willingness to work closely with international partners, which is vital to implementing the GFA and addressing the increased violent conflict and extremism.

OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:
Libya



Sharing the 21st spot with Mozambique, Libya's FSI rank improved from #17 in 2021. Unlike Mozambique, Libya's worst scores were found in External Intervention and State Legitimacy. However, the current political situation in Libya provides an opening the international community must urgently seize.

OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:
Papua New Guinea



While Papua New Guinea, listed as #55 on the FSI, was not the most obvious choice for a GFA priority country, it is an excellent case to focus on fragility and prevention. Violent inter-tribal conflict and violence against women threaten stability, along with Economic Inequality and Public Services.

Additionally, there are ongoing independence negotiations following the civil war in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, and the People's Republic of China's engagement is growing.

The only region selected is Coastal West Africa which includes Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo. This region is experiencing spreading violent extremism from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin.⁸ Additionally, the recent military coup in Guinea is evidence of increasing instability. It shows the need to address the causes of violent extremism early, including political fragility, to prevent violent extremism from gaining a foothold in this region.

The selection of the priority countries and region moves the work of the GFA out of theory and into practice, but major work lies ahead. First, Congress must fund the GFA over 10 years at the full authorized amount \$200 million each year. To ensure successful 10-year strategies in these priority countries and region and hopefully all conflict-affected and fragile states in the future, it cannot be business as usual. The U.S. government still must request Congress to address the challenges that could impede successfully implementing the GFA, such as earmarks, procurement constraints, and staffing challenges. It is also critical that the U.S. government use the exceptional tools at its disposal, including the Fragile States Index and other evidence-based conflict watch lists, to monitor progress and failure and learn the lessons and adapt the strategies in real-time. We know conflict is not static and linear, nor should strategies and approaches be.

Footnotes

- ¹ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/01/addressing-the-collective-challenges-of-our-time-implementing-the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/>
- ² <https://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/afp-publications/gfa-coalition-statement-gfa-priority-country-and-region-release-4122>
- ³ <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-US-Strategy-to-Prevent-Conflict-and-Promote-Stabilit-508c-508.pdf>
- ⁴ <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>
- ⁵ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/bl178-winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north>
- ⁶ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-humanitarian-aid-and-supplies-help-respond-to-insecurity-in-mozambique/>
- ⁷ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/libya-elections-2021-postponed/>
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BRAZIL: DISTRUST AND FRAGMENTATION



NÁDYA SILVEIRA

A steady decline in social and political cohesion in Brazil over the last eight years, as measured by the FSI, has created a situation of increasing precarity. This sharp worsening coincided with a reduction in public confidence in institutions following the 2016 impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff. As an indication of President Bolsonaro's authoritarian proclivities, he was quoted in April 2020 as saying, "Really, I am the Constitution."¹ In this context, when COVID-19 struck, instead of a collective and coordinated response which may otherwise have reduced the crisis, there was further division and suffering. By June 2022, Brazil had registered more than 31 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and more than 668,000 deaths, the second highest rate of COVID-19 deaths in the world in absolute numbers, after the United States.²

President Bolsonaro downplayed the danger, criticized masks, said vaccines might spread AIDS, and advocated untested alternative treatments.³ Since the pandemic began, there have been four health ministers⁴ and numerous allegations of corruption and fraud in the purchase of vaccines and medicines. Faced with criminal investigations, the president

threatened the Supreme Court with unspecified actions "not within the bounds of the constitution."⁵ In April 2021, the Federal Senate set up the COVID-19 Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (CPI), to investigate irregularities in Brazilian government spending during the management of the pandemic. By October, when the CPI report was published, Bolsonaro was accused of committing 9 crimes, including misuse of public funds.⁶ A highly polarized media environment further divides left from right in Brazil and engenders distrust in the public square as a space for discussion, debate, and consensus-building. The Bolsonaro administration has used a military dictatorship-era national security law to issue arrest warrants for at least 17 critics.⁷

Minority groups have also become more vulnerable in recent years. Despite a history of social tolerance and inclusion, Brazil has one of the highest rates of violence against LGBTQIA+ people in the world.⁸ In the South and Southeast regions, there was a reported increase of neo-Nazi cells, from 349 in 2020 to 530 in May 2021.⁹ Illegal mining and deforestation in the Northern region, has increasingly affected the livelihoods of indigenous and traditional (quilombola) communities. In June 2021, the UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, expressed


particular concern about the risk to indigenous people in Brazil.¹⁰ Indigenous people have been severely affected by the pandemic, and in August 2021 indigenous leaders accused the government of targeting them and their livelihoods through the dismantling of social and environmental protection institutions.¹¹

Setting the stage for a political clash between left and right, a Supreme Court judge overturned the convictions of former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) allowing him to run for President in October 2022.¹² As those elections draw nearer, attempts are being made to discredit the country's electoral system, using claims of fraud and the need to replace the electronic voting system with paper ballots. When Congress rejected Bolsonaro's proposed changes to the electoral system, he suggested he might cancel the elections altogether.¹³

After a steady worsening in the FSI scores from 2014 to 2021, this year the overall score has improved as the economy begins to recover slightly. But in a scenario of greater impunity and fetishization of police violence and a continued worsening in Human Rights, Public Services, and Demographic Pressures, and near record high scores for Group Grievance, and Factionalized Elites, Brazil is going into an election period that could prove volatile.

Footnotes

- ¹ <https://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/710?page=1>
- ² <https://systems.jhu.edu/research/public-health/ncov/>
- ³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2022>
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- ⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/brazil>
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- ⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/brazil>
- ⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2022>
- ⁹ https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3136152_BRAZIL-2021-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf
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- ¹¹ https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3136152_BRAZIL-2021-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf
- ¹² <https://www.dw.com/en/brazil-judge-annuls-convictions-against-lula-da-silva/a-56810379>
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HAITI: TWO STEPS FORWARD, THREE STEPS BACK



NÁDYA SILVEIRA

With President Jovenel Moïse’s inauguration in 2017, Haiti became the most improved country on the FSI 2018. With his assassination in 2021, it is now among the most worsened. Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere and has been ranked among the fifteen most fragile countries in the world in the past ten years. Haiti has experienced extreme volatility, with the devastation of the 2010 earthquake followed by cholera, protests, and political crisis. After over a year of political gridlock in 2016, President Jovenel Moïse was finally inaugurated in 2017, leading to a sharp improvement in the FSI 2018 and raising hopes that Haiti might be on a positive trajectory. However, on July 7, 2021, a group of foreign mercenaries with reported links to organized crime broke into his residence, and shot him dead.


The first half of the year was marked by protests against President Jovenel Moïse and the escape of 400 inmates in what would be the country’s largest and deadliest prison break of the decade.¹ After his assassination in July, there was a succession crisis² and an escalation of gang violence, and gun battles over territory, leading to a two-week state of emergency.³ In addition to the political and security shocks in

2021, in August an earthquake of magnitude 7.2 left 2,248 dead, more than 12,000 injured,⁴ more than 30,000 homeless,⁵ and destroyed 60% of the health facilities in the affected departments.⁶

In April 2022, the White House released a statement designating Haiti as a priority country under the Global Fragility Act.⁷ There are several examples of countries that have managed to climb out of the fragility trap over a period of generations. Haiti is not yet one of them. Disadvantaged in terms of resources and external intervention, most countries at the top of the Index find themselves unable to get far enough ahead of the vicious cycle of protracted and recurrent crisis to make durable progress in governance systems and development outcomes.

Haiti started at a disadvantage, with enormous debts to France in exchange for independence, which it paid off over 122 years.⁸ This hindered investment in the country’s infrastructure and inclusive development, further exacerbated by its susceptibility to frequent tropical storms and earthquakes. With few natural resources, it relies primarily on agriculture which creates vulnerability to global commodity price shocks, such as that which sparked food riots in 2008.⁹ Combined


with weak governance and insecurity, the sustainability of international development interventions proves highly challenging. Roads and other production hubs are often controlled by armed groups for kidnapping and extortion, which restricts economic activity.¹⁰ Kidnappings for ransom have increased by almost 60% in the first three months of 2022 compared to 2021.¹¹



Responding to each humanitarian crisis, while at the same time building durable and resilient systems for livelihoods and governance will prove enormously challenging. It will require resources, innovation, and a sustained commitment over decades to come.


Footnotes

- ¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/27/prison-director-and-gang-leader-among-25-killed-in-haitian-jailbreak>
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- ³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/haiti-reels-murder-president-police-hunt-assassins-jovenel-moise>
- ⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/2021-haiti-earthquake-situation-report-10-december-16-2021>
- ⁵ EM-DAT Source
- ⁶ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicf-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-end-year-2021#:~:text=Situation%20Overview%20%26%20Humanitarian%20Needs&text=Grand'Anse%20and%20Nippes%2C%20and,in%20urgent%20need%20of%20assistance.>
- ⁷ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/01/addressing-the-collective-challenges-of-our-time-implementing-the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/>
- ⁸ <https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/10/05/1042518732/the-greatest-heist-in-history-how-haiti-was-forced-to-pay-reparations-for-free>
- ⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/09/11>
- ¹⁰ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/can-new-us-plan-finally-give-haiti-long-term-framework-it-needs>
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RISING STAKES OF FRAGILITY IN WEST AFRICA'S SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD BASIN REGIONS



JIBIKEOLUWA FAVORODE

The current situations of the countries that make up the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (LCB) regions are crucial for the stability of West Africa since they represent half of the sub-continent and have been battling insecurity for years.¹ Despite years of interventions aimed at addressing the myriad of structural issues facing the regions, these countries continue to grapple with multiple vulnerabilities to fragility and protracted conflicts – which include climate change impacts, violent extremism, organized crime, poverty, political instability and a weakened social contract between the countries' respective governments and populations. The stakes continue to rise as vulnerabilities combine to exacerbate one-other, as evidenced by the consistently poor FSI ranking of Sahelian and LCB countries year-on-year.

