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Coordinates: 35°18′04″N 75°44′40″E / 35.3010°N 75.74434°E / 35.3010; 75.74434
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== Prelude ==
== Prelude ==


During the [[Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948]] , specifically at the [[Siege of Skardu]], Colonel Sher Jung Thapa belonging to state forces, he and his garrison successfully held off the Gilgit Scouts,<ref name=":0">{{Harvb|Palit|1972|p=231}} :</ref> which were a [[paramilitary]] force within the [[Gilgit Baltistan|Gilgit-Baltistan]] region in northern Pakistan. Colonel Thapa repeatedly requested reinforcements from the headquarters in Srinagar.<ref name=":0" /> After receiving previous support, another relief column, codenamed "Biscuit column", was dispatched, this time led by Brigadier Faqir Singh of the State forces.<ref name=":1">{{Harvb|Prasad|1987|p=288}} :</ref>
During the [[Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948]] , specifically at the [[Siege of Skardu]], Colonel Sher Jung Thapa belonging to state forces, he and his garrison successfully held off the Gilgit Scouts,<ref name=":0">{{Harvb|Palit|1972|p=231}} :</ref> which were a [[paramilitary]] force within the [[Gilgit Baltistan|Gilgit-Baltistan]] region in northern Pakistan. Colonel Thapa repeatedly requested reinforcements from the headquarters in Srinagar.<ref name=":0" /> The Skardu garrison after receiving previous support, another relief column, codenamed "Biscuit column", was dispatched, this time led by Brigadier Faqir Singh of the State forces.<ref name=":1">{{Harvb|Prasad|1987|p=288}} :</ref>


Major Ehsan Ali the commander of Gilgit scouts, had initially planned to ambush the earlier relief column that arrived on 13 February but was unable to do so. When he learned of the new column, he prepared another ambush targeting Brigadier Faqir Singh's forces.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=383-384}} :</ref> According to Mahajan, fighting intensified in the Skardu sector, including a failed attempt by the Skardu garrison to capture Point 8853, which was under the control of the scouts.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=385-386}} :</ref>[[File:Battle of Thorgo map 1.jpg|Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming relief force.|left|alt=Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming Relief force.|thumb]]On 15 February, the Skardu garrison spotted a small force of Gilgit Scouts moving towards the direction from which the relief column was expected to arrive. The next day, a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction.<ref name=":1" />
Major Ehsan Ali the commander of Gilgit scouts, had initially planned to ambush the earlier relief column that arrived on 13 February but was unable to do so. When he learned of the new column, he prepared another ambush targeting Brigadier Faqir Singh's forces.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=383-384}} :</ref> According to Mahajan, fighting intensified in the Skardu sector, including a failed attempt by the Skardu garrison to capture Point 8853, which was under the control of the scouts.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=385-386}} :</ref>[[File:Battle of Thorgo map 1.jpg|Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming relief force.|left|alt=Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming Relief force.|thumb]]On 15 February, the Skardu garrison spotted a small force of Gilgit Scouts moving towards the direction from which the relief column was expected to arrive. The next day, a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction.<ref name=":1" />
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Colonel Thapa, having been informed by Srinagar Headquarters that reinforcements would reach him on 18 February, realized that the Scouts were preparing to ambush the relief column.<ref name=":1" /> However, due to a malfunctioning W/T communication set with the relief forces and no means to repair it, Thapa was unable to warn them about the Scouts' movements. Despite notifying Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the Scouts, no strikes were conducted.<ref name="ReferenceA" />
Colonel Thapa, having been informed by Srinagar Headquarters that reinforcements would reach him on 18 February, realized that the Scouts were preparing to ambush the relief column.<ref name=":1" /> However, due to a malfunctioning W/T communication set with the relief forces and no means to repair it, Thapa was unable to warn them about the Scouts' movements. Despite notifying Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the Scouts, no strikes were conducted.<ref name="ReferenceA" />


Meanwhile, the arrival of the relief column greatly concerned Major Ehsan. Orders were given to Brigadier Faqir Singh to secure Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=386}}</ref> As Brigadier Faqir's column approached Parkutta and Gol, he believed that the severe cold would incapacitate the Scouts.<ref name=":1" />However, the Gilgit Scouts split their forces, leaving a smaller contingent at Skardu to continue shelling the garrison, while the majority of troops under Major Ehsan Ali prepared to ambush the relief column.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=386-387}} :</ref>
Meanwhile, the arrival of the relief column greatly concerned Major Ehsan. Orders were given to Brigadier Faqir Singh to secure Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=386}}</ref> As Brigadier Faqir's column approached Parkutta and Gol, he believed that the severe cold would incapacitate the Scouts.<ref name=":1" /> However, the Gilgit Scouts split their forces, leaving a smaller contingent at Skardu to continue shelling the garrison, while the majority of troops under Major Ehsan Ali prepared to ambush the relief column.<ref>{{Harvb|Dani|1989|pp=386-387}} :</ref>


