

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA AND TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes middle powers according to their foreign aid behaviors through a comparative analysis of South Korea and Turkey. It describes two country cases in line with their foreign aid practices by putting emphasis on how middle powers construct their identities, and the effect of middle power identity on development assistance policy. It concludes that both middle powers show different behaviors in foreign aid. Both rely on their own development experience as recipients to become effective development partners as well as to have a global stance, while at the same time differentiating themselves from other practices by putting emphasis on their best qualities as middle powers.

Keywords: Middle Power Diplomacy, Development Cooperation, Turkey, Korea

ÖZ

DIŐ YARDIMLARIN ORTA BÜYÜKLÜKTEKİ GÜÇ DİPLOMASİSİNDEKİ ROLÜ: GÜNEY KORE VE TÜRKİYE'NİN KARŐILAŐTIRMALI İNCELEMESİ

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Bu çalıŐma orta büyüklükteki güçleri dıŐ yardım davranıŐları ağısından Güney Kore ve Türkiye'yi temel alarak inceleyen karşılaŐtirmalı bir analizdir. Betimleyici bir analiz olan tez, orta büyüklükteki güçlerin kimliklerini nasıl inşa ettiklerine ve bunların dıŐ yardım politikaları üzerindeki rolüne değinmeyi amaçlamaktadır. ÇalıŐmanın sonucu göstermiŐtir ki, Güney Kore ve Türkiye dıŐ yardımlarında farklı davranıŐsal özellikler göstermektedir. Her iki devlet daha etkili bir kalkınma ortađı olabilmek ve aynı zamanda uluslararası konumunu güçlendirmek için geçmişlerinde dıŐ yardım alan ülke olmalarını vurgulamaktadır. Böylece, kendi kalkınma tecrübelerinden faydalanırken, aynı zamanda dıŐ yardım uygulamalarını diđer uygulamalardan ayırarak kendi özelliklerini öne çıkarmayı hedeflemektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Büyüklükteki Güç Diplomasisi, Kalkınma DıŐ Yardımları, Türkiye, Kore

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi (in English, Justice and Development Party)
ADB	Asia Development Bank
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIVETS	Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DS	Developmental State
EDCF	Economic Development and Cooperation Fund
EU	European Union
G20	Group of Twenty – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
HLF-4	Fourth High Level Forum for Development Effectiveness
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
KCAC	Korean Civil Assistance Command
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
KoFID	Korean Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LICs	Low Income Countries
LIDCs	Low Income Developing Countries

LMICs	Lower Middle Income Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIKTA	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia
MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOSF	Ministry of Strategy and Finance
MPT	Middle Power Theory
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N-11	Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
MPT	Middle Power Theory
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
P5	Permanent Five (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China)
SMU	Saemaul Undong
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSDC	South-South Development Cooperation
SU	Soviet Union
TIKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı (in English, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
US	United States
UMICs	Upper Middle Income Countries
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNKRA	United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
W-20	Women-20
WB	World Bank
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Argument

In IR literature both South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) and Turkey are considered middle powers. Middle power theories argue that soft power is a significant tool for emerging middle powers whose foreign policy behaviors are broadly cooperative. Therefore, middle powers are expected to get involved in international mediation, peacekeeping and consensus building. In line with the expectations of the middle power theories, both Korea and Turkey are involved in development assistance. Both countries locate themselves outside the mainstream international development agenda and claim to emphasize the recipient perspective in international development.

Even though both countries are considered middle powers, they have different approaches to development cooperation. Korea is a member of the OECD-DAC, whereas Turkey, after a brief period of rapprochement, has remained aloof from the committee. Nevertheless, both countries claim to play a distinct role as development partners, differing from that of traditional and other emerging donors. While Korea relies on its official motto “learning from experience” by referring to its own experience as a recipient, Turkey puts emphasis on its humanitarianism linked to its historical, linguistic and religious ties with the developing world and claims to understand recipients’ needs better. Therefore, the thesis claims that Korea and Turkey as emerging middle powers show different foreign aid behaviors.

The main argument of the thesis revolves around (i) how middle powers construct their identities and (ii) to what extent/how middle power identity has an effect on foreign aid policy, by looking at two country cases, Korea and Turkey. Based on these, the research question of the thesis is “how do Korea and Turkey behave in foreign aid?” This contribution aims at conducting a descriptive analysis of two middle powers in line with their foreign aid behavior by looking at the institutional and political contexts of the countries. The data to conduct the analysis will come from interviews with officials and experts as well as secondary sources.

1.2 Literature Review

The collapse of the Soviet Union (SU) has witnessed the end of bipolar world order resulting in the emergence of the strong leadership of the United States (US) as a hegemon. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the US hegemony was visible in the realms of global politics and the economy. However recently, due to the economic and political rise of new powers, the world has been going through a significant shift from a unipolar international system to a multipolar one (Armijo, 2007; Grimm, Humphrey, Lundsgaarde, & De Sousa, 2009). Such a shift affected the balance of global economic power as a result of active engagement of the fast-developing economies in global affairs (Ahearn, 2012; Cornelissen, 2009). Those powers are called “rising powers” (Ahearn, 2012), or to put it differently “emerging powers” (Carothers & Youngs, 2011) or latecomer countries (Okano-Heijmans, 2012) and they are believed to play a future pivotal role in global governance and the economy (A. F. Cooper, 2016; Schirm, 2012). Whatever they are called, there is a consensus in the literature that these powers will continue to remain both challengers and contributors to the system.

The research question of the thesis essentially necessitates a broad literature review on rising/emerging powers as a background information. Thus, it will be focusing on three fundamental discussions: The first section will try to develop an understanding of the shifts in the international system. It will mainly concentrate on rising powers: BRICs

(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and second tier emerging powers as non-BRICs. It is important to uncover some commonalities and differentiations among powers. Later, how these powers have been influencing the international system will be reviewed by referring to the level of analysis in foreign policy as mentioned in the work of Breuning (2007). Finally, second tier emerging powers will be outlined as BRIC-like countries, seeking a place in the international system currently in the making.

It is important to note that some of the second tier emerging powers are considered middle powers, among which I would like to mention the two case studies of Korea and Turkey. In a sense, these middle powers can be thought as part of second tiers in terms of their increasing economic capacity and political influence; yet they still have certain characteristics that distinguish them from the others. Therefore, in the second section, Middle Power Theory (MPT) will be outlined as the main theoretical framework by mentioning three approaches to MPT in the literature as summarized by Adam Chapnick (1999): Hierarchical, functional and behavioral. Additionally, these three models reflect three main International Relations (IR) theories, respectively: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

Briefly, the hierarchical model is a classical approach to middle powers that sorts them in terms of their size and other quantifiable measures such as their economy and population; whereas the functional model focuses on “niche diplomacy”. In other words, the functional model suggests that middle powers have certain capacities to influence specific issue areas in global affairs. In this regard, a state’s middle power status is time specific and depends on circumstances; since global issue areas tend to change in time according to different developments in international affairs (Chapnick, 1999). The behavioral model, on the other hand, is related to states’ self-perceptions and to the way they project themselves in their middle power role. The behavioral approach will be the focal point of the discussions of the entire thesis. Switching from the theoretical framework, the thesis will continue by focusing on traditional and emerging middle powers. In this part, I will focus on ways of differentiating between middle powers of the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods so as to be able to define emerging middle powers.

Based on the behavioral approach to MPT, the thesis will argue that certain powers identify themselves as middle powers, and are willing to engage with global politics by pursuing a middle power strategy. While doing that, the thesis will focus on development cooperation policies of Korea and Turkey in line with their middle power strategies. Therefore in the final section, the literature will mention two approaches to foreign aid: the macro-economic approach and the approach that takes foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. The thesis primarily relies on the latter and claims that foreign aid has mixed motives and is used as a foreign policy tool in middle power diplomacy. This section will be concluded with a discussion on emerging donors to clarify the place of emerging middle powers among them.

The main reason for looking at the issue from a foreign policy perspective is that low political issues in niche areas, such as peacekeeping, and development cooperation are seen to be one of the essential components of middle power diplomacy enabling them to play leadership roles (Behringer, 2005). Middle powers are mostly mentioned by their recently increasing foreign aid practices which gained momentum with their recent economic growth (Chin & Quadir, 2013). Therefore, their growing economic power is reflected in their foreign policies. In addition, the thesis does not argue that the use of foreign aid is only reserved for middle power interests. On the contrary, foreign aid is generally perceived as a foreign policy tool which includes both economic and political interests. In his classical text *A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*, Morgenthau (1962) took foreign aid as the third category together with foreign political and military policy as a fundamental and complementary aspect of the US foreign policy. Therefore, foreign aid is considered to be a tool to be used where military means and traditional diplomatic methods are inadequate (Morgenthau, 1962).

1.2.1 Shifts in the international system

The international system has been going through a shift as a result of the economic and political rise of new actors, which are called rising/emerging powers as mentioned earlier. To better interpret the major shifts, it is worth stressing the issue by relying on

three levels of analysis in IR, based on the work of Breuning (2007), who argued that foreign policy analysis should be conducted according to individual, state and systemic levels to understand decision-making in foreign politics, state behavior and the systemic dimensions based on the relative power of countries.

The individual level of analysis focuses on the leaders and decision makers, since individuals' "options and decisions" are considered important factors in foreign policy making (Breuning, 2007, p. 11). Even though it constitutes an important and an integral part of foreign policy making, this study will skip the analysis of the individual level. The main reason is that it requires a detailed analysis of leaders' characteristics, decisions and influence or the role of the elite. However, the main focus of the thesis is not individuals. Therefore, it is not feasible to carry out an analysis on this level.

The state level of analysis is about the factors determining states' behavior in pursuing a foreign policy strategy in the international arena (Breuning, 2007, p. 13). This reflects a common policy goal of a state shaped by the state's institutional framework effecting how it positions itself globally (Breuning, 2007) such as,

the relationships between the executive and legislative branches of government, the organization of the government bureaucracy, or whether the state is a democracy, domestic constituencies (such as interest groups, ethnic groups, or public opinion more generally), economic conditions, and also the state's national history and culture (Breuning, 2007, p. 12-13).

Again, the thesis does not dwell on a detailed analysis of the state level which mainly necessitates focusing on domestic dimensions of rising powers. Still, the improvement of their economic conditions can be taken to be the major aspect for this research that determines the overall behavior of rising powers based on extending their global political influence. Thus, they have a significant role in shaping the international system.

Finally, the systemic level of analysis tells us about the overall impact of interactions among different actors, by comparing the relative powers of different states, rather than explaining the behaviors of individual states (Breuning, 2007, p. 13). The systemic level of analysis also explains recent shifts in the international system towards a multipolar world order, especially the interactions of rising powers among

each other as well as with traditional powers. To put it in another way, the more rising powers are involved in world politics, the more their interactions create a systemic influence on international politics.

In the following discussions, state level analysis will tell us about the increasing role of rising powers in line with their behavioral aspects that primarily focus on extending their economic and political influence. Such tendencies affect the overall state of the international system, which is in a transformation process towards multilateralism. In order to better understand their effects, the next section will be focusing on emerging powers.

Emerging Powers

The main actors leading to the recent shifts in international system are the emerging powers. These powers, as mentioned in the literature above, have recently experienced rapid economic growth and they are willing to increase their market access. Their eagerness in this field also motivates them to become active parties in global politics. In a way, they become important actors in global governance, while at the same time they lead to the recent shifts in the international system. Not all emerging powers are considered to affect the system in a similar way. These powers are also called rising powers¹ and need to be seen as BRICs and non-BRICs.

¹ Here, an emphasis must be put on the definitions of rising and emerging powers. Both “rising” and “emerging” do not concretely set the framework of the definitions. While some scholars use the term rising powers, oftentimes these powers are also called emerging powers, emerging markets or emerging economies. Therefore, two different definitions do not indicate different perspectives. Briefly, as Schirm (2010, pp. 197-198) argued,

The reasons for the assignment of a new role and often of increased power to these states are their demographic and geographic size, their economic and military capacities and their political aspirations. The countries defined here under the rubric of ‘emerging powers’ dominate their neighbors in terms of power over resources, that is, population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product.

However, it is not correct to enter the debate by only looking at the market level (Ferguson, 2015) or resource capacity (Nye, 2011). As MacFarlane (2006) suggested, an emergence of a state means that it dynamically grows and actively transforms itself (p. 43). As its power rises, the country in question starts questioning its established place in global system, and it engages with international politics more ambitiously (MacFarlane, 2006). In this case, the rising of a state’s power means that it emerges more

The debate on emerging powers has started with the discussions on the BRICs, the acronym first used in 2001 in a Goldman Sachs report, where the British economist Jim O’Neill predicted that the total economy of the United States and Japan and the four major European economies of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom would, by 2050, be less than the combination of those of Brazil, Russia, India, and specifically China, which has been playing the leading role among BRICs (O’Neill, 2001). From that date on BRICs came to be used as shorthand for non-Western powers that have increasing weight in the global political and economic system. In time, BRICs countries started to initiate their own summitries, and the acronym turned out to be a forum where the leaders of its member states started to meet regularly. For some scholars, BRICs became a “political identity” as a counter-response to the Western dominance of the global political system (Fues, Chaturvedi, & Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 141). Therefore, the idea to hold a forum comes from their willingness to increase their international visibility and bargaining power (Stuenkel, 2014).

The first BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009 resulting in the declaration of a joint statement by the four leaders. The initial position of the BRICs was to foster a broader inclusion of emerging and developing economies into the international financial system by reinforcing the G20² (BRICS Forum, 2009). In 2011, the third BRIC summit was held, broadening it and turning the acronym into “BRICS” when South Africa joined as a full member. In this summit, the significance of strong coordination and cooperation among the members were emphasized in line with their common interests on international and regional levels (Brütsch & Papa, 2013, p. 300).

powerful compared to the past; i.e. “a transformation process from one international position to a higher one: small power to medium power, medium to big, big to global” (Gratius, 2008, p. 4). Therefore in this study, I take the two definitions “rising” and “emerging” to be identical.

² The G20 refers to a group of nineteen countries and the European Union (EU), namely: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union. It is an international platform started in 1999 after the Asian Financial Crisis. In 2008, the first G20 summit was held to respond to the Global Financial Crisis. From that time on, the G20 meetings have been taking place annually.

As a result, the BRICs concept turned out to be a political category rather than remaining limited to an economic analysis.

Rising powers take their main strength from their recent and relatively faster economic growth compared to established powers. Regional powers such as Brazil and India have come onto stage with their rapidly expanding market and this led to significant political implications shaping the international order (Stephen, 2012). For instance, as Florini (2011) argued, rising powers such as China and India are willing to be among the rule-makers rather than being rule-takers in global governance (p 25). Thus, they aim at increasing their political weight in international institutions (Jacobs & Van Rossem, 2014, p. 59).

For some scholars, on the other hand, these assumptions reflect an optimistic interpretation of BRICs. The BRICs countries have basically fragile economies unless they are able to pursue the right macroeconomic policy and political stability (Cheng, Gutierrez, Mahajan, Shachmurove, & Shahrokhi, 2007; Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). As Jacobs & Van Rossem (2014) also emphasized, BRICs are not yet as economically advanced as the developed countries when their relatively low level of GDP per capita is taken into consideration (p. 53).

It is also worth mentioning here that the thesis only takes BRICs – mainly Brazil, Russia, India and China – to be the first wave of rising powers in order to give a brief insight. BRICs are essential because not all the emerging powers have the same capacity and thus do not influence global politics in the same way. BRICs' influence on world politics is more effective than the influence of other emerging economies in terms of having a changing effect on the global order. For some scholars, BRICs are considered main challengers of the established great powers (Armijo, 2007; Çağaptay, 2013; Grimm et al., 2009; Stephen, 2014), balancing against them (Narlikar, 2013) with a “bloc-type mentality” (Durotoye, 2014).

Other studies, on the other hand, consider BRICs to be far from constituting a set in terms of domestic politics and economics. Russia and China, for instance, are authoritarian regimes, while Brazil and India are democracies. They have different

cultural and historical backgrounds, and they have been considered “recognizable entities” for centuries (Armijo, 2007, p. 8). In this respect, some of them may be more willing to give consent to some international norms, such as human rights, while some are more interested in international issues like environmental protection. Despite their differences, BRICs pursue close cooperation with each other in order to realize their own foreign policy objectives (Glosny, 2010). The main objective of these rising powers is a multipolar system in which state sovereignty is preserved and they can play an active role in decision-making processes:

Brazil has been pursuing an active foreign policy since 2003 to become one of the prominent states in global economic and security governance. It created a “Brazilian sphere” of economic interest in the Latin American region (Gray & Murphy, 2013, p. 189) and emerged as a regional power putting emphasis on global issues such as climate change negotiations and diplomatic engagements by increasing its active role to become an “ecological superpower” (Collecott, 2011). It was also one of the donor countries after the 2010 Haiti earthquake and co-chaired the UN conference as the only non-western humanitarian donor (Binder, Meier, & Streets, 2010).

Russia perceived the unipolar world order as the main threat in the 2000s, opposing American unilateralism. Thus, in order to eliminate US dominance and to preserve sovereign rights of the state, the Russian foreign policy agenda has prioritized the multilateral international system where the United Nations and the Security Council play a strong role based on a multilateral structure (MacFarlane, 2006, p. 48).

India has a similar attitude towards multilateralism. A pluralist international society is supported by the Indian government and is seen as the best way to secure the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. One of the reasons is that India already has its own problems with its domestic governance stemming from its cultural divisions (Bevir & Gaskarth, 2015, p. 91). Not only India has such an attitude. In order to prevent intervention in their domestic affairs, some emerging powers are reluctant to give consent to some international norms and principles which might be disadvantageous to them (Carothers & Youngs, 2011). The main reason is that most of the emerging powers have undemocratic regimes with authoritarian tendencies.

China is often times categorized separately since it is considered one of the most important countries in the world by being the second largest economy, and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, as well as being politically influential as a permanent member of the UNSC (A. F. Cooper & Flesmes, 2013; Glosny, 2010). As Gaskarth (2015) argued, China's rise is the key to understanding the decline of American economic and political power which affects the US-supported global order (p. 5). According to Xinbo (2001), it is the aim of the Chinese government to affect the direction of global issues and to be accepted as a major player, not only regionally in Asia-Pacific, but also globally (p. 294).

Its recent engagement with the international community and its responses to global issues are the reflections of Chinese active foreign policy. Golley & Song (2011) asserted that, the more China is integrated into the global economy, the more economic activities have been re-allocated worldwide. Such integration leads to a change in the global and regional economic and political landscapes (p. 1). There are some concerns about China's rise as "an authoritarian alternative to liberal order" (Carothers & Youngs, 2011). Nevertheless, many others believe that China has been engaging in global affairs by using multilateral means to show its support for a multilateral international system (Kitano, 2011; Wang, 2000). By doing so, China aims at achieving its "national policy objectives" at the highest level (Deleanu, 2015).

To summarize the above discussion referring to the literature, BRICs have four major characteristics: First of all, they challenge the established powers by claiming a more active role in global governance and demanding a redistribution of power in the international system (Ferguson, 2015; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012; Schirm, 2012). Schirm (2010) came up with a conclusion in his comparative case study on Brazil and Germany that emerging powers have been striving for an upgraded position in the international system by relying on established institutions, such as the UNSC, and question international institutions' legitimacy in terms of equal representation. Some of the BRICs, such as Brazil and India claim that the UNSC needs to be reformed in order to sustain its efficiency, effectiveness and equal representation (Haibin, 2012, p. 4), even though they do not get any support from Russia and China, which are already

members of the UNSC Permanent Five – United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China – (P5) (Narlikar, 2013). In this regard, BRICs do not act in concert, but are rather more self-interested, using “collective action” when necessary.

Secondly, they transform the international system into multilateralism by prioritizing a non-interventionist, diverse approach that guarantees the rights of state sovereignty. Multilateralism is described as relations which are coordinated among three or more states in accordance with certain generalized principles (Ruggie, 1992). Wright (2015) argued that today some important actors are excluded from the international system, because the system has been continuing to preserve the 1940s’ distribution of power (p. 16). Even though China and Russia have already been part of this system as one of the P5, over the past five years, there has been an essential change which led to the rise of the G20 (Wright, 2015, p. 17). BRICs’ rise among these powers is considered to be unique. Thus, it is not surprising to see a significant shift from a unipolar world order to a multipolar one as the BRICs’ relative power increases and challenges US hegemony (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013).

Thirdly, emerging powers are considered fundamental parties to address international problems (Grimm et al., 2009). Emerging powers are expected to support the international community by providing global collective goods (Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016, p. 499). Cornelissen's example on the G20 (2009) is important to note here: G20-Finance ministerial and deputies meetings have aimed at reinforcing global coordination on issues of the world’s economy through more inclusion of the countries from the Global South (p. 19). Thus, the new economic equilibrium reflects a more diverse approach to global economic governance (Cornelissen, 2009). In fact, the scope of the global issues that the G20 handles is not limited to global economic and financial governance. Especially the decline of US hegemony, together with the rise of BRICs, mainly China, have led the G20’s scope to go above and beyond its initial purpose (A. F. Cooper, 2016, p. 543). Thus, global issues such as security, peacekeeping, and climate change, and especially the practice of development cooperation have gained importance.

Foreign aid is essential to note here, since rising powers rely on development cooperation in building and strengthening their bilateral relations. As Okano-Heijmans (2012) argued, political instruments are important tools for those powers in question to pursue further economic and commercial interests (p. 270). In this respect, development cooperation does not only constitute a simple relation between the donor and the recipient. It is used as a tool to improve economic and political relations instead of opting only for development outcomes. In a way, rising powers have challenged the traditional North-South relations based mostly on one-way-giving from a donor to the recipient and built up a new type of cooperation based on Southern values (Davis & Taylor, 2015, p. 154).

South-South Cooperation (SSC) has become an important concept to understand BRICs' behavior where they engage in the global South by using soft power (Mathur, 2014), and "sharing knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts." (UNOSSC, n.d.). This approach can be considered to be a criticism of the traditional donor-recipient relations which are also opposed by BRICs and the developing world (Muggah & Pasarelli Hamann, 2012). It is also believed to provide an alternative for traditional foreign aid relations, because now the recipient countries can also choose their partner countries from the emerging donors of the South (Holden, 2015). So, the rise of BRICs is thought to challenge the long-established international aid regime (Chin & Quadir, 2013).

Lastly, among BRICs, China's acceptance as a great power is highly approved by some scholars (Shichor, 2014) and Russia has long been considered to be in the great power category (Parlar Dal, 2014); yet they are still part of the western-system in which they emerge as challengers. The main motivation of these emerging powers stems from "their common desire to become insiders and founding actors within the central institutions of global governance" (Ünay, 2014, p. 146). Thus, one might argue, the main motivation of powers like China and Russia is not to become a great power, since they already have a certain position in the system at the great power level. Rather, it is their claim to change the western-oriented system in their favor.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, BRICs are already considered to have changed the distribution of power in the global system. As Armijo (2007) asserted, the BRICs are among the most powerful ten to fifteen economies, and are likely to continue growing. If the economic size of a state is the crucial element of its power, then BRICs are likely to become great powers of the early mid-21st century (p. 17). In addition, the more emerging powers are getting economically stronger, the more they tend to play an active role in global political issues (Haibin, 2012; Jacobs & Van Rossem, 2014). Especially, as the presence of rising powers becomes apparent in addressing global challenges such as peacekeeping, development cooperation, and climate change, their criticism towards the established system rises. For example, China has long been emphasizing the principle of equality of sovereign states, and criticizing the superpowers for being self-interested while ignoring the issues of global poverty, insecurity and injustice (Dellios, 2005, p. 4).

The above summary gives a good insight on the future roles that BRICs might play in world politics. To comprehend the bigger picture, it is important to understand the rise of the BRICs. In this regard, one should take the above discussions as a starting point signifying how shifts have started in the international system. That is to say, these powers lead to the transformation in both the international economy and politics. Especially when their first summit was held, BRICs leaders called for “a democratic and multipolar world based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision making of all states” (Singh & Dube, 2011). These demands signify the political determination of rising powers in changing the western-dominated world order.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that BRICs do not constitute the whole story of emerging powers. In the literature, the rising power debate focuses especially on the rise of China and the rise of other BRIC countries. This has led to ignoring other emerging powers. In other words, BRICs alone are not enough to explain recent trends and crucial shifts in the global order. Their proactive foreign policy have encouraged new actors to get involved more actively in international affairs. Therefore, the thesis argues that we can talk about an overall change started by the BRICs influence on

international politics, accelerated by further involvement of other emerging powers on which I would like to put a broader emphasis in this study.

I call these powers *second tier emerging powers* and claim that they play a significant role for the overall shifts in the international system. After the BRICs, these countries now started to be grouped under new acronyms such as Next Eleven (N-11) (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia) or CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa).

Second tier emerging powers play a significant, or to put it differently, a supportive role in the debate on the rise of new actors. Regional and global economic engagements of second tier emerging powers are “rational responses” to the rise of the BRICs’ economic influence as suggested by T. Kim (2014) in his example of relations between Korea and China (p. 90). These powers, like the BRICs, are different from each other in terms of political, economic and security aspects. Some of them are important regional powers, whereas others already have a degree of influence on other continents (Gaskarth, 2015). Moreover, as Gaskarth (2015) argued, it is difficult to conduct a simple comparison between these powers because of their distinct cultural norms and ideas which shape their goals and interests (p. 11-12).

For instance, MIKTA was first formed during the UN General Assembly in 2013 in New York with a meeting of five countries on foreign ministry level. Despite their diverse cultures and regions, these powers claim to share core values and similarities in terms of being democracies, free market economies and the strategic importance of their regions (MIKTA, n.d.). These emerging powers like Korea, Turkey, Australia are allied to the US; countries like Indonesia and Turkey are populated by a majority of Muslims; Korea, Indonesia and Australia are from Asia; Mexico is constantly challenged by external security issues; and so on and so forth (Wright, 2015, p. 21). Nevertheless, each contributes to multilateralism in its own way. In a way, they contribute to the establishment of multilateralism where they seek proactive diplomacy along with the BRICs.

The aim of the following discussion is to clarify the characteristics of second tier emerging powers as non-BRICs, since it is essential to make this differentiation for the further discussions on this thesis. By referring to above discussion on BRICs and to a considerable amount of scholarly work, the paper argues that they have several distinguishing characteristics differing from those of BRICs. The theoretical framework will be discussed later in detail by referring to the Middle Power Theory.

Second Tier Emerging Powers

First of all, second tier emerging powers; or ‘next’ tiers (Chin & Quadir, 2013); or emerging middle tier economies (Çağaptay, 2013), are relatively smaller in terms of their economic and political power when compared to the BRICs, and they have more regional influence rather than global impact. Among some scholars, BRICs are also called regional powers despite their broader international importance (Flemes, 2007; Flandes & Habib, 2009; Gómez Bruera, 2015). However, most of the BRICs have already been playing leadership role in their regions by establishing close cooperation with other smaller powers, creating political and economic linkages with them (Haibin, 2012, p. 1). Thus, the next step for BRICs is predicted to be a global role as a result of their relative economic growth and political influence (A. F. Cooper, 2015c; Stuenkel, 2014).

Looking at the size of their economy and population, together with material resources; one might argue that second tier emerging powers are relatively less powerful than BRICs. For instance, as A. F. Cooper (2015b) argued by relying on IMF 2015 estimates, MIKTA countries clustered among the second tiers are not placed at the top in global ranking, and thus they are not expected to reach BRICs in terms of nominal GDP (p. 107) (see Table 1). For another example, MINT countries – namely Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey – is an acronym again put forth by former Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neil (2013) as new potential destinations for investment. According to the estimates, MINT countries are not likely to overtake BRICs in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2050 (BBC, 2014) (see Table 2).

Third, second tiers have great geopolitical and strategic importance. They are geopolitically situated close to large markets from which they can benefit. For example, Indonesia is close to China, as is Turkey to the EU, as is Mexico to the United States, while Nigeria is a potential hub for Africa’s economy (Durotoye, 2014, p. 99). Moreover, they play an essential role in addressing global challenges (Flemes & Habib, 2009; Grimm et al., 2009). Flemes & Habib (2009) asserted that international issues such as global financial crises, climate change or challenges of energy security and meeting energy needs cannot be addressed without the participation of these emerging regional powers; since they now act upon their own rights in world affairs (p. 139).

Finally, these powers in question are bound by great powers in their foreign policy agenda, if not totally dependent on them. Fels (2012) suggested that they are significant sources of support for great powers, especially in their regional engagements (p. 14). What Hurrell (2006) argued is important to note here: The Post-Cold War emergence of US hegemony resulted in the establishment of an international system based on the liberal “Greater West” which continues to be dominant in the current system (p. 3). BRICs powers remain outside of it, but are not left-out. However, other powers such as Korea, Japan, Canada, and Australia or major European powers (both the EU and individual countries) are still very much integrated into the US-led system of alliance (Hurrell, 2006).

Table 1 Global ranking of MIKTA in terms of nominal GDP
(US\$ billions)

MIKTA	Global Ranking	Nominal GDP in 2015
<i>Australia</i>	12	1,444,189
<i>Korea</i>	13	1,416,949
<i>Mexico</i>	15	1,282,725
<i>Indonesia</i>	16	888, 648
<i>Turkey</i>	18	806,108

Source: IMF April 2015 World Economic Outlook Database from A. F. Cooper (2015b)

Table 2 Rise of BRICs compared to MINT
(US\$ trillions)

BRICs	2012	2050	MINT	2012	2050
	GDP	Estimated GDP		GDP	Estimated GDP
<i>China</i>	8.23	52.62	<i>Mexico</i>	1.18	6.95
<i>Brazil</i>	2.25	9.71	<i>Indonesia</i>	0.88	6.04
<i>Russia</i>	2.01	8.01	<i>Turkey</i>	0.79	4.45
<i>India</i>	1.84	24.98	<i>Nigeria</i>	0.26	4.91

Source: World Bank, Goldman Sachs estimates from BBC (2014)

What differs BRICs from those is that they are historically challengers of the liberal developed West: *Revolutionism* of Soviet Union and China, *hard-revisionist Third Worldism* of post-1948 India and *soft-revisionist Third Worldism* of early 1970s and late 1980s Brazil are significant enough to highlight (Hurrell, 2006, p. 3). Unlike BRICs, most of the second tier emerging powers have been part of an alliance led by a greater power. For instance, countries allied with the US have benefited from its bilateral security and economic relations (Ikenberry, 2004), such as Turkey and Korea (Wright, 2015). One might also give the examples of the influence of Japan and the US on Southeast Asian trade (Beeson, 2002), or the political dominance of Russia on former Soviet countries.