Burkina Faso featured as the third most worsened country in 2021 and also as the fourth most worsened country in 2019 in the annual FSI rankings.² In line with this negative trend, humanitarian funding for Burkina Faso rose from \$117 million in 2019 to \$311 million and \$384m in 2020 and 2021, respectively.³ While Burkina Faso's neighbors, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, do not feature on the top-five most worsened list, they are also ranked poorly across several indicators, particularly Refugees and IDPs and Security Apparatus. Despite growing national efforts and external assistance, conflicts continue to intensify and spiral with increasing attacks on civilians, growing food insecurity and massive displacement across the region. West Africa has recorded a fourfold increase in food insecurity since 2019, with seven Sahelian and LCB countries representing the most severe cases.⁴ This highlights the Sahel's growing need for humanitarian assistance, amidst a backdrop of the Burkinabé

insurgency that resulted in one of the world's fastest growing displacement situations in 2021, with rising internally displaced populations and pressures of refugee outflows to neighboring countries.⁵ The World Food Program has stressed that the number of extremely food insecure people in the Sahel and West Africa will hit 35.7 million in 2022 and immediate, efficient, and coordinated action is needed to respond.⁶

The drivers and impacts are not only interwoven, they are also multidimensional, structural, dynamic and encompassing of a wide range of actors. Violent conflicts within and across countries involve a steadily increasing number of non-state actors such as jihadists, smugglers, political rebels, bandits and self-styled vigilante groups. The multiplicity of terrorist groups operating across the regions alone makes tackling violent extremism a complex problem that transcends international borders. Although military interventions by national and international actors have recorded successes in reclaiming territories previously overrun by terrorists, Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) activities remain widespread in Nigeria and Niger⁷; Mali continues to be an epicenter of Al-Qaeda and ISWAP affiliated activities; and Burkina Faso has endured spill-over of terrorist activities across Malian borders.⁸ These actors are enjoying increased access to intelligence, training cells, arms and financiers based on their expanded local and international networks – making their operations increasingly sophisticated, with greater leverage over vulnerable youths and communities needing livelihoods opportunities and essential public goods not provided for by the state.

Violent extremism is therefore combining with several long-term economic, environmental, social and political weaknesses across the region, acting both as a cause and effect to heighten the occurrence of varied violent conflicts and limitations of state control. Sahelian and LCB countries are amongst the world's poorest countries, with significant climate vulnerability,

an agriculture-heavy subsistence economy, neglected border regions and a long-term presence of illicit transnational crime networks that thrive based on economic and political leverage.⁹ Since over 80% of this regions' population rely on agriculture and pastoral activities, climate change is putting significant pressures on limited natural resources and exacerbating resource competition which worsen pre-existing ethnic-tinged and intercommunal conflicts, as well as other fragility risks.¹⁰ The Lake Chad has reportedly lost approximately 90% of its volume over the years, further limiting livelihood options in the region alongside access limitations caused by ongoing military operations to decimate terrorist activities in the region.¹¹ Farmer-herder clashes have intensified and spilled into several parts of Nigeria, due to a climate change-induced increase in pastoral mobility and worsening social inequalities.¹² Similarly, in Burkina Faso and other Sahelian states, there are increasing violent clashes over pastoral access and competition.¹³

Largely unimpeded transnational arms proliferation and ungoverned borders are also reinforcing the spiraling of resource competition into armed banditry, with terrorists strategically capturing natural and economic resources for more control and financial inflows. There are cases of insurgents taxing communities for fishing in the Lake Chad Basin¹⁴, as well as involvement in Burkina Faso's largely informal artisanal gold mining sector.¹⁵ In addition, population growth is compounding pressures on limited resources, services and climate-resilient livelihoods options¹⁶ – making youths and communities increasingly vulnerable to terrorists' recruitment strategies and offer of protection or alternative statehood.¹⁷ Since a weak social contract already exists where neglected communities and populations have barely enjoyed the presence and provision expected from their governments, insurgents and numerous self-defense groups offer communities some respite. There are, however, human rights abuses associated with these actors, as well as with military offences by states – again, contributing to persistent social

tensions, conflicts, uprisings and threats to democracy. Yet, the regions' democratic institutions lack adequate capacity to effectively meet the multifaceted challenges of mitigating fragility risks, combating terrorism, managing conflicts, meeting humanitarian needs, stabilizing post-conflict situations, facilitating justice and offering sustainable and equitable opportunities for climate-resilient livelihoods. Based on the transnational drivers and impact of the insecurity across the region, effective regional coordination and political governance remain critical for addressing the situation.

Unfortunately, national and regional political instability and incoherence are setting back the desired progress. Burkina Faso recently experienced a coup that ousted its democratically elected President in January 2022 – representing West Africa's fourth coup in two years.¹⁸ Poor regional cooperation also lingers with Mali's recent exit from the regional G5 Sahel force, on the heels of the withdrawal of French troops from the country.¹⁹ It is evident that these developments have further widened the vacuum and that complex structural weaknesses continue to jeopardize the efforts of governments and their partners to contain and stem insecurity in the Sahel and LCB. Despite the current primacy of the situation in Ukraine in the media and on the international agenda, stakeholders must acknowledge and address the rising stakes that the deteriorating situations in the Sahel and LCB pose – not just for West Africa but on a global scale.

Footnotes

- ¹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/cape-verde/west-africa-sahel-sub-region-appeal-no-01412003> — Sahel countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Senegal, the Gambia ; LCB countries: Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon
- ² <https://fragilestatesindex.org/2020/05/10/regional-instability-drives-worsening-in-burkina-faso/>
- ³ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/36/summary/2021>
- ⁴ <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/sahel-and-lake-chad-regions-fao-joins-global-effort-reinforce-response-food>. — For

the third consecutive year, Sahel and West Africa countries are facing exceptional food and nutrition crisis.

⁵ <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/2/61fcf11c4/insecurity-drives-burkinabe-exile-further-straining-fragile-sahel-region.html> — Burkina Faso recorded a 50 per cent increase in refugees fleeing to neighboring countries like Cote d'Ivoire.

⁶ <https://www.wfp.org/news/conflict-economic-fragility-and-rising-food-prices-drive-hunger-west-and-central-africa>

⁷ <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/growing-state-fragility-in-the-sahel-rethinking-international-involvement>. — Military operations in the Lake Chad region helped recapture a territory the size of Belgium in northern Nigeria

⁸ <https://fraym.io/blog/violence-in-burkina-faso/> — Malian insecurity expanded first into Burkina Faso's northern regions and then spread primarily to its eastern regions.

⁹ https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/en/documents/laender/factsheet-lake-chad_EN.pdf

¹⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad_en

¹¹ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Climate%20Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20and%20Way%20Forward_0.pdf

¹² <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/302-ending-nigerias-herder-farmer-crisis-livestock-reform-plan> — An estimated 1,000 violent farmer-herder clashes occurred between 2010-2019 compared to less than 100 in 2000-2016

¹³ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/287-burkina-faso-sortir-de-la-spirale-des-violences>

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¹⁶ <https://wcaro.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA-WCARO-BLT-EN-LAKE%20CHAD-DYNAMICS-WEB.pdf>


¹⁷ <https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/Lake%20Chad%20Climate%20Risk%20Assessment%20FINDINGS%20September%202018.pdf>

¹⁸ <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-caused-the-coup-in-burkina-faso>

¹⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/mali-government-pulls-military-out-of-regional-g5-sahel-force>



BREAKING THE CYCLE: MILITARY COUPS IN WEST AFRICA



JULIETTE GALLO- CARELLI

Rising social and economic stresses have eroded public confidence in institutions of democratic governance around the world. In many countries, this has led to an increase in riots and protests. In some countries, this has galvanized populist or autocratic movements. In West and Central Africa, this has translated into a spate of coups d'états, at a rate unseen since before the adoption of the Lomé Declaration in July 2000, which banned coups and adopted sanctions against regimes that had taken power through a coup.¹ Since the beginning of 2021, there have been military seizures of power in Chad, Guinea, Mali (twice), Sudan and (in early 2022) Burkina Faso. In March 2021, a coup attempt was reportedly foiled in Niger, days before the inauguration of the President. The cases of Guinea and Mali are illustrative of this broader trend.

In Guinea, a year of violent protests was triggered by a constitutional referendum which allowed Alpha Condé to run

for a third term in office, and contested legislative elections in which Condé's party, the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG), won a majority of seats. As demonstrations spread rapidly across the country,² on September 5, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya appeared on state television to announce that President Alpha Condé had been detained and the constitution dissolved.

On May 24, 2021, only a few months prior to Guinea's coup, neighboring Mali also experienced a military takeover, its second in 9 months. On that occasion, Malian soldiers arrested transitional President Bah N'Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane on charges that they were preparing a government reshuffle without informing Vice-President Colonel Assimi Goïta.³ Colonel Goïta had only just come into power on August 18, 2020, after overthrowing then-President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, commonly referred to as IBK. The May coup in Mali followed three months of protests led by the June 5 Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), which disputed the legislative elections that took place in April without

opposition leader Soumaila Cissé who had been kidnapped by armed groups.⁴ When IBK's party won 51 out of 147 seats, there was immediate contestation of the results with charges that they were fabricated.⁵

This occurred in the context of a long and growing security crisis since the early 2012 with the rebellion of a Tuareg separatist group, taking over territory in the north and the rise of Islamist militant groups. In 2013, the French military intervened under what was named Operation Barkhane, to stop those Islamist groups from reaching the centre of the country, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was created to combat extremism in the region. However, despite international involvement the spread of militancy continued.⁶

According to Afrobarometer, most Guineans and Malians, in theory, prefer democracy to other systems of government.⁷ However public confidence in democratic institutions is low, with the majority of Malians, 82%, trusting the military, while only 47% express trust in the President.⁸ Consequently, popular expressions of support for the coups were effusive in both countries.

Both countries had been at a point in time, considered to be success stories for democratic governance in Africa. When Alpha Condé was first elected in 2010, Guinea had experienced 50 years of repressive authoritarian rule, was impoverished and economically isolated. Condé's election was widely regarded as Guinea's first democratic presidential election, and it sparked hope that the country was on its path towards democratic consolidation. Before the Tuareg rebellion in 2012, Mali had been seen as a shining light for democracy in an unstable region since 1991, when students successfully marched for an end to one-party rule.