== Battle ==
== Battle ==

Revision as of 06:01, 9 October 2024

Battle of Thorgo
Part of Kashmir Conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948
Date16–18 March 1948[1]
Location
Thorgo near Skardu, Pakistan
35°18′04″N 75°44′40″E / 35.3010°N 75.74434°E / 35.3010; 75.74434
Result

Ambush successful[2]

  • Relief column defeated[3]
  • Remaining forces retreat[2]
Belligerents
Pakistan Dominion of Pakistan

India Dominion of India

Commanders and leaders
Maj.Ehsan Ali
Lieu.Babar
Capt.Nek Alam		 Faqir Singh (WIA)[4]
India Col.Cootes
Units involved

Gilgit Scouts

  • Ibex Force
  • Local Volunteers

6 J&K Infantry

  • Biscuit Column
Strength
~3 Platoons,[5] Approximately
(100-300)		 ~1 company
(350 men)[5]
Accompanied by:
~600 Jawans,400 Porters,200 horses[5]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Pakistani Sources:
150 killed, 75000 rounds of 303 ammo, (2-3) Mortar, rifles, Sten-guns, MMG's[6]
Indian Sources:
26 killed, 7 missing presumed killed, 18 wounded, 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 VB Machine guns, 64000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 84 Hand grenades, 51 HE bombs of 2-mch mortar, 204 HE bombs of 3-mch mortar.[7]

Battle of Thorgo[8] also known as Thorgo Incident[note 1] or Nurbachung ambush,[9] Thorgo also spelled as Thurgo[10] or Thergo,[11] took place during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 in the Gilgit-Baltistan sector, between 16 and 18 March 1948, Involving Gilgit scouts and the Jammu and Kashmir forces, the Gilgit Scouts hid at the Thorgo Pari[note 2] between Gol and Skardu,[5] after being informed of the relief column which was dispatched by the Indian Headquarters at Srinagar for the reinforcement of the besieged Skardu garrison,[12] upon the arrival of the relief column the hidden scouts would ambush the relief column and throw large rocks at them causing panic and heavy casualties among them including Brigadier Faqir Singh being injured.[13]

The remnants of the defeated relief column would retreat back to Kargil under Major Cootes and the wounded Faqir Singh would head to Srinagar Headquarters.[14] A column would be made of two feeble platoons sent by the Colonel Sher Jung Thapa to receive the relief column on 18th February. After receiving information from Srinagar Headquarters regarding their arrival, but after being told by villagers the fate of the defeated relief column, the Skardu column would head back to Skardu garrison which would also be ambushed by the scouts, but would reach safety without any casualties.[15] Following the defeat of the relief column close to Gol, the scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison.[16] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force.[17]

Prelude

During the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 , specifically at the Siege of Skardu, Colonel Sher Jung Thapa belonging to state forces, he and his garrison successfully held off the Gilgit Scouts,[18] which were a paramilitary force within the Gilgit-Baltistan region in northern Pakistan. Colonel Thapa repeatedly requested reinforcements from the headquarters in Srinagar.[18] The Skardu garrison after receiving previous support, another relief column, codenamed "Biscuit column", was dispatched, this time led by Brigadier Faqir Singh of the State forces.[19]

Major Ehsan Ali the commander of Gilgit scouts, had initially planned to ambush the earlier relief column that arrived on 13 February but was unable to do so. When he learned of the new column, he prepared another ambush targeting Brigadier Faqir Singh's forces.[20] According to Mahajan, fighting intensified in the Skardu sector, including a failed attempt by the Skardu garrison to capture Point 8853, which was under the control of the scouts.[21]

Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming Relief force.
Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming relief force.

On 15 February, the Skardu garrison spotted a small force of Gilgit Scouts moving towards the direction from which the relief column was expected to arrive. The next day, a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction.[19]

Colonel Thapa, having been informed by Srinagar Headquarters that reinforcements would reach him on 18 February, realized that the Scouts were preparing to ambush the relief column.[19] However, due to a malfunctioning W/T communication set with the relief forces and no means to repair it, Thapa was unable to warn them about the Scouts' movements. Despite notifying Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the Scouts, no strikes were conducted.[14]

Meanwhile, the arrival of the relief column greatly concerned Major Ehsan. Orders were given to Brigadier Faqir Singh to secure Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open.[22] As Brigadier Faqir's column approached Parkutta and Gol, he believed that the severe cold would incapacitate the Scouts.[19] However, the Gilgit Scouts split their forces, leaving a smaller contingent at Skardu to continue shelling the garrison, while the majority of troops under Major Ehsan Ali prepared to ambush the relief column.[23]

Battle

Ambush and casualties

Gilgit scouts waiting for Relief column to enter the firing range to be ambushed by them.

