Papers by Mario Blokken - Finabel
As climate change reshapes the global landscape, its impact is vast not just in its effect on the... more As climate change reshapes the global landscape, its impact is vast not just in its effect on the environment but also politics, economics and security. For European militaries, climate change is a “threat multiplier”, intensifying resource competition, migration as well as instability. From extreme weather disrupting operations to the growing demand for disaster relief, armed forces need to adapt to new challenges.
This paper investigates how European military strategies are evolving in order to combat climate related threats, assessing the implications for national security and NATO’s collective defence. The future of defence is climate conscious- are we ready
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many countries in Europe, which ... more The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many countries in Europe, which decided to start a comprehensive modernization of their armed forces after decades of neglect. Although traditionally sceptical about prioritising the strengthening of its military, Italy is raising its defence expenditures to address the structural problems of its armed forces, which include a lack of personnel and adequate equipment. While these steps are surely essential, there is more that Italy can do to further improve the condition of its land, naval and air forces, including a better allocation of resources, the integration of innovative weapons systems in its arsenals and an increased proactivity in some European collaborative defence projects.
In this paper, Marek Gallo analyses the implications of the newly created post of Defence and Spa... more In this paper, Marek Gallo analyses the implications of the newly created post of Defence and Space Commissioner (DaSC) for the European security architecture. The appointment of Andrius Kubilius reflects a strategic shift aimed at bolstering the EU’s defence industry and achieving greater strategic autonomy in response to Russian aggression and global instability. However, this paper argues that while the DaSC role emphasises joint procurement and enhanced interoperability, the portfolio lacks the authority to drive substantial defence reforms. At the same time, Kubilius' success depends on securing resources, overcoming institutional hesitancy, and fostering collaboration with NATO. Additionally, the EU’s cost-effective space policy focuses on regulatory leadership and space programmes continuity, rather than militarisation. This paper constructively highlights the challenges Kubilius will face in aligning immediate security concerns with long-term strategic objectives, positioning the DaSC as a symbolic yet limited step in strengthening Europe’s defence posture.
Examining the role of Command and Control (C2) dynamics in the war in Ukraine, this article highl... more Examining the role of Command and Control (C2) dynamics in the war in Ukraine, this article highlights the advantages of decentralised over traditional command systems in multi-front combat lines. The research showcases the benefits of utilising decentralised C2 frameworks for European armed forces in specialised scenarios, such as the one at hand, implying that better operational efficacy and strategic posture in upcoming wars hinge on greater flexibility and real-time information.
Greece is taking significant steps in securing its air superiority in the Aegean Sea with moderni... more Greece is taking significant steps in securing its air superiority in the Aegean Sea with modernised fighter jets and drone technologies. As part of a broader defense modernisation strategy “Agenda 2030”, the country is planning to integrate Switchblade drones into its military framework to bolster surveillance and precision strike capabilities. At the same time, the acquisition of F-35 jets and Rafale fighters strengthens Greece’s air defense in response to regional tensions with Turkey. The question remains: is this buildup a proactive defense strategy or a sign of escalating conflict in the Mediterranean region?
In this paper, Marek Gallo examines the European Union’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly... more In this paper, Marek Gallo examines the European Union’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It begins by defining hybrid warfare, exploring its historical context and contemporary implications for security. The analysis highlights the EU’s strategies, including the creation of institutions like the Hybrid Fusion Cell, and assesses their effectiveness. While recognising the dual role of the EU in utilising soft power alongside NATO’s hard power, the paper also addresses the challenges posed by geopolitical ambiguities and the necessity of building trust among member states. Furthermore, it emphasises the importance of enhancing the EU’s capabilities, as articulated in the Strategic Compass of 2022, and proposes recommendations for strengthening resilience against hybrid threats. The conclusion calls for a proactive stance in upholding international law and engaging civil society, reinforcing the EU’s position as a key player in addressing hybrid warfare in a complex security environment.
This article studies the Federated Advanced Cyber Physical Test range (FACT), a new initiative la... more This article studies the Federated Advanced Cyber Physical Test range (FACT), a new initiative launched by the European Defence Fund (EDF) in December 2023 to develop a next-generation European cyber test-bed capability. The dependence of military and civil-urban infrastructures on digital and IoT systems underscores the need for and importance of a European cyber range to test military equipment on its cyber resilience. The article addresses the cyber vulnerability of these infrastructures under the current context of hybrid warfare and foreign cyber potential. The FACT case study underlines how this initiative embodies a capability that has yet to be achieved in the current EU framework by creating a shared cyber range test-bed. The analysis of pertinent EU-based NATO-owned cyber infrastructure also emphasises the existing future potential for appropriation and integration into a new European cyber architecture. Finally, the article stresses how FACT shows the potential and political willingness to change European cyber-resilience and interoperability in the long-term.