However, pressure has been rising for the last 15 years.

According to the FSI, the indicators for State Legitimacy and Group Grievance have both been steadily worsening in Guinea and Mali since 2005. An expanding security crisis in Mali and a crisis of legitimacy in Guinea combined with rising challenges in 2020 and a contagion effect of coups in the wider region, tipped the scales in 2021.

Guinea's coup was immediately condemned by regional actors and the entire international community, including the United States, the United Nations, and the African Union. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) showed its strong disapproval towards the military coup, suspended Guinea's membership from the regional bloc, and imposed sanctions on the Junta regime.⁹ Following Mali's first coup, the African Union suspended the country's membership to the union while ECOWAS suspended Mali from its internal decision-making bodies. The coup was also largely condemned by the international community, including the United States and the United Nations.¹⁰

As important as sweeping condemnations of coups may be to reinforce international norms and standards, statements and sanctions do little to address the stresses and pressures that contribute to a breakdown in public confidence and cause people to lose hope in democratic governance in the first place. In addition to condemnation, there is much work to be done.

In Guinea, the 'Conseil National de Transition' (CNT), or transition party, is in place and in charge of the organization of the general elections and the constitution building process. In addition, civilian Prime Minister Mohamed Béavogui was appointed on October 6, 2021. Finally, positive efforts from Guinean authorities to rebuild relationships with ECOWAS and the international community have been observed, such as the creation of a court to prosecute economic and financial crimes, and a vetting of lists of civil servants and senior military

officers, among others.¹¹ However, at the time of writing, Guinea has not yet held elections within 6 months of the coup as mandated ECOWAS.

In Mali, the head of the transition government, Colonel Goïta, announced that he will provide ECOWAS with an election timetable by the end of January and will meet the 27 February deadline for elections in the country.¹² However, on February 21, 2022, Mali’s interim parliament Council voted to allow the military government to govern for up to five years. On 14 December, French forces left the city of Timbuktu after nine years of military intervention aiming to push back armed groups.¹³ In an effort to diversify their national security partners, the Malian government is in talks with, among others, the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, which some have observed may have fewer democratic scruples, themselves.


Looking ahead, many difficult decisions will need to be made that will take political courage on the part of leadership at all levels of society. But perhaps Mali can look back to its own history to a time when it, however improbably, succeeded in breaking the vicious cycle in 1991. Otherwise, if the established consensus becomes that the promise of inclusive and representative governance is too good to be true, then the only currency left is power and subjugation.

Footnotes

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- ² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/8/west-african-bloc-suspends-guineas-membership-following-coup>
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- ⁴ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup>
- ⁵ <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/malis-transition-high-expectations-and-little-time>
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- ⁷ https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/press-release/Guinea/news_release-guineans_prefer_democracy-7sept21.pdf
- ⁸ https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ad386-malians_eager_for_change_still_look_to_democracy-afrobarometer_dispatch-25aug20.pdf
- ⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/11/uncertainty-in-guinea-after-military-coup-topples-alpha-conde>
- ¹⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/19/mali-military-coup-how-the-world-reacted>
- ¹¹ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/guineas-lesson-strengthening-democracy-use-peer-power>
- ¹² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/12/malis-leader-promises-election-timetable-by-new-year>
- ¹³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/15/french-forces-leave-malis-timbuktu-after-nearly-9-years>


OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:

Mali



OVERALL TREND, 2006-2022:

Guinea





AN ADAPTIVE COMMITMENT: ANALYZING CABO VERDE'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM POST COVID-19




DYLAN SOUQUET MOGLEN

Over the past three decades, the small island nation of Cabo Verde has become one of the Africa's most stable democracies; a status that has endured through electoral transitions, ongoing environmental disasters, and rising regional political instability.¹ However, the COVID-19 pandemic presented an unprecedented challenge to this rising star of democracy, with the country confronting major economic and political stressors. So how did Cabo Verde's democratic systems fare under these unique challenges of COVID-19, challenges that resulted in patterns of democratic backsliding/decline in countries across the globe? FFP's 2022 FSI analysis of Cabo Verde paints a picture of a country whose democratic systems not only managed to weather the impacts of the pandemic, but even showed growth and resilience. But why is the Cabo Verdean recovery story such a unique one and what lessons can we draw from it?

To understand Cabo Verde's unique story of recovery and growth over the past year, we must first examine the effects of the pandemic on this small, island nation and how it set the tone for what seemed like an inevitable backsliding. Early pandemic fragility indicators tell a harrowing story, with

notable declines in economic stability, access to public infrastructure and demographic pressures. This is hardly surprising given that the country struggled to contend with the increased burden on health and infrastructure systems, made more difficult for a nation comprised of ten disparate islands, with varying access to critical infrastructure.² The temporary global collapse of the tourism industry, which had annually comprised about 25% of the country's GDP, and comprises up to 60% of its service industry, further helped plunge the country into uncertainty.³ To make matters worse, Cabo Verde's long running dependence on external imports – resulting from a low accessibility to arable land and a lack of infrastructure for complex manufacturing- rose sharply as the country became increasingly dependent on foreign aid to obtain desperately needed medical supplies.⁴



Cabo Verde's political system was also beginning to show cracks, as the country struggled to balance maintaining its upcoming election cycle with the ongoing crises. A delayed decision in late 2020 to hold the parliamentary elections in March 2021 (with the president citing concerns relating to COVID-19) resulted in notable tensions as internal and external observers expressed concern over the state's ability to respond adequately to COVID-19.⁵ Internal tensions were also evident following the results of the 2020 local election which saw the opposition party – the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV)- reclaim control of both the capital Praia and the island of Sao Felipe, campaigning on the accusation that the ruling MpD was botching their Covid response.⁶ With both the Assembly and Presidential elections scheduled for 2021, and demographic and economic pressures on the rise, the stage seemed set for a crisis in the political process.

But the very opposite occurred - not only did Cabo Verde effectively anticipate and manage pandemic-related challenges, but it demonstrated notable efforts towards reducing overall state fragility. Both elections, the parliamentary in March and the presidency in October, were cited by internal and external observers as largely free and fair, occurring without any major incident or rumblings of widespread discontent.⁷ Despite fears over the state's ability to safely hold elections during COVID-19, voter turnout during the local and presidential elections notably rose for the first time in a decade.⁸ The parliamentary election, the first to be held since the country had put in place its 2019 Gender Parity law – requiring a 40% minimum of candidate lists to be female, saw a historic rise in the number of female legislators from ~24% in 2016 to 38%.⁹ The presidential election also saw the PAICV reclaim control of the presidency without any major contention or political unrest. FSI indicators for 2021 additionally showed across the board reductions in fragility, particularly those indicators relating to economic fragility and group grievance. These changes are all

the more impressive given that a majority of indicators showed marked improvement over pre-pandemic levels, particularly in regard to perceptions of state legitimacy and respect for human rights. Cabo Verde had not only managed to weather the storm, it bounced back stronger than before

But how did this small nation avoid many of the political pitfalls that came out of the pandemic period elsewhere? Two major factors are key to the explanation: Cabo Verde's unique capacity for adaptability and growth (even in the face of crisis) and an established history of peaceful transfers of power and internal political relations. As to the former, Cabo Verde's consistent pattern of fragility reduction is by no means a new phenomenon. Quite the opposite in fact – the country has remained one of the most consistently improved across the board since data collection on the country as part of the FSI first began in 2006.¹⁰ The country has also proven its remarkable capacity to adapt when, following the 2014 Fogo Volcano explosion, the country rapidly addressed and even improved upon some of the fragility concerns that emerged out of this catastrophe.¹⁰ Secondly, Cabo Verde's longtime status as an example of successful democratic processes has been largely due to the amiable and peaceful transfers of power that have occurred since the country held its first multiparty elections in 1990. The parties' commitments to assuring the peaceful exchange of power both during and following elections, coupled with an extraordinary capacity for shared dialogue towards resolving country wide issues, have held the country together during even the most turbulent of crises.


This is not to say that Cabo Verde has fully recovered from COVID-19, nor fully overcome all the challenges the nation faces. The country remains in crisis with much of its population suffering from a five-year ongoing drought and threatened by rapidly rising sea levels.¹¹ The country is still reeling from the economic shocks it received during COVID-19, as it works to

juggle rebuilding its service and tourism economies and its continued heavy reliance on imports.¹² While Cabo Verde still has much work to do, this past year has more than proven the nation’s extraordinary capacity to restructure and rebuild while maintaining full commitment to its long held democratic principles.


Footnotes

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
Economic Indicator Trends
Cape Verde 2006-2022



Political Indicator Trends
Cape Verde 2006-2022



Social Indicator Trends
Cape Verde 2006-2022





GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION: CIVIL SOCIETY'S CRITICAL ROLE IN LIBYAN PEACEBUILDING



ANDY TOMUSIAK
RAPHAEL MILLER

Muammar Gaddafi's ousting in 2011 ushered in an era of power vacuum and partition in Libya, with a myriad of domestic and foreign armed groups vying for control of the country's territory and resources. The resultant surge of internally displaced persons (IDPs), coupled with Libya's central positioning along the busiest migrant route to Europe,¹ have since created one of the world's most dire refugee and humanitarian crises. However, despite ranking 7th most worsened over the past decade in this year's Fragile States Index (FSI), Libya stands out among the top five in one-year growth in the 2022 FSI, with significant improvements in Economy and State Legitimacy and positive trends in Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievance, and Human Flight and Brain Drain. While these augmentations are related in part to the internationally hailed October 2020 ceasefire² between Libya's two rival governments – the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) – critical momentum for reconciliation is building at the ground level. With a robust foundation of grassroots peacebuilding-oriented civil society organizations (CSOs) and new forums for political dialogue that promote

inclusion and unity, Libya is experiencing a unique window of opportunity for democratic reform and national stability.