The literature on the rise of BRICs and other emerging powers discussed so far lets us develop an understanding for the conceptual framework of this study. According to Fels (2012), the mainstream literature focuses mainly on great powers, especially in the field of security (p. 13). Thus, little emphasis is put on non-great powers which are mostly considered “the rest” (Fels, 2012). The discussions on BRICs emerge from the same considerations, since they directly challenge the hegemonic system of a great power. Second tier countries are neglected in this sense (Fels, 2012). Apart from other things, the importance of second tiers should not be underestimated because they play

a key role in relational understanding of power in explaining power shifts (Fels, 2012, p. 14).

Based on what Fels (2012) argued, some of the second tier emerging powers will be further elaborated under the category of middle powers. This research specifically concentrates on middle powers, and requires a theoretical framework in order to come up with a stronger foundation for the case studies of Korea and Turkey. It is also necessary because middle powers show different behavioral characteristics compared to BRICs and some of the non-BRICs. Therefore, the following part of the literature review is required to position Korea and Turkey in the international system. In the next section, a theoretical framework under the Middle Power Theory will be given.

1.2.2 Theoretical framework: Middle Power Theory

A part of second tier emerging powers (hereafter referred to as emerging middle powers) should be considered under a theoretical framework given by the Middle Power Theory (MPT). To begin with, it is important to note that there is no agreed definition of middle powers in the academic literature. Among scholars middle power, also called “middle power-ism” (Engin & Baba, 2015), is defined using different aspects. Some scholars point out that middle powers lack defined position on where they exactly belong in the categorization of states (Bélanger & Mace, 1997) and middle power is a relative term which requires determining the other extremes, i.e. great and small powers (Chapnick, 1999; Yalçın, 2012). With reference to this argument, the first definition that comes to mind is that middle powers are in the middle position in terms of classical terms such as size, population and capabilities.

However, nowadays material capabilities are not enough to define middle powers, as they disregard intentions. For instance, Jordaan (2003) asserted that what differs middle powers from non-middle powers is the fact that middle powers are more involved in international political issues, and that they rely highly on multilateral means and international institutions, especially by focusing on “conflict reduction” (p.

167). States in the middle position between great and small powers in terms of their material capabilities alone should not be directly labeled as middle powers, as inferred from the former argument by Jordaan. There must be some additional characteristics other than their middle position in the hierarchy of states. For instance, for Ravenhill (1998), there are five characteristics that determine a state as a middle power (five Cs): “capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition-building, and credibility” (p. 310).

Middle powers are states that are not as influential and powerful as great powers or great powers-to-be; but, they still have a considerable amount of influence in promoting cohesion and stability in the world system compared to the small powers (Chapnick, 1999; Glazebrook, 1947; Jordaan, 2003). They are mainly not powerful enough to act alone, but they are effective in collective action with states which have similar capacities or with less powerful ones (Da Silva, Spohr, & da Silveira, 2016), or through international organizations (Flemes & Habib, 2009). For some, such as A. F. Cooper (2015a), the main difference between middle powers and others – both great and small powers – emerges from their concern for strengthening the international system through diplomatic means by using their specific and flexible form of behavior (p. 35).

Parallel to that, Gilley & O’Neil (2014) argued that middle powers are both “entrepreneurs” and “defenders” of the norms and principles of the international order with the responsibility of being counterhegemonic to reduce great powers’ influence, while also contributing to a multi-polar order (p. 13). In this respect, middle powers mostly engage in international issues by relying on their soft power by pursuing proactive diplomacy with the aim of affecting multilateral outcomes (O’Neil, 2015, p. 75), or by politically representing “the social, environmental and human interests of humanity” (Bradford, 2015, p. 9). As mentioned by Wright (2015), a “rule-based international order” is pursued by middle powers in order for them to realize their special interests since it is more predictable for their action and more suitable for their survival (p. 20). Therefore, active middle power diplomacy emerges from the will of being more integrated globally whilst also directing it in a certain way.

Among different definitions and approaches, the thesis will rely on three

categorizations of middle powers according to the hierarchical, functional and behavioral approach in the literature summarized by Chapnick (1999) for three reasons: First of all, the main approaches to middle power theory are well summarized, covering the three main approaches to middle power in the literature. Secondly, it is a categorization that does not depend on historical context, in the sense that it does not derive the definition of middle power in terms of some historical circumstance such as Cold War politics. Finally, three categories are suitable for explaining middle power according to a theoretical framework in International Relations (IR). Thus, these three categories will also be associated with three main theories of IR: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

Hierarchical approach

The hierarchical approach, also called by some scholars “position approach” (Carr, 2014; A. F. Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1993), or “material model”, identifies small powers in terms of their relatively smaller size, population and having limited resources; whereas the great powers are defined as the states dealing with high political issues and pursuing military policies (Glazebrook, 1947, p. 307). When it comes to middle powers, they lie in between those two according to the hierarchical categorization based on power; even though there is no agreed-upon list (Glazebrook, 1947; Holbraad, 1971). Thus, one might argue, middle powers are non-great powers. The model prioritizes quantifiable patterns of their power such as “area, population, size, complexity and strength of economic, military capability and other comparable factors” (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993, p. 17) to come up with an objective definition (Carr, 2014).

The hierarchical model is presumed to be a classical approach to middle power theory that emerged during the Cold War period (D. A. Cooper, 2011). It can be basically associated with the traditional realist understanding of state’s capabilities approach since it relies on quantifiable, objective measures and assumes a hierarchy among

powers. It puts the emphasis on the “style” rather than the “content” of middle power statecraft (D. A. Cooper, 2011).

For some, the hierarchical model lacks a deep understanding of middle powers and an intellectually satisfying definition (Carr, 2014) since it is based on a comparison with great powers in terms of their roles in world politics (Manicom & Reeve, 2014). In this regard, it is also possible to identify middle powers as non-BRICs, because the discussions on BRICs are mainly based on material capabilities such as their economic growth and the increase in their political power (see Armijo, 2007; Cheng et al., 2007). It is important to note that middle powers have different characteristics apart from their positions in the hierarchy of powers, as will be emphasized by the next two discussions on middle power categorization.

Functional approach

The second model is the functional approach to “middlepowerhood” which puts emphasis on middle powers’ capability of having an influence on some specific global issues (Chapnick, 1999, p. 74). According to Bernard Wood (1988), middle powers tend to assume responsibility in global political issues in which they pursue strong interests and want to gain unique influence (as cited in Chapnick, 1999, p. 74). In that sense, issues of low politics in which middle powers can play active roles – such as environment, human rights, and development – become significant; since the issues of high politics on a broader global scale are reserved for the great powers. Thus, middle powers lack the capacity to engage in every issue-area in global politics. As a result, they are expected to be selective in determining their primary policies according to their capacity and region (Howe, 2015).

Cooper (1997) linked the functional approach to the concept of “niche diplomacy” where middle powers focus on specific issue areas from which they can get the best return (as cited in Hynek, 2004, p. 38). Therefore, the functional model suggests that middle powers either follow a great power, or build their small number of “functional

niches” by relying on multilateral efforts (D. A. Cooper, 2011). In a way, as Behringer (2005) argued,

Middle power states may act as ‘catalysts’ in launching diplomatic initiatives, ‘facilitators’ in setting agendas and building coalitions of support, and ‘managers’ in aiding the establishment of regulatory institutions (p. 2).

The functional model can be thought as an extension of the liberal theory of IR because it puts emphasis on diplomatic engagement and cooperation in multilateral aspects. According to the liberal internationalist approach, middle powers have no chance other than acting collaboratively and engaging in world politics multilaterally (Manicom & Reeve, 2014).

However, the liberal approach does not take middle powers as independent actors since they formulate strategies that link them to larger states (Manicom & Reeve, 2014, p. 26). Moreover, the functional approach is considered to be a limited definition of middle power; since middle power interests have to adopt to the specific issue areas of world politics whose importance is prone to change (Engin & Baba, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, they might not make a long-term middle power strategy in specific issue areas that fit their interests.

Behavioral approach

The third model, behavioral approach, is considered to be driven by “a role conception resting on the notion of a distinctive mode of statecraft” (Hynek, 2004, p. 36). This model is related to the state’s will and capacity of dedicating itself to be a middle power (Bélanger & Mace, 1997; Hynek, 2004). A. F. Cooper et al. (1993) have come up with an important definition regarding the behavioral model by indicating that middle powers are identified by their characteristics of pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems (p. 19). That is to say, they tend to take position in international disputes as mediators, and to pursue their diplomacy by relying on the notion of “good international citizenship” (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993). For Glazebrook (1947), it is a conscious decision of middle powers to take such a position in world

politics and to be part of the world affairs concerning peace, order and prosperity with a suitable voice (p. 307). Moreover, Evans and Grant (1991) put emphasis on the importance of “creativity” for middle power diplomacy in addressing and finding solutions to international problems, since it is the only way for them to increase their power relative to great powers (as cited in Lee, 2012, p. 5). Such an approach together with searching for multilateral engagements are considered “soft targets” (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 323).

The behavioral model is closer to the constructivist approach of IR, since middle powers are assumed to construct their identities by taking a middle power position in the world system. Patience (2014) claimed that the way states “imagine” themselves in terms of being great, small or middle powers, together with the perception of other states, influence states’ foreign policy agendas. For some scholars, what middle powers do is more than constructing identities, but also about constructing institutions. For Cass (2008),

Middle powers typically seek to promote norms related to multilateralism, wide consultation, consensus and respect for international law because their influence depends upon a rule-based system of bargaining to secure foreign policy autonomy and to create an environment more conducive to achieving their interests (p. 467).

In this case, constructivist theory suits the behavioral model in two ways: First, it focuses on non-material structures in determining actors’ identities which form interests and thus actions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001); such as “how they think they should act, what perceived limitations on their actions are and what strategies they can imagine” (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 197). To that effect, a state identifying itself as a “middle power” is expected to behave according to its identification. Or, to put it differently, middle powers construct their identities strategically to justify their interests and actions.

Secondly, “imagination” is one of the mechanisms that shape actors’ identity in terms of how they should act and construct their strategies in achieving their objectives (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 198). As pointed out by Reus-Smit (2005), constructivists argue that giving consent to international norms and ideas is a way of justifying behavior when these norms suit states’ strategy (p. 198). This approach also explains the

importance attributed to multilateralism in serving middle power interests. Nevertheless, behavioral categorization is considered by some scholars as a “too flexible” identification (Manicom & Reeve, 2014).

Theoretically, different approaches to middle power theory relate to different concepts and theories of IR. In Table 3, a brief insight on how different middle power approaches conceive the nature of power, relations with great powers, attitudes towards international institutions, and related IR theory is given with regards to the above discussions (see Table 3). Historically, middle power theory became significant during Cold War years. After the end of the Cold War the definition has started to change. As Jordaan (2003) put forth, one can make the differentiation between traditional and emerging middle powers. The paper will mainly focus on emerging middle powers; nevertheless, it is worth looking at traditional middle powers to better understand the features of today’s emerging middle powers.

Traditional Middle Powers

Traditional middle powers, as Jordaan (2003) defined, are the high-income countries with social democratic stability which emerged during the Cold War period and whose influence at the regional level is quite low because of not being known for their regional importance – also related to their geographically isolated positions – but for their global influence on low political issues (p. 168). Those powers emerged during the Cold War period, and mostly complied with the bipolar division, aligning with one of the two great powers or choosing non-alignment. Holbraad (1971) pointed out that a situation where they did not join any alliance might have been risky for them, due to the possibility of being torn apart by the central rivalry and pressure from both sides (p. 83). Therefore, they entered into political and military alliances with the great powers with whom they shared common interests (Holbraad, 1971).

Table 3 Three middle power approaches

	Nature of power	Relations with great powers	Attitude towards international institutions	Main domain of activity	Related IR theory
<i>Hierarchical (Positional)</i>	Hard power	Very likely to join alliances with great powers, possibility of bandwagoning	Serving great power interests, joining international organizations on the side of great powers	High political issues: security, military, energy	Realism
<i>Functional</i>	Soft power	Pursuing niche diplomacy, possibility of bandwagoning	Support for multilateral platforms where they can address global problems of niche areas	Low political issues: trade, development, human rights, climate, peacekeeping etc.	Liberalism / Liberal institutionalism
<i>Behavioral</i>	Soft power, diplomacy	Not necessarily joining alliances with great powers, forming groups with like-minded states, playing mediator role in conflicting situations	Platform for engagement with international politics to show their notion of “good international citizenship”	Low political issues: trade, development, human rights, climate, peacekeeping etc.	Constructivism

According to O’Neil (2015) on the other hand, middle powers were bridges between the developed and the developing world and also between the two super powers during the Cold War years (p. 77). They were significant actors in strategic and geographic great-power rivalry (Müftüler & Yüksel, 1997). Some middle powers such as Canada and Australia – even though allied to the US – were thought to be more “trustworthy” because they played an “honest-broker” role to ease the tough environment of Cold War rivalry through multilateral means and through engaging in political issues of arms control and the environment (O’Neil, 2015). In their relations with partner countries, these powers lacked power to impose their own will (Cass, 2008, p. 467). In that sense, White (2010) argued, they differ from other states in their ability to pursue and defend their own interests against great powers by negotiating with them (as cited in Beeson, 2011, p. 564).

Nevertheless, the Cold War bipolarity gave limited, and sometimes no opportunities to middle powers to play an active role in world politics. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War gave rise to the economic aspect of middle power diplomacy, focusing on economic well-being and the “economization of foreign policy” (Cooper, 2013, p. 964). One of the reason was that the world entered a process of globalization, where according to Nye (1990), power started being used less coercively (p. 167). Thus, the consequences of the deterioration of relationships became more costly as a result of the stronger economic interdependence between states (Nye, 1990).

As the international community has become more and more interdependent, the significance of soft power increased. As Nye argued, shaping preference of others lies at the very essence of soft power (Nye, 2008, 2011). Such developments served middle powers’ interests, especially in their economic and diplomatic relations. Taking Canada as an example, the Canadian government enjoyed the benefits of US-led liberalization of trade and investment regimes during the unipolar system under US hegemony (Neufeld, 1995, p. 16), just as Australia which started to get involved in multilateral cooperation, especially to support trade liberalization (Higgot & Cooper), or to pursue an active foreign policy in the areas of human rights and environment (Cooper as cited in Carr, 2014).

Emerging Middle Powers

Jordaan (2003) argued that emerging middle powers, or alternatively non-traditional middle powers (A. F. Cooper, 2013), are the developing countries that emerged in the post-Cold War period and which are strategically important at the regional level in terms of pursuing a leadership position (p. 168). Moreover, these middle powers are the recently democratized countries still struggling with unstable democratic aspects (Jordaan, 2003). Emerging middle powers are seeking to establish their multilateral groupings by pushing for their own international interests (Engin & Baba, 2015, p. 7), in order to find a place in the multilateral world order. To give an example, MIKTA which refers to the group of countries composed of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia is an informal grouping of middle powers that seeks to build innovative partnerships to find constructive solutions to recent global challenges in the areas of economics, security, environment and sustainable development in order to maintain the stability of the international community (MIKTA, n.d.). Except for Australia, all four members of MIKTA are emerging middle powers.

It is essential to note that the “utility, versatility and visibility” that MIKTA prioritizes in fostering global cooperation are the most significant features of middle power diplomacy. So, despite their differences, being eager to integrate themselves into the multilateral world order can be considered to be one of the unchanged interests of middle powers in terms of dealing with “soft security issues” – which became more important in the post-Cold War era – such as human rights, environment, or peace and conflict (John, 2014, p. 328). As Behringer (2005) asserted, they can play leadership roles only by resorting to multilateralism (p. 26). Having said that, middle power activism is also considered to be essential in finding multilateral solutions for today’s global challenges. As Maihold (2016) asserted in his example, MIKTA countries as emerging donors could claim the leadership role in development cooperation in terms of the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the discussions on aid effectiveness and monitoring processes (p. 559).

Soft power is an essential concept to explain the proactive foreign policy of emerging

middle powers. Nye (2004) categorized soft power according to three aspects: culture, political values and diplomacy (as cited in Yapıcı, 2015, p. 10). In this regard, this research takes soft power capabilities of middle powers according to their diplomatic relationships. It is difficult to define soft power³. For that reason, this research takes Oğuzlu's assumptions as the basis of the soft power concept. Oğuzlu (2014) defined power relationships by ranging them from "the softest version of a soft power relationship" to "the hardest version of a hard power relationship" (p. 2). In Oğuzlu's terms, I rely on "the lesser soft power relationship" when defining middle powers' soft power approach according to the behavioral model of MPT. In this version, Oğuzlu (2014) primarily argued that soft power is "purposefully and intentionally" used for image-making (p. 2). Secondly, this type of relationship does not require direct or automatic leadership over other countries, but rather is more about investing in image-making to improve one's position and to become attractive in the eyes of others (Oğuzlu, 2014).

In above terms, soft power gives middle powers flexibility in their relations with other countries and enables them to play safe in the international arena, unlike hard power which would decrease their impact by inviting great powers. To be able to do so, it is also required that the country has the skills for image-making. On this matter, it is worth looking at Nye's (2011) interpretation of rising powers. He argued that it would be misleading to only look at increased populations, as well as economic and military capacities of rising powers to understand their rise (p. 3). How they transform their resources to preferred outcomes is a significant aspect of them. Yet, pursuing such a strategy depends upon "the context and the country's skills" (Nye, 2011).

Another significant characteristic of emerging middle powers is that they are regional powers (Flemes & Habib, 2009; Jordaan, 2003; Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016). Compared to traditional middle powers – which focused more on global issues, such as Canada (Müftüler & Yüksel, 1997, p. 187) – they are not geopolitically isolated. To put it differently, they have relatively important geopolitical and economic positions,

³ The definition of the concept is open to discussion, because it is not easy to measure soft power. For further discussion see: *Utku Yapıcı (2015) "Can soft power be measured?"*.

or they represent their regions (Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016, p. 496) (see Figure 1). For instance, the Africa region is economically dominated by South Africa and Nigeria; and Malaysia has the most developed economy in South East Asia region after Singapore (Jordaan, 2003, p. 172).

For Huntington (1999), middle powers can also be defined as secondary regional powers. To give an example, Bélanger & Mace (1997) argued that the geopolitical position of Mexico – one of the emerging middle powers today – was highly relevant in playing a bridging role between the North and the South after the end of the Cold War because of its geopolitical importance in the region, even though Mexico refrained from identifying itself as a middle power (p. 175). For another example, Turkey is considered both a regional and a middle power (Müftüler & Yüksel, 1997).

Figure 1 Geopolitical positions of MIKTA middle powers



Source: Wikipedia (2017)

Apart from soft power and regionalism, middle powers are traditionally attributed a foreign policy behavior towards multi-polarity (Manicom & Reeve, 2014) for further global engagement. Flesher (2007) pointed out that the multilateral approach is a fundamental part of middle power leadership since these powers are not capable of

leading at the international stage (p. 11). That is why building consensus in multilateral platforms is more preferable for middle powers (Flemes, 2007). Moreover, such an engagement with the international community positively contributes to middle powers' identity construction. Theoretically, active engagement with international organizations by relying on international institutions and multilateral means gives middle powers a relatively better position in terms of being good global citizens.

To give an example, the G20 has become one of the platforms supporting "a strategy of using international institutions to build South-South coalitions" (Flemes, 2007, p. 17). The G20 is an informal group of 19 countries and the EU, with representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Its mandate is to "promote discussion and study and review policy issues among industrialized countries and emerging markets with a view to promoting international financial stability." (G20 Information Center, n.d.). The first G20 Summit was held in 2008, in the US. After the first three summits, the G20 started to be more dominated by hosting middle powers. As A. F. Cooper (2015) argued, these summit processes are different from those of the 19th and 20th centuries where middle powers were in a subordinate position to the great powers (p. 100). The G20 has become a platform where middle powers are actively involved and find greater chances in being equally represented with the greater powers (Bradford, 2015; A. F. Cooper, 2013, 2015a, 2015c; A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013) (see Table 4). For emerging middle powers, such platforms are important in order to take an active position in global politics. Therefore, as some scholars would argue, power is measured among today's new actors of world politics not only according to the mere size of their economy, but also according to what extent they are integrated in the world economy (Subacchi, 2008).

As discussed above, emerging middle powers resemble the traditional middle powers in terms of their active involvement in global politics, using soft power and encouraging the establishment of multilateral platforms. When it comes to their differences, the most important aspect of emerging middle powers is the fact that they are also regional powers. This might attribute them more responsibility in the sense that they not only address global problems, but also their regional issues. Nevertheless,

they have more flexibility compared to traditional middle powers in terms of being freed from the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War.

Table 4 Middle powers representation in the G20

	<i>Great powers</i>	<i>Middle powers in G20</i>	<i>Other Middle powers</i>
<i>Asia</i>	China	Australia India Japan Korea	
<i>Europe</i>	EU Russia	France Germany Italy United Kingdom	Spain Denmark Norway Sweden
<i>Latin America</i>		Argentina Brazil Mexico	
<i>North America</i>	United States	Canada	
<i>Other</i>		Saudi Arabia South Africa Turkey	Chile Iran Israel Nigeria Singapore

Source: Bradford, 2015 (p. 9).

In addition to the characteristics of emerging middle powers mentioned above, one of the most significant motives behind their proactive foreign policy is their increased economic capacity. Therefore, this research raises the question of how they transform their economic power into middle power diplomacy and claims that development

cooperation plays the essential part of transforming their economic capacities into practical areas of international politics. To better understand how development cooperation can be a mean to pursue foreign policy strategies, it is worth mentioning two fundamental approaches in foreign aid discussions: the macro-economic approach and the approach that takes foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. The thesis mostly relies on the second approach and mentions the positive role of foreign aid in foreign policy.

1.2.3 Two approaches to development cooperation

First of all, foreign aid is based on the relationship between the donor and the recipient, regardless of the donor categorization of traditional or emerging donor. In foreign aid literature, discussions mostly revolve around the issue of aid effectiveness. However, this research claims that donors' motives should not be neglected. Therefore, this section looks at the literature on both approaches, in order to better position middle power diplomacy into foreign aid literature.

Macro-economic approaches

Macro-economic approaches to development cooperation constitute the main discussions on foreign aid giving, and concentrate on aid impact and effectiveness. In this regard, scholars looking at the issue from this perspective mostly focus on the outcome of the development cooperation. They tend to explain donor motives by looking at the outcome, or suggest that donors should pursue a performance-based approach in order to get positive outcomes.

As an example for the first argument, some scholars argue that the level of need is the determining factor in aid allocation. The motives of development aid are humanitarian and demand-driven in their essence when we look at the outcomes. Lumsdaine & Schopf (2007) argued that the data on OECD ODA shows that aid is mainly provided to countries with low level incomes and high populations rather than to those with high economic or strategic values. According to 2004 estimates, foreign aid provided by

OECD DAC to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) has increased to 43% from 35% in 1994 (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007, p. 225).

Those who are in favor of performance-based approach suggest that the donor-driven nature of foreign aid can be minimized when recipient demands are considered carefully and when they are integrated into the aid process. Putting recipients' needs into focus, aid effectiveness becomes the question to be addressed in development cooperation (E. M. Kim & Oh, 2012). They emphasize an altruistic donor motivation, however with some conditions. Therefore, it can also be named "conditional aid" (Angelsen, 2013). Some scholars argue that good governance is the key for aid effectiveness. Pronk (2001) pointed out that a good policy environment is needed in order to achieve the economic development of recipient countries (p. 613). Therefore, recipients with better governance indicators are the targets of most donors (Berthélemy, 2006). Furthermore, economic development progress of recipients is believed to be fostered by the reinforcement of liberal values of democracy and human rights (Easterly, 2007; Svensson, 2003; Zanger, 2000).

The second approach: Foreign aid for strategic interests

The second approach to foreign aid projects a strategic interest of aid provision where it is mostly used as a foreign policy tool to realize donors' interests. The realist critic of Morgenthau (1962) claims that the practices of aid giving is basically the transfer of money and services from one government to another, and names them as "modern bribes" for the purchase of political favors under the name of foreign aid. Including the realist criticism, Lancaster (2007) came up with four main purposes of foreign aid giving: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial, and less prominently cultural purposes (p. 13). Therefore, the literature on foreign aid also concentrates on mixed-motives of aid giving, where development is only one among them (Lancaster, 2007, 2009). Foreign aid as part of strategic calculations is best summarized by Lundsgaarde (2013):

A common and straightforward conclusion...has been that aid programs reflect a mixture of self-interested and altruistic motivation: most donors provide aid to address some combinations of diplomatic, economic and development-oriented goals (p. 4).

There are several studies which dwelled into the donors' foreign policy strategies of aid giving. Here is a brief literature review on donor motives:

Alesina & Dollar (2000) have come up with considerable findings on different types of donor-driven motives of aid. Their study suggests that colonial ties still play an important role in development cooperation. Former colonial powers, such as France and the UK, tend to give more aid to their former colonies (p. 45). This is obviously because those donors do not want to lose long-established political and economic ties with the recipients. On the other hand, UN voting patterns also affect aid practice: Either aid is used for obtaining political support, or aid provision results in an increase in the UN votes favoring donors (Alesina et al., 2000). In either case, foreign aid is used as a political tool. For instance, a 345% increase in Japanese aid results in one standard deviation increase in voting correlation, while this is the case for the US with a 78% increase in US aid (Alesina et al., 2000, p. 46). In addition to this, some specific countries with no needs receive high amounts of aid because of political reasons (Alesina et al., 2000, p. 47). For example, one-third of US aid is provided to Egypt and Israel and mainly motivated by US self-interests in the Middle East rather than recipients' needs.

Besides political motives, donor countries are also motivated by economic interests. Studies show that recipients are expected to buy more products from donor countries, when foreign aid is used as an "instrument for goodwill" (Younas, 2008, p. 662). To give an example, Younas (2008) argued that among the top six OECD bilateral donors (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States), more aid is provided when the recipient countries import machinery and transportation products from the donor, except for the United States which is mostly motivated by its political and strategic interests (p. 672).

Some donors tend to provide aid to their trading partners for economic reasons (Berthélemy, 2006) in order to sustain growth or to reduce economic vulnerabilities for the purpose of getting profit from its exports and imports (Maizels & Nissanke,

1984, p. 884). Furthermore, access to natural resources is another motive for foreign aid giving as a result of the growing demand for minerals, oil, and so on (Klingebiel, 2014b).

The second approach to development cooperation constitutes the fundamental argument of this research, which claims that foreign aid is used as a foreign policy instrument and emerging middle powers have mixed motives in their foreign aid provision. As some scholars suggested, powerful states use foreign aid as a policy tool to improve their relationships with smaller states as well as to become more effective in their regions (T. Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 170). Hence, to make a clearer argument on the relevance of taking foreign aid as a foreign policy instrument, we can also apply foreign policy analysis based on Breuning's assumptions (2007) to foreign aid:

The use of foreign aid as an instrument can be explained by the individual level of analysis, if pursuing development cooperation as part of a diplomacy is a specific decision taken by an individual ruler or the elite. When it comes to state level of analysis, economic conditions of a state can be a motive for pursuing an active foreign aid strategy as in the example of emerging middle powers (e.g. good international citizenship or being a bridge between the developed and the developing world). Finally, the systemic level of analysis tells us about the recent shifts in international development cooperation with the active involvement of emerging donors. Thus, we can compare their relative powers and influence in the field, and analyze their actions.

Being able to position foreign aid policy into three levels of analysis shows us the relevance of development cooperation for a foreign policy analysis. Starting from this, the research will mainly focus on the state level of analysis to explain states' behavior and also the systemic level of analysis to mention the overall changes in international politics. At this point, the individual level of analysis will not be mentioned, since it requires a more detailed analysis on characteristics of the leaders, their decisions and the foreign policy focus of the decision-makers. Still, one might take into consideration that pursuing a foreign aid policy can also be attributed to a development-oriented leader, or the elite.

Overall, change in development cooperation landscape can be explained by the assertive behaviors of emerging powers in the international aid system where they effect and change it with their own approaches. To be more specific, it is worth looking briefly at the literature on emerging donors which also includes the emerging middle powers of this research's focus.

To What Extent Are Emerging Middle Powers Emerging Donors?

The emergence, or re-emergence (Kragelund, 2008; Woods, 2008), of new donors have brought the discussions on aid effectiveness and donors' strategic motives back on the table, because development cooperation is considered one of the dimensions which is a fundamental instrument of today's international political economy (Chin & Quadir, 2013, p. 493). Emerging donors refer to non-OECD or OECD non-DAC countries, in contrast to traditional donors which formed OECD DAC (with the exception of Korea which became a DAC member in 2010) (Klingebiel, 2014a; Woods, 2008). As some scholars would argue, they challenge the established system, and might lead to a significant effect on international development policy (Ş. Kardaş, 2013b).

From the perspective of established donors, emerging donors affect the long-established standards of foreign aid giving which were established by the World Bank and other regional development banks, and the OECD (Woods, 2008, p. 1210). Thus, the North-South flows of aid no longer dominates international development cooperation (Manning, 2006). The main reason is that emerging donors claim to bring an alternative to foreign aid provision, by putting South-South cooperation on the agenda, reflecting a "horizontal cooperative relationship" (Klingebiel, 2014a). For some scholars, SSC plays a significant role for their regional, interregional and global engagements (Mathur, 2014). Mawdsley (2012) came up with four points which summarize the motives of South-South development cooperation (SSDC) differing from those of traditional western foreign aid practice (p. 152):

1. Emerging donors claim to have a shared experience with the developing world because they themselves are still developing countries. Thus, they develop a “shared identity”.
2. Based on shared identity, experience, and historical ties together with some common aspects in terms of socio-economic and geographical aspects, emerging donors claimed to have a better approach to development cooperation.
3. Principles of non-intervention and preservation of state sovereignty are fundamental aspects of development cooperation for emerging donors who reject hierarchical relations.
4. Finally, win-win outcome is emphasized as an initial aspect of SSDC (Mawdsley, 2012).