The Gilgit scouts choose the site of ambush at Thorgo Pari near Gol where the road pass from a lofty point from the left of the Indus river and where the valley became constricted. Only one horse could proceed at a time.[24] On the northernmost area of the Thorgo hill Captain Nek Alam and his platoon took position. Subedar Muhammad Ali[note 3] and Lieutenant Babar dispersed their two platoons, to the opposite of the Nurhbuchung village next to the river. Captain Mohammed Khan positioned one mortar and one machine gun section at the other end of the Pari, while one machine gun section was deployed at the edge. Then, the Gilgit scouts were all set.[25]

Brig. Faqir and Major Cootes would set out in the dark slim pass on their horses along with their forces and supplies on 17 February,[24] after they had finished their meals, to the surprise of the scouts the column stopped near the site of ambush for their lunch, after their meals the column got up for further advance.[26] The scouts who were hidden, as soon as they advanced in the area of the shooting range, the scouts ambushed and started to shoot at the relief column. Large rocks were hurled down at them.[24] The troops tried to regroup and hold on, but soon 3-inch and 2-inch mortar bombs were launched which resulted in casualties and Brig. Faqir himself also got his Face and shoulder wounded.[24][27] The relief column prevented any further attacks by scouts by returning fire and holding shorter positions. The column would not be able to escape until dusk and leaving their dead troops.[27] The scouts would not end the bombardment on the column, with mortars and continuous firing with the view to prevent any troop to regroup towards Brig. Faqir Singh.[26] After facing defeat the remaining forces would retreat towards Kargil with a night stay at Totli on 18 March.[27] The column would reach Kargil back at 21 March. Brig. Faqir himself would handover his command to the Indian military advisor Col. Cootes, and return to Srinagar for medical treatment.[27]

Map showing Gilgit scouts ambushing and rolling boulders at the Relief forces at Thorgo Peak.

Considerable confusion was caused by the ambush of the relief column, which resulted in numerous deaths. Some dived into water to escape the ambush and left their supplies which included 3 mortars, L.M.G, Rifles, a Bren gun, a Sten gun, grenades, 303 rounds and 20 wireless sets according to Ahmad Hasan, Dani.[17] As per Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf the Scouts would capture 75000 rounds of 303 including 2 or 3 mortars, M.M.Gs, rifles and Sten guns and many civil supplies. One hundred fifty were identified as dead on the spot out of 350. Only 75 were believed to have survived.[6] According to S.N Prasad, the relief column suffered 18 injuries, 7 missing persons presumed dead, and 26 deaths. The scouts found 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 Vickers Berthier machine guns, 64,000 rounds of rifle ammo, 84 hand grenades, 51 HE bombs for the 2-mch mortar, and 204 HE bombs for the 3-mch mortar.[28] According to a Government of India publication, the Indian casualties in this attempt were 26 killed, seven missing, presumed dead, and 18 wounded, with ammunition and baggage looted.[29]

Col. Thapa made up a little column of two feeble platoons from his garrison on March 18, and marched out to receive Brig. Faqir according to Srinagar Headquarters. Col. Thapa and his troops would also encounter an ambush laid by the raiders but would escape and ended the encounter without any casualties. After they had advanced a little further, the locals informed them of the defeat of the relief column.[14]

The fact that column had had to turn back after reaching so close to Skardu was most tragic. The tragedy was all the more heightened after it became known that the Skardu Garrison had sent out two platoons under Lieutenant Ajit Singh (accompanied by Major Thapa himself) towards Gol to receive the relief column half way, but unfortunately this was done on 18 March which happened to be a day too late.[30]

— K. Brahma Singh, History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956, Pg: 253

Aftermath

Map illustrating the successful ambush by the Gilgit Scouts on the relief forces, resulting in heavy casualties and the capture of supplies intended for the Skardu garrison.