Libya's recent successes in designing a post-ceasefire national political dialogue have their foundations in an exceptionally strong presence of CSOs, which act as agents of local stabilization. With their roots in the 2011 justice and accountability movement,³ one Brandeis University study estimated 2,000 CSOs were active in Libya as of 2014 – a rate six times that of Iraq and comparable to that of Egypt.⁴ After an uptick in violence in that year, CSOs reorganized to focus on peacebuilding, public services, and reconciliation.⁵ Despite the challenges posed by sporadic violence in the years since, CSOs have played a distinctive and critical role in promoting Libyan peace and political transition, from dispute resolution⁶ to constitution-writing⁷ to IDP resettlement.⁸ These gains in peace have expanded horizontally to influence other communities and organizations, as realized by a CSO-led cross-tribal market project in Ubari that revitalized a city fractured by Tebu-Tuareg violence and created an inclusive space for normalization through trade.⁹ The new opportunities for interaction and commerce offered by Ubari's marketplace to the local populace, particularly to many of the city's women, demonstrate the peacebuilding gains that can be achieved at

the local level even when national-level peace processes and economies are struggling.¹⁰ Ultimately, the Ubari model inspired the nearby city of Sebha to pursue a similar peacebuilding project and provided hope for conflicting Arab and Amazigh communities in the Nafusa Mountains.¹¹ Through community-based projects and inter-group cooperation, CSOs have not only helped to mitigate local desperation and subsequent displacement, but also increased generalized societal trust among CSO members compared to unaffiliated Libyans.¹² Trust has been shown to be linked with economic development,¹³ giving CSOs an important role to play in integrating Libyans into a mature and diversified economy, which recorded encouraging growth with a 1.0 point indicator improvement this year.

CSO-led peacebuilding in Libya has also shown signs of vertical expansion by influencing national institutions and dialogues. In 2018, CSOs played a crucial role in launching the UN-backed Libyan National Conference Process (NCP), a broad-based consultation process which aimed to bring as many Libyan voices as possible into a dialogue about their collective future.¹⁴ The first bottom-up effort at a national dialogue, the NCP formally included 9,000 Libyans with engagement from over 1.8 million more online. Though the NCP was disrupted by the LNA's April 2019 offensive, it created sufficient momentum to launch the U.N.-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) in 2020, whose 74 members successfully elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as Prime Minister and Mohammed al-Menfi as Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya to lead the provisional Government of National Unity (GNU) during a transitional period culminating in general elections.¹⁵ Originally scheduled for December 2021, the vote was later postponed to 2022.¹⁶ Despite electoral uncertainty, institutional remodeling and the creation of a transition infrastructure lifted Libya's State Legitimacy indicator 0.5 points.

Progress towards political normalization has also translated into measurable improvements in Libya's humanitarian situation

– a key factor for its appearance on the 2022 FSI most improved list. With prospects of democratic legitimization, localized stabilization, and a durable cease-fire, The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) predicts that 36% fewer Libyans will need humanitarian assistance in 2022, down to 800,000 from 1.3 million in 2021.¹⁷ As CSOs work to restore communal cohesion and the state works to reconcile warring factions, IDPs have begun to safely return to their places of origin. UN OCHA records a drop in IDPs by nearly a quarter from 278,000 at the beginning of 2021 to 213,000 by the end.¹⁸ The 2022 FSI data corroborates this trend, showing a 0.3-point improvement in the Refugees and IDPs indicator in comparison to the 2021 FSI. Improved humanitarian conditions and relatively low violence levels also facilitated an 0.3-point improvement in the Human Flight and Brain Drain indicator, which measures the economic impact of human displacement, over the same time span. These improvements, while modest, represent the lowest score since 2015 in the case of the Refugees and IDPs indicator, and the lowest since 2013 in the case of the Human Flight and Brain Drain indicator.

Despite remarkable progress, the current insecurity surrounding the creation of a unified, legitimate government in Libya risks reversing the country's most improved status in future years. The postponement of elections by the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) until 2022 threatens to embolden destabilizing actors and jeopardize the 2020 ceasefire, entrenching state fragility. While PM Dbeibah reaffirmed his commitment to turn over power and announced a plan to hold elections in June 2022 – later postponed to the end of the year¹⁹ – elections may not be a silver bullet. According to former United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) political advisor Omar Hammady, rushing the election without substantial progress in ground-level capacity building, decentralization, and reconciliation will continue to undermine the legitimacy of Libya's electoral process.²⁰ In addition to electoral disputes, continued foreign military and

mercenary activity,²¹ the brutal detainment of migrants by state authorities,²² and the largest surge in IS-Libya attacks in a year²³ combine to ensure that Libya's FSI Security Apparatus score remains dizzyingly high, at 9.3.

Libya's CSOs will play an integral part as reservoirs of resilience in maintaining the state's upward course amidst forthcoming uncertainty. Positive trends in 9 of Libya's 12 indicators this year reflect the cautious optimism that has led to the country's inclusion as a focus state for the United States' landmark Global Fragility Act (GFA) in light of the opportunity to consolidate meaningful gains.²⁴ Fortunately, Libyan CSOs are set to receive increased international support in the coming year, particularly from Libya's special designation under the GFA, which specifically details strengthening CSOs as a strategic priority.²⁵ Civic engagement, inclusive economic development, and design of long-awaited transitional justice initiatives²⁶ to address harm inflicted over the last decade will also be crucial arenas where CSOs can help lead the way to a durable restoration of social and political cohesion in Libya.

Footnotes

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SUDAN: THE PUSH AND PULL OF PROGRESS AND IMPASSE



ASA COOPER

In 2019, Sudan appeared to be at a turning point, with a sharp 3.2 point drop on the FSI as civil society demanded change. Protests sparked by economic grievances¹ quickly evolved into a widespread movement against 30-year dictator Omar al-Bashir. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad-based political coalition of armed groups, political parties and civil society organizations, formed in January 2019. The group organized sustained protests that eventually led the military to force Bashir to step down in April.

Civilians remained in the streets to protest against the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that was formed in Bashir's wake, demanding a full civilian government that would lead the country to elections. The military was forced into negotiations with the FFC following the June 3 Khartoum Massacre during which over 100 protestors were killed and hundreds more injured.² In response, the FFC organized widespread a civil disobedience campaign that brought the country to a standstill and forced the military into negotiations. A Constitutional Declaration was signed between the military and the FFC in August 2019, establishing the Sovereignty


Council through which the military and civilians would share power during a transition to elections.³

However, in 2021 (FSI 2022) the scores worsened by 3.2 points as the transition seems to have derailed. On October 25, 2021, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese military and chairman of the Sovereignty Council, had the civilian members of the council arrested three weeks before a civilian representative was due to take his position as head of the transition.⁴ Since then, he has declared that he will lead the country in the transition to elections. However, much of the country has rejected this notion with sustained protests against any military involvement in government. Nearly 100 protestors have been killed since October 2021. Unfortunately, both the domestic and international context have changed significantly since then, with profound implications for Sudan's democratic future.


The landscape of civil society in Sudan has shifted significantly since the signing of the Constitutional Declaration. The movement that brought down Bashir has fractured along several fault lines.⁵ Issues began to arise from the beginning of the transition when the FFC failed to adequately include women in a transitional government despite their outsized role

in the revolution.⁶ Divisions increased over time resulting in multiple groups quitting the coalition and its eventual split into two factions.

Cohesion Indicator Trends
Sudan 2006-2022



Political Indicator Trends
Sudan 2006-2022



The coup exacerbated divisions within civil society as groups have taken sides on whether or not to participate in a UN-AU-Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tri-lateral initiative to promote dialogue between civilians and the military.⁷ While some civilian groups have agreed to participate, key leading groups from the 2019 revolution, along with much of the population, remain firmly against any negotiations with the military.⁸ One key set of opponents are the Resistance Committees, a decentralized network of activists spread across the country that enjoy broad support

from “the streets” of Sudan.⁹ Without their support, there can be no meaningful dialogue.


Many of the armed groups’ leaders that stood in opposition to Bashir in 2019 have been integrated into the government under General al-Burhan.¹⁰ While this bodes well for the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement as government positions are likely to keep the signatories from returning to war,¹¹ it greatly reduces the ability of civilian groups to put pressure on the military. This, combined with a fractured civil society, leaves the pro-democracy movement in Sudan in a significantly weaker position than it was in 2019. This was demonstrated when the FFC declared a second civil disobedience campaign in the wake of the October coup¹² but failed to achieve the same result as they did in response to the Khartoum Massacre.

The strong domestic response to the Khartoum Massacre in June 2019 was strengthened by international support. The backlash from the international community was swift including suspension from the African Union and strong condemnation from across the world. A “Western Troika” made up of the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States used their influence in the region to pressure the military into negotiations with civilians.¹³ But now there is a broader trend toward the outsourcing of US-led foreign policy to allies in the region, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sudan maintains deep connections with the “Arab Troika” on which it relies heavily for economic, political and diplomatic support, going so far as to contribute troops to the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

The pro-democracy movement has lost significant external support as Western influence in the region declines.¹⁴ The US’s unipolar moment has begun to fade as traditional allies, including the Gulf States, have demonstrated their increased willingness to sacrifice alignment with Washington on certain issues in order to build or maintain favor with other major players in the region. Additionally, Russia’s¹⁵ and China’s¹⁶

growing influence and interests has given the military multiple options for support from anti-democratic regimes that actively contest US hegemony while Israel has signaled support for the military after steps were taken to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹⁷ This marks a profound shift from the geopolitical context of 2019 during which Western influence was much stronger and pro-democracy groups in Sudan could rely on a certain level of international support.

There is no clear way out of the current situation in Sudan. The military maintains a tight grip on the country even though much of the population refuses to recognize their authority. While civil society currently lacks the cohesion necessary to relaunch a civil resistance campaign against autocratic rule as they did in 2019, the Sudanese people’s fight for democracy has not diminished. The cycle of protests and violent repression is bound to continue in Sudan unless civil society groups are able to reignite the cooperation that sparked the extraordinary 2019 movement.