The above points are important to understand how emerging donors perceive and challenge the practice. Mawdsley’s assertions are mostly applicable to emerging donors; however not all the emerging donors have the same capacity to implement them in the same way. In this case, BRICs have the leading role in SSDC as challengers of the established aid regime (Chin & Quadir, 2013). Their cooperation is diverse from economic sphere to political and security areas (Mathur, 2014, p. 19).

The main debate on emerging donors revolves around the question to what extent they contribute to international development. Chandy & Kharas (2011) asserted that the practice of SSDC has been linked to diplomatic and commercial objectives aiming at mutual benefit, and using different aid modalities based on a non-conditional approach that takes recipients’ preferences into consideration (p. 742). Alternatively, Bräutigam (2011) argued in her example of Chinese expansion into developing countries that aid is not the only motive but one of the instruments of economic engagements. As a consequence, new donors also seek to combine foreign aid provision to commercial activities (Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015). Therefore, criticisms emerge that they do not pursue altruistic interests, but rather strategic ones.

In this study, I argue that emerging middle powers are in the same category as emerging donors, because they also increased their foreign aid provision parallel to

their economic growth. What differs emerging middle powers is that they use foreign aid as part of their middle power strategy as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Thus, one might conclude that they share similar aspects with some exceptions stemming from their middle power roles. In addition, they are not independent from established international politics of development cooperation as much as BRICs or other non-OECD donors are. Therefore, their development cooperation has mixed motives, and an “in between” status.

For instance, Korea became one of OECD DAC members in 2009. Its compliance with DAC standards in aid allocation together with its reliance on global development strategies – the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs) – limit, if not totally abolish, the use of foreign aid by solely relying on self-motivation (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007, pp. 225-226). For another example, Turkey as a non-DAC member of OECD has also been strengthening their role in international foreign aid. For instance, the absolute ODA allocation of Turkey in 2004 (US\$ 339 million) was already larger than that of two existing DAC members (Manning, 2006, p. 373). Even though Turkey has recently been seeking out more independent position in development cooperation as other emerging donors do, it still regularly reports to OECD about its ODA allocations. Therefore, Turkey is not completely outside of the traditional system.

To conclude, one might argue that emerging middle powers are not solely part of SSDC. They perceive development cooperation as one of the foreign policy tools to engage in global politics to be able to strengthen their middle power status. They are considered emerging donors, while at the same time, they are a part of the traditional system which was established by the OECD. In the following chapters, the thesis will make this argument clearer, while analyzing Korea and Turkey more in detail.

1.3 Methodology

This study is a foreign policy analysis of two middle powers, namely Korea and Turkey, focusing on their middle power diplomacy in line with foreign aid practices. It aims at an interpretative research based on comparative case study. It is inspired by the method of most-similar case comparison (Lamont, 2015), also called J.S. Mill's "method of difference"; or most similar systems design (Landman, 2003), yet not fully utilizes it. Therefore, the objective of the research is to compare cases that have some features in common, while highlighting differences (Landman, 2003, p. 29).

In this respect, I specifically use the comparative method because of the following reasons: To begin with, all research is comparative. Be they single-country studies or few or many country cases, comparisons "provide contextual description... confirm and infirm theories, and explain the presence of deviant countries identified through cross-national comparison" (Landman, 2003, p. 34). Second, a comparative study highlights the differences and similarities between two or more cases, and forms a basis for interpreting how differently the parallel processes occur within each framework (Collier, 1993, p. 105). Finally, a comparative study is useful for concept-testing. As Collier (1993) suggested, this method enables us to analyze different cases according to "a particular model or set of concepts" (p. 108). In doing so, it also reinforces descriptive research (Collier, 1993).

Parallel to the reasons above, descriptive analysis constitutes another essential aspect of my comparative research. As Landman (2013) argued, descriptive analysis is the first goal of comparing political phenomena and events of a particular country or group of countries (p. 5). As we describe different cases on the same level, it is easier to assess similarities and differences (Hatipoğlu, 2013, p. 26). What is more, a few case study method for comparison (as this study focuses on two country cases) enables us to analyze an issue in depth, as well as to have control over other possible explanations of the same political phenomena (Hatipoğlu, 2013, p. 33). Therefore, selection of only two country cases is done purposively to be able to sharpen the descriptive aspect of the research.

Starting from the above assumptions, the comparative method is useful for interpreting behaviors, institutions, concepts and phenomena which we observe in political sciences (Hatipoğlu, 2013). Therefore, comparing few countries requires “careful selection” as “studies using this method are more intensive and less extensive since they encompass more of the nuances specific to each country” (Landman, 2003, p. 29). Based on this, the justification for selecting Korea and Turkey is as follows:

Selection of Cases

The thesis argues that both Korea and Turkey can be categorized as *emerging power*, *emerging middle power* and *emerging donor* in line with the discussions given in the literature review. Aligned with these aspects, I do purposive sampling in selecting two country cases according to the following criteria:

To begin with, both countries have similar aspects in terms of size, population, geopolitical importance and their economic and political involvement in global affairs. In other words, their position in the hierarchy of states is in the middle. That is to say, both countries lack the capacity to become great powers, and at the same time are so significant that one cannot put them into category of small or middle range power (not middle power as the theory suggests, but simply in the middle position in the global hierarchy of powers). The reason is, as Holbraad argued, that middle powers are prone to international pressures as the small powers are, whereas they still influence some outcomes in the international system and are able to protect their interests and goals as the great powers do (as cited in Gilley & O’Neil, 2014, p. 10).

Relatedly, both countries have a close cooperation with a greater power, i.e. the United States. It is traditionally a middle power characteristic to follow a greater power (D. A. Cooper, 2011), therefore they are the functional players of international politics. The Cold War period traditional middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, were in the western power camp led by the United States. The same applies to Korea and Turkey. It is the United States whose aid they both received in their own

developmental processes and both have been allies to the US since the end of World War II.

Historically, both countries were poor in the 1950s, and remained net recipients for years until the 1990s when they established their own development agencies (KOICA in 1991 and TIKA in 1992). Today, both can be considered developing countries in a transition period towards becoming developed ones. In this case Korea is closer because of being one of the DAC members of the OECD, but is not yet fully developed when compared to its western counterparts; whereas Turkey is still considered an upper-middle income developing country. To be more specific, both countries are among the biggest twenty economies in the world (both are members of the G20) and have similar GDP growth rates: while Korea's annual GDP growth rate in 2016 was 2,750%, Turkey's rate was 2,930% (OECD.Stat, 2017c).

Fourth, the first impression of both donors is that they are part of the same traditional western club. Korea has been an OECD DAC member since 2010, while Turkey is one of the founding members of the OECD which was established in 1961, and an observer to DAC. In addition, both Korea and Turkey have steadily increased their aid volume for the last ten years to open up and meet development needs of developing countries. Given the statistics between 2010-2015, Korea has increased its total aid disbursements from US\$ 1173,79 million to US\$ 1915,39 million, whereas Turkey has done so from US\$ 967,42 million to US\$ 3919,14 million (OECD.Stat, 2017d).

Fifth, both Korea and Turkey have strengthened economic and political ties with the developing countries parallel to their increasing foreign aid volume. For instance, both countries define their roles as a bridge between the developed and the developing world, and claim to be an important development cooperation partner on a global scale (Sung-han Kim, 2013; MFA Turkey, 2014). This aspect of theirs is of utmost significance for this study because it gives a solid ground in explaining the nexus between the middle power diplomacy and foreign aid behaviors of two cases.

Last but not least, both countries are members of the middle power grouping MIKTA. Therefore, MIKTA is another significant justification for the case selection in two

aspects: On the one hand, MIKTA identifies itself as a group of “like-minded” states (MIKTA, n.d.). It tells us about the similar foreign policy orientations of both Korea and Turkey on a global level. On the other hand, the bridging role between the developed and the developing world was also emphasized by MIKTA powers in a joint statement on the foreign ministry level meeting in 2014 (MFA Turkey, 2014). Therefore, the understandings of “a bridging role” of two cases are similar, and enables us to better compare the foreign aid policies of two country cases.

When we look at MIKTA powers, they are put in the same category of like-minded middle powers. Among them, I select Korea and Turkey to see to what extent these middle powers behave similarly/differently in foreign aid, and therefore to test their like-mindedness in a specific policy area. Given the methodology and the justification for case selection, I used the following methods of data collection for this research:

Collection of Data

This study is based on archival and document-based research as well as literature as the secondary source. Moreover, it is projected to conduct semi-structured interviews with governmental officials, relevant experts, and scholars working on this topic in capitals of the case countries, Seoul and Ankara. In this respect, the interview questions are prepared beforehand, open-ended, and specifically focused on the questions related to the nexus between foreign aid practice and middle power diplomacy, and the proactive role of two middle powers in international affairs. In order to make the comparative analysis more effective, the questions are designed to be the same for each country with slight differences.

In order to collect the relevant qualitative data on Korea, I conducted field research in Seoul, for two weeks in October 1-14, 2016. As a result of the field work, I interviewed six interview partners from academia, the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the United Nations Development Program Seoul Policy Center, and the Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation (KoFID). Moreover, as proceeded from the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was invited to

the 3rd Busan Global Partnership Forum, which was held in October 6-7, 2016, and where I received the opportunity to observe middle power behaviors in practice.

Compared to the project in Seoul, I only managed to conduct three interviews in Ankara, where I encountered difficulties in arranging appointments. Two interviews were conducted with officials from Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and one from academia. Therefore, the research project is not completely satisfactory in terms of having found interview partners in Turkey.

1.4 Overview

The literature review arrived at the following conclusions: First, rising powers, namely BRICs and the second tier emerging powers, are the main actors leading to the political and economic shifts in the international system. Second, some of the second tiers can be categorized as middle powers under the Middle Power Theory. The thesis basically relies on the behavioral approach to MPT and tries to understand middle power behavior and analyzes their development policies in explaining their foreign policy strategies. Therefore in the final section, the discussions on middle powers were linked to the debates on the motives of foreign aid giving: macro-economic and the approach that takes foreign aid to be a foreign policy tool. The middle powers are explained in line with the latter, since they have mixed motives in foreign aid. The discussions on the following chapters of the thesis are as follows:

The second chapter of the thesis discusses Korea's middle power role, and its effect on its development policy. Korea has a declared middle power strategy of Global Korea. Therefore, it suggests that middle power is an identity adopted by Korea and it leads it to behave in a certain way. The main argument of the thesis is that Korea, by using the motto of "learning from experience", claims to have a recipient perspective in pursuing its development policy. It is a reflection of its middle power identity that tries to project a global and at the same time a unique role for Korea.

The third chapter takes Turkey as the second case study and argues that even though Turkey does not have a declared middle power strategy, it adapted to middle power identity based on the assumptions of the behavioral approach. Turkey's strategy is reflected by a "humanitarian diplomacy" and has a significant effect on its development policy. In approaching the developing world, Turkey stresses its humanitarianism in understanding the recipients' needs as well as its cultural, linguistic and religious ties which date back to the Ottoman period. In a way, Turkey justifies its unique approach globally and construct its identity on it.

The fourth chapter as an evaluation of the thesis claims that Korea and Turkey have similar approaches to development cooperation in terms of pursuing mixed motives. Moreover, these two emerging middle powers construct their identities on the grounds of good global citizenship and being a bridge between the developed and the developing world. Therefore, they stress the recipient perspective in international development. While doing so however, the two middle powers show different foreign aid behaviors. It is suggested that middle powers pursue their strategies based on their soft power capabilities and construct their identities in specific issue areas of international politics, as in the case of development cooperation. Hence, they rely on their best quality in pursuing their development policies which enables them to differentiate themselves from mainstream practices.

The conclusion chapter provides an overall assessment of the thesis together with suggestions for further research. This chapter concludes that both Korea and Turkey rely on their soft power capabilities and construct their identities according to them. In this case, development cooperation is one of the best examples in explaining foreign policy strategies of two middle powers. For further research, the thesis suggests that the impact of foreign aid giving in middle power diplomacy must be analyzed in line with to what extent foreign aid is used strategically as a soft power tool. Therefore, aid outcome must be analyzed more in detail. In addition, another research question that emerges out of this thesis can be "why do different middle powers behave differently in aid giving?" Finally and related to the previous, the thesis also recommends a detailed analysis of other middle powers so as to be able to make generalizations.

CHAPTER 2

KOREA'S MIDDLE POWER ROLE: A DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Introduction

Korea is one of the emerging middle powers, which pursues an active middle power diplomacy. This chapter aims to analyze how Korea identifies itself as a middle power, and how its middle power role affects its development policy. Before dwelling on the main discussion, it is worth having a brief look at the main issues of Korean foreign politics:

To begin with, Korea is a formal ally to the United States (T. Kim, 2014). Its long-established relations with the US is one of the determinant factors of its foreign policy. The strategic partnership between two states started after the Korean War. Back then, the US was the primary actor in Korea's war recovery through aid. After the end of the Cold War period, the US-Korea relations has remained as a strategic alliance, especially in terms of military means against the communist North, as much as it evolved into a trade partnership as a result of Korea's rapid growth (Konishi & Manyin, 2009).

Secondly, since the end of the Korean War, the relations with North Korea are one of the crucial issues both in Korea's domestic as well as foreign politics. On the one hand, the unification concerns with the North determines the characteristics of Korean domestic political agenda. On the other hand, North Korea creates a global security problem as a result of its nuclear program (Mo, 2016, p. 589).

The third important issue is Korea's relation with China. Historically, China and South Korea have been on opposite camps, since the North Korea's survival after the Korean War was as a result of China's entry into the war on the side of the North (T. Kim, 2014, p. 87). Nevertheless, the confrontation between the two powers declined in the 1990s. Today, the rise of China creates a particular challenge both for Korea's global role as well as the region (Mo, 2016).

Having said that, Korea is one of the important powers in its region, and it identifies itself as a middle power, and uses middle power discourse to define its global role. According to John (2014),

The deployment of the 'middle power' concept by politicians and practitioners implies a kind of shorthand for a pre-defined and generally agreed set of foreign policy behaviors and roles. The main motivation for the adoption of 'middle power diplomacy' as a foreign policy strategy is to obtain international recognition as big contributors in international politics (p. 338).

As John argued, middle power diplomacy is a defined strategy of Korean foreign policy, as much as a self-identification. It aims to make Korea an active contributor in global affairs, so that Korea can strengthen its relative position in the international arena. Based on the behavioral approach to MPT, this research argues that Korea adopts a middle power identity and construct its global position based on this strategy. Moreover, such a defined strategy requires a strong tool to be realized. Therefore, I put Korea's foreign aid provision into focus in explaining Korea's middle power role.

The first section of this chapter will try to explain Korea's middle power role by looking at its active foreign policy behavior. It will mainly focus on the *Global Korea* initiative, its G20 membership and the middle powers grouping of MIKTA in which Korea is a part. *Global Korea* attributes Korea a global role in discourse, whereas Korea's attempts to have a global role in the G20 by prioritizing development cooperation shows how ambitious Korea is. The last part of this section will further discuss its membership to the middle power grouping MIKTA, and its effectiveness. On this matter, this part focuses on two important questions: whether MIKTA is an effective platform for Korea in realizing its middle power quest, and whether the group is likely to survive in the long-run.

The second section will mainly focus on Korea's foreign aid practice where Korean government puts emphasis on its unique approach: "learning from experience". First, it will provide an overview on Korean ODA – namely Korea's ODA volume and type of aid, priority regions, income groups and countries, and sectoral division in its foreign aid policy. Later, to better understand how Korea combines its development experience to its foreign aid practice, the paper will focus on Saemaul Undong, a program which was applied in Korea's own rural development during the 1970s and recently aimed to be exported globally by the government. Basically, the program targets agricultural and community development in rural areas in LDCs and developing countries. The second section will also cover the discussions on whether the Korean experience is applicable, and how it is reflected in its policy in Africa. Here, Africa is a significant partner region to understand Korea's overseas expansion. In the final section, Korea's middle power role will be assessed in line with previous discussions. Briefly, this chapter analyzes Korean foreign aid policy in line with its middle powerhood; or to put it in another way, it will try to respond to the question of how/to what extent Korea's middle power role affects its development policy.

2.1 Korea: An ambitious middle power

Korea is a middle power (Bradford, 2015). The thesis argues that Korea's middle power strategy can be explained by the behavioral approach which takes middle power as a state's identity (John, 2014). The Korean former vice Minister of foreign affairs and trade S. Kim (2013) stresses Korea's role as a middle power by stating that Korea would address global issues by taking its own interests into consideration together with those of its counterparts and the international community. Moreover, he further stated that middle powers should be considered to be a bridge between the developed and the developing world that respond to complex challenges of global issues; since great powers can no longer coordinate all the actors involved, but can only mobilize cooperation among them (Sung-han Kim, 2013). In this regard, Korea is given a global role as a middle power, and thus an identity.

To justify my position from the perspective of the behavioral approach, it is first worth looking at how Korea can be positioned according to the other two perspectives of MPT. The hierarchical approach suggests that Korea is a middle power when its size and population as well as its economic and political capabilities are taken into consideration (Ko, 2012). As Hilpert (2007) argued, Korea has always been in the secondary place against greater power such as Japan, China, USA and Russia in its region (p. 15). Besides, these powers have a facilitating effect on Korea's middle power diplomacy. For instance, Korea is geopolitically situated between major greater trade partners, one of which is China; and increasing economic relations with China plays an essential role in Korea's global engagements (T. Kim, 2014, p. 89).

As the functional model suggests, on the other hand, Korean government supports and encourages multilateral partnership and aims to contribute to international peace and prosperity. As Ko (2012) pointed out, joining UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs)⁴ plays a significant role in improving Korea's international image as a middle power, together with "nation branding" that contributes to its economy (Ko, 2012, p. 296). As a result, Korea shows its middle power strength in niche areas of international politics, such as development cooperation and PKOs, as the functional approach would suggest (Howe, 2015).

As inferred from the above theoretical framework, two definitions of middle power suggested above are supportive for Korea's middle power role; yet I argue, they are not enough to explain it. Korea's hierarchical position is defined according to its position to the greater or smaller powers and it only explains Korea's middle power role in relative terms. To put it differently, the hierarchical approach positions Korea into the middle in the hierarchy of states, regardless of Korea's self-identification as a middle power. However, from the level of analysis perspective, position in the system is not sufficient for explaining foreign policy strategy. The functional approach, on the

⁴ This research does not discuss Korea's PKOs in detail, since it only focuses on Korea's foreign aid practice. Nevertheless, it is important to note that PKOs play a significant role in Korea's middle power approach. Korea addresses the issues concerning global peace and security and gets involved in PKOs to find multilateral solutions. In this regard, Korea attributes itself a mediator role in conflict situations. For further discussion see: *Sangtu Ko (2012) "Korea's middle power activism and peacekeeping operations"*.

other hand, is only relevant for explaining Korea's multilateral engagements in niche areas. In this regard, the continuity of its middle power-ness is only possible as long as Korea is actively engaged with some of the global issue areas which it finds relevant for its interests and capabilities.

Therefore, the behavioral approach provides a better explanation, because the Korean government itself attributes Korea a middle power identity on which Korea can develop a long-term foreign policy strategy. As a matter of fact, such a conclusion is not wrong to make, since this approach is also more compatible with emerging middle powers' foreign policy calculations. While doing so, the Korean government relies on its soft power capabilities. As Bradford (2015) suggested, there is a need for middle powers to keep the international system balanced, where they use their soft powers of "knowledge, expertise, organization, preparation, discipline, leadership, and institutions" to address interests of humanity emerging from social, environmental and human needs (p. 9).

In this respect, the Korean government takes the stage by pursuing an ambitious middle power diplomacy. To formulate Korea's middle power approach, there are three important stages which Korea has gone through: First, the Korean government launched the *Global Korea* initiative in 2008. Global Korea exemplifies Korea's middle power role in the sense that Korea has started questioning its place in the world. Secondly, Korea has become one of the founding members of the G20 – which replaced the G8 after the 2008 financial crisis – in the same year as its declaration of the Global Korea initiative. Finally, to further its functional capabilities, Korea needs like-minded middle powers. In this respect, MIKTA which gathers emerging middle powers Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia under the same umbrella can be taken into consideration as one of the necessities in strengthening its middle power position.

2.1.1 Global Korea Initiative

The middle power discourse has become popular in Korean official statements, and resulted in the announcement of its foreign policy strategy of Global Korea in 2008 (John, 2014, p. 330). The initiative, as inferred from its name, attributes Korea an international responsibility stemming from its strengthened status in international politics. It can be also read as an approach that questions its place in the world and creates a new identity for Korea. Such initiative, in the speech of the Korea's former president in 2009, is thought to be achieved by using two policy instruments appropriately: ODA and PKO (Ko, 2012, p. 296).

As the former vice minister of foreign affairs and trade Sung-han Kim stated in 2013, the Global Korea initiative is vital for realizing middle power strategy and it is kind of a necessity in the recent international environment which is highly interconnected and not governed hierarchically, but in a “network fashion” (Sung-han Kim, 2013). Therefore, countries having similar foreign policy objectives now can have an impact on global issues through their “innovative ideas, smart and flexible strategies, and moral leadership” (Sung-han Kim, 2013). In a way, the foreign ministry put emphasis on “like-mindedness” for middle powers to achieve their strategies through cooperation. Korea is considered one of the unique countries to achieve this because of belonging to neither of the two camps: developed and developing world (A. F. Cooper, 2015b).

Global Korea as a foreign policy initiative that attributes Korea an expanded global outreach rather than a regional scope which Korea mostly had before (John, 2014). Moreover, it not only brings new structural features to its traditional foreign policy where Korea can pursue its national interests more independently, but also improves Korea's middle power identity as its national identity (John, 2014, p. 332). Thus, the Korean government puts emphasis on using soft power in addressing global issues, having a moral responsibility to get involved in development cooperation, and engaging with multilateral partnerships. John (2014) argued that Korea's eagerness to pursue such diplomacy is because of its strategy to increase its international reputation as “a big contributor to international politics” (p. 328). Therefore, the Global Korea

initiative as a strategy positively contributes to gaining such a reputation. Moreover, the declaration of such an initiative shows how devoted Korea is in obtaining a middle power role by providing a well-structured foreign policy agenda.

O'Neil (2015) came up with a significant analysis on the timing of Global Korea launched under the Lee Presidency: First of all, it was launched when the G8 was first replaced by the G20 as an institution for global economic governance in 2008 (p. 84). Korea was one of the founding members of the G20 in 1999. Later in 2010, Korea became the first non-G8 country to host the G20 Summit in Seoul. In the G20 leaders' summits, Korea has focused very much on development cooperation and economic growth as will be discussed in detail in the next section. Secondly, the Global Korea initiative came into the picture when Korea also launched *New Asian Initiative* where Korea attributed itself a leadership role in the region as the leading voice of Asian countries in international platforms (O'Neil, 2015, p. 84). New Asian Initiative was later followed by *Eurasian Initiative* launched in 2013 under the Park government with the motto of "making Eurasia into a single united continent, a continent of creativity and a continent of peace." (O'Neil, 2015, p. 85). Finally O'Neil (2015) pointed out that Korea's membership to OECD DAC has further reinforced its global position, since Korea was the first country who transformed from being one of the least-developed recipients to a DAC donor (p. 85).

O'Neil's analysis on Global Korea is important to understand the mindset behind Korea's middle power approach. Regarding the use of soft power, Korea prioritizes economic growth and development cooperation, because the government considerably internalized the task of being the link between the developed and developing world. For A. F. Cooper (2013), this task is important in multilateral negotiations; therefore, middle powers are well-suited for developing an economic focus which requires technical diplomacy (p. 980). Declaration of an initiative that attributes Korea a global role is an important step, yet not enough to put it into practice. The G20 is another essential platform for the Korean government to internationalize its global strategy. Therefore, as O'Neil also asserted once, correspondence of the timing of the launch of Global Korea with the G20 is one of the turning points for Korean foreign policy.

2.1.2 The G20

The G20 is a platform composed of countries with diverse identities; and it neither has an ideological uniformity, nor alliance-like position (A. F. Cooper, 2015b). It is a multilateral platform where middle powers are represented more equally with greater powers. Therefore, it gives them opportunity to engage in some multilateral efforts together with the G20 policy discussions. Korea was one of the middle powers who did so, when it brought about the discussions on development cooperation in the Seoul Summit (Gowan, 2015, p. 93). Korea is no doubt an active middle power of the G20. The Summit in 2010 in Seoul was important for Korea in terms of being the first multilateral event it ever hosted and it was an explicit declaration for the Korean government that it was now one of the major economic powers (John, 2014).

Under Korea's hosting in 2010, priority was given to the norms and principles of development cooperation in terms of untied aid and self-determination; i.e. "no one-size-fits all approach to development" (A. F. Cooper, 2015a, p. 37). The fact that Korea emphasized development cooperation in the G20 Summit in Seoul shows the link between aid and middle powerhood. The emphasis put by the Korean government was on alternative models of development which would increase the role of developing countries with the country ownership approach, in order to bring about more effective results in development. The government adopted the "Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth" and launched its "Multi-Year Action Plan on Development." The focus of the Seoul Development Consensus was more on the "structurally important pillars of development, such as "education and skills, infrastructure, domestic mobilization of resources, private sector-led growth, social inclusion, and food security" rather than being solely on aid allocation (O'Neil, 2015, p. 84). After hosting the G20 summit, Korea has expanded its active engagement by addressing global challenges regarding development cooperation, security and climate change and hosted more international meeting such as the Fourth High Level Forum for Development Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan in 2011, and the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 (John, 2014).

Apart from its role in international financial governance, the G20 is considered to have become one of the major platforms in addressing multilateral issues of global challenges, one of which is development cooperation. As a result, the role of the G20 is essential for emerging middle powers like Korea in terms of creating a platform to discuss the global issues that Korea wants to bring on the table. Furthermore, the G20 has also become a platform for gathering like-minded states together, in this case middle powers.

Still, the G20 should not be considered a concert of middle powers. Thus, one cannot make the conclusion that the G20 solely serves middle powers' interests; rather it gives middle powers the chance "to move up from being regional" (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016). The significance of the G20 is that it enables the continuation of the cooperation among powers, thus middle powers, such as the group MIKTA. To be more specific, MIKTA should be taken as a more important case to understand their role and intentions in international engagement. Thus, the next section will give a more detailed overview of MIKTA.

2.1.3 MIKTA

MIKTA is a grouping on the foreign ministry level that was formed during the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2013. It consists of like-minded middle powers, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia that come from diverse cultures and regions, yet have similarities in terms of being strategically important in their regions as democratic and liberal market economies (MIKTA, n.d.). The primary aim of the MIKTA countries is to be a bridge between the developed and developing world and to play a constructive role in addressing global challenges (MIKTA, n.d.).

MIKTA has as two-fold significance: First, it is supportive for the Global Korea initiative in terms of gaining a stronger global stance, and thus plays a complementary role in Korean middle power diplomacy. As I discussed earlier, middle powers are not powerful enough to act alone in international politics. That is why acting together with other middle powers is important in accomplishing their foreign policy goals. Second,

belonging to a group of like-minded middle powers also supports the assumptions of adopting middle powerhood as an identity. As John (2014) emphasized,

Korea's self-perception as a middle power in the international community brought Seoul closer with other 'like-minded' middle-power countries to bring about a new discourse of international relations from the middle-power perspective as an alternative to the dominant narrative of great powers (p. 332).

The emergence of MIKTA resulted in two opposite view points for consideration: First, and most significantly, MIKTA has emerged out of a need for encouraging cooperation and coalition among like-minded powers to achieve an effective middle power diplomacy. For instance, Mo (2015) argued that MIKTA can go further than being an informal grouping of the G20 by encouraging and improving cooperation among its members in different fields such as getting involved into a cooperation in energy: whereas Korea and Turkey are oil dependent countries; Australia, Indonesia and Mexico are oil and natural gas exporters (p. 8). In this respect, MIKTA can provide a platform to realize middle power interests. Thus, it is easier to keep its correct and relevant definition by creating a group identity. Therefore, MIKTA as an acronym can strengthen belongingness and encourage collective action.

Looking from the opposite angle, there is this counter viewpoint that MIKTA is a loose coalition and is not expected to sustain the grouping in the long-run for several reasons: Most significantly, middle power members of MIKTA have no common interest with the exception of some occasional ones. Furthermore, they do not have a common strategy either to create coordinated action among five powers (Wright, 2015). In addition, not all the middle powers of MIKTA have the same ambition in implementing a common strategy of middle power diplomacy.

Here, Korea is one of the most ambitious middle powers that might benefit the most from the MIKTA grouping in promoting a multilateral order, since it is globally well-positioned between the US and China and plays a bridging role between those two powers (Wright, 2015, p. 22). However, Korea alone is not expected to be as effective as MIKTA. Despite such assumptions, some scholars argued that MIKTA as a loose coalition can serve middle power interests much better because of being "capable of shifting concerted actions among differing cluster of countries" instead of

implementing forced consensus among them (Bradford, 2015, p. 10). Looking at the issue in practice, what Bradford argued is closer to what MIKTA group has recently been doing. Thus, the group remains as a loose coalition.

In summary, Global Korea is a foreign policy strategy declared by the foreign ministry of Korea. The G20 as a multilateral platform contributes to its active involvement, while the MIKTA grouping might strengthen Korea's position as a middle power. In fact, Korea had made a lot of efforts to bring the middle power concept into the G20 (A. F. Cooper, 2015c). Apart from its multilateral engagements with global affairs, the issue areas that Korea has been highlighting in both the G20 and MITKA have utmost importance in its strategy. Development cooperation is one of the significant global foci of the Korean government. In the next section, Korea's development cooperation will be analyzed in accordance with its middle power activism.