Following the defeat of the relief Column and the success of Gilgit scouts close to Gol, the fleeing troops of the relief column would be hunted by Jamadar Ismail Khan[note 4], the scouts also intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison.[31] The retreating troops were both chased by the scouts and were further worn out by the Muslims in their retreat to Kargil, which caused further casualties.[26] Gilgit scouts anticipated that reinforcements would be dispatched from Srinagar to reinforce Skardu if it wasn't taken swiftly.[3]

Both the Brigadier and the Major failed to follow the elementary principles of fire and movement tactics, and this failure proved very costly to the men of the column. The Brigadier who was also wounded handed over command to Major Coutts and returned to Srinagar. Thus ended the second attempt to reinforce Skardu.[32]

— M. N. Gulati, Military Plight of Pakistan: Indo-Pak War, 1947-48, Volume 1, Pg: 68

A machine-gun which wrought havoc on the Enemy was brilliantly manned by Havildar Muhammad Nazir. The success of the ambush and its extent may well be judged from what the Indians have themselves admitted in their account of the fighting in Kashmir, contained in the book "DEFENDING KASHMIR"[33]

— Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Pg: 280

After this engagement Major Ehsan recruited young locals and had enough supplies to arm them taken from the relief force, with the increase in strength the attacks on the Skardu garrison in the cantonment was increased and the shelling of the cantonment also increased.[17] At dark an attack was further launched by the scouts on Skardu garrison on March 26 resulting in heavy cross fire, the attack proved to be inconclusive.[26] Major Ehsan was now informed of further reinforcements dispatched for the Skardu garrison under the codename Z Brigade which was consolidating at Kargil which would be commanded by Lieutenant Col. Kripal Singh, Major Ehsan would split his force and send to Parkutta for countering this force.[17]

A and B Companies of 7th Jammu and Kashmir rifles, led by Captains Davinder Sing and Durga Singh, respectively, were also ordered to Skardu in an attempt to strengthen the garrison.[34] They were at Kargil, teamed up with Major Coutts and the other members of the previous column, pushing forward to Parkutta in order to await reinforcements from 5th Jammu and Kashmir rifles.[34] Lieut. Babar Khan would be left in charge of the Skardu siege and Major Ehsan would leave on April 29 for Parkutta.[17] After Major Ehsan left, Lieut. Babar Khan would leave for Ladakh and the Siege of Skardu would continue its siege with Col. Mataul of Chitral, The RIAF would also come in support of the besieged forces at Skardu by now.[35]

See also

Sources

Notes

  1. ^ The Inscription written at the monument built in Thorgo refers to it as the Thorgo incident, however the inscription written in Urdu refers it as (معرکہ تھورگو) which means Battle of Thorgo.
  2. ^ The word Pari means Peak in Urdu spelled using Indian English.
  3. ^ Subedar is a military rank which is classed as a junior commissioned officer rank in India and Pakistan.
  4. ^ Jemadar is a title used for various military and other officials in the Indian subcontinent mostly for lower ranks.

Citations

  1. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 288–289 :Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  2. ^ a b Dani (1989), p. 387
  3. ^ a b Prasad (1987), p. 289
  4. ^ Palit (1972), p. 233
  5. ^ a b c d Dani (1989), p. 386
  6. ^ a b Saraf (2015), p. 280
  7. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  8. ^ Jaffri (2019), p. 30
  9. ^ Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 155
  10. ^ Dani (1989), p. 369
  11. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  12. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 287–288
  13. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  14. ^ a b c Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  15. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  16. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  17. ^ a b c d e Dani (1989), pp. 387
  18. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 231 :
  19. ^ a b c d Prasad (1987), p. 288 :
  20. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 383–384 :
  21. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 385–386 :
  22. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386
  23. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 :
  24. ^ a b c d Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  25. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  26. ^ a b c d Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 156
  27. ^ a b c d Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  28. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  29. ^ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1949), p. 67
  30. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  31. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387–388
  32. ^ Gulati (2000), p. 68
  33. ^ Saraf (2015), p. 280
  34. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 234
  35. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387–388

Works Cited

  • Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 2021-03-29
  • Gulati, M. N. (2000). Military Plight of Pakistan: Indo-Pak War, 1947-48, Volume 1. Vol. 1. Manas Publications. ISBN 9788170491231. Archived from the original on 2017-01-18.
  • Jaffri, Imran Haider (Summer 2019). "Captain Hussain Khan, Fakhr-i-Kashmir, OBI, shaheed: A Forgotten Hero of Kashmir Liberation War-1947/48". Bugle and Trumpet. 1 (2). Army Institute of Military History, Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2024-02-25 – via Aimh.
  • Palit, D. K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles. Palit & Dutt. ASIN B0006C8HKM. Archived from the original on 2000-01-20.
  • Dani, Ahmad Hasan (1989). History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. ISBN 9789694150161. Archived from the original on 2022-12-15.
  • Prasad, S.N (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2017-01-15.
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India (1949). Defending Kashmir. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2014-10-26.
  • Suharwardy, Abdul Haq (1983), Tragedy in Kashmir, Wajidalis
  • Singh, K.Brahma (1990). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956 The State Force Background (Hardcover). Lancer International. ISBN 9788170620914.
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