Footnotes

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FAMINE IN SOMALIA: CRISIS AND INNOVATION



ASA COOPER

Somalia is facing one of its worst food crises in recent history.¹ An unprecedented four consecutive failed rains² have created drought conditions that have left over four million people at severe levels of food insecurity and displaced³ hundreds of thousands from their homes. The crisis has been exacerbated by conflict and insecurity both domestically and abroad. The war in Ukraine has caused food prices to spike globally⁴ while an increase in insecurity due to the long-running conflict with al-Shabaab has prevented many families from planting crops vital to their survival, for both direct consumption and market access. Additionally, political infighting has prevented an effective response from the central government.⁵ Meanwhile, the international community has remained focused on the war in Ukraine,⁶ highlighting gross inequalities in the international humanitarian response architecture. Still, despite being ranked as the second most fragile country on the FSI this year, there are lessons in the ways in which Somalia has become increasingly resilient in the management of droughts over the last decade. These lessons offer insights on how governments and international partners can address the immediate needs of populations affected by food insecurity in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

In the last hundred years, the Horn of Africa has presented the most severe cases of famine across the globe. In response to this, the international development community has undertaken significant efforts to develop Early Warning and Early Response (EVER) systems that will alert the relevant actors to increased risk of famine and support communities in preventing and managing shocks without spiraling into high levels of food insecurity and associated social and political instability.⁷ While these efforts have seen significant results, they are far from fully addressing the issue.

Somalia experienced the first famine of the 21st century in 2011. Sparked by multiple failed rains beginning in mid-2010, the crisis killed over 250,000 people by 2012.⁸ The Famine Early Warnings Systems Network (FEWS-NET) successfully sounded the alarm about the approaching crisis, releasing their first warning in August of 2010 and continuing to do so into and throughout 2011.⁹ While this was a significant step towards famine prevention, a proper response failed to materialize until it was far too late, nearly 11 months after the first FEWS-NET warning. Exacerbating the challenge of coordinating a national and international response, at that time,

Somalia was still being governed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), largely from a position of exile, as al-Shabaab controlled most of southern Somalia including the port of Mogadishu. However, Somalis, even among poor and rural communities, were early and enthusiastic adopters of financial technology innovations. In 2011, Hormuud Telecom, a Mogadishu-based private company launched a mobile money platform which revolutionized trade, commerce, as well as humanitarian response in the years to come.¹⁰ Cash-based assistance¹¹ blunted the disaster in 2011 by allowing for quick and easy dissemination to hard-to-reach populations.¹²

In 2017, severe drought struck the Horn of Africa once again. By that time, two fundamental things had changed. First, Somalia had a Mogadishu-based Federal Government that could partner with private sector and the international community. Second, mobile money was now ubiquitous in Somalia, used by everyone, from the elites to market traders, and even beggars on the street. While the devastation of the 2017 drought should not be understated,¹³ there was a noticeable improvement in the early response that allowed Somalia to avoid reaching a famine-level crisis.

The Somali government declared a drought in February 2017 in response to the early warning from FEWS-NET a month earlier in January 2017. The response was immediate, with UN OCHA delivering a report that mobilized over \$800 million in funding.¹⁴ This funding assisted the Somali government in establishing the national Drought Operations Coordination Centers (DOCCs)¹⁵ in multiple cities as well as the National Humanitarian Coordination Center. This allowed the government and its partners to coordinate a comprehensive response that provided food, medical and livelihood assistance to millions of Somalis across the country.¹⁶





Cash-based assistance played a crucial role in mitigating the crisis in 2017.¹⁷ While the drought had reduced food production and livelihoods in the country, many of the markets

were still functioning as food continued to be imported. The cash-based assistance allowed Somalis to access these markets and kept crucial parts of the economy running throughout the crisis. The efficacy of this intervention highlights the resiliency of the Somali people and the need for the government and international donors to utilize local, bottom-up approaches as much as possible when tailoring responses.

While the successes of the 2017 response inspired hope for the avoidance of future crises in Somalia, the current situation in the country has diminished much of that hope.¹⁸ FEWS-NET has delivered numerous warnings since the first rains failed in 2021 and continues to do so as the situation deteriorates. Despite this, the international community has failed to adequately respond to the crisis¹⁹, as much of the world's attention has remained focused on the war in Ukraine. However, humanitarian response is not a zero-sum game, and the international community has the ability to support both Ukrainians and Somalis in their fight for survival. Food security expert Daniel Maxwell stated, "With all the attention in the media and the sort of geopolitical priorities that Ukraine comprises, the amount of additional assistance for other parts of the world, I think, is going to be pretty constrained. We should be able to think about two problems at once. But I'm not sure that there's evidence that we're fully doing that."²⁰

The crises that struck Somalia in 2011 and 2017 present important opportunities for the situation in Somalia today. The successes, failures and subsequent lessons learned from both can inform responses that will be crucial to avoiding further death and destruction of livelihoods. The resilience and adaptability of the Somali people in the face of increasing droughts in the region²¹ have demonstrated that a little bit of support goes a long way in achieving this goal.

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2022



Footnotes

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SECURITY PRESSURES, VIOLENCE, AND NIGERIA'S 2023 ELECTIONS



NKASI WODU

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Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, is getting ready for its general elections next year, with two front liners from the two major parties emerging in a defining election. This election will be defining for Nigerians because the candidate sworn in on May 29, 2023, will be taking over the reins of a country pulled in different directions by multiple security pressures, an unprecedented situation since the country last fought its civil war in 1970.

Elections in Nigeria since the post-independence period have been marked by violence and contentious politics. In the country's early days, the western region (now south west region) was engulfed by riots in the lead-up to the 1965 regional elections. More recently, 800 people lost their lives in a span of three days due to post-election violence, following the 2011 general elections.

However, violence in Nigeria's elections does not occur in a vacuum; instead, it is exacerbated by the existence of particular security pressures that increase the vulnerability to electoral

violence. For example, the 2011 post-election violence, which occurred mainly in Kaduna State, Northern Nigeria, was worsened by a history of sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims² and a culture of impunity for religious violence in that State. Similarly, the violence experienced in the 2015 and 2019 elections in Rivers State, Southern Nigeria, was fed by a complex mix of organized violence,³ the increasing activities of armed groups,⁴ and their association with political factions in the State during that period. Coincidentally, Nigeria's ranking in the Fund for Peace's (FFP) Fragile States Index (FSI) in the last three election cycles (2011, 2015 & 2019) continues to hover below the 15th position, a worrying trend considering the violence experienced in those three periods.⁵

As the political season for the 2023 elections draws near, Nigeria is at risk of experiencing another bout of election-related violence, particularly as the security pressures have increased in intensity and expanded in scope this time. Among the regions mainly untouched by high levels of electoral violence in previous election cycles was the southeast region. However, this situation has changed. As the site of an emerging insurgency led by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) – a secessionist group to separate from the Nigerian State –and its militant arm, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the region

has recorded an increasing number of clashes with public security forces since 2020 including attacks on police stations, prisons, courts and the offices of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigeria's electoral management body.⁶ According to reports, more than 100 people were killed by security personnel in the first four months of 2020 alone, while 21 policemen were killed in three months alone that same year.⁷ Added to this mix are troubling reports of human rights violations by the public security forces in Nigeria⁸ and an overly militarized approach employed by the government to address the problem.⁹ Even more disturbing is that IPOB had begun to use its military arm – the ESN – to enforce sit-at-home orders¹⁰ and had threatened¹¹ a large-scale boycott of the 2021 gubernatorial elections in Anambra State, a southeast state and one of the strongholds of the separatist group, although ultimately did not enforce the boycott that time, and later came out with a statement to say they did not actually mean it.

Nigeria's Northern region had also been the epicenter of increasing violence from armed groups referred to as 'bandits' or 'unknown gunmen' in the Nigerian media until January 2022, when the Nigerian government declared them a terror group. Major hotspots for banditry in Nigeria are Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto, Nasarawa and Niger. Unfortunately, these formerly unorganized criminal entities have evolved into an organized criminal network,¹² willing to enforce the destructive ideologies of extremist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – who have continued to threaten peaceful elections in Nigeria since 2011. Recently, these groups have been involved in kidnapping school children and other victims while extorting huge sums from their families; they have also attacked a passenger train¹³ and shot down an Air Force fighter jet.¹⁴ More worrying in light of the 2023 election is that these opportunist groups can be used to perpetrate election violence or stop elections in strongholds of opposition politicians.


Nigeria's South-South region has ceased to be a scene for criminal insurgency since the devastating activities of the Niger Delta Avengers in 2016. But unfortunately, it has continued to be home to a different kind of threat— cult groups and armed groups made up of young people – which have proliferated across its six states. Typically, in the lead-up to previous elections, violence from cult groups intensifies as they battle for control over an area.¹⁵ This control provides them the leverage to negotiate with political parties to 'deliver' the elections in that area - a term used to describe a situation where the use of violence is deployed to give a particular politician or his party an advantage in the polls. Thus, rivalries and supremacy battles between cult groups have become an extension of political battles as rival politicians fund opposing cult groups to gain an advantage over others.¹⁶ This was the case in the 2015 and 2019 elections, and the continued existence of these groups and competitive politics in Nigeria pose significant risks in the 2023 elections.

In Lagos, Nigeria's most populous city, and former capital located in the South-West, citizens were besieged by brazen attacks from cult groups,¹⁷ particularly the *One Million Boys* and *Awawa* groups in 2020 during the pandemic. Reports indicate that these groups operated with impunity, forcing residents to form local vigilantes because of the inability of the Nigerian police force to respond to repeated calls from residents.¹⁸ Cult groups continue to terrorize the South-West states as well,¹⁹ and just as in the South-South, these groups have been tools in the hands of politicians to perpetrate election-related violence.

Electoral violence in Nigeria seldom occurs in a vacuum; it is driven by a system that rewards violence, encouraged by a struggling and overstretched security architecture, a culture of impunity, and a political structure that incentivizes zero-sum politics. In this intricate system, violent groups continue to rise and spread across Nigeria and serve as tools for fierce political contestation. As Nigeria's 2023 election cycle draws near, the

prospects of a violent contest loom, especially in the face of a battle for survival between the two major political parties who face different tests. Analysts have declared that without power, the ruling APC, formed in 2014, to wrest political power from the PDP could disintegrate²⁰, while losing a third Presidential election in 2023 could have deleterious effects on the PDP.²¹ Against this backdrop, the stage is set for a fierce contest. As past elections have shown, existing security pressures exacerbate this contest.