2.2 Korea's development cooperation: Learning from experience

2.2.1 Historical background

Korea became one of the least-developed countries after the Korean War in 1953, heavily dependent on foreign aid for post-war recovery and economic reconstruction which was primarily delivered by the United States and the United Nations. 70% of total grant aid was provided to Korea between 1945 and 1960 (KOICA, n.d.-a). The war led to economic devastation in the country as a result of the destruction of infrastructural facilities, 43% of industrial facilities, and 41% of power production facilities together with more than 500,000 deaths and 610,000 ruined houses (KOICA, n.d.-a). The UN established the economic rehabilitation program, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) in order to provide emergency relief worth US\$ 460 million, together with an extra US\$ 120 million granted for the reconstruction of industry, communication facilities, houses, and health and education facilities. In addition, the US government supported the Korean Civil Assistance Command

(KCAC) in sectors such as transportation and communication systems, public administration, electricity, welfare, labor, and agriculture (KOICA, n.d.-a).

Between 1960 and 1990, Korea was both a recipient and a donor country. During the 1970s, Korea entered a process of long-term growth, and continued receiving concessional loans from its bilateral partners, mainly the US and Japan (ODA Korea, n.d.-a); while it also started conducting training programs for public officials of developing countries with the financial support of USAID (KOICA, n.d.-a). In the 1980s, Korea continued receiving aid from bilateral donors such as Germany and Japan in order to sustain stability in economic growth. Eventually in 1991, the United Nations Development Program announced Korea's transition from recipient to donor. The same year, the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established.

Because of Cold War politics, the United States paid a lot of attention to the economic development of Korea as a strategic response to the communist threat in East Asia. The alliance with the US helped Korea to achieve economic growth and development and to deter the threat from North Korea (O'Neil, 2015, p. 80). Furthermore, the Korean government used US bilateral assistance effectively, since bilateral cooperation with such a strong donor did not lead to the problems stemming from multilateral assistance such as high transaction costs or disharmony among donor countries (J. Kim, 2011, p. 264). In the post-Cold War period, Korea continued taking a more and more active part in world politics, and increased its engagement with global issues in the late 2000s (O'Neil, 2015). Eventually, Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2010 by achieving a successful transition. Such an economic transformation has reinforced its position in international politics, as Korea continues its middle power diplomacy (Bradford, 2015, p. 10).

Korea's active engagement in international issues on development cooperation gained momentum with its membership to OECD DAC. According to Bradford (2015), OECD is such a platform where Korea can focus on economic policy together with many policy areas such as "energy, finance, trade, employment. Environment, development, science and technology" (p. 15). In 2011, Korea co-chaired the G20

Development Working Group by taking an active part in implementing the G20 Agenda for development. Again in 2011, Korea hosted the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) which aimed at enhancing global partnership encouraging the involvement of new actors together with fulfilling the recipients' needs by reaching result-oriented development cooperation (MOFAT Korea, n.d.-b). Since 2014, Korea has been hosting the annual Busan Global Partnership Forum on effective development cooperation for encouraging and monitoring the country-level implementation of Busan principles adopted during the HLF-4 in 2011, which are: "country ownership of development, a focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability" (MFA Korea, n.d.-a). The Third Forum has significantly concentrated on SSDC, inclusion of new actors, country ownership, and monitoring. It is also essential to note here that the sessions were mostly dominated by non-western, emerging middle powers such as Mexico, Nigeria, and Egypt together with Korea (personal observation⁵, October 6-7, 2016).

Some scholars argue that Korea's ODA activism and its proactive middle power diplomacy are positively contributing to each other (Howe, 2015, p. 26). For the Korean government, middle power diplomacy requires Korea's leadership in development cooperation in helping the developing world achieve economic growth by both providing material aid and introducing new visions in their engagement with non-traditional partners such as other emerging economies or civil society organizations (Sung-han Kim, 2013). According to a UNDP policy specialist, it is a very strategic decision of Korea in order to achieve international visibility and recognition, rather than simply investing in improving its practice of development cooperation (personal communication, October 12, 2016). Nevertheless, its active foreign aid policy also symbolically signifies Korea's eagerness to have a role in international power competition.

For the Korean government, Korea's own development experience can be an applicable model for the developing world (Howe, 2015). Therefore, the government

⁵ From Third Busan Global Partnership Forum on Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), held on October 6-7, 2016 in Seoul, Korea.

claims that Korea is capable of assessing development needs and implementing development programs better than many other traditional and emerging donors. That is why “learning from experience” is the official motto of Korea’s foreign aid policy. In this respect, this approach is the essential part for KOICA’s efforts to become a development platform where the developing world can benefit the most by still having a say in their own development (I. S. Kim, n.d.). This also exemplifies Mawdsley’s (2012) first point discussed elsewhere in this thesis. It is also essential to note here, that the Korean government refrains from a “one size fits all” approach by prioritizing country ownership. To what extent the Korean government is successful should be analyzed by looking briefly at how its aid allocation is organized, its rural development project Saemaul Undong and its involvement in Africa.

2.2.2 How is aid allocation organized?

Korea’s ODA is composed of bilateral grants, bilateral loans and multilateral assistance. Decisions regarding bilateral grant aid policy are made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and implemented by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Bilateral grant aid has no obligation for repayment, and includes various types of transfers, such as in cash contributions, goods and services (KOICA, n.d.-a).

Bilateral loans policy, on the other hand, is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and implemented by the Korea Eximbank’s Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF). These loans are provided on concessional terms (KOICA, n.d.-a). In addition, multilateral assistance is conducted by both MOFAT and MOSF with an assistance either as financial subscriptions or (grant) contributions to international organizations (KOICA, n.d.-a). KOICA and Korea Exim Bank play the leading role in providing foreign aid. A brief overview of Korea’s aid is as follows:

ODA volume and type of aid

Korea's net aid allocation was US\$ 500 million in the mid-2000s, and it reached US\$ 1.325 billion in 2011 which was equal to 0.12 % of its Gross National Income (GNI). When its aid allocation reached more than a US\$ 1 billion in 2010, the ODA/GNI ratio stayed unchanged and was still below the DAC average of 0.32% (Howe, 2015, p. 33). Korea's aid allocation has remained relatively smaller than other DAC donors from North America, Western Europe and particularly Nordic countries (Howe, 2015). The Korean government intended to increase its ODA/GNI ratio up to 0.25% by 2015 (ODA Korea, n.d.-b) in order to get closer to the 0.7% target set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but could not reach it for several reasons according to the OECD (2016) report: "the global economic downturn, tighter fiscal policy in Korea and a change in calculation of GNI" (p. 223). The new target for the Korean government is now set to the ratio of 0.30% by 2030 (OECD, 2016).

Korea's Strategic Plan aims to keep the ratio between bilateral and multilateral ODA at 75:25 (ODA Korea, n.d.-b). According to the OECD report (2016), 82% of bilateral ODA went to country programmable aid, whereas 9% of it was used to support NGOs in partner countries. Only 5% of aid was used as a humanitarian and food aid (p. 223). To briefly look at the types of bilateral and multilateral ODA: The first three types of bilateral ODA allocated in 2014 from the total amount of US\$ 1,395.8 million were *project-type intervention* (US\$ 883.4 million – 63.3%), *expert and other technical assistance* (US\$ 227.5 million – 16.5%), and *bilateral core support & pooled programs & fund* (US\$ 143.0 million – 10.2%) (ODA Korea, n.d.-b). When it comes to multilateral ODA, from the total amount of US\$ 461.0 million in 2014, 41.5% (US\$ 191.4 million) went to *World Bank programs*, whereas 26.8% (US\$ 123.8 million) of the share went to *regional development banks*, and 24.4% (US\$ 112.0 million) to *UN agencies* (ODA Korea, n.d.-b).

In 2015, among the total 540 projects/programs of bilateral and multilateral ODA, 19 projects were conducted with international organizations. Among 521 bilateral ODA projects/programs: 208 were infrastructural projects, 190 of the projects aimed at strengthening public-private partnership, and 70 of the programs were development

study projects. In addition, 52 of the projects were in kind/or in cash contributions (KOICA, n.d.-b).

Regions

According to regions, Asia has the largest portion of Korea's aid with 47% of bilateral ODA according to 2014 estimates, followed by Africa with 23.8% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b). There has been a decreasing trend in aid provision to the Asia region as a result of the inclusion of Africa as the new focus in foreign aid policy. For example, bilateral aid provided to Asia in 2010 was 61.4% of the total bilateral ODA whereas Africa received 15.5% of it (ODA Korea, n.d.-b). Among African countries, aid allocation to the sub-Saharan region has increased to 20% of the share of total bilateral ODA (2013-2014 average) (OECD, 2016), compared to 14 % in 2010, and 11% of a much smaller total amount in 2006 (OECD, 2012, p. 50). Nevertheless, because of geographical and cultural proximity, Asian recipients play the leading role in Korea's bilateral assistance. Between 2008-2014, the average regional aid share of bilateral ODA was led by Asia with 53% of the share, followed by Africa with 17.67% and the Middle East with 8.15% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b).

Income groups and partner countries

Korea was recommended by the 2008 DAC Special Review to determine a list of 26 priority partner countries for both grants and loans. Over 70% of its bilateral ODA now goes to the partner countries listed on the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) as an aid policy guideline for projects and programs (ODA Korea, n.d.-b). According to the income groups, Korean bilateral assistance to LDCs had the biggest share with 38.1% in 2014, remaining stable from 2013; and higher than the 2014 DAC average of 25.6% (OECD, 2016). However, compared to the UN's target of 0.15% of GNI, it remained much lower with 0.05% of GNI in 2014 (OECD, 2016). LDCs are followed by lower- and upper-middle income countries. On the country level, the first ten recipients of Korean ODA according to the 2013-2014 average – among which Viet

Nam (US\$ 215 million), Afghanistan (US\$ 93 million) and Tanzania (US\$ 68 million) are the first three – received 52% of total bilateral ODA (OECD, 2016).

Sectoral division of aid

Looking at the division of sectors in Korea's bilateral ODA in the years 2013-2014 according to the OECD (2016) report, economic infrastructure plays the leading role with 30 percent (p. 225). This is followed by the sectors of education, health and population with 26 percent, whereas other social infrastructural projects have 24 percent of the share. Apart from these, Korea provided bilateral assistance in sectors like production (9%), multisector (5%), and humanitarian aid (3%) (OECD, 2016). In 2014 alone, a total amount of US\$ 812.9 million was allocated to social infrastructure and services with a focus on sectors like health (US\$ 292.7 million), education (US\$ 228.7 million), and water and sanitation (US\$ 225.4 million) (OECD, 2016, p. 225). Additionally, the Korean government has recently included green ODA into its agenda to support environmental integration and to tackle climate change. As a result, the government committed to increase green ODA to 30 percent by 2020 (OECD, 2016). Moreover, it is currently hosting the Green Climate Fund.

Assessment

Based on a brief overview on Korean foreign aid allocation (see Table 5), it is also important to analyze Korea in terms of the existing typologies of foreign aid allocation in the literature. Korean aid shows three main purposes in aid giving according to the categorization suggested by Lancaster (2007): Diplomatic, development and commercial. Therefore, the literature agrees that Korea has mixed motives in aid giving. As findings of E. M. Kim & Oh (2012) showed, the motives of Korean aid changes according to the different income groups of recipients: "South Korea has in fact a dual-track structure, showing a "donor interest" perspective toward the higher-income group and a "recipient needs" perspective toward the second group (LDCs)." (pp. 268-69). In this regard, Korean aid aims at addressing global peace and welfare

Table 5 Korea's bilateral ODA allocation

<i>Years</i>	<i>Net disbursements (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Type of aid in total ODA</i> ^{**}	<i>Top-ten recipients (2013-14)</i> ^{***}	<i>Income groups (2008-15)</i> [†]	<i>Regional divide on aid allocation (2008-15)</i> ^{††}	<i>Top-three sectoral share of bilateral ODA (2010-15)</i> ^{†††}
2010	900.63	Bilateral 75% Multilateral 25% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b)	Vietnam Afghanistan Tanzania Cambodia Bangladesh Mozambique Philippines Sri Lanka Ethiopia Indonesia (OECD, 2016)	LDCs 37.89% LMICs 34.61% UMICs 7.17% Other LICs 0.61% Unallocated 19.73% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b)	Asia 46.3% Africa 23.9% America 7.9% Middle East 4.3% Oceania 0.6% Unallocated 17.1% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b)	Social Infrastructure & Services 42.6% Economic Infrastructure & Services 27.6% Production Sectors 9.3% (ODA Korea, n.d.-b)
2011	989.57					
2012	1 183.17					
2013	1 309.58					
2014	1 395.77					
2015	1 468.79					

* See other years on OECD.Stat. (2017c). *Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]*: Bilateral official development assistance by types of aid. Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: <http://stats.oecd.org/#>

** Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.Overview.do>

*** Top-ten recipients in the years 2013-14 constituted 52% of total bilateral disbursements. Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: http://www.keepseek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/occd/development/development-co-operation-report-2016_dcr-2016-en#page175

† Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.incomegroup.do>

†† Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.RegionCountryOverview.do>

††† Others: Environment 1.5%, Multi-sector/Cross-cutting 3.4%, Commodity aid/General Program Assist. 0.1%, Humanitarian aid 3.2%, Administrative costs 4.1%, Unallocated/Unspecified 8.2%. Retrieved on April 24, 2017 from: <http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.Sector.do>

while at the same time wanting to increase its political and economic relations through development cooperation (Lagerkvist & Jonsson, 2011).

In line with the above conclusions, Korea's increasing role in development cooperation was further strengthened by the launch of its development model called *Saemaul Undong* program (SMU), i.e. New Village Movement. The program, aiming at rural development especially at the agricultural and community levels, is a development initiative focusing on having an impact on the rural development of the recipient countries, and which the Korean government tries to utilize in the creation of a "brand". It can also be considered as part of the middle power role that the Korean governments wants to adopt. To better understand, I will look at the SMU movement in detail in the following section.

2.2.3 Saemaul Undong

In this section, the research focuses on *Saemaul Undong* as part of Korea's grant aid delivered by KOICA, which was also implemented during the Park Chung-Lee era in the 1970s, the father of the former president (Howe, 2015). The movement is defined as a community development and modernization project with collective guidance based on "diligence (working ethic), self-help (ownership and responsibility), and cooperation (community for mutual help)" (SMU, n.d.-b). The New Village Movement emerged as a result of extreme poverty, and was implemented during the authoritarian regime of 1970s Korea. Its success was significant because SMU was one of the fundamental parts of a development package that carried Korea from being one of the LDCs to one of today's OECD DAC donors. That is one of the significant reasons why the Korean government launched it as a model with the intention of promoting self-sustainable growth where country ownership is the key (SMU, n.d.-a).

Saemaul Undong constitutes a significant part of Korean development. Its achievements in rural development cannot be underestimated. The Korean government stresses the significance of SMU and aims at exporting it as a global project, since rural areas constitute 70% of the population in developing countries (Saemaul Undong

(SMU), n.d.-a). As a result, the government launched its Saemaul training program where government officials and development leaders from the developing world are invited to share the Korean experience. Between 2009 and 2014, 1298 people from 44 countries have participated in Saemaul Training which is composed of lectures, field trips, discussions and action plans (SMU, n.d.-a). It also organizes annual Global Saemaul Leadership Forum in partner countries.

Korea, in its own development process, achieved an exceptional economic performance as a result of the positive relationship between market and the state, and between the public and private sector, further strengthening its economic performance (Bradford, 2015, p. 11). More conceptually, Korea's unique development experience can be best explained by the developmental state (DS) model which emerged in East Asian countries between 1960 and 1990. Briefly, the term refers to rapid and sustainable economic growth coupled with rapid demographic transition, a broader focus on the agricultural sector and rapid export growth (World Bank, 1993). The developmental state model in East Asia was protectionist and nationalistic in its implementation of industrial strategies (Routley, 2012). As a result, the DS model is defined as a state-led model allowing state intervention into the market by a strong development-oriented political leadership (Mkandawire, 2001; Musamba, 2010).

According to a fundamental research on DS conducted by Doner, Ritchie, & Slater (2005) based on East Asian DS experience, factors leading to systemic vulnerability – i.e. (1) broad coalitional commitments enabling public-private linkages, (2) scarce resource endowments, and (3) severe security threats – are the basis for the emergence of a DS (p. 329). When we look at the Korean case, Korea has been a resource-poor country, and was exposed to communist threats during the Cold War confrontation. By referring to the research, one might argue that Korean DS led to the emergence of a strong elite with the help of systemic vulnerability, and led to the implementation of state-led economic growth, hand in hand with the private sector.

The New Village Movement emerged in such an environment during the 1970s and can be thought of as a complementary part of Korea's overall development. SMU was launched to abolish growing imbalances between the developments of urban and rural

areas: whereas urban areas were rapidly industrialized under the first and second five-year plans, the need emerged to develop rural areas in order to prevent demographic changes such as unemployment, or migration from rural to urban areas (ADB, 2012, p.5).

Despite its notable success, it is a controversial model because of its launch during the authoritarian regime of Park's era (Aboubacar, 2014). As Howe (2015) asserted, the development process of Korea in the 1970s undermined the human rights of the citizens; i.e. it was sacrificed by the dictatorship for the collective good (p. 31). According to some policy analysts and scholars in Korea, the Korean government refrains from mentioning its authoritarian regime experience while implementing SMU as a model in African LDCs (personal communications, October 1-15, 2016). Moreover, the implementation of the program in today's LDCs is still seen as problematic by some scholars and experts. Even though it is successful in infrastructural projects, it lacks the necessary results of poverty reduction and socioeconomic change (Howe, 2015, p. 31). Nevertheless, the program is currently implemented in 7 Asian – namely Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Nepal, Cambodia, Timor Lest – and in 2 African countries – namely Uganda and Tanzania – with projects such as living condition improvement, income increasing, or mindset change projects (SMU, n.d.-a). According to KOICA's 2016-2020 mid-term strategy, 10.1% of total KOICA funds (average of the years 1991-2014) are allocated to agricultural projects that also include SMU (KOICA, 2016).

Based on the above discussion, SMU says two things about Korea's middle power role: First of all, SMU has transformed (or wanted to be transformed) from a national development experience to a global one in order to be implemented as a development model. The reason is that Korea wants to integrate it into its motto of "learning from experience" as a global project of rural development. While doing so, the controversies about the historical facts regarding authoritarian implementations are tried to be glossed over by the government. Secondly, a development model is used as a mean for Korea's nation branding through which Korea can play an active, or leading, role in the international arena; and perhaps also differentiate itself from other donors. In this

respect, Korea has recently expanded overseas, such as in Africa, to increase its global presence in international aid.

Africa is significant for Korea's global stance in international aid because of several reasons: First of all, Africa has a role in the sense that Korea can become an international actor by expanding overseas rather than remaining an important actor only in its region, as is the case for Asia in which Korea's foreign aid practice has a long history compared to its overseas involvements. When it comes to development cooperation, Korea aims to become a model for the developing world. In order to achieve this, Korea must eliminate the role of cultural, and historical ties in its development cooperation practice, and align its practice more with global standards. Therefore, Korea aims to leave its Asian character in foreign aid giving. In this regard, the use of discourse on country ownership in Africa is prioritized to make the Korean model suitable for African recipients, apart from the use of concepts in line with the OECD DAC recommendations. Lastly, Africa has become an important destination for emerging donors, where they have increased their foreign aid allocations. It is also essential to take Korea to be one of the emerging donors in the region, again related to the concerns of gaining a global stance. The next section will give a detailed analysis on Korea's quest for Africa.

2.2.4 Korea's involvement in Africa

The main discussions in the literature on Korea's opening up to Africa mostly question whether Korean DS experience can be applicable as a model for today's LDCs. For some, the use of the term "Korean model" has the meaning of "one size fits all" in its essence because of representing a single model (Howe, 2015, p 33). Thus, some scholars prefer to call it an "alternative" – as an alternative both to the western model and to Korean DS in the twentieth century – rather than a model (E. M. Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013). Underlying this is the fact that the economic and political landscape of the 21st century is different to that of the 20th century. Therefore, some scholars argue that the neo-liberal free market economy is prioritized within the new global economic

system, and that the role of government in the economy is minimized (Y. T. Kim, 1999; Peng, 2004; Routley, 2012; Weiss, 2000; Wong, 2004).

Together with the neo-liberal economic system, discourses of democracy and human rights have become significant components of global politics of development, spreading out with globalization. Thus, the Korean government, which is mostly part of the western system because of its membership to OECD DAC, must take into consideration that the East Asian model might not lead to positive results in today's circumstances. It is not only the change in the international landscape that might make the Korean model – or alternative – less effective, but also the implementation of the model in LDCs overseas. That might be one of the main reasons why Korea prioritizes country ownership, together with Korea's intentions to become a good OECD DAC member. Another reason is that Korean successful experience in development is also a result of Korea's ownership of development as a recipient achieved with foreign aid.

The majority of Korea's development assistance still goes to Asia. However, Korea launched its *Africa's Development Initiative* from 2005 to 2008 to increase its support for African countries. Later in 2009, Korea announced a second program of assistance in the Korea Africa Forum. For some, Korea's foreign aid activism has been expanded to Africa with the sense of moral obligation to respond to poverty in the region (Yoon & Moon, 2014). To one of the Korean scholars, the increase in foreign aid to Africa is also as a result of requests and suggestions from OECD DAC; since Korea has not been providing enough to LDCs, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. In this respect it is more humanitarian compared to Korean ODA allocation to Asia, which is more in line with business interests (personal communication, October 13, 2016).

Apart from altruistic concerns, Korea's increasing role in Africa is criticized for being self-interested together with other rising Asian donors, such as China. As Chôn et al. (2007) argued, Korea's development policies on poverty reduction targets reducing the risks and uncertainties in the market (as cited in Lagerkvist & Jonsson, 2011, p.58). The involvement of other Asian actors has also pushed Korea to seek commercial interests in aid provision for the sake of energy and resource security (Chun, Munyi, & Lee, 2010). Obviously, Africa is not only the source of global poverty, but also a

market and source of natural resources. Also as a result of this, the region is now second after Asia as it receives 23.8 % of Korea's total bilateral ODA according to 2014 estimates (ODA Korea, n.d.-b).

To give an example, Korea provides loans to the sub-Saharan region through its development bank, by setting conditions that enables Korean companies to do infrastructural projects in the recipient country. Most importantly, some loans are set to be paid back later by direct transfer of resources or by permission for Korean companies to do the explorations (Darracq & Neville, 2014, p. 5). The Korean government engages with the region by using powerful state-owned enterprises; such as the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), the Korea Resources Corporation (KORES, in the mining sector), the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korea Land & Housing Corporation (LH). As such, the Korean government development cooperation policy in sub-Saharan Africa not only involves the DAC conditions of foreign aid provision, but also relies on its own economic interests similar to its emerging donor counterparts. The reason behind the duality might be a result of Korea's ambitions to increase its economic and political influence globally, while at the same time contributing to its own wealth and security.

Korea pursues its development cooperation policy as part of its foreign policy of opening up to overseas. In this regard, development cooperation is used as a tool for two targets: First of all, Korean development assistance is used in order to make trade deals in different areas overseas with potential markets and rich resources. For instance, KOICA reached an agreement in 2014 with the Ugandan government on one of KOICA's largest scale project for the modernization of Entebbe International Airport. The Korean government recommended the Ugandan government a consortium to agree on an oil refinery project in exchange for the cooperation (Yi, 2014). Even though Korea lost the project to Chinese counterparts, the significant fact is that Korea wanted to be involved in Uganda's energy sector and to develop close ties with the country. This might also be an example for Korea's competition with other powers in the region.

Secondly, Korean intention in its development cooperation policy cannot be simply reduced to foreign aid provision on humanitarian grounds or business interests, but rather it is also used as a tool to introduce Korean culture to increase Korea's global recognition as a significant player. In this case, the *Korea Aid initiative* can be given as an example. The initiative was launched by former president Park as part of Korea's ODA to African developing countries. In this program, Korea provides food, medical care and cultural content and it already started with three African countries – Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya – with the slogan “no one is left behind” (U. Lee, 2016).

Korea Aid provides a mobile health clinic, and two ambulances offering checkups, medical supplies and first aid education in each country. These can be still considered as development aid for immediate purposes. In addition, however, traditional Korean food is also served in food trucks under the label of “cultural content” (U. Lee, 2016). According to an official from a civil society organization of Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development (KoFID), the aid provided under the initiative is far from being part of ODA. Especially food trucks, driving around the cities only to serve Korean food, are part of a kind of initiative to introduce Korean culture overseas (personal communication, October 14, 2016).

Referring to the above discussions, Korea's involvement in Africa plays an important role to understand its quest for becoming a global player. For some scholars, such as Lagerkvist & Jonsson (2011), Korea's involvement in Africa is not only to contribute global peace and welfare, but also to enhance its global position (p. 58). It is important to note that it is difficult to categorize Korean development policy. In fact, no policy can be simply explained by one single motive. Thus, one might argue that Korea's development cooperation has mixed motives; that is to say, it might be defined both altruistic and self-interested motives. This implication is significant for two reasons: First of all, the way the government uses development cooperation as a tool to reach developing world, except for pure development concerns, explains the great role attributed to foreign aid. Secondly, such an approach strengthens Korea's middle power role because it gives Korea an opportunity of global outreach, where Korea builds up its identity as a global player as would be suggested by the behavioral model

of MPT. Therefore in the next section, Korea's middle power approach will be analyzed more in detail, in line with its foreign aid policy discussed in the previous sections.

2.3 Assessing Korea's middle power role in terms of its development policy

Looking at the government's official statements, Korea's middle power discourse constructs a middle power identity for Korea, especially in terms of attributing itself "good global citizenship" in line with its development policy. Therefore in practice, Korea can be considered an emerging middle power that engages with global issues as a soft power contributor (Mo, 2016). This chapter has mainly focused on its foreign aid practice as a soft power tool. As Commuri (2012) suggested, "tools are specific resources that are used to affect the outcome – in terms of shaping state behavior to one's own interests" (p. 46). On these grounds, here are the main implications from the chapter:

First of all, Korea is an emerging middle power, strategically important and thus automatically involved in the global economy and politics; unlike its traditional counterparts, which can be historically analyzed according to the Cold War context and have isolated positions. Mathur (2014) believes that emerging powers of the Global South are significant parties to regional solutions (p. 26). This is a noteworthy assumption. To be more precise, Korea is located in the middle of four major powers, namely China, US, Japan and Russia. During the Cold War, Korea was specifically taken care of by the US, as a response to communist threats. In fact, the division between North and South Korea was also as a result of bipolar Cold War politics. Today, Korea continues to be a close ally to the United States. While engaging with the world, Korea benefits from its positional advantage.

Secondly, Korea is an emerging donor. Most of the second tiers fit the definition of emerging middle powers, because foreign aid is one of the ways for realizing their

middle power diplomacy. Korea's own story of economic development is the major source of its strength in this field (Bradford, 2015, p. 10). It gave Korea a unique discourse of "learning from experience" to describe its relationships with the developing world. Most importantly, Korea's membership to OECD DAC is thought to be a turning point for Korea's position as a donor and a middle power. First of all, it gave Korea the chance of being recognized as a developed country (Chun et al., 2010). Secondly, it further facilitated Korea to play an international role on international platforms such as the G20; or international platforms like Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in which Korea is eager to play a leadership role by hosting the forum annually.

All in all, the research question of this chapter does not focus on the question why Korea is providing aid, but rather why Korea is an active player as a donor now. Because in reality Korea's ODA provision had already started earlier in the 1960s (ODA Korea, n.d.-a). Later, Korea's assistance to developing countries increased, and the first assistance budget was set up in 1977 for ODA by the MFA (ODA Korea, n.d.-a). In the late 1980s, Korea's ODA further increased, leading to the establishment of EDCF in 1987. Later in 1991 KOICA was established. Looking at the brief history of Korea's official development assistance, foreign aid is not a new phenomenon, not only for Korea but also for other emerging powers.

What is significant here is the way foreign aid is used to open up to the world, by not only using economic policy and export orientation – which Korea had already been doing – but also by diplomatic means. In Korea's case, the ODA activism had started with the Lee administration as a "contribution diplomacy" with respect to enhancing global peace and development by strengthening cooperation with the international community (Howe, 2015, p. 25). Later, during the Park government which took power in 2013, it turned into a middle power diplomacy, officially emphasized by the foreign ministry. With these, the Korean middle power role started shaping its development policy, together with strategic calculations on aid giving that enables it to have better access to resources, trade and investment deals (Chun et al., 2010). Consequently,

development cooperation can be thought of as a complementary tool for its middle power claim.

Conclusion

This chapter took Korea's foreign aid practice into focus in order to explain its middle power role. It came up with a conclusion that Korea's initiatives to become an active, and also an effective middle power have a complementary relationship with its foreign aid policy for two reasons: First of all, foreign aid involves cooperation between two countries which might lead, or directly leads, to political and economic cooperation as well. Thus, it enables Korea to strengthen its positive relations with the developing world. Secondly, development cooperation as a soft political issue does not involve heavy risks leading to the deterioration of relations, as might be the case in a security cooperation which primarily involves national security interests. Thus, one might argue that Korea's practice of development cooperation positively contributes to its middle power diplomacy.

From this perspective, foreign aid helps in its claim to become a "good global citizen" which has been emphasized by the Korean government as the determinant of its middle power strategy. In this respect, this chapter concludes that foreign aid plays a positive role in realizing Korea's middle power ambitions. Likewise, a strategic middle power role has also required Korea to seek a global stance in international development cooperation, as well as shaping its foreign aid policy. As a consequence, Korea has not been playing its role in development cooperation coincidentally. This strengthens the argument that foreign aid is one of the strategic foreign policy tools.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY’S HUMANITARIAN APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: A WAY TO A MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY?