This article studies the events surrounding the explosive attacks in Lebanon on September 17th an... more This article studies the events surrounding the explosive attacks in Lebanon on September 17th and 18th through the lens of IHL, uncovering significant concerns about Israel’s adherence to IHL regarding the lawful use of weapons. The lack of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, coupled with the high number of civilian casualties, underscores the failure to comply with fundamental principles of IHL. This article explains how the implicit use of devices such as pagers, mobile phones, and laptops as explosive weapons hinders the ability to target combatants while minimising harm to civilians, making the use of this new method of warfare unlawful. This case exemplifies a broader and worrying trend of rising civilian harm in conflicts globally, as seen in Ukraine, the Middle East, and beyond. The analysis underscores the need for respect for the most basic principles of IHL, particularly distinction and caution, when developing and using new methods of warfare, and serves as a call for respect and accountability for the principles that aim to make conflicts more humane by safeguarding the lives of civilians.
For decades, air superiority has been considered crucial for victory in Western military strategy... more For decades, air superiority has been considered crucial for victory in Western military strategy. However, the Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed limitations to this approach, particularly with lethal air defence, UAV proliferation and enhanced electronic warfare capabilities. Thus, this paper highlights the need to rethink air power strategy, advocating for a focus on exploiting "windows of opportunity" in specific times and places. It argues for a shift towards limited air superiority and joint operations in increasingly contested airspace.
Estonia is gearing up for the future of warfare! From cutting-edge drone technology to cyber defe... more Estonia is gearing up for the future of warfare! From cutting-edge drone technology to cyber defenses, the Estonian Armed Forces are taking modernization to the next level. With a 3% GDP investment in military advancements, Estonia is setting the standard for a compact military overhaul in the Baltics.
Estonia is emerging as a key player in modernizing military forces in the Baltic region, blending technological innovation with a focus on territorial defense. Driven by lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, Estonia has enhanced its defense strategy, integrating advanced drone technologies, cybersecurity measures, and precision weaponry like the HIMARS artillery system. Estonia’s unique approach, which combines a citizen-professional army model, mandatory conscription, and collaboration with local tech startups, reinforce its resilience in the face of potential Conflict.
In this infoflash, Berk Büyükarslan briefly analyses the intersection of civic-military engagement in Estonia and explores multiple domains of future warfare where Estonians make their progress visible. Check out how Estonians are reshaping their land defense strategy from cybersecurity to the local industries.
The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of the ... more The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of the conflict and raising some legal questions regarding the Ukrainian incursion into Russian Territory. This paper examines the context that prompts what might be the third phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, examining the legal arguments that make this act lawful and compliant with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants States the right to self-defence. By analysing the right to self-defence, alongside the principles of proportionality and necessity, this paper argues that the Kursk Operation can be lawfully considered an act of self-defence. Lastly, it examines the definition of "occupation" to clarify the legal distinctions relevant to this operation.
The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military o... more The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military or civilian missions stands as an important change in the dynamics of the security and defence world, as they change how operations can be conducted, especially for armed forces. Dating back to the Middle Ages with mercenaries, they have taken different forms throughout history. Nowadays, they deliver a large span of services (from indirect support in logistics or military counselling to taking part directly in combat). This shows how they adapted to the most modern types of conflict thanks to their business structure and flexibility in various scenarios.
On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at-risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs).
The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not.
This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter.
This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year, and the debate around aidi... more The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year, and the debate around aiding the war-torn country is increasingly shifting towards empowering Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, to make it more autonomous against a larger and more resourceful opponent. At the same time, in 2023 the former Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin suggested that the EU could also benefit from this process by learning from the evolution of Ukraine’s defence industry (EDA, 2023). This paper will thus give a brief overview of the condition of the country’s industry before and after the war with Russia and summarise the main lessons that the EU can incorporate from the Ukrainian experience.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has been among the most active cou... more Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has been among the most active countries in supporting its eastern neighbour to halt the advance of Russian forces and to conduct its counteroffensive. This decision was consistent with Polish strategic objectives, allowing Poland to launch its modernisation project and expand its military capabilities. Although Poland’s strategic rationales vary depending on the political stance of its elites (Pawłuszko, 2022), there are three common denominators: the intent to deter Russia, the need to secure US support, and the ambition to become the Central-Eastern European region’s leading power.
Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.
Slovakia's air defence is at a critical juncture. The study critically assesses the pressing nece... more Slovakia's air defence is at a critical juncture. The study critically assesses the pressing necessity for modernisation and the ongoing initiatives to enhance the deterrence.
Given the outdated equipment and increasing regional conflicts, Slovakia ought to dedicate top priority to enhancing its air defence capabilities to safeguard its airspace and sovereignty.
This is a pivotal moment for small nations like Slovakia to ensure their defence and contribute to collective NATO security.
Women have historically faced barriers to full participation in the military, with progress only ... more Women have historically faced barriers to full participation in the military, with progress only arising in the recent decades. Traditionally confined to non-combat roles, societal norms majorly restricted their contributions to nursing and administrative tasks. However , the world wars marked a turning point, as women began to take on more active roles, paving the way for future integration. Despite these advancements, women in today’s European armed forces still encounter significant challenges such as gender bias, discrimination and limited access to leadership roles. Achieving full equality requires not only policy reforms, but also cultural shifts within military institutions.