Even more significant from a stabilization perspective is that whoever emerges as the winner of the elections next year will be faced with severe security pressures. Increasingly violent armed groups, a security architecture unable to keep up with the pace of worsening insecurity, and large swathes of spaces governed by violent non-state actors are a few of those challenges. Therefore, Nigerians need to ask questions of the major contenders for the 2023 elections and decide which of them is capable of pulling the country back from its brink yet again.



Footnotes

- ¹ <https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/08/nigerias-2011-elections-best-run-most-violent>
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- ¹⁵ <https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/conflictbulletin-rivers-1505.pdf>
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- ¹⁷ <https://tribuneonlineng.com/cult-members-are-now-lords-of-our-communities-lagos-residents-cry-out/>
- ¹⁸ <https://punchng.com/residents-turn-vigilantes-as-hoodlums-raid-ogun-lagos-communities/>
- ¹⁹ <https://punchng.com/spike-in-cult-killings-in-south-west/>
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THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data

analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 179 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FSI: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FSI ANALYTICAL PROCESS


Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis

and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 179 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.



These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted

by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index – as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.



UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 179 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2022 FSI, the 18th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2022 are not covered by the 2022 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

COHESION INDICATORS



Security Apparatus



Factionalized Elites



Group Grievance

ECONOMIC INDICATORS



Economic Decline



Uneven Development



Human Flight & Brain Drain

POLITICAL INDICATORS



State Legitimacy



Public Services



Human Rights & Rule of Law

SOCIAL + CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS



Demographic Pressures



Refugees & IDPs



External Intervention

THE INDICATORS: COHESION

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state” that may consist of secret intelligence units or other irregular security forces that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include*:

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

* Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.

GROUP GRIEVANCE

Questions to consider may include*:

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group’s role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately,” which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include*:

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated (or is there a plan to)?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings/reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

THE INDICATORS: ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics


- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?
- Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

THE INDICATORS: POLITICAL

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include*:

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights aren't protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

THE INDICATORS: SOCIAL AND CROSS-CUTTING

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth

rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include*:

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases or epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there a likelihood of droughts?

- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year-on-year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Questions to consider may include*:

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include*:

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?













Force Intervention













- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?

Economic Intervention













- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?













FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2022

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Afghanistan	9.1	8.9	8.2	8.0	8.2	9.3	9.2	9.9	8.4	10	8.7	8.0	105.9	3.8
Albania	4.4	2.5	3.8	8.3	2.6	6.0	5.2	4.1	3.3	4.5	6.2	5.8	56.7	-2.3
Algeria	5.3	6.5	6.9	5.4	5.3	6.3	7.9	5.3	6.6	6.1	7.2	3.4	72.2	-1.4
Angola	9.2	5.6	8.4	5.9	8.8	8.3	8.3	9.1	6.1	6.9	7.2	4.3	88.1	-0.9
Antigua and Barbuda	4.0	2.5	3.6	6.0	4.8	7.1	3.9	4.1	3.6	5.1	3.7	5.8	54.2	-0.7
Argentina	5.6	1.9	3.5	3.0	5.0	6.3	3.7	4.5	3.0	4.6	2.8	4.0	47.9	-2.2
Armenia	4.1	6.5	5.6	6.7	3.1	6.1	6.6	3.6	5.7	5.4	6.7	6.9	67.0	-2.8
Australia	3.7	2.0	3.2	0.4	2.3	1.9	0.4	2.5	1.9	2.4	1.7	0.3	22.7	0.9
Austria	3.9	4.2	3.6	1.7	2.3	1.5	0.6	2.0	0.4	1.7	3.2	0.3	25.4	-0.7
Azerbaijan	3.9	6.6	5.8	4.4	4.8	4.2	9.1	5.2	7.4	6.1	7.9	7.7	73.1	-2.0
Bahamas	6.6	2.4	2.6	4.3	4.6	4.8	2.1	5.6	4.7	4.6	4.5	3.8	50.6	-1.8
Bahrain	4.4	1.7	9.6	3.0	5.6	4.0	8.1	3.2	8.6	5.6	7.6	5.2	66.6	-0.1
Bangladesh	7.6	7.4	8.7	6.7	5.4	5.4	7.4	7.8	7.2	6.7	9.3	4.9	84.5	-0.5
Barbados	4.0	1.6	2.6	5.0	5.1	6.2	1.3	3.5	2.8	4.1	4.2	5.5	45.9	-1.1
Belarus	5.1	2.7	5.6	4.2	3.4	4.8	9.3	3.0	8.2	5.3	9.5	7.6	68.7	0.7
Belgium	4.5	2.4	3.8	2.6	2.0	4.3	0.9	2.8	0.9	2.3	4.4	1.0	31.9	0.9
Belize	5.3	3.3	4.7	5.2	3.9	7.2	3.7	5.7	5.3	7.1	4.3	6.4	62.1	-2.1
Benin	8.0	5.4	2.5	6.2	7.9	6.7	5.3	8.4	5.2	5.0	6.7	5.2	72.5	-0.3
Bhutan	5.7	5.5	9.4	5.8	4.6	5.5	2.8	5.9	4.9	3.0	7.5	6.8	67.4	-0.9
Bolivia	7.2	2.9	6.1	5.9	7.9	6.0	6.7	6.6	6.0	5.6	8.2	4.3	73.4	-1.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.4	7.1	6.3	6.8	4.2	6.1	6.3	4.5	4.6	4.7	8.7	7.3	73.0	0.1
Boswana	7.9	3.4	4.0	4.8	6.9	6.1	2.5	6.6	4.9	3.1	3.3	2.6	56.1	-0.9
Brazil	9.0	3.0	7.4	3.7	6.9	6.1	6.7	7.5	7.6	6.5	6.2	3.3	73.9	-1.9
Brunei Darussalam	2.7	0.8	6.8	3.7	7.2	3.0	7.4	2.3	6.6	3.9	7.4	3.3	55.1	-1.2
Bulgaria	5.7	3.4	4.3	5.1	4.3	4.9	3.4	4.2	3.0	4.0	5.3	4.0	51.6	0.0
Burkina Faso	8.4	7.7	5.5	7.1	8.1	6.9	6.4	8.8	6.5	8.7	7.8	8.6	90.5	3.4
Burundi	8.9	8.3	7.0	5.5	7.1	8.3	9.4	7.9	8.9	7.7	8.5	7.9	95.4	-1.7
Cabo Verde	6.5	3.3	2.6	7.7	5.2	5.7	3.8	5.9	2.6	4.5	5.5	8.1	61.4	-2.8
Cambodia	6.9	4.2	5.8	6.3	6.3	5.5	8.8	7.9	7.8	6.1	8.4	6.5	80.5	-0.1
Cameroon	8.8	8.4	8.4	7.2	7.7	6.5	8.7	8.3	7.6	8.4	9.3	6.7	96.0	-1.2
Canada	1.5	2.3	2.3	0.8	2.2	1.7	0.4	2.0	1.6	2.5	2.5	0.3	20.1	-1.6
Central African Republic	9.2	9.8	8.4	6.5	9.7	8.2	9.2	10	9.4	8.3	9.7	9.7	108.1	1.1
Chad	9.6	9.1	8.4	8.0	8.8	8.7	9.4	9.7	8.3	8.6	9.5	7.6	105.7	-0.1
Chile	6.2	1.8	3.5	3.3	5.0	3.7	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.9	2.2	0.9	43.2	-0.9
China	6.2	3.4	6.8	3.5	6.0	3.3	8.2	5.0	9.7	5.2	7.2	2.4	66.9	-2.0
Colombia	8.1	7.7	7.6	4.8	6.3	5.5	5.6	6.3	7.2	6.6	7.6	5.1	78.4	-0.9
Comoros	8.3	5.8	4.5	7.1	7.4	7.3	7.9	8.1	5.5	5.9	8.0	6.5	82.3	-0.2
Congo Democratic Rep-	9.7	9.7	9.3	6.7	8.4	8.3	9.3	9.5	9.3	8.7	9.6	8.8	107.3	-1.1
Congo Republic	8.3	6.8	8.7	6.5	7.8	9.3	9.1	9.0	7.5	6.7	6.7	5.8	92.2	-0.2
Costa Rica	3.2	4.4	2.7	3.2	4.8	5.2	1.2	4.4	1.1	3.2	3.8	3.8	41.0	-1.5
Cote d'Ivoire	8.5	6.3	7.0	6.1	7.8	6.3	7.8	8.3	7.2	6.9	9.9	7.5	89.6	-1.1
Croatia	5.1	6.7	4.6	5.8	2.7	5.4	2.4	3.4	2.3	2.3	4.4	4.2	49.3	-0.5
Cuba	5.8	2.7	2.5	5.6	4.1	5.1	7.5	4.8	6.6	3.7	7.0	4.7	60.1	0.6
Cyprus	3.7	5.6	4.8	3.4	4.8	5.3	3.7	3.6	2.7	3.2	7.9	8.2	56.9	-0.5
Czechia	3.5	3.5	4.3	3.4	1.9	3.9	4.2	3.2	2.0	2.3	5.3	2.4	39.9	0.6