Introduction

Turkey is the second case study of this research as an emerging middle power which pursues an active middle power diplomacy. This chapter mainly focuses on how Turkey positions itself as a middle power by using the discourse of “humanitarian diplomacy” and aims at linking it to its development policy. Before going further in detail, the introduction will give a brief overview of the main issues of Turkish foreign politics:

Similar to the discussions in the previous chapter on Korea, the strategic partnership with the US plays a crucial role in Turkish foreign politics. The Turkey-US strategic partnership dates back to the post-World War II period, where the US government provided economic assistance to Turkey as response to the communist threat from the Soviets (Lancaster, 2007, p. 28). Geopolitically, Turkey was considered a buffer zone (Aksu, 2012). During the Cold War, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has become an official ally to the US and also the western power camp since then.

The second important issue in Turkish foreign politics is its accession process to the European Union (EU) which had started with the Association Agreement in 1963 (Hürsoy, 2017) and continuously experienced rises and falls until today. Recently, the

Turkish government is considered to be distancing itself from the European norms by adopting authoritarian tendencies, therefore risking full accession. In addition, the refugee crisis stemming from the ongoing Syrian civil war has also increased tension between Europe and Turkey, since the latter is the major transit point for refugees fleeing to Europe (Gabiam, 2016).

In its relations with the neighboring region as the third issue, Turkey has traditionally been pursuing a peaceful approach and cooperation, especially in the Middle East, to not get involved in regional disputes (Bayer & Keyman, 2012; İşeri & Dilek, 2011). However, recently the crisis on the Syrian border as well as the global terror posed by the Islamic State are the main issues of Turkish foreign politics, creating a regional threat. Especially the Syrian crisis has a role in Turkey's humanitarian discourse, since it hosts more than 2 million refugees (Gabiam, 2016).

Turkey has recently been increasing its power in the global arena by engaging in international platforms. Therefore, current discussions on emerging powers include Turkey's rise. It is firstly based on the improvement of its own economic conditions which led it to become one of the world's largest 20 economies. Strengthening its economic power has also led Turkey to broaden its economic engagement with the rest of the world (Yalçın, 2012, p. 202), especially with developing countries. Related to the former developments, Turkey's political power has gained momentum for the last decade resulting in Turkey's broader engagement with the international community.

The discussions on Turkey's quest for middle power status must be analyzed from the perspective of the behavioral approach for two reasons: On the one hand, Turkey must be taken as a second tier emerging power in terms of its economic and political capabilities together with its geopolitical importance. More importantly, Turkey is an emerging middle power when we look at how Turkey benefits from those capabilities in line with a soft power strategy. On the other hand, Turkey's self-identification as a humanitarian power and a good global citizen supports the idea that Turkey constructs an identity for its global role. As the behavioral approach suggests, being a middle power is based on how state perceives itself. In that sense, Turkey is not considered a middle power because of some pre-determined characteristics or actions; on the

contrary, Turkey identifies itself as a middle power and acts upon its self-identification. Thus, this chapter will go into detail regarding these two discussions:

In the first section of this chapter, there will be a detailed analysis of Turkey's middle power role. The section will pose the question of whether Turkey had already been a middle power or whether it has recently been on the rise. Whilst concentrating on the main question of its middle power role, the section will focus on three important issues: First of all, it will handle Turkey's possible middle power strategy which constitutes the foundation of its behavioral approach. Secondly, it will present a brief analysis on its active G20 membership. The G20 is an important international platform to develop a better understanding on middle power behavior in multilateral platforms. Finally, the middle power grouping MIKTA, in which Turkey is a part, will be discussed. MIKTA is significant for this analysis because of it being a semi-formal middle power grouping. If Turkey is to be analyzed in terms of its middle power quest, then it is worth looking at its active involvement in MIKTA.

In the second section of this chapter, a more detailed discussion will be held on Turkey's development cooperation policy and its significant role for its middle power quest. In this regard, Turkey is considered one of the emerging donors, which recently increased its foreign aid allocation to developing countries. In the first part of this section, the history of Turkey's ODA allocation and some relevant statistical data on Turkey's development assistance will be given. The two following parts will be looking at Turkey's development cooperation policy in line with its pro-active global engagement: Firstly, it will emphasize Turkey's approach to development cooperation, particularly in terms of partner country selection which also determines the characteristics of the "Turkish model" of aid giving. Secondly, in order to better understand the main discussion on Turkey's foreign assistance and its relation to its global expansion as a middle power, it will look at Turkey's opening up to the Africa region under its Africa initiative through which Turkey is eager to further engage with LDCs and developing countries of the region. In the final section, both discussions will be linked to each other in order to come up with a more concrete response to the

question of whether an active policy in development cooperation supports Turkey's middle power strategy.

3.1 Turkey: A middle power without the name

There is controversy in the literature on whether Turkey was already a middle power before or whether it is currently an emerging one. According to the first view, the end of the Cold War was the period when Turkey emerged as a middle power. To Müftüler & Yüksel (1997), the main reason for Turkey's rise as a middle power was that Turkey became more independent in its foreign policy in the post-Cold War period which was eventually freed from bipolar rivalry (p. 186). Some scholars studying Turkish foreign policy, like Oran (2001) or Hale (2000), look at Turkey's middle power role in line with the realist definition of middle-range power by taking quantifiable measures into consideration, such as size, population, military strength and the economy (as cited in Barlas, 2005, p. 441). Alliances with great powers are also considered significant. In this case, having shared interests with the United States and Europe (Çağaptay, 2013) is an especially determinant factor in Turkey's position in the international system, which was more obvious during the Cold War years (Davutoğlu, 2012b). For some scholars, Turkey's rise as a middle power started even earlier. Barlas (2005) argued that Turkey's unique role dates back to the inter-war period of the 1930s due to its geopolitical position and diplomatic efforts pursued independently of great powers (p. 442).

According to the latter view, Turkey is one of the newcomers in the world stage (Shichor, 2014), a second generation middle power (Ünay, 2014), i.e. an emerging middle power (Öniş & Kutlay, 2015; Parlar Dal, 2014). Turkey's middle power quest started in the early 2000s (Bayer & Keyman, 2012), and gained momentum for the last decade under the rule of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, i.e. Justice and Development Party (hereafter referred as the AKP). Meral & Paris (2010) asserted that Turkey has been pursuing a proactive foreign policy since the early 2000s, to engage more actively in regional and global affairs because of a variety of historical and geopolitical reasons

(p. 75). For instance, Turkey involved itself in the Middle East in order to gain a significant position relative to the other powers in the region (Meral & Paris, 2010). Many scholars agree that the Middle East is an important region for the realization of Turkey's soft power (Altunışık, 2008; Öniş, 2014). Furthermore, it is Turkey's fast economic growth which contributes to its rise the most (Çağaptay, 2013); despite some criticisms arguing that Turkey's rise is not so significant or relatively important, since it is not the only power rising during the same period (Bagdonas, 2015, p. 326).

As can be seen in the above discussions, some scholars attribute Turkey a middle power role with respect to its geographical location; thus they rely on positional, or hierarchical categorizations of middle powers. Similar to most of the other emerging middle powers, Turkey is a regional power surrounded by strategically important regions – namely the Balkans, Caucasia, the Middle East and North Africa (Bagdonas, 2015; Ünay, 2014). Moreover, when its material capabilities such as its size, population and economy are taken into consideration, Turkey is again considered a middle power (Yalçın, 2012). When it comes to the functional approach, Turkey's middle power role is thought to be more obvious since it actively participates in global efforts and also pursues a global foreign policy in niche areas. In this respect, Turkey is thought to be one of the major humanitarian actors together with other emerging middle powers like South Korea (Gilley, 2015). Moreover, Turkey supports multilateral efforts and builds its relations with the West under a “follower” role (Dal, 2014, p. 111). Consequently, Turkey has long showed characteristics of a functional middle power.

The above arguments cannot be fully falsified, yet I argue that they are not enough to explain Turkey's role as a middle power. Therefore, this study relies on the behavioral approach to MPT and claims that Turkey is an emerging middle power as a result of how it identifies itself: To begin with, the discourse of being a humanitarian power, and a development aid contributor are attributable to a middle power strategy in terms of behavioral aspects. In practice, Turkey reflects most of them as an emerging middle power. This can be inferred from its recent independent and assertive foreign policy (A. F. Cooper, 2015b; Öniş, 2011) and the official statements of the government,

claiming that Turkey does not remain “...indifferent to the developments in the world, assumes a reconciliatory, constructive and intermediary role in order to reach amicable solutions for the global problems.” (TIKA Report, 2014, p. 2).

Surprisingly enough, Turkish foreign policy has put little emphasis on a “middle power strategy” in discourse, despite the compatibility of its foreign policy strategy. For some scholars, such as Dal (2014), the government refrains from attributing itself a middle power role in order not to limit its global capabilities (p. 111). This can also be inferred from Davutoğlu’s readings, which position Turkey as a “central country with multiple regional identities” and predict that Turkey’s identity will be transformed into a global power as it engages more actively in global issues through international platforms (p. 83). Contrarily, this study argues that Turkey is an emerging middle power, and constructs the basis of its argument on Turkey’s foreign political orientation, active global engagement and its similarities with like-minded states. This is because the research is well aware, as Türkeş (2016) successfully argued, that “there is no room in the existing international order for a medium-sized regional power to upgrade itself into a regional sub-superpower status” (p. 211). Therefore, the following parts will go into further detail on whether Turkey has any specific middle power strategy, together with its role as an active participant of the G20 and its membership to the middle power grouping MIKTA.

3.1.1 Any specific strategy of middle power diplomacy?

This study defines Turkey as an emerging middle power, despite the Turkish government not showing much willingness to attribute itself a middle power role in its discourse. That is to say, the government has no declared foreign policy strategy on this matter, let alone a declared middle power strategy. For some scholars, it is the weakness of Turkey of not being able to establish a clearly determined regional and global foreign policy strategy (Pehlivantürk, 2011).

For some scholars, on the other hand, the *zero problem with neighbors* declared by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2009 is considered a foreign policy

strategy which has strengthened Turkey's regional power, together with its middle power role (Wright, 2015, pp. 24-25). According to this approach, the Turkish government attributes itself the responsibility to pursue a humanistic foreign policy agenda towards its neighbors through peaceful means to achieve a win-win outcome while addressing problems (MFA Turkey, n.d.-a). According to the zero problem strategy, Turkey must set an agenda to reconnect with the Balkans, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and the Middle East for further cooperation and partnership, rather than having chronic disputes that have long dominated Turkish foreign policy both regionally and internationally (Davutoğlu, 2013). Therefore, for some scholars Turkey's foreign policy has become "moral-driven and value-based" in its essence (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 716).

The question must be raised here whether the strategy of zero problem with neighbors can be labeled a middle power strategy. The approach claims to reflect an idealist and an altruistic intention. It projects the use of soft power, especially playing a mediator role in conflicting situations. For that purpose, Turkey follows the policy of building good relationships with the parties to different conflicts, so that it positions itself as "a third party mediator", as in the case of Arab-Israeli conflict (Altunışık, 2008). Furthermore, Turkey has also been responding to humanitarian crises (Haşimi, 2014) and actively participating in PKOs⁶. Nevertheless, most scholars argued that the politics of zero problem has been challenged especially by the outbreak of Arab upheaval in 2011 (Grigoriadis, 2014) resulting in an ongoing civil war in Syria, and global terrorism posed by the Islamic State on Turkey's borders. This shows that Turkey's claim to have a progressive and peaceful foreign policy towards the region was not achieved in the short-run.

Even though we cannot talk about a long-lasting middle power strategy of zero problem, it would also be a mistake to claim that Turkey has no middle power strategy

⁶ As in the case of South Korea, Turkey's peace keeping and peacebuilding operations are not the main focus of this research. However, it is important to note that Turkey is actively engaged in conflicting situations as a mediator. In this respect as well, Turkey is considered a middle power. For further readings see: *Bayer & Keyman (2012) "Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?"*

at all. Therefore, it is better to take zero problem as an initiative to clear the blocks on Turkey's road to middle power status; since Turkey's long-standing problems with its neighbors were preventing Turkey from projecting its power. Still, the zero problem initiative requires a detailed analysis to develop a better understating on whether Turkey attempts a peaceful approach, or not. However, this study does not focus on issues of *realpolitik*; i.e. Turkey's foreign security policy, or its peacekeeping operations; rather it analyzes its middle power strategy in terms of development cooperation.

Regardless of a success of the so-called "Davutoglu doctrine", one might argue that Turkey has set a new global agenda which prioritizes "opening up" to the overseas, together with its active engagement with global issues (Kardaş, 2013, p. 637). As Çağaptay (2013) argued, the Turkish government wants to go beyond classical diplomacy by "involving in economic development and public engagement abroad" (p. 802). This also led to a shift in Turkey's position, and raised its criticisms against the established international order and some global issues. For instance, President Erdoğan criticized the unequal representation in UNSC in his speech at the annual UN conference in 2015, stating "the world is bigger than five" by referring to the P5 of the UNSC (Presidency of Turkey, 2016). Thus, one might argue that Turkey started questioning its global role as most of the other emerging powers do, even if is not able to challenge the system as a single middle power.

Turkey's economic rise and its foreign aid policy play a significant role in this shift. While the former has positively contributed to its global political position, the latter has eased its engagement with the developing world. Thus, this chapter regards Turkey's middle power role in line with its prioritized humanitarian approach in development cooperation and its role as an emerging donor. First however, to be more specific, Turkey's membership to the G20 will be discussed in the following section.

3.1.2 The G20

Non-western middle powers are expected to increase the cooperation among each other as a result of their significant rise (Pehlivanürk, 2011). In line with this, the G20 has become one of the leading platforms in realizing this cooperation on a global scale. Moreover, it provides middle powers a chance to achieve equal status with the great powers (A. F. Cooper, 2015c). Representing the world's twenty largest economies, it has led to the strengthening of "participatory global governance" (Ünay, 2014).

Turkey's proactive foreign policy strategy during the AKP era led Turkey to become an active middle power of the G20 (A. F. Cooper, 2015b), willing to play a "bridge building role between west and the rest" (Dal, 2014, p. 108). Ünay (2014) predicted that the G20 Presidency in 2015 would be an opportunity for Turkey in which development issues were to be addressed by creating linkages between the members of the G20 and the LDCs (p. 138). Ünay had a point in his predictions. Turkey's G20 Presidency has led to the emergence of a new concept of "inclusive growth" with the establishment of Women-20 (W-20) as an engagement group focusing on:

increasing women's participation in the workforce; the launch of the Istanbul-based World SME Forum to provide small and medium enterprises with a global voice; adopting a concrete the G20 goal to decrease youth unemployment; and establishing closer dialogue with Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) (the G20 Turkey, n.d.).

As inferred from the example, Turkey seeks to become an innovative party to the international community. Thus, a proactive role in the G20 is complimentary to its ambitions for becoming an active participant in global affairs. Bayer & Keyman (2012) asserted that one of the most significant aspect of Turkey is its presence in multiple geo-cultural spheres, a result of its geopolitical position in the world (being in the middle of the Balkans, the Middle East and Europe); thus it is a better strategy for Turkey to become an innovative and active player while improving its global vision (p. 74). This argument also signifies the positive role of being a regional power.

Apart from its regional engagement, in order to enhance its global visionary role, Turkey also pursues a strategy of cooperation with like-minded states which stems

from a corollary of being a middle power. Being part of a middle power initiative MIKTA is one of the steps that Turkey has taken for the sake of increasing its influence in the international arena. Hence, the following part will discuss Turkey's membership in MIKTA.

3.1.3 MIKTA

Forming partnerships with like-minded states is one of the important means for middle powers to become more active in the global system. On this matter, MIKTA – composed of five middle powers; namely Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia – is a good example of a “pure middle power initiative” because of not including any great powers (Engin & Baba, 2015). Schiavon & Domínguez (2016) use the terms middle power and constructive power interchangeably. They have a point in doing so, since emerging middle powers seek better engagement with the international system and contribute to global affairs by using their innovative skills, as MIKTA does – or aims to do.

As discussed in the previous chapter, MIKTA is considered a loose coalition which is in its early stage (Mo, 2015), or to put it differently, “it remains as a work in progress” (A. F. Cooper, 2015b, p. 97). This is because it seems that members of MIKTA do not give the forum equal importance. For instance, Korea and Australia play a more active role compared to other members. Korea especially shows high eagerness in projecting a middle power role and puts a lot of effort into developing the concept (A. F. Cooper, 2015c). For that reason, A. F. Cooper (2015b) argued that the MIKTA group requiring “club cohesion and operational substance” also needs to have an agreement on the elements of like-mindedness to be prioritized (p. 97). This is highly significant for the continuation of the forum.

When it comes to Turkey, it seems that Turkey is a part but not an active member of MIKTA. According to an official from TİKA, MIKTA is far from being one of the priority agendas of Turkish foreign policy (personal communication, January 18, 2017). Here, the question must be raised: Why does Turkey not give necessary

importance to such a coalition even though it is a member? There are two possible answers to this question: First of all, the general view on MIKTA being a loose coalition is still valid because of several differences among members and some individual challenges. On the one hand, MIKTA is an informal meeting on only the foreign ministerial level (Mo, 2015). On the other hand, as A. F. Cooper (2015b) pointed out, each country has domestic challenges which prevent the group from going global:

Migration in the case of Mexico, security in the case of Turkey, building ASEAN community values in the case of Indonesia, balancing the relationship with China in the case of Australia, or dealing with peninsular issues in the case of Korea (p.107).

Secondly, as discussed earlier, even though the humanitarian diplomacy that Turkey has been pursuing is compatible with a middle power strategy, Turkey does not put emphasis on its middle power-ness. As Wright (2015) asserted, Turkey's conception of its power is more a central power than a middle power which is boosted by its capacity and will of active engagement first with its neighbors and then with the international community (p. 24). One might also argue that a middle power coalition is not so appealing for the Turkish elite just because it might put some limitations to Turkey's ambitions for further regional and global influence. Yet, it is better to be realistic on Turkey's capabilities as a middle power.

To conclude, the thesis argues that Turkey is a humanitarian actor. Turkey's foreign policy strategy of zero problem and active humanitarian diplomacy together with its involvement in multilateral platforms support its middle power identity when looking at it from the constructivist view point. It is not surprising to claim so, because, as inferred from its name, humanitarian diplomacy requires a positive contribution to the global system which must bring progress in human lives. In this respect, Turkey is eager to contribute to the development of LDCs and the rest of the developing world. As a result, Turkey has developed further foreign policy interests to realize its humanitarian goals, while also engaging with the world as an emerging middle power. Its proactive policy on development cooperation can be considered an expansion of its soft power (Hausmann, 2014), thus its middle power identity.

Apart from Turkey's foreign policy calculations, its own economic development has also facilitated this strategy of bringing betterment to human lives and global peace (Bayer & Keyman, 2012, p. 77). As the main focus of this study, Turkey's practice of development cooperation is an essential tool for the realization of this aim. Therefore, I will be analyzing Turkey's development policy in the next section in terms of its middle power role.

3.2 Turkey's development policy: A humanitarian approach

3.2.1 Historical background

Turkey was one of the foreign aid recipients in the 1940s. Under the Truman Doctrine declared in 1947, Turkey became part of the Marshall Plan implemented by the United States, through which Turkey was provided US\$ 150 million of ODA (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008). To enhance close cooperation between the two countries, Turkey further adopted pro-Western positions compatible with the US strategic foreign policy interests after World War II (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008, pp. 98-99). Foreign aid contributed to Turkey's economic development during the 1950s. Apart from the US, Japan and Germany were also main aid providers to Turkey.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was the turning point for the development aid policy, when Turkey started to provide aid to newly-independent Turkic Republics (Turkish-speaking) in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Dal, 2014, p. 111). The aim of Turkish foreign policy in the region was to support the independence of those countries, and to integrate them into the global system by building close cooperation (Ametbek & Amirbek, 2014, p. 191). Thus, the establishment of TIKA as a technical aid organization under the MFA dates back to 1992, and aimed "to respond to the restructuring, adaptation and development needs of the Turkic Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union." (TIKA, n.d.).

As some scholars argue, the establishment of TIKA is a result of a foreign policy strategy based on constructivist understanding (T. Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012). For Dal

(2014), it was a good chance for Turkey to realize its middle power potential because Turkey claimed to be a role model for the countries in the region (p. 111). In those years, TIKA aimed at a sustainable construction of social structure and establishment of their own identity in Turkic nations together with technical support for infrastructural development (TIKA, n.d.). Thus, it has conducted projects in health, restoration, agricultural development, finance, tourism, and industry (TIKA, n.d.).

Since the 2000s, Turkey has started to pursue an assertive foreign aid policy resulting in a significant change in Turkey's development policy orientation. It has transformed its scope from being Central Asia-focused to a broader focus "across multiple geographic settings" (Apaydin, 2012, p. 268). Parallel to this, TIKA has also broadened its scope and increased its Program Coordination Offices from 12 in 2002 to 25 in 2011 and 33 in 2012 abroad (TIKA, n.d.). To facilitate this transformation, TIKA has gone through a structural change and started operating under the Prime Ministry, instead of the MFA (Denizhan, 2010). As a result, TIKA became a more independent institution, and this facilitated its coordination with different institutions in terms of Turkey's soft power political issues (Denizhan, 2010, p. 22). Nowadays, TIKA has 56 Program Coordination Offices located in 54 countries (TIKA, n.d.).

These developments occurred as a result of both betterment in Turkey's own economy and a significant change in global trends in terms of foreign aid giving (Ş. Kardaş, 2013b): First of all, Turkey became more powerful. As the 18th largest economy in the world, it is now placed among the most important emerging donors. To put it in another way, between the years 2003-2012, Turkey's GDP grew by an annual average of 5% (Hausmann, 2014, p.5). Secondly, emerging non-traditional powers, who are mostly criticized for being more interest-oriented than having development concerns, have recently been active players in international development (Ozkan, 2013, p. 140). Wanting to keep up with other rising powers, Turkey also behaves self-interestedly. In other words, Turkey is also interested in cheap energy and the natural resources of developing countries, and improvement of its import-driven economic model, such as in Central Asia (Denizhan, 2010, p. 21).

For some scholars, on the other hand, Turkey's foreign aid giving does not constitute fundamental differences from that of traditional donors (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). Therefore, it also has altruistic concerns. In official statement of TIKA, Turkey's foreign aid is identified as "friendly, fraternal and cooperative" (TIKA, n.d.). According to an official from TIKA, the Turkish model is considered by the government as a composition of two basic elements: humanitarianism and generosity (personal communication, January 18, 2017). In fact, compared to other emerging economies such as China, which are mostly criticized for changing the aspect of development cooperation negatively, Turkey is closer to traditional western aid providers (Hausmann, 2014, p. 3). This is not surprising, because Turkey is one of the founding members of the OECD and already has the observer status to the Development Assistance Committee (OECD, n.d.-b). For the above reasons, Turkey's development cooperation can be thought to have mixed motives.

Before dwelling into a detailed discussion on how Turkey's middle power diplomacy has affected its foreign aid provision, it is worth briefly looking at its allocation of ODA and some statistical data on Turkey's focus in foreign aid giving. Later, characteristics of Turkey's foreign aid practice will be analyzed in detail, especially in terms of partner country selection. Finally, to specify its overseas expansion, Turkey's involvement in Africa will be discussed by referring to its foreign aid motives.

3.2.2 How is aid allocation organized?

On the governmental level, Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in charge of coordinating and determining policies on development cooperation. All governmental institutions are coordinated by the MFA, while the technical coordination is done by TIKA (Kulaklıkaya & Aybey, 2008, p. 263). Apart from technical cooperation, TIKA is in charge of providing development assistance via its development projects and programs (Kulaklıkaya & Aybey, 2008). Moreover, it also plays an important role in the decision-making processes on funding and aid allocation (Denizhan, 2010, p. 22). There are also other public institutions, NGOs and the private

sector organizations implementing projects and programs funded through Turkey's ODA (OECD, n.d.-b).

Turkey's activism in foreign aid giving has started to gain importance after the end of the Cold War, requiring a need for institutionalization of its practice of development cooperation. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is the main institution established in 1992 under the Foreign Ministry (now under the Prime Ministry), and is responsible for providing bilateral aid. TIKA works in coordination with other ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector (OECD, n.d.-b). After 2003, its presence as a global aid agency gained importance thanks to its overseas expansion, especially in Africa (Özkan, 2010, p. 98). Between 1992-2002, the average amount of projects and programs conducted by TIKA were 256, whereas between 2003-2006 TIKA conducted an average of 700 projects (T. Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 171). Furthermore, TIKA is considered one of the important institutions for realizing Turkey's soft power. It expanded its foreign aid contributions to US\$ 700 million between 2006 and 2009, from an average of US\$ 60 million from 2004 to 2006 (Bayer & Keyman, 2012, p. 78). TIKA is currently active in more than 140 countries where it focuses on development cooperation in sharing knowledge and expertise (TIKA, n.d.). To give a brief overview on Turkey's ODA allocation in numbers, it is worth looking at the below statistics which hint at some details on Turkish aid:

ODA volume and type of aid

Together with private flows, Turkey's total amount of assistance was US\$ 6.403 billion in the year 2014 (TIKA, 2014b, p. 9). In the same year US\$ 3.591 billion was allocated as ODA, with a 8.6% increase compared to the year 2013 (TIKA, 2014b). According to a TIKA Report (2014a), Turkey's ODA/GNI ratio was 0.41% in 2014 (p. 12). Even though it could not achieve the 0.7% global target set according to MDGs, the ratio was higher than the average of OECD DAC donors at 0.29% (TIKA,

2014a). Turkey was 10th in the OECD ranking in which Sweden, Luxembourg, and Norway got the first three (TIKA, 2014a).

In the year 2014, US\$ 185.8 million from the total amount of TIKa contributions of US\$ 191.8 million was allocated for the implementation of the projects under the bilateral ODA (TIKA, 2014a). The first three areas of bilateral assistance were composed of *program assistance* (US\$ 102.44 million), *technical cooperation* (US\$ 53.44 million) and *assistance for national NGOs* (US\$ 3.8 million) (TIKA, 2014a). They were followed by *development food aid* with US\$ 2.22 million, and *humanitarian aid* with US\$ 3.7 million. On the other hand, Turkey's multilateral ODA only constituted 2% of its total ODA in 2014. Among this amount, 44% was provided through the United Nations, 33% through regional development banks and 4% through the International Development Association and other multilateral organizations (OECD, n.d.-b).

Regions

On the regional basis, Turkey's aid disbursement seems limited to neighboring regions, especially Middle East which has received a total amount of US\$ 2.988 billion in 2015 (OECD.Stat, 2017b). It is followed by South and Central Asia which received US\$ 256.6 million in the year 2015 (OECD.Stat, 2017b). However, recently Turkey has also increased its development assistance to overseas. After South and Central Asia, Africa had the third place in 2015, with an amount of US\$ 183.44 million which showed a decreasing trend compared to the previous year's US\$ 331.01 million (OECD.Stat, 2017b). The aid provision to the Balkans and Eastern Europe amounted to US\$ 222.92 million in 2015 (OECD.Stat, 2017b).

Income groups and partner countries

According to the TIKA Report (2014b), from 2008 to 2014 the total amount of development assistance to LDCs reached US\$ 1.5 billion. However, Turkey's average bilateral ODA in 2013-2014 to LDCs still remains lower (at the third place with US\$ 250 million) compared to its ODA provision to lower-middle income countries (average of US\$ 2.518 billion) and upper middle income countries (average of US\$ 355 million) (TIKA, 2014b). When it comes to partner countries, the ongoing civil war in Syria resulting in a refugee crisis has led to a considerable increase in the amount of bilateral aid allocated to Syria. In 2012, 42% of total ODA was provided to Syria, compared to 52% in 2013 and 65% in 2014 (OECD, n.d.-b). Syria remained the primary partner country in 2014 (OECD, n.d.-b), followed by Tunisia, Kyrgyzstan and Somalia that together constituted the largest share of bilateral ODA (TIKA, 2014b). The top ten recipients of bilateral ODA in the years 2013-2014 – among which Syria received US\$ 1.965 billion, Egypt received US\$ 272.1 million and Somalia was provided US\$ 95.0 million – constituted 84.5% of the share of gross bilateral ODA (OECD, n.d.-b).

Sectoral division

Social infrastructure and services constituted 72.46% of Turkey's sectoral distribution of assistance in 2014 with the amount of US\$ 121.9 million (TIKA, 2014a, p. 15). The first three categories of these projects and services were health, cultural cooperation and restoration projects and strengthening of educational infrastructure (TIKA, 2014a). In 2014, US\$ 30.73 million of the budget was allocated to the cultural cooperation and restoration projects as one of the main priorities of Turkey's bilateral ODA, especially in Central Asia (TIKA, 2014a, p. 15). These were followed by economic infrastructure and services (13.52% - US\$ 22.76 million), production sectors (4.70% - US\$ 7.9 million), and multi-sectoral initiatives (9.32% - US\$ 15.71 million)

(TIKA, 2014a, p. 15). The refugee crisis emerging from the Syrian civil war has also affected the sectoral division of Turkey's bilateral ODA. Accordingly, the three main sectors of Turkey's development cooperation in the years 2013-2014 were humanitarian aid and refugee support, education, governance and civil society (OECD, n.d.-b).

Assessment

Table 6 summarizes Turkey's bilateral ODA flows. Similar to Korea, the thesis argues that Turkish foreign aid has three main purposes: Diplomatic, development and commercial (Lancaster, 2007). Therefore, one might argue that the main motivation of Turkey's bilateral ODA is a mixture of these three aspects.

Literature suggests that Turkey's development policy has certain altruistic motives, in line with OECD principles (Hausmann, 2014), and therefore aims improving human lives in developing countries. In addition, Turkey also aims at increasing its global reach, as a result of its interests in becoming a global actor to increase its international prestige (Cannon, 2016) through the use of foreign aid (Hausmann, 2014); as well as to strengthen its trade and commercial relations, as in the case of the development cooperation with the recipients from SSA (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014).