The August 1st, 2024, prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, involving 26 individuals, wa... more The August 1st, 2024, prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, involving 26 individuals, was the largest since the Cold War. This article critically examines the event's legal and political implications, questioning its portrayal as a diplomatic victory. It highlights the absence of specific international regulations for such exchanges and explores existing legal frameworks like International Humanitarian Law. The article also addresses the rising trend of 'hostage diplomacy,' where states use detained foreigners as leverage, potentially setting dangerous precedents for future negotiations.
Technological developments and sophisticated hostile Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities... more Technological developments and sophisticated hostile Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities have pushed the modern battlefield outside its traditional boundary. The NATO Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine aims to fully leverage and integrate capabilities in the five operational domains, and thus to deter enemies below the threshold of conflict and defeat them when necessary. Nevertheless, European Land Forces have to overcome cultural, institutional, technological, and structural hurdles to effectively adopt the doctrine.
The prisoner exchange between Russia and the West surprised the international community last 1st ... more The prisoner exchange between Russia and the West surprised the international community last 1st of August, drawing attention for being the largest prisoner exchange between Russia and the West since the Cold War; its multinational nature and the high profile of the prisoners involved. As Russia released twice as many prisoners as the West did, including notable activists and journalists, media outlets have framed the exchange as a diplomatic victory for the West. Academia, however, must examine this exchange more critically and address the legal complexities that arise from ‘hostage diplomacy’ and prisoner exchanges, as well as the diplomatic and political implications of such agreements. Despite being generally considered a political exercise rather than a legal one, this article examines prisoner exchanges from a legal perspective. The author briefly analyses the different categories of prisoners involved and which international framework applies in each case. To conclude, it explores the political considerations of this practice and showcases some concerns regarding the normalisation of ‘hostage diplomacy’, particularly as a precedence-setting practice.
With the publication of this Food For Thought (FFT), Finabel explores various strands of the stra... more With the publication of this Food For Thought (FFT), Finabel explores various strands of the strategic domain of space in the European context, involving analyses ranging from explorations of the sector’s legal dimensions to a further dive into the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War in the realm of space. The first paper tackles the issue of fragmentation in the EU’s space landscape, highlighting the limitations of governing the domain across numerous different organisations. The second evaluates the establishment of the EU’s Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²), while the third and fourth delve into European endeavours to bolster future capabilities in space and the upper atmosphere and the European Space Agency’s Ariane 6 Rocket, respectively. Moreover, it is here, in the fifth paper, where the space lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War are considered. Finally, as previously touched upon, this FFT’s second section explores the legal dimensions of space in the realm of defence and security, including an examination of international space law, an exploration of anti-satellite weapons, and the future creation of EU space regulation.
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Papers by Mario Blokken - Finabel
This paper investigates how European military strategies are evolving in order to combat climate related threats, assessing the implications for national security and NATO’s collective defence. The future of defence is climate conscious- are we ready
Estonia is emerging as a key player in modernizing military forces in the Baltic region, blending technological innovation with a focus on territorial defense. Driven by lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, Estonia has enhanced its defense strategy, integrating advanced drone technologies, cybersecurity measures, and precision weaponry like the HIMARS artillery system. Estonia’s unique approach, which combines a citizen-professional army model, mandatory conscription, and collaboration with local tech startups, reinforce its resilience in the face of potential Conflict.
In this infoflash, Berk Büyükarslan briefly analyses the intersection of civic-military engagement in Estonia and explores multiple domains of future warfare where Estonians make their progress visible. Check out how Estonians are reshaping their land defense strategy from cybersecurity to the local industries.
On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at-risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs).
The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not.
This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter.
This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.
Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.
Given the outdated equipment and increasing regional conflicts, Slovakia ought to dedicate top priority to enhancing its air defence capabilities to safeguard its airspace and sovereignty.
This is a pivotal moment for small nations like Slovakia to ensure their defence and contribute to collective NATO security.
This paper investigates how European military strategies are evolving in order to combat climate related threats, assessing the implications for national security and NATO’s collective defence. The future of defence is climate conscious- are we ready
Estonia is emerging as a key player in modernizing military forces in the Baltic region, blending technological innovation with a focus on territorial defense. Driven by lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, Estonia has enhanced its defense strategy, integrating advanced drone technologies, cybersecurity measures, and precision weaponry like the HIMARS artillery system. Estonia’s unique approach, which combines a citizen-professional army model, mandatory conscription, and collaboration with local tech startups, reinforce its resilience in the face of potential Conflict.
In this infoflash, Berk Büyükarslan briefly analyses the intersection of civic-military engagement in Estonia and explores multiple domains of future warfare where Estonians make their progress visible. Check out how Estonians are reshaping their land defense strategy from cybersecurity to the local industries.
On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at-risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs).
The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not.
This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter.
This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.
Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.
Given the outdated equipment and increasing regional conflicts, Slovakia ought to dedicate top priority to enhancing its air defence capabilities to safeguard its airspace and sovereignty.
This is a pivotal moment for small nations like Slovakia to ensure their defence and contribute to collective NATO security.