													Total	Change from Previous Year
Denmark	2.6	2.7	3.4	1.0	1.5	1.2	0.3	1.7	0.6	1.4	1.4	0.3	18.1	-0.7
Djibouti	7.2	7.4	5.0	4.3	7.2	6.7	8.5	7.4	7.4	5.0	7.3	7.9	81.3	-1.1
Dominican Republic	6.7	2.5	4.6	6.7	4.8	4.8	5.7	6.7	4.4	5.8	6.2	3.9	62.8	-1.9
Ecuador	7.0	5.3	5.8	4.3	5.9	6.0	5.8	6.3	4.1	5.6	8.2	4.8	69.1	-2.1
Egypt	7.0	5.8	8.0	5.1	4.8	7.0	8.6	5.0	9.5	7.3	9.1	6.4	83.6	-1.4
El Salvador	7.1	5.6	5.6	8.4	5.1	5.6	4.9	6.5	5.6	6.3	4.8	5.3	70.8	-0.8
Equatorial Guinea	8.8	5.2	7.2	4.0	7.9	6.6	9.8	8.8	8.1	5.6	8.2	3.9	84.1	0.0
Eritrea	8.0	7.1	8.6	8.5	8.2	7.4	9.6	8.0	9.0	5.9	8.7	6.9	95.9	-1.1
Estonia	3.2	1.6	7.1	4.4	2.7	2.7	1.2	2.2	1.3	2.0	5.9	3.4	37.7	-1.8
Eswatini	9.0	4.0	1.9	6.3	7.9	9.3	8.7	7.4	7.9	4.8	6.8	6.4	80.4	-2.1
Ethiopia	9.7	9.2	9.2	6.3	7.0	6.0	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.5	9.2	8.4	99.3	0.3
Fiji	4.1	2.7	5.4	7.5	5.0	7.8	5.8	4.2	5.4	6.2	7.9	6.9	68.9	-1.5
Finland	2.0	1.6	0.3	1.5	1.3	2.6	0.3	1.3	0.3	2.2	1.4	0.3	15.1	-1.1
France	3.4	2.7	6.7	2.1	2.9	3.7	1.1	1.5	1.1	3.2	1.9	0.6	30.9	-1.6
Gabon	6.7	3.1	2.9	5.1	5.7	5.9	7.8	6.7	6.4	4.5	7.7	4.2	66.7	-0.7
Gambia	8.5	5.7	2.7	7.2	5.8	7.9	6.9	7.7	7.3	5.4	7.7	5.8	78.6	-1.9
Georgia	5.0	6.0	7.0	5.8	4.3	5.5	8.3	4.1	4.9	5.3	9.1	6.5	71.8	-0.8
Germany	2.6	4.0	3.7	1.9	2.4	1.5	0.4	1.7	0.8	2.0	2.3	0.3	23.6	-1.2
Ghana	7.2	3.8	3.3	7.1	6.3	5.3	3.2	7.1	4.1	4.3	5.9	5.4	63.0	-0.9
Greece	4.4	5.6	4.3	4.1	2.9	5.7	5.8	4.3	3.6	3.6	4.1	7.4	55.8	1.3
Grenada	4.4	1.9	3.6	7.4	4.6	6.2	4.0	4.1	1.8	4.5	5.6	6.2	54.3	-1.8
Guatemala	7.0	4.9	9.3	6.8	6.8	4.6	6.6	6.9	7.3	6.5	7.1	3.7	77.5	-1.9
Guinea	9.1	6.5	9.7	6.4	7.6	7.9	10	9.7	7.0	9.0	10	6.7	99.6	2.2
Guinea Bissau	8.9	5.8	4.0	6.8	9.4	7.5	9.0	9.1	6.3	7.4	9.6	7.5	91.3	-0.7
Guyana	6.1	3.3	6.2	8.1	4.4	4.0	4.5	6.4	3.1	6.8	5.1	6.2	64.2	-1.9
Haiti	8.7	7.2	5.4	8.2	9.3	8.6	9.8	9.7	7.4	6.3	9.6	9.5	99.7	2.2
Honduras	6.8	5.3	4.8	6.9	6.7	6.0	7.1	7.3	7.5	6.7	7.0	6.6	78.7	-0.7
Hungary	3.8	5.7	3.6	4.0	2.6	4.7	6.5	3.1	5.8	2.1	5.3	3.6	50.8	-0.3
Iceland	1.8	1.8	0.5	1.7	1.4	3.1	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.4	1.8	2.9	17.1	-0.9
India	8.4	3.8	8.1	5.2	6.1	6.5	4.4	7.6	7.4	6.3	7.3	4.2	75.3	-1.7
Indonesia	7.3	4.3	6.8	6.0	4.5	4.2	4.5	6.2	6.2	5.5	7.1	4.0	66.6	-1.0
Iran	6.5	5.4	9.2	5.0	4.6	7.3	9.3	4.4	9.8	6.6	9.6	6.4	84.1	-0.4
Iraq	8.5	8.0	7.9	6.4	5.8	6.6	8.3	8.6	8.1	7.8	9.6	8.2	93.8	-2.4
Ireland	3.1	1.3	0.6	2.6	1.7	2.0	0.6	2.2	1.5	2.4	1.5	1.3	20.8	-1.4
Israel	5.1	1.2	6.8	2.4	3.4	1.1	3.0	1.7	2.9	2.5	8.0	4.5	42.6	-0.4
Italy	4.9	4.6	4.0	2.3	2.6	5.1	2.3	3.6	0.8	4.8	3.9	3.5	43.4	-1.8
Jamaica	5.1	2.5	1.9	9.1	5.4	6.6	3.7	7.3	5.3	6.7	3.7	4.8	62.1	0.9
Japan	6.2	2.9	2.2	2.9	2.4	3.4	0.2	1.5	2.9	1.5	2.6	2.3	31.0	-1.2
Jordan	6.6	8.7	8.3	5.4	4.7	6.5	6.4	5.1	6.9	4.9	6.9	6.2	76.6	-0.2
Kazakhstan	4.4	2.0	7.7	4.3	2.9	5.0	8.1	4.3	6.8	3.7	7.6	2.7	59.5	-1.7
Kenya	8.4	7.6	8.0	6.7	7.1	6.3	7.3	8.3	6.2	7.1	8.6	6.6	88.2	-1.0
Kuwait	4.7	2.3	4.4	2.7	4.5	2.8	7.1	3.0	7.2	2.7	7.5	3.3	52.2	-0.7
Kyrgyz Republic	6.0	3.8	8.2	6.7	5.0	7.2	8.5	5.0	6.4	5.9	8.2	6.2	77.1	0.7
Laos	6.7	5.1	7.2	6.7	5.4	4.8	9.0	6.4	6.8	4.1	8.3	5.0	75.5	-0.5
Latvia	3.5	2.0	8.0	5.5	3.6	3.4	2.1	3.6	2.1	2.3	4.3	2.4	42.8	-1.2

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2022

													Total	<i>Change from Previous Year</i>
Lebanon	5.7	8.5	8.0	6.3	6.3	9.1	7.8	6.7	7.1	7.6	9.6	8.6	91.3	2.3
Lesotho	8.9	4.2	3.0	7.6	8.1	8.3	4.8	7.2	4.8	6.1	7.3	7.1	77.4	-0.5
Liberia	8.5	7.8	4.3	6.8	7.1	8.2	6.5	9.0	7.0	6.3	8.9	7.8	88.2	-1.3
Libya	6.2	7.4	7.2	5.1	5.9	8.6	9.4	7.7	8.8	9.3	9.1	9.6	94.3	-2.7
Lithuania	3.9	1.9	3.0	5.3	4.0	3.2	1.3	4.0	2.0	2.5	3.0	4.5	38.6	-0.1
Luxembourg	2.9	2.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.1	0.3	1.6	1.1	0.4	3.4	0.3	20.0	-1.1
Madagascar	9.5	4.0	3.6	5.8	9.1	7.6	7.0	8.8	5.9	6.0	7.8	5.3	80.4	0.9
Malawi	9.5	5.5	4.4	6.7	7.9	7.8	7.4	8.5	5.0	4.5	8.7	7.1	83.0	-0.2
Malaysia	5.0	3.1	5.1	4.4	4.0	3.2	6.4	4.0	7.0	5.1	6.8	2.3	56.4	-0.5
Maldives	5.5	3.4	3.7	5.3	2.7	5.5	7.2	5.1	7.2	5.2	8.1	5.6	64.5	-3.1
Mali	8.8	8.4	8.2	7.8	7.3	7.2	8.5	8.9	7.2	9.7	7.2	9.4	98.6	2.0
Malta	4.0	3.5	2.4	3.5	2.0	3.7	3.2	2.1	3.4	2.1	2.0	2.8	34.7	-1.5
Mauritania	8.5	8.2	7.3	6.2	6.7	6.6	7.9	8.6	6.6	6.0	8.8	6.5	87.9	-1.2
Mauritius	3.0	1.9	4.7	4.1	2.8	5.3	2.1	3.1	3.5	1.1	3.1	3.2	37.9	-0.2
Mexico	7.2	5.3	6.4	4.6	5.4	4.5	6.0	6.6	5.5	8.6	5.9	4.3	70.3	0.4
Micronesia	6.1	3.9	3.7	8.7	6.8	8.8	4.4	6.5	3.5	3.4	5.6	9.6	71.0	-0.7
Moldova	5.7	2.8	6.1	7.8	3.9	5.4	5.2	4.9	4.2	4.8	7.8	5.9	64.5	-2.5
Mongolia	5.0	2.6	2.4	4.3	5.1	5.0	3.8	4.9	4.1	2.6	5.5	6.3	51.6	-0.7
Montenegro	4.4	3.1	9.2	4.9	2.3	5.5	3.8	4.1	3.2	4.3	6.5	6.6	57.9	-0.6
Morocco	4.7	5.0	8.6	7.4	4.9	5.9	6.8	5.4	5.3	4.6	6.6	4.9	70.1	-1.4
Mozambique	9.5	7.8	6.9	7.4	9.1	8.0	6.8	9.6	7.5	7.3	6.3	8.1	94.3	0.4
Myanmar	7.3	9.1	9.6	6.4	7.2	7.5	9.1	9.0	9.2	9.0	9.0	7.6	100.0	6.2
Namibia	8.4	3.9	4.3	6.1	7.3	7.1	3.1	7.5	2.3	4.5	3.5	4.9	62.9	-1.4
Nepal	8.4	6.9	9.1	6.1	5.6	5.6	6.1	7.4	6.0	5.0	8.8	5.6	80.6	-1.6
Netherlands	2.8	2.3	3.3	2.4	1.7	1.9	0.3	1.0	0.6	2.1	3.4	0.3	22.1	-2.0
New Zealand	1.3	1.5	2.3	1.4	2.3	2.9	0.5	1.2	0.5	1.7	1.4	0.5	17.5	-0.9
Nicaragua	5.3	4.1	5.7	7.6	6.9	5.7	8.9	6.6	7.4	5.9	7.1	6.5	77.7	0.6
Niger	8.8	8.2	7.6	6.9	7.9	6.5	6.8	9.6	7.0	8.6	9.6	7.7	95.2	-0.8
Nigeria	9.5	6.3	8.9	6.6	8.0	8.3	8.5	9.1	8.4	8.9	9.3	5.4	97.2	-0.8
North Korea	7.6	3.5	4.9	3.5	7.4	8.6	9.9	8.3	9.3	7.7	9.2	9.2	89.1	-0.9
North Macedonia	4.5	6.6	5.7	6.3	4.4	6.2	4.8	4.5	2.7	4.4	7.3	5.2	62.6	-1.9
Norway	1.7	2.0	3.4	0.7	1.3	1.7	0.3	1.3	0.3	1.5	1.1	0.3	15.6	-1.0
Oman	4.3	1.9	2.6	1.8	4.0	4.7	6.9	3.4	6.8	2.7	6.6	3.8	49.5	-0.9
Pakistan	8.2	7.5	8.9	5.9	5.0	6.6	7.4	7.7	7.4	7.9	9.0	8.2	89.7	-0.8
Palestine	8.6	5.9	5.3	8.8	5.0	6.5	8.8	3.9	7.8	6.1	8.9	10.0	85.6	-0.4
Panama	4.8	2.3	5.9	3.9	6.1	3.2	3.2	5.1	4.1	4.9	2.2	1.8	47.5	-1.2
Papua New Guinea	7.7	4.6	4.8	6.2	8.5	7.1	5.8	9.4	6.6	6.4	7.1	5.3	79.5	-1.4
Paraguay	6.0	3.2	4.7	4.7	7.0	4.6	6.7	6.0	5.2	6.0	7.8	3.5	65.4	-1.0
Peru	7.9	4.4	8.3	5.9	6.1	4.3	6.9	7.1	3.7	5.8	7.4	2.0	69.8	-1.6
Philippines	8.1	6.0	7.0	5.1	4.9	4.9	7.1	6.5	7.8	9.4	8.0	5.7	80.5	-1.9
Poland	4.1	2.5	5.3	4.6	2.2	3.3	4.0	3.3	4.1	2.1	4.2	2.5	42.2	-0.9
Portugal	4.3	1.7	1.0	3.0	2.3	4.4	0.8	3.2	1.2	0.3	2.5	2.8	27.5	0.7
Qatar	3.1	1.6	3.1	1.2	5.0	1.5	6.3	2.6	5.8	1.1	5.0	6.0	42.3	-1.8
Romania	4.8	2.0	5.7	5.3	3.9	4.0	4.7	5.3	3.8	2.2	5.7	3.4	50.8	-0.2
Russia	5.1	4.3	8.1	3.4	4.7	4.7	8.6	4.0	9.0	7.8	8.4	4.5	72.6	-1.0