Briefly assessing Turkish development policy in numbers, the above conclusions provide a background for Turkey's foreign aid approach. The following sections will be concentrating on how it is reflected in its foreign policy, as well as in discourse. Therefore, it is important to stress the role of cultural, historical and religious ties in foreign aid practice, which constitute the main discourse of Turkey's development cooperation policy. Later, its development policy towards Africa will be emphasized, because Africa is important to assess Turkey's global expansion under its development policy.

Table 6 Turkey's bilateral ODA allocation

Years	Net disbursements (US\$ million)	Type of aid in total ODA (2014)**	Top-ten recipients (2013-14)***	Income groups (2013-14)†	Regional divide on aid allocation (2013-14)††	Top-three sectoral share of bilateral ODA (2015)†††
2010	920.13	Bilateral 98% Multilateral 2% (OECD, n.d.-b)	Syria Egypt Somalia Tunisia	LMICs 75.61% UMICs 10.66% LDCs 7.50%	MENA 77.62% South and Central Asia 12.77%	Social services and infrastructure 86.9% Economic services and infrastructure 10.1%
2011	1 226.21		Afghanistan West Bank and Gaza Strip	OLICs 0.24%	SSA 5.25%	Manufacturing sector 2.6% (TIKA, 2015)
2012	2 422.50		Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Pakistan	Unallocated 5.97% (OECD, n.d.-b)	Europe 3.53%	
2013	3 156.67		Iraq (OECD, n.d.-b)		Other Asia and Oceania 0.69%	
2014	3 502.35				Latin America and Caribbean 0.11% (OECD, n.d.-b)	
2015	3 845.90					

* See other years on OECD.Stat. (2017c). Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]: Bilateral official development assistance by types of aid. Retrieved on May 16, 2017 from: <http://stats.oecd.org/#>

** Retrieved on May 16, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm>

*** Retrieved on April 26, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm>

† Retrieved on May 16, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm>

†† Retrieved on May 16, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm>

††† Others: Multisectoral activities 0.5%. Retrieved on April 26, 2017 from: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/YAYINLAR/TKYR%202015%20ENG/KALKINMA%20.pdf>

3.2.3 The role of cultural, historical and religious ties in foreign aid practice

Turkey's active engagement can be inferred from the above statistical information. This brief information gives us a hint about the recent increase in Turkey's development assistance, priority regions and income groups. For a better assessment, it must be linked to its pro-active foreign strategy that aims at Turkey's global engagement as an emerging middle power.

The Turkish development cooperation model is based on historical, cultural and religious proximity with partner countries. Thus, it directly affects its strategy of partner country selection. Turkey has three main priorities: First of all, it has long had a strategy of developing close cooperation with Turkic countries in Central Asia, who once were part of the Soviet Union, on the basis of cultural and linguistic ties (Denizhan, 2010; Fidan & Nurdun, 2008; Parlar Dal, 2014). Such cooperation was used as a way of integrating newly independent states into the post-Cold War system. Moreover, for Apaydin (2012), the main purpose of TIKA's establishment in 1992 was to serve as a foreign policy tool to develop relations with those countries based on "historical and imagined kinship ties" (pp. 266-267).

Secondly, the regions that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire are significant partners, again because of cultural and historical ties. Some African countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, have once been more or less included in the former Ottoman territories (Ozkan, 2010, p. 533). They now constitute significant partners in Turkey's opening up to Africa. This approach has gained momentum during the AKP rule. As a result, Turkey's foreign aid policy has gone through a significant change backed by the AKP's strategic policy of overseas expansion (Apaydin, 2012; Haşimi, 2014). Consequently, TIKA was transformed into a global agency and thus became more compatible with different geographical settings in aid allocation (Apaydin, 2012).

Finally, Turkey has been trying to establish strong relations with Muslim countries by prioritizing a common religious identity, especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Somalia is a good examples as partner country to Turkey

because of its shared cultural, and historical ties (Cannon, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2012). However, the AKP government pursued less secular foreign aid policy towards Somalia, and particularly prioritized its Muslim characteristic when Somalia was provided aid in 2011 as a result of the famine during Ramadan (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 3). During that period, Somalia was significantly projected by the government as a “Muslim” country in need. Moreover, public awareness of Somalia was raised through media coverage and campaigns.

What we infer from the above discussion is that Turkey prioritizes the partner countries that have long had cultural, historical and also religious ties among which the last one has been recently prioritized by the current government: Turkey claims to have strong cultural and also linguistic ties with Turkic countries, whereas it supports a similar argument with the Balkans and the MENA region in terms of a shared culture that dates back to Ottoman rule. Again, the Muslim recipients are emphasized for their religious characteristics.

Three types of relations are suitable for Turkey’s middle power strategy backed by its development policy. First of all, Turkey’s approach is claimed to be based on addressing the underlying needs of the recipients which might stem from variety of historical, cultural and religious reasons. Moreover, different needs of the recipient countries also requires recipient-perspective in development cooperation. As suggested in the OECD Policy Brief on the evaluation of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2012a), country ownership is an approach to eliminate donor-driven nature of aid giving for increasing aid effectiveness, provided that partner countries have a say on their development needs (p. 1). Having shared historical and cultural values, Turkey’s involvement is supported by the government, claiming that Turkey can better understand the recipient perspective with whom Turkey has closer ties in terms of three aspects mentioned. This is also a way to differentiate Turkey’s approach from other donors.

Secondly, the Turkish model is claimed to serve altruistic purposes in foreign aid giving, since it does not have any colonial past during the Republican rule or the Ottoman Empire (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014; Wheeler, 2011). We can see this in

governmental statements as well. As one of the speeches delivered by the former ministry of foreign affairs Davutoğlu (2011) on Turkey-Africa partnership:

At times when we were able to strengthen our interactions, cultural links, trade connections and political positions, we were triumphant and prosperous. However, when our ties and defenses were weakened due to many reasons including imperialism, colonialism, conflicts, or inner strife, we were both weakened and fell back behind other nations and groupings.

As the speech suggested, the Turkish government puts emphasis on Turkey's experience as a recipient. Therefore, Turkey claims to understand the recipient needs without exploiting them and also tries to portray a trustworthy image because of not having been one of the former colonial powers. The latter has become more significant when Turkey started to have several attempts to open up to overseas, especially in Africa. As Bilgic & Nascimento (2014) also emphasized, anti-colonial discourse is specifically adopted by the government itself in order to gain political support from its African partners (p. 3). In this respect, Turkey's opening up to Africa is essential to understand its middle power quest which is linked to its development cooperation policy. Therefore, the next section will concentrate on Turkey's African Initiative.

3.2.4 African Initiative

In 1998, Turkey launched its strategy of opening up to Africa in order to strengthen its political, economic, development and cultural relations with African countries (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014). Even though it dates back to 1998, Turkey has recently been pursuing its geographical focus on Africa more assertively (A. F. Cooper, 2015b). Turkey declared 2005 as "Africa Year" in line with its new foreign policy in order to further strengthen its relations with the region.

Turkey's recent engagement with Africa is considered proactive and having developed intensively in a short period of time, especially looking at the economic indicators (Özkan, 2010 p. 94). To be more specific, Turkey has increased the number of its embassies from 12 (5 of them in North Africa) in the year 2009 to 39 today (MFA Turkey, n.d.-b). Moreover, TIKA opened new offices in Africa to facilitate cooperation, to improve its access to the region and increase its development projects

(TIKA, 2014, p. 14). Under the development cooperation, Turkey engages in capacity building projects in Africa by organizing vocational training courses in sectors matching their needs (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, p. 137). Moreover, TIKA also conducts infrastructural projects, such as construction of schools and hospitals, to allow for better provision of social services (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010).

The discussions on Turkey's opening up to Africa are primarily based on the characteristic of the development assistance, since Turkey is considered one of the emerging donors from the South recently active in the region. Therefore, the main controversy in the literature points out Turkey's foreign aid provision for altruistic versus strategic reasons.

Turkey claims to pursue a humanitarian approach and this approach is strengthened, as Wheeler (2011) pointed out, with its non-colonial past and having "kinship" with the Muslim populations in Africa apart from its geographical closeness to the region (p. 43). For Özkan (2010), the aspect about kinship has only been valid for North Africa for a long time since the region once belonged to the Ottoman territories in the past (Özkan, 2010, p. 94). Turkey's activism in Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, explains its proactive engagement much better. This is because the region has long been perceived as a "faraway land" by Turkey. Yet, Turkey has increased its overseas missions to the region since 2005. Thus, it tries to improve the relations with the partner countries on a more trustful basis where Turkey, as a donor, can understand and address recipients' needs.

For some scholars, on the other hand, Turkey's proactive involvement in Africa is not solely dependent on altruistic reasons. The rise of new donors in the region has led to an "unspoken competition" among traditional and emerging donors regarding the control of energy resources and economic benefits (Ozkan, 2013, p. 140). Thus, Turkey's rapid growth led it to pursue proactive commercial interests (Bayer & Keyman, 2012, p. 77), and to search for alternative export markets for a sustainable future growth (Apaydin, 2012, p. 277). Thus, political and strategic motives together with trade concerns are also reasons for Turkey's proactive development cooperation policy (Kulaklıkaya & Nurdun, 2010, p. 132). For Korkut & Civelekoglu (2012),

claiming shared values and goals with the African states while providing development assistance is to facilitate Turkey's involvement in the region which actually emerges from Turkey's search for material gains (p. 188). For example, Turkey's trade with the states in sub-Saharan Africa increased from an annual worth of US\$ 1 billion to more than US\$ 17 billion in 2013 (Çağaptay, 2013, p 801). Turkey has also started having more interest in political engagements and state-building apart from focusing on development cooperation and economic affairs in the region (Ozkan, 2013).

As many others would agree, Turkey's involvement in Africa can also be considered as a part of its humanitarian diplomacy, emerging mostly from humanitarian reasons. Hausmann (2014) argued that compared to other emerging economies, Turkey's foreign aid policy is not primarily based on economic interests in recipients; rather, Turkey's motives are a mixture of altruistic and economic interests (p. 10). As understood from its foreign aid policy, Turkey's main focus does not seem to depend solely on countries rich in raw materials or improving Turkey's own economy (Hausmann, 2014, p.10).

To conclude, this section aimed at shedding light on partner country selection criteria and its rising influence in Africa region in order to better understand Turkey's expansion on a global scale in terms of development assistance. The discussions showed that Turkey has mixed motives in foreign aid giving, based on altruistic as well as strategic calculations. Having said that, the next section will combine Turkey's foreign aid activity with its middle power strategy for the sake of a better assessment of the role of Turkish foreign aid in its middle power diplomacy.

3.3 Assessing Turkey's middle power role as an aid contributor

In this chapter, Turkey's middle power role and active development cooperation policy based on a humanitarian approach were discussed so far. Based on these, Turkey's middle power role as an aid contributor can be assessed as follows: First of all Turkey is an emerging middle power with great regional capabilities. Despite some

controversies on whether Turkey should be identified as either a regional power or a middle one; in this study, Turkey is taken as emerging middle power with regional importance. Unlike traditional middle powers who were mostly influential globally, Turkey has both potentials. Secondly, Turkey is a humanitarian power according to the behavioral approach to middle power theory. Humanitarianism is the key concept that Turkey has adopted for its foreign policy interests (Öniş & Kutlay, 2015, p. 13). Turkey has been pursuing its humanitarian diplomacy as part of its development cooperation policy as well. In that sense, foreign assistance plays a significant role in realizing Turkey's "unannounced" middle power vision.

To begin with, Turkey fits into the definition of both emerging middle power and regional power. Most importantly, these two categorizations are complementary to each other. First of all, as mentioned elsewhere in this study, most of today's middle powers are regionally well-positioned. It is important to note here, as Jordaan (2003) also pointed out, that emerging middle powers are powerful or even dominant in their regions unlike their traditional counterparts (p. 172). They are basically eager to play an active role in their "regional integration and cooperation" (Jordaan, 2003, p. 172).

Oftentimes, there are controversies in the literature on the categorization of the countries in terms of their power capabilities. Such controversies are also reflected in the debates on the differences between middle and regional powers. As Neumann pointed out, regional powers "have potential to balance other forces, maintain code of conduct, stabilize sphere of influences and police unruly" (p. 187-188). Emerging middle powers might also have such a potential. Thus, it raises the question whether one should call emerging middle powers simply regional powers. In this study, I take emerging middle powers as states that have regional capacities, no matter whether they act on it or not. However, the most essential difference between two definitions might be that emerging middle powers are not limited by their regions. Together with their possible regional quest, they have ambition to go global, as in the case of Turkey. That is the most significant aspect which might differ middle powers from being simply regional powers.

Secondly, Turkey has an active middle power strategy and identifies itself as a humanitarian power. Turkey has shown great ambition in engaging with the developing world as a humanitarian power. This has not only resulted in the establishment of peaceful relations with the developing world, but also led Turkey to broaden its global reach. Turkey, having provided US\$ 1.6 billion worth of humanitarian assistance, ranked at the third place after the US and the United Kingdom (UK) in 2013 (TIKA, 2016). Regarding the ratio of its official humanitarian assistance to its national income, Turkey makes one of the most generous impressions as a humanitarian donor. As a reflection of its middle power strategy of global engagement, Turkey was the first non-Western country to host the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in 2011, and also hosted the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 (MFA Turkey, n.d.-c).

This study claims that Turkey's foreign policy vision can be explained by the behavioral approach to MPT according to which a state attributes itself a global role in one of the niche areas. In a way, it is related to self-identification which determines its global position. To better understand and support the argument, it is essential to have a look at how Turkey positions itself. Former Prime Minister Davutoglu (2012) called Turkey's strategy as "a value-based foreign policy" according to which Turkey assumes "the responsibilities of a global actor" and sets "the objective to be reckoned as a wise country in the international community" (p. 3).

The concept of a wise country is essential to note here, since it signifies "a responsible member of the international community" (Davutoğlu, 2012a), in other words "a good international citizen". On this matter, what Davutoglu (2012) further argued is that Turkey, as a consequence of its unique vision, pursues its foreign policy objectives in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation, conflict resolution or development assistance (p. 3). As mentioned before, the first three objectives do not constitute the main discussion of this research. When it comes to development cooperation, Turkey's regional and global expansion by improving its foreign economic and political relations with the developing world, as well as by increasing its development

assistance to the poor under its humanitarian approach support Turkey's quest for a global reach (Çevik, 2016), thus for its middle power strategy.

Another argument worth being stressed by this chapter should be that Turkey's development cooperation is one of the main tools for the realization of its approach. For T. Kardaş & Erdağ (2012), the country started learning to include different tools in its foreign diplomacy (p. 170), so that it has increased the efficiency of Turkey's humanitarian approach. In that sense, TIKA is thought to be an "output" of Turkey's new foreign policy orientation and it has become one of the most essential one (T. Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012). One of the significance of development cooperation in Turkey's foreign policy is the fact that it enables Turkey to use its soft power skills flexibly. Thus, Turkey's approach adapts to different situations and also is capable of addressing different challenges.

Most importantly, Turkey as a donor is positioned somewhere between traditional OECD DAC donors and rising donors of the global South. As Ş. Kardaş (2013b) asserted, Turkey might eventually chose to stay in between even though becoming a DAC member, which might symbolically mean an ointment into the league of the developed world (p. 4). It is obvious that Turkey's approach maintains its unique characteristic in its essence. But at the same time it poses a rhetorical criticism of the western model of development cooperation (Ş. Kardaş, 2013b, p. 4). By this way, Turkey claims to maintain its trustworthy profile towards recipient countries, while at the same time it does not radically go to an opposite direction of the western donors.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on two essential points for this research: First of all, it has posed the question to what extent Turkey can be considered a middle power. Regarding this, there emerge some controversies in the literature contesting Turkey's middle powerhood, since Turkey has no declared middle power strategy. Therefore, I called Turkey a middle power without the name, because obviously Turkey's overall foreign

policy strategy is highly compatible with being a middle power despite some controversies. That is to say, the discussions on the sections of this chapter have shown that Turkey is an emerging middle power simply because of its assertive role in fostering multilateralism, and its pro-active engagement with global politics and thus the international community.

Secondly, Turkey's emerging middle power role is strengthening with its humanitarian approach for the sake of being a good global citizen. In this regard, the thesis looked at it from a constructivist perspective and posed the question whether Turkey's foreign policy agenda is linked to its middle power identity. While doing so, I specifically took its development policy agenda into consideration, in order to conduct an analysis on its quest to being a humanitarian power. Therefore, the research concluded that claiming to be a humanitarian power is an explicit way of showing a middle power identity, since it is at the same time highly related to being "a good global citizen", and an "active player of international politics".

CHAPTER 4

MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: ASSESSING THE CASES OF KOREA AND TURKEY

Introduction

The main argument of the thesis focuses on middle power identity and its effect on foreign aid policy. Before dwelling on this subject, there are two significant points that the thesis made so far: On the one hand, the overall research argues that foreign aid has a significant role in foreign policy. For some realist scholars, like Morgenthau (1962), foreign aid is the third pillar of foreign politics when diplomacy and security policies are not effective. Yet, one should also keep in mind that it is shaped by foreign policy interests. To put it in another way, states' political, economic or security interests, as a general tendency, shape the policy of foreign aid provision (Hasimi, 2014, p. 131).

Including the realist critique, some others argue that foreign aid has mixed motives which still contains altruistic interests such as developmental goals, humanitarian relief or conflict prevention together with diplomatic goals or commercial interests (Lancaster, 2007, pp. 5-6). Based on this argument, this research is convinced that foreign aid can be a category under foreign policy. Likewise, this viewpoint is applicable to every donor country regardless of them being emerging or traditional donor.

Another key thing to remember is that emerging powers (including emerging middle powers) have sped up their global engagements as aid providers: Emerging economies tend not to confine themselves only to become economically powerful. Rather, they tend to support their growing economic power with political one in different issue areas of international politics. Political power is used here in the sense that they want to become active players especially in global decision-making processes (Florini, 2011; Klingebiel, 2016, 2017). In addition, these emerging economies pursue an assertive role in the international arena where they can combine their growing economic power with an active foreign policy (Chin & Quadir, 2013; Manning, 2006; Woods, 2008). In this regard, development cooperation is one of the issues areas that they engage in. This viewpoint can be generalized to emerging economies including rising powers like BRICs or emerging middle powers like MIKTA.

Above all, the main argument of the thesis makes further implications on emerging middle powers. The emphasis put on foreign aid behavior of these powers are different to those of other emerging donors. This implies that the research takes development cooperation as an essential component of middle power diplomacy, and tries to explain how their foreign aid policy is located in the core of middle power strategy:

To begin with, one of the significant points is that middle power is an identity. There are several reasons for those powers to identify themselves so, but most importantly these powers lack the capacity to have a direct influence on global politics as great powers do. Therefore, middle power identity provides them with flexibility in their engagements in world affairs. Furthermore, it enables them to affect some global outcomes, especially when they act simultaneously as a group of middle powers. As Gilley & O'Neil (2014) also suggested, middle powers “are capable of reshaping great powers and their relations among themselves” (p. 10).

What makes emerging middle powers even more unique than their traditional counterparts is that they are also regional powers, so that they can be more influential in decision-making processes in their regions, and mostly in their favor. Another suggestion made by Gilley & O'Neil (2014) is that building regional institutions and playing a leadership role are of utmost interest to middle powers in their efforts for

diplomatic initiatives based on “rules and institutions” (p. 12). It provides these powers with a kind of controlling mechanism over global challenges.

Second, emerging middle powers strengthen their identities by attributing themselves some unique characteristics. By doing so, they claim kind an expertise in specific issue areas of international politics. To put it in another way, middle powers are assertive to be able to affect international outcomes and eager to combine their knowledge in specific issue areas with their experiences, if applicable (personal observations from the third Busan Global Partnership Forum, 6-7 October, 2016). For instance, Turkey identifies itself as a humanitarian power (Gilley, 2015), whereas Mexico focuses on humanitarian issues like migration (A. F. Cooper, 2010), and Korea emphasizes “learning from experience” as a guide to development (Aboubacar, 2014). As one would also agree, these issue areas are specifically chosen from niche areas of international politics, or to put it more simply, from the issue areas of low politics, such as development, environment, and migration and so on.

Regarding development cooperation and two case studies of the thesis, foreign aid can be considered part of a middle power strategy because these powers explicitly claim to play a bridging role between the developed and developing world by relying on development cooperation that eases their global reach. That emerging middle powers put emphasis on foreign aid might be a result of their recent economic growth (where they can exercise their economic power more easily through cooperation); because of their search for international support (especially support from developing world with whom they aim at developing good relations); or simply because of their attempts to increase their global visibility (which would also help them to be visible in decision-making processes in other issue areas).

Starting from the above conclusions, there still remain two important points which, I believe, need to be clarified based on the country cases:

1. Do Korea and Turkey pursue a similar approach to foreign aid as part of their middle power diplomacy?
2. If not, why do their foreign aid behaviors differ from each other?

To answer these questions, the thesis will make a descriptive comparative analysis of the two emerging middle powers in the following sections by looking at (i) their foreign aid behaviors, and (ii) the statements that they make regarding their policies of development cooperation as reflection of their middle power role.

4.1 Evaluating the case studies: A fine line

In Chapter 2 and 3, Korea and Turkey have been separately evaluated according to their middle power roles and development cooperation policies. Each chapter concluded that the two country cases can be labeled as emerging middle powers. A further question based on this was also raised whether their development cooperation plays a role in their middle power diplomacy.

First of all, both powers are emerging middle powers. As the behavioral model of MPT suggests, middle power is an identity adopted by the state itself. While doing so, there are several characteristics that middle powers would have, which also enables us to evaluate these powers according to their middle power roles. The most important aspect of the behavioral approach is that middle powers claim to have the characteristic of being a “good global citizen” (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993), fostering multilateralism and using the means of diplomacy and mediation in low political issue areas (Gilley, 2015), or to put it in another way adopting “soft targets” (Ravenhill, 1998). In addition to these, middle powers are also expected to find creative solutions to global problems. Therefore, they are active parties to international platforms.

As discussed several times elsewhere in this study, emerging middle powers also have regional importance compared to their traditional counterparts (Jordaan, 2003). The research’s two cases exemplify this assumption: While Korea is an important middle power in East Asia, close to greater powers such as China, Russia and Japan; Turkey is a neighboring country to Europe, and a potential hub for three areas – Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Therefore, they are regional powers.

For this study, I do not suggest that regionalism is an essential qualification for being an emerging middle power, since it is not always easy to make the differentiation between regional and emerging middle powers. Rather I argue that some emerging middle powers might have regional importance, or might act on their regionalism; while others only focus on their global reach. What is more important for this study is whether emerging middle powers adopt an identity in line with a middle power strategy.

Second, both middle powers are emerging donors that have recently been actively engaging in development cooperation. First of all, both Korea and Turkey – like most other emerging donors – claim that they have shared identity with the developing world because of having experienced similar paths to development and want to differentiate their foreign aid from that of traditional donors (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014, p. 2; Chun et al., 2010, p. 798). While Korea claims to understand the recipients' needs better and sticks to its motto of "learning from experience", Turkey puts emphasis on "humanitarianism" based mostly on cultural, religious and historical ties.

Their role as emerging donors is also linked to their middle power strategy. This research takes both middle powers' African initiatives as an attempt for a global reach. On the one hand, Africa is a new target for both Korea and Turkey, who have long been mostly providing aid to the LDCs or other developing countries in close regions. Korea has increased its net bilateral ODA disbursement to Africa from US\$ 104.06 million in 2008 to US\$ 358.76 million in 2015, whereas Turkey's bilateral ODA disbursement to Africa reached US\$ 183.44 million in 2015 from US\$ 51.73 million in 2008 (OECD.Stat, 2017a). On the other hand, African development is one of the main target for the international community. Hence, their presence in Africa symbolizes their role as global players, as well as the use of their soft power reflected on their practice of development cooperation.

By the same token, Africa is significant for their strategic interests as is the case for other emerging donors. Africa is the continent where traditional western donors have long been present, and in which other rising powers, especially emerging donors like BRICs, have started becoming more interested. The two middle power cases of this

thesis are not only willing to address global problems of international development, or try to gain an international recognition to play leadership roles; but also to fulfill some of their strategic interests stemming from their rapid economic growth, such as broadening their market access or sustaining their energy security (Apaydın, 2012; Chun et al., 2010).

Last but not least, development cooperation policy is an integral part of middle power diplomacy of both Korea and Turkey. This implication does not suggest that both middle powers have declared a middle power strategy in line with a foreign aid policy. However, the discussions on previous chapters of the thesis showed that development cooperation plays a significant role for both middle powers. This will be explained more in detail in the following sub-sections.

To be able to make the above conclusions, the next two sub-sections evaluate the cases in line with the overall findings of the previous chapters of the thesis. There are mainly two important points which I clarify: (i) to what extent Korea and Turkey have similar middle power characteristics, and (ii) to what extent these middle powers have similar foreign aid behaviors.

4.1.1 Korea and Turkey as emerging middle powers

This study takes Korea and Turkey as emerging middle powers with similar characteristics mentioned on the justification of case selection: Hierarchically, both Korea and Turkey are located in the middle position with similar material capabilities, such as size, population, economic growth and so on. Moreover, both middle powers have close cooperation with the United States. Historically both countries – both of which are members of the OECD – were net aid recipients and recently became donors. As donors, both countries have recently increased their ODA allocations, and further improved their economic and diplomatic relationships with the developing world. Apart from these, their membership to MIKTA is also of utmost importance, because of being a group of like-minded middle powers engaging in niche diplomacy.

The above assumptions reflect hierarchical and functional approaches to MPT, contrary to the focus of this research based on the behavioral model. It is important to note that this study does not deny other approaches. In fact, hierarchical and functional approaches are complementary to the assumptions of the behavioral approach to MPT. Clearly, capabilities of middle powers are one of the determining factor of their behavioral characteristics (Gilley & O’Neil, 2014, p. 10). Therefore, justifications are mentioned to be able to come up with more visible measures of two countries to understand their “physical” place in the world.

The main argument of the entire thesis requires specific focus on both powers’ middle power approach in discourse. Both cases of this study exemplify behavioral model in the sense that middle powers attribute themselves an identity and act on it: Korea has a declared foreign policy strategy. The Korean Foreign Ministry officially names Korea a middle power, as it launched the Global Korea initiative as a significant step to realize its middle power strategy which attributes Korea a global role (Sung-han Kim, 2013).

Concerning Turkey’s case, one might argue that Turkey is a middle power without a name. The main reason of understanding Turkey as a nameless middle power is that there is no official statements on the part of the Turkish government regarding such a strategy. Nevertheless, this fact does not change the research’s assumption that Turkey is an emerging middle power. As Gilley & O’Neil (2014) would also argue, these powers are still middle powers even though they do not behave according to what the theory suggests (p.10). Turkey identifies itself as a humanitarian power and shows most of the characteristics of an emerging middle power. To give an example, the current Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu names Turkish foreign policy as an “enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy” (MFA Turkey, n.d.). As can be inferred from the definition, Turkey’s declared foreign policy strategy is in line with a middle power role.

Overall, the research claims that Korea and Turkey takes middle power identities and this aspect is reflected in discourse. To support this argument, the thesis has specifically concentrated on development cooperation policies of both emerging

middle powers. Therefore, it concluded that foreign aid has a role in their foreign policy strategies. Hence, in the following section the role of foreign aid in middle power diplomacy of both country cases is further highlighted.

4.1.2. The role of foreign aid in middle power diplomacy

The thesis identifies three main aspects of middle power diplomacy in connection to foreign aid practices of both Korea and Turkey: To begin with, being “a bridge between the developing and the developed world” is the first indication of the use of foreign aid as part of their middle power diplomacy. Middle powers are willing to play crucial roles in global partnerships in line with international commitments, such as *Busan Partnership Agreement* (2011), *Mexico High Level Meeting Communiqué* (2014), and *Nairobi Outcome Document* (2016)⁷. As mentioned in the joint statement of the 4th MIKTA foreign ministers meeting, “MIKTA, as a consultative forum and innovative partnership, could play a bridging role between advanced countries and developing countries on key global issues” (MFA Turkey, 2014). While doing so, they claim to be important stakeholders in enabling and sustaining the connection between the developed and the developing world. For middle powers global partnerships are suitable platforms for realizing leadership role in addressing development related issues.

To give an example, Korean government announced in the 1st High Level Meeting on GPEDC held in 2014 in Mexico, that it would hold an annual forum for reviewing the implementation of Busan shared principles⁸ agreed on HLF-4 in 2011, to support the political dialogue and sustainable and effective partnership (MOFAT Korea, n.d.-a). Korea is eager to play the leading role in Busan forums, yet other middle powers such as Mexico, also use this platform to raise their voices. In this regard, one might argue

⁷ See the documents on OECD, Effective development cooperation, *Global Partnership initiatives*. Retrieved on May 1, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/>

⁸ See: Busan Partnership Document. (2011). *The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*. Retrieved July 4, 2017 from: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf>

that middle powers are willing to take part in the negotiations as one of the leading partners, as their middle power characteristics requires them to act so. (Personal observations from the 3rd Busan Global Partnership Forum for GPEDC, held in 6-7 October, 2016).

Second, both countries rely on some motto or characteristic that signify the importance of their partnership roles in development cooperation and distinguish their practices from that of other donors. This is another indication of a middle power identity, because it attributes these powers a unique role in international development. Korea relies on its official motto of “learning from experience” to present itself as an experienced guide for the developing world, whereas Turkey does it under its official label of “humanitarian power” which attributes Turkey a role for showing its sensitivity about the suffering elsewhere in the world. Both qualifications can be realized through a foreign aid strategy. In this regard, this study claims that middle powerism requires adopting a role in line with being a good global citizen by pursuing a soft power approach. Therefore, development policy can be an integral part of a middle power diplomacy.

Finally, both countries foster international platforms which contribute to multilateralism, and in which development cooperation is prioritized as one of the crucial global issue areas. Middle powers need such platforms in order to have a say, and most significantly have an effect on the outcomes or simply to be an active party to international politics. For instance, the G20 Seoul Summit in 2010 led to the establishment of the G20 Development Working Group and agreed on the Seoul Development Consensus and the Multi-Year Action plan in order to support LICs (Fues et al., 2012, p. 141). When we look at our second case, Turkey was the first to host UN humanitarian summit in 2016, where an emphasis was put on the delivery of foreign aid for ending need (WHS, 2016); that is to say, the effectiveness of aid especially in regions affected by conflict.

Furthermore, close cooperation among like-minded states is another indication of middle powerism, since cooperation among each other strengthens their effectiveness in world politics. In this regard, both Korea and Turkey are parties to MIKTA, and

agreed on a declaration which fosters each one of these aspects mentioned above. By putting an emphasis on like-mindedness, MIKTA statement suggests that MIKTA powers can “play a constructive role in the international agenda and exert greater influence” (MIKTA, n.d.).

All in all, middle power identity requires a kind of expertise or active involvement in specific issue areas of international politics, which especially requires soft power targets. Therefore, the thesis claims that development cooperation is one of the relevant issue areas which suits middle powers’ interests. Based on their middle power roles two case studies have developed certain foreign aid behaviors. The following part of this section further evaluates foreign aid behaviors of Korea and Turkey.

4.1.3. Foreign aid behaviors of Korea and Turkey

The research aims at showing how Korea and Turkey as emerging middle powers construct middle power identities, and make their middle power strategies in line with their practice of development cooperation. Therefore, it urges us to emphasize their foreign aid behaviors.

Before dwelling on this discussion, it is important to note that the study takes both countries as emerging donors. Equally important, both countries are part of the same system established by the OECD: while Korea is an OECD DAC member, Turkey is part of the OECD non-DAC and an observer to DAC. In the previous sections, the emphasis was put on their emerging donor status. Apart from that, the membership to OECD DAC must be taken as the fundamental part of this study, because of two reasons:

On the one hand, as the literature suggests, OECD DAC principles, which have long dominated international development policy, are challenged by the emerging donors. Obviously, the reason is that OECD DAC has long been playing the leading role in international development, and considered a club of traditional donors which have long

determined the main principles of foreign aid allocation (Klingebiel, 2014a; Woods, 2008). Hence, the emergence of new actors brought new practices into foreign aid provision, such as SSDC. Therefore, OECD plays an important role in categorizing two donor countries, in the sense that it enables us to understand where Korea and Turkey stand in this picture.

The second reason is that the membership to OECD DAC is also relevant to find out how they distinguish themselves from their traditional counterparts, or whether they rely on other principles such as SSDC. Having said, this sub-section requires an emphasis on the categories in identifying donors (OECD DAC and OECD non-DAC), since it is the most relevant differentiation for two. While doing so, the research counts on their similarities/differences specifically in discourse, which I believe, is essential at this point of the research to figure out their behavioral aspects.

Looking from a broader perspective, the fact that both Korea and Turkey have been in close cooperation with the western powers during and after the Cold War period, especially with the United States, have made them more into adopting the principles of western-liberal institutions. Therefore, both cases are members of the OECD, and complies with its principles. Likewise, the attitudes of officials from KOICA and TIKA, whom I interviewed, support this idea. Both agencies show commitments to OECD by stating that they regularly report to OECD about their ODA allocations. Consequently, one might argue that both donors share some similarities with regards to their understanding of development shaped by the established system. This is, at least, the very first impression I get from two cases.

Although the above argument may be true, it is still worth looking at it more specifically: The OECD DAC membership for Korea has a crucial role in approaching recipient countries. As the Korean foreign ministry highlights, Korea is a “recipient-turned-donor” country (MOFAT Korea, n.d.). Underlining Korea’s past experience as a recipient and its achievement of donor status in the OECD DAC are significant aspects for this study: It is used as a way to distinguish Korea from traditional western donors, by emphasizing its experience as a recipient. For some scholars, Koreans are

proud of what they achieved and ambitious to align their development programs with the past experiences of their own development (Chun et al., 2010). The underlying reason is that Korea can make its distinctive contribution to international development.

This brings us to the second indication that Korea wants to convey to the developing world the message that development is achievable through foreign aid, by showing the fact that it finally achieved joining the club of the established powers. The main reason for taking Korean development as a distinctive achievement is that foreign aid after the Korean War was the main financial source of Korea's own economic growth (J. Kim, 2011). As Mawdsley (2012) suggested, "for South Korea, membership of the DAC represents another marker of international status." (p. 177). Additionally, Korea is willing to introduce itself as the only OECD DAC donor that once shared the same experience with its partners. Therefore, Korea can be a model for the developing world.

Yet, for some scholars, Korea has not yet achieved an established donor status. Korea is still considered in the transition period, and its donor status is placed in between traditional and emerging donors. According to a Korean scholar working on Korean development cooperation in Seoul, some aspects of Korea's development cooperation reflect SSDC "in spirit or in practice", while at the same time Korea works with the OECD DAC and "speaks the same language with it" (personal communication, October 12, 2016).

Based on the above argument together with the discussions on the previous chapters of this study, the characteristics of Korean ODA in practice does not fully reflect that of the developed donors, when compared to other OECD DAC members. Hence, Korea is not fully part of the club of the developed in practice, but still uses the same discourse with them. This shows that Korea pursues the strategy of becoming one of members of the established donors in discourse unlike other southern providers that refrain from being associated with traditional practices. That gives the most significant hint for Korea's foreign aid behavior.

When we look at the case of Turkey, Turkey is an OECD non-DAC member (and an observer to DAC) and committed to OECD principles, as well as sharing a long history of alliances and partnership with the western powers. For instance, as Mawdsley (2012) argued, Turkey's potential membership to EU is one of the motives for Turkey to pursue its foreign aid policy in line with the practices of the western donors, as well as the strategic partnership between Turkey and the US (p. 176). At the same time, Turkey officially considers itself one of the new aid providers who actively engages in SSDC (MFA Turkey, n.d.-d). Turkey's practice, therefore, lies in between traditional and emerging donors.

As it is the case for Korea, Turkey's "in between" status gives Turkey a kind of flexibility to adopt its development practice in different ways. Nevertheless, Turkey is more willing to preserve its status as an emerging donor compared to Korea (Hausmann, 2014), as can be also inferred from the official statement of the foreign ministry of Turkey (MFA Turkey, n.d.-d). For Hausmann (2014), Turkey does not clearly define its status, and considers itself as an alternative to traditional and emerging donors (p. 10).

On the other hand, Turkey is not a challenger for the OECD DAC principles as other southern rising powers are, such as the BRICs. The main reason is that Turkey's practice of aid giving has similar characteristics with that of established aid providers (Hausmann, 2014; Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). This can be inferred from the fact that Turkey regularly reports to OECD. For that reason, one might argue that Turkey does not show sharp differences with the traditional donors in practice, compared to other southern providers.

In fact, Turkey was eager to enter the club of the established donors, showing ambition through taking some initiatives in the OECD. For instance, Turkey wanted to play a bridging role by initiating policy dialogues meeting among DAC and non-DAC members of the OECD in Istanbul in 2006, followed by Korea in Seoul in 2007. For some scholars, these dialogues provide valid grounds for hearing about Turkey's emphasis on emerging donors (Kulaklikaya & Aybey, 2008, p. 267). What is surprising in Turkey's case is that Turkey was officially offered an OECD DAC

membership in 2012 (UNDP Turkey, 2012), yet there is no sign of an attempt on the side of Turkish government to join the club. According to an official in TIKA, joining OECD DAC does not seem to be one of Turkey's primary goals in the near future (personal communication, January 18, 2017).

What is discussed so far shows that Turkey, unlike Korea, is willing to preserve its “in between” status. Therefore, my interpretation of two cases (analyzed more in detail compared to my first impression mentioned before) is that foreign aid behaviors of Korea and Turkey seem similar in practice in terms of being emerging donors and at the same time being part of the traditional system established by the OECD; nevertheless, they have different approaches in discourse. While the first is keen to place itself among traditional donors, the latter refrains from being fully labeled as a member of the traditional donors club. Both approaches basically aim at distinguishing their practices in order to preserve bridging role between the developing and the developed countries.

To conclude, Table 7 presents a brief summary of the whole discussion of the thesis, comparing Korea and Turkey in major aspects mentioned for this study. Overall, Korea and Turkey are less similar in discourse, but still similar enough to be put under the same category of powers that use foreign aid as an integral part of their diplomacy.

Table 7 Comparing Korea and Turkey

Middle Power approach		International	Economic				Development cooperation	
<i>Nature of power</i>	<i>Middle power characteristic</i>	<i>Participation to international platforms</i>	<i>Ranking by GDP (nominal)</i>	<i>Annual GDP growth rate (2016)*</i>	<i>OECD membership</i>	<i>Gross ODA disbursement -US\$, millions- (2015)**</i>	<i>Approach to development cooperation</i>	<i>Foreign aid behaviors</i>
<i>Korea</i>	Soft power Good global citizenship, a bridge btw the developing and the developed countries	The G20 MIKTA GPEDC	11 th	2.750%	OECD DAC	1 995.50	Learning from experience	Close to western donors, uses its experience to show developing world that it is possible to become one of the developed countries by receiving foreign aid
<i>Turkey</i>	Soft power Good global citizenship, a bridge btw the developing and the developed countries	The G20 MIKTA GPEDC	18 th	2.930%	OECD non-DAC (observer to the DAC)	4 169.14	Humanitarian approach, prioritizing cultural, historical and linguistic ties	Stays in between the developed and the developing countries to be able to claim that Turkey's approach can address recipients' needs better

* See other years on OECD.Stat. (2017b). *Economic Outlook No 100 - November 2016: Economic Outlook*. Retrieved on April 30, 2017 from: <https://stats.oecd.org/#>

** See other years on OECD.Stat. (2017c). *Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]*. Retrieved on May 3, 2017 from: <http://stats.oecd.org/>

4.2. How do Korea and Turkey behave in foreign aid?

Characteristically, Korea and Turkey's status and identities as middle powers have a significant impact on their foreign aid practices. Both countries pursue a regional approach in foreign aid allocation, as well as increase development assistance overseas, for instance Sub-Saharan African countries. They often focus on differentiating themselves from the mainstream development assistance. In other words, both Korea and Turkey often focus on improving the mainstream system by creating a difference and support better application of shared principles (such as Busan) rather than revolutionizing the system as a whole.

In this respect, emphasis on their past as non-Western countries that were once aid recipients is important. Certainly, the Korean and Turkish narratives with regards to this last point differ. While Korea clings to the motto of "learning from experience", the Turkish narrative often recalls the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire. Especially in appealing to the domestic audiences, this rhetoric may involve religious and cultural motives.

4.2.1 Overall findings

The research is convinced that emerging middle powers take up an identity, as discussed so far in line with behavioral approach to MPT. By adopting a middle power identity, they claim to have some responsibilities in the international system, and they address low political issue areas of international politics. By doing so, first they use their soft power capabilities. Second, they increase their global visibility. Third and related to the former, they realize their specific foreign policy interests by actively participating in one or several niche areas of international politics, one of which is development cooperation.

Among our country cases, Korea explicitly adopts a middle power identity by declaring an official middle power strategy under the Global Korea initiative, whereas Turkey does not mention its middle powerhood although it acts according to it.

Therefore, one might argue that Turkey adapts itself to middle power identity. Nonetheless, the research comes to the conclusion that we can talk about a middle power identity which is projected by the state itself as the two case studies exemplify.

As discussed so far, there is consensus in the literature, as well as in this entire research, that development cooperation is an essential component of the diplomacy of the emerging middle powers in question. Narrowly speaking, development is one of the global problems to be addressed, by bringing different stakeholders onto the stage. Foreign aid allocation of emerging middle powers to the LDCs and other developing world is needed for effectiveness of international development. Even though one cannot talk about pure altruism, still they contribute to it because their economic growth requires them to do so.

To speak more in line with what this research suggests about the link between foreign aid and middle power diplomacy, the main reason for their keenness in increasing their foreign aid practices is that development cooperation is one of the niche areas of international politics where they can pursue an active policy. Second, foreign aid enables them to have a global reach where they can connect to the developing world, and at the same time, have a say in addressing international problems. Additionally, they also need to contribute to their economic growth further by involving in foreign aid activities. Therefore, foreign aid is one of the fundamental parts of their middle power approaches.

Thus, the thesis argues that development cooperation increases the international visibility of the two emerging middle powers. Having said that, Korea and Turkey pursue different approaches to development cooperation even though they are both considered emerging middle powers. One should be informed that this research does not conduct an individual level of analysis in foreign policy decision-making, but rather focuses more on state level analysis. While doing so as well, it does not go into detail on the domestic politics of two countries. Therefore, it aims at looking at two states' middle power identities built by certain common aspects, and their reflections on differing foreign aid behaviors.

4.2.2 Two middle powers with two different approaches to foreign aid

What is similar for both middle powers is that they are significant actors in their regions. Moreover, they both stress their development history as aid recipients. This aspect of theirs makes them more in line with emerging donors, rather than only being part of the western camp established by the OECD DAC. Emphasizing being one of the old recipients supports their political and economic goals as well as their foreign aid strategies which have mixed motives, in the sense that they can develop a better approach towards the developing world as well as being able to get access to markets and energy resources. Above all, what differentiates the two middle powers from each other is that their foreign aid behaviors are shaped by different aspects they have:

Korea's successful development story as a recipient is the primary aspect that Korean government highlights, so that Korea can make the claim "learning from experience" while implementing its development programs in recipients. While doing so, Korea also emphasizes its OECD DAC membership as a benchmark for measuring the level of achievement. Thus, Korea distinguishes itself as a development partner, who once was a recipient and achieved being one of the developed one. This distinctive characteristic of Korea differentiates it from both emerging and traditional donors.

The main stress here must be put on its middle power role in shaping its foreign aid behavior. Korea's attempt to distinguish itself is basically to gain more global reach. While doing that, Korea must rely on global characteristics of its development programs rather than adopting a regional or cultural approach. To put it more simply, Korea is an active donor in its region, where the majority of its bilateral ODA still goes to Asian recipients. Obviously, geographical proximity has an impact on Korean development policy. However, if the Korean government talks about having a global reach, its foreign aid must open up to faraway regions. Only that way can Korea become an international actor as an effective aid provider, as well as realize its middle power strategy of going global. Therefore, the research claims that Korea realizes its middle power diplomacy by relying on its own development experience, which is not region- or culture-specific.

In contrast to Korea, Turkey defines its development cooperation more in line with its cultural, linguistic and religious aspects established by its historical ties and links it to a humanitarian approach, by highlighting its humanitarian-sensitive generosity in aid giving. As discussed earlier elsewhere in this study, Turkey has long played a limited global role because of Cold War politics. However, today Turkey pursues a middle power strategy which facilitates its global reach in different regions, with an active foreign aid policy. That is to say, as its geo-political position enables, Turkey is in a better position to reach the developing world in different regions with whom its relations date back to the Ottoman period: As Turkey has linguistic ties with Central Asian Turkic states, it has cultural ties with Balkans, and cultural and religious ties with the MENA region. Moreover, when Turkey cannot combine its approach to one of these three aspects, it easily relies on its humanitarian-sensitive approach, and also by stressing its non-colonial past, as in the case of some Sub-Saharan African and Latin American recipients.

Having said that, Turkey's middle power strategy of becoming a global actor is reachable when Turkey emphasizes its historical aspects that include sharing linguistic, cultural and religious ties, which Turkey combines with its humanitarianism. Therefore, one might argue that the main characteristic of Turkey's foreign aid behavior is shaped by its geographical position, and relatedly its historical ties that enable Turkey to connect many different regions. Different to the Korean case, Turkey's approach towards the developing world constitute cultural, linguistic and religious aspects established by its geographical advantage, because Turkey's development process is not effective when presented as a global development model. Therefore, Turkey's foreign aid behavior tends to be more region- or culture-specific.

Conclusion

All in all, middle powers mainly show cooperative foreign policy behaviors. Therefore, one of the important issue areas of international politics in which they are active contributors is development cooperation. Both Korea and Turkey pursue a

foreign aid policy shaped by their middle power strategies. They claim expertise on development cooperation to show that they are reliable partners pursuing a recipient perspective in development, as well as to differentiate their practice from that of other donors regardless of being traditional or emerging.

My overall assessment of the discussions in this chapter is that Korea and Turkey show similarities stemming from their middle power identities, especially in terms of willing to have active roles in international politics, claiming a moral stance as good global citizens. To realize this claim, both powers reach the developing world through increasing their aid provision. However, the two middle powers differ from each other in terms of their behaviors in foreign aid. The main reason I put forth is that they want to highlight their best qualities as donors. Such an attitude is essential for their global reach through development cooperation, as well as to strengthen their middle power identity and to have a better place in the international system as active players.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this study, I tried to describe middle power behaviors in foreign aid by looking at two case studies of Korea and Turkey under the Middle Power Theories. Traditionally, middle powers show specific characteristics as active players of international politics based on cooperative behavior. Today's middle powers, in this respect, are not different when compared to their traditional counterparts. As the behavioral approach to the theory expects, middle powers engage in international politics by using their soft power, supporting multilateral platforms and following the notion of good global citizenship. By doing so, they play an active role in international mediation, development or peacekeeping.

The thesis focused on development policies of Korea and Turkey. The primary reason is that development cooperation is one of the soft political issue areas of international affairs where the two middle powers pursue their global strategies as their identities require. Therefore, foreign aid policy enables them to be in close cooperation with the developing world, and in a way fulfill their demands of being good global citizens by contributing to the betterment of human lives.

Development policy requires soft power capabilities of the two middle powers in question. That is to say, international development is freed from hard power politics, and gives middle powers flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy strategies shaped by their soft power capabilities. Thus, international development policy can be thought of as a sphere which does not directly involve great power competition, as might be

the case in hard power politics, such as international security, and military affairs. However, it still does not mean that development cooperation is not used as a foreign policy tool to realize some interests of the states. Rather, it involves less risk in the sense that development policy does not pose a direct threat to the national security of states.

Here, it is essential to note that development cooperation should not be considered solely from an altruistic perspective. In this research I argued that both Korea and Turkey as middle powers have mixed motives in foreign aid allocation. That is to say, their development policies are not only altruistic in its essence, but also involve some strategic calculations. For both Korea and Turkey, their recent economic growth is one of the main motivations in increasing their development assistance. It leads them to gain not only international impact through their increasing foreign aid allocation, but also market access. Furthermore, it also strengthens their diplomatic engagements with the developing world. Therefore, foreign aid is an important tool for them to realize their middle power strategies of having a bridging role between the developed and the developing world, as well as of realizing their interests in becoming active players of global affairs.

I argued that Korea and Turkey are emerging middle powers which construct their identities based on the assumptions of the behavioral approach to MPT. Both countries have recently been active players in international development cooperation. The significant point of this thesis suggested that the active involvement of both countries in international development is not only a result of their recent economic growth (i.e. as a result of them being one of the emerging powers/donors), but also as a result of the necessities brought by their middle power identities. That is to say, the construction of a middle power identity requires a country to behave in a certain way. Both countries, in this respect, attribute themselves a global role as middle powers and pursue their foreign aid policies in line with it.

The research question of the thesis revolves around the question of whether Korea and Turkey show similar foreign aid behaviors, since they are both emerging middle powers. In line with the research conducted for this thesis, I suggested that both Korea

and Turkey have a similar approach in constructing their identities and establishing their middle power strategies in development cooperation, yet they differ from each other in discourse. Consequently, the research concluded that the two middle powers show different foreign aid behaviors even though they go through a similar path in constructing their middle power strategies. One might argue that the adaptation of a middle power identity requires certain general behavior and discourse, such as following the notion of good global citizenship. However, the implementation of middle power strategy on a specific policy (development policy) requires a unique discourse.

To briefly look at the findings of the research, Korea pursues its foreign aid policy by relying on the motto of “learning from experience” and introduces its development programs globally. That is to say, Korea does not pursue a regional approach, because it is already an actor in its own region. For Korea to become an effective aid provider, its foreign aid must open up to faraway regions. This is also essential for a middle power strategy that attributes Korea a global role. Therefore, Korea puts emphasis on its development experience, which is not region or culture-specific; but global.

Compared to Korea, Turkey’s humanitarian approach to development cooperation is more in line with cultural, linguistic and religious aspects established by Turkey’s historical ties with the neighboring regions. What makes Turkey’s approach more region and culture-specific is its geopolitical position that combines many different regions from the developing world together with its Ottoman history where Turkey was in constant interaction with them. Therefore, a discourse of cultural, linguistic, and religious proximity makes sense in achieving a global stance for Turkey.

Based on above conclusions, I argue that both Korea and Turkey benefit from their best qualities in order to strengthen their relative position in international politics. That is the main reason why they show similar characteristics in practice, in their discourse of adopting a middle power identity and act accordingly, and also in their foreign aid activism. However, their foreign aid behaviors show differences since they must strategically rely on their capabilities in pursuing a global role as middle powers. In other words, the two middle powers rely on their best practices in order to distinguish

themselves from other powers. When applied to the development policy, Korea and Turkey try to make a unique contribution to international development in order to become qualified and active players of international development policy.

In this thesis I tried to illuminate how Korea and Turkey construct their middle power identities and how their identities affect their foreign aid policy. The conclusion is that middle powers, even though they follow a similar path to construct their identities, do not behave similarly in specific policy areas. All in all, the thesis gives a detailed descriptive analysis, and opens the door for further research.

First of all, the thesis conducts a descriptive analysis of the soft power capabilities of two middle powers in foreign aid giving, and how they construct their identities according to those capabilities. Therefore, the thesis tells us more about the middle power ambition in discourse, but less about to what extent their middle power strategies are effective in increasing their global stance. Therefore, there is still room for a further analysis on the outcome of aid for Korea and Turkey.

As Oğuzlu (2014) argued, having soft power is related to the ability to change outcomes for one's own benefit. Therefore, in order to talk about the use of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool, one should conduct an analysis on whether foreign aid leads to intended outcomes when used as a soft power. For instance, one of the most discussed topics on aid impact is UN voting behaviors of recipients in favor of donors. There has been some research, such as Alesina & Dollar (2000), conducted on favoring the established donors in UN voting. However, middle powers, like Korea and Turkey, were not paid so much attention.

Having discussed how Korea and Turkey behave in foreign aid giving, the intended outcome of the aid should also be emphasized. For instance, some studies argue that one of the reasons of Korea's active involvement in Africa is "to gain political clout through UN voting system" (Soyeun Kim, 2013). Similarly, one of the governmental officials once claimed that Turkey's aid to some poor African countries aimed at obtaining more votes for the temporary membership to the 2008 UNSC elections (Radikal, 2008). In fact, with the votes of African countries, Turkey became a non-

permanent member of the UNSC in 2008. The fact that no country that receives aid from Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus indicates that the link between aid and policy outcomes is quite complex. These examples show the need for further research in this area.

Secondly, during my two year research, I found out that the studies on MIKTA are not enough to talk about a group identity because of it being considered a loose platform. Therefore, the question is raised to what extent MIKTA countries are like-minded. For instance, recently Parlar Dal (2017) talked about a possible alternative development cooperation model of MIKTA which might lead MIKTA to step forward as an institutionalized platform. However, as this study already suggested, at least two relatively important members of MIKTA do not pursue a common strategy in aid giving. In order to better assess this argument, a further study on the foreign aid approaches of MIKTA members is needed.

Above all, it is also necessary that different groups of middle powers be analyzed. In this respect, the MIKTA grouping is a good starting point, but not enough to identify today's emerging middle powers because of not constructing a group identity. Such research would also lead us to be able to make generalization among middle powers regardless of them belonging to a group, like MIKTA. What I can assert about this issue so far is that MIKTA is a useful grouping but does not provide a concrete group identity for those powers. This is because, as this study suggests, two members of MIKTA already have different behavioral approaches to a specific policy area.

All in all, this study aimed at conducting an analysis on emerging powers, namely the second tiers which are mostly neglected in the literature. Moreover, I also tried to combine a relevant theory (MPT) with the recent discussions on rising powers in order to categorize some of the second tiers in a specific group of powers, i.e. middle powers. The overall argument of the thesis has shown that middle powers, regardless of them being effective or not, are important parties to global politics since the Cold War period and will continue to be so.

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APPENDICES

A: Curriculum Vitae

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Baydağ, Rena Melis
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MSc	METU International Relations	2017
BSc	METU International Relations	2014
High School	Ankara Atatürk Lisesi	2009

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2017 Feb-Apr	German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn, Germany	Research Intern
2013 Jan-Feb	Embassy of Luxembourg, Ankara, Turkey	Intern (Political Affairs)
2012 Oct-Dec	Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, Turkey	Research Intern

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English (C1), German (B2), French (B2), Spanish (B1), Italian (A1)

PROJECTS

METU Scientific Research Project, Oct 1-14, 2016
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Project title: “South Korean Foreign Aid and its Middle Power Diplomacy”

PRESENTATIONS

European Workshops in International Studies 2017
Cardiff, United Kingdom

Presented paper «Middle Powers and International Development Architecture: The Cases of Turkey and Korea» in the Workshop New Frontiers in International Development Assistance: Interdisciplinary Explorations of Financing Sustainable Development, held in Jun 7–10, 2017

B: Interview Questionnaire – Korea

1. What are the motives of South Korea's development cooperation?
2. What are the preferred aid modalities (bilateral or multilateral channels, in-kind or cash contributions) and why are they preferred? What are the percentages of grants and loans and tied aid?
3. Which are the main areas, sectors in Korea's development cooperation activities?
4. Who are the partner countries and priority regions?
5. What are the considerations in the selection of partner countries?
6. Could you tell more specifically about the Saemaul Undong as a development model?
7. How does Korea's past experience as a recipient affect its development cooperation?
8. What are the expected development outcomes?

Organizational structure and implementation of development programs

9. Which institutions and state organizations are in charge of the implementation of development cooperation?
10. How is the organizational structure of them? What are their capabilities and scope of authority? Which internal legal, fiscal and policy documents guide the process?
11. What are the main principles and strategies for development cooperation?
12. What are the roles of partnership with private sector and NGOs in development cooperation?
13. How does the government define its development cooperation policy in terms of relationship with the recipient?

To put it differently, where does Korean government place itself?

Does the Korean government consider its practice of development cooperation as a part of the western-model (traditional) or as a part of the south-south cooperation (mutual benefit, win-win situation, non-intervention)?

14. How does the Korean concept of development cooperation differ from that of established donors?
15. To what extent/how does OECD DAC membership effect the policy-making and implementation of Korea's development cooperation?
16. Are there any conditionalities attached to development cooperation in terms of democracy promotion, good governance and rule of law?

17. Is there any ease, and/or impediment that emerges from complying with OECD principles and rules on development assistance?
18. Korean former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Sung-Hwan Kim defined on February 2013 Korea as a "middle power". How would you evaluate this definition?
19. Compared to other middle powers, is there any specific characteristic unique to Korea?
20. What is the role of soft power in Korean middle power diplomacy?
21. What is the role of development cooperation in middle power diplomacy?
22. How would you explain innovative partnership that Korean government is to build?
23. Which regional and international bodies is Korea actively participating in?
24. How important is to create link between developed and developing world?
25. Could you evaluate Korea in terms of "good international citizenship"?
26. What is the role of groupings with other middle powers (such as MIKTA) and forums (such as G20) in realizing its foreign policy?

Follow-up questions

27. How would you differentiate Korea from other rising/emerging donors, i.e. BRICS?
 28. Do BRICS play any role in Korea's development cooperation policy?
- Can more and more involvement of rising powers in development cooperation be considered as a motive for Korea to increase foreign assistance?*
- Some scholars consider Korea as a part of the south-south cooperation. Are foreign relations with China and other emerging donors determinant factor in putting Korea into south-south cooperation?*
29. With its DAC membership, does Korea play any role in building link between western and non-western donors?
 30. Is there any political/economic competition among emerging donors in which Korea is involved?
 31. According to some critics, Korea's involvement in developing countries, especially in Africa, can be explained by energy and resource security policy. To what extent do you agree?
 32. What is the role of private sector in increasing investments and building trade partnership with the recipients, other than development cooperation?

33. To what extent is Korean government supportive in increasing trade partnership?
34. Considering development cooperation as "soft power", to what extent is Korea's development cooperation effective in realizing its middle power diplomacy; i.e. foreign policy?

C: Interview Questionnaire – Turkey

1. What are the motives of Turkey's development cooperation?
2. What are the preferred aid modalities (bilateral or multilateral channels, in-kind or cash contributions) and why are they preferred? What are the percentages of grants and loans and tied aid?
3. Which are the main areas, sectors in Turkey's development cooperation activities?
4. Who are the partner countries and priority regions?
5. What are the considerations in the selection of partner countries?
6. Is there any development model?
7. What is so-called humanitarian approach in Turkey's development cooperation?
8. What are the expected development outcomes?
9. Which institutions and state organizations are in charge of the implementation of development cooperation?
10. What is the role of TIKA in decision-making processes?
11. How is the division of labor among different institutions; such as AFAD, MOFA, Ministry of Development, and Presidency for Turks abroad and related communities?
12. How is the organizational structure of them? What are their capabilities and scope of authority? Which internal legal, fiscal and policy documents guide the process?
13. What are the main principles and strategies for development cooperation?
14. What are the roles of partnership with private sector and NGOs?
15. Where does TIKA see itself in the international system?
16. How does the government define its development cooperation policy in terms of relationship with the recipient?
To put it differently, where does Turkish government place itself?
Does the Turkish government consider its practice of development cooperation as a part of the western-model (traditional) or as a part of the south-south cooperation (mutual benefit, win-win situation, non-intervention)?
17. How does the Turkish concept of development cooperation differ from that of established donors?
18. To what extent/how does OECD membership affect the policy-making and implementation of Turkey's development cooperation?

19. Are there any conditionalities attached to development cooperation in terms of democracy promotion, good governance and rule of law?
20. Is there any ease, and/or impediment that emerges from complying with OECD principles and rules on development assistance?
21. How would you evaluate Turkey as a middle power?
22. Compared to other middle powers, is there any specific characteristic unique to Turkey?
23. What is the role of development cooperation in middle power diplomacy?
24. Which regional and international bodies is Turkey actively participating in?
25. How important is to create link between developed and developing world?
26. Could you evaluate Turkey in terms of "good international citizenship"?
27. What is the role of groupings with other middle powers (such as MIKTA) and forums (such as G20) in realizing its foreign policy?
28. How active is Turkey in MIKTA grouping? Are there any projects in which Turkey takes part regarding development cooperation?