													Total	<i>Change from Previous Year</i>
Rwanda	7.3	7.6	9.3	6.4	7.7	6.1	6.7	7.0	6.1	5.5	8.0	6.0	83.7	-1.3
Samoa	4.9	3.2	4.8	10.0	3.6	7.0	4.4	4.9	3.5	3.9	5.1	9.5	64.8	0.6
Sao Tome and Principe	7.0	4.9	4.2	7.6	6.5	8.6	4.1	6.5	2.7	4.4	6.3	7.6	70.4	-1.1
Saudi Arabia	4.6	3.5	9.3	3.0	4.5	4.0	7.8	4.1	8.4	5.4	8.5	4.4	67.5	-2.2
Senegal	7.4	5.8	5.3	7.0	6.6	7.2	3.7	7.6	4.5	4.8	7.0	5.2	72.1	-1.3
Serbia	4.4	7.1	6.8	6.0	4.2	5.8	5.8	4.2	3.6	4.2	8.6	7.1	67.8	0.4
Seychelles	4.5	2.2	4.0	5.0	5.6	4.1	4.0	2.6	4.3	5.1	6.0	6.8	54.2	-2.1
Sierra Leone	8.8	7.7	5.3	7.3	7.8	8.2	5.4	8.9	5.3	3.5	7.8	6.4	82.4	-1.0
Singapore	2.6	0.4	2.5	1.6	3.1	1.1	3.7	1.2	4.8	0.4	4.0	0.4	25.8	-0.8
Slovak Republic	2.9	2.3	5.4	4.1	2.3	4.0	3.5	2.9	2.3	0.9	4.7	1.8	37.1	-1.9
Slovenia	3.9	2.5	3.3	3.7	2.6	2.9	1.7	2.7	1.3	0.3	2.0	0.8	27.7	-0.5
Solomon Islands	7.4	4.7	5.8	6.2	7.9	6.7	6.1	8.1	3.9	5.3	8.7	9.6	80.4	1.1
Somalia	10.0	8.7	8.4	8.7	9.0	9.1	9.5	9.9	8.8	9.4	10.0	9.0	110.5	-0.4
South Africa	7.9	3.9	5.9	4.8	7.0	8.0	6.4	6.9	4.5	6.9	6.8	3.0	72.0	2.0
South Korea	2.8	1.4	2.6	3.4	2.5	1.7	2.7	2.7	3.1	1.8	3.9	4.1	32.7	0.2
South Sudan	9.6	10.0	8.5	6.6	8.7	8.9	9.6	9.8	8.6	9.8	9.2	9.1	108.4	-1.0
Spain	3.6	2.2	7.0	1.1	3.0	4.8	6.6	3.2	1.5	3.1	6.9	1.4	44.4	-0.4
Sri Lanka	6.7	6.9	8.1	6.6	5.6	5.5	6.0	5.0	7.9	6.5	9.1	5.4	79.3	-1.2
Sudan	9.1	9.5	9.6	7.8	8.4	9.2	9.3	8.9	9.1	8.2	9.6	8.4	107.1	1.9
Suriname	5.8	3.1	6.7	5.6	5.0	7.7	3.5	4.9	4.3	3.7	5.8	4.7	60.8	-0.7
Sweden	3.3	4.0	2.0	0.6	2.0	1.6	0.6	1.1	1.2	2.4	1.8	0.3	20.9	-0.5
Switzerland	2.7	3.1	2.4	1.0	2.1	1.9	0.3	1.9	0.5	1.7	1.0	0.3	18.9	-1.0
Syria	7.3	9.4	9.4	8.1	6.8	9.3	10.0	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.9	10.0	108.4	-2.3
Tajikistan	7.3	3.7	6.7	5.5	4.2	6.0	9.3	5.0	8.5	5.4	8.4	5.0	75.0	-0.1
Tanzania	8.9	5.2	5.1	6.7	7.0	5.9	7.4	8.4	5.9	4.9	6.5	6.3	78.2	-1.1
Thailand	6.4	5.2	7.0	3.8	4.6	3.6	7.8	3.7	7.6	8.3	9.7	2.3	70.0	-0.9
Timor-Leste	9.0	5.4	5.3	6.9	6.1	7.4	5.2	7.3	4.2	5.9	8.3	8.3	79.3	-1.6
Togo	7.4	6.0	6.3	6.8	8.2	7.0	7.9	8.2	6.5	6.1	7.6	5.6	83.6	-1.5
Trinidad and Tobago	4.0	2.8	3.3	6.9	4.4	4.1	3.0	4.6	3.4	7.0	5.6	3.3	52.4	-0.5
Tunisia	4.6	3.2	7.2	5.5	4.4	7.9	6.0	4.7	5.4	7.2	7.2	4.9	68.2	-1.0
Turkey	5.0	8.1	9.4	3.9	4.6	4.9	7.3	5.1	8.1	6.9	8.8	6.0	78.1	-1.6
Turkmenistan	5.9	2.6	5.4	4.4	5.9	4.6	9.8	4.4	8.3	4.8	7.8	2.6	66.5	-1.7
Uganda	8.9	9.2	7.9	6.4	7.1	6.2	8.5	8.3	7.1	6.6	8.9	7.0	92.1	-0.8
Ukraine	4.8	4.2	5.8	5.9	2.9	6.5	6.5	4.3	5.8	6.4	8.0	7.5	68.6	-1.2
United Arab Emirates	3.9	1.7	2.5	2.2	3.0	1.9	6.4	2.4	7.1	2.6	3.6	1.8	39.1	-1.2
United Kingdom	3.9	1.9	6.1	2.4	3.2	4.7	3.3	2.3	2.4	3.2	5.8	1.4	40.6	-0.9
United States	5.5	2.5	6.8	1.8	3.7	1.8	4.5	2.5	4.5	5.0	7.3	0.7	46.6	2.0
Uruguay	3.7	2.1	2.3	3.4	3.2	4.3	0.4	3.5	3.3	3.9	2.7	2.4	35.2	-0.7
Uzbekistan	4.5	4.1	5.7	5.1	5.6	5.1	9.2	4.3	7.6	5.9	8.8	3.7	69.6	-2.4
Venezuela	6.8	6.0	6.7	6.6	6.8	9.9	9.6	8.6	8.8	7.0	9.4	5.4	91.6	-1.0
Vietnam	4.7	4.2	5.1	5.0	3.5	3.6	8.3	4.0	7.8	3.8	6.9	4.0	60.9	-2.4
Yemen	9.9	9.9	9.1	6.7	8.0	9.9	9.9	9.9	9.9	9.1	10.0	9.4	111.7	0.0
Zambia	9.3	5.2	5.6	6.8	9.2	8.7	7.2	7.8	7.2	4.2	5.9	6.5	83.6	-1.3
Zimbabwe	9.0	7.9	5.8	7.0	7.7	9.1	8.9	8.7	8.1	8.7	9.9	7.0	97.8	-1.3



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