Follow-up questions

29. How would you differentiate Turkey from other rising/emerging donors, i.e. BRICS?

30. Do BRICS play any role in Turkey's development cooperation policy?

Can more and more involvement of rising powers in development cooperation be considered as a motive for Turkey to increase foreign assistance?

Some scholars consider Turkey as a part of the south-south cooperation. Are foreign relations with other emerging donors determinant factor in putting Turkey into SSDC?

31. Is there any political/economic competition among emerging donors in which Turkey is involved?

32. According to some critics, emerging donors' involvements, especially in Africa, can be explained by political and strategic motives, or trade. Considering Turkey, to what extent do you agree?

33. To what extent is Turkish government supportive in increasing trade partnership?

34. What is the role of private sector in increasing investments and building trade partnership with the recipients, other than development cooperation?

35. Considering development cooperation as "soft power", to what extent is Turkey's development cooperation effective in realizing its middle power diplomacy; i.e. foreign policy?

D: Turkish Summary/Türkçe Özet

Giriş

Bu çalışma orta büyüklükte güçler olan Güney Kore (buradan sonra Kore olarak adlandırılacaktır) ve Türkiye'nin karşılaştırmalı bir incelemesidir. Orta büyüklükteki güç teorileri yumuşak gücün orta büyüklükteki güç diplomasisinde önemli bir unsur olduğuna dikkat çeker. Bu sebeptendir ki bu güçlerin dış politika davranışları genel olarak işbirlikçidir. Bu tez orta büyüklükteki güçlerin dış yardım politikalarını bir yumuşak güç unsuru olarak kullanılabilmeleri açısından incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Kore ve Türkiye dış yardım politikalarını orta büyüklükteki güç kimliklerine göre inşa etmekte ve kendi faaliyetlerini geçmişlerinde dış yardım alan ülke olmalarına vurgu yaparak diğer geleneksel ve yükselen güçlerden ayırmaktadır.

Kore ve Türkiye günümüz orta büyüklükteki güçleri olarak adlandırılırsalar bile, kalkınma işbirliği yaklaşımları birbirinden farklılık göstermektedir. Kore OECD Kalkınma Yardımları Komitesi (DAC) üyesiyken, Türkiye ise belirli bir yakınlaşmadan sonra OECD DAC dışında kalmayı seçmiştir. Yine de iki ülke de kalkınma işbirliği partnerleri olarak kendilerine özgü bir karaktere sahip olduklarını vurgulamakta, böylece geleneksel ve diğer yükselen donörlerden ayrı bir görüntü çizmeyi hedeflemektedirler. Bu çalışma, onların bu yaklaşımını orta büyüklükte güç kimliklerinin bir gerekliliği olarak düşünmektedir. Bu bağlamda iki ülke de en iyi özelliklerini öne çıkararak uluslararası platformda saygın bir yer edinmeyi amaçlar.

Kore dış yardımlarında "tecrübelerden öğrenmek" mottosunu vurgularken, Türkiye insani bir güç olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bunu yaparken de tarihi, kültürel ve dini yakınlık gibi, Türkiye'nin Osmanlı geçmişinden kalan unsurları öne çıkarmaktadır. Bu sebeple, bu tezin ana fikri Kore ve Türkiye'nin orta büyüklükte güçler olarak benzer özellikler gösterse bile, dış yardım davranışlarında farklılıklar olduğudur.

Bu çalışmanın temel savı iki soru çevresinde oluşmaktadır: (i) orta büyüklükteki güçler kimliklerini nasıl inşa ederler? ve (ii) Orta büyüklükteki güç kimliğinin kalkınma dış yardımları üzerinde ne derece/nasıl bir etkisi vardır? Bu bağlamda Kore ve Türkiye

karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışması olarak incelenecektir. Bundan yola çıkarak, tez "Kore ve Türkiye dış yardımlarda nasıl bir davranış sergilemektedir?" araştırma sorusunu sorar. Bu tez betimleyici bir çerçevede iki orta büyüklükteki gücü dış yardım davranışları açısından analiz etmeyi hedefler. Araştırma için gerekli veriler resmi makamlar ve uzmanlarla gerçekleştirilecek mülakatlar ile ikinci derece kaynaklardan gelecektir.

Uluslararası sistemde değişim: Yükselen güçler

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında uluslararası sistemde önemli güç kaymaları meydana gelmektedir. Yükselen güçler üzerine tartışmaları BRIC ülkeleriyle başlatmak mümkündür. BRIC kısaltması - Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan ve Çin - ilk olarak 2001'de Goldman Sachs'ın raporunda İngiliz ekonomist Jim O'Neill tarafından yapılmış ve bu dört ülkenin toplam ekonomisinin 2050 yılına kadar Amerika Birleşik Devletler ve Japonya ile dört Avrupa ülkesi Almanya, Fransa, İtalya ve İngiltere'nin toplam ekonomisini geçeceğini iddia etmiştir (O'Neill, 2001). Bu tarihten itibaren BRIC'ler batı-dışı güçler olarak uluslararası arenada ekonomik ve politik etkililiğini arttırmışlardır. Bu etkililik günümüzde BRIC Zirvesi düzenlemeye kadar ilerlemiş, liderlerin düzenli bir araya geldiği bir platform halini almıştır. Bazı akademisyenler, BRIC'lerin "siyasi bir kimlik" olarak küresel sistemi domine eden batı hegemonyasına karşıt bir güç oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır (Fues, Chaturvedi, & Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 141).

Yükselen güçler üzerine tartışmaları onların büyümekte olan ekonomileri üzerinden almak yanlış olmaz. Brezilya ve Hindistan gibi bölgesel güçlerin hızlı bir şekilde büyüyen sermayeleri uluslararası sistemi şekillendiren önemli sonuçlar doğurmuştur (Stephen, 2012). Örneğin Florini (2011), Çin ve Hindistan gibi yükselen güçlerin uluslararası arenada artık kurallara uyan ülkeler olmaksızın kural koyucu ülkeler olmak istemelerini vurgularken (s. 25), Jacobs & Van Rossem (2014) bunu bu devletlerin uluslararası kurum ve kuruluşlarda siyasi ağırlıklarını ortaya koyma isteklerine bağlamıştır (s. 59).

Yukarıda belirtilenlerden yola çıkarak, BRIC ülkelerini dört kategoride incelemek mümkündür: Öncelikle, BRIC ülkeleri geleneksel güçlere karşı küresel yönetim ve güç dengelerinin yeniden oluşturulması konusunda zorlayıcı bir unsur teşkil eder (Ferguson, 2015; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012; Schirm, 2012). Schirm'in tartıştığı gibi (2010), yükselen güçler uluslararası sistemde daha avantajlı bir konuma sahip olmayı amaçlarken, uluslararası siyasi kurumların meşruluğunu sorgulamakta, ve bunların ne derecede eşit temsil gücüne sahip olduğunu tartışmaktadır. İkinci olarak, yükselen güçler uluslararası sistemde çok yönlülüğü savunarak, bunu bir norm olarak öne çıkartmak istemektedir. Bu istekleri onların küresel siyasette daha etkin bir rol oynamasına zemin hazırlamaktadır. Üçüncü ve bir önceki ile bağlantılı olarak, BRIC ülkeleri başta olmak üzere yükselen güçlerin sistemin aktif bir parçası olmak isteyen güçler olarak da tanımlamak mümkündür. Son olarak, yükselen güçler günümüz uluslararası sorunlarının önemli katılımcılarıdır (Grimm et al., 2009). Bu anlamda, bu güçlerden uluslararası toplumu kamusal malları temin etmede desteklemesi beklenmektedir (Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016, p. 499).

Uluslararası sorunlara değinmede kalkınma dış yardımları yükselen güç politikasının önemli bir parçasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu manada yükselen güçlerden beklenen, aktif bir rol oynayarak küresel kalkınmaya katkı sağlamalarıdır. BRIC ülkelerinin bu kaygıyı taşıdığını söylemek yerinde olacaktır. Buna ek olarak, yükselen güçler kalkınma yardımlarını kendi çıkarlarını gözetmede önemli bir araç olarak kullandığı söylenebilir. Okano-Heijmans'a göre (2012), dış yardımın bir dış politika aracı olarak kullanılması bu ülkelerin ekonomik ve ticari çıkarlarına katkı sağlamaktadır (s. 270). Böylece, kalkınma işbirliğinin basit “yardım alan ülke-donör ilişkisi” olarak görmekten çok, ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkileri güçlendirmede bir araç olarak görmek daha doğru olur.

Bu bağlamda yükselen güçlerin kalkınma işbirliğindeki davranışlarını anlamlandırmamızda Güney-Güney Kalkınma İşbirliği bir yumuşak güç aracı olarak önemli bir kavram haline gelmiştir (Mathur, 2014). Özetle, Güney-Güney İşbirliği'ni kalkınma hedeflerini karşılayan “bilgi, yetenek, uzmanlık ya da kaynak paylaşımı” olarak betimlemek mümkündür (UNOSSC, n.d.). Bu yaklaşım geleneksel batı tarzı

kalkınma işbirliğine (OECD DAC ile ortaya çıkan) de bir eleştiri teşkil etmektedir (Muggah & Pasarelli Hamann, 2012). Bu bağlamda kalkınmakta ülkelere daha fazla seçme şansı vererek bir alternatif teşkil etmesi de söz konusudur (Holden, 2015). Bu yüzdendir ki bazı akademisyenlere göre, yükselen güçleri geleneksel batı tipi kalkınma işbirliği sistemine bir meydan okuma olarak okunabilir (Chin & Quadir, 2013).

BRIC'ler uluslararası sistemdeki kaymaları başlatan önemli aktörler olarak düşünülebilir. Ancak literatürde sıkça tartışılmakta olup, ikinci derecede yükselen güçler üzerine yapılan vurguyu azaltmaktadır. Bu çalışma, ikinci derece yükselen güçler üzerine bir çalışma olup, küresel sistemde nasıl bir rol oynadıklarına ışık tutmayı hedefler. Bu güçler genel olarak literatürde ikinci derece yükselen güçler olarak adlandırılırken, "bir sonraki derece" (Chin & Quadir, 2013); ya da yükselen orta dereceli ekonomiler (Çağaptay, 2013), olarak da adlandırılabilir. Bu güçler BRIC ülkelerine nazaran ekonomik ve siyasi açıdan daha küçük ölçekli, bölgesel olarak önemli güçlerdir. Jeopolitik konumları onları özellikle süper güçlerle olan ilişkileri açısından önemli bir konuma yükseltir. Bu yüzdendir ki BRIC'ler gibi onlarda kısaltmalarla kategorize edilmeye başlanmıştır: Next Eleven (N-11) (Bangladeş, Mısır, Endonezya, İran, Meksika, Nijerya, Pakistan, Filipinler, Türkiye, Güney Kore ve Vietnam), MINT (Meksika, Endonezya, Nijerya ve Türkiye), MIKTA (Meksika, Endonezya, Kore, Türkiye and Avusturalya) ya da CIVETS (Kolombiya, Endonezya, Vietnam, Mısır, Türkiye and Güney Afrika).

Yukarıda verilen ön bilgiye göre, uluslararası sistemdeki kaymaları başlatan yükselen güçleri BRIC'ler ve BRIC benzeri ikinci derece yükselen güçler olarak almak mümkündür. BRIC'ler üzerine yapılan vurgu küresel ölçekli değişimler ve bunların sebeplerine değinmek için olsa da, bu çalışmanın temelini ikinci derece yükselen güçler oluşturmaktadır. Bu güçler arasında özellikle Kore ve Türkiye'yi karşılaştırmalı olarak alan tez, bu iki ülkeyi orta büyüklükteki güç teorisi üzerinden incelemeyi hedefler.

Orta büyüklükteki güç diplomasisi

Orta büyüklükteki güçleri bağımsız olan aktörler kadar etkili ve güçlü olmayan, yine de daha zayıf güçlere göre uluslararası sistemde belirli ölçüde birlik ve istikrarı sağlayan güçler olarak adlandırmak mümkündür (Chapnick, 1999; Glazebrook, 1947; Jordaan, 2003). Bu güçler benzer kapasite ve güce sahip olan güçler ya da daha zayıf güçlerle ortak eylemde etkilidirler (Da Silva, Spohr, & da Silveira, 2016). Buna ek olarak, etkililiklerini uluslararası örgütler vasıtasıyla da ortaya koyabilirler (Flemes & Habib, 2009). Bu sebeple, genel olarak G20 veya MIKTA gibi gruplarla adlandırılırlar.

Orta büyüklükteki güç teorisini üç yaklaşımda incelemek mümkündür: Hiyerarşik yaklaşım orta büyüklükteki güçleri materyalist açıdan - büyüklük, ekonomi, askeri güç, nüfus - gibi özelliklere göre kategorize ederek; orta büyüklükteki güçleri devletler hiyerarşisinde orta pozisyonda konumlandırır. Fonksiyonel yaklaşım orta büyüklükteki güçlerin küresel sistemde bazı siyasi alanlardaki fonksiyonel özelliklerine değinir. Bu siyasi alanlar özellikle yumuşak güç kullanılmasını gerektiren alanlar olup - kalkınma işbirliği, çevre, insan hakları gibi - bu güçlerin fonksiyonel özelliklerini ortaya koyduğu "niş diplomasi" olarak da adlandırılmaktadır. Davranışsal yaklaşım ise, orta büyüklükteki güçleri kimliklerini kendilerine ahlaki bir özellik atfederek oluşturan, uluslararası sistemde "iyi dünya vatandaşı" olarak davranan devletler olarak vurgular. Bu yüzden ki orta büyüklükteki devlet diplomasisi daha çok işbirlikçi ve arabulucu olarak öngörülür.

Bu çalışma orta büyüklükteki güçleri davranışsal açıdan incelemektedir. Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal'a göre (1993), orta büyüklükteki güçler karakterlerini uluslararası sorunlara çok yönlü çözümler bulma üzerinden inşa eder (p. 19). Başka bir deyişle, orta büyüklükte güçler ara bulucu karakterleriyle "iyi dünya vatandaşı" profili çizmektedir (Cooper et al., 1993). Bu bağlamda, kalkınma işbirliği küresel sorunları çözmeye önemli bir rol oynar.

Kalkınma dış yardımları ve orta büyüklükteki güç ilişkisi

Güney Kore

1950 Kore savaşı Güney Kore'deki milli üretim gücünün 3'te 2'sini yok ederek Güney Kore'yi dünyanın en fakir ülkeleri arasına soktu. 1950'li yıllar boyunca dış yardımlar tek gelir kaynağı olarak barınma, yiyecek, sağlık gibi temel ihtiyaçları karşılamada kullanıldı (KOICA). 1960'lara gelindiğinde dış yardımlar sermaye ve yatırımın temel kaynağı haline geldi. Bu sayede Güney Kore endüstri teknolojisi ve yönetim becerileri gibi konularda gelişme göstermeye başladı. Soğuk savaş yıllarını kapsayan bu dönemde, Güney Kore için temel kalkınma yardımı başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri olmak üzere Uluslararası Kalkınma Birliği (IDA), Birleşmiş Milletler Kalkınma Programı (UNDP), Dünya Bankası, Asya Kalkınma Bankası, USAID ve Japonya merkezli Denizaşırı Ekonomik İşbirliği Fonu (OECD) gibi uluslararası örgütler tarafından yapılmaktaydı. 1997 – 98 ekonomik krizini atlatan Güney Kore, kendisine yapılan dış yardımları etkili bir biçimde kullanarak günümüzün en güçlü 11. ekonomisi oldu ve gemi, çelik, otomobil gibi sanayilerin en önemli merkezlerinden biri haline geldi.

Güney Kore'nin dış yardım alan ülke konumundan Kalkınma Yardımları Komitesi (DAC) ülkeleri arasına katılması literatürde Güney Kore'ye özgü bir başarı öyküsü olarak yer almaktadır. Bunun en büyük sebebi ise, en fakir ülkeler arasından gelip G-20'deki 11. en iyi ekonomi olarak yerini almış olmasıdır. Kim'e göre (2011), Güney Kore hükümeti soğuk savaş yıllarında alınan dış yardımları etkili bir biçimde kullanarak ülkenin karşılaştığı krizleri kolay atlatmasını sağlamıştır. Bunun sonucunda ise ekonomik büyüme sağlanabilmiştir. Bu başarının en önemli sebeplerinden biri ise iyi yönetim ve dış yardımlar ile ekonomik büyüme arasındaki pozitif ilişkidir (s. 282).

Kalkınma alanında gösterdiği başarı dolayısıyla, literatürde "Güney Kore modeli" ortaya çıktı. Bununla birlikte Güney Kore gelişmekte olan ülkelere yaptığı kalkınma yardımlarında kendi deneyimlerinden yola çıkan bir dış politika uygulamaya başladı. Güney Kore'nin yardımları genel olarak üç özellikten oluştuğu söylenebilir: (1) OECD

DAC standartlarına uygun, (2) Güney Kore'nin kendi kalkınma deneyimine uygun ve (3) günümüzdeki kalkınmakta olan ülkelerin yürüttüğü küresel siyasi iktisat kontekstine uygun (E. M. Kim et al., 2013, s. 331).

Yukarıdakilere karşıt bir görüş olarak bir kesim akademisyene göre ise, Güney Kore modeli gelişmekte olan ülkelere bir ilham kaynağı olsa da, günümüz şartlarının soğuk savaş yıllarından farklı olması Kore kalkınma modelinin uygulanabilirliğini sorgulatmaktadır (Watsons, 2012, s. 87).

Güney Kore'nin 2010 yılında OECD DAC ülkeleri arasına katılmasıyla dış yardım alan ülke konumundan dış yardım yapan ülke statüsüne yükselmesi, Kore'nin orta büyüklükte güç olarak uluslararası platformda etkin bir diplomasi izleyen ülke haline gelmesiyle doğru orantılıdır. Bunu takiben, Kore 2010 yılında G-20 zirvesine, 2011 yılında High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4)'a ev sahipliği yapmıştır. OECD'nin raporuna göre, Kore'nin uluslararası kalkınma işbirliği adına atmış olduğu adımlar onun dış politikasının önemli bir parçasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu sebeple, Kore küresel barış ve kalkınmaya katkıda bulunarak aslında uluslararası toplum ile daha yakın ilişkiler geliştirmektedir (OECD, 2012, s. 26).

Bu açıdan bakıldığında, uluslararası yardımın bir dış politika aracı olarak kullanıldığı söylenebilir. Buna ek olarak, Güney Kore Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile olan ve 1945'ten bu yana süregelen ikili ilişkilerini de ekonomik işbirliği çerçevesinde daha da güçlendirmiştir. Bölgedeki bir diğer güç olan Çin'e baktığımızda ise, 2008 yılından bu yana yapmış olduğu stratejik işbirliği ile karşılıklı ilişkilerini pozitif çıkara bağlamıştır (Sung-han, 2012, p. 3). Güney Kore'nin yürüttüğü dış politika kendisinin orta büyüklükte bir devlet olarak kabul edilmesinde etken rol oynar. O'Neill'e göre (2015), Güney Kore'nin gelişmekte olan ülke statüsünden gelişmiş ülke statüsüne ve otoriter devlet düzeninden demokratik devlet düzenine geçmiş olması Güney Kore'nin siyasi elitler tarafından orta büyüklükte güç olarak adlandırılmasında bir geçerlilik oluşturmaktadır (s. 82). Roehrig'e göre ise (2013), Güney Kore'nin kalkınma yardımlarını artırması ve de Birleşmiş Milletler barış koruma harekâtlarında aktif bir şekilde rol alması orta büyüklükte bir güç olarak ortaya çıkmasında büyük rol oynar (s. 625).

Yukarıdaki tartışma bize Kore'nin iki önemli özelliğinden bahsetmektedir: Öncelikle Kore orta büyüklükte bir güçtür. Teoriden de yola çıkarak söylenebilir ki, Kore'nin dış politika stratejisinde orta büyüklükteki güç kimliği rol oynamaktadır. İkinci olarak ise, Kore'nin yumuşak güç olarak dış yardım politikasını daha da geliştirdiğini görüyoruz.

Türkiye

1940'larda Türkiye kalkınma yardımı alan bir ülkeydi. 1947'de ilan edilen Truman Doktrini ile Türkiye Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Marshall Yardımlarından faydalanmaya başladı. (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008). Amerika ile olan işbirliği Türkiye'nin batı kampında yerini almasıyla daha da güçlenerek günümüze kadar süregelen ABD-Türkiye stratejik işbirliğinin de gelişmesine katkı sağladı (Fidan & Nurdun, 2008, pp. 98-99). Türkiye'nin 1950'lerdeki ekonomik kalkınmasında dış yardımların rolü büyüktür.

Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılması Türkiye'nin kalkınma dış yardımları politikasında bir dönüm noktası oluşturmaktadır. Türkiye bu dönemde bağımsızlıklarına yeni kavuşan Orta Asya ve Kafkaslardaki Türki cumhuriyetlere dış yardım da bulunmuştur (Dal, 2014, p. 111). Türkiye'nin bu bölgedeki dış politikası temelde bu ülkelerin bağımsızlıklarını destekleyerek, onların sisteme daha iyi entegre olabilmelerini hedeflemiştir (Ametbek & Amirbek, 2014, p. 191). Böylece, Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı (TİKA) Dış İşleri'ne bağlı olarak 1992 yılında kurulmuş, bu ülkelerin Sovyetlerden ayrılmasıyla oluşan kalkınma ihtiyaçlarını karşılamayı hedeflemiştir (TİKA, n.d.).

Bazı akademisyenlere göre, TİKA'nın kuruluşu Türkiye'nin inşacı anlayışla hareket eden dış politika stratejisinin bir sonucudur (T. Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012). Dal'a göre ise (2014), Türkiye'nin o bölgede orta büyüklükteki güç potansiyelini ortaya koymada büyük bir fırsat olarak nitelendirilmiştir (p. 111). O yıllarda, TİKA sürdürülebilir bir sosyal yapı inşa etmede ve de yeni bağımsızlıklarına kavuşan bu ülkelerin kendi kimliklerini kazanmada teknik altyapı desteği sağlamıştır (TİKA, n.d.).

2000'lerden beri Türkiye daha iddialı bir dış yardım politikası arayışına girmiş, bu ise Türkiye'nin kalkınma işbirliği politikası yöneliminde önemli değişikliklere sebep olmuştur. Bu sayede Türkiye Orta-Asya odaklı kalkınma işbirliği anlayışını çok odaklı bölgeler şeklinde değiştirmiştir (Apaydin, 2012, p. 268). Buna paralel olarak, TİKA da etki alanını genişleterek 200'de 12 olan ofis sayısını 201'de 33'e yükseltti (TIKA, n.d.). Günümüzde TİKA 56 ofis ile 54 ülkede kalkınma işbirliği faaliyetleri yürütmektedir (TIKA, n.d.).

Türkiye'nin aktif dış yardım politikası izlemesinde iki temel sebep söylenebilir: Bir yandan Türkiye yükselen güçlerden biri olarak hızlı bir ekonomik büyüme sergilerken, diğer yandan dış yardımda diğer birçok ülkeyi de kapsayan küresel bir trend gözlemlenmektedir (Ş. Kardeş, 2013b): Öncelikle, Türkiye ekonomik büyümesiyle daha güçlü bir ülke haline gelmiştir diyebiliriz. Dünyada G20 üyesi olan 18. en büyük ekonomiye sahiptir. Bir başka deyişle, Türkiye ekonomisi 2003-2012 yılları arasında yıllık ortalama yüzde 5 büyüme göstermiştir (Hausmann, 2014, p.5). İkinci olarak, Türkiye de yükselen diğer geleneksel olmayan ülkeler gibi dış yardımlarını stratejik bir çerçevede arttırarak, daha çok çıkar amaçlı olması ile ilgili bazı eleştirilere maruz kalmaktadır (Ozkan, 2013, p. 140). Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin dış yardım politikası orta büyüklükte bir güç olarak daha stratejik bir şekilde kullandığı söylenebilir.

Bazı çalışmalara göre ise Türkiye'nin dış yardımları geleneksel donörlerden çok farklılık göstermemektedir (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye'nin dış yardım politikası özgecil ve stratejiktir. Bunu Türkiye'nin OECD üyesi olmasıyla ilişkilendirebiliriz. Resmi söylemlerde ise TİKA Türkiye'nin dış yardım politikasını "dostane, fraternal ve işbirlikçi" olarak nitelendirmektedir (TIKA, n.d.). Buradan yola çıkarak, Türkiye'nin çizdiği orta büyüklükteki güç profili, dış yardım politikasıyla paralellik göstermektedir. Türkiye'nin ahlaki sorumluluk taşıyan, küresel sorunlara duyarlı bir insani güç olması bu savı güçlendirmektedir.

Kore ve Türkiye'nin dış yardım davranışları

Kore'nin dış yardım politikasını şekillendiren iki önemli unsur vardır: Kore OECD Kalkınma Yardımları Komitesi üyeliği ve geçmişte dış yardım alan bir ülke olması. OECD DAC sisteminin bir parçası olması Kore'nin küresel statüsünü yükselten bir etkidir. O'Neil'in dediği gibi (2015) Kore'nin OECD DAC üyeliği onun en az gelişmiş yardım alan ülke statüsünden gelişmiş yardım yapan ülkeler seviyesine geçişini vurgulaması açısından önemlidir (s. 85). Başka bir deyişle, bu üyelik Kore'ye gelişmiş ülke olarak tanınma şansını vermiştir (Chun, Munyi, & Lee, 2010). Buna ek olarak, Kore'nin değişik platformlarda, G20 Zirvesi ya da Busan GPEDC gibi, küresel bir rol oynamasını kolaylaştırıcı etkiye sahiptir. Buna ek olarak, OECD DAC üyeliği Kore için bir başarı ölçüsü olmakla beraber, yardım alan ülkelere ulaşmada önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Kore Dış İşleri Bakanlığı'nın da değindiği gibi, Kore "gelişmiş ülkeye dönüşmüş bir dış yardım alan ülkedir" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFAT) Korea, n.d.). Bu sebeptendir ki, Kore'nin donör ülke olma statüsüne erişmesi ve Kore'nin geçmişinde dış yardım alan ülke olması Kore'yi diğer donör ülkelere ayıran iki önemli unsurdur.

Kore'nin kendi kalkınma tecrübesi ve bunun sayesinde oluşturduğu kendine özgü mottosu olan "tecrübelerden öğrenmek" anlayışı dış yardım alan ülkelerle ilişkisini belirlemede önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Öncelikle, Kore bu sayede kendini geleneksel güçlerden farklılaştırmayı başarmıştır. Buna ek olarak Kore DAC üyeliğine vurgu yaparak da diğer yükselen güçlerden kendini ayırmaktadır. Bunun en önemli sebebi ise şudur: Kore bu sayede uluslararası kalkınma işbirliğinde ayırt edici bir rol oynayabilir. Bunu yaparken de kendini bir zamanlar aynı tecrübeleri paylaşmış, dış yardım alan bir ülke olmasıyla tanıtarak gelişmekte olan ülkelere yakınlığını vurgulamaktadır. Böylece, Kore deneyimi alternatif olarak gösterilebilir.

Türkiye'ye baktığımızda ise onun Güney-Güney İşbirliği ile OECD DAC donörleri arasında bir çizgide olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Türkiye uluslararası platformda kalkınma yardımları yönetişimi konularında aktif bir rol oynamaktadır. OECD Kalkınma Yardımları Komitesi'ne gözlemci statüsünde üye olmasının yanı sıra, OECD'ye

kalkınma yardımlarını düzenli olarak rapor etmektedir (Hausmann & Lundsgaarde, 2015). Resmi söylemlere bakıldığında, EKLE

Türkiye, OECD DAC üyeliği ile ilgili kendisine atılan adımları cevapsız bırakmaktadır. Bundan yola çıkarak, OECD DAC üyeliğini Türkiye'nin dış yardımlarında siyasi alanını sınırlandırmak olarak algılandığını söyleyebiliriz. Yine de Türkiye uluslararası arenada itibarını ve tanınırlığını arttırmak adına OECD DAC sisteminden tamamen ayrılmayı seçmemiştir. Prensip, Türkiye "Üçüncü Dünya" bir batı-dışı söylemde bulunmasa da, var olan DAC sisteminden kendini farklılaştırma yoluna gitmiştir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye kendini bir zamanlar ekonomik kalkınmanın zorlu yanlarını tecrübe etmiş ve bu sebeple de kalkınmakta olan ülkeleri daha iyi anlayan bir konumda olan bir ülke olarak sunmaktadır.

Sonuç

Literatürdeki tartışmalardan da yola çıkarak, bu çalışma Kore ve Türkiye orta büyüklükte güçler olarak adlandırmaktadır. Buna paralel olarak iki ülkenin orta büyüklükteki güç niteliklerinin dış yardım davranışları üzerinde önemli bir etkisi bulunmaktadır. Bu açıdan iki ülke de Güney Güney İşbirliği yaklaşımına dâhil olmak yerine kendilerini ana akım dış yardım uygulamalarına daha yakın olarak konumlandırmaktadırlar. Ancak bunu yaparken de kendilerini OECD-DAC üyelerinden de farklılaştırmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Kore bunu kendi kalkınma tecrübesini geliştirmekte olan ülkelere aktarmak olarak gerçekleştirirken, Türkiye daha çok insani güç olması üzerine vurgu yaparak yardım yaptığı ülkeler ile tarihi, kültürel ve dini yakınlığını geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma iki orta büyüklükteki gücün kalkınma dış yardımlarında farklı davranışsal özellikler göstermesini ise şöyle açıklamaktadır: Kore ve Türkiye orta büyüklükteki güç diplomasisi gereği uluslararası alanda kendilerinin en iyi olduğu özellikleri göstermek zorundadır. Aksi takdirde orta büyüklükteki güç iddialarını gerçekleştiremezler.

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Soyadı : BAYDAĞ

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Